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Volume E-4
Iran 1970
  

Iran 1970

--  44. Memorandum From the President's Assistant for International Economic Affairs (Flanigan) to the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger), Washington, January 10, 1970 [Get Acrobat Reader PDF version   ] 

Flanigan reported to Kissinger on possible means of meeting Iran's oil revenue requirements.

Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 601, Country Files, Middle East, Iran, Vol. II, 6/1/70-12/70. Secret.


--  45. Memorandum From the Assistant Secretary of State for Near East and South Asian Affairs (Sisco) to the Acting Secretary of State (Richardson), February 12, 1970 [Get Acrobat Reader PDF version   ] 

Sisco sent Richardson the draft of a letter for Acting Secretary of Defense David Packard requesting an early decision on the continuation of the USAF technical assistance team for Iran.

Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970-73, DEF 19-9 US-IRAN. Secret. Drafted by Miclos; and cleared by Rockwell and Matheron. Tab B was attached but is not published. In a handwritten note on the memo, Sisco added, "The problems at the ISA level in Pentagon are fantastic. We have to do something about it!" Richardson replied, "Please inform UAJ [U. Alexis Johnson] in case he wants to take up with Packard."


--  46. Telegram 602 From the Embassy in Iran to the Department of State, February 17, 1970, 1425Z [Get Acrobat Reader PDF version   ] 

Ambassador MacArthur relayed the Shah's urgent demand for a response to the matters he had raised with President Nixon in October, particularly oil.

Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970-73, DEF 12-5 IRAN. Secret; Exdis. On February 19, in Telegram 25377, Sisco responded sympathetically to MacArthur's plea for the government to be forthcoming towards the Shah's requests, but added that the Shah's appetite was difficult to satiate. (Ibid., POL IRAN-US) (declass.)


--  47. Memorandum of Conversation, Washington, February 19, 1970 [Get Acrobat Reader PDF version   ] 

Since Congress was delaying Foreign Military Sales (FMS) legislation, Iranian Plan Organization Managing Director Mehdi Samii asked Assistant Secretary Sisco to estimate the Iranian Government's prospects for U.S. foreign military sales credit in FY 1970.

Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970-73, DEF 19-8 US-IRAN. Secret; Exdis. Drafted by McClelland. The conversation took place at the Department of State.


--  48. Letter From President Nixon to the Shah of Iran, Washington, February 23, 1970 [Get Acrobat Reader PDF version   ] 

Nixon replied favorably to the Shah's request for more Air Force technicians, but said he could not yet commit himself to more pilot training or the Shah's oil proposal.

Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 755, Presidential Correspondence, 1969-1974, Iran. No classification marking. In his December 17 letter, the Shah had queried Nixon on the above items, pledging cooperation with Saudi Arabia in Gulf defense but warning that Iraq was becoming "an armed camp." (Ibid.)


--  49. Telegram 668 From the Embassy in Tehran to the Department of State, February 24, 1970, 140Z [Get Acrobat Reader PDF version   ] 

Ambassador MacArthur informed the Department that after three days of student demonstrations, the Iranian Government had cancelled the recent hike in bus fares.

Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970-73, POL 23-8 IRAN. Confidential. Repeated to Ankara, CINCSTRIKE, London, and Rawalpindi.


--  50. Memorandum From the President's Assistant for International Economic Affairs (Flanigan) and the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger) to President Nixon, Washington, February 25, 1970 [Get Acrobat Reader PDF version   ] 

Flanigan informed Nixon of the National Iranian Oil Company's (NIOC) interest in selling oil to Norwegian agents for shipment to Cuba on behalf of the USSR, since the oil consortium would be unable to increase Iranian oil liftings.

Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 601, Country Files, Middle East, Iran, Vol. 1, 1/20/69-5/31/70. Confidential. Sent for action. The President initialed his approval of the memorandum, and, with reference to the oil consortium, wrote: "Flanigan -- Tell them unless they help us on this I shall reverse the oil import decision. This is an order. No appeal."


--  51. Memorandum from the Country Director for Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, Yemen and Aden (Brewer) to the Country Director for Iran (Miklos), February 27, 1970 [Get Acrobat Reader PDF version   ] 

Brewer strongly dissented from the rationale with which Embassy Tehran had justified military credit sales to Iran.

Source: National Archives, RG 59, NEA/IRN, Office of Iran Affairs, Lot File, 76D470, Box 9, Chronological Correspondence from Ambassador, 1970. Secret. Tehran's A-69 is not published.


--  52. Letter from the Shah of Iran to President Nixon, Tehran, March 11, 1970 [Get Acrobat Reader PDF version   ] 

The Shah complained that his oil-for-arms plan had made no progress, and that the terms for procuring American military equipment were too severe.

Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 755, Presidential Correspondence, 1969-1974, Iran. In a March 4 memorandum, Kissinger suggested to Flanigan that it would do no harm to remind the consortium, as Alam recommended, of the U.S. Government's "persistent interest" in the oil negotiations. (Ibid., Box 601, Country Files, Middle East, Iran, Vol. 1, 1/20/69-5/31/70.)


