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Volume E-5, Part 1
Nigerian Civil War
  

Nigerian Civil War

--  23. Telegram 5133 From the Department of State to the Embassy in Nigeria, January 11, 1969, 2050Z [Get Acrobat Reader PDF version   ] 

The Department provided its justification for the sale of eight C-97G aircraft to Joint Church Aid U.S.A., Inc. (JCA) and ICRC and included a statement that U.S. Government policy remained "one Nigeria" with relief supplied to both sides in the conflict.

Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1967-69, POL 27-9 Biafra-Nigeria. Secret; Immediate. Repeated to Addis Ababa, London, Paris, Geneva, USUN. Drafted by Deputy Assistant Secretary Moore (AF), D. Smith (AF/W), and Country Director for West Africa Melbourne (AF/W); cleared by Under Secretary of State Katzenbach (U), Walker (S/S), William Lang (DOD/ISA), and North (AID); and approved by Assistant Secretary of State Palmer (AF).


--  24. Telegram 333 From the Embassy in Nigeria to the Department of State, January, 14, 1969, 1530Z [Get Acrobat Reader PDF version   ] 

The Embassy reported on Ambassador Elbert Mathews' meeting with Major General Gowon, Chairman of the Supreme Military Council of Nigeria, regarding the C-97G aircraft, relief agencies, U.S. policy, and daylight flights.  Gowon preferred to have the ICRC, rather than church groups, operating in rebel territories.

Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1967-69, POL 27-9, Biafra-Nigeria. Confidential; Immediate. Repeated priority to Addis Ababa. Also repeated to Geneva, London, Paris, and USUN.


--  25. Memorandum From the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger) to President Nixon, Washington, January 28, 1969 [Get Acrobat Reader PDF version   ] 

Kissinger's memorandum, drafted by Roger Morris, sketched the background of the Biafra relief problem, the current situation, the interplay of relief and diplomacy, and where other nations stood, and recommended that the President sign a NSSM that would get the bureaucracy moving toward consideration of alternate Biafra relief programs. Tab C is Document 26.

Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 741, Country Files, Africa, Nigeria, Vol. I. Secret. Nixon checked and initialed "Authorize NSSM." An adjacent note states, "NSSM 11 issued 1/28/69, distributed 1/29/69."


--  26. National Security Study Memorandum 11, Washington, January 28, 1969 [Get Acrobat Reader PDF version   ] 

NSSM 11 directed the preparation of papers on 1) alternative approaches and programs for expanding relief and 2) alternate views of the U.S. interest in Nigeria and Biafra.

Source:  National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, NSC Institutional Files (H-Files), Box H-133, NSSM Files, NSSM 11.  Secret. A copy was sent to the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, General Earle G. Wheeler.


--  27. Intelligence Memorandum, Washington, January 29, 1969 [Get Acrobat Reader PDF version   ] 

The memorandum analyzed the Biafran relief problem, which was likely to worsen in the next few months. Nigerian authorities were expected to become increasingly suspicious of foreign involvement.

Source:  National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 741, Country Files, Africa, 3/54.  Secret; No Foreign Dissem. Prepared in the Office of Current Intelligence, Central Intelligence Agency.


--  28. Talking Paper, Washington, undated [Get Acrobat Reader PDF version   ] 

This paper, prepared in the Department of State, included background information and talking points regarding Nigeria and Biafra for the President's meetings with European leaders during his upcoming trip to Europe.

Source:  National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, President's Trip Files - Europe, Feb-March 1969.  Secret.


--  29. Telegram 16759 From the Department of State to the Embassy in Nigeria, Washington, February 3, 1969, 1511Z [Get Acrobat Reader PDF version   ] 

The Department reported on Secretary William Rogers' and Assistant Secretary Joseph Palmer's meeting with Nigerian Ambassador Iyalla, during which they assured him that the United States's main interest in Biafra was feeding people.  Palmer indicated that inspection procedures were not yet completed with Joint Church Aid U.S.A., Inc. (JCA) for the C-97 flights.  There also was discussion of ICRC flights and visas for relief experts.

Source:  National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1967-69, POL 27-9 Biafra-Nigeria.  Confidential; Priority. Repeated to Addis Ababa, Geneva, London, USUN, Lome, Yaounde.  Drafted by G.B. Sherry (AF/W), cleared in S/S and S; and approved by Palmer.


--  30. Study Prepared by the NSC Interdepartmental Group on Africa, Washington, February 4, 1969 [Get Acrobat Reader PDF version   ] 

Paper I considered relief needs in Nigeria and Biafra and alternative U.S. approaches and programs aimed at expediting and enlarging the flow of relief.

Source:  National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, NSC Institutional Files (H-Files), Box H-20, NSC Meeting, Biafra, Strategic Policy Issues 2/14/69.  Secret.


--  31. Study Prepared by the NSC Interdepartmental Group on Africa, Washington, February 4, 1969 [Get Acrobat Reader PDF version   ] 

Paper II considered alternative views of U.S. interests in Nigeria and Biafra, the range of policy choices open to the United States, and the political consequences of the relief courses described in Paper I.

Source:  National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, NSC Institutional Files (H-Files), Box H-20, NSC Meeting, Biafra, Strategic Policy Issues 2/14/69.  Secret.


--  32. Memorandum From Roger Morris of the National Security Council Staff to the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger), Washington, February 6, 1969 [Get Acrobat Reader PDF version   ] 

Morris indicated that the NSC papers on Biafran relief basically told the President that the United States could not expect to expand relief under the present low-involvement policy, and if relief were expanded it would mean becoming more involved in supporting Federal Nigeria. Attached at Tab A are Talking Points attached by Morris in anticipation of an NSC Review Group discussion of Nigeria that afternoon.

Source:  Library of Congress, Manuscript Division, Kissinger Papers, Box TS 68, NSC Committees & Panels Review Group, Feb-April 1969.


--  33. Policy Options Paper, Washington, February 7, 1969 [Get Acrobat Reader PDF version   ] 

Prepared for the February 14 NSC meeting, this paper distilled Paper I and Paper II on Biafra into categories of relief, policy, basic choices, and options with the conclusion that there was little maneuverability in attempting to expand relief without antagonizing Federal Nigeria.

Source:  National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, NSC Institutional Files (H-Files), Box H-20, NSC Meeting, Biafra, Strategic Policy Issues 2/14/69.  Secret.


--  34. Telegram 20875 From the Department of State to the Embassy in Nigeria, February 9, 1969, 1710Z 

The Department reported on the meetings of Godfrey Amachree, personal representative of Major General Gowon, Chairman of the Supreme Military Council of Nigeria, and Commissioner Arikpo, Nigerian Federal Commissioner for External Affairs, with Assistant Secretary Joseph Palmer and with several Congressmen and their staffs. Amachree's goal was to sound out U.S. policy at the beginning of a new administration.

Source:  National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1967-69, POL 27 Biafra-Nigeria.  Confidential. Repeated to London.  Drafted by Palmer and R. Wach (AF/W) and approved by Palmer.


--  35. Paper Prepared by the NSC Interdepartmental Group for Africa, Washington, February 10, 1969 [Get Acrobat Reader PDF version   ] 

This background paper discussed the Biafran War, the minority problem, genocide, relief, involvement of other powers, and the U.S. role.  A two-page appendix covers the Congressional aspects of Nigeria/Biafra relief.

Source:  National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, NSC Institutional Files (H-Files), Box H-20, NSC Meeting, Biafra, Strategic Policy Issues 2/14/69.  Secret.


--  36. Memorandum of Telephone Conversation, Washington, February 11, 1969, 5:25 p.m. [Get Acrobat Reader PDF version   ] 

Under Secretary of State Elliot Richardson and Assistant to the President Henry Kissinger discussed Biafra and the upcoming NSC meeting. Richardson said his position was somewhere between Options 1 and 2.  He supported naming a Relief Coordinator without political involvement.  Kissinger agreed.

Source:  Library of Congress, Manuscript Division, Kissinger Papers, Box 359, Telephone Conversations, Chronological File.  No classification marking.


--  37. Telegram 22400 From the Department of State to the Embassy in Nigeria, February 12, 1969, 0101Z [Get Acrobat Reader PDF version   ] 

The Department reported on Godfrey Amachree's (the personal representative of Major General Gowon, Chairman of the Supreme Military Council of Nigeria) meeting with Secretary of State William Rogers on February 11.  Rogers stated that with the change of administrations the previous policies would continue unless or until a decision was taken to change them.  The administration was reviewing relief policy, regarding which there was great public pressure.

Source:  National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1967-69, POL 7-Nigeria.  Secret. Repeated to London. Drafted by Palmer, cleared in S, and approved in S/S.


--  38. Memorandum From Roger Morris of the National Security Council Staff to the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger), Washington, February 12, 1969 [Get Acrobat Reader PDF version   ] 

Morris presented his personal views on Biafran relief options, recommending a limited approach. The United States should make a credible effort to get in more food without greater political involvement or risk to American lives, property, and long-range political interests.

Source:  National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 741, Country Files, Nigeria.  Secret.


--  39. Memorandum From Richard V. Allen of the National Security Council Staff to the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger), Washington, February 13, 1969 [Get Acrobat Reader PDF version   ] 

Allen commented that the three Biafra situation papers had given insufficient attention to the roles of Western Europe and the United Nations. Anticipating that when a policy decision was made, Nixon's two statements on the Nigerian Civil War made during his Presidential campaign might be recalled, he attached a composite Nixon's statements from July 17 and September 10, 1968.

Source:  National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 741, Country Files, Nigeria, Vol. I. Secret; Exdis.


--  40. Memorandum From Roger Morris of the National Security Council Staff to the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger), Washington, February 14, 1969 [Get Acrobat Reader PDF version   ] 

In anticipation of the NSC meeting later that day, Morris outlined the latest developments regarding relief flights, prospects for a neutral relief airstrip, the war, and French policy on Biafra. 

Source:  National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, NSC Institutional Files (H-Files), Box H-20, NSC Meeting, Biafra, Strategic Policy Issues 2/14/69.  Secret.


--  41. Issues Paper, Washington, February 14, 1969 [Get Acrobat Reader PDF version   ] 

This paper, prepared for President Nixon, outlined issues for decision at the NSC meeting on February 14. Attached was a letter to Nixon from Major-General Gowon, Chairman of the Supreme Military Council of Nigeria, to President Nixon, January 16, 1969.

Source:  National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, NSC Institutional Files (H-Files), Box H-20, NSC Meeting, Biafra, Strategic Policy Issues 2/14/69.  Secret.


--  42. Issues Paper Prepared for President Nixon, Washington, February 14, 1969 [Get Acrobat Reader PDF version   ] 

The paper outlined issues for decision at the NSC meeting on February 14 and recommended courses of action.

Source:  National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, NSC Institutional Files (H-Files), Box H-20, NSC Meeting, Biafra, Strategic Policy Issues 2/14/69.  Secret; also, Library of Congress, Manuscript Division, Kissinger Papers, Box CL 312, NSC Meetings Feb-Mar 1969.  Secret.


--  43. Memorandum of Telephone Conversation Between the Under Secretary of State for Public Affairs (Richardson) and the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger), Washington, February 20, 1969 [Get Acrobat Reader PDF version   ] 

Kissinger told Richardson that the President wanted the Relief Coordinator to come
from outside the Department of State.

Source:  Library of Congress, Manuscript Division, Kissinger Papers, Box 359, Telephone Conversations, Chronological File.  No classification marking.


--  44. Memorandum From the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger) to President Nixon, Washington, February 21, 1969 [Get Acrobat Reader PDF version   ] 

As recommended by Kissinger, the President authorized a press statement announcing the appointment of C. Clyde Ferguson, Jr., as the Biafran Relief Coordinator.

Source:  National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 741, Country Files, Africa, Nigeria, Vol. I.  No classification marking. The President initialed the "Approve" option. Tab A, a press release, and Tab B, Ferguson's biographic information were attached but not published.


--  45. Memorandum From the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger) to President Nixon, Washington, February 21, 1969 [Get Acrobat Reader PDF version   ] 

Kissinger recommended that Nixon sign an attached letter to Major General Gowon, Chairman of the Supreme Military Council of Nigeria, which stressed U.S. humanitarian interest in Nigeria and U.S. desire to avoid political involvement as much as possible. The letter also informed Gowon that a Relief Coordinator was being appointed to emphasize U.S. humanitarian concern. Tab B, a letter from Gowon to Nixon, is published as the attachment to Document 41. 

Source:  Library of Congress, Manuscript Division, Kissinger Papers, Box 1, HAK Memoranda to the President, February 1969.  Secret. Sent for action. The memorandum is an unsigned copy. Morris drafted both the memorandum and the attached letter to Gowon. The latter is a copy marked with an indication that the President signed the original.


--  46. Memorandum From the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger) to President Nixon, Washington, February 22, 1969 [Get Acrobat Reader PDF version   ] 

Nixon approved decisions made at the February 14 NSC meeting, including designation of a Relief Coordinator not closely associated with the U.S. Government, and continuing to regard an ultimate Nigerian victory as best suited to U.S. interests. 

Source:  National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, NSC Institutional Files (H-Files), Box H-20, NSC Meeting, Biafra, Strategic Policy Issues 2/14/69. Top Secret; Sensitive. Sent for action.


--  47. Letter from the Secretary-Treasurer of Joint Church Aid-U.S.A., Inc. (Kinney) to the Special Coordinator on Relief (Ferguson), New York, February 26, 1969 [Get Acrobat Reader PDF version   ] 

Kinney expressed hope that one of Ferguson's first acts would be to ask the Nigerian Government to cease attacking relief planes making night flights into Uli airstrip.

Source:  National Archives, RG 59, Records of the Special Coordinator on Relief to Civilian Victims of the Nigerian Civil War, February 1969 -June 1970, Lot 70 D 336, Box 517, D-13 Voluntary Agencies Joint Church AID.  No classification marking.


--  48. Memorandum of Conversation, Paris, March 1, 1969, 10:00 a.m. [Get Acrobat Reader PDF version   ] 

According to this draft memorandum, French Foreign Minister Michel Debri emphasized France's support for Biafra on moral and political grounds while Secretary of State William Rogers stressed the necessity for humanitarian relief on both sides.

Source:  National Archives, RG 59, Conference Files 1969-1972, Box 484, President's Trip to Europe 2/23-3/2/69, Chronology, Memcons - Vol. I of VIII.  Secret.


--  49. Telegram 2010 from the Embassy in Nigeria to the Department of State, March 6, 1969, 1500Z [Get Acrobat Reader PDF version   ] 

Mathews reported that he told Commissioner for External Affairs Arikpo he had been instructed to discuss Nigerian Air Force bombing of civilians in rebel territory.  Arikpo said it was not policy or intent of the federal military government to harm civilians and that the government was tightening controls over the Nigerian Air Force to minimize casualties.

Source:  National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1967-69, POL 27 Biafra-Nigeria.  Secret; Priority. Repeated to Addis Ababa, Cotonou, London, Ottawa, Paris, Yaounde, USUN, and Geneva.


