Political Turmoil in the United States, 
June 1973–September 1974

35. Conversation Between President Nixon and his Assistant for 
National Security Affairs (Kissinger)¹


Nixon: With regard to Mao, you know, that is quite significant, 
don’t you think?²

Kissinger: Oh, I think that’s of enormous significance, Mr. President. 
Nixon: The other thing I was going to say, though, that—

Kissinger: Because it means that they think that they are going to 
deal with you for the foreseeable future.

Nixon: Right. The other thing is do you think that we should get 
in—well we can’t do it before you leave—but if you could get a mes-

Nixon: You see, it’s going to look rather strange if I go running to 
China if he doesn’t come here.

Kissinger: No, I’ve already done that.

Nixon: How’d you do it?

Kissinger: I had already extended an invitation at your suggestion 
a few months ago.

¹ Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, White House Tapes, Con-
versation No. 39–87. No classification marking. The editor transcribed the portions of 
the conversation printed here specifically for this volume. According to the President’s 
Daily Diary, Nixon met with Kissinger from 11:16 until 11:22 p.m. (Ibid., White House 
Central Files)

² Nixon is referring to a statement that Huang Zhen gave Kissinger that afternoon, 
indicating “Chairman Mao welcomes President Nixon to visit China at an appropriate 
time.” (Memorandum of conversation, June 4, 3–3:30 p.m.; ibid., NSC Files, Kissinger 
Office Files, Box 94, Country Files, Far East, China Exchanges, May 16–June 13, 1973)

³ Kissinger told Huang Zhen that Zhou “has a standing invitation from the Presi-
dent and we would be pleased to welcome him, either on a visit to Washington or in 
combination with a visit he may take to New York.” (Ibid.)
Nixon: Yeah, I know, but recently?

Kissinger: I repeated it and I said we can do it in one of two ways: either to go to the UN, or better yet just come to Washington on a personal visit.

Nixon: No, what he should do is come to the UN and then drop down here and we’ll give him a nice dinner, you know, without the head of state thing, but it will be everything except the drill.

Kissinger: Right. Well, I told him we could handle it either way. And—

Nixon: And he’s going to forward that to them, huh?

Kissinger: And he said—well, he didn’t turn it down. You know, in the past they said they could never do it as long as the ROC was—

Nixon: Yeah, I know. I know. Yeah.

Kissinger: He said, well he’s very busy and he’ll look at his calendar.

Nixon: Well in view of the Mao thing, you see, the Mao thing has to be significant, because if it came from Chou En-lai that would be one thing, but coming from Mao—

Kissinger: It came from both. It was a joint invitation.

Nixon: Right.

Kissinger: And I don’t know whether you noticed, Mr. President, when he came that he said to you, “Mr. and Mrs. Mao.”

Nixon: Yeah! Yeah, I know.

Kissinger: Well, that was very significant considering her role in the Cultural Revolution.

Nixon: Yeah, and as a member of the Central Committee.

Kissinger: Yes, and of the Politburo.


Kissinger: So I thought it was an extremely significant event.

Nixon: Yeah.

Kissinger: And also that they answered you within three days. I mean, you only saw him last Wednesday.4

Nixon: Right. Right.

Kissinger: And they also gave us a rather good message on Cambodia.5

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4 See Document 34.
5 The message about Cambodia that Huang read to Kissinger earlier that day is in National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Kissinger Office Files, Box 94, Country Files, Far East, China Exchanges, May 16–June 13, 1973.
Nixon: Oh, did they?
Kissinger: Yes, but we mustn’t refer to that it in any sense.
Nixon: Oh, no, no, no. Because they can’t get caught at it, I know.

[Omitted here is discussion unrelated to China.]

36. Editorial Note


The following day, June 14, Kissinger met in his White House office with Huang Zhen, Chief of the PRC Liaison Office in the United States. Kissinger gave Huang a memorandum that explained U.S. support for the dissolution of the United Nations Commission for the Unification and Rehabilitation of Korea (UNCURK) and the decision to postpone discussion of the future of the United Nations Command. (Memorandum from Kennedy to Kissinger, June 14; ibid., Box 99, Country Files, Far East, PRC–UNCURK/UNC)

On the subject of Southeast Asia, Kissinger remarked, “We can’t reiterate enough that the key element in Indochina is now Cambodia, and everything else will be easy once that is settled.” Kissinger also described the agenda for the upcoming summit with Brezhnev, which was to begin on June 18. Concerning the Strategic Arms Limitation Talks, Kissinger stated that there would be an “agreement on the principles,” but no “concrete agreement.” Kissinger also addressed the Chinese Government’s displeasure with U.S.-Soviet plans for an “Agreement on the Prevention of Nuclear War.” Two weeks earlier, the Chinese Government had decried this agreement as an attempt to establish a “U.S.-Soviet nuclear hegemony.” (See footnote 2, Document 34.) Kissinger noted, “We have decided to proceed [with the agreement] even though we take your views extremely seriously. It is important for you to understand our position. If we want to establish hegemony with the Soviet Union, we don’t need an agreement. We have many offers...
without an agreement.” (Memorandum of conversation; National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Kissinger Office Files, Box 95, Country Files, Far East, China Exchanges, June 14–July 9, 1973)

In response to Kissinger’s position, Huang produced a note from the Chinese Government rejecting the proposed U.S.–PRC accord requiring the two countries to consult each other before engaging in negotiations that could affect the other nation. Kissinger and Nixon had suggested such an accord in order to alleviate Chinese concern over U.S.-Soviet cooperation in the prevention of nuclear war. (See footnote 2, Document 34.) The Chinese note stated, “the joint declaration proposed by Dr. Kissinger on May 29 does not go beyond the scopes [sic] of the Shanghai Communiqué in principle, but on the contrary would, in effect, provide the Soviet Union with a pretext to peddle its bilateral agreements and Asian security system.” (National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Kissinger Office Files, Box 95, Country Files, Far East, China Exchanges, June 14–July 9, 1973)

37. Memorandum of Conversation

Washington, June 19, 1973, 10–10:50 a.m.

PARTICIPANTS

Ambassador Huang Chen, Chief, PRC Liaison Office, Washington
Han Hsu, Deputy Chief, PRC Liaison Office
Chi Chiao-chu, Interpreter
Dr. Henry A. Kissinger, Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs
Lawrence S. Eagleburger, Deputy Assistant to the President for National Security Operations
Peter W. Rodman, NSC Staff

Huang Chen: You are very busy.
Dr. Kissinger: With your allies here! We took out three paragraphs of a speech he wanted to make last night. I will show them to you.

1 Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Kissinger Office Files, Box 95, Country Files, Far East, China Exchanges, June 14–July 9, 1973. Top Secret; Sensitive; Exclusively Eyes Only. The meeting was held in Kissinger’s office at the White House. All brackets are in the original.
[These were later delivered to the Ambassador. Tab A] He wanted to attack countries who were opposed to the improvement of US-Soviet relations, because it showed warlike intentions. We told him he couldn't criticize third countries in the White House.

[Dr. Kissinger then hands over an autographed picture of the President and Huang Chen, signed by the President.]

Huang Chen: Thank you.

Dr. Kissinger: We have yesterday asked Ambassador Bruce to request an appointment with the Prime Minister, and we have asked him to deliver a letter to the Prime Minister, which we telegraphed to him. And I wanted to give you the original of the letter. Why don't you read it? And if you have any questions, I can explain it to you. [He hands over the letter at Tab B. The Ambassador examines it.]

I knew the Ambassador was learning English!

Huang Chen: It is progressing slowly.

Dr. Kissinger: Oh, really. How is your search for a house coming?

Huang Chen: Han Hsu can tell you.

Han Hsu: We have been looking at a large building and apartment house north of 16th Street.

Dr. Kissinger: Near the Soviet Embassy!

Han Hsu: No, much further north. Past the bridge.

[Chi then translates the letter for the Ambassador.]

Dr. Kissinger: Notice I am on a one-man campaign to change the Premier’s title [to Prime Minister]. It is because I can't pronounce Premier. It is the Assistant Minister’s fault; he gave him the title in Yenan. [Chi translates the letter.] And we have asked Ambassador Bruce to hand the telegraphic copy to the Prime Minister. We sent it last night. In case he has any questions.

But I think we have stated our policy here quite clearly.

Huang Chen: It is very clear.

Dr. Kissinger: And we consider that an obligation.

Huang Chen: And I believe Ambassador Bruce will see the Premier today.

Dr. Kissinger: I am amazed by your communications. I cannot find out what Eagleburger does in 24 hours.

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2 Attached but not printed. Tab A is a copy of Brezhnev’s speech on the evening of June 18. The three paragraphs, which criticized those who cast aspersions on U.S.-Soviet cooperation, were delivered with a covering letter from Scowcroft to the PRCL0 on June 19. (Ibid.)

3 Document 38.
Huang Chen: Your communications are very rapid.

Dr. Kissinger: Yours seems to be extremely efficient. Another thing that impresses me in China is that one is in a continuous conversation. Anything one says—first of all, the Prime Minister knows about it, and second, it is likely to be answered by another Chinese. [Laughter]

Huang Chen: We have the practice of what you call briefing. Don’t you have this, this briefing of correspondents?

Dr. Kissinger: Yes, but we don’t do it so elegantly. Once, when I first took Jenkins there, the Prime Minister came to visit the Guest House within one-half hour of our arrival, and he already knew about the house Jenkins had stayed in twenty years ago and whether it was still standing.

When I write my biography, I will ask for the Chinese file on me. It is probably better than my own.

Huang Chen: If Dr. Kissinger agrees, I would like to give you a message from our Government. [Tab C]4

Dr. Kissinger: If I don’t like it I won’t give you this one! [referring to UNCURK note in his hand]

[The Ambassador hands over the note at Tab C, and Dr. Kissinger reads it.]

Dr. Kissinger: They are doing to you what they are trying to do to us.

We appreciate the communication. And it is within the spirit of our mutual consultation. And I will keep you fully informed about our discussions here, and I will talk to you in a minute about them.

I have a paper on the Korean situation. [He hands over note on UNCURK/UNC at Tab D.]5 Let me fix one word. [He takes it back, crosses out phrase in fourth paragraph.] It is not “at least.”

[Chi translates the note for the Ambassador.]

Specifically, Mr. Ambassador, to make it slightly more concrete, we are prepared to bring about the termination of UNCURK during the 1973 UN General Assembly and the United Nations Command by the session of the 1974 General Assembly.

Han Hsu: You handed me another note on the 14th.6 This one is more specific.

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4 Attached but not printed. Tab C is a message from the Chinese Government about the Soviet Union’s proposed “Treaty of Non-Aggression Between the Union of the Soviet Socialist Republics and the People’s Republic of China.”

5 Attached but not printed.

6 See Document 36.
Dr. Kissinger: Yes. This is an elaboration of the other one. The other one was more preliminary.

Also, we have reason to believe the Seoul Government would be prepared to establish some contacts with your government, and if we can be helpful in this respect we are willing to do this. At the same time, to the extent that you have contacts with Seoul, we are prepared to have this with Pyongyang.

Huang Chen: We will report this to our Government.

What you said about the termination of UNCURK this year and of the UNC next year, it is not in here [in the note].

Dr. Kissinger: It is an elaboration. And we will encourage the Government of South Korea to make some of these proposals publicly, in the near future. Not about the United Nations Command.

One other matter, about Senator Mansfield’s visit to the People’s Republic. Everything being equal, we would prefer it if he came after I have been to Peking.

Huang Chen: That is up to you, to your convenience.

Dr. Kissinger: It is up to your skill in managing. You can do it more tactfully than I can!

Huang Chen: Last Thursday, when Senators Mansfield and Scott invited me to lunch, they said they had invited Dr. Kissinger but Dr. Kissinger had not been able to attend.

Dr. Kissinger: I had just returned from Paris.

Huang Chen: Senator Mansfield mentioned this. He said there were various factors involved.

Dr. Kissinger: We are in favor of his going.

Huang Chen: Didn’t you speak with him?

Dr. Kissinger: He mentioned last night that he was thinking of August. Why don’t you just schedule it after mine?

Huang Chen: Have you preliminarily decided on the date of your visit?

Dr. Kissinger: Would you like a proposal? We will do it soon. I will make a proposal within a week. Maybe when you come to San Clemente. [Laughter]

I want to tell your Prime Minister that if by the time I get to Peking a ceasefire exists in Cambodia, I would be prepared to meet Prince Sihanouk to have political discussions. But it should not be announced in advance.

Huang Chen: I will convey this view of yours to the Prime Minister. In talking about the visit of Senator Mansfield, you mentioned the interest of Senator Jackson. We welcome him to go but we would welcome him to go with the present Congressional delegation.
Dr. Kissinger: I think the Prime Minister and Senator Jackson will get along very well. Another person who would like to go, whom the Prime Minister and I discussed, is Governor Rockefeller of New York.

Chi Chiao-chu: Nelson Rockefeller.

Dr. Kissinger: Yes. David you know.

Huang Chen: I invited his brother to lunch.

Dr. Kissinger: He may be an important factor in 1976.

Huang Chen: David Rockefeller, at a luncheon with me, said his house in Maine is near Ambassador Watson’s house.

Dr. Kissinger: That is right.

Huang Chen: Ambassador Watson has invited me to visit Maine. So Mr. David Rockefeller invited me to visit him in Maine if I come to visit Watson in August. I don’t know whether I can visit Maine in August because I don’t know whether our housing situation will be solved by then.

On this subject, I would like to come to your suggestion. We have so far called upon various people in Washington, according to a list provided by the State Department. We called upon Senators Mansfield and Scott, the Vice President, and we will call on the Secretaries of Finance and Agriculture. So far there are many other friends who would like to contact us, but we have had to say we are busy. We would like to ask your advice of which friends we should visit.

Dr. Kissinger: Do you have a list? We can give you our suggestions. Or we can give you our recommendations. In 48 hours.

Huang Chen: There is no need for such a hurry.

Dr. Kissinger: We will do it. But you are of course free to see anybody you like.

When you speak of friends, do you mean private people or people in government?

Huang Chen: In government, or members of Congress or the Senate, or well-known personages.

Dr. Kissinger: We will make a list of recommendations for you.

Huang Chen: As for the list provided by the State Department, we told it to General Scowcroft over the phone.

Then about the call on the Vice President. I would like to tell you that the Vice President gave us a very friendly reception but didn’t mention his wish to visit China as had been indicated by General Dunn.

Dr. Kissinger: We would like to defer that until we have settled the time of the visit by the President—and of the visit of the Prime Minister to America. [Laughter]

Huang Chen: These are all questions we should discuss in August.

Dr. Kissinger: Maybe he should come on a secret visit. [Laughter]
Huang Chen: As I told Dr. Kissinger some time ago, as of my departure from Peking the Prime Minister had no plans to go abroad.

Dr. Kissinger: I understand. Have you any decision on whether you can visit us in San Clemente?

Huang Chen: Personally speaking, of course I would be happy to have the chance to visit you. But there still is some time.

Dr. Kissinger: Of course. You can let us know. It would be better for us, actually, the week after next.

Huang Chen: The week after next. The beginning or the middle?

Dr. Kissinger: It is up to you. Next week the French Foreign Minister will visit me in San Clemente.

Huang Chen: Jobert.

Dr. Kissinger: Jobert. You know him! Very cynical and very intelligent. We are counting on the Prime Minister to help us with the European program when Pompidou comes [to Peking] in September.

Huang Chen: Mr. Pompidou is coming here? Or to China?

Dr. Kissinger: China.

Huang Chen: Many questions will be discussed.

Dr. Kissinger: On the meeting with Brezhnev, I don’t know whether you know him, but he doesn’t have the same precision of mind as your Prime Minister. So the President asked him yesterday if he wanted to make any opening remarks. He started, and 2½ hours later he said he would make a brief conclusion, and then ½ hour later he finished his opening remarks. [Laughter] And they were very emotional and very general. And really less precise than what I had already told you from Zavidovo.