--   53. Telegram 928 From the Embassy in Iran to the Department of State, March 12, 1970, 1335Z [Get Acrobat Reader PDF version   ] 

Ambassador MacArthur conveyed the Shah's belief that the Iraqi Government's concession of an autonomous province to its Kurds bore out his fears of Soviet influence on Baghdad.

Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 601, Country Files, Middle East, Iran, Vol. 1, 1/20/69-5/31/70. Secret; Priority; Exdis. In Telegram 291 from Dhahran, March 14, Consul Lee F. Dinsmore observed that "it was Iran which encouraged [Kurdish leader] Mulla Mustafa [Barzani] to sustain military pressure on Baghdad Government, by means of arms, training, food, and a porous border. Israel supported Iran in this effort... If Soviet Union is happy over direction Kurdish situation taking in Iraq, it may have our friends to thank. It is doubtful Kurds could have held out over last 10 years had they not had Iran's help." (Ibid.)


--  54. Memorandum From the President's Assistant for International Economic Affairs (Flanigan) to the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger) and the Deputy Under Secretary of State for Economic Affairs (Samuels), March 16, 1970 [Get Acrobat Reader PDF version   ] 

Flanigan sketched out his recommended solution for meeting Tehran's oil requirements.

Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970-73, PET 6 IRAN. Secret. The memorandum is a copy that is not initialed.


--  55. Telegram 1019 From the Embassy in Iran to the Department of State, March 19, 1970, 0900Z [Get Acrobat Reader PDF version   ] 

Ambassador MacArthur summarized his recent audience with the Shah in which the latter reiterated his arguments for more U.S. credit to purchase military equipment.

Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970-73, DEF 12-5 IRAN. Secret; Priority; Exdis.


--  56. Memorandum From the Executive Secretary of the Department of State (Eliot) to the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger), Washington, March 27, 1970 [Get Acrobat Reader PDF version   ] 

Eliot informed Kissinger that the NSC Interdepartmental Group for Near East and South Asia had agreed to supply Iran with $100 million in FMS credit for FY 70.

Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970-73, DEF 12-5 IRAN. Secret. Drafted by McClelland; cleared by Sisco; Davies, Miklos, William D. Brewer (NEA/ARP), Stanley D. Schiff (NEA/RA), Christian Chapman (PM), OASD/ISA, Treasury. Attached but not published were the minutes of the NSCIG/NEA meeting of March 17.


--  57. Telegram 1247 From the Ambassador in Iran to the Assistant of State for Near East and South Asian Affairs (Sisco), April 1, 1970, 1430Z [Get Acrobat Reader PDF version   ] 

To avoid a crisis with the Shah over U.S. difficulty in meeting his needs, Ambassador MacArthur proposed that the United States stretch out the current military credit agreement with Iran.

Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970-73, DEF 19-8 US-IRAN. Secret; Nodis.


--  58. Telegram 1312 From the Embassy in Iran to the Department of State, April 7, 1970, 1259Z [Get Acrobat Reader PDF version   ] 

Ambassador MacArthur reported that Iran had contracted to purchase some Soviet military equipment at very low interest rates, and again urged extension of the 1968 military agreement.

Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970-73, DEF 12-5 IRAN. Secret; Exdis. Kissinger's May 13 summary for the President of the Shah's conversation with General Earle Wheeler is Document 67.


--  59. Memorandum From the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger) to President Nixon, Washington, April 13, 1970 [Get Acrobat Reader PDF version   ] 

Kissinger advised Nixon on how to respond to the Shah's recent letter inquiring about the status of his oil and military credit sales requests.

Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 755, Presidential Correspondence, 1969-1974, Iran. Secret. Tabs A and B were attached but are not published. Nixon signed the letter, which was sent on April 16. (Ibid.)


--  60. Letter From the Deputy Secretary of Defense (Packard) to the Under Secretary of State (Richardson), Washington, April 14, 1970 [Get Acrobat Reader PDF version   ] 

Packard presented Richardson with the Defense Department's case against extending the 1968 credit agreement with Iran.

Source: Washington National Records Center, OSD Files, FRC 330-76-067, Iran 1970, Iran 400.737. Secret. Underneath his signature, Packard added, "Read this subject to our telephone conversation of April 14." In an April 15 memorandum to Kissinger, Saunders noted that Packard would reluctantly concur with the plan if the Review Group had no time to meet before Richardson's trip to Tehran. Saunders added, "It is difficult to conceive that we will reduce our present military relationship with Iran and that we will build our posture in the Persian Gulf around it." Saunders did not believe "the decision we are asking the President to make now will foreclose any realistic option." (National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 601, Country Files, Middle East, Iran, Vol. I, 1/20/69 - 5/31/70.)


--  61. Memorandum of Conversation, Washington, April 14, 1970 [Get Acrobat Reader PDF version   ] 

Chairman of the Joint Chiefs Wheeler and Under Secretary Richardson discussed Iranian capability to absorb the military equipment which the Shah insisted on acquiring.

Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970-73, DEF 19-8 US-IRAN. Secret; Nodis. Drafted by Miklos and approved in U by John D. Stempel. The conversation took place in the Department of State.


--  62. Memorandum From the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger) to President Nixon, Washington, April 16, 1970 [Get Acrobat Reader PDF version   ] 

After weighing the pros and cons, Kissinger recommended that Nixon approve the Ambassador's military stretch-out proposal.

Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 601, Country Files, Middle East, Iran, Vol. I, 1/20/69 - 5/31/70. Secret; Nodis. According to a note on an April 14 memorandum from Rogers to Nixon, the President approved the plan on April 17, and Richardson notified the Shah on April 20. (Ibid., RG 59, Central Files 1970-73, DEF 19-8 US-IRAN.)


--  63. Memorandum From Harold Saunders of the National Security Council Staff to the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger), Washington, April 16, 1970 [Get Acrobat Reader PDF version   ] 

Saunders sent Kissinger a memorandum from DCI Helms on intelligence facilities in Iran, which both Saunders and Helms felt justified an increase in credit assistance to Tehran even at the expense of other programs.

Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 601, Country Files, Middle East, Iran, Vol. I, 1/20/69 - 5/31/70. Top Secret; Sensitive. Kissinger wrote on the memo, "Hal - where do we stand on mil credit? HK."


--  64. Telegram 1626 From the Embassy in Iran to the Department of State, April 21, 1970, 1100Z [Get Acrobat Reader PDF version   ] 

The Shah presented to Under Secretary Richardson his list of concerns regarding Iran's military equipment program.

Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970-73, ORG 7 U. Secret; Exdis. In Telegram 1736, April 25, the Ambassador reported that the Shah appeared more relaxed following his meeting with Richardson, and that if financing could be arranged for Iran's military equipment program, the Shah might abandon his oil quota idea. (Ibid.)


--  65. Memorandum From Harold Saunders of the National Security Council Staff to the President's Assistant for International Economic Affairs (Flanigan), Washington, May 7, 1970 [Get Acrobat Reader PDF version   ] 

Saunders informed Flanigan of the outcome of the annual Iranian-consortium negotiations, crediting Flanigan with the consortium's greater flexibility.

Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 601, Country Files, Middle East, Iran, Vol. II, 6/1/70-12/70. Secret; Exdis. Kissinger wrote on a copy of a May 8 memorandum from Flanigan to the President informing him of the agreement, "Since when does Saunders write memos to Flanigan?" The "French company" was CFP, the French member of the consortium, which had agreed to supply oil to Iran at a "quarter way" price, i.e., between cost and posted price, for Tehran to sell on its own. In another memorandum of May 8, Samuels observed to Flanigan that "this arrangement is extremely sensitive to the oil companies and could be explosive if it became known in the other oil producing countries." (Ibid., RG 59, Central Files 1970-73, PET 6 IRAN)


--  66. Memorandum From the Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs (Nutter) to Secretary of Defense Laird, Washington, May 9, 1970 [Get Acrobat Reader PDF version   ] 

Nutter provided Laird a detailed analysis of the Iranian FMS credit program and its probable cost to the U.S. Government.

Source: Washington National Records Center, OSD Files, FRC-330-76-067, Box 73, Iran 1970, Iran 400.137. Secret. A note on the memorandum indicated that Laird saw it.


--  67. Memorandum From the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger) to President Nixon, Washington, May 13, 1970 [Get Acrobat Reader PDF version   ] 

Kissinger furnished a summary of General Earle Wheeler's conversation with the Shah during the April CENTO meeting, adding that the Shah seemed to be testing the limits of Washington's capacity to help him.

Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 601, Country Files, Middle East, Iran, Vol. I, 1/1/69-5/31/70. Secret; Nodis. A stamp on the memorandum indicated that the President saw it on May 19. The attached memorandum from Wheeler to Nixon is not published.


--  68. Telegram 2225 From the Embassy in Iran to the Department of State, May 25, 1970, 0800Z [Get Acrobat Reader PDF version   ] 

Ambassador MacArthur advised against the British plan for arbitrating the territorial dispute between Iran and the sheikdoms of Sharja and Umm-al-Qaiwain, since Tehran would consider it a test of the US-Iranian relationship.

Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970-73, POL 33 Persian Gulf. Confidential; Priority. Repeated Priority to Beirut, and to Jidda, Kuwait, London, and Rome. In Telegram 2059 from Jidda, May 26, Hermann F. Eilts observed that the Arab and Iranian sides both had to be considered in the dispute, which involved the sovereignty claims of the sheikdoms of Sharja and Ras Al-Khaimah to the islands of Tunbs and Abu Musa at the mouth of the Persian Gulf. Noting that Abu Musa was inhabited by Arabs, he added that "with deep respect, however, I find it just a bit difficult to accept suggestion that Iran's vital security and 'even survival' may depend on possessing these islands. While appreciating Iran's potential for stabilizing Gulf, we and Iran should also bear in mind that this is best achieved through sincere cooperation with Arab littoral states." (Ibid.)