--  50. Telegram 36410 From the Department of State to the Embassy in Nigeria, March 8, 1969, 1954Z [Get Acrobat Reader PDF version   ] The Department reported on Assistant Secretary of State Joseph Palmer's meeting with Nigerian Information Commissioner Anthony Enahoro. They discussed U.S. humanitarian policy, bombing of civilians and relief aircraft, assistance to Relief Coordinator Clyde Ferguson, protection of Ibos, Soviet influence in Nigeria, and delays in Nigerian visa issuances.

Source:  National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1967-69, POL 7 Nigeria.  Confidential. Repeated to London, Geneva, Paris, and Cotonou. Drafted by R.J. Wach (AF/W), cleared by Palmer, and approved by Melbourne.
--  51. Memorandum From the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger) to President Nixon, Washington, March 20, 1969  Source:  National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Presidential Correspondence - 1969-1974, Box 763, United Kingdom:  Prime Minister Wilson Correspondence #9.  Secret. Sent for action.

[4 pages not declassified in time for publication.]
--  52. Telegram 2674 From the Embassy in Nigeria to the Department of State, March 26, 1969, 1150Z [Get Acrobat Reader PDF version   ] 

The Embassy reported on Special Coordinator Clyde Ferguson's mission, including his meetings with Lieutenant Colonel Ojukwu, Military Governor of the Eastern Region of Nigeria, and Major General Gowon, Chairman of the Supreme Military Council of Nigeria.  Ojukwu objected to daylight relief flights but supported a new airstrip, which Ferguson would not support.  Gowon noted that Ojukwu's position blocked relief efforts.  Ferguson told Gowon that civilian bombing had unified Ibo resistance.

Source:  National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1967-69, POL 27-9 Biafra-Nigeria.  Confidential; Immediate. Repeated immediate to Addis Ababa. Also repeated to Geneva and USUN.


--  53. Research Memorandum From the Director of the Bureau of Intelligence and Research (Hughes) to Secretary of State Rogers, Washington, April 2, 1969 [Get Acrobat Reader PDF version   ] 

INR's analysis of USSR-Nigeria relations concluded that the USSR had exploited the situation as far as possible and would prefer a negotiated end to the war rather than continued fighting.

Source:  National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 4, President's Daily Briefs.  Secret; No Foreign Dissem; Controlled Dissem.


--  54. Memorandum From the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger) to President Nixon, Washington, April 8, 1969 [Get Acrobat Reader PDF version   ] 

Kissinger told Nixon that the war continued to be a stalemate; British Prime Minister Harold Wilson's visit to Nigeria had produced no changes, as anticipated; diplomatic initiatives by Ivory Coast President Houphouet-Boigny and the Organization of African Unity (OAU) had been unsuccessful; and Special Coordinator Clyde Ferguson's efforts had yielded no results but had satisfied Congressional critics and public lobbies at home.
 
Source:  National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 741, Country Files, Africa, Nigeria, Vol. I.  Secret.  Sent for information.  Nixon wrote the following note on page one:  "Sunday, I have decided that our policy supporting the Feds is wrong.  They can't make it.  Let's begin to get State off this kick."


--  55. Memorandum From the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger) to President Nixon, Washington, April 9, 1969 

Source:  National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 763, Presidential Correspondence 1969-1974, United Kingdom:  Prime Minister Wilson Correspondence #10.  Confidential. Sent for information. Another copy of the attached message is in the National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1967-69, POL 27- Biafra-Nigeria. Confidential; Exdis.

[7 pages not declassified in time for publication.]


--  56. Memorandum From the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger) to the Under Secretary of State (Richardson), Washington, April 15, 1969 [Get Acrobat Reader PDF version   ] 

Kissinger forwarded a memorandum of David Rockefeller's conversation with Ivory Coast Ambassador Ahoua, who met with Rockefeller to present President Houphouet-Boigny's views on Nigeria.  Those views concerned Soviet influence in Nigeria, South African Government financial aid for Biafra, and criticism of Secretary Palmer's commitment to the Nigerian Government. 

Source:  National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 741, Country Files, Africa, Nigeria, Vol. I.  Secret. This unsigned copy of the memorandum indicates that Kissinger signed the original.


--  57. Telegram 58725 From the Department of State to the Embassy in Liberia, April 16, 1969, 2343Z [Get Acrobat Reader PDF version   ] 

The Department reported on Special Coordinator Clyde Ferguson's visit to Nigeria, including his meeting with Major General Gowon, Chairman of the Supreme Military Council of Nigeria then Ojukwu, Military Governor of the Eastern Region of Nigeria, and again with Gowon between March 15 and March 25.  Until a surface corridor into Biafra could be opened, a plan to use both Uli and Obilago air fields for daylight relief flights was proposed.  Both men were favorable to the corridor concept but stuck to known positions on daylight flights and use of Obilago airstrip.

Source:  National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1967-69, POL 27-9 Biafra-Nigeria.  Secret; Limdis. Drafted by S.C. Schott (U/CF); cleared in AF/W and by Melbourne; and approved in U/CF.


--  58. Memorandum From the Country Director for West Africa (Melbourne) to the Assistant Secretary of State for African Affairs (Palmer), Washington, April 18, 1969 [Get Acrobat Reader PDF version   ] 

The memorandum outlined the lobbying activities in Washington of Biafrans Dr. Pius Okigbo, Dr. Eni Njoku, and Dr. Kenneth Dike.

Source:  National Archives, RG 59, Records of the Special Coordinator on Relief to Civilian Victims of the Nigerian Civil War, February 1969 - June 1970, Box 514, Lot 70 D 336, Political.  Limited Official Use.


--  59. Memorandum of Conversation, Washington, April 21, 1969 [Get Acrobat Reader PDF version   ] 

During a four-hour dinner conversation with U.S. officials, three Biafrans representatives proposed that the United States call for an arms embargo and an end to the war against Biafran independence.

Source:  National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1967-69, POL 27 Biafra-Nigeria.  Confidential. Drafted by George Sherry (AF/W).


--  60. Memorandum From the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger) to President Nixon, Washington, April 24, 1969 [Get Acrobat Reader PDF version   ] 

Kissinger warned the President that the Congressional chorus on Nigeria might be rising again, in particular due to a new organization, "Americans for Biafran Relief," with Senator Kennedy taking the lead.  Tabs to attachment are included with Kissinger's January 28 memorandum, Document 25.

Source:  National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 741, Country Files, Africa, Nigeria.  Confidential. Sent for information.


--  61. Telegram 3636 From the Embassy in Nigeria to the Department of State, April 25, 1969, 1518Z [Get Acrobat Reader PDF version   ] 

The Embassy suggested that "Americans for Biafran Relief" might present an opportunity to put pressure on Lieutenant Colonel Ojukwu, Military Governor of the Eastern Region of Nigeria, to facilitate relief efforts. The Embassy wanted the onus for blocking relief put on Ojukwu.

Source:  National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1967-69, POL 27-9, Biafra-Nigeria.  Confidential.


--  62. Situation Report Prepared by Nigerian Task Force, April 29, 1969, 4:00 p.m. [Get Acrobat Reader PDF version   ] 

French officials estimated 20-40 tons of arms per day had gone into Biafra since March 31.

Source:  National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 741, Country Files, Africa, Nigeria.  Secret. Drafted by D.F. Smith (AF/W) and approved by Melbourne.


--  63. Memorandum of Conversation, Washington, May 5, 1969 [Get Acrobat Reader PDF version   ] 

In a meeting with Special Coordinator Clyde Ferguson, Ambassador Iyalla stated that the Cross River surface corridor was all right in principle. However, the Federal Military Government opposed two more C-97s for church groups involved in relief, and airdrops would be acceptable only if inspected first in Lagos.

Source:  National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1967-69, POL 27-9 Biafra-Nigeria.  Secret. Drafted by S.C. Schott (U/CF).


--  64. Telegram 3911 From the Embassy in Nigeria to the Department of State, May 5, 1969, 1600Z [Get Acrobat Reader PDF version   ] 

The Embassy assumed the Federal Military Government (FMG) would win the war, then devise a multi-state structure to provide stability, and there would not be a pattern of recurring coups.

Source:  National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1967-69, POL 2 Nigeria.  Secret. Repeated to Paris, Ibadan, Kaduna, CINCSTRIKE, DIA


--  65. Memorandum From the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger) to President Nixon, Washington, May 15, 1969 [Get Acrobat Reader PDF version   ] 

In a status report on the war, Kissinger told the President that the fighting and diplomacy were stalemated.  Biafra could win only through political exhaustion on the Federal side.  U.S. policy was being carried out, i.e., political non-involvement and basic neutrality.

Source:  National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 741, Country Files, Africa, Nigeria, Vol. I.  Secret. Sent for information. The document is stamped, "The President Has Seen." Nixon wrote on page one, "HK - I hope the Biafrans survive!"


--  66. Memorandum From Acting Executive Secretary of the Department of State (Walsh) to the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger), Washington, May 15, 1969 [Get Acrobat Reader PDF version   ] 

According to Walsh's report, Bishop Swanstrom had requested that the U.S. Government sell two additional C-97s to Joint Church Aid U.S.A., Inc. (JCA) despite FMG opposition.  The FMG was linking surface corridor negotiations to sale of additional aircraft.  The U.S. Government decided it would replace one JCA C-97 that crashed and was a total loss. Attachments 1 and 2, Incoming Correspondence and Suggested reply, are not published.

Source:  National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1967-69, POL 27-9 Biafra-Nigeria.  Confidential.


--  67. Aide Mimoire From the Special Coordinator (Ferguson), Washington, May 16, 1969 [Get Acrobat Reader PDF version   ] 

Ferguson stated in a message to Major General Gowon, Chairman of the Supreme Military Council of Nigeria, that the crashed JCA C-97 plane would be replaced but the two additional C-97s were in abeyance during surface corridor discussions.

Source:  National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1967-69, POL 27-9 Biafra-Nigeria.  Unclassified. A handwritten note states that the aide-mimoire was handed to the Nigerian ambassador on May 16.


--  68. Memorandum From Roger Morris of the National Security Council Staff to the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger), Washington, May 26, 1969 [Get Acrobat Reader PDF version   ] 

Morris briefed Kissinger for his meeting that afternoon with Pius Okigbo.  He advised Kissinger to stress relief, U.S. neutrality, and the U.S. hope that the two sides would try negotiations.

Source:  National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 741, Country Files, Africa, Nigeria, Vol. I.  Secret. Attached was Document 65.


--  69. Memorandum From Roger Morris of the National Security Council Staff to the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger), Washington, June 2, 1969 [Get Acrobat Reader PDF version   ] 

Morris advised Kissinger that Federal feelings had reached a flash point over the recent appearance of a Biafran "air force" piloted by Swedish mercenaries and armed with French rockets. In response, it was possible that Major General Gowon, Chairman of the Supreme Military Council of Nigeria, would bar all relief flights.  This would cause tough decisions for the United States.

Source:  National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 741, Country Files, Nigeria, Vol. I.  Secret. Kissinger underlined "all but foredoomed" in paragraph 3 on page one and wrote "Why?" and "Roger, What is it that keeps Feds from winning?"  In response to the penultimate paragraph on page two, Kissinger wrote: "When are we going to see paper?" In an attached memorandum dated June 11, Bob Houdek asked Morris to answer the questions Kissinger had posed, referring to the "paper" as "the State contingency paper on relief efforts should the Feds decide to outlaw or stop relief flights." Written at the top of page one of Morris' memorandum is, "Action completed orally per RMorris, 7/22."


--  70. Telegram 5026 From the Embassy in Nigeria to the Department of State, June 4, 1969, 1540Z [Get Acrobat Reader PDF version   ] 

The Embassy reported that Special Coordinator Clyde Ferguson had asked major General Gowon, Chairman of the Supreme Military Council of Nigeria, if there was any change in policy toward relief flights.  Gowon stated that the policy had not changed--all night flights were "illegal" and those flying did so at their own risk. 

Source:  National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1967-69, POL 27-9 Biafra-Nigeria.  Confidential; Priority. Repeated to Geneva, London, Addis Ababa, Cotonou, Lisbon, Kaduna, and Ibadan.


--  71. Situation Report Prepared by the Nigerian Task Force, Washington, June 6, 1969 [Get Acrobat Reader PDF version   ] 

On June 5, an International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) plane was shot down by a Nigerian MIG while en-route to Biafra with relief supplies.

Source:  National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 742, Country Files, Africa, Nigeria, Vol. I.  Confidential.


--  72. Department of State Press Statement, Washington, undated [Get Acrobat Reader PDF version   ] 

In this statement, which was handed out to the press on June 6, the Department expressed U.S. regret for the attack by the Nigerian Air Force and reiterated the U.S. position of avoiding political or military involvement in the Nigerian civil war.  The attached briefing paper, which was read but not distributed, acknowledged that relief and arms night flights were intermingled, and urged expanded relief through daylight flights and a land corridor.

Source:  National Archives, RG 59, Records of the Special Coordinator on Relief to Civilian Victims of the Nigerian Civil war, February 1969-June 1970, Lot 70 D 336, Box 517, ICRC, Records.  Unclassified.  At the top of page one of the statement, Schott wrote, "Clyde - Here is last Friday's statement.  The top page was handed out and the second one only read out. SCS."


--  73. Telegram 5164 From the Embassy in Nigeria to the Department of State, June 7, 1969, 2029Z [Get Acrobat Reader PDF version   ] 

The Embassy transmitted a Federal Military Government (FMG) statement in which that government stated that the press releases of the U.S. and Swedish Governments were hypocritical. The FMG charged that Swedish nationals had bombed and strafed civil installations as mercenaries of Biafra, and the United States did not condemn it.

Source:  National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1967-69, POL 27-9 Biafra-Nigeria.  Unclassified; Immediate. Repeated priority to Lome. Also repeated to Cotonou, Geneva, The Hague, Stockholm, Libreville, Yaounde, and London.


--  74. Telegram 1835 From the Mission to the European Office of the United Nations to the Department of State, Geneva, June 9, 1969, 1534Z [Get Acrobat Reader PDF version   ] 

Ambassador Roger Tubby reported on a meeting with James Freymond, Acting President of the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC), who expressed grave concern regarding problems dealing with both the Federal Military Government (FMG) and Lieutenant Colonel Ojukwu, Military Governor of the Eastern Region of Nigeria.  Tubby also noted profound changes in the attitude of some governments and public groups who had been strong supporters of the ICRC.

Source:  National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1967-69, POL 27-9 Biafra-Nigeria.  Confidential; Immediate. Repated immediate to Lagos. Also repeated to London.


--  75. Telegram 93759 From the Department of State to the Embassy in Nigeria, June 10, 1969, 1525Z [Get Acrobat Reader PDF version   ] 

The Department expressed its concern that the Federal Military Government (FMG) statement transmitted in telegram 5164 (Document 73) indicated its policy toward relief flights had changed after the ICRC plane was shot down.  The Department was aware of the intermingling of arms and relief flights but believed interdiction of relief planes would do damage to the FMG in the long run.