His basic strategy is to attempt to prove there are no differences left between the United States and the Soviet Union and that there is total solidarity on a global basis.

Huang Chen: So he thinks there is a relationship of partnership, as he said.

Dr. Kissinger: That is the impression he is trying to create. But that is not our policy. On very practical grounds it makes no sense to support the stronger against the weaker. And we will not do anything practical to support that policy.

Huang Chen: I don’t know this man personally. I only know Gromyko.

Dr. Kissinger: Gromyko is very precise. But Brezhnev is very emotional. And very brutal. I will give you a full report as the discussions develop.

Huang Chen: You mentioned there are three paragraphs you wanted him to delete.
Dr. Kissinger: I will send them to you this afternoon. They don’t mention China but it is obvious. They sent us over a text, and we said it was inappropriate to deliver at the White House. It is not exactly according to protocol, Mr. Minister. [Laughter]

I will in any event try to see you before we leave, but if you come to San Clemente we can have a long talk. And we will arrange housing for you when you are there.

Huang Chen: How many hours will it take?

Dr. Kissinger: If you wanted to, you could use one of our planes. But about 4½ hours. You are welcome to stay as long as you can. It can be done in two days. It can be done in one day but it is very exhausting. You should stay one night. If you think it is appropriate, I could invite some California friends for a dinner with you.

Huang Chen: Certainly if I go I would be happy to have dinner with you. And I thank you in advance for arranging if I go.

You are very busy, so I won’t keep you.

[The meeting then ended.]

38. Letter From President Nixon to Chinese Premier Zhou En-lai


Dear Mr. Prime Minister:

I have been following the discussions between Dr. Kissinger and Ambassador Huang Chen with great attention and I have also studied the notes that have been sent to us by the Chinese Government with respect to the proposed draft agreement. As you know, we differ in our assessment of the consequences of the agreement, though not in the purposes it is supposed to serve. It remains our view that this agreement confers no special rights on the U.S. or the U.S.S.R.—and we would oppose any such claim. On the other hand, there is no way re-
course to force can be initiated by the U.S.S.R. without violating this agreement and thus creating a legal basis for resistance. As we have told your representatives and also other governments we intend to use this agreement to obtain greater scope for actions in areas not now covered by formal obligations.

Whatever our disagreement as to tactics, I want to use this occasion to tell you formally that the U.S. will oppose a policy that aims at hegemony or seeks to bring about the isolation of the People’s Republic of China. For this reason Dr. Kissinger has assured Ambassador Huang Chen on my behalf that the U.S. will not change its vote at the United Nations on the issue of the prohibition of nuclear weapons.

I understand the hesitation of the Chinese side to sign a formal declaration along the lines proposed by Dr. Kissinger on May 29. Let me, therefore, state our policy unilaterally: The U.S. will not engage in consultations that could affect the interests of the People’s Republic of China without a full prior discussion with the Chinese Government. Specifically, any consultation under Article 4 of the agreement will be fully discussed with the Chinese Government before it is initiated and will not be concluded before the Chinese Government has an opportunity to express its view. In no case will the U.S. participate in a joint move together with the Soviet Union under this agreement with respect to conflicts or disputes where the People’s Republic of China is a party.

Dr. Kissinger will be prepared to repeat our opposition to hegemony and our readiness for full consultation publicly on the occasion of his visit in August if the Chinese Government should consider it appropriate.

I recognize that the Chinese Government will reserve the right to express its views on this agreement. I hope, however, that it will do so in a manner that will not complicate the fixed course of the U.S. policy which is to oppose hegemonial aspirations no matter what their pretext.

Sincerely,

Richard Nixon

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2 See footnote 2, Document 34.
5. Subject: Meeting with Chou En-lai.

1. I was called with no prior notice on June 25 at 5 pm and told Prime Minister Chou wanted to see me. I met him at Great Hall of the People at 5:45 pm, accompanied by Jenkins and Holdridge. On Chinese side were Chou, Ch’iao Kuan-hua, Chang Wen-chin, Lin P’ing (Head American/Oceanian Department, MFA), Ting Yung-hung (Deputy Head, American/Oceanian Department EARAN), Nancy T’ang, Shen Jo-yun, and two others.

2. Chou began with polite chit-chat about weather, and then worked the conversation around to modern science—"It can’t be said that there is no progress, but there are many unknowns." We talked about archeology, elimination of disease in China, and cancer research. (Comment: I recall from record of your conversation with Chou that cancer research was often mentioned, and wonder if this subject might have a special interest for Chou.)

3. We then got on to topic of way that scientists today keep in touch with one another in various parts of the world. Noted that this included nuclear scientists, who often felt an obligation to share their discoveries with fellow scientists in other countries regardless of security considerations. Chou picked this up, saying it was not possible for nuclear secrets to be spread throughout the world because their purpose was not to cure disease but to cause harm. He then referred to an article he had read in a Japanese newspaper about the USSR having stolen secret plans, weapons and equipment from NATO since World War II, which had given it much military knowledge. There had been more than ten major cases of this.

4. I told Chou I accepted the dissemination of nuclear science secrets as an exceedingly dangerous thing. I considered that any nation would be foolish to let other nations know about its technical developments in this field, regardless of whether these nations were friendly or not.

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5. Chou promptly agreed. “No matter how friendly people are to each other around the Western White House swimming pool, it is impermissible to make an exhibition of their nuclear secrets.” There was a political question here, and in spite of the fact that so many agreements had been signed, people still viewed them with suspicion.

6. Chou emphasized that this was his own view even after receiving the President’s letter.² He thanked the President for writing, but the Chinese would maintain the position set forth in the U.S.–PRC Joint Communiqué of February 1972. This position has been conveyed to you through Ambassador Huang Hua and Huang Chen, and so no further renunciation necessary. Similar reactions among others in the world would become evident in a short period of time.

7. Chou indicated the Chinese had been notified through “friends in the White House” that they would be informed about the Brezhnev talks. Ambassador Huang Chen was to be invited to the Western White House on July 5. Colonel Kennedy had also informed them in a letter that Brezhnev would make public the non-aggression agreement. (Chou referred in this context to four articles.) Brezhnev had told the President he would do so.

8. Chou declared that the Chinese had expected something like this ever since they had seen the draft agreement two days before Brezhnev’s departure for the U.S. They had said so to the President through you, and had also forwarded their conclusions. They were quite familiar with Soviet tricks, and could imagine what kind of show the Soviets would put up both before and afterwards.

9. I said I thought that the Chinese position was perfectly well known in the U.S., and was indeed indicated by the President’s letter. It was quite unique that in the course of all our negotiations with the USSR, the President had instructed you to keep Prime Minister Chou informed before, during, and after, about what had gone on. I deduced from this that there was a certain amount of suspicion also in the U.S. regarding the USSR.

10. I remarked it seemed to me that it had been a Soviet tactic for a considerable length of time to try to divide the U.S. and China. They must have been surprised at the turn taken in U.S.–PRC relations, and in fact had given every indication of it. If PM Chou recalled the original draft agreement submitted to you by the Soviets, it was evident this was an attempt on their part to arrive at a bilateral agreement with the U.S. in which the interests of third parties were not taken into account. As I understood the present agreement, the U.S.

² Document 38.
has undertaken with the Soviets to renounce the aggressive use of nuclear weapons, and not only by one power against the other but against a third power. This raised an interesting question—if two parties entered into an agreement not to take certain action, could one nation trust the other not to violate this agreement if it was not a treaty but an executive agreement?

11. Chou said the agreement was a mere statement about which we could not be sure. World opinion also had doubts. “When a nation has very adequate weapons, do you think it would renounce them?” Besides, even treaties had not been honored by the Soviets in the past. The Sino-Soviet Friendship Treaty had been signed to last for a thirty-year period and still had seven years to run, so why was it necessary to propose another non-aggression? (sic) To conclude a new treaty would show that the old one did not exist; hence, the (old) treaty was not reliable. If there was good faith, then a tacit understanding or a simple statement would be useful, but without good faith nothing was useful. Even a treaty would be useless.

12. Chou raised another point: Since only the two major powers were engaged in this agreement, there were grave doubts among other states as to whether these two powers wanted to dominate the world. The U.S.–PRC Joint Communiqué stated that neither party should seek hegemony, and it was also mentioned in the President’s letter that you would mention this when you came. But from the speeches and statements of the Soviet leaders, it could be seen they were seeking out-and-out domination by the two world powers.

13. I said I sincerely believed that the U.S. was not out to dominate the world even if it could. It had had enough difficulties in its worldwide endeavors, even in the recent past. However, I frankly could not say I had the same judgement or opinions about the Soviet Union. In my opinion, the agreement would be inoperable in case of aggression as far as its practical effects were concerned because its status would not affect any existing treaties, alliances, or rights involving third parties. Therefore, the U.S. was in exactly the same position as before—if there were an attack on a NATO country, or more dangerously, on Berlin, we had an obligation under existing agreements to come to their assistance. Such undertakings could not be breached now or in any other way.

14. Chou observed that in this case, we would give the world the impression it was possible to have a relaxation of tension. There would be a false sense of security.

15. I said that might be. I referred to the dangerous situation which already had been created for us in Europe by the measures advocated by some members of our Congress. They wanted to withdraw troops from NATO and rely entirely on nuclear power for defense. I did not
know what the consequences would be if our people were lulled into a false sense of security regarding the USSR.

16. Chou injected at this point that we would have to wait and see. It did not yet matter, because there was still time.

17. Continuing, I explained their attitude as being one of trying to make arrangements of one kind or another via trade, aid, etc. to get as many guarantees as possible no matter whether these were later violated or not. Knowing of the President’s and your own communications and talks with PM Chou, I realized the Chinese attitude regarding this operation was different from ours. Nevertheless, we were informing them of what we had in mind every step of the way. In my opinion, this was a very unique situation.

18. Chou remarked there had been direct Chinese contact with the U.S. for less than two years, and so there were various speculations as far as the world was concerned. He noted that although I had just arrived, I had read the records of previous conversations. He wanted to repeat what Chairman Mao had said to you last February: The U.S. wanted to step on the Chinese shoulders to reach the USSR. He, Chou, repeated this to indicate that such things could happen. Chairman Mao extended this philosophy to visualize what might happen if a war broke out between China and the USSR. In the beginning, the U.S. would maintain a position of non-involvement, but give military supplies to the USSR. Then, after waiting until China had dragged out the USSR for a period of time, the U.S. would strike the Soviets from behind. Chou reiterated that he was only repeating what the Chairman had said; however, the Chinese had made material preparations.

19. I said that I could see from this why they had such strong reservations about the agreement. Chou asked me if I had read the passage from the record, and I said I had.

Comment: I in fact do not recall Mao having spoken in such terms, though Chou himself did speak elsewhere of the U.S. standing on China’s shoulders to reach the USSR.

I added that I thought that estimate was highly pessimistic.

20. Chou declared that as he had told you, they had all along calculated on fighting on two fronts. They were digging tunnels and storing grain, and hence did not fear isolation. You had said they were approaching this question from the standpoint of revolutionaries, and they agreed. This was right—from the beginning they were revolutionaries, they had made revolution, they would never abandon their revolutionary principles. Chou said he wanted to tell me this frankly

3 See Document 12.
so that I could understand their general picture. They were not pes-
simistic but had to be realistic. This was why they went overseas to
seek friends everywhere, and opposed hegemony.

21. I said I hoped and believed our people understood. Every
country had to consult its own self-interest and prepare for the worst.
It should not be optimistic; that would be foolish.

22. Chou stated that there were many people in the world how-
ever not aware of this. They wanted to rely on other kinds of forces
rather than on their own people themselves. I observed that it would
be a terrible mistake for a great nation not to be self-sufficient, and to
rely largely on other nations.

23. I went on to say that I had been refreshed and invigorated (by)
the Shanghai Joint Communiqué because it contained statements which
outlined the differences between us—e.g., our political and social sys-
tems. However, there were also areas of agreement, and we could reach
more agreement if we proceeded carefully and frankly. All too often
people talked together and ignored their differences, and left them still
in existence. In our case, I did not see the differences between our two
countries as irreconcilable over the long run if we proceeded with
patience.

24. Chou paused for a long moment without comment, and then
asked me how long my diplomatic experience had been—forty or fifty
years? I replied, not that long, about twenty to twenty-five years. He
referred to my previous statement as having been made on the basis
of practical experience, and then said in effect that if things become too
complicated and too many empty words are said, matters turn out su-
perficially. It would be far better to work out one thing effectively and
keep one’s promises.

25. I said the U.S. would never want, nor could it achieve hege-
mony over China, over the USSR, or indeed over any peoples in the
world, because hegemony in the old imperialistic sense is gone. Na-
tionalism is dominant. People may make a mess of their internal af-
fairs, but it is their mess. This is the great change which has come about
in my life time. Chou added, especially after World War Two.

26. I continued that the real point of possible difference between
our two countries might arise from each of us acting on our own vis-
à-vis the USSR. If we acted independently in this regard, it could cause
great international difficulty. The situation in Western Europe also fig-
ures in the equation. The emergence of WE economically has been star-
tling and beneficial. But if it could also develop political cohesion, this
would be beneficial to you and to us—but not to the Soviet Union.
Chou interjected that the Soviets have tried different tricks to divide
us. I said the Soviets since 1947 had tried to destroy Western Europe
or to dominate it. I was skeptical that they would surrender that am-
bition. Chou said emphatically, “they haven’t.” I said if WE could form its own political apparatus (economic cohesion was comparatively easy), it would be at least as strong as the U.S., and stronger than the USSR. I did not know whether this could be achieved. Some progress had been made, but they had been talking unification for thirty years.

27. Chou said Soviets were not applying pressure on Japan. He asked whether it would be possible to improve our relations with Japan now, or whether this possibility had become more doubtful. I said I would like to answer by asking the Premier a question: Can any nation as economically prosperous as Japan, which has had a past history of imperialism and expansionism, ever renounce it? Chou said the Chinese at many times expressed to us the conviction that economic expansionism would bring about military expansionism. They also said this to their Japanese friends. It is necessary for us to work together with respect to Japan, for it is still at the crossroads. Chou said he had discussed this with you several times, emphasizing that we must work to keep Japan on the right course. Japan still speaks of its alliance with the U.S. now. It was important that Japan not be left in a position where it felt there was no way out. Japan should not listen to Soviet recommendations. For a time it might be possible for Japan to derive advantage (note: “win more rights”) but this could not be relied upon.

28. I said it was essential that Japan not fall under Soviet influence. China and the U.S., for different reasons, should take the position of keeping Japan from engaging in some mad adventure, e.g. allying themselves with a great power in a way which would put them under its control.

29. Chou observed that Japan has its own self-dignity, but economically its development was lop-sided. With such a large population in a small area it was dependent on foreign markets. To export, it had to import large quantities of raw materials. It might be beneficial to export Japanese capital to certain places, such as Siberia. The USSR has left the door wide open. Chou said China would not mind if the U.S. and Japan made investment there if we thought there was profit in it. We will feel more reassured if you are in it with Japan. If you are both in it together, you will not be so easily taken advantage of.

30. At this point the conversation had lasted over an hour and a half. Chou’s colleagues were consulting their watches; they probably had dinner engagements. The PM said when he left: “I’ve enjoyed this talk; I wish it could have continued.”

31. Comment: Perhaps because of U.S.-Soviet summit, most Chinese officials present appeared unusually serious at first, but warmed during hour and half meeting. Chou was relaxed and friendly throughout, although deputies thought he too was more serious than usual. In sorrow but not in anger he dismissed U.S.-Soviet agreement as a fait
accompli, but several times referred to Soviet unreliability and duplicity. Neither Indo-China nor Taiwan was mentioned.

32. Chou appeared to be in excellent health and spirits. Would appreciate if you would have check made as to textual accuracy of Chou’s reference to Chairman Mao’s statement (twice emphasized by Chou) of possibility of Soviets attacking China, and then in turn being attacked by the U.S. End of comment.