--  69. Telegram 2333 From the Embassy in Iran to the Department of State, June 1, 1970, 1400Z [Get Acrobat Reader PDF version   ] 

Ambassador MacArthur warned Under Secretary Richardson and Assistant Secretary Sisco that the Shah was alarmed at growing Soviet pressure upon Iran and suspicious that the United Kingdom was plotting with Iraq against Iranian interests.

Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970-73, POL IRAN-USSR. Secret; Priority; Exdis; Noforn.


--  70. Memorandum From Harold Saunders and Richard Kennedy of the National Security Council Staff to the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger), Washington, June 3, 1970 [Get Acrobat Reader PDF version   ] 

Saunders and Kennedy furnished Kissinger with a briefing on the subjects which would be covered at the Review Group's upcoming Persian Gulf meeting.

Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, NSC Institutional Files (H-files), Box H-046, Senior Review Group Meetings, Persian Gulf, 6/5/70. Secret. National Security Decision Memorandum 92, which emerged from the June 5 meeting, is Document 97. The minutes of the meeting are scheduled for publication in Foreign Relations of the United States, 1969-76, Volume XXIV: Arabian Peninsula; Middle East Region, 1969-72; Jordan, 1970. The attachment entitled "Programs" is not published.


--  71. Telegram 87985 From the Department of State to the Embassy in Iran, June 6, 1970, 1937Z [Get Acrobat Reader PDF version   ] 

The Department endorsed the Ambassador MacArthur's reassurances regarding British intentions, and considered Soviet moves as anti-U.S. rather than anti-Iranian.

Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970-73, POL IRAN-USSR. Secret; Exdis; Noforn. Drafted by Miklos; cleared by Emory C. Swank (EUR), Irving Cheslaw (EUR/BMI), Davies; Richard W. Murphy (NEA/ARP), Bryan H. Baas (NEA/ARN), and Brown (S/S); and approved by Sisco. In Telegram 2506 from Tehran, June 13, MacArthur advised that the British be urged to reach an agreement with Iran over the Gulf islands, so as to prevent an Arab-Iranian rupture. MacArthur recommended that the British put forward a reasonable arrangement that, while not impairing the Sheikhs' legal claims to the islands, would meet Iran's basic security requirements. If the British did so, MacArthur suggested that the United States use its influence informally to persuade Iran to blur the issue of sovereignty. (Ibid., POL 33 Persian Gulf) In Telegram 93548 to Tehran, June 15, Sisco agreed. (Ibid.)


--  72. Airgram 182 From the Embassy in Iran to the Department of State, June 9, 1970 [Get Acrobat Reader PDF version   ] 

Ambassador MacArthur notified the Department that the Iranian Government, still determined to produce opium, had doubled the acreage allotted to poppy cultivation.

Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970-73, SOC 11-5 IRAN. Limited Official Use. Drafted by John H. Rouse, Jr, Political Officer, Executive Section; cleared by Donald R. Touissaint, Political Officer, Political Section; and approved by Thacher, DCM. Enclosures 1 and 2 are not published. In Airgram 296, October 12, the Embassy reported that in September the government had banned private poppy cultivation, which it interpreted as showing Tehran's determination to control these crops. (Ibid.)


--  73. Letter From the Shah of Iran to President Nixon, Tehran, June 15, 1970 [Get Acrobat Reader PDF version   ] 

The Shah renewed his warning to Nixon about threats to Gulf security before asking again for an importation quota which would permit him to purchase military hardware.

Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970-73, POL IRAN-US. No classification marking.


--  74. Telegram 97664 From the Department of State to the Embassy in Iran, June 20, 1970, 0014Z [Get Acrobat Reader PDF version   ] 

Assistant Secretary Sisco sympathized with Ambassador MacArthur's anxiety over the consequences of the delay in FMS legislation, but argued against Iran's seeking alternative financing.

Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970-73, DEF 12-5 IRAN. Secret; Limdis. Drafted by Miklos;cleared by DOD/ISA and Davies; and approved by Sisco. MacArthur had expressed his concern in telegram 2623 from Tehran, June 18. (Ibid.)


--  75. Memorandum From the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger) to President Nixon, Washington, June 25, 1970 [Get Acrobat Reader PDF version   ] 

Kissinger summarized the conclusions of Assistant Secretary Sisco's report on the extent to which Iran could guarantee stability in the Persian Gulf.

Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 601, Country Files, Middle East, Iran, Vol. II, 6/1/70-12/70. Secret. Sent for information. A stamped note on the memorandum indicated that President Nixon read it. The report was in response to an attached, undated, handwritten instruction from Nixon, which read, "Give me a report (no priority) on the Shah's idea of Iran (& Cento) playing a greater role in the Persian Gulf--Is it just too naïve--"


--  76. Airgram 217 From the Embassy in Iran to the Department of State, July 7, 1970 [Get Acrobat Reader PDF version   ] 

The Embassy apprised the Department of the struggle for the role "Pishva," or leader, of Shi'ite Islam between exiled cleric Ayatollah Khomeini and two leaders backed by the Shah's government.

Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970-73, SOC 12 IRAN. Confidential. Drafted by Arnold L. Raphel and approved by Touissaint.


--  77. Telegram 115967 From the Department of State to the Embassy in Iran, July 20, 1970, 2106Z [Get Acrobat Reader PDF version   ] 

The Department advised the Embassy that the U.S. Government would examine whether military sales to Iran were in the U.S. national interest, whether they would affect area security, and whether they were a military imperative.

Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970-73, DEF 12-5 IRAN. Secret. Drafted by Miklos; cleared by DOD and Richard C. Matheron (PM/MA&S); and approved by Davies.


--  78. Telegram 3144 From the Embassy in Iran to the Department of State, July 22, 1970, 0730Z [Get Acrobat Reader PDF version   ] 

Ambassador MacArthur asserted that if the United States refused to sell the Shah military equipment, such action would irreparably damage the vital relationship with Iran.

Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970-73, DEF 12-5 IRAN. Secret; Priority; Limdis.


--  79. Memorandum From the Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs (Nutter) to the Director, Joint Staff (Vogt), Washington, July 29, 1970 [Get Acrobat Reader PDF version   ] 

Nutter requested that the JCS prepare a plan to reduce the size of the U.S. Military Advisory Group in Iran.

Source: Washington National Records Center, OASD Files, ISA Files, Box 19, FRC 330-73 A-1975, Iran 000.1--, 333, 1970, 320.2, Iran. Secret. Drafted by Colonel Aguilar. This document, a copy, has a stamp indicating that Nutter signed the original.


--  80. Letter From President Nixon to the Shah of Iran, Washington, July 30, 1970 [Get Acrobat Reader PDF version   ] 

Nixon responded to the Shah's letter of June 15, addressing the questions of FMS credit and Gulf security, and regretting that the United States could not offer Iran a special oil import quota.

Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970-73, POL IRAN-US. Drafted and cleared in NEA on July 15. In Telegram 105171 July 1, the Department reported to the Embassy that its attempt to encourage American oil companies to replace reductions in Libyan production with Iranian oil had been unavailing to date, but that the Department would continue to pursue these efforts. (Ibid., PET 6 IRAN)


--  81. Telegram 124269 From the Department of State to the Embassy in Iran, August 1, 1970, 1617Z [Get Acrobat Reader PDF version   ] 

Acting Secretary U. Alexis Johnson responded to the Embassy's concerns, maintaining that the United States was bound by the terms of the 1968 Accord to assess the impact of Iran's military purchases on economic and social development.

Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970-73, DEF 12-5 IRAN. Secret; Immediate; Limdis. Repeated to CINCSTRIKE/CINCMEAFSA. Drafted by Miklos; cleared by Christian G. Chapman (PM), DOD, Melvyn Levitsky (S/S), Christopher Van Hollen (NEA), and Sisco; and approved by Acting Secretary Johnson. In Telegram 3387 from Tehran, August 7, MacArthur relayed the unanimous recommendation of the country team that a "fundamental US policy review with respect to Iran be considered ASAP by highest level of USG in the broad context of the over-all RPT over-all role of Iran in terms of Nixon Doctrine and our national interests in this vitally important part of world where Iran is the solid and only dependable eastern anchor of our over-all Mid-east position." (Ibid.)


--  82. Memorandum From [name not declassified] of the Near East and South Asia Division of the Directorate for Plans, Central Intelligence, to the Deputy Director's Executive Assistant [name not declassified], August 10, 1970 [Get Acrobat Reader PDF version   ] 

In preparation for the visit of an Iranian general, the CIA forwarded information on the Iranian military requests supplied by ARMISH/MAAG, Tehran.

Source: Central Intelligence Agency, Executive Registry Files, Job 80B01086A, Box 1, Folder Executive Registry Subject Files, I-13, Iran. Secret. The memorandum and attachment are copies with indications that the originals were signed.


--  83. Memorandum From the Executive Secretary of the Department of State (Eliot) to the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger), Washington, August 27, 1970 [Get Acrobat Reader PDF version   ] 

Eliot sent Kissinger the Department's urgent recommendation that the Export-Import Bank be asked to provide Iran with credit to replace the delayed FMS appropriation.

Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970-73, DEF 12-5 IRAN. Secret. Drafted by Miklos; cleared by Schnee, Chapman, and Davies, and in Treasury, and Defense,. According to Telegram 3760 from Tehran, August 31, Iran was able to reach agreement with the Export-Import bank on financing for military aircraft. (Ibid.)


--  84. Memorandum From the Director of the Central Intelligence Agency (Helms) to the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger), September 2, 1970 [Get Acrobat Reader PDF version   ] 

Helms forwarded Kissinger a copy of an August 1970 CIA study entitled "Student Unrest Abroad," which featured a chapter on Iranian students.

Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 1325, NSC Unfiled Material, Unfiled Material, 1970. Secret. The full study is in ibid., Box 1323. A note on the attached routing slip reads, "There seems no reason for HAK to read or reply to this. It is much like the Time and Newsweek cover stories. No action required."


--  85. Memorandum From Harold Saunders of the National Security Council Staff to the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger), Washington, September 2, 1970 [Get Acrobat Reader PDF version   ] 

Saunders passed along to Kissinger a memorandum from Helms, in which Helms reinforced MacArthur's concern that bureaucratic wrangling in Washington would imperil the Shah's aircraft purchases and thus put U.S. intelligence facilities in Iran at risk.

Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 601, Country Files, Middle East, Iran, Vol. II, 6/17/70-12/70. Secret; Sensitive. Kissinger wrote on the memo, "Make sure this is followed."


--  86. Special National Intelligence Estimate 34-70, Washington, September 3, 1970 [Get Acrobat Reader PDF version   ] 

The report examined Iranian policy towards its neighbors and its implications for U.S. interests.

Source: Central Intelligence Agency, NIC Files, Job 79R01012A, Box 387, Folder 3, SNIE-34-70, Iran's International Position. Secret; Controlled Dissem.


--  87. Telegram 144737 From the Department of State to the Embassy in Iran, September 3, 1970, 2142Z [Get Acrobat Reader PDF version   ] 

The Department agreed with the Ambassador that any attempt by the Shah to rally nationalist feeling against the oil companies would only produce a backlash.

Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970-73, PET 6 IRAN. Secret; Exdis. Drafted by Miklos, cleared by Davies, Clark, Murphy, and Robert C. Brewster, and in S/S; approved by Samuels.


--  88. Memorandum From the Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Near Eastern, African, and South Asian Affairs (Noyes) to the Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs (Nutter), Washington, October 2, 1970 [Get Acrobat Reader PDF version   ] Noyes recommended that the Department of Defense not concur with the Export-Import Bank's decision to loan Iran $120 million in FY 71 instead of the $100 million to which it had agreed originally.
--  89. Extract from the President's Daily Security Brief, October 6, 1970 [Get Acrobat Reader PDF version   ] 

The report discussed the Shah's feud with the oil companies, and his assertion that he might be forced to seek a "legislative solution" based on the UN principle that mineral resources belonged to countries rather than exploiting foreign companies.

Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, President's Office Files, Presidential Handwriting, Box 7, Folder Presidential Handwriting, October 1970. Top Secret; Sensitive. Contains Codeword. The president wrote on the memorandum, "Peter --tell these oil barons --American security is vitally involved—keep Henry advised of your progress." Tab A was not found. The full report of the Shah's remarks is in Telegram 4335 from Tehran, October 3 (Ibid., RG 59, Central Files 1970-73, PET 6 IRAN).


--  90. Memorandum From the Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs (Nutter) to Secretary of Defense Laird, Washington, October 12, 1970 [Get Acrobat Reader PDF version   ] 

Nutter recommended that Laird attempt to dissuade the Shah from buying a last increment of F-4s but approve an Export-Import bank proposal to offer Iran $120 million in credit.

Source: Washington National Records Center, OASD Files, ISA Files, FRC 330-73A, 1975, Iran, 334--1970, 400 Iran. Secret. Laird approved both recommendations on October 15. Tab A is published as Document 86. The other attachments are not published.


--  91. Memorandum From the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger) to President Nixon, Washington, October 22, 1970 [Get Acrobat Reader PDF version   ] 

Kissinger described to Nixon the options presented by the NSC Review Group for the security of the Persian Gulf following the British departure.

Source: Library of Congress, Manuscript Division, Kissinger Papers, Box CL-315, NSC Files, National Security Memoranda, NSDMS 11/70-9/71. Secret. Sent for action. Tab A, the draft decision memorandum, is not published, but the final version is published as Document 97.


--  92. Telegram 174651 From the Department of State to the Embassy in Iran, October 23, 1970, 0047Z [Get Acrobat Reader PDF version   ] 

The Department sent the Embassy a list of items approved in principle under the FY 71 military credit for Iran, which excluded the seventh and eighth squadrons of F-4s the Shah had requested.

Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970-73, DEF 12-5 IRAN. Secret. Joint State/Defense Message. Drafted by Robert L. Dowell, Jr.(NEA/IRN); cleared by Chapman, John M. Bowie(PM/MC),; Johnson, Eliot, Philip J. Farley, and in Ex-Im Bank, DOD/ISA, and ACDA for information; approved by Davies. In telegram 4665 from Tehran, October 24, the Embassy responded that the status of the seventh and eighth squadrons had to be clarified, since the Shah had assumed from his October 1969 talks with the President that Iran already had U.S. approval. A U.S. Government refusal to endorse the sale at this stage, the Embassy observed, would run the "serious risk of being interpreted by Shah as unilateral modification of high-level policy decision" with serious consequences. (Ibid.)