Source:  National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1967-69, POL 27-9 Biafra-Nigeria.  Secret; Immediate. Repeated to Addis Ababa, Cotonou, Lisbon, London, and Geneva.  Drafted by Smith (AF/W); cleared by Moore and Ferguson; and approved by Palmer.


--  76. Telegram 5314 From the Embassy in Nigeria to the Department of State, June 11, 1969, 1629Z [Get Acrobat Reader PDF version   ] 

Ambassador Mathews reported on his meeting with Federal Commissioner for External Affairs Arikpo, during which he presented U.S. views on Federal Military Government (FMG) policy toward relief flights, the FMG statement in response to a U.S. press release (see Documents 72 and 73), and FMG assurances that the Nigerian Air Force could be controlled.  Arikpo stated that the FMG must control its air space.  Regarding the FMG statement, Arikpo said it had come from the Ministry of Information and was not an expression of FMG policy.

Source:  National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1967-69, POL 27-9 Biafra-Nigeria.  Secret; Immediate; Limdis. Repeated priority to Addis Ababa. Also repeated to Cotonou, Lisbon, London, Geneva, CINCSTRIKE.


--  77. Memorandum From Roger Morris of the National Security Council Staff to the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger), Washington, June 13, 1969 [Get Acrobat Reader PDF version   ] 

Morris advised Kissinger that now that the Federal Military Government (FMG) was moving to interdict arms flights, this would embargo or cause serious danger to relief flights.  He admitted that he was not enchanted with the Federal cause, but this could end the war with a Federal victory, which the President reluctantly has concluded to be in the United State's long-term interests.

Source:  National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 742, Country Files, Africa, Nigeria, Vol. I.  Secret.


--  78. Telegram 5401 From the Embassy in Nigeria to the Department of State, June 13, 1969, 1653Z [Get Acrobat Reader PDF version   ] 

Ambassador Mathews reported on his meeting with Major General Gowon, Chairman of the Supreme Military Council of Nigeria, and Arikpo, Nigerian Federal Commissioner for External Affairs. Gowon stated that the Federal Military Government (FMG) would do all possible to prevent shooting down genuine relief flights.  Aircraft that did not comply with Nigerian Air Force instructions would be subject to attack.  The FMG wanted to terminate or reduce the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) role in Nigeria.

Source:  National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1967-69, POL 27-9 Biafra-Nigeria.  Secret; Immediate. Repeated priority to Addis Ababa. Also repeated to Cotonou, Geneva, Lisbon, and London.  The Department replied in telegram 97185, June 13, that it agreed that Gowon's assurances were the most they could hope for at this stage and under the circumstances it was urgent that both the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) and Joint Church Aid U.S.A., Inc. (JCA) carefully screen cargo on all future flights to ensure there was nothing aboard which the FMG might consider non-relief items. Ibid.


--  79. Telegram 99708 From the Department of State to the Embassy in Nigeria, June 18, 1969, 2131Z [Get Acrobat Reader PDF version   ] 

The Department transmitted Ferguson's June 18 press release in which he stated that there was agreement by the FMG and Biafran authorities to a surface corridor up the Cross River and that the ICRC had undertaken to manage the new relief arrangement.

Source:  National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1967-69, POL 27-9 Biafra-Nigeria.  Unclassified; Immediate. Repeated priority to Addis Ababa. Also repeated to Cotonou, The Hague, Lome, London, Paris, USUN, Ibadan and Kaduna. Drafted by Raymond L. Perkins (AF/P), cleared in P/ON, and approved by Perkins.


--  80. Memorandum From Roger Morris of the National Security Council Staff to the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger), Washington, July 1, 1969 [Get Acrobat Reader PDF version   ] 

Morris told Kissinger that the Federal Military Government (FMG) had all but kicked out the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) and imposed a de facto embargo on relief flights into Biafra. Airlifts into Biafra could operate only in daylight following inspection in Federal territory.  Those from Sao Tome were illegal and subject to interdiction.  Morris was apprehensive of negative reaction by Senator Kennedy and the Biafra lobby.

Source:  National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 741, Country Files, Africa, Nigeria, Vol. I.  Secret.


--  81. Telegram 109879 From the Department of State to the Embassy in Nigeria, July 2, 1969, 2316Z [Get Acrobat Reader PDF version   ] 

The Department transmitted a statement by Secretary Rogers issued on July 2 about the Nigerian situation.  Rogers deplored the curtailment of the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) role in Nigeria, stated that the United States financed the charter of two shallow draft vessels for ICRC use on the Cross River, and supported controlled day-time relief flights.

Source:  National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1967-69, POL 27-9 Biafra-Nigeria.  Unclassified. The telegrams was also addressed to Addis Ababa, Cotonou, Lagos, London, Niamey, Paris, Stockholm, Yaounde, Geneva, USUN, Douala, Ibadan, Kaduna. Drafted by Powell (AF/P), cleared in P/ON, and approved by Powell.


--  82. Memorandum From the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger) to President Nixon, Washington, July 7, 1969 [Get Acrobat Reader PDF version   ] 

Kissinger summarized where the United States Government stood in the wake of the recent Federal Military Government (FMG) decision to take over the relief operation and presented three broad approaches:  contest the Federal relief embargo; guarantee relief corridors against military violation; and separate relief from any appearance of pro-Federal bias.

Source:  National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 742, Country Files, Africa, Nigeria, Vol. I.  Secret. Sent for information.  The memorandum is stamped, "The President Has Seen." Nixon marked suggested actions in the margin as "OK," "Good," and "NO."  He initialed his approval of the three approaches proposed by Kissinger.


--  83. Telegram 6116 From the Embassy in Nigeria to the Department of State, July 7, 1969, 1230Z [Get Acrobat Reader PDF version   ] 

Ambassador Mathews stated that a new, even more serious crisis in U.S.-Nigerian relations was possible arising from the fact that the United States and the Federal Military Government (FMG) faced a similar problem--how to strike a balance between internal pressures and external political realities. In the FMG's case, restrictions on the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) and relief organizations were necessary to alleviate internal dissent.  According to Mathews, the United States balance had for some time been titled toward internal pressure. Thus domestic sympathy for Ibos had led the United States to waver from its usual post-World War II stance of giving firm political support to friendly governments against internal dissidents.

Source:  National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1967-69, POL 27-9 Biafra-Nigeria.  Secret; Exdis; Immediate.


--  84. Briefing Memorandum From the Assistant Secretary of State for African Affairs (Palmer) to Under Secretary of State (Richardson), Washington, July 7, 1969 [Get Acrobat Reader PDF version   ] 

In this briefing memorandum on the situation in Nigeria, Palmer discussed U.S. policy and possible initiatives following Federal Military Government (FMG) withdrawal of the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) from a relief role in Federal areas and the restrictions placed on relief shipments into Biafra.  He was pessimistic about a favorable solution. Tabs A-H are not published.

Source:  Central Intelligence Agency Files, Job 89-0028R/4/41.  Confidential.


--  85. Telegram 114395 From the Department of State to the Embassy in New Zealand, July 10, 1969, 2239Z [Get Acrobat Reader PDF version   ] 

The Department provided the text of a classified report on the Biafran food situation. A survey of Biafra's food needs indicated the supply should be adequate in terms of caloric content, even without relief shipments, at least through the end of the summer but the shortage of protein foods would become acute.

Source:  National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1967-69, POL 27-9 Biafra-Nigeria.  Confidential. Drafted by Fitzcharles (U/CF), cleared in AF/W, and approved in U/CF.


--  86. Memorandum From the Deputy Assistant to the President (Butterfield) to the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger), Washington, July 14, 1969 [Get Acrobat Reader PDF version   ] 

Butterfield reported that the President, after reading in his daily news summary an advertisement placed in the New York Times by "Americans for Biafran Relief," stated that he agreed with it and that he (not State) should do something about Biafra.

Source:  National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 742, Country Files, Africa, Nigeria, Vol. I.  No classification marking. An attached, but unpublished, memorandum from the Staff Secretary to Kissinger, July 15, asked that a plan of Presidential actions be submitted. A handwritten note on the memorandum states, "Roger Morris is preparing plan for HAK's approval, Aug 5."


--  87. Telegram 116458 From the Department of State to the Embassy in Nigeria, July 15, 1969, 0317Z [Get Acrobat Reader PDF version   ] 

Under Secretary of State Richardson instructed Ambassador Mathews to inform Major General Gowon, Chairman of the Supreme Military Council of Nigeria, when delivering the letter transmitted in telegram 116460, that the United States Government was disturbed at his incitement of public opinion against the United States.  Further, if the relief impasse continued much longer, the question of possible new U.S. approaches to the problem would undoubtedly arise.

Source:  National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1967-69, POL 27-9 Biafra-Nigeria.  Secret; Exdis; Immediate. Drafted by Sherry (AF/W) and Melbourne; cleared in the White House, U, S/S, and by Ferguson and Moore AF; and approved by Richardson.


--  88. Telegram 116460 From the Department of State to the Embassy in Nigeria, July 15, 1969, 0321Z [Get Acrobat Reader PDF version   ] 

In a letter to Major General Gowon, Chairman of the Supreme Military Council of Nigeria, President Nixon urged the Federal Military Government (FMG) leader to permit an immediate resumption of relief flights by the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) and religious voluntary agencies and implementation of the Cross River relief corridor.

Source:  National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1967-69, POL 27-9 Biafra-Nigeria.  Secret; Exdis; Immediate. Drafted by Faville (AF/W); cleared in S/S, the White House, U, U/CF and by Moore; and approved by Richardson.


--  89. Telegram 116456 From the Department of State to the Embassy in France and the U.S. Mission in Geneva, July 15, 1969, 0313Z [Get Acrobat Reader PDF version   ] 

The Department transmitted a letter in which President Nixon urged Ivory Coast President Houphouet-Boigny to encourage Biafran authorities to agree to a prompt resumption of relief flights and realization of the Cross River corridor.

Source:  National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1967-69, POL 27-9 Biafra-Nigeria.  Secret; Exdis; Immediate. Drafted by Sherry (AF/W); cleared in S/S, AF, the White House, AF/CW, EUR/FBX, U/CF and U; and approved by Richardson.


--  90. Memorandum of Telephone Conversation, Washington, July 18, 1969 [Get Acrobat Reader PDF version   ] 

In a conversation with his Assistant for National Security Affairs, Henry Kissinger, President Nixon indicated a shift in control of Nigerian policy from the Department of State to the National Security Council.  Nixon said that the United States had to use everything it had to end the war; support for the Nigerian Government should stop, British Prime Minister Wilson should cease his assistance, and French President Pompidou should increase Biafran support.

Source:  Library of Congress, Manuscript Division, Kissinger Papers, Box 360, Telephone Conversations, Chronological File.  No classification marking.


--  91. Telegram 2581 From the Mission to the European Office of the United Nations to the Department of State, Geneva, July 23, 1969,1750Z [Get Acrobat Reader PDF version   ] 

The Mission transmitted the Biafran Government's open letter to Special Coordinator Clyde Ferguson suggesting acceptance of Secretary of State Rogers' statement on relief.  Biafra accepted day and night relief flights, day flights to commence immediately, and the Cross River proposal.  The letter went on, however, to impose conditions that negated acceptance of  the proposals.

Source:  National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1967-69, POL 27-9 Biafra-Nigeria.  Limited Official Use; Immediate. Repeated priority to Lagos. Also repeated to London and The Hague.


--  92. Memorandum of Conversation, Washington, July 31, 1969, 5:00 p.m. [Get Acrobat Reader PDF version   ] 

During a long conversation with Assistant Secretary of State Newsom and the Country Director for West Africa, Roy Melbourne, Saturday Review editor Norman Cousins reported on his trip to Nigeria and Biafra.  He met Major General Gowon, Chairman of the Supreme Military Council of Nigeria, then Lieutenant Colonel Ojukwu, Military Governor of the Eastern Region of Nigeria, and believed it might be possible to begin negotiations if the sides could be pinned down.

Source:  National Archives, RG 59, Records of the Special Coordinator on Relief to Civilian Victims of the Nigerian Civil War February 1969 - June 1970, Lot 70 D 336, Box 517, Memcons (other).  Confidential. Drafted by Stokes (AF/W).


--  93. Memorandum From Roger Morris of the National Security Council Staff to the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger), Washington, August 1, 1969, 5:30 p.m. [Get Acrobat Reader PDF version   ] 

Morris provided background information for Kissinger in case Biafra was raised by the French in Paris meetings. According to Morris there were no major military changes, no serious talks were underway, relief flights had been blocked by failure to agree on daytime flights.  Special Coordinator Clyde Ferguson had the two sides meeting secretly in Geneva, but chances of an agreement were slim.

Source:  National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 742, Country Files, Africa, Nigeria, Vol. I.  Secret. "Dispatched" is written at the top of page one.


--  94. Telegram 2740 From the Mission to the European Office of the United Nations to the Department of State, Geneva, August 1, 1969, 1256Z [Get Acrobat Reader PDF version   ] 

The Mission transmitted the final text of the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) note to the Federal Military Government (FMG) dated August 1. The ICRC note stated that daylight relief flights from Cotonou and Santa Isabel could be inspected and observers could board and accompany flights.

Source:  National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1967-69, POL 27-9 Biafra-Nigeria.  Limited Official Use; Immediate. Repeated to Lagos, Addis Ababa, London, Paris, The Hague, and USUN.


--  95. Telegram 129202 From the Department of State to the Embassy in Nigeria, August 2, 1969, 0106Z [Get Acrobat Reader PDF version   ] 

The Department believed the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) daytime flight proposal merited careful Federal Military Government (FMG) consideration.  The assistance of the United Kingdom High Commissioner should be sought to persuade the FMG to consider the proposal.

Source:  National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1967-69, POL 27-9 Biafra-Nigeria.  Confidential; Limdis; Immediate. Repeated to Addis Ababa, London, Paris, The Hague, Geneva, and USUN. Drafted by Melbourne and Sherry (AF/W); cleared in U/CF, Gleysteen S/S, and U; and approved by Moore.


--  96. Telegram 6969 From the Embassy in Nigeria to the Department of State, August 2, 1969, 1430Z [Get Acrobat Reader PDF version   ] 

The Embassy reported that the United Kingdom High Commissioner had said that the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) proposal was worse than expected. It offered the Federal Military Government (FMG) no concessions, and might end chances for a reasonable compromise.

Source:  National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1967-69, POL 27-9 Biafra-Nigeria.  Confidential; Limdis; Immediate. Repeated priority to Addis Ababa. Also repeated to London, Paris, The Hague, Geneva, and USUN.


--  97. Telegram 129331 From the Department of State to the Embassies in Nigeria and the United Kingdom, August 2, 1969, 2122Z [Get Acrobat Reader PDF version   ] 

The Department expressed its disappointment that United Kingdom High Commissioner considered the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) note so negative from the standpoint of Federal Military Government (FMG) interests.  The embassies were urged to press the proposal to the FMG as a neutral.