33. Warm regards.

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4 In backchannel message 23 to Beijing, June 28, Kissinger suggested that Chou was referring to an exchange with Kissinger (see Document 12) that began with a statement from Mao: “And then you can let them get bogged down in China, for half a year, or one, two, or three, or four years. And then you can poke your finger at the Soviet back.” (National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Kissinger Office Files, Box 95, Country Files, Far East, China Exchanges, June 14–July 9, 1973)

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40. Memorandum From the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger) to President Nixon


SUBJECT

Butz’ Meeting with Huang Chen

On June 21 Secretary Butz (memo at Tab A) met with PRC Liaison Office Chief Huang Chen. Butz was told by Huang of his deep respect for American agriculture. Huang asked whether the U.S. would welcome a visit by PRC agricultural specialists. Butz responded that we would and would also like to send similar groups to the PRC. Huang said that his country would probably be buying grain and soybeans from us for a number of years, and that in the near future it would be appropriate to have discussions regarding PRC longer-term needs.

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2 Attached but not printed at Tab A is a June 22 memorandum from Butz to Nixon. During a telephone conversation with Kissinger on June 24, Butz described his meeting with Huang Zhen. (Ibid., Kissinger Telcons, Box 20–3 [June–July 1973])
With respect to the present PRC crop outlook, Huang indicated that prospects were generally favorable but the weather was somewhat of a problem. It is too early to make a judgment on the wheat problem. The PRC has bought heavily from the U.S. in the first half of this year, and might need even more in the last half. Butz indicated that it would be helpful in our planning to have PRC estimates of their requirements for the entire 1973–1974 crop. Huang said he would ask Peking for the information.

Huang showed interest in the possibility of export controls. Butz indicated that he hoped we would not have to impose such controls; however, if they became necessary we would do our best to deal with customers on an equitable basis.

Huang took great pleasure in comparing our response and attitude to trade with that of France. The PRC had spent months negotiating an airplane purchase with the French, but had managed to buy the ten U.S. Boeings after only a short negotiation.

My View: This rather open discussion by Huang points up the importance the PRC attaches to agricultural purchases in the U.S. That they are interested in discussions regarding longer-term needs raises the possibility that they may be contemplating an agreement similar to that which we signed last year with the Soviets.

41. Memorandum of Conversation

San Clemente, California, July 6, 1973, 10 a.m.

PARTICIPANTS

USA

Henry A. Kissinger
Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs
Brent Scowcroft
Deputy Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs
Lawrence S. Eagleburger
Deputy Assistant to the President for National Security Council Operations

1 Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Kissinger Office Files, Box 95, Country Files, Far East, China Exchanges, June 14–July 9, 1973. Top Secret; Sensitive; Exclusively Eyes Only. The meeting was held in Kissinger’s office at the Western White House. Eagleburger prepared Kissinger’s talking points prior to the meeting and drafted the memorandum of conversation after the meeting. (Memorandum from Eagleburger to Kissinger, July 2; ibid.)
Ambassador Huang: While we are on the subject of speculation, let me discuss the visit of Prime Minister Chou En-lai to the U.S. There has been a great deal of speculation in the press, including one report on June 27 from San Clemente that the Prime Minister might consider a visit to the Western White House since it would not be so detrimental to our “principled stand.”

Dr. Kissinger: You must understand that we had nothing to do with those stories.

Ambassador Huang: The U.S. side must understand that it still has relations with the Chiang group. Last year a message of congratulations was sent to Chiang from President Nixon, and the Chiang group still has an embassy in Washington. Under these conditions, how would it be possible for our Prime Minister to visit the U.S.? A visit to San Clemente would only be using the side door or the back door. I should also tell you that the Prime Minister has no plans to visit the UN.

Dr. Kissinger: The stories did not come from us. We have always officially denied them.

Ambassador Huang: My personal recommendation is that it is beneficial when Ziegler says there are no grounds for such speculation, as he recently did.

Dr. Kissinger: That’s our position. As the President has said, he is willing to visit China again. But it would be difficult for us when there is no intermediate meeting in Washington. It would have eased matters if something took place between the first Presidential visit to Peking and the next Presidential visit, which we are prepared to do in 1974.

Ambassador Huang: This can be discussed in Peking.

Dr. Kissinger: Yes; we will stop all speculation in the meantime. How should we proceed? We have a number of concrete problems to discuss. I want to review the Brezhnev visit and one particular matter arising from it. Further, there are Cambodia, Korea, and a number of minor things.

Ambassador Huang: I’ll finish up and then listen to you. The other thing I want to discuss is Cambodia. I have a paper here to give you. (Hands over paper, text of which follows.)

“The Chinese side informed the U.S. side earlier that as Samdech Norodom Sihanouk was visiting in Africa and Europe, it was yet in-
feasible for the Chinese side to communicate to him U.S. tentative thinking on a settlement of the Cambodian question. Although the Chinese side had informed the U.S. side that negotiations between Samdech Sihanouk and the Phnom Penh traitorous clique would be impossible, the U.S. side nevertheless openly refused to negotiate with Samdech Sihanouk, which enraged him all the more. However, according to news reports, U.S. government officials have recently made some disclosures on this question, which have given rise to various speculations. At the same time, it is learned that the Lon Nol clique has gone to the length of spreading the rumour that the Phnom Penh authorities will enter into official negotiations with the National United Front of Cambodia very soon, with the United States and the Chinese Communists serving as go-betweens. In spreading such utterly groundless assertions, the Lon Nol clique harbours ulterior motives, widely attempting to confuse public opinion and forestall the settlement of the Cambodian question. The Chinese side is of the view that such a turn of events is extremely disadvantageous to seeking a settlement of the Cambodian question and will even cause trouble. The Chinese side cannot but bring this to the serious attention of the U.S. side.”

Ambassador Huang: This message was received before Prince Sihanouk returned to Peking.

Dr. Kissinger: (reading paper) He is certainly enraged.

Ambassador Huang: Since you always indicated in the past that you didn’t want to talk to him, he is angry.

Dr. Kissinger: Yes, but you have received several communications from us. These were before his return to Peking.

Ambassador Huang: Now that Sihanouk has returned to Peking, we will hand over your thinking to him.

Dr. Kissinger: I gather he had not received this by the time of his arrival.

Ambassador Huang: By the looks of it, no.

Dr. Kissinger: I did not know that the Prime Minister could speak French.

Ambassador Huang: He was in France.

Dr. Kissinger: I had forgotten. He made some comments in French about us.

Let me give you our view on Cambodia. First, we cannot control what the Lon Nol people are saying. But they do not know what we have said to you; the proposals we have made to you. It is just speculation on their side.

I want to speak frankly. What we have proposed to you—a cease-fire if necessary for only 90 days, we believe takes care of the situation. We have no interests in Cambodia other than what the Prime Minister
said to Ambassador Bruce the first time he saw him. This is our objective. We have no objection—in fact, we would welcome it—if the Government in Phnom Penh is on very friendly terms with Peking and would refuse to participate in great power hegemonial activities in Southeast Asia.

As I have expressed before, it is a delicate problem for us as to how to manage the transition. If we are pushed into an undignified position, it will only strengthen the forces in this country who will oppose other things we may judge it necessary to do over the next three or four years. So we think it important that the matter in Cambodia be ended in a way not necessarily wounding for the U.S. We take great care not to embarrass you publicly. We really think it is not in our interest to create a situation which is unnecessarily difficult for either side.

Ambassador Huang: I will report this to my Government. Our attitude has already been made clear by the Prime Minister to Ambassador Bruce. As the Prime Minister said, all sides should respect Cambodia’s sovereignty. We cannot negotiate about Cambodia. That must be between you, those now in power in Phnom Penh, and Sihanouk.

Dr. Kissinger: We’re not asking to negotiate with you, but we have made suggestions as the basis for a solution. If the Prince proposes a ceasefire before my arrival we could stop bombing, and then reach a solution satisfactory to everyone’s needs.

Ambassador Huang: It is up to the Prince. It is not for us to predict.

Dr. Kissinger: No, but our thinking could be mentioned to him.

Ambassador Huang: I can only report. It depends thereafter on my Government.

Dr. Kissinger: Of course.

Ambassador Huang: The Prince said a great deal at the airport.

Dr. Kissinger: I know. The guns have been going off all over Peking these days. The Prime Minister, for example, made some remarks to our Congressional delegation the other day.3

Ambassador Huang: I have not seen this.

Dr. Kissinger: I’m not criticizing. He bracketed us, but he hasn’t hit us yet.

Ambassador Huang: We haven’t heard anything of this.

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2 See Document 33.
3 Zhou Enlai’s comments about Cambodia to a Congressional delegation led by Senator Warren Magnuson (D–Washington) were reported in telegram 493 from Beijing, July 6. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy Files)
Dr. Kissinger: No? What he said was in the spirit of what you said before. It was new to the Congressmen, but not to us.

Let me say a few words about Brezhnev. I take it rather seriously. I want to tell it to you as it happened. I want first to discuss our conversations about China. Brezhnev sought for a week to see the President without me.

Ambassador Huang: You are a dangerous man.

Dr. Kissinger: Brezhnev is persistent but not subtle. He did see the President for about 30 minutes alone at Camp David. His comments about China were not favorable, but you may know that. But on the last day—on Saturday—Brezhnev had three hours with the President at which I was present.4 We talked about China at great length. It was his initiative. During the first part of the meeting he violently attacked the Chinese leadership and gave us his explanation of the Lin Piao affair. I won’t discuss that unless you want me to.

Ambassador Huang: It’s up to you.

Dr. Kissinger: It was in that context that he told us about the non-aggression treaty about which you had already informed us. He said he would publish it at a suitable interval after his return as an example of the bellicosity of the PRC.

On Lin Piao, the only thing that may be of interest is that he said he would be prepared to let us see their investigation report. We said we were not interested.

He then discussed a number of things. He said it would be intolerable to imagine a Chinese nuclear capability in 15 years equal to what the Soviets have today. This, he said, would be intolerable and unacceptable to the USSR. He suggested we cooperate on this problem, as he had hinted at Zavidovo. Now he was making a formal and more explicit proposal.

He proposed as well that the U.S. and USSR begin exchanging information on your nuclear program. We said we would not exchange military information and were not interested. Brezhnev then asked if we are prepared to exchange other information on China. We said we could not make one country the subject of regular exchanges. They could always tell us what they had on their minds, but we would make no such undertaking. Brezhnev then said he expected our relations with you to improve, and that they could not object to this. But if military arrangements were made between the U.S. and the PRC, this would have the most serious consequences and would lead the Soviets to take drastic measures. Those were the key points.

4 June 23.
They asked if we were planning any military arrangements. We replied three times that we have made no military arrangements, but we said nothing about the future. We do this as a question of principle. Neither of us has any plans along these lines, but we don’t believe the Soviets can tell us with whom we can have arrangements.

The meeting was between Brezhnev, the President, myself, and the Soviet interpreter. We have told no one in our Government of this conversation. It must be kept totally secret. We have not told Ambassador Bruce, but I would have no objection if, when you return, you talk to Ambassador Bruce about it. But no one else should be present.

Ambassador Huang: I won’t say anything to Bruce. You discuss it when you are there. As for us, as the President said to me last time, the Chinese side is very careful.

Dr. Kissinger: Brezhnev told us that only those in the room would hear of this conversation. But that evening, Gromyko asked to see me and asked what I thought of the Brezhnev conversation. (laughter)

He asked if I understood Brezhnev’s proposal about China. I said that I understood it to have something to do with military arrangements between us. Gromyko then said I had misunderstood. Brezhnev not only meant military arrangements, but also political arrangements directed against the USSR. I asked what was meant by political arrangements, and who determined whether they were directed against the USSR. Gromyko was very evasive. I then called his attention to the Shanghai Communiqué and told him that we had an understanding not to make agreements directed at other parties.

It is my impression that the Soviet Union was quite serious about some of the matters we discussed previously. They were more openly brazen and brutal than I would have thought possible.

Under these conditions we think it is very important that we understand each other and what our intentions are. Your Prime Minister mentioned to Ambassador Bruce that you think in the event of a Sino-Soviet war we would give arms and supplies to the Soviet Union. That is absurd. We have no interest in supporting the stronger against the weaker.

Ambassador Huang: The Prime Minister said that?

Dr. Kissinger: (Reading from Ambassador Bruce’s cable of June 26) “In the beginning, the U.S. would maintain a position of non-involvement, but give military supplies to the USSR. Then, after waiting until China had dragged out the USSR for a period of time, the U.S. would strike the Soviets from behind.”

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5 Document 39.
If China was attacked by the USSR, we would certainly cut off all credits to the Soviets. The second part of the Prime Minister’s remarks might be true, but certainly not the first part. Under no circumstances would we give military or other supplies to the Soviets if they attacked the PRC. We would certainly cut off all economic ties, but we don’t know whether that would be enough.

We must do the maximum we can to deter an attack on China. I used the Nuclear Agreement in a press conference to say that no attack on China would be conceivable that would not threaten peace and security. There would have been an unbelievable uproar in the Congress without the Agreement. So don’t attack the Agreement too much. Give us a chance to use it in the one way we want. I think we have out-maneuvered your allies on this one.

I have set up a very secret group of four or five of the best officers I can find to see what the U.S. could do if such an event occurred. This will never be publicly known. I tell it to you in the strictest confidence. The group is only being formed this week. I talked to the Chairman of the JCS about it when he was here this week. I am prepared to exchange views on this subject if it can be done in secret.

Further, I have talked to the French Foreign Minister about our interest in strengthening the PRC. We will do what we can to encourage our allies to speed up requests they receive from you on items for Chinese defense.

In particular, you have asked for some Rolls Royce technology. Under existing regulations we have to oppose this, but we have worked out a procedure with the British where they will go ahead anyway.6 We will take a formal position in opposition, but only that. Don’t be confused by what we do publicly. In the future, now that we have our military establishment understanding the problem, we can handle these problems in a different way.

When I come to Peking I think we should discuss this complex of issues rather seriously. That is, how we can do the maximum to deter an attack without providing an excuse to undertake it.

You above all should understand what our policy is. If we wanted to cooperate with the USSR, then we would not have to be so complicated. We are trying to gain time and be in a position for maximum resistance should it happen. This is our position. I must say that we considered our discussions with the Soviets quite ominous.

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6 Rolls Royce sought to sell Spey jet aircraft engines to the PRC. (Memorandum from Sonnenfeldt to Kissinger, July 12; National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 527, Country Files, Far East, People’s Republic of China, Vol. 8, July 10, 1973–December 31, 1973)
Ambassador Huang: I will report to my Government. As to the U.S.-Soviet Nuclear Agreement, I have already told you our position.

Dr. Kissinger: I know. It does not give us any great pain. It would be worse if you supported the Agreement. I just want you to understand our position. But don’t tell our Congressmen that it is just a scrap of paper. We want to use it. You can criticize it in other ways.\(^7\)

Ambassador Huang: Our Prime Minister said that?

Dr. Kissinger: Our newspapers so report. As I have said, we don’t object to criticism. The Soviets would think something was wrong otherwise.

Ambassador Huang: Our experience has been that if means nothing to the Soviets when they sign a paper.

Dr. Kissinger: I understand. Its purpose is in terms of our own problems; it has no impact on the Russians. But if I had said an attack on China threatened the U.S., there would have been a major uproar in the absence of the Agreement. But with the Agreement it was possible to say this relatively quietly.

I have to talk to the press now. What should I say about our meeting? That we had a review of the situation, and that we had a friendly talk? Nothing more specific? Do they know you are returning to China?

Ambassador Huang: Not yet.

Dr. Kissinger: The press will now say I have upset you so much you are returning to China.

Ambassador Huang: Others will say that I am so happy that I am returning to report.

(Break for meeting with the press and the President.)

Dr. Kissinger: I have just had a report from Ambassador Bruce about the Prime Minister’s meeting with the Congressmen. He did say what I reported, but he was provoked by our side. He did not volunteer his comments, they insisted on raising it. We understand that he has no choice but to express his view when asked. Then the Senators repeated it to the newsmen.