--  93. Letter From Secretary of Defense Laird to Secretary of State Rogers, Washington, October 27, 1970 [Get Acrobat Reader PDF version   ] 

Anxious that unwarranted Iranian armament not destabilize the Gulf, Laird informed Rogers that he was prepared to sell only two squadrons of F-4Es to the Shah.

Source: Washington National Records Center, OASD Files, ISA Files, FRC 330-73A- 1975, Iran, 334-1970, 470 Iran. Secret. In Telegram 4760 from Tehran, October 31, the Embassy advised that the Shah had urgently demanded clarification of the news from F-4 manufacturer McDonnell Douglas that the U.S. Government had not approved the seventh and eighth squadrons. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970-73, DEF 12-5 IRAN.) In Telegram 4772 from Tehran, November 2, the country team recommended that the U.S. Government assert better control over Iran's contract negotiations with private companies, and avoid manufacturer pressure to sign contracts in advance of funding, by channeling them into FMS procedures. (Ibid.)


--  94. Memorandum From Harold Saunders of the National Security Council Staff to the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger), Washington, November 4, 1970 [Get Acrobat Reader PDF version   ] 

Saunders presented Kissinger with the conflicting opinions of the State and Defense Departments on the Shah's demand for a seventh and eighth squadron of F-4 aircraft to Iran.

Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 601, Country Files, Middle East, Iran, Vol. II, 6/1/70-12/70. Secret. Sent for information. This document was a copy that was not initialed.


--  95. Memorandum From Harold Saunders of the National Security Council Staff to the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger), Washington, November 6, 1970 [Get Acrobat Reader PDF version   ] 

Saunders summarized the contents of a proposed State-Defense telegram which suggested that the Iranians could wait until the joint US-Iranian study of their forces was completed to determine their purchases.

Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 601, Country Files, Middle East, Iran, Vol. II, 6/1/70-12/70. Secret. Sent for action. Kissinger initialed his approval. The attached telegram is published.


--  96. Telegram 183657 From the Department of State to the Embassy in Iran, November 6, 1970, 0221Z [Get Acrobat Reader PDF version   ] 

The Department recommended that Tehran base its decision on how many F-4s to buy on factors such as Iranian resources to absorb the aircraft, as well as maintaining a regional arms balance.

Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970-73, DEF 12-5 IRAN. Secret; Priority. Joint State/Defense message. Drafted by Miklos; cleared by Chapman, in DOD, and JCS; and approved by Davies.


--  97. National Security Decision Memorandum 92, Washington, November 7, 1970 [Get Acrobat Reader PDF version   ] 

Kissinger forwarded the President's approved strategy for "Future U.S. Policy in the Persian Gulf" to appropriate Cabinet and Agency officers.

Source: Library of Congress, Manuscript Division, Kissinger Papers, Box CL-315, NSC Files, National Security Memoranda, NSDMS 11/70-9/71. Secret.


--  98. Telegram 187449 From the Department of State to the Embassies in Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, United Kingdom, and Iran, November 16, 1970, 2141Z [Get Acrobat Reader PDF version   ] 

The Department announced the President's decision in principle not to reduce the U.S. naval presence in the Persian Gulf, unless it proved unwelcome to U.S. allies in the region, particularly Iran.

Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970-73, POL 33 PERSIAN GULF. Secret; Exdis. Repeated to Dharan, COMIDEASTFOR, CINCSTRIKE/CINCMEAFSA, CINCUSNAVEUR, Vienna. Drafted by Joseph W. Twinam (NEA/ARP); cleared by Davies, Atherton, Murphy, Philip H. Stoddard (PM), Stanley D. Schiff (NEA/RA), Miklos, Robert T. Curran (S/S), Robert T. Burns (EUR/BMI), DOD/ISA, and in Navy, Joint Staff/J5, DOD/Gen. Counsel, DOD/I & L, DOD/ISA; and approved by Sisco.


--  99. Letter From Secretary of State Rogers to Secretary of Defense Laird, Washington, November 19, 1970 [Get Acrobat Reader PDF version   ] 

Replying to Laird's October 27 letter, Rogers emphasized that the joint study of Iranian forces would be the best means of moderating the Shah's ambitions for further costly aircraft.

Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970-73, DEF 12-5 IRAN. Secret. Drafted by Miklos; and cleared by Chapman, Davies, and Sisco.


--  100. Memorandum From Harold Saunders of the National Security Council Staff to the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger), Washington, November 20, 1970 [Get Acrobat Reader PDF version   ] 

Saunders informed Kissinger that Ambassador MacArthur had requested permission to offer the U.S. Government's agreement in principle to the sale of the seventh and eighth squadrons of F-4s.

Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 601, Country Files, Middle East, Iran, Vol. II, 6/1/70-12/70. Secret; Exdis. Sent for information. Tehran 5021 is not published. Kissinger wrote on the memorandum, "There is nothing to resolve. Pres. wants to go ahead. Al--take up with [Laird's aide, Assistant Brigadier General Robert E.] Pursley."