Source:  National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1967-69, POL 27-9 Biafra-Nigeria.  Confidential; Limdis; Immediate. Repeated to Addis Ababa, Paris, The Hague, Geneva, and USUN. Drafted by Melbourne and Spigler (AF/W); cleared in U/CF and approved by Moore.


--  98. Telegram 2773 From the Mission to the European Office of the United Nations to the Department of State, Geneva, August 4, 1969, 1730Z [Get Acrobat Reader PDF version   ] 

The Mission reported on Special Coordinator Clyde Ferguson's meeting with International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) officials, who expected the Federal Military Government (FMG) to reject its plan.  They also anticipated attacks on Joint Church Aid U.S.A., Inc. (JCA) flights when night fighter planes were acquired.  There was severe division within the committee but all agreed the ICRC would leave Nigeria between August 15 and September 3. There was considerable support for the ICRC's becoming "revolutionary humanitarians" if it was to survive.

Source:  National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1967-69, POL 27-9 Biafra-Nigeria.  Secret; Limdis; Immediate. Repeated priority to Lagos. Also repeated to Libreville, Addis Ababa, The Hague, London, Paris, and USUN.


--  99. Telegram 7068 From the Embassy in Nigeria to the Department of State, August 5, 1969, 1725Z [Get Acrobat Reader PDF version   ] 

The Embassy expected the negative Federal Military Government (FMG) response as the ICRC failed to consider the sovereignty issue, but the message should not be taken as absolute rejection. The International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) should consider a new personal mission to Lagos.  The Embassy did not believe the FMG was pursuing a policy of genocide nor did Marcel Naville, ICRC president, despite the belief by ICRC Vice President James Freymond and others.

Source:  National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1967-69, POL 27-9 Biafra-Nigeria.  Confidential; Limdis; Priority. Repeated to Geneva, Addis Ababa, London, Paris, and USUN. The text of Gowon's August 4 message to Naville was transmitted in telegram 7029 from Lagos, August 5. Gowon stated in part: "You have not informed me of any aspects my government's policy which in your opinion contravene any articles Geneva Convention pertinent to situation civil war. My government's policy can only be regarded as defective or unrealistic if can be shown contravene international conventions. Any judgment other than that cannot but be political and this is no function your organization." (Ibid.)


--  100. Memorandum Prepared by the Office of Current Intelligence, Central Intelligence Agency, Washington, August 5, 1969 [Get Acrobat Reader PDF version   ] 

The memorandum analyzed Federal Military Government (FMG) war aims with specific regard to the Ibos.  According to the memorandum, there was no intent to commit genocide, and Gowon and his senior officers probably would take great pains to prevent the massacre of Ibos if federal forces did overrun the Biafran enclave.

Source:  National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 741, Country Files, Africa, Nigeria, Vol. I. Confidential; No Foreign Dissem. The memorandum was prepared at Morris' request, concurred in by the Clandestine Service, and forwarded to Kissinger by Thomas Karamessines under cover of an August 6 memorandum.


--  101. Memorandum From Roger Morris of the National Security Council Staff to the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger), Washington, August 10, 1969 [Get Acrobat Reader PDF version   ] 

Morris agreed with Kissinger that Richardson should direct the peace initiative, if approved by the President, but felt that State's Africa Bureau was hopelessly pro-Federal.  Morris recommended that he have direct participation in the probe.

Source:  National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files Box 741, Country Files, Africa, Nigeria, Vol. I.  Secret; Eyes Only.


--  102. Memorandum From the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger) to President Nixon, Washington, August 11, 1969 [Get Acrobat Reader PDF version   ] 

Responding to Nixon's instruction to consider a Presidential initiative to conciliate Nigeria and Biafra, Kissinger provided a summary on the major elements to be dealt with in peace negotiations and on the President's options, with a recommended plan of action that Nixon approved. 

Source:  National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 741, Country Files, Africa, Nigeria, Vol. I. Secret. Sent for action. Nixon initialed his approval of Kissinger's recommendation.


--  103. Special National Intelligence Estimate, Washington, August 12, 1969 [Get Acrobat Reader PDF version   ] 

The SNIE concluded that an effective embargo on arms shipments to both parties was highly unlikely.  If there were an effective embargo, the level of hostilities would soon diminish but neither party would be any more willing to compromise.

Source:  Central Intelligence Agency Files, NIC Files, Job 79R-01012A, Box 372, Folders 1 and 2.  Secret; No Foreign Dissem.


--  104. Special Annex to Special National Intelligence Estimate 64.2-69, Washington, August 12, 1969 Source:  Central Intelligence Agency Files.  Top Secret; Umbra.

[10 pages not declassified.]
--  105. Memorandum From Roger Morris of the National Security Council Staff to the Assistant Secretary of State for African Affairs (Newsom), Washington, August 21, 1969 [Get Acrobat Reader PDF version   ] 

Morris recommended several steps to be taken if a full-scale initiative began to work.

Source:  National Archives, RG 59, Records of the Special Coordinator on Relief to Civilian Victims of the Nigerian Civil War, February 1969-June 1970, Lot 70 D 336, Box 519, Geneva. Secret.


--  106. Letter From Norman Cousins to the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger), New York, August 25, 1969 [Get Acrobat Reader PDF version   ] 

Norman Cousins, editor of the Saturday Review, expressed his reservations about the possibility of an early Federal victory and his belief that President Nixon could play an effective role in ending the war.  He suggested that the food situation might be serious but was not decisive in Biafra's ability to persevere.

Source:  National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 741, Country Files, Africa, Nigeria, Vol. I. Confidential.


--  107. Memorandum From Roger Morris of the National Security Council Staff to the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger), Washington, August 21, 1969 [Get Acrobat Reader PDF version   ] 

In anticipation of the President's meeting with Secretary of State Rogers on August 22, Morris provided Kissinger with a copy of Newsom's briefing memorandum for Rogers for the meeting, in which Newsom recommended immediately launching a full-fledged peace probe that Morris considered heavily weighted toward the Federal side. Morris recommended that Kissinger advise the President to pursue a serious peace probe but on a more even-handed basis and with White House participation.

Source:  National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Kissinger Office Files, Box 148, U.S.-Domestic-Agency Files, State/White House Relationship, Vol. I January 28 - October 31, 1969.  Secret; Sensitive. Sent for action. The attached memorandum from Assistant Secretary of State Newsom to Rogers, was classified Secret. The President's Daily Diary indicates that a meeting between the President, who was at the Western White House, and Rogers did not take place on August 22 nor did they meet before the end of the month. The President and Rogers talked by phone on the evening of August 28.


--  108. Memorandum From Roger Morris of the National Security Council Staff to Anthony Lake of the National Security Council Staff, Washington, August 23, 1969 [Get Acrobat Reader PDF version   ] 

Morris informed Lake of his confusion over Secretary of State Rogers' intentions in the Nigerian problem.

Source:  National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Kissinger Office Files, Box 148, U.S.-Domestic-Agency Files, State/White House Relationship, Vol. I January 28 - October 31, 1969.  Secret; Sensitive. Tab A of the attachment was attached but not published. Tab B of the attachment is Document 101.


--  109. Editorial Note  

In an August 28, 1969, memorandum to the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs, Henry Kissinger, regarding several recent incidents in which the Departments of State and Defense had not followed the White House's policy lead, Anthony Lake of the National Security Council Staff stated:

"Secretary Rogers carefully avoided discussing with you in advance his effort of last weekend to get the President to agree to a Nigeria/Biafra initiative which probably would have been rejected by the Biafrans as it paid the most attention to the Feds.

"The President noted in his own handwriting on the top of a memo from you to him on April 8, 1969: 'I have decided that our supporting the Feds is wrong. They can't make it. Let's begin to get State off this kick.' His desire to avoid a pro-Fed bias by the USG was also evident in his approval of various steps suggested in your memo of July 7 on 'Next Steps in Biafra/Nigeria.'" (Document 82)

"In addition, State has not seemed terribly responsive to the President's desire that it be his and not State's initiative." (National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Kissinger Office Files, Box 148, U.S.-Domestic-Agency Files, State/White House Relationship, Vol. I January 28 - October 31, 1969)

Kissinger incorporated the information into a September 1 memorandum to Attorney General Mitchell (Document 111).   


--  110. Memorandum From Roger Morris of the National Security Council Staff to the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger), Washington, August 30, 1969 [Get Acrobat Reader PDF version   ] 

Morris informed Kissinger that the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) had offered the Federal Military Government (FMG) the right to call down random flights for inspection on Nigerian territory.  They had requested a response to be given by September 1.  If the response were anything less than an unequivocal yes, the ICRC would end its operation.  That would leave the Joint Church Aid U.S.A., Inc. (JCA) agencies and their "illegal" flights as the only relief operation and force the United States to choose either to support their airlift or bow out of the relief business altogether.

Source:  National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 741, Country Files, Africa, Nigeria, Vol. I. Secret. Sent for information. This copy of the memorandum is not initialed.


--  111. Memorandum From the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger) to Attorney General Mitchell, Washington, September 1, 1969 [Get Acrobat Reader PDF version   ] 

Kissinger discussed Nigeria/Biafra as one of a series of incidents in which the bureaucracy was either unresponsive to President Nixon's desires or displayed an extraordinary inability to coordinate internal matters.

Source:  National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Kissinger Office Files, Box 148, U.S.-Domestic-Agency Files, State/White House Relationship, Vol. I, January 18 - October 31, 1969.  Secret; Exclusively Eyes Only.


--  112. Memorandum of Telephone Conversation, Washington, September 2, 1969 [Get Acrobat Reader PDF version   ] 

The President's Assistant for National Security Affairs, Henry Kissinger, and Saturday Review editor Norman Cousins discussed Cousins' upcoming trip to Nigeria. The trip would be unofficial. President Nixon did not want to put anything in writing--official involvement would come when there were potential areas of agreement.

Source:  National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Kissinger Office Files, Box 52, Country Files, Africa, "Cousins, Norman" Biafra.  No classification marking.


--  113. Memorandum From the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger) to President Nixon, Washington, September 3, 1969 [Get Acrobat Reader PDF version   ] 

Kissinger confirmed the unofficial trip by Saturday Review editor Norman Cousins with no U.S. involvement unless Major General Gowon, Chairman of the Supreme Military Council of Nigeria, and Lieutenant Colonel Ojukwu, Military Governor of the Eastern Region of Nigeria, responded positively.

Source:  National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Kissinger Office Files, Box 52, Country Files, Africa, "Cousins, Norman" Biafra.  Secret; Nodis. Sent for information. This copy of the memorandum is not initialed.


--  114. Memorandum From the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger) to President Nixon, Washington, September 4, 1969 [Get Acrobat Reader PDF version   ] 

Kissinger informed the President that Major General Gowon, Chairman of the Supreme Military Council of Nigeria, had agreed to a 3-week period of International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) daylight relief flights to Biafra. A reliable source reported that he made the decision in the face of almost unanimous cabinet opposition.

Source:  National Archives, Nixon's Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 10, President's Daily Briefs.  Top Secret; Sensitive. Sent for information. Tab A is not published.


--  115. Memorandum of Telephone Conversation, Washington, September 9, 1969 [Get Acrobat Reader PDF version   ] 

In a telephone conversation with Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs Henry Kissinger, Saturday Review editor Norman Cousins indicated that he was going to meet with a representative from the Eastern region the following day.  Kissinger stated he and the President would not take an official position until there was some hope.

Source:  National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Kissinger Office Files, Box 52, Country Files, Africa, "Cousins, Norman" Biafra.  No classification marking.


--  116. Memorandum From Roger Morris of the National Security Council Staff to the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger), Washington, September 12, 1969 [Get Acrobat Reader PDF version   ] 

Morris brought Kissinger up to date on negotiations over International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) relief flights. The Federals had agreed "in principle" to daylight flights while the Biafrans had not because they wanted a guarantee against Nigerian violations. 

Source:  National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 741, Country Files, Africa, Nigeria, Vol. I.  Secret. Sent for information. The memorandum is stamped  "HAK has seen." Telegram 3296 from the U.S. Mission in Geneva to the Department of State, September 15, transmitted a Markpress release stating: "The Government of the Republic of Biafra has rejected the new agreement signed between the Nigerian Government and the ICRC on daylight relief flights to Biafra as it contains no adequate guarantee against Nigerian military exploitation of the flights." (National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1967-69, POL 27-9 Biafra-Nigeria)


--  117. Telegram 8336 From the Embassy in Nigeria to the Department of State, September 16, 1969, 1111Z [Get Acrobat Reader PDF version   ] 

The Embassy reported that Biafra was expanding its air force through acquisition of T-6 airplanes and needed more aviation gas, which was obtained from relief flights based in Sao Tome and Libreville.  This increased friction between the Federal Military Government (FMG) and the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC).  Delivery of C-97s to Joint Church Aid U.S.A., Inc. (JCA) threatened to have an adverse effect on the U.S. position in Nigeria unless strict fuel control measures were adopted.

Source:  National Archives, RG 59, Records of the Special Coordinator on Relief to Civilian Victims of the Nigerian Civil War, February 1969-June 1970, Lot 70 D 336, Box 514, Folder A-2.  Confidential. Repeated to Geneva, DIA, and CINCSTRIKE.


--  118. Memorandum From the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger) to President Nixon, Washington, September 20, 1969 [Get Acrobat Reader PDF version   ] 

Kissinger told the President that Norman Cousins, the editor of the Saturday Review, believed his usefulness in the Nigerian situation had ended.  Kissinger recommended, and Nixon approved, that Cousins be authorized to pass a message to the Biafran representatives in Paris that a member of Kissinger's staff would be available for an informal meeting. Nixon initialed "Approve."

Source:  National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 741, Country Files, Africa, Nigeria, Vol. I. Secret; Nodis. Sent for action.


--  119. Memorandum From the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger) to President Nixon, Washington, September 20, 1969 [Get Acrobat Reader PDF version   ] 

Kissinger recommended a Presidential statement on the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) daylight relief flight efforts and a quiet offer of assistance to the ICRC in an attempt to secure Biafran agreement. 

Source:  National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 741, Country Files, Africa, Nigeria, Vol. I.  Secret; Nodis. Nixon initialed "Approve" and wrote "good work!" below. The memorandum is marked on page one, "Roger Informed" and "File - Special File.  Not to Secretariat". Tab A is not published.


--  120. Memorandum of Conversation, Washington, September 22, 1969 [Get Acrobat Reader PDF version   ] 

Special Coordinator Clyde Ferguson's 3-hour conversation with Biafran representatives included the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) daylight flight plan, the Cross River route project, and the One Nigeria concept.

Source:  National Archives, RG 59, Records of the Special Coordinator on Relief to Civilian Victims of the Nigerian Civil War, February 1969-June 1970, Lot 70 D 336, Box 517, Memcons (2/25-12/29/69).  Confidential.