Our Congressmen do not have a capacity for keeping confidential information, and Senator Magnuson knows nothing about foreign policy, which makes it worse. We will have a chance to deal with it in our channels.

We have told you our views on Korea. I suppose that the Prime Minister will discuss it with me when I get there.

\(^7\) On July 7, the *Washington Post* reported, “Chou told the Congressmen that he thought the recent Nixon-Brezhnev agreement aimed at preventing nuclear war was unreliable and ‘only a piece of paper.’” (“Chou Condemns Bombing by U.S.,” p. A10)
Ambassador Huang: Did Dr. Kissinger see what our Prime Minister said about Korea at the Mali reception? He supported Kim Il Sung’s 5 points.

Dr. Kissinger: Yes, but that was a general statement. Now, however, we have to decide how we will deal with specifics—UNCURK and the UNC—over the coming years.

Ambassador Huang: You can discuss this in Peking.

Dr. Kissinger: You mentioned in an earlier conversation the possibility of an exchange of chancery sites. It is complicated legally, but we would be prepared to facilitate an exchange when you are ready.

Ambassador Huang: I am grateful for your concern. I wanted to discuss the general problem at a convenient time anyway. An exchange of property for a chancery is not an immediate problem, but I do need to ask your help now in obtaining an office building.

We have located 4 houses near each other—near S Street and Massachusetts Avenue. We have looked over hotels but find that they will not work. Now we have learned that office work is not possible in the area where the 4 houses are located because of zoning restrictions. So we have 2 requests.

First, can you help us find an office building near the 4 houses? We would then use the 4 houses as residences. The houses are located at 1) 2230 S Street (to be used as the Ambassador’s Residence); 2) 2200 S Street; 3) 2301 S Street; 4) 2339 S Street.

Second, can we get permission to use these houses for offices? We had been dealing with the Ramada Inn but when they heard we were interested they raised their price and are now asking far too much. So, can we find a small hotel or apartment (50 rooms or so) for our office work and for some of our staff to live in?

Dr. Kissinger: We will try two things: First, to get the zoning regulations removed from one of the buildings you have already found. Second, if that is not possible, we will see if we can find some small office building for your use.

Ambassador Huang: But we would still like, if possible, your help in finding a small building of 50 rooms or so.

Dr. Kissinger: We will do what we can. We are not well equipped for efforts of this sort, but we will do what we can.

Ambassador Huang: If any of the Rockefellers have real estate nearby, we would appreciate their help.

Dr. Kissinger: I was thinking precisely along those lines.

About my trip. I had thought of going to Hong Kong to get used to the time change, and then coming in from Hong Kong. Does this cause any problems?
Ambassador Huang: I am sure not. Ambassador Bruce stayed there several days. You should, too. Stay as long as you like. If you want to contact any of our people in Hong Kong, feel free to do so.

Dr. Kissinger: I know about your conversation with Secretary Butz. We will cooperate as much as we can on your purchase of agricultural products. You should know that Brezhnev proposed a five year agreement of 5 million tons of grain per year for five years. We agreed in principle, but went no further.

Ambassador Huang: Yes, I had a good discussion with Secretaries Butz and Dent. Both took a very positive attitude toward the development of relations.

Dr. Kissinger: If you ever encounter bureaucratic problems, let my office know. You will get sympathetic treatment from us.

Ambassador Huang: Secretary Butz mentioned the possibility of having officers in charge of agriculture in each Liaison Office. I have put this proposal to my Government. Personally, it looks sensible to me.

8 See Document 40.

42. Memorandum for the President’s File by the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger)

San Clemente, California, July 6, 1973, 11:30 a.m.

SUBJECT

Meeting with Ambassador Huang Chen, Head of the PRC Liaison Office in Washington, Friday, July 6, 1973, 11:30 a.m.

PARTICIPANTS

The President
Ambassador Huang Chen
Dr. Henry A. Kissinger, Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs
Chi Ch’ao-chu (Interpreter)

1 Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Kissinger Office Files, Box 95, Country Files, Far East, China Exchanges, June 14–Jul 9, 1973. Top Secret; Sensitive; Exclusively Eyes Only. The meeting was held in the President’s office at the Western White House. Kissinger provided Nixon with talking points prior to the meeting. (Briefing paper from Kissinger, July 6; ibid.) Brackets are in the original.
The President welcomed Ambassador Huang to the Western White House. He told the Ambassador that he expected the sun to be returning in the afternoon. Ambassador Huang Chen thanked the President and expressed his happiness to be in the Western White House to pay his respects. The President told the Ambassador that he would drive the Ambassador over there to see the President’s house. The Ambassador noted that looking across the Pacific, we realize China is just on the other side.

The President pointed out that it was from here in July 1971 that he had announced his visit to China.

The President then said that he wanted to reaffirm the matters that Dr. Kissinger had discussed with the Ambassador. These assurances all had the President’s complete support. Sometimes one may wonder which assistants speak for the President. But Dr. Kissinger never spoke for himself alone. He always reflected the President’s own views.

[At this point in the conversation there was a break for picture-taking.]

The President continued by saying that he wanted to re-emphasize the point made in his letter to Premier Chou En-lai regarding the President’s meetings with Brezhnev. The Ambassador and the Premier would recall the President’s first meeting with Huang Chen in Washington when the President said that nothing would be done with Brezhnev in derogation of our relations with the PRC. We had kept both the letter and the spirit of this commitment, the President stressed. Any interpretation that this nuclear agreement set up a condominium or inhibited the United States from doing what it required if there was an attack, nuclear or otherwise, on third countries was inaccurate. When Dr. Kissinger had had his press briefing on the nuclear agreement, the President had asked him to say that an attack on the PRC would endanger international peace and security. This President wanted this point made, not because we feared an attack or because we have good relations with the PRC, but because we had determined on the basis of the security interests of the United States that the PRC should be free, independent, and secure. One could have tried to put

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2 Document 38.
3 See Document 34.
4 A transcript of Kissinger’s press conference of June 25, in which he discussed China, international peace and security, as well as the nuclear agreement, is in Ford Library, National Security Adviser, Kissinger–Scowcroft West Wing Office Files, 1974–1977, China Exchanges, Box 4. When asked whether the United States was signaling “the Russians that they have a free hand where China is concerned,” Kissinger replied, “it is difficult to conceive a military attack by anybody on the People’s Republic of China that would not endanger international peace and security and, therefore, it would be thought to be, from whatever direction it came, not consistent with our view of this treaty.”
it on the basis of a personal relationship, but this was a lasting national interest. Each country had an interest in the survival of the other. We could sign a piece of paper with great fanfare and clinking of glasses. But we knew from history that every war has started with the breaking of a treaty.

Our interests today coincided and would continue to coincide for many years to come, the President continued. These personal discussions with the Ambassador, while not reduced to a formal agreement, represented the policy of the United States, which would be implemented without question in the years to come. We did not say things privately to the PRC and another thing publicly to the Russians. Our interests required us to meet with the Soviet leaders and find ways to agree. But we totally rejected a condominium of the two superpowers. And we totally rejected the idea of giving the Soviets a free hand to move against their neighbors. So the United States would work hard for continuing to develop its relations with the PRC, having in mind the personal warmth which characterized this relationship but also that our interests required that we be inseparable on security matters.

Ambassador Huang wanted again to express his happiness to come to the Western White House. He would surely report to Chairman Mao and Premier Chou En-lai what the President had said. He would be returning to China but he will see Dr. Kissinger again in August in Peking. The President pointed out the importance we attached to taking care of our confidential channel. The Ambassador repeated that he would report all this to Premier Chou En-lai.

The President then turned to Cambodia. At the present time it was our judgment, he said, that the Chinese Government held the key, through the influence it may exert on Sihanouk. The situation was urgent, because if it continued to deteriorate, the possibility of the conflict spreading was real. The war in South Vietnam was over, and in Laos. They were continuing to negotiate in typically Laotian fashion. But in Cambodia the war was going on, and the President felt very strongly that it did not serve our mutual interest to be dragged into differences and even a confrontation about Cambodia. The United States had no desire to retain a special position of influence or to retain any military forces there. Our desire was to have a government in Phnom Penh to bring peace. If our two countries could work together it would have a good effect not only in the relations of our two countries but also on world opinion. There were many danger spots, like the Middle East. The small country of Cambodia was the only one where a war was going on. We therefore felt a way must be found to settle it. The United States had no unilateral solution, but rather it took the influence of all interested parties.

The President then said he was not asking for an immediate comment from the Ambassador. But the President hoped the Ambassador
would convey these ideas to Premier Chou En-lai so that the US and PRC could discuss it if it was not settled by the time Dr. Kissinger got to Peking. Ambassador Huang responded that he would carefully convey the President’s words to the Premier. He added that China, too, wished for an early end to the war.

43. Memorandum of Conversation

Washington, July 19, 1973, 11:00–11:46 a.m.

PARTICIPANTS

Henry A. Kissinger
General Brent Scowcroft
Lawrence Eagleburger
Winston Lord
Jonathan T. Howe
Richard Solomon
Peter W. Rodman

Mr. Kissinger convened the meeting in order to discuss the note received from the PRC the previous evening (Tab A)—its implications with respect to Cambodia, his prospective trip to Peking, and the course of Sino-U.S. relations; and how the U.S. should respond.

Mr. Kissinger began by pointing out that the note had to be read against the background of the course of the U.S.-Chinese relationship over the past several months. This note was clearly intended as a cancellation or postponement of the Kissinger trip and an opting-out by the Chinese of any involvement in negotiations for a Cambodian settlement. This was a complete reversal of the Chinese position on both counts.


2 Attached but not printed is a note that Han Xu handed to Scowcroft on July 18 at 6:30 p.m. In the note, the Chinese Government expressed support for Sihanouk’s demand that the United States end its military involvement in Cambodia and declared its unwillingness to communicate the U.S. point of view to Sihanouk under present circumstances. The Chinese blamed the inability to settle the Cambodia question on the U.S. Government’s unwillingness to accept Sihanouk’s “reasonable demands,” and asserted, “It is up to the doer to undo the knot. The key to the settlement of the question is held by the United States, and not by others.”
On each and every previous Kissinger trip to China the Chinese had proposed that he meet with Sihanouk. Sihanouk has now said, in a speech on July 10,\(^3\) that we should negotiate with the Khmer Rouge and not with him, Mr. Solomon interjected. That is true, Mr. Kissinger replied. But on each previous trip, especially in February 1973, Cambodia had been discussed extensively. At the end of May we had made a proposal and the Chinese had said they would convey it to Sihanouk once he returned from his travels.\(^4\) Their message of June 4 went to the extraordinary length of reciting our proposal back to us to make sure they understood it correctly—something they had never done on any other subject.\(^5\) Therefore this note represented a reneging on a clear assurance.

What had happened in the interim? Mr. Kissinger asked. The Congressional vote to cut off the bombing had destroyed the balance in Cambodia. It was clear the Chinese couldn’t deliver.

The bombing cut-off had fundamentally changed the situation in Cambodia. Formerly, Sihanouk’s utility to the Khmer Rouge had been that he gave them legitimacy which they had not had. Now they didn’t need legitimacy; they saw they could win. Sihanouk’s utility to the Chinese had been that he gave them influence over the Khmer Rouge and could resist other outside influences. The utility of the Chinese to us was that they had some control over Sihanouk. Sihanouk’s utility to us was that, once he returned to Cambodia, he might be able to keep things balanced. Ironically the Chinese needed the Lon Nol group—this was a restraint on Sihanouk and on the Khmer Rouge. The Congressmen had totally misjudged the situation. Now this was all lost. Sihanouk couldn’t deliver the Khmer Rouge and the Chinese couldn’t deliver Sihanouk.

With respect to the trip, the Chinese had virtually agreed in June that it would take place in early August. They had invited us to choose any date we wanted. We had then proposed August 6. They had spread

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\(^4\) On May 27, Kissinger told Huang Hua, “We are prepared to stop our bombing in Cambodia, and we are prepared to withdraw the very small advisory group we have there. And we are prepared to arrange for Lon Nol to leave for medical treatment in the United States. In return we would like a ceasefire—if necessary, say for ninety days—a negotiation between the Sihanouk group and the remainder of the Lon Nol group; and while this negotiation is going on in Cambodia, we would authorize some discussions between the staff of Ambassador Bruce and Prince Sihanouk in Peking.” (Memorandum of conversation; National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Kissinger Office Files, Box 94, Country Files, Far East, China Exchanges, May 16–June 13, 1973) Kissinger reiterated this proposal in a meeting with Huang Chen on May 29. (Memorandum of conversation; ibid.)

\(^5\) Huang Zhen read the U.S. proposal on Cambodia during a June 4 meeting with Kissinger, lasting from 3 to 3:30 p.m. (Ibid.)
the word around that it would be early August and had even leaked the date of August 6th to the press in Peking. But then Huang Chen was called back the beginning of this month and we received the note that they couldn’t reply on a date until he got to Peking. We had yet to receive a reply to our proposed dates for the trip and for the announcement. We had first proposed July 16th for the announcement. But July 16th had come and gone. The Chinese had to know that this delay in replying, and the turn-around on Cambodia, meant a postponement.

This was a conscious decision, Mr. Kissinger concluded. The question was whether it reflected only the Cambodian issue or something more fundamental that was happening to the relationship. Brent had told Han Hsu that Dr. Kissinger’s authority would be undermined if he came back empty-handed on Cambodia and that he and the President were the key men who embodied American support for China for the right reasons. All this talk about 25 years of mutual estrangement was crap. What the Chinese wanted was support in a military contingency. We might not be able to pull it off, but at least he and the President understood this. Alex Eckstein and other chowder-headed liberals loved China but if you asked them about military actions in a contingency they’d have 600 heart attacks. Liberals kept talking about how isolation was so psychologically disturbing to the Chinese. It might have been psychologically disturbing to us, but it wasn’t to the Chinese. For 3,000 years it didn’t bother them to be isolated. They’ve been self-contained more than they’ve been in contact with the rest of the world, and they have the self-assurance to handle it quite well.

To cancel a Kissinger trip was a major international event. It had to be a major decision for them. To assess this question—this was the real reason Mr. Kissinger had called together this group.

Mr. Solomon pointed out the disastrous Magnuson conversation with Chou En-lai. Chou had been visibly angered by Magnuson’s attempt to engage him with the Congress against the President. Magnuson’s repeated assertions of the independence of Congress and the obvious interest of many Senators and Representatives in using trips to the PRC for their own domestic political purposes, very likely has left PRC leaders with a contemptuous feeling toward our governmental system, and a belief that they could use these men against an Administration position which they did not like.

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7 Solomon, who accompanied the delegation, reported that “the Magnuson delegation almost certainly made a negative impact on the Chinese regarding its general intellectual level.” Solomon continued, “Magnuson’s repeated assertions of the independence of Congress and the obvious interest of many Senators and Representatives in using trips to the PRC for their own domestic political purposes, very likely has left PRC leaders with a contemptuous feeling toward our governmental system, and a belief that they could use these men against an Administration position which they did not like.” (Memorandum from Solomon to Kissinger, July 18; National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Kissinger Office Files, Box 95, Country Files, Far East, China Exchanges, July 10–Oct. 31, 1973)
nuson had talked for 45 minutes about Cambodia in spite of everyone else’s efforts to get off the subject. While Chou attacked the U.S.-Soviet nuclear agreement, and uttered some harsh words about the Cambodian bombing, Magnuson stressed the role of Congress in cutting off the bombing and repeatedly urged Chou to “Be patient. It’ll be over soon.” Jenkins and Holdridge, Mr. Solomon noted, thought that the tone of the note may have reflected their irritation at Magnuson’s performance. Mr. Kissinger said he had thought that was a stupid point. There was something more fundamental underlying this. He suggested that from a coldly calculated Chinese point of view they now saw a paralyzed President unable to provide firm support in matters affecting their security. This may have made them now question the value of our relationship. General Scowcroft emphasized that the Chinese wanted firm action from the U.S.