--  101. Memorandum From the President's Assistant for International Economic Affairs (Flanigan) to President Nixon, Washington, December 1, 1970 [Get Acrobat Reader PDF version   ] 

Flanigan assessed the significance of the Iranian-consortium agreement.

Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 601, Country Files, Middle East, Iran, Vol. II 6/1/70-12/70. No classification marking. Sent for information.


--  102. Telegram 5142 From the Embassy in Iran to the Department of State, December 1, 1970, 0955Z [Get Acrobat Reader PDF version   ] 

Ambassador MacArthur notified the Department that the previous evening, he and his wife had been the victims of an abduction or assassination attempt that would not be publicized.

Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970-73, POL 17 US-IRAN. Secret; Nodis. In Telegram 196031 to Tehran, December 2, the Department agreed that the official story should be that the Ambassador's car had been struck by a hit-and-run driver. (Ibid.)


--  103. Memorandum From the Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs (Nutter) to Secretary of Defense Laird, Washington, December 7, 1970 [Get Acrobat Reader PDF version   ] 

Nutter advised Laird that since attempts to dissuade the Shah from buying two more squadrons of F-4s had failed, the Department of Defense should withdraw its objections to the sale.

Source: Washington National Records Center, OSD Files, FRC 330-76-067, Iran 1970, Iran 452. Secret. Approved by Laird on December 9. Tab A is not published.


--  104. Telegram 5332 From the Embassy in Iran to the Department of State, December 10, 1970, 1240Z [Get Acrobat Reader PDF version   ] 

The Shah asserted that communist elements hoping to discredit the Shah's regime were responsible for the attack on the Ambassador.

Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970-73, POL 17 US-IRAN. Secret; Nodis. In Telegram 5272 from Tehran, December 7, Hoveyda had speculated that the radical Iranian student groups abroad, and perhaps also the Palestinian Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine (PFLP), could have been involved in the attack. Since the attack had betrayed the weaknesses in the Iranian system, the Prime Minister also had requested U.S. assistance in putting Iranian security files into processed data form. (Ibid., POL IRAN-US)


--  105. Telegram 5334 From the Embassy in Iran to the Department of State, December 10, 1970, 1300Z [Get Acrobat Reader PDF version   ] 

Following a discussion of regional issues, the Ambassador informed the Shah that the United States intended to maintain a naval presence, MIDEASTFOR, in the Persian Gulf after the British withdrawal.

Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970-73, POL 33 PERSIAN GULF. Secret; Exdis.


--  106. Telegram 5335 From the Embassy in Iran to the Department of State, December 10, 1970, 1320Z [Get Acrobat Reader PDF version   ] 

Citing the many regional threats, the Shah vehemently defended his air force requirements.

Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970-73, POL 33 PERSIAN GULF. Secret; Exdis. In Telegram 5193 from Tehran, December 2, the Embassy conveyed the Shah's concern over information, allegedly from a Department source, that some State officials viewed selling the two extra squadrons of F-4s to the Iranians as "provocative." MacArthur denied the rumors, but in a private comment blamed the Shah's suspicions on the lack of a positive response on the squadrons. (Ibid., POL 15-1 IRAN). In Telegram 197768 to Tehran, December 4, the Department responded that the Shah's suspicions were disappointing after all the U.S. efforts to ensure Iranian security, adding that the Department was trying to come up with an inter-agency response on the F-4s. (Ibid.)


--  107. Telegram 202975 From the Department of State to the Embassy in Iran, December 14, 1970, 2238Z [Get Acrobat Reader PDF version   ] 

The Department authorized the Embassy to notify the Shah that the Departments of State and Defense had approved in principle the sale of a seventh and eighth squadron of F-4s to Tehran.

Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970-73, DEF 12-5 IRAN. Secret; Priority. Joint State/Defense Message. Repeated to CINCSTRIKE, SECDEF, CSAF, ExIm Bank. Drafted by Robert L. Dowel Jr. (NEA/IRN); cleared by Miklos, Schiff, and in DOD/ISA, JCS, DOD/ISA/MA&S, PM/MAS, ACDA, PM/MC; and approved by Davies.


--  108. Telegram 5566 From the Embassy in Iran to the Department of State, December 30, 1970, 0930Z [Get Acrobat Reader PDF version   ] 

The Ambassador reported that another crisis between Iran, OPEC, and the consortium was brewing, due to the Shah's insistence on raising oil prices.

Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970-73, PET 6 IRAN. Confidential. Repeated to Dhahran, Jidda, the Hague, Kuwait, London, Paris, and Caracas. In Telegram 206077 to London, Bonn, Brussels, the Hague, Paris, Rome, and Tokyo, December 18, the Department disseminated the resolutions from the recent OPEC conference in Caracas, which included increasing and standardizing prices, and authorizing Iran, Iraq, and Saudi Arabia to negotiate with the oil companies within 30 days (Ibid., PET 3 OPEC). (declass.)


  
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