--  121. Memorandum From Roger Morris of the National Security Council Staff to the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger), Washington, September 22, 1969 [Get Acrobat Reader PDF version   ] 

Morris objected to two telegrams from the Embassy in Nigeria that ran counter to the President's Nigeria policy.  Morris wrote that he would discuss the telegrams with Assistant Secretary of State David Newsom.

Source:  National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 742, Country Files, Africa, Nigeria, Vol. I.  Confidential; Nodis.  The memorandum is stamped "HAK has seen Sep 30 1969."


--  122. Memorandum of Conversation, New York, September 25, 1969 [Get Acrobat Reader PDF version   ] 

In a meeting with Norman Cousins, the editor of the Saturday Review, and Biafran representatives, Roger Morris of the National Security Council staff stressed that the discussions were informal, secret, and implied no U.S. commitment.  The participants discussed starting negotiations, a partial stand-down, the U.S. position, negotiation procedures, the Organization of African Unity (OAU), security guarantees, other powers, relief, and the shape of the settlement.  Morris stated that he would convey the content of the conversation to the President and his assistant for National Security Affairs Henry Kissinger.

Source:  National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Kissinger Office Files, Box 52, Country Files, Africa, "Cousins, Norman" Biafra.  Secret; Sensitive.  An October 3 memorandum from Morris to Bill Watts indicates that the memorandum of conversation was forwarded to Kissinger.  (Ibid., Box 742, Country Files, Africa, Nigeria, Vol. I)


--  123. Memorandum of Conversation, New York, September 26, 1969 [Get Acrobat Reader PDF version   ] 

Secretary of State Rogers met with Federal Commissioner for External Affairs Arikpo in New York. They discussed International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) flights, reintegration of Ibos into Nigerian society, and meetings with Special Coordinator Clyde Ferguson.

Source:  National Archives, RG 59, S/S Conference Files 1966-1972, Entry 3051B, Box 499, 24th UNGA - Memcons, Vol. II, #30.  Secret.


--  124. Memorandum of Conversation, New York, October 2, 1969 [Get Acrobat Reader PDF version   ] 

Special Coordinator Clyde Ferguson met with Nigerian officials in New York and had a candid exchange of views about C-97s, Joint Church Aid U.S.A., Inc. (JCA) operations, and political pressure from churches.

Source:  National Archives, RG 59, Records of the Special Coordinator on Relief to Civilian Victims of the Nigerian Civil War, February 1969-June 1970, Lot 70 D 336, Box 518, E-1 Office Memoranda, reports to Under Secretary, etc.  Confidential.


--  125. Memorandum From Roger Morris of the National Security Council Staff to the Assistant Secretary of State for African Affairs (Newsom), Washington, October 6, 1969 [Get Acrobat Reader PDF version   ] 

Morris outlined new diplomatic efforts for ending the Biafran War.  He believed the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) had done some fast shuffling with the daylight flight proposal so the Federal Military Government (FMG) was committed while Biafra was not.  Morris felt that the next proposals must be precise.

Source:  National Archives, RG 59, Records of the Special Coordinator on Relief to Civilian Victims of the Nigerian Civil War, February 1969-June 1970, Lot 70 D 336, Box 517, Memorandum.  Secret. Copies were sent to Ferguson and Ruser.


--  126. Memorandum From Roger Morris of the National Security Council Staff to the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger), Washington, October 6, 1969 [Get Acrobat Reader PDF version   ] 

In anticipation of President Nixon's meeting with Secretary of State William Rogers on October 6, Morris briefed Kissinger on bilateral talks on Nigeria at the United Nations, developments in the war, and the Department of State's line of argument.  Morris advocated an activist U.S. role and warned Kissinger against Rogers' hands-off policy.

Source:  National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 280, Agency Files, Department of State, 10/01/69, Vol. IV.  Top Secret; Eyes Only. Sent for briefing. The cables at Tab A are not published.


--  127. Memorandum From Secretary of State Rogers to President Nixon, Washington, October 6, 1969 [Get Acrobat Reader PDF version   ] 

Rogers thought prospects for achieving agreement on relief arrangements were not good, nor was there evidence that either side was prepared to make the concessions required for meaningful negotiations. He outlined a number of "further steps."

Source:  National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1967-69, POL 27 Biafra-Nigeria.  Secret. In an October 8 memorandum for Kissinger, Haig said that Morris thought Rogers' memo completely misrepresented the issues; Morris was preparing a memorandum on it for Kissinger. (Ibid., Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Subject Files, Items to Discuss With the President, 8/13/69-12/30/69)


--  128. Memorandum of Conversation, Washington, October 12, 1969, 1-4 p.m. [Get Acrobat Reader PDF version   ] 

Roger Morris of the National Security Council staff met with Federal Commissioner for External Affairs Arikpo and Nigerian Ambassador Iyalla at the latter's residence and had a slightly acrimonious discussion on a range of topics: Biafran morale, U.S. relief policy, French status, Uli airfield, Chairman of the Supreme Military Council of Nigeria, Major General Gowon's, position and authority, International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) daylight flights, and U.S. interest in the conflict.

Source:  National Archives, RG 59, Records of the Special Coordinator on Relief to Civilian Victims of the Nigerian Civil war, February 1969-June 1970, Lot 70 D 336, Box 518, President Nixon. Secret; Nodis. A copy was sent to Ferguson.


--  129. Memorandum From Roger Morris of the National Security Council Staff to the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger), Washington, October 15, 1969 [Get Acrobat Reader PDF version   ] 

Morris briefed Kissinger on Nigeria/Biafra for his meeting that afternoon with Federal Commissioner for External Affairs Arikpo and provided talking points. Morris noted that Under Secretary of State Richardson had "decided" to proceed with the relief initiative the President previously instructed and had also "decided" to get moving on peace probing.

Source:  National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NCS Files, Box 742, Country Files, Africa, Nigeria, Vol. I. Secret. Morris attached the memorandum of his conversation with Arikpo and Iyalla on October 12 (Document 128).     


--  130. Memorandum From Roger Morris of the National Security Council Staff to the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger), Washington, October 24, 1969 [Get Acrobat Reader PDF version   ] 

Morris informed Kissinger that he was still very concerned about the low-key way the Department of State was going about the Presidential instruction to mount a serious peace probe. Under Secretary of State Elliot Richardson seemed on board and sought to bring Secretary of State William Rogers around by having Assistant Secretary of State David Newsom send a memorandum to the Secretary which Richardson would endorse. But the an advance draft copy of Newsom's memorandum, which Morris attached, "directly contravenes the President's instructions to pursue an even-handed and vigorous initiative." Morris requested (and received) Kissinger's approval to discuss Saturday Review editor Norman Cousins' peace efforts with Richardson.

Source:  National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 742, Country Files, Africa, Nigeria, Vol. I. Secret; Eyes Only. Sent for action. Morris made notations on and underlined portions of the attachment.


--  131. Telegram 180295 From the Department of State to the Embassy in Nigeria, October 24, 1969, 0443Z [Get Acrobat Reader PDF version   ] 

The telegram transmitted a message for Major General Gowon, Chairman of the Supreme Military Council of Nigeria, from President Nixon. The United States stood with the Federal Military Government (FMG) on its commitment to International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) daylight flights without violation.  The Biafrans would be asked that Uli not be used for arms flights in daylight hours.

Source:  National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1967-69, POL 27-9 Biafra-Nigeria.  Secret; Priority. Repeated to London and Abidjan.  Drafted by Brubeck (AF/SN); cleared by Newsom, and in U/CF, S/S, and the White House; and approved by Richardson.


--  132. Telegram 3001 From the Embassy in Ivory Coast to the Department of State, October 24, 1969, 1650Z [Get Acrobat Reader PDF version   ] 

Biafra rejected the U.S. proposal for daylight flights, blaming the rejection on the Federal Military Government (FMG).

Source:  National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1967-69, POL 27-9, Biafra-Nigeria.  Secret.


--  133. Memorandum From Roger Morris of the National Security Council Staff to the Deputy Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs (Haig), Washington, October 27, 1969 [Get Acrobat Reader PDF version   ] 

Morris informed Haig that the Department of State's Bureau of African Affairs personnel had been instructed not to talk to him.  Also, Assistant Secretary of State David Newsom had attempted to cut him off from all Bureau of African Affairs papers, memoranda, and policy discussions.
 
Source:  National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Kissinger Office Files, Box 148, U.S.-Domestic-Agency Files, State/White House Relationship, Vol. 1, January 28 - October 31, 1969.  Confidential; Informal; Sensitive; Eyes Only. Morris wrote in hand at the bottom of page 3, "Newsom 'cleared' his testimony, as pro forma, with Bob--and was told to avoid all statements implying what our policy is or would be.  Commerce and Treas. Were told likewise, and they observed the restraint.  You can judge from passages at clips how seriously Newsom took the 'clearance.'" The attachments are not published.


--  134. Memorandum From the Executive Secretary of the Department of State (Eliot) to the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger), Washington, November 1, 1969 [Get Acrobat Reader PDF version   ] 

Under Secretary of State Elliot Richardson proposed a Presidential statement that placed responsibility on Biafran authorities for the failure to achieve an agreement for daytime International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) relief flights.  Robert L. Brown signed the memorandum for Eliot.

Source:  National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1967-69, POL 27-9 Biafra-Nigeria. No classification marking. The statement was not released. See Document 135, Attachment C thereto, and Document 137.


--  135. Memorandum From Roger Morris of the National Security Council Staff to the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger), Washington, November 6, 1969 [Get Acrobat Reader PDF version   ] 

Morris recommended against a harsh Presidential statement condemning Biafra for its failure to implement daytime relief flights.  He wanted Under Secretary of State Elliot Richardson to issue a mild statement to preserve an impression of balance and fairness.

Source:  National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 742, Country Files, Africa, Nigeria, Vol. I.  Secret; Nodis. Tab B is not published. Morris' memorandum at Tab C is marked OBE, Overtaken By Events. The attached draft memorandum was not forwarded to the President. Attachments A and B to the draft memorandum were not published.


--  136. Memorandum of Conversation, Washington, November 6, 1969 [Get Acrobat Reader PDF version   ] 

Edward Kinney of Joint Church Aid U.S.A., Inc. (JCA) reported on talks with the Federal Military Government (FMG) and Biafra on JCA daylight flights.  The Nigerians were more interested than the Biafrans, but he was not optimistic of a favorable result.

Source:  National Archives, RG 59, Records of the Special Coordinator on Relief to Civilian Victims of the Nigerian Civil War, Lot 70 D 336, Box 517, D-13 Voluntary Agencies JCA.  Secret. The memorandum is 8 pages but only the summary is published.


--  137. Memorandum From Roger Morris of the National Security Council Staff to Anthony Lake of the National Security Council Staff, Washington, November 7, 1969 [Get Acrobat Reader PDF version   ] 

Morris outlined the ideological clash over Biafra among Secretary of State William Rogers, Under Secretary of State Elliot Richardson, and himself.  Morris complained that State was not clearing Nigerian policy cables and recommended Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs Henry Kissinger discuss with Rogers the President's desire for an active peace probe.

Source:  National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 742, Country Files, Africa, Nigeria, Vol. I.  Secret; Eyes Only; Highest Priority. The memorandum is marked "Sent by wire to K. B., 11/6" and "OK, W" and was initialed by Haig.


--  138. Memorandum From the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger) to President Nixon, Washington, November 11, 1969 [Get Acrobat Reader PDF version   ] 

Kissinger informed the President that the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) had ceased direct relief to Biafra and would channel its funds, food stocks, and equipment (including U.S. donated aircraft) to French and Scandinavian Red Cross agencies operating out of Sao Tome and Libreville.

Source:  National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 13, President's Daily Briefs.  Nixon wrote on page 2, "What does State suggest we do?"


--  139. Statement by Secretary Rogers, Washington, November 12, 1969 [Get Acrobat Reader PDF version   ] 

In his statement, Rogers rebuked Biafra for rejecting daytime flights and expressed doubt that the Cross River proposal could substitute for relief flights due to a low water level.

Source:  National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1967-69, POL 27-9, Biafra-Nigeria.  No classification marking.


--  140. Memorandum From Roger Morris of the National Security Council Staff to the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger), Washington, November 14, 1969 [Get Acrobat Reader PDF version   ] 

Morris's memorandum on bureaucratic coordination outlined the policy conflict over Nigeria/Biafra among the President, the National Security Council, Secretary of State William Rogers, Under Secretary of State Elliot Richardson, and Assistant Secretary of State David Newsom.  Morris recommended that Kissinger discuss the policy with Rogers, but Kissinger preferred to discuss it with Richardson.

Source:  National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 742, Country Files, Africa, Nigeria, Vol. I.  Secret; Eyes Only. Sent for action. The option, "I'll handle it with Richardson," was checked. A handwritten note on page one says, "Action Completed."


--  141. Intelligence Note No. 811 From the Director of the Bureau of Intelligence and Research (Cline) to Secretary of State Rogers, Washington, November 14, 1969 [Get Acrobat Reader PDF version   ] 

Cline assessed the recent acquisition of aircraft by Biafra and Nigeria as well as new Nigerian field pieces.  He doubted there would be serious negotiations until one side or the other was hurt sufficiently to force concessions.

Source:  National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1967-69, POL 27 Biafra-Nigeria.  Secret; No Foreign Dissem.


--  142. Intelligence Note No. 830 From the Director of the Bureau of Intelligence and Research (Cline) to Secretary Rogers, Washington, November 26, 1969 [Get Acrobat Reader PDF version   ] 

Although an attempt would be made to have second level talks under Haile Selassie's supervision when Ramadan ended after December 12, Cline believed a military solution was most likely. 

Source:  National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1967-69, POL 27-14 Biafra-Nigeria.  Secret; No Foreign Dissem; Controlled Dissem.


--  143. Memorandum From the Acting Secretary of State (Richardson) to President Nixon, Washington, December 4, 1969 [Get Acrobat Reader PDF version   ] 

Richardson outlined four basic courses of action on relief and indicated that the Department of State planned to proceed with the fourth one: increase U.S. support for humanitarian organizations that had existing airlift programs capable of ensuring a more adequate flow of supplies.

Source:  National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 742, Country Files, Africa, Nigeria, Vol. I.  Secret. In a December 23 note to Morris regarding Richardson's memorandum, Jeanne Davis, Director of the NSC Secretariat, stated, "I agree, of course, that this was OBE as of the week following its receipt. However, since we received it on December 5, several days before it became OBE, we are in the embarrassing position of having interdicted a memo from the Acting Secretary of State to the President on an important item. If there was any follow-up action, or if there are mitigating circumstances, could you please do a small memo for the record as a fig leaf to cover our nakedness."  Morris responded in an undated, handwritten note, "This was OBE as a matter of policy substance in State before it arrived, let alone events in Africa being anticipated here. Those who know the substance of the problem, therefore, are quite clothed."