Mr. Solomon turned again to the Cambodian aspect. Sihanouk had displayed his own powerlessness and admitted he could be only a figurehead in asserting that we should now talk to the Khmer Rouge. This was probably true. In addition, the Chinese might not want him to expose his weakness in negotiations with us, as they probably hoped to use him as a point of influence in Cambodia in the future. Nor would the Chinese leadership want to expose themselves to criticism from domestic or foreign sources for pressuring an evidently successful “people’s war” into compromising negotiations on the eve of an apparent victory. Certainly not before a Party Congress.

Mr. Eagleburger suggested that the unfortunate juxtaposition of press leaks here about the “delicate negotiations in progress” and the Kissinger trip to Peking may have provoked a change in the Chinese attitude. He asked if some members of the Chinese leadership might not be saying that China had, wittingly or unwittingly, been used by the Americans to obtain a 45-day extension of the bombing.

Mr. Kissinger responded that the bombing cutoff was the decisive thing, not the bombing extension. We had been bombing the bejesus out of them since May. There had in fact been no intensification of the bombing since the Congressional vote. General Scowcroft confirmed this. Next to us, Mr. Kissinger continued, the ones most hurt by the bombing cutoff were the Chinese. Before, our bombing gave them and Sihanouk something they could deliver to the Khmer Rouge, namely a bombing halt worked out with us. Now if the Chinese try to exert their influence for a settlement it comes across as a brute big-power play between us and them.

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8 See footnote 3, Document 41.
Mr. Lord commented that to him the language in the note didn’t seem especially harsh. Mr. Rodman mentioned that the language was their standard line on Cambodia, which was not new. They had always been relatively abusive to us on Cambodia in their public statements. Mr. Kissinger said he was sure the Chinese didn’t like the bombing. But this was nevertheless in marked contrast to all their previous exchanges with us on the subject and with the experience we had had with them on Vietnam. On Vietnam when they had harsh things to say in a message, they would always have other things to say, or would make clear in other ways that this did not hurt our relationship. This time, the failure to reiterate the invitation, and indeed the failure to reply at all to our date proposal, was a major step, and very puzzling.

Commander Howe noted that we had established a clear link between movement on Cambodia and the trip. They were on the spot and couldn’t deliver. By commenting only on Cambodia they may have been trying to make a clean break and separate the two issues. They wanted to make a “principled stand.”

Mr. Lord asked what the tone of the previous few months had been. Mr. Kissinger reiterated that it had been totally positive and that this note was something new. Mr. Lord asked how they had taken the Brezhnev visit. They had taken it all in stride, Mr. Kissinger replied. They didn’t like the nuclear agreement but had said so in very restrained fashion. General Scowcroft pointed out how extensively we had consulted with them on that.

Mr. Solomon stated that there was no other evidence of a basic shift in the line toward the U.S. On the contrary, three days before, Mao himself had taken the unusual step of receiving a Chinese-American nuclear physicist, and then Chou had had a banquet for him. This was an unmistakable signal to the Chinese people and overseas Chinese that the Sino-U.S. relationship was still on. And Madame Mao’s appearance with Ambassador Bruce at the basketball game a few weeks before showed that the very people who might have been challenging the rapprochement with the U.S. were now solidly lined up with it.9

Mr. Kissinger commented that this was all people-to-people stuff and did not exclude a shift in the political line.

Mr. Kissinger returned to the issue of the Chinese seeing a paralyzed President. They might want to provide themselves with a little more flexibility, particularly with respect to the Russians. There was no

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question about the significance of turning off a Kissinger trip, particularly after the Brezhnev summit. Mr. Rodman pointed out that the Chinese message was a response to a question we had put, namely, what could we expect on Cambodia? They were giving us an honest answer. We had linked the trip with Cambodia. It was now being left to us how to respond. Mr. Kissinger reiterated that the Chinese response was unmistakably a postponement of the trip. They could have done any one of a number of things to take the edge off the Cambodian note. Responding in any way to our proposed date would have done this. They could have said, “We can’t do anything for you on Cambodia but we are glad to have you on August 6—or some other date.” Mr. Rodman suggested that they might not want to propose August 6 knowing it was now impossible for us to come. General Scowcroft stated that there were a hundred other ways they could have played it.

Mr. Eagleburger concluded that we were simply not going to be able to answer Mr. Kissinger’s question as to why the Chinese had behaved in this way.

The discussion then turned to how to respond. It was agreed that we should answer the Cambodian note in strong terms and also postpone the trip. Mr. Kissinger said that we should have Bruce deliver a tough note on Cambodia which would express regret that for the first time in our relationship the Chinese word had not counted. We should just list all the things they had said before—their assurances that they would convey our proposal to Sihanouk. There had been no change in the situation. The idea that we had to communicate with Sihanouk through Mauritania was absurd. Sihanouk was in Peking. And the Chinese themselves had said they couldn’t contact Sihanouk when he was abroad because it wasn’t secure.

We should try to find out what their message means about our relationship. We should have Bruce go in and sound out Ch’iao Kuan-hua about the status of our relations generally. We should say we are asking Bruce to have a general review of Sino-American relations. If they answer, we’ll find out. Even if they give us no answers, that in itself is an answer. Either way, we learn something. We should have Bruce deliver a stern message on Cambodia and then raise the other questions orally. We should do that next week, on the 24th or 25th.10

It was agreed that we had no choice but to postpone the trip with a cool note. On the 21st we should give a note to Han Hsu here doing this, Mr. Kissinger said. There was some discussion about whether we should propose a date after September 1st, or propose “some time in the fall,” or ask them to propose a time period. The note should be “ice

10 See footnote 4, Document 44.
cold.” The second question was whether we should propose the text of a joint announcement or ask them for their proposal on an announcement. This would put them on the spot. A formal announcement would have a heavy impact. But we had to have some announcement, Mr. Kissinger said, or at least some answer to give to press queries, because as August went by there would surely be a flood of press questions. We could just say that because of scheduling difficulties the two sides agreed to postpone until September.

Postscript: At 5:00 p.m. on July 19, Han Hsu delivered a second Chinese note (Tab B)[11] proposing that Mr. Kissinger come on August 16. By the end of the day it was tentatively decided to respond to the two Chinese notes in sequence, as they had done—replying to Cambodia on one day and proposing a September trip on the second day. It would be done here, on paper, with Han Hsu. There was now no need for Bruce to raise “fundamental questions” with Ch’iao.

11 Attached but not printed.

44. Note From the Government of the United States to the Government of the People’s Republic of China


The US side has consistently sought a ceasefire and political settlement in Cambodia since the January 27 Paris Agreement. The other side has continually refused to end the war in Cambodia and responded to the unilateral ceasefire proclaimed by the Phnom Penh government and the cessation of US air actions in Cambodia in February with an intensified military offensive.

1 Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Kissinger Office Files, Box 95, Country Files, Far East, China Exchanges, July 10–October 31 1973 [2 of 2]. No classification marking. According to a handwritten notation, Scowcroft passed the note to Han Xu during a July 24 meeting, which took place in the Map Room at the White House at 6 p.m. (Memorandum of conversation, July 24; ibid., Box 1027, Presidential/HAK MemCons, MemCons-HAK & Presidential, April–November 1973 [3 of 5]) Scowcroft also communicated an oral message: “My Government notes, with regret, that this is the first time in the development of our new relationship that the Chinese word has not counted.” (Ford Library, National Security Adviser, Kissinger–Scowcroft West Wing Office Files, 1969–1977, Box 4, China Exchanges) On July 25, Scowcroft informed Han that Kissinger could not arrive in China on August 16 and proposed instead that Kissinger visit September 13–16 or September 6–9. (Ibid.)
The Chinese side declared to the US side in its message of June 4 that it would communicate the US peace proposal of May 27 to Prince Sihanouk. This proposal accepted a long-standing Chinese suggestion for direct talks with Prince Sihanouk made during every visit by Dr. Kissinger to Peking. The contents of the June 4 message were reiterated on June 13 by Foreign Minister Chi P’eng-fei and again in the Chinese message of July 6, that this awaited only the return of Prince Sihanouk from his travels. On July 6, Ambassador Huang Chen declared that the Chinese side would convey the US proposal to Prince Sihanouk now that he had returned to Peking.

The Chinese message of July 18 has therefore been noted with astonishment. There has been no change in US policy and no increase in US activities. In light of these earlier assurances, and the principles and spirit of the Shanghai Communiqué, it is difficult to understand why the Chinese side is unable to communicate an American peace proposal to a leader located in Peking. It is utterly unreasonable that this leader should publicly demand that communications to him go through Mauritania to which the Chinese side would not entrust the original US communication of May 27. This raises special difficulties because in reliance on the June 4 note and subsequent assurances, the US had not engaged in any other negotiations or responded to any other channels.

As to the substance of the Chinese note of July 18, the Chinese side will not be surprised that the US side rejects a “solution” so arbitrarily weighted against it. This is inconsistent with the requirements of reciprocity and equality. It is beyond the bounds of logic to be asked to negotiate on an issue when the other side, clearly and from the outset, leaves no room for negotiations. In such circumstances the US side will leave negotiations to the Cambodian parties.

See footnote 2, Document 43. Backchannel message 19 to Beijing, July 18, referred to the Chinese note as relatively “brutal,” asked the advice of the USLO, and proposed that “On Monday or Tuesday [July 23 or 24] Ambassador Bruce would pass a harsh response to their Cambodia note, express his astonishment and offer a fundamental discussion of the full range of US/Chinese relations.” (National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Kissinger Office Files, Box 95, Country Files, Far East, China Exchanges, July 10-Oct. 31, 1973 [2 of 2]) In backchannel message 21 to Beijing, July 19, Jenkins and Holdridge responded: “We do not read this as a brutal message, but rather a restatement of a firm Chinese position.” They questioned whether a Party Congress might be about to occur and also noted, “Chinese calculate we are in weak position in Cambodia. They were unquestionably angered by our last spurt of intensified bombing, not to mention Chou’s anger produced by Magnuson’s counseling ‘patience’ while that was going on.” (Ibid.)
SUBJECT
U.S.–PRC Exchanges May be Adding to Chou En-lai’s Problems

Over the weekend additional corroborative evidence has become available which strengthens the interpretation that Chou En-lai is under some pressure from radical elements in the PRC who object to his relatively pragmatic policies toward the intellectual community and related efforts to depoliticize both university entrance requirements and scientific research. The available material is pieced together in a fine bit of analysis from the Hong Kong Consulate at Tab A.2

Of particular interest is the evidence (in paragraphs 2 and 3) that two PRC scientific groups which visited the U.S. last year3 drew criticism from radicals around Mao’s wife who found their attitudes toward America too favorable. If accurate, these reports suggest that U.S.–PRC exchanges, particularly those which involve China’s scientific and academic communities, may be adding to Premier Chou’s political vulnerability. The Hong Kong analysis adds, however, that Chairman Mao’s July 17 public meeting with Chinese-American scientist Yang Chen-ning may have represented Mao siding with Chou in this dispute.4

You should know that this evidence of political resistance in China to U.S.–PRC exchanges comes at a time when American academics involved in facilitating such exchanges—particularly those in the scientific community—are miffed at Chinese authorities for apparently calling all the shots on exchange programs and for not being responsive to the particular interests of American scientists. These same people feel that the U.S. Government has not pressed Peking sufficiently in

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2 Attached but not printed is telegram 7602 from Hong Kong, July 30.
4 See footnote 9, Document 43.
terms of American interests in these exchanges. Department of State officers concerned with exchanges will be meeting with representatives of the Committee on Scholarly Communication and National Committee on U.S.-China Relations next week to discuss differences. I will attend the meeting in an effort to keep the participants sensitized to the larger interest that is being served by exchange programs, and to discourage any uncoordinated approaches to the PRC Liaison Office on exchange matters that might compound the above-mentioned situation.

46. Memorandum of Conversation


PARTICIPANTS
James C. H. Shen, Republic of China Ambassador to the United States
Henry Chen, Political Counselor, Embassy of the Republic of China
Henry A. Kissinger, Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs
John A. Froebe, Jr., Staff Member, NSC

SUBJECT
Rumored changes in ROC foreign policy, Dr. Kissinger’s planned Peking trip, possible high-level exchange of visits with ROC, current conditions in PRC, possible U.S. recognition of PRC

Ambassador Shen: It’s been five and one-half months since I’ve seen you.

Mr. Kissinger: That shows how good our relations are.

Ambassador Shen: I was in Taipei in March. Premier Chiang asked to be remembered to you. When I returned I saw Under Secretary Porter to assure him that there was absolutely no truth to the rumors making the rounds at that point—that we were in contact with the Soviets, and that we were undertaking discussions with the PRC.

Mr. Kissinger: What about the rumor that the Soviets were interested in establishing a naval base in the Pescadores Islands?

1 Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 523, Country Files, Far East, China, Vol. XI, Aug 1972–Oct 24, 1973. Secret; Sensitive. The meeting took place at the White House. All brackets are in the original. On August 18, Scowcroft approved this memorandum of conversation. (Memorandum from Froebe to Kissinger, August 18; ibid.) In response to a Department of State request for a copy, Kissinger wrote, “Don’t send anything.” (Note from Scowcroft to Kissinger, undated; ibid.)
Ambassador Shen: This rumor is merely the latest. It is true that the Pescadores have deep water and are suitable for subs, but the ROC will never permit a Soviet naval base there.

Mr. Kissinger: I’ve never been to Taipei.

Ambassador Shen: Then how about visiting there in the near future?

Mr. Kissinger: We’ll have to see later this year.

Ambassador Shen: When are you going to Peiping?

Mr. Kissinger: I’ve not set a date. I didn’t want to be there at the time of the Cambodian bombing halt. I didn’t want to give them the satisfaction of my being in Peking at the time of the bombing halt.

Ambassador Shen: How are your relations with Peiping?

Mr. Kissinger: We don’t plan any major new initiatives in the near future. Our deputy in the Liaison Office there is returning soon.

Ambassador Shen: But if you are going to Peiping in the near future, isn’t it unusual that the deputy would be returning?

Mr. Kissinger: Not necessarily.

Ambassador Shen: How do you see the state of U.S.–ROC relations?

Mr. Kissinger: I think they are cordial, don’t you?

Ambassador Shen: In general I agree, but people have been talking because of the amount of attention that you have been showering on Huang Chen and his Liaison Office. You even look him out to San Clemente on a special jet.

Mr. Kissinger: That was to counterbalance the Russians. As to the flight, Huang took a regular courier flight, not a special flight.

Ambassador Shen: My understanding was that this was a special jet.

Mr. Kissinger: No, this was a regular courier flight; it goes out three times a week. We have taken others on this flight as well.

Ambassador Shen: But when Huang Chen was out there he was introduced to the movie stars. You haven’t done this for me.

Mr. Kissinger: That is true. You have a point there. But do we have any problems in our bilateral relations?

Ambassador Shen: People notice a cooling in the relationship. There is much pessimism in Taipei. People there fear that the U.S. and Peiping will recognize each other.

Mr. Kissinger: We have no plans to that effect. Didn’t I tell you a year ago that we would not be moving on recognition soon? I can assure you that it won’t come in the immediate future.

Ambassador Shen: The people noticed that when Secretary Rogers went to Japan and South Korea, he skipped Taipei. This causes the
people to wonder. They are disturbed by the fact that no ranking U.S. officials have visited Taiwan in some time. It is as if there were a deliberate attempt to downgrade U.S.–ROC relations.

Mr. Kissinger: There is no deliberate attempt to downgrade our relationship. As to Secretary Rogers, I don’t control his travel.

Ambassador Shen: How about our Foreign Minister visiting the United States?

Mr. Kissinger: Let me consider this.

Ambassador Shen: The Premier has not visited the U.S. since he was shot at [in May 1970].

Mr. Kissinger: I will look into it. I see no basic obstacle in the Foreign Minister’s coming here. In the case of the Premier, however, I would have to consult the President’s schedule.