--  144. Memorandum From the President's Deputy Assistant for National Security Affairs (Haig) to the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger), Washington, December 5, 1969 [Get Acrobat Reader PDF version   ] 

Haig, at National Security Council staffer Roger Morris's suggestion, proposed to Kissinger placing before the President the choice of appealing for a Christmas Humanitarian Truce in Biafra.  He expected the African Bureau at the Department of State to drag its feet on the idea.  Special Coordinator Clyde Ferguson, however, approved of the idea, which would strengthen the President's position for the coming tragedy. 

National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Subject Files, Henry A. Kissinger/Richardson Meetings, 11/12-69.  Top Secret; Sensitive. Kissinger indicated on the memorandum that he had discussed the concept with Richardson and wrote "appealing idea--will make proposal."


--  145. Memorandum Prepared for the Under Secretary of State (Richardson), Washington, Washington, December 9, 1969 [Get Acrobat Reader PDF version   ] 

The memorandum concluded that the population of Biafra was 3.2 million, considerably lower than figures used by relief agencies; the nutritional condition had deteriorated since June, 1969; and 160 tons of relief supplies per night would meet minimum needs.

Source:  National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NCS Files, Box 742, Country Files, Africa, Nigeria, Vol. I.  Confidential. The memorandum was forwarded to Kissinger by Theodore Eliot, Department of State Executive Secretary, under cover of a December 10 memorandum stating: "Enclosed is a copy of a memorandum prepared for the Under Secretary." Written in hand on the cover memorandum is, "No action necessary per R. Morris 12/16/69."


--  146. Memorandum From the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger) to President Nixon, Washington, December 10, 1969 [Get Acrobat Reader PDF version   ] 

Kissinger wrote the memorandum in reaction to an article in the Washington Post on December 10 stating that the Agency for International Development (AID) was building a road which was of potential military value to the Federal forces surrounding Biafra. Kissinger told the President that the road was good for relief, but had no military value to the Federals; he thought there was reason to suspend construction and was reviewing the matter further with State and AID.

Source:  National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 742, Country Files, Africa, Nigeria, Vol. I.  Secret; Sensitive. There are three handwritten notes on page one: Nixon wrote, "K - I think we need another review of our policy here--We are satisfying no one--& accomplishing nothing"; Kissinger wrote, "Roger--crank up another review after talking to me. K"; and a third note states "OBE" per MR 1/16/70." The article at Tab A and the map at Tab B are not published.


--  147. Telegram 208132 From the Department of State to the Embassy in Nigeria, December 16, 1969, 2115Z [Get Acrobat Reader PDF version   ] 

The Department transmitted a message for Nigerian Federal Commissioner for External Affairs Arikpo from under Secretary of Sate Richardson. The prospect of Addis talks under the supervision of His Imperial Majesty was encouraging, but while Biafran representatives were en-route, Federal Military Government (FMG) participation was in doubt.  Richardson sought to convince Arikpo that FMG attendance was essential, if only for positive public relations.

Source:  National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1967-69, POL 27-14 Biafra-Nigeria.  Secret; Immediate. Repeated to Addis Ababa, London, Paris, and USUN. Drafted by Brubeck (AF/SN); cleared by Moore AF, Newsom, and Eliot; and approved by Richardson.


--  148. Telegram 10757 From the Embassy in Nigeria to the Department of State, December 17, 1969, 1108Z [Get Acrobat Reader PDF version   ] 

Ambassador Trueheart reported on Nigerian Federal Commissioner for External Affairs Arikpo's reaction to receiving Under Secretary of State Elliot Richardson's message. Arikpo appreciated the points made, but believed it was time to end the "propaganda exercises." 

Source:  National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1967-69, POL 27-14 Biafra-Nigeria.  Secret; Exdis; Immediate.


--  149. Telegram 5483 From the Embassy in Ethiopia to the Department of State, Addis Ababa, December 18, 1969, 1400Z [Get Acrobat Reader PDF version   ] 

The Embasssy transmitted the statement to the press issued by the leader of the Biafran delegation to the Addis Ababa peace talks, explaining why the delegation was departing.  

Source:  National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 15, President's Daily Briefs.  Unclassified; Immediate. Repeated immediate to Lagos. Also repeated to London and Paris.


--  150. Transcript of Telephone Conversation, Washington, December 23, 1969 [Get Acrobat Reader PDF version   ] 

Under Secretary of State Elliot Richardson and Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs Henry Kissinger discussed National Security Council staff member Roger Morris's proposal for a Christmas truce. Richardson indicated that the Department of State had sought to determine if there was any basis for joining other countries in an appeal and had received little support. He noted that the Federal Military Government (FMG) was engaged in a broad offensive and would believe that unilateral action on the part of the United States would suggest involvement. 

Source:  Library of Congress, Manuscript Division, Kissinger Papers, Box 361, Telephone Conversations, Chronological File.  No classification marking.


--  151. Memorandum From Secretary of State Rogers to President Nixon, Washington, January 9, 1970 [Get Acrobat Reader PDF version   ] 

Rogers provided the President with a status report from the Department of State's perspective on the military situation, relief problems, future contingencies, diplomatic initiatives, and mediation efforts of the Biafra problem.


Source:  National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 742, Country Files, Africa, Nigeria, Vol. I.  Secret.


--  152. Memorandum From the President's Deputy Assistant for National Security Affairs (Haig) to the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger), Washington, January 9, 1970 [Get Acrobat Reader PDF version   ] 

The memorandum illustrates the division between the White House and State over Nigeria/Biafra, with Eagleburger meeting privately with Biafran representatives in Brussels and not informing any Department of State official. Haig advised Kissinger to inform Richardson about the meeting, claiming that the Biafrans refused to deal with State and this was only a feeler.


Source:  National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 742, Country Files, Africa, Nigeria, Vol. I.  Top Secret; Umbra; Eyes Only.


--  153. Memorandum from Roger Morris of the National Security Council Staff to the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger), January 10, 1970 [Get Acrobat Reader PDF version   ] 

Morris expressed his concern over the possibility of genocide by the Federal army and his desire for an armistice that recognized Biafra.

Source:  Library of Congress, Manuscripts Division, Kissinger Papers, Box TS SCI 17, Memoranda to the President, Jan-April 1970.  Secret.


--  154. Memorandum From the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger) to President Nixon, Washington, January 10, 1970 [Get Acrobat Reader PDF version   ] 

Kissinger informed the President that, according to the French, Biafran forces were collapsing.  The French desired U.S. common action in these grave circumstances.  The map at Tab A is not published.

Source:  Library of Congress, Manuscripts Division, Kissinger Papers,  Box TS SCI 17, Memoranda to the President, Jan-April 1970.  Top Secret; Sensitive; Contains Codeword.


--  155. Memorandum From the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger) to President Nixon, Washington, January 10, 1970 [Get Acrobat Reader PDF version   ] 

Kissinger provided the President with talking points on Biafra for his telephone call with Prime Minister Wilson.

Source:  Library of Congress, Manuscripts Division, Kissinger Papers, Box TS SCI 17, Memoranda to the President, Jan-April 1970.  Secret. Sent for briefing.


--  156. Telegram 233 From the Embassy in Nigeria to the Department of State, January 10, 1970, 2245Z [Get Acrobat Reader PDF version   ] 

The embassy reported that the Federal Military Government (FMG) had made no victory claims, and no information was available that would suggest Biafran defenses had disintegrated. Hard evidence indicated that Biafrans who had recently come under FMG control were being well cared for.

Source:  National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1967-69, POL 27 Biafra-Nigeria.  Confidential; Immediate. Repeated priority to London. Also repeated to Paris, Geneva, USUN, Libreville, Addis Ababa, CINCSTRIKE, DIA.


--  157. Memorandum From Secretary of State Rogers to President Nixon, Washington, January 12, 1970 [Get Acrobat Reader PDF version   ] 

Rogers provided an updated status report from the Department's viewpoint. An early Biafran capitulation or disintegration was likely, presenting problems of relief and security. Rogers noted the Federal Military Government's (FMG) sensitivity to external meddling and the need for a low-key approach.  It was also important for the United States to have a clear record demonstrating its support of an expanded relief effort.

 Source:  National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 281, Agency Files, Department of State, 12/01/69 - 02/21/70, Vol. V.  Confidential.


--  158. Memorandum From the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger) to President Nixon, Washington, January 12, 1970 [Get Acrobat Reader PDF version   ] 

Kissinger recommended announcement of a $10 million emergency donation to Biafra relief and approval of a message to Major General Gowon, Chairman of the Supreme Military Council of Nigeria, offering assistance and recognizing his conciliatory policy.

Source:  National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 742, Country Files, Africa, Nigeria, Vol. I.  Secret.  Sent for action.  A check mark next to "Approve" and an adjacent handwritten note, "per HAK 1/12," indicate that the President approved Kissinger's recommendations. A January 12 memorandum from Eliot to Rogers indicates that Rogers approved a telegram containing the letter to Gowon as revised by the White House. Eliot noted that the wording of the proposed letter, as drafted by State, had been changed considerably by the White House but there were few substantive changes. (Ibid., RG 59, Central Files 1970-73, POL 27 Biafra-Nigeria)


--  159. Transcript of Telephone Conversation, Washington, January 14, 1970, 5:40 p.m. [Get Acrobat Reader PDF version   ] 

In a conversation with Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs Kissinger, President Nixon approved Secretary of State Rogers' proposed trip to Lagos but believed he had to be strong with Major General Gowon, Chairman of the Supreme Military Council of Nigeria. The President emphasized that Rogers should stress U.S. interest in humanitarian concerns.

Source:  Library of Congress, Manuscript Division, Kissinger Papers, Box 361, Telephone Conversations, Chronological File, 3-14 Jan 1970.  No classification marking.


--  160. Telegram From the Central Intelligence Agency to the White House Situation Room, Washington, January 14, 1970, 2026Z [Get Acrobat Reader PDF version   ] 

Director of Central Intelligence Helms forwarded an intelligence report that he believed showed "such cynicism on the part of the French" that Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs Kissinger might want to bring it to the attention of the President. The report stated that there were no plans at present for French support to Biafran guerrilla resistance. The rationale, it was reported, was that the French supported Biafra because of oil, not the Ibo revolution.

 Source:  National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 742, Country Files, Africa, Nigeria, Vol. I.  Secret; Noforn Dissem; Controlled Dissem. The telegram was forwarded to Deputy Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs Haig by his secretary under cover of a January 14 memorandum which stated that DCI Helms had called and left the following message for Haig: "It seems to me that this item, although raw intelligence, shows such cynicism on the part of the French, Dr. Kissinger might want to bring it to the attention of the President."


--  161. Memorandum for the Record, Washington, January 14, 1970 [Get Acrobat Reader PDF version   ] 

Morris reported to the NSC Staff that many relief operations in Nigeria had been blacklisted.  Kissinger wanted to maintain a moral stance and stress our concern. The United States could not accept the concept that whatever Lagos did was right.

Source:  Library of Congress, Manuscript Division, Kissinger Papers, Box CL 314, NSC 14, Meetings Staff Meetings 1969-1971.  Secret.


--  162. Memorandum From Roger Morris of the National Security Council Staff to the Under Secretary of State (Richardson), Washington, January 14, 1970 [Get Acrobat Reader PDF version   ] 

In this memorandum on "Next Steps in Nigerian Relief," Morris outlined numerous relief effort possibilities while expressing concern about possible domestic criticism.  He stressed the Western Report as the basis for determining food needs in Biafra while doubting the capabilities of the Federal Military Government (FMG). Tab A is not published. 

Source:  National Archives, RG 59, Central files 1970-73, POL 27-9, Biafra-Nigeria.  Secret; Eyes Only.


--  163. Telegram 6676 From the Department of State to the Embassy in Ivory Coast, January 15, 1970, 2010Z [Get Acrobat Reader PDF version   ] 

The telegram provided a situation report on Nigeria. Hostilities had ended despite assertions to the contrary by Lieutenant Colonel Ojukwu, Military Governor of the Eastern Region of Nigeria. No evidence of atrocities by either side had turned up. The Federal Military Government (FMG) had blacklisted four governments and five relief agencies. Foreign relief workers who operated illegally in the Biafran enclave had been declared persona non grata.

Source:  National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970-73, POL 23 Nigeria.  Confidential. Drafted by J.O. Westmoreland, and approved by Brubeck and the Nigeria Working Group. Also sent for action to Addis Ababa, Bonn, Lagos, Libreville, London, Lome, Niamey, Oslo, Paris, Rome, The Hague, Geneva, USUN, CINCSTRIKE, MAC CP Scott AFB.


--  164. Memorandum From Roger Morris of the National Security Council Staff to the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger), Washington, January 15, 1970 [Get Acrobat Reader PDF version   ] 

Morris recommended that Kissinger see Princess de Bourbon who flew out of Biafra with Lieutenant Colonel Ojukwu, Military Governor of the Eastern Region of Nigeria, and had a message for the President.  Kissinger deferred to Richardson, who objected because it could ruffle feelings in Lagos, and arranged for her to meet Deputy Assistant Secretary Moore.

Source:  National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 742, Country Files, Africa, Nigeria, Vol. I.  No classification marking. Kissinger initialed "HK" next to "Approve" but wrote, "(But give Richardson opportunity to object.)" A handwritten note on the attachment, "HAK will call," indicated Kissinger would explain the situation to Galbraith.


--  165. Transcript of Telephone Conversation, Washington, January 15, 1970, 4:20 p.m. [Get Acrobat Reader PDF version   ] 

Norman Cousins urged Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs Kissinger to organize a large-scale "post-war reparations" program for Biafra.

Source:  Library of Congress, Manuscript Division, Kissinger Papers, Box 361, Telephone Conversations, Chronological Files.  No classification marking.


--  166. Transcript of Telephone Conversation, Washington, January 15, 1970, 6:10 p.m. [Get Acrobat Reader PDF version   ] 

Kissinger told Nixon that Cousins felt the President could gain prestige with groups not usually accessible to him by stressing humanitarian relief to Biafra. Nixon indicated he wanted to be sure that the USG took a leadership role on humanitarian problems.

Source:  Library of Congress, Manuscript Division, Kissinger Papers, Box 361, Telephone Conversations, Chronological File.  No classification marking.


--  167. Telegram 432 From the Embassy in Nigeria to the Department of State, January 15, 1970, 1703Z [Get Acrobat Reader PDF version   ] 

The telegram reported on conditions in the former Biafran enclave. There was no misbehavior of Federal troops, no evidence of guerrilla activity by Biafrans, and no pockets of serious malnutrition.  There was a fragmentary report that food and drugs were needed at Orlu, but there was puzzlement over the failure to find areas of serious malnutrition.

Source:  National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970-73, POL 23-9 Nigeria. Secret; Immediate. Repeated priority to London. Also repeated to Paris, Geneva, USUN.


--  168. Transcript of Telephone Conversation, Washington, January 16, 1970, 2:40 p.m. [Get Acrobat Reader PDF version   ] 

Rogers stated that Major General Gowon, Chairman of the Supreme Military Council of Nigeria, was the key to Africa, but that he resented intrusion.  As a practical matter, the United States could not do anything that Gowon did not approve. 