Ambassador Shen: The Premier would be able to sit down with you and the President for some basic discussions.

Mr. Kissinger: I will check.

Ambassador Shen: People on Taiwan are working hard to get ahead.

Mr. Kissinger: Everyone who has visited there is impressed.

Ambassador Shen: Premier Chiang is also seeing that more Taiwanese are taken into government ranks.

Mr. Kissinger: You have no contacts with Peking? I noticed that Singapore Prime Minister Lee Kuan Yew visited Taipei recently.

Ambassador Shen: Yes, Lee visited Taiwan about two months ago, but he is not acting as an intermediary.

Mr. Kissinger: Prime Minister Lee told me he would not go to Peking.

Ambassador Shen: My government has relations with Singapore. This was Lee’s first visit to Taiwan.

Mr. Kissinger: What are your impressions of the current conditions on the Mainland?

Ambassador Shen: I think in general they are quiet for now. The regime may hold the National People’s Congress in late September. The Party Congress, which is the important one of the two, would come earlier. What is your estimate on the timing?

Mr. Kissinger: Our intelligence had been saying that the Party Congress would be held in early August. This has obviously been overtaken. Now our intelligence is saying that the Party Congress will be held in late September. This just shows you how little they know.

Ambassador Shen: How is your Liaison Office in Peiping getting along?
Mr. Kissinger: There is not much going on. The PRC is watching
the United States. Possibly they are wondering whether the U.S. will
have a cultural revolution.

Ambassador Shen: Will Chou En-lai come to New York for this
fall’s General Assembly? He told Senator Magnuson recently that he
would not come to Washington as long as the ROC’s Ambassador is
here. But this does not exclude the possibility of New York.

Mr. Kissinger: I don’t think he will come.

Ambassador Shen: Chou’s picture now seems to appear alongside
of Mao’s in public.

Mr. Kissinger: We’ve noticed that they have dropped the “Great
Leader” caption from Mao’s picture.

Ambassador Shen: But why should they change this now? I would
think they would continue to call him the “Great Leader” until he is
dead.

Mr. Kissinger: Someone just sent me a copy of the I-Ching.

Ambassador Shen: This is the right kind of book for you. This is
one of our most valued classics.

What should Taiwan do now?

Mr. Kissinger: Anything that will symbolize your permanence. You
are behaving very ably and skillfully.

Ambassador Shen: But we are just a little boat.

Mr. Kissinger: The U.S. won’t tolerate a military invasion of Tai-
wan. Besides, the PRC does not have the capability to pull off such an
invasion.

Ambassador Shen: But what if the U.S. recognizes Peiping as the
sole legitimate government of all China?

Mr. Kissinger: This will not happen unless Peking recognizes your
separate existence. But the U.S. has no plans for recognizing Peking.

Ambassador Shen: Does U.S. recognition of Peiping mean auto-
matic de-recognition of Taipei?

Mr. Kissinger: My trip to Peking will not result in U.S. recognition
of the PRC.

Ambassador Shen: There is speculation that your trip to Peiping
will achieve some settlement on the Cambodian situation. Your strong
interest in a settlement there would appear to give Chou En-lai some
leverage over you.

Mr. Kissinger: But Chou can’t wind up Cambodian hostilities.

Ambassador Shen: What will happen in Cambodia?

Mr. Kissinger: The Communists will probably win.

Ambassador Shen: How will this affect the settlement in Vietnam?
Mr. Kissinger: Unfavorably.

Are you taking a vacation this summer?

Ambassador Shen: As I was just telling Jack [Froebel], when others leave town I have to stay on. I did, however, just get away this past week for a couple of days at St. Marys. You have taken no vacation?

Mr. Kissinger: I have no chance to at this point. I usually take some time off in the spring and go to Acapulco.

You can be sure that nothing startling will happen during my trip to Peking—and certainly nothing as regards Taiwan.

Ambassador Shen: We appreciate that very much. We believe we should begin trying to look down the road a distance.

Mr. Kissinger: You ought to consider the possibility that the PRC might decide to give in to dual recognition. After all, they have done some unusual things before.

Ambassador Shen: This is possible in the case of the U.S. in light of the clout which you have with Peiping. The Japanese were miffed at the exceptions Peiping made for you.

Mr. Kissinger: The Japanese behave treacherously towards you.

I can assure you, Mr. Ambassador, that it won’t take five and one-half months the next time.

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47. Memorandum of Conversation

I–24725/73 Washington, August 7, 1973, 2:10–2:50 p.m.

SUBJECT

Secretary of Defense Schlesinger’s Visit With General Lai Ming-tang, Chief of the General Staff, Ministry of National Defense, Republic of China

PARTICIPANTS

United States

Secretary of Defense—James R. Schlesinger
Deputy Secretary of Defense—William P. Clements

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Opening Remarks. General Lai expressed his gratitude for the call and his government’s thanks for our continued assistance. He said that he first came to Washington in 1943 after finishing school at Leavenworth. Mr. Clements said that Admiral Moorer told him that he had known General Lai for some thirty years.

U.S.–ROC Relations. Secretary Schlesinger said that there have been some adaptations in our international relations, but told General Lai that the loss of rigidity in U.S.–PRC relations will not affect our alliance with the Republic of China. Mr. Clements added that this requires understanding on both sides. General Lai agreed with the foregoing and said that that is the value of visits such as this. He then tendered an invitation to Secretary Schlesinger to visit Taiwan. The Secretary said that he would accept when his schedule permits.

The Situation in Taiwan and U.S. Aid to the ROC. General Lai said that his government is doing everything it can to strengthen internal political stability, as economic development cannot proceed in the absence of stability. The General said that the ROC faces a great threat from the mainland and must maintain a strong military deterrent. Secretary Schlesinger said that we have taken note of Taiwan’s fabulous economic development and added that we envy Taiwan its growth rate and its BOP position. The Secretary pointed out that our world-wide grant MAP is now in real terms about 25% of what it was a decade ago. He complimented General Lai on Taiwan’s economic development which has enabled the GRC to increase its own military expenditures. General Lai then made a strong representation for more excess defense articles (EDA). Admiral Peet said that the EDA pool is drying up. General Lai then asked whether additional EDA would be available when U.S. force levels in Europe are reduced. The Secretary replied that this ran counter to his instincts as we must remain strong in NATO. General Lai then said that the basic national policy of his government would never change. The GRC will stick to a democratic system, will never undertake peace talks with the PRC, and will endeavor to strengthen ties with the U.S. He said again that any assistance to Taiwan will pay high dividends as it is in our mutual defense. In response to a question from Mr. Clements, General Lai said that the size of the ROC Army is 600,000 but added quickly that it has to be substantial because the threat is substantial. General Lai said that 10% of Taiwan’s
GNP goes to defense. A discussion of military personnel costs followed, with Secretary Schlesinger noting that the all-volunteer force has increased U.S. defense spending from 5% to 6.2% of GNP. General Lai then commented on the increasing capability of the PRC armed forces, including indigenous production of advanced jets and TU–16 bombers. Secretary Schlesinger responded that the F5E is better than anything the PRC has. This seemed to unsettle General Lai a bit, but he did allow that Nationalist Chinese pilots were much better than their mainland counterparts and cited by way of example the fact that in the 1958 Strait crisis the Communists lost thirty-one aircraft as compared with only one by Taiwan and, finally, General Lai allowed, quality not quantity is the most important. General Lai then commented in passing on the two submarines that we are providing to the Nationalist navy, and said that they will be quite expensive to maintain (see Addendum). Secretary Schlesinger replied that we must not provide items with high O&M costs as such items are not really assistance; we’re really creating problems both for the recipients of such items and for ourselves. Finally, General Lai passed around some pictures of mainland Chinese fishermen that were captured and taken to Quemoy. They were all in rags. General Lai added that he was struck by the fact that none of them had any schooling. Mr. Clements asked General Lai how good the ROC intelligence capability is concerning the PRC. General Lai said that they would like to know more about mainland events, especially with regard to how the Communist regime maintains control. The Deputy Secretary then expressed his admiration for Taiwan’s adjustment and accommodation to international developments in light of the new U.S.–PRC relationship. The Deputy Secretary said that he considered this adjustment to be remarkable and evidence of a great deal of grace on the part of Taiwan. General Lai was clearly quite pleased.

Addendum. With regard to General Lai’s professed astonishment at the O&M cost for submarines, this was pointed out on numerous occasions to Nationalist Chinese officials (including Chiang Ching-kuo and Admiral Ko) before the agreement was concluded. Over two years ago, Mr. Doolin told Admiral Ko that the cost of operating a submarine could run as high as $10,000 per day. The Chinese CNO dismissed these figures and indicated that his navy could do this for one-tenth the cost. Admiral Ko was told that experience would prove him wrong. At the time the Chinese were pressing hard to secure these submarines, they told us over and over again that they required these submarines solely for ASW training for their surface units as much as SubPac assets were not always available at the time the Chinese navy wished to conduct the exercise. At a meeting with Secretary Laird in 1971 prior to the conclusion of the submarine agreement, Chiang Ching-kuo said in Chinese that the reason his government required these two boats
would be to maintain naval superiority in the Taiwan Strait. His astute interpreter did not translate this sentence. Mr. Doolin, who attended the meeting, speaks Chinese. He noted the omission; informed the Secretary of the omission after the meeting; and described the incident in the Memorandum of Conversation of that meeting.

48. National Security Decision Memorandum 230


TO
The Secretary of State
The Secretary of Defense

SUBJECT
U.S. Strategy and Forces for Asia

Based on a review of the NSSM 171 study,\(^2\) the President has decided that the following guidance should govern our future military planning for Asia.

Strategic Planning

The basic strategic guidance for Asia as originally defined by NSDM 27\(^3\) shall remain in force. U.S. forces should be planned so that U.S. and Allied forces would be capable of conducting a combined conventional defense against a joint PRC/Communist ally attack in either Northeast or Southeast Asia as well as a non-PRC attack in the other

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\(^1\) Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 364, Subject Files, National Security Decision Memoranda Nos. 145–264. Top Secret. Copies were sent to the Director of ACDA, the Director of Central Intelligence, the Chairman of the JCS, and the Director of OMB.

\(^2\) NSSM 171, February 13, “directed that in the aftermath of the Vietnamese conflict, current U.S. strategy for Asia should be reviewed” with particular emphasis on proper force levels and requirements, basing postures, security assistance programs, and the diplomatic ramifications of changes in these areas. (Ibid., NSC Files, Subject Files, Box 365, National Security Study Memoranda, Nos. 104–206) A committee chaired by a representative of the Department of Defense and composed of representatives from the Departments of Defense and State, the CIA, and ACDA performed the review requested in NSSM 171 and produced a paper which is ibid., NSC Institutional Files (H-Files), Box H–196, National Security Study Memoranda, NSSM 171 [1 of 2]. NSSM 171 and the response study are scheduled for publication in Foreign Relations, 1969–1976, vol. E–12.

\(^3\) Scheduled for publication ibid., vol. XXXIV.
Asian theater. The U.S. should continue to plan for an adequate capability to reinforce our Allies in support of this strategy, including the full range of land, naval, and tactical air forces.

Tactical nuclear forces should be planned in Asia as a hedge against the failure of a conventional defense. [1½ lines not declassified]

Security Assistance planning will continue to focus on assisting our Allies to meet indigenous and non-PRC communist nation threats. Planning will not be based on building Allied self-sufficiency in meeting major threats from the PRC. However, improvements in Allied capabilities to enhance a joint U.S./Allied defense will be planned as a lower priority goal.

**U.S. Deployments**

U.S. planning for the next five years should include Asian baseline deployments at essentially current levels in Korea, Japan/Okinawa, and the Philippines. Normal minor adjustments in manning and support forces would be made, but any proposed changes in combat force levels or major changes in manpower levels should be submitted to the President for approval. Deployments on Taiwan and in Thailand will be kept under continuous review. There will be no increases in forces or manpower on Taiwan without prior Presidential approval.

The Department of State should develop a scenario for informing the governments of Korea, Philippines, and Japan and other governments they believe appropriate of our deployment plans for FY 74. This scenario should be submitted to the President for approval by August 15, 1973.

Henry A. Kissinger
49. Memorandum From Charles Cooper, Robert D. Hormats, and Richard H. Solomon of the National Security Council Staff to the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger)\(^1\)


SUBJECT
Problems in the China Trade

We are increasingly concerned about several problems in our economic relations with the People’s Republic of China which could cause substantial difficulties if they get out of hand. The two discussed in this memorandum are coming to a head, and you should be aware of them in case you may need to take action to resolve them.

The National Council for U.S.–China Trade

The National Council for U.S.–China Trade was set up, largely through the efforts of the Department of Commerce, to act as a facilitating organization in the promotion of U.S.–PRC trade. Through informational and liaison activities, it was to have served as a non-governmental bridge between the American business community and the PRC in the same pattern of the private organizations that facilitate cultural and scientific exchanges. In practice, the Trade Council has gotten off to a very slow start because of a combination of staffing problems, the overshadowing influence of Commerce in various activities relating to the China trade, and the partisan, big-business and export orientation of the Council’s board.

We recently have picked up some negative comments about the Council from the PRC Liaison Office staff, who are disappointed with both the slow growth of the organization and its big-business orientation. The Chinese also may be giving encouragement to some of their local “friends” to set up a rival organization formed largely of small importers of Chinese products—who can help the PRC in its effort to bring its trade with the U.S. into better balance. The present danger is of a polarization between the Council and a rival group which would weaken USG influence over the development of trade and enable the Chinese to play one group against another. We are encouraging the Council to broaden its membership to include small traders, and to

separate itself at an appropriate distance from the USG to give itself the independence necessary to gain wider support.

In this regard, a Council group scheduled to go to the PRC in early October had informally asked Secretary of Commerce Dent to join them. Dent declined, but suggested Deputy Assistant Secretary for East-West Trade Steven Lazarus to join the tour. The Council has now had second thoughts about Lazarus’ inclusion in the delegation, given his position in the USG and their desire to establish an independent position. We also feel that it would be unwise for Lazarus to visit the PRC with the Council group at this time. We trust that Commerce will accept the Council’s reversal of its invitation for his participation, but there may be some complaint.

USG Involvement in the Canton Fair

We are also concerned about excessive USG presence at the fall session of the Canton Fair. As a recent cable from our Peking Liaison Office (Tab A)² indicates, present plans are for seven (7) USG officers (2 from the Liaison Office, 4 from the Hong Kong Consulate, and 1 man from Commerce) to staff at various times an office which the government would sponsor at the month-long Fair. In addition, the Trade Council is planning to establish an advisory facility to be of assistance to U.S. businessmen attending the Fair. While there is a legitimate role to be played by commercial specialists of the USG in assisting American businessmen, we may be—as the USLO cable suggests—“overloading” the Chinese by requesting that seven men participate at this stage of our commercial relations with the PRC. In addition, the USG presence will tend to overshadow the National Council, which is supposed to be playing the advisory role. Thus, we think it wise to discourage a highly-visible USG presence at the Canton Fair this fall. We are now attempting to cope with this issue through the China desk at State, which will suggest to USLO and the Hong Kong Consulate that they cut back on their representation.

² Attached but not printed is telegram 789 from Beijing, August 15, containing additional information about the Canton Trade Fair.
50. **Note From the Government of the United States to the Government of the People's Republic of China**


The U.S. side wishes to inform the Chinese side that the United Nations Commission on the Unification and Rehabilitation of Korea (UNCURK) will include in its yearly report a call for the dissolution of the organization without prejudice to its past activities. As indicated in recent messages presented to the PRC Liaison Office, the U.S. side will support this position during the 28th Session of the UN General Assembly.

The U.S. side also wishes to reiterate its position that it will use its influence to insure that any debate on the Korean issue in this year’s General Assembly not exacerbate tensions, but contribute to an orderly evolution of the Korean situation. On the basis of such circumstances, the U.S. side is prepared to discuss after the 28th Session of the General Assembly ways in which the question of the UN Command might be resolved. Efforts of the Chinese side in behalf of this objective will be welcomed.

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51. **Memorandum From John A. Froebe, Jr., of the National Security Council Staff to the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger)**


**SUBJECT**

Chinese Representation in the International Financial Institutions (IFI’s)

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1 Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Kissinger Office Files, Box 95, Country Files, Far East, China Exchanges, July 10–Oct 31, 1973 [2 of 2]. No classification marking. According to a handwritten comment on the note, Solomon presented the note to Chi Ch’ao-chu and Chien Ta-yung on August 22. Kissinger wrote “OK” on an earlier draft of the note and, on August 21, Scowcroft sent the revised version to Kennedy for delivery by Solomon. (Ibid.)

At Tab A² is a State cable, concurred in by Treasury, directing the 36 action posts to seek the support of the host governments in the event that the ROC position in the IFI’s (the World Bank and International Monetary Fund) is challenged at the annual meeting of these organizations planned for September 24–28 in Nairobi. The cable was sent without either NSC clearance or that of the seventh floor of State—which we had asked to clear the cable with us. We have put a hold on any implementation of the cable instruction.

I agree with the State position that it continues to be in our interest to support the ROC’s continued participation in the IFI’s—both because of its importance to the ROC’s diplomatic position and to its international financial position, and because of our desire to avoid injecting political issues into the operations of the IMF/IBRD.

As State notes, however, we have no indication that the PRC either wants to join the Bank or Fund or that it wants to have the ROC expelled. A preliminary sounding with selected posts a month ago turned up no evidence of any such PRC inclination. Speculatively, it would seem unlikely that the PRC is interested in making such a challenge at this juncture:

—Peking is unlikely to want to assume the financial obligations of membership in the Bank and Fund, which include divulging their reserves, undertaking to make their currencies convertible into other currencies, and providing gold to the IMF.
—Even short of wanting to seek membership for itself, it is less than likely to want to have the ROC expelled at this juncture: this would risk another contretemps with us (in addition to that which may possibly occur at the U.N. General Assembly on the Korean question), and would run counter to its current campaign for a peaceful reconciliation with Taiwan.

The possibility remains that another state such as Algeria might make a challenge on Peking’s behalf, but independent of PRC guidance. On balance, however, this eventuality also seems improbable. As last year, the great majority of Bank and Fund members, so far as we know, strongly want to avoid having to face the issue. State’s strategy approach is essentially the same as that used at the Bank and Fund annual meeting last September: if the ROC position is challenged, another member (Saudi Arabia has already indicated its willingness to do so) would propose that the question be referred to the Bank and Fund’s Executive Directors for consideration after the annual meetings. Our role would be strictly supportive of initiatives taken by others. I have no problem with this basic approach. State argues that this is the least

² Attached but not printed is a revised draft of telegram 166065, August 21, which was sent to 36 posts.
contentious method for handling a challenge which also would seem 
effective in parrying the challenge. The Bank and Fund’s management 
support this approach.

I believe that this is a preferred approach. The alternatives either 
would probably not be effective—as with a ruling from the Chair that 
tried to refer the matter for study—or would probably be more 
contentious—as a proposal that the matter be shelved until the PRC 
had indicated its willingness to accept the obligations of membership.

*State’s recommended representations in support of this strategy*

The State cable would instruct the 36 posts to take more definitive 
soundings, reiterate U.S. support for continued ROC participation in 
the IFI’s, and seek the host governments’ support for our strategy in 
the event of a challenge. Peace representations would also be aimed at 
acquainting the considerable number of new Bank/Fund governors 
from these countries with our strategy.

*In my view,* State’s proposed representations carry too high profile: 
both in the number of posts involved and in the tenor of the substance 
of the proposed representations the State approach would risk stimu-
lating that which it is designed to avoid. I recommend that the num-
ber of posts making representations be reduced to 21 (particularly in 
view of the weighted system of voting used in the Bank and Fund), 
and that the substance of the approach be pitched in a somewhat lower 
key. I have amended the State cable at Tab A to reflect both of these 
objections.

**Recommendation:**

That you approve the State cable at Tab A as amended.³

³Kissinger initialed the Approve option. The cable was sent as revised as a telegram, 
and posts were instructed to disregard telegram 166065. (Memorandum from Davis to Pick-
ering, September 1; National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 527, 

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52. **Editorial Note**

On September 26, 1973, newly appointed Secretary of State Henry 
Kissinger met with People’s Republic of China Representative to the 
United Nations Huang Hua. Kissinger analyzed the U.S.–PRC rela-
tionship in the United Nations and declared, “the only issue that 
I see that could give us some difficulty is Korea. We conveyed our
thoughts to you some months ago. We think we should show restraint in having a confrontation because we are moving in the direction which the Prime Minister and I discussed.”

Kissinger also noted, “We have agreed to the dissolution of UNCURK. If we could shelve the issue of the United Nations Command for one year at least. The problem now is that the armistice depends on the existence of the UN Command. That will give us an opportunity to look and work with you on this and to develop alternative legal arrangements.” Huang Hua suggested, “If you could persuade South Korea to give up its position of perpetuating a division of Korea in contradiction of agreements between the two sides, I think this will help with rapprochement and relaxation in that area.” In particular, Huang Hua suggested that South Korean President Park Chung Hee abandon his proposal to have both Koreas admitted into the United Nations. Kissinger, however, refused to commit himself on this question. The memorandum of conversation is in National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Kissinger Office Files, Box 95, Country Files, Far East, China Exchanges, July 10–Oct. 31, 1973.

On September 29, Kissinger met with Ambassador Huang Zhen, Chief of the People’s Republic of China Liaison Office, to follow up on discussions they had in July at the Western White House in San Clemente, California, on the Soviet threat to China (see Document 41). Kissinger deferred serious discussion on this topic until his visit to China scheduled for late October: “I also wish to go further into that problem which I discussed with you in San Clemente, the one which grew out of the June meetings (with Brezhnev). I want to discuss developments in that respect since June. I propose that any meeting on this particular issue be carried out in a restricted group, as we have done in the past.” The Secretary of State also declared, “If there are any questions regarding developments in Southeast Asia we will be glad to discuss them, but we are not asking you to do anything in this regard now. We will also be prepared to discuss developments in South Asia, the area of Iran, Pakistan, and Turkey, the problems in this area that we discussed with the Premier before. And of course, there is Taiwan, Japan, as well as any other problems the Premier would like to discuss.” The memorandum of conversation is in National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Kissinger Office Files, Box 95, Country Files, Far East, China Exchanges, July 10–Oct 31, 1973.

On October 25, the Central Intelligence Agency disseminated National Intelligence Estimate 11/13/6–73, on “Possible Changes in the Sino-Soviet Relationship,” which concluded that improvement in the relationship was unlikely in the next couple of years, but that war was also improbable. In the longer run, it predicted, “movement beyond limited accommodations toward a genuine and durable rapprochement . . . seems highly unlikely, even through 1980.” (National Intelligence
Council, Tracking the Dragon, pages 615–630) One month earlier, National Intelligence Estimate 11–13–73, “The Sino-Soviet Relationship: Military Aspects,” dated September 20, predicted that war between the Soviet Union and China was unlikely. (Ibid., from accompanying compact disk with additional documents)

53. Notes on a Conversation Between Secretary of State Kissinger and the Ambassador to the Republic of China (McConaughy)¹


(At some point HAK said he would not bring up Taiwan when he goes to Peking. Would focus on Soviets, Indochina and other topics.)

W [Walter]—greetings, congratulations on job. Grateful for fact of meeting, because it will be important for U.S.–ROC relations.

K—Give special regards to CCK and others. There is no people I regard more highly than those of Taiwan. I regret that the Chinese on Taiwan have suffered some blows, and my heart bled that we had to take the actions we did. If we had not, the U.S. would have been torn apart. We had to move on this in 1971 (in order to de-fuse the Vietnam issue so that we could proceed toward a Vietnam settlement at our own pace).

We are not turning our backs on Taiwan, and this attitude has not and will not change.

However we are moving inexorably toward full recognition of Peking, which is bound to come by 1980 at the latest. There may be some initial moves earlier, perhaps in 1975. But we will not press Taiwan to the wall. Our movements will include guaranteed enforceable

¹ Source: Department of State, Papers of William H. Gleysteen; Lot 89 D 436, Box 8132, PRC Related Papers 1973. Eyes Only. The meeting took place in Kissinger’s office. Arthur Hummel, Acting Assistant Secretary of State for East Asian and Pacific Affairs, prepared these notes based on McConaughy’s account of the meeting. Kissinger initially refused to meet with McConaughy or to authorize that Nixon meet with him. (Memorandum from Froebe to Kissinger, August 22; National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 527, Country Files, Far East, People’s Republic of China, Vol. 8, July 10–Dec 31, 1973) Hummel, with the support of Eagleburger and Pickering, convinced Kissinger to reconsider by suggesting that a refusal to meet with McConaughy might weaken the position of Jiang Jingguo and lead Taiwan to pursue a more independent foreign policy. (Memorandum from Pickering to Kissinger, September 30; ibid., RG 59, EAP ROC Files: Lot 76 D 441, PER 17–Amb. McConaughy, 1973)
provisions for ensuring continued separate status for Taiwan if that is what Taiwan wants.

W—This of course assumes no provocative acts by Taiwan, such as an announcement of separate status.

K—That is true; there should be no provocations, but in a de facto way they can go their separate way. If we move, we will build in assurances so that Taiwan will not automatically fall into mainland hands. For instance we might arrange so that the US-Taiwan defense treaty does not lapse, or if it does lapse that there could be automatic restoration of the treaty under certain circumstances.

(He then criticized Japan’s devious game toward Taiwan, in counting on us to preserve, and getting a free ride without helping to bear the burden. The Japanese suggested in 1972 (Walter thinks Tanaka at Kuilima) that Japan could represent US interests in Peking in return for US representation of Japan on Taiwan.)

W—Hope there will not be a determined economic squeeze by Peking on Taiwan.

K—I discount this, and doubt the PRC will go all out to stifle Taiwan trade. If there is such a move, to make Taiwan non-viable, the Japanese might take steps, and we would also.

W—Reminded Kissinger of Pres Nixon’s statements of Walter’s mission in repeated statements of 1969–72—that is, hand-holding the GRC, and reassuring them. I assume these instructions still stand.

K—Yes indeed. I am well aware of those statements and I am sure the President still wants them to be operative. Now I want you to know that of course we will maintain an Amb in Taipei, and we will replace you after you leave. There have been rumors here and on Taiwan that we would not, but they are not true. I understand you are rather disposed to retire.

W—Yes, but I am not pushing. I’ve been there a long time and I’m past normal retirement age. I would like to leave in the reasonable future.

K—No time yet to focus on Ambs. Realize long time for you. I will soon focus.

W—Maybe next Spring would be good for me. Give time for leisurely departure, but of course could be earlier if you want.
54. Telegram From the Liaison Office in China to the Department of State*


1216. Subj: Jackson Bill and PRC.

1. While I realize that overriding concern with Jackson Bill limiting President’s authority to grant MFN treatment is centered on Soviet Union and its restrictions on Jewish emigration, I would like to call attention to fact that, if passed in present form, bill will apply equally to PRC and will be a major obstacle to developing U.S.-PRC trade relations. I am particularly concerned that members of Congress may not be fully aware of importance Peking attaches to MFN, both as a prerequisite for expanding its exports to the U.S. and thereby improving balance of trade and politically as a significant indicator of further progress in normalization of relations.

2. Recent discussion between Hong Kong ConGen officers and Senator Jackson’s staff assistant, Richard N. Perle, (as reported to us by visiting FSO John J. Taylor) suggests ignorance in some congressional quarters of consequences for Sino-U.S. relations if free emigration imposed as condition for MFN. In describing Senator Jackson’s views on this subject, Mr. Perle assumed that China would not be concerned over failure to receive MFN status. When the problems were pointed out to Mr. Perle, he had no response except to offer the hope that somehow the issue would not be raised. He made clear that the proposed legislation was aimed solely at the USSR.

3. In addition to difficulties posed for Sino-U.S. trade, Jackson Bill will also raise political problem of a public finding that PRC practices emigration policies making it subject to provisions of the bill. Given Chinese sensitivities on question of refugees and emigration this cannot help but have negative impact on our developing relations.

4. I realize fully that question of MFN for the PRC inevitably bound up with that of Soviet Union. Nevertheless, I think it important—and possibly useful in Soviet context as well—that Congress be made aware of significance which PRC attaches to this question and possible adverse impact Jackson Bill could have on U.S.-PRC commercial and political relations. Perhaps some additional educational efforts with the Congress might be useful.

Bruce

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*Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Kissinger Office Files, Box 93, Country Files, Far East, China Trade and Exchanges, July 5, 1973–Feb. 28, 1974. Confidential; Nodis; Cherokee. No time of transmission appears on the telegram; however a stamped notation indicates it was received at 9:04 p.m.*
55. Memorandum of Conversation

Beijing, November 10, 1973, 9:25–10:00 p.m.

PARTICIPANTS
Prime Minister Chou En-lai
Yeh Chien-ying, Chairman of the Military Affairs Committee
Vice Prime Minister Chiao Kuan-hua
Tang Wang-shen, Interpreter
Shen Jo-yen, Interpreter
Henry A. Kissinger, Secretary of State
Winston Lord, Director of Planning and Coordination, State Department

(As the group was walking toward the meeting room, Marshal Yeh indicated to the Secretary that he now had heavier burdens as Secretary of State. The Secretary replied that it was more complicated, but the direction of policy was the same. There had been major personnel changes.)

The Secretary: I thought, Mr. Prime Minister, we might have a brief talk on a particular problem that came up during the visit of General Secretary Brezhnev to the United States. It rose in the following manner, and I’ll give you the circumstances because they may be of some interest to you. During that week, during the visit, Mr. Brezhnev attempted to see the President alone without me (laughter). He went through extremely complicated maneuvers to accomplish this (laughter). For example, in California, he stayed in the house of the President and he pretended to go to bed, and then he thought I would leave. When he thought I had left, he got up and asked to see the President, who himself had gone to bed (laughter). I mention it only because it was not an accidental conversation. After all the maneuvers the President insisted that I be present. So it was myself, the President, Mr. Brezhnev and an interpreter.

And he (Brezhnev) said he wanted to have a conversation which only he and the President would know about and no one else. This led him into a long diagnosis of what he called the “China problem” which
was extremely violent and reported many examples of how the Russians were treated in China. That is of no consequence. But there were two major points he was making in this conversation. First, that the Soviet Union would resist by force any military arrangement between the United States and China, and he asked whether there existed a military arrangement. We didn't feel he had a right to ask that question. I know there doesn't exist one, but we do not feel that he had the right to ask that question. So we said the Chinese have never raised any military arrangement with us, which is correct. He then demanded an assurance that there would never by any military arrangements in the future, and he repeated the thought again that he would use force if anything like this happened.

The second point he made was independent of the United States and China. It had to do only with China. He said that the growth of the Chinese nuclear capability was unacceptable to the Soviet Union, and he proposed an exchange of information about what we knew about their nuclear program. We told them that we don’t engage in an exchange of intelligence information. Since then . . . let me do this in sequence. This happened late one afternoon; it lasted a very long time, but I'm just giving the essence. Late that night Gromyko asked to see me, and asked me what I thought of what Brezhnev had earlier said to the President, even though Brezhnev had given his word that no one would know except Brezhnev and the President what he said. He said that Brezhnev had said to the President only two things and that I would know about them. I said it was an unheard of proposition, and I’d never heard this kind of talk between countries who were not allies.

He then said he wanted it understood that they might consider Chinese political relationships, and not only military relations, a provocation.

Prime Minister Chou: Chinese military relations or relations with other countries?

The Secretary: And I said like your friendship treaty with India? He then evaded the answer, and I told him that this was an inadmissible line of discussion and that we would not pursue it.