Source:  Library of Congress, Manuscripts Division, Kissinger Papers, Box 361, Telephone Conversations, Chronological File.  No classification marking.


--  169. Memorandum of Conversation, Washington, January 17, 1970, 10:30 a.m. [Get Acrobat Reader PDF version   ] 

Four pro-Biafran individuals meeting with Assistant Secretary of State Newsom complained that the United States was doing nothing to prevent starvation while endorsing Federal Military Government (FMG) propaganda.  Newsom countered by stressing FMG sovereignty and the need for hard facts.

Source:  National Archives, RG 59, Records of the Special Coordinator on Relief to Civilian Victims of the Nigerian Civil War, February 1969-June 1970, Lot 70 D 336, Box 517.  Confidential.


--  170. Memorandum From the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger) to President Nixon, Washington, January 19, 1970 [Get Acrobat Reader PDF version   ] 

Kissinger provided the President with a status report on relief, comparing the findings of Dr. Karl Western, CDC, based on a survey of Biafra in October/November 1969, with those presented in an attached memorandum from Rogers. Western stressed that there would be a completely unacceptable magnitude of starvation and suffering.  Rogers disagreed, noting that FMG claimed to have the situation under control.

Source:  National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 742, Country Files, Africa, Nigeria, Vol. I.  Secret; Sensitive. Tab B is not published.


--  171. Memorandum From the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger) to President Nixon, Washington, January 19, 1970 [Get Acrobat Reader PDF version   ] 

Kissinger presented talking points for the President's meeting with Secretary of State Rogers, Special Coordinator on Relief Ferguson, and Assistant Secretary of State Newsom the next day.  He stated that the purpose was to impress State with the urgency of the relief situation and the need for action by Nigeria.

Source: Library of Congress, Manuscript Division, Kissinger Papers, Box 3, Chronological Files, 1969-1975. Secret; Sensitive.  Sent for briefing. At Tab A presumably was Document 170.


--  172. Transcript of Telephone Conversation, Washington, January 20, 1970, 2:43 p.m. [Get Acrobat Reader PDF version   ] 

President Nixon told his Assistant for National Security Affairs, Kissinger, that he believed Special Coordinator on Relief Ferguson and others were convinced that it was necessary to deal with Major General Gowon, Chairman of the Supreme Military Council of Nigeria.  They discussed the starvation crisis, and Nixon expressed his belief that neither the Department of State nor Ferguson cared.

Source:  Library of Congress, Manuscript Division, Kissinger Papers, Box 361, Telephone Conversations, Chronological File.  No classification marking.


--  173. Memorandum From the Assistant Secretary of State for African Affairs (Newsom) to Secretary of State Rogers, Washington, January 19, 1970 [Get Acrobat Reader PDF version   ] 

Newsom's briefing memorandum for Rogers' meeting with the President emphasized Nigerian sensitivity to interference, the need for cooperation, and the very incomplete and inconclusive information about the situation in Biafra. Tab A indicated food supplies in Biafra were adequate and conditions were improving.

Source: National Archives, RG 59, Records of the Special Coordinator on Relief to Civilian Victims of the Nigerian Civil War, February 1969-June 1970, Lot 70 D 336, Box 517. Confidential. The memorandum is an unsigned copy that may have been sent to Ferguson for clearance and thus was not necessarily forwarded to Rogers in this form. Commenting on the last paragraph on page one, Ferguson wrote in the margins: "misunderstanding here of Western Jan memo which gave 4 choices & was addressed to total needs of 4 groups. Also, Western Appendix IV was misconstrued - airlift plus local food plus local commerce trade." Tabs B through E, entitled "Relief Organization and Tactics," "External Assistance (Excluding US)," "Food Requirements and Availability," and "US Actions, " respectively, are not published.


--  174. Memorandum From the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger) to President Nixon, Washington, January 20, 1970 [Get Acrobat Reader PDF version   ] 

Kissinger attached a memorandum from Morris that considered the Western Report valid in all aspects, cast doubt on Gowon's future, and expected large-scale human loss and serious political damage at home. Kissinger agreed that one million to one-and-one-half million people were in danger of dying from starvation or epidemics in the approaching 3 weeks.

Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 742, Country Files, Africa, Nigeria, Vol. I. Secret; Sensitive. Nixon wrote at the bottom of page one, "K - T. Kennedy told me Newsom & Ferguson had done well in their appearance before his committee. - He said he was not concerned about Rape etc. - That always happens - but that starvation is the problem." Attached to Morris' memorandum was Document 170.


--  175. Telegram 685 From the Embassy in Nigeria to the Department of State, January 21, 1970, 2101Z [Get Acrobat Reader PDF version   ] 

The telegram highlighted observations of Colonel Eugene Dewey, U.S. relief expert, following his recent visit to the enclave area. He reported a developing disaster of major proportions. At least one million people were in acute need, but relief was being hampered by the military in occupied areas.

Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970-73, SOC 10 Nigeria, POL 23 Nigeria. Secret. Repeated priority to London. Also repeated to Geneva and USUN. A February 3 telegram from the CIA to the White House Situation Room stated that a source had reported that Gowon had expelled Dewey. Gowon explained that he expelled Dewey because he was personally responsible for overdrawn and sensational reporting after his first visit to the enclave, and much of the subsequent overseas agitation about conditions around Owerri were traceable to his original report. (Ibid., Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 742, Country Files, Africa, Nigeria, Vol. I)


--  176. Transcript of Telephone Conversation, Washington, January 22, 1970, 8:05 p.m. [Get Acrobat Reader PDF version   ] 

In a conversation with Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs Kissinger, Senator Edward Kennedy expressed concern over the possibility that 30 to 60 percent of Biafrans might die. Kissinger expressed his frustration at bureaucratic obstacles and African sensitivities.

Source: Library of Congress, Manuscript Division, Kissinger Papers, Box 361, Telephone Conversations, Chronological File. No classification marking.


--  177. Telegram 738 From the Embassy in Nigeria to the Department of State, January 22, 1970, 1733Z [Get Acrobat Reader PDF version   ] 

During a press conference, Major General Gowon, Chairman of the Supreme Military Council of Nigeria, stated that relief was a Nigerian problem to be solved by Nigerians. He rejected any suggestion of Europeans coming in to provide assistance and said that relief agencies prolonged the war.

Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 742, Country Files, Africa, Nigeria, Vol. I. Unclassified. Repeated priority to Dar es Salaam. Also repeated to Addis Ababa, London, Lusaka, Paris, USUN, Geneva, CINCSTIKE, DIA.


--  178. Memorandum From the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger) to President Nixon, Washington, January 23, 1970 [Get Acrobat Reader PDF version   ] 

Kissinger listed in detail the U.S. actions taken so far in Nigerian relief and then summarized the current situation, concluding that as many as one-and-one-half million people would die in the next 2 to 3 weeks without an airlift of food.

Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 742, Country Files, Africa, Nigeria, Vol. I. Secret. The memorandum is marked "ret'd Jan 24 1970."


--  179. Memorandum of Conversation, Washington, January 27-28, 1970 [Get Acrobat Reader PDF version   ] 

In his meeting with the President, Prime Minister Wilson defended the Lagos government and noted that Nigerians did not like to be coerced. He believed reports of starvation were self-serving. Nixon stated that there was considerable suffering and emphasized that the U.S. concern was humanitarian.

Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 1023, Presidential/Henry A. Kissinger Memcons, Memcon Nixon/Prime Minister Wilson, January 27-28, 1970. Top Secret; Sensitive; Nodis. Haig forwarded the memorandum of conversation to Kissinger under cover of a March 3 memorandum in which he referred to the attachment as an "edited version" of the President's conversations with Wilson on January 27 and 28 which had been "further modified to remove any comments you made during the first day and cut down the first day somewhat." An unedited version of this memorandum of conversation is in the Library of Congress, Manuscript Division, Kissinger Papers, Box TS 63, Memoranda of Conversations, Presidential File, 1970.


--  180. Telegram From the Central Intelligence Agency to White House Situation Room, Washington, January 30, 1970, 1659Z [Get Acrobat Reader PDF version   ] 

A source reported Gowon's anger towards the U.S. Embassy and its efforts to press relief estimates on the Federal Military Government (FMG). The source reported that conditions were quite good in ex-rebel area and U.S. insistence that there were problems was causing deep resentment toward the U.S.

Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 742, Country Files, Africa, Nigeria, Vol. I. Secret; Noforn Dissem; Controlled Dissem; No Dissem Abroad.


--  181. Telegram 1005 From the Embassy in Nigeria to the Department of State, January 29, 1970, 1255Z [Get Acrobat Reader PDF version   ] 

The Embassy transmitted an eyewitness report by an Embassy officer who traveled through the eastern sector of the Biafran enclave and found that conditions were in good shape with much less devastation than expected.

Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 742, Country Files, Africa, Nigeria, Vol. I. Confidential; Immediate. Repeated priority to London. Also repeated to USUN.


--  182. Memorandum for the Record Prepared by William Watts of the National Security Council Staff, Washington, February 4, 1970 [Get Acrobat Reader PDF version   ] 

At a National Security Council Staff meeting, Roger Morris reported that many were dying in the enclave, and there was nothing more the United States could do.

Source: Library of Congress, Manuscript Division, Kissinger Papers, Box CL 314, NSC 14, Meetings, Staff Meetings 1969-1971. Secret; Sensitive.


--  183. Telegram 24460 From the Department of State to the Embassy in the Congo (K), February 10, 1970, 0203Z [Get Acrobat Reader PDF version   ] 

Under Secretary of State Richardson's message to Secretary of State Rogers sought to prepare him for a meeting with Major General Gowon, Chairman of the Supreme Military Council of Nigeria. Richardson noted that having launched a magnanimous policy of reconciliation, Gowon must have found the critical reports over conditions in Eastern Nigeria a rude shock. Rogers should be aware of Nigerian sensitivity and defensiveness and should proceed in a low-key manner.

Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 746, Country Files, Africa, Vol. I. Secret; Nodis; Immediate. Drafted by Ruser (S/PC); cleared by Moore, Brubeck and Lloyd (S/S); and approved by Richardson. Repeated immediate to Lagos.


--  184. Memorandum for the Record, Washington, February 15, 1970 [Get Acrobat Reader PDF version   ] 

National Security Staffer Richard Kennedy reported on his Nigerian visit from January 26 to February 5. He stated that there was widespread malnutrition in the former Biafran enclave but it varied from village to village. There was enough food, but insufficient transportation. Organization of the relief effort was all but chaotic. The attitude of the Embassy seemed to be somewhat "business as usual." He saw a conflict between the Embassy's desire for good relations and an expanded relief operation.

Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 742, Country Files, Africa, Nigeria, Vol. I. Secret; Nodis.


--  185. Telegram 1699 From the Embassy in Nigeria to the Department of State, February 15, 1970, 0955Z [Get Acrobat Reader PDF version   ] 

Ambassador Trueheart believed that U.S. pressures on the relief front had bought U.S.-Nigerian relations close to the breaking point and thus the United States should maintain the lowest of profiles until the irritations recently created had subsided somewhat. He noted that the feeding problem was being addressed with increasing effectiveness.

Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970-73, POL 1 Nigeria-US. Secret; Immediate; Eyes Only.


--  186. Memorandum From the President's Deputy Assistant for National Security Affairs (Haig) to the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger), Washington, February 16, 1970 [Get Acrobat Reader PDF version   ] 

Haig reported that the Biafrans might have reversed their attitude towards the Central Government and attached a CIA report on which that view was based. He cautioned against reliance on ultra liberal attitudes that had prolonged the war by their insistence that the Biafrans would be wiped out if the Central Government prevailed. He advised against nit-picking the Central Government, and did not share National Security Council Staffer Roger Morris's attitude with respect to the plight of the Biafrans.

Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 18, President's Daily Briefs. Secret; Noforn. The attachments to the memorandum at Tab A are not published.


--  187. Memorandum From the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger) to President Nixon, Washington, February 17, 1970 [Get Acrobat Reader PDF version   ] 

Kissinger seconded a recommendation from Ambassador to Nigeria Trueheart and Under Secretary Richardson that Secretary of State Rogers, while seeing Major General Gowon, Chairman of the Supreme Military Council of Nigeria, the next day, deliver a personal letter from the President and extend an invitation to visit the United States. Both steps were calculated to improve strained relations. Kissinger expressed concern that if the United States did not express continuing interest in relief efforts, failure to do so might be taken as satisfaction with current measures.

Source: Library of Congress, Manuscript Division, Kissinger Papers, Box 4, Memoranda to the President, Jan-Feb 1970, Feb 1970, folder 2. Secret; Nodis. The attachments are not published. Nixon approved both the letter and the invitation but wrote in regard to the latter, "but keep it very vague." Kissinger noted on page one, "To Haig - Rush." Attached, but not published, was a February 18 handwritten note from Haig to Kissinger stating, "I've implemented this with 'very vague' caveat. Note, Richardson cable sent w/out our clearance!"


--  188. Memorandum From the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger) to President Nixon, Washington, February 24, 1970 [Get Acrobat Reader PDF version   ] 

Kissinger forwarded Secretary of State Rogers' report of his meeting with Major General Gowon, Chairman of the Supreme Military Council of Nigeria, and highlighted it in his covering memorandum. Rogers reported that relations with Nigeria had obviously been strained but Gowon sought to improve them and was pleased with the invitation to visit the United States. He believed the relief problem was under control. Rogers thought the Embassy should be given maximum flexibility to deal with the situation.

Source: Library of Congress, Manuscript Division, Kissinger Papers, Box CL 288, Memoranda to the President, Jan-Feb 1970, Feb 1970, Folder 3. Confidential; Nodis. Sent for information. The memorandum is a copy marked with an indication that Kissinger signed the original.


--  189. Memorandum From the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger) to President Nixon, Washington, March 14, 1970 [Get Acrobat Reader PDF version   ] 

Kissinger forwarded Under Secretary of State Elliot Richardson's latest progress report on Nigerian relief and expressed his concern over the poor distribution and low tonnage of relief supplies. While the Nigerian effort had made tangible progress since the first chaotic days in January, the tonnage still fell far short of estimated needs.

Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 742, Country Files, Africa, Nigeria, Vol. I. Confidential. Sent for information.


--  190. Telegram 3073 From the Embassy in Nigeria to the Department of State, March 26, 1970, 1541Z [Get Acrobat Reader PDF version   ] 

In its weekly relief roundup, the Embassy reported significant improvement in the relief situation in Owerri and other sectors of the former enclave.

Source: National Archives, RG 59, Records of the Special Coordinator on Relief to Civilian Victims of the Nigerian Civil War February 1969-June 1970, Lot 70 D 336, Box 514. Confidential; Immediate.


--  191. Memorandum From the Assistant Secretary of State for African Affairs (Newsom) to Secretary of State Rogers, Washington, undated [Get Acrobat Reader PDF version   ] 

Newsom reported to Rogers that Ambassador to Nigeria Trueheart had expressed grave concern at the prospect of Dr. George Lythcott, who led the Nutritional Survey Mission in Nigeria, proceeding with further consultations with Nigerian health officials. Trueheart feared it could damage already strained relations. The Department wanted him to proceed with his mission, believing that unless the relief program was further strengthened there might be substantial deterioration in the feeding situation in the east.

Source: National Archives, RG 59, Records of the Special Coordinator on Relief to Civilian Victims of the Nigerian Civil War February 1969-June 1970, Lot 70 D 336, Box 518. Confidential. Drafted by William Brubeck on March 30. The memorandum is not signed.


--  192. Memorandum From Richard T. Kennedy and Roger Morris of the National Security Council Staff to the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger), Washington, April 7, 1970 [Get Acrobat Reader PDF version   ] 

Kennedy and Morris expressed concern that an article in the Washington Star, derived from a leak of a sensitive nutritional survey done by U.S. and Nigerian doctors in February, could have serious consequences for the relief effort and the U.S. role in it.

Source:  National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 742, Country Files, Africa, Nigeria, Vol. I.  Confidential. The memorandum is marked, "HAK has seen, 4/11." In an April 8 letter to the editor of the Star, George Lythcott, who led the American group that participated in the survey, stated that the numbers were incorrect and the conclusions drawn were wholly in error.  Lythcott also sent an apologetic letter to Dr. Silva and Dr. Adesyui in Lagos refuting Doyle's article, which was transmitted to Lagos by the Department in telegram 51941. These and other related items are ibid., RG 59, Records of the Special Coordinator on Relief to Civilian Victims of the Nigerian Civil War, February 1969-June 1970, Lot 70 D 336, Boxes 514 and 517.


--  193. Memorandum of Conversation, Washington, April 14, 1970 [Get Acrobat Reader PDF version   ] 

Ambassador Iyalla objected to the Star article, preferential treatment for Biafran visa applicants, and Biafran organizations soliciting money in the United States.

Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970-73, POL Nigeria 03. Confidential.


--  194. Special Report Prepared by the Central Intelligence Agency, Washington, May 28, 1970 [Get Acrobat Reader PDF version   ] 

The report depicted the new Nigeria as more nationalistic, assertive, and pragmatic. There was little enthusiasm for close ties with the USSR. The government was favorably disposed towards the United Kingdom but was suspicious of the United States.

Source: Central Intelligence Agency Files, OCI, SR 0372/70A. Secret; No Foreign Dissem. The report was issued by the Office of Current Intelligence, Central Intelligence Agency.


--  195. Memorandum From the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger) to President Nixon, Washington, June 1, 1970 [Get Acrobat Reader PDF version   ] 

Kissinger forwarded Secretary of State Rogers' proposal for a new course of action on Nigerian assistance together with his own comments. Kissinger thought there was no need to subordinate relief to reconstruction. Kissinger also forwarded a draft response to Rogers, which Nixon approved.

Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 742, Country Files, Africa, Nigeria, Vol. I. Secret. Sent for Action. Nixon initialed his approval of the response to Rogers at Tab A, which is not published. The graph attached to Rogers' memorandum is not published.


--  196. Memorandum From the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger) to Secretary of State Rogers, Washington, June 12, 1970 [Get Acrobat Reader PDF version   ] 

Kissinger informed Rogers that the President approved increased attention to rehabilitation and long-term recovery in Nigeria, but saw no contradiction between good relations and a significant continuing U.S. contribution to relief.

Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 742, Country Files, Africa, Nigeria, Vol. I. Secret.


--  197. Dispatch to the Chief, Africa Division, Central Intelligence Agency, July 31, 1970 [Get Acrobat Reader PDF version   ] 

The dispatch provided a number of comments on postwar Nigeria relevant to the preparation of National Intelligence Estimate 64.2-70 (Document 201 ). It was noted, for example, that reintegration of the Ibos into national life had gone much better than could have been expected. The military government had indicated that future U.S.-Nigerian relations would largely depend upon U.S. provision of military training and equipment.

Source: Central Intelligence Agency Files, 78-03050R/1/3. Secret.


--  198. Memorandum of Conversation, Washington, August 17, 1970 [Get Acrobat Reader PDF version   ] 

Upon his return from Lagos, Ambassador Iyalla met with Department of State officials for a wide-ranging discussion during which he said that U.S.-Nigerian relations were becoming cordial, the AID reconstruction loan was enthusiastically received, and the U.S. Embassy in Lagos was handling well its relationships with the Federal Military Government (FMG). He continued to object to activities in the United States by the Biafran International Foundation and the Nigeria War Victims Relief Foundation.

Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970-73, POL 17 Nigeria-US. Confidential.


--  199. Memorandum From the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger) to President Nixon, Washington, Undated [Get Acrobat Reader PDF version   ] 

Kissinger highlighted an attached report to the President from Secretary of State Rogers on Nigeria 7 months after the war. The report stated that Nigeria's recovery was continuing well, international relief had succeeded in averting mass starvation, and U.S. relations with Nigeria had mainly recovered, but there was lingering resentment over the U.S. role during the war.

Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 742, Country Files, Africa, Nigeria, Vol. I. Confidential. Morris drafted Kissinger's memorandum and forwarded it to him under cover of an August 20 memorandum, on which Kissinger wrote: "Word must be dependence in Point 3 of memo HK." (Ibid.)


--  200. Telegram 177998 from the Department of State to the Embassy in Ivory [Get Acrobat Reader PDF version   ] 

Newsom expressed his concern that Ojukwu might seek asylum in the United States, which could do much harm to relations with Nigeria.

Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970-73, POL 30 Nigeria. Confidential; priority; Limdis. Drafted by Kontos (AF/AFR-N), cleared in (AF/W), and approved by Newsom.


--  201. National Intelligence Estimate, Washington, November 2, 1970 [Get Acrobat Reader PDF version   ] 

The estimate examined the "Prospects for Postwar Nigeria." It noted that relations with the United States were improving, but that Nigeria emerged from the war with a heightened sense of national pride mixed with anti-foreign sentiment. Major General Gowon, Chairman of the Supreme Military Council of Nigeria, and others in the top military ranks had taken the recent U.S. affirmative response to their military training requests as an indication of U.S. support for, and interest in, Nigeria.

Source: Central Intelligence Agency Files, DDI Files, Job 79R-01012A, Box 391, Folder 5. Secret; Controlled Dissem.


--  202. Memorandum of Conversation, Washington, February 2, 1971 [Get Acrobat Reader PDF version   ] 

In a meeting with the Director of the Office of Nigerian Affairs, Ambassador Iyalla, on behalf of Major General Gowon and the Supreme Military Council, strenuously objected to the issuance of U.S. visas to former top leaders of the Biafran regime.

Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970-73, POL 27 Biafra-Nigeria. Confidential.


--  203. Memorandum of Conversation, Washington, February 9, 1971 [Get Acrobat Reader PDF version   ] 

In meeting with Assistant Secretary of State Newsom, Abassador Iyalla again raised the issue of admitting into the United States key members of the former Biafran regime, in particular Christopher C. Mojekwu, formerly Commissioner for Home Affairs. Newsom explained the limitations on what the Department of State could do about it.

Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970-73, POL 30 Nigeria. Confidential. In telegram 2103 from the Embassy in Nigeria to the Department of State, March 8, 1971, Trueheart reported that he had informed Ambassador Iyalla of the issuance of a visa to Mojekwu. Iyalla's only comment was "General Gowon will not like this." (Ibid.)


--  204. Memorandum From President Nixon to Secretary of State Rogers, Washington, April 7, 1971 [Get Acrobat Reader PDF version   ] 

The President, upon the recommendation of Rogers, approved the furnishing defense articles and defense services to Nigeria. Nigeria's eligibility had been suspended during the civil war, but top Nigerian officials were now interested in sending military personnel to Department of Defense schools in the United States.

Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970-73, DEF 12-5 Nigeria. Confidential. Enclosure 1 to Rogers' memorandum is not published.


--  205. Telegram 60226 From the Department of State to the Embassy in Nigeria, Washington, April 8, 1971 [Get Acrobat Reader PDF version   ] 

In a meeting with Secretary of State Rogers, Ambassadro Iyalla stated that he had returned from Lagos with instructions from Major General Gowon, Chairman of the Supreme Military Council of Nigeria, to protest the visa granted to C.C. Mojekwu. Mojekwu could become a major problem in U.S-Nigerian relations as he was a chronic troublemaker likely to incite Nigerian students in the United States against the Federal Military Government (FMG).

Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970-73, POL Nigeria-U.S. Confidential. Drafted by Foley (AF/NI); cleared in AF, SCA, and S; and approved by Eliot. Repeated to Abidjan and Lisbon.


--  206. Telegram 3902 From the Embassy in Nigeria to the Department of State, [Get Acrobat Reader PDF version   ] 

Under instruction from Major General Gowon, Chairman of the Supreme Military Council of Nigeria, Deputy Permanent Secretary of External Affairs B.A. Clark called in the Deputy Chief of Mission to express unhappiness over issuance of a visa to C.C. Mojekwu.

Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970-73, POL Nigeria-US, XR POL 30 Nigeria. Confidential. Repeated to Lisbon.


--  207. Telegram 74799 From the Department of State to the Embassy in Nigeria, [Get Acrobat Reader PDF version   ] 

This joint Department of State-Department of Defense telegram informed the Embassy that it was authorized to inform the Federal Military Government (FMG) that Nigeria was eligible to purchase defense articles and services under the Foreign Military Sales Act, but the FMG should be encouraged to focus primarily on the purchase of training.

Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970-73, DEF 12-5 Nigeria. Confidential. Drafted by Kormann (AF/I) and Critz (AF/I); cleared in AF/NI, DOD/ISA, Joint Staff, DOD/ISA/MA&S, AF/I and PM/MAS; and approved in AF/I.


--  208. Memorandum of Conversation, Washington, May 27, 1971 [Get Acrobat Reader PDF version   ] 

In a meeting with Department of State officials, Ambassador Iyalla discussed the Paris sessions of the Consultative Group for Nigeria and future U.S.-Nigerian aid relationships. He dwelt extensively on the need to improve AID's image in Nigeria.

Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970-73, POL Nigeria-US. Confidential.


--  209. Airgram A-22 From the Department of State to the Embassy in Nigeria, Washington, June 21, 1971 [Get Acrobat Reader PDF version   ] 

The Policy Planning Paper for Nigeria, dated June 1971 and approved by the National Security Council Inter-departmental Group for Africa, contained sections on U.S. interests, U.S. objectives, Nigeria's objectives, and recommended courses of action.

Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970-73, POL 1 Nigeria-U.S. Secret; Limdis; Noforn. The annexes are not published.


--  210. Letter From Major-General Gowon to President Nixon, Lagos, [Get Acrobat Reader PDF version   ] 

Gowon responded to Nixon's invitation to visit in October by pleading extensive commitments under the aegis of the OAU as well as State visits to African countries. He requested a new visit date, perhaps in 1972.

Source:National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Presidential Correspondence, 1969-1974, Nigeria - Gen. Gowon.No classification marking. The Department had authorized offering October 5-6 as dates for a state visit in telegram 64751 to Lagos, April 15. (Ibid., RG 59, Central Files 1970-73, POL 7 Nigeria)


--  211. Letter From President Nixon to General Yakubu Gowon, Washington, [Get Acrobat Reader PDF version   ] 

Nixon responded to Gowon's September 18 letter, regretting that a visit was not possible, but holding the invitation open for 1972.

Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Presidential Correspondence, 1969-1974, Nigeria - Gen. Gowon. No classification marking.


--  212. Memorandum of Conversation, The Georgetown Club, Washington, November 8, 1971 [Get Acrobat Reader PDF version   ] 

In a meeting with the Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for African Affairs, Iyalla expressed concerns that the U. S. Embassy in Nigeria was being downgraded from Class I to Class II and a Black ambassador was being assigned, indicating his country was being placed on the back burner. They also discussed possible visits by Vice President Agnew and Gowon.

Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970-73, POL Nigeria-US, Limited Official Use.


--  213. Memorandum of Conversation, Washington, March 6-7, 1972 [Get Acrobat Reader PDF version   ] 

British and U.S. officials had an open exchange of views regarding Nigeria, including prospects for political stability, economic development and Nigerianization, and U.S., British, and French relations with Nigeria.

Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970-73, POL UK-US. Confidential.


--  214. Memorandum From Fred Rondon of the National Security Council Staff to the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger), Washington, April 11, 1972 [Get Acrobat Reader PDF version   ] 

Rondon forwarded Secretary of State Rogers' memorandum recommending that Ambassador Iyalla pay a farewell call on the President. National Security Council Staff Secretary Jeanne Davis called the idea a "non-starter" and Deputy Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs Haig disapproved it.

Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 742, Country Files, Africa, Nigeria, Vol. I. Confidential. Sent for action. The suggested schedule attached at Tab II is not published, nor is the biographical sketch attached to Rogers' memorandum. A handwritten notation on Rondon's memorandum states, "disapproved by Gen'l Haig 4-14." In an April 11 memorandum to John Howe, Jeanne Davis wrote: "I think this is a non-starter. The President's office (Parker) has made it plain that the President does not want to see any more departing Ambassadors unless there are overriding reasons why he should. If HAK really wants to support this, we will have to be prepared to have one or two turn-downs before it actually goes through." Haig wrote on the memorandum, "AgreeDrop it." Both Haig and John Howe initialed Haig's comment. (Ibid.)


--  215. Memorandum From Melvin H. Levine of the National Security Council Staff to the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger), Washington, July 11, 1972 [Get Acrobat Reader PDF version   ] 

Levine forwarded a Department of State memorandum regarding troublesome relations with Nigeria and added comments of his own. One problem was Nigerian unhappiness at the U.S. resumption of imports of Rhodesian chrome. Another was former Ambassador Iyalla's unhappiness at not seeing the President for a farewell call.

Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 742, Country Files, Africa, Nigeria, Vol. I. Confidential. Sent for information. >At the top of the memorandum is written, "HAK has seen."


--  216. Telegram 8136 From the Embassy in Nigeria to the Department of State, Lagos, October 18, 1972 [Get Acrobat Reader PDF version   ] 

Ministry of External Affairs Permanent Secretary Joe Iyalla presented Ambassador Reinhardt with a lengthy list of alleged calculated U.S. attempts to downgrade Nigeria which, Iyalla believed, all added up to a pattern of U.S. indifference and a penchant to take Nigeria for granted.

Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970-73, POL Nigeria-US. Confidential. Repeated to Ibadan and Kaduna.


--  217. Telegram 9519 From the Embassy in Nigeria to the Department of State, Lagos, December 11, 1972 [Get Acrobat Reader PDF version   ] 

Assistant Secretary of State Newsom reported on his 5-day visit to Nigeria, remarking on Nigeria's independence and sensitivity. He noted that the United States remained popular but suffered from its civil war policy, its stand on South Africa, and the belief that the United States was unwilling to respond to Nigerian priorities on aid.

Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970-73, AID (US) Nigeria. Confidential.


  
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