Since then, the Soviet Union has tried on three or four occasions to exchange information on China with us by putting it in the context of a discussion on strategic nuclear limitations. The way they do it is to say they should be entitled to have equality with the United States, and, in addition to this equality, enough weapons to destroy China. And those weapons must increase each year because of the Chinese situation.

I tell you this, Mr. Prime Minister, not out of altruism, but because I believe the destruction of China by the Soviet Union, or even a massive attack on China by the Soviet Union, would have unforeseeable consequences for the entire international situation. (The interpreter
indicated that there was not total understanding of this point.) I don’t
tell this out of abstract altruism because I believe it is in our interest to
prevent such an attack. You know as well as I do, Mr. Prime Minister,
the consequences on Japan, Europe, South Asia, and the Middle East
if such an attack even had the appearance of success.

Before these conversations, I believed the Soviets had a generalized
hostility toward China, but I did not believe they had a specific plan.
You may have had another idea. I do not now exclude the possibility
of some specific ideas.

Now, as a result of these conversations, I ordered some studies in
our government that only four or five people know about, of what we
know about what such a threat could be, and what from our knowl-
edge could be done to prevent it, and of what help we could be in ways
that are not obvious, because I don’t think a formal relationship is de-
sirable for either of us. These would be of a technical nature. I don’t
have those papers with me here now, but I have them in my guest
house. We have some ideas on how to lessen the vulnerability of your
forces and how to increase the warning time, and I repeat that it has
to be done in such a way that it is very secret and not obvious.3

If the Prime Minister is interested, I can have Commander Howe,
or in some respects I could mention the details in a small group—
either to the Prime Minister or someone he designates. This is not some-
thing that involves reciprocity or any formal relationship, but advice
based on our experience and some regularized intelligence informa-
tion. (The interpreter questions the meaning of “regularized.”) “Regu-
larized intelligence information” means the regularized information
from us to you, not the other way.

Apart from that, I thought it might be of some importance to you
to know the state of mind of Brezhnev as stated to us. As far as we are
concerned, we don’t believe we can permit this, though it is a very dif-
ferent problem how to work out in practice.

Prime Minister Chou: During your recent short visit,4 it was prob-
ably not raised again.

The Secretary: No, he raised it again. He raised the question of ex-
changing military information again.

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3 In an October 22 memorandum to Kissinger, Fred Iklé, Director of the Arms Con-
trol and Disarmament Agency, suggested offering intelligence to China about the Soviet
threat. Solomon sent Iklé’s memorandum to Kissinger under a November 1 covering
memorandum. (National Archives, RG 59, Policy Planning Staff (S/P), Director’s Files
(Winston Lord) 1969–1977, Entry 5027, Box 370, Secretary Kissinger’s Visit to Peking, Oc-
tober 1973, S/PC, Mr. Lord, Vol. II)

4 Kissinger visited Moscow October 20–22, mainly to discuss the Middle East war.
Prime Minister Chou: They have satellites that can survey China every day.

The Secretary: I know.

Prime Minister Chou: And they still want it?

The Secretary: Our belief is their photography is not as good as ours. But I think what they want is an indication from us that they would use as a symbol of cooperation rather than using it. They want us to accept the desirability of destroying China’s nuclear capability or limiting it rather than the information itself. But the exchange of information is not a big problem, as that obviously we won’t do, and they probably have what they need.

Prime Minister Chou: Even though the Middle East was so tense, they still discuss such an issue?

The Secretary: When I was there it was during the ceasefire discussion.

Prime Minister Chou: It was before our alert. You went originally for the ceasefire.

The Secretary: Yes.

Prime Minister Chou: They invited you?

The Secretary: At that time there was no question of military pressure on us. The military pressure started four days later, and since then, they have not raised it.

Prime Minister Chou: It was only mentioned during the visit.

The Secretary: During my visit and not since then.

Prime Minister Chou: I believe they would suggest such matters to Japan, too.

The Secretary: It is conceivable. In any event, even if they don’t, if they started on this course, it is in my judgment not clear what Japan will do. We have not heard that they have proposed anything like this to Japan.

Prime Minister Chou: They always wanted to get Japan brought closer to them and away from us. They know they can’t sever relations completely between you and Japan, but at least they want to get Japan closer to them than to you.

The Secretary: Yes.

Prime Minister Chou: We have also said to Japan that if they want to exploit Siberia, it is better to be done with you than alone. I believe Prime Minister Tanaka will tell you that when he meets you.

The Secretary: That is our view, too.

Prime Minister Chou: I told them that if they do, it is better to do it with the United States. We said we do not fear their exploiting Siberian resources. The only thing is that we are afraid that they might be taken in.
Have you found some difficulties within the Soviet leadership at present, among the three or four of them?

The Secretary: No, because we always deal with Brezhnev.

Prime Minister Chou: Yes, he monopolizes the scene.

The Secretary: At first we always dealt with Kosygin or Podgorny and Brezhnev. Gromyko is a functionary and not a leader.

Prime Minister Chou: Suslov doesn’t take part in the negotiations.

The Secretary: Only once when the President was in Moscow. We have no special information on that. Our people think he’s more ideological and less bureaucratic than the others. He’s ideological and less bureaucratic than the others, but I don’t know how we would know that.

Prime Minister Chou: He knows historical theory, but he follows the other line of thinking. He explains other peoples’ theories. The Soviet party history has been changed three times, and all three times under his guidance.

The Secretary: That I didn’t know. I knew it had changed three times; I didn’t know he did it.

Prime Minister Chou: He is the one who finalized the draft, so he is that kind of author who follows the others.

The Secretary: There is no outstanding intellectual leader in the Soviet Union.

Prime Minister Chou: No, they don’t have any. It is impossible to have any, because they are so oppressive.

Thank you for anyway for your information and for your notification. Anyway, Ambassador Huang Chen has passed on what you have told him, and we have taken note of that. At present, though they are quite busy on day-to-day policies and other matters, they have to curse us everyday in the newspapers anyway. There are some people here in our party who read and study the materials, but we don’t have the time to go through them all.

So should we begin with a plenary session tomorrow?

The Secretary: Yes.

Prime Minister Chou: Would you like a plenary session or begin with five or six people as I just said now?

The Secretary: What do you think?

Prime Minister Chou: I think about four or five.

The Secretary: All right. We’ll make it four or five. I think that’s better.

Prime Minister Chou: Because you have travelled through so many countries.
China, June 1973–September 1974  331

The Secretary: If on the other matter, the Marshal or someone else wants the studies, they can get in touch with Mr. Lord, and Commander Howe can give those conclusions.

Prime Minister Chou: All right. You’re leaving on the 14th, is that so?

The Secretary: Yes, in the morning.

Prime Minister Chou: The more you move eastward, the more time you lose.

The Secretary: That is true, but at the end you finally gain it all back.

56. Memorandum of Conversation

Beijing, November 11, 1973, 3:15–7:00 p.m.

PARTICIPANTS

Prime Minister Chou En-lai
Foreign Minister Chi Peng-fei
Vice Foreign Minister Chiao Kuan-hua
Assistant Minister of Foreign Affairs Wang Hai-jung
Two Other Chinese Officials
Tang Wang-shen, Interpreter
Shen Jo-yen, Interpreter
Chinese note-taker
Henry A. Kissinger, Secretary of State
Ambassador David Bruce, Chief U.S. Liaison Office
Ambassador Robert Ingersoll, U.S. Embassy Tokyo
Ambassador Robert McCloskey, State Department Press Spokesman
Winston Lord, Director of Planning and Coordination, Department of State
John Holdridge, Deputy Chief U.S. Liaison Office

(After the press took pictures and there was light banter, the journalists and photographers left the room. There was then preliminary conversation in informal plenary session, from 3:15–3:25 p.m., highlights of which follow.)

Prime Minister Chou: Dr. Kissinger suggested that we separate into two groups to speed up the work. I also agree.

1 Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Kissinger Office Files, Box 100, Country Files, Far East, Secretary Kissinger’s Conversations in Peking, November 1973. Top Secret; Sensitive; Exclusively Eyes Only. The meeting was held in the Great Hall of the People.
Secretary Kissinger: I thought, Mr. Prime Minister, that we might have one group dealing with the essential political-international problems and the other group on some of the technical issues.

Prime Minister Chou: I agree to the two groups. Perhaps we can divide ourselves now. Who will be in the other?

Secretary Kissinger: Hummel will be in charge of the technical side and with me will be Ambassador Bruce, Ingersoll, McCloskey, Holdridge and Lord. We may change later.

Prime Minister Chou: Who will be with the other group?

Secretary Kissinger: Hummel, Armstrong, Jenkins and Solomon.

Prime Minister Chou: Mr. Solomon—is this Solomon the same one as the Indians?

Secretary Kissinger: I thought they had Moynihan.

Prime Minister Chou: It is a different case; and one of them is Solomon. Is he the same Solomon as the bible?

Secretary Kissinger: I have seen no evidence of that. He is very shy so he may not show it.

Prime Minister Chou: I thought he was interested in Confucius. If you are interested, I am also. I also have the interest to discuss it with you because we began our revolutionary activities by struggling to overthrow the school of Confucius during the reform movement.

They will go to the other hall. We will stay here. Shall we separate now? (The groups for the technical meeting left the room.)

You must be familiar with this hall by now.

Secretary Kissinger: Yes. What is the name of this hall?

Prime Minister Chou: Just a reception hall. It does not have the name of any province.

Secretary Kissinger: You met here with the President.

Prime Minister Chou: The first time when we met with the President, it was in this hall, and Mr. Ziegler was making the announcement to the press outside.

Secretary Kissinger: Yes, about the (Mao) meeting. They were speculating about the great difficulties because the meeting started late.

Prime Minister Chou: But, of course, after the news got out, there were other ideas. Perhaps that is why there was a similar practice in Moscow.

Secretary Kissinger: The first meeting?

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Prime Minister Chou: But that time your name did not appear, but I could determine that you must have been there.

Secretary Kissinger: You were right. That was the first evening of my arrival. He does everything openly, but it takes me a week to find out all of the implications of what he has said.

Prime Minister Chou: Ambassador Ingersoll, do you smoke?

Ambassador Ingersoll: No, my wife takes care of that. I have never done well with smoking.

Prime Minister Chou: First of all, we would like to express our welcome to our old friend who is now concurrently Secretary of State, and because of this dual capacity, we suppose we should express a dual welcome to you. But if you see Mr. Rogers, please also convey our regards to him.

Secretary Kissinger: I shall do that. Mr. Prime Minister, my colleagues and I always appreciate the opportunity to come here. I think that our two peoples and our two governments have established a very unique relationship which is founded on principle and in which we understand each other’s over-all approach in an unusual and complete manner. We have agreed that we were brought together by mutual necessity but since then we have built on this foundation, on a basis of candor and honesty, and a long range view. There is no leader with whom we speak as comprehensively as with the Prime Minister. It is due to the fact that there are not many leaders in the world who can think in so complicated a fashion.

Prime Minister Chou: You have overestimated me, and I think the credit should go to Chairman Mao. And as his comrade in arms, I have not learned enough. I agree to what you said just now, that we have built on the basis of our initial relations, based on a principled manner and in a candid and honest way taking the long view. And in view of such amelioration of attitudes we can discuss anything.

Secretary Kissinger: I don’t know how the Prime Minister would propose we should proceed in our discussion.

Prime Minister Chou: Yesterday we said that we would like to hear you first, and if you want to begin with an over-all picture or main issues, it is up to you.

Secretary Kissinger: Mr. Prime Minister, why don’t I begin with a general review of the situation as we see it.

(There was then a brief, humorous discussion of the stenotype machine of Mrs. Hill. During this discussion there was reference by the Prime Minister to future visits by Secretary Kissinger to China. He assumed two trips a year.)

Secretary Kissinger: Mr. Prime Minister, I will not go into the bilateral relations. That will be discussed by the other group. If they have
any difficulties, I may take the liberty of raising them with you. There is only one issue which is on my list and sometime while I am here we should settle it. We understand your point of view. It has to do with the Marine detachment, but we can reserve that for another occasion. It goes without saying that we will abide by your wishes, and our only concern is the impact in other countries where it has been our custom.

The primary thing I would say about our bilateral relations, leaving aside that one issue, is that we believe they are going well, and secondly, they have both a substantive and a symbolic aspect. The substantive issues will be discussed in the other group. The symbolic aspect is that our relationship continues to grow closer and beyond the technical side. We are prepared on our side to consider all means by which we can emphasize this symbolic aspect which we believe is very important.

Turning now to our political relationships—we recognize that the greatest difficulties we have had in our relationship have concerned the question of Taiwan. I would like to summarize again the understanding which we believe exists. We will conform strictly to the Shanghai Communiqué which affirms there is only one China and this is respected on both sides of the Formosa Straits.

Prime Minister Chou: That was your famous sentence.

Secretary Kissinger: Secondly, we will not . . .

Prime Minister Chou: But in the communiqué we talked about the Taiwan Straits.

Secretary Kissinger: That is correct. The second point is that we will not support any independence movement on Taiwan.

Prime Minister Chou: And this morning before going to bed I read an intelligence report that we received saying you were supporting the Taiwan independence movement. I did not quite believe it.

Secretary Kissinger: That cannot be correct, but if you should have information that any of our people are doing this I would appreciate it if you would inform us. It would be totally unauthorized. I don’t believe it is correct.

Prime Minister Chou: If the information seems to be reliable, we would pass it on; but if in the first instance it is not to be credited, we then would not notify you. I did not even think of telling the Chairman about that piece of information. It would only be a waste of time.

Secretary Kissinger: Mr. Prime Minister, our firm policy is to oppose a two China policy. We have talked about this on my previous visits and we will strictly carry this out.

Prime Minister Chou: And we also heard some news from the United States that Taiwan wanted to add two consulates—to have two Consulates General in the United States.
Secretary Kissinger: I was going to get into this. I am familiar with one consulate they are planning to set up for the time that we may move in the direction of a full exchange of diplomatic relations between Peking and Washington, and it is intended as a point of contact in the United States for the contingency of the evolution of our policy. It is not intended as an expansion of their representation but as a contingency plan for their position they recognize as coming in the future. I do not know about a second one. I know about a Consulate General in New York. The basic direction which we established in July 1971 is one on which you can count on, and we will not engage in little maneuvers within that context, much less outside it.

Prime Minister Chou: Perhaps the Chaing Kai-shek side put that forward.

Secretary Kissinger: That may be, but it is a reflection of the reduction of their position in the United States, not an attempt to increase it.

We have also understood that we would not support any attempt by third countries to move into Taiwan.

Prime Minister Chou: And this has something to do with both our sides.

Secretary Kissinger: Fourthly, the United States will support any peaceful resolution of the problem.

And finally, we would discourage any military moves from Taiwan against the Mainland. In the context of the Shanghai Communiqué and our understandings we have kept you informed about the nature of our military establishments on Taiwan. We are in the process of carrying out the military movements which I informed you of in February—the withdrawal of the transportation squadrons from Taiwan.

In the same spirit, I would like to inform you of our plans for next year. During 1974 we shall remove the two squadrons of Phantom planes that are now on Taiwan—one squadron in each half of the year. One-half in the first half and the second squadron in the second half. We will remove the U–2 planes from Taiwan. And we will remove the nuclear weapons which are in Taiwan. This will reduce our presence on Taiwan to communications and logistics. We will keep you informed of the further reductions which will take place after that.

It is also our intention, which we have mentioned to you and which the President reconfirmed to you, to complete the full normalization of the relations between China and the United States during this term of office, before the middle of 1976. We are prepared at any point to intensify the existing relationship or to establish full diplomatic relations, but we have the difficulty of how to handle the relationship with Taiwan in the interim period. But we will be prepared to listen to any proposal that you might have in this connection and make every attempt to meet it. If at any point the Chinese thought the formulation
of the Shanghai Communiqué or an adaptation would provide some-
way to have diplomatic relations we would be prepared to proceed on
that basis.

In the meantime, we need to be prepared to expand the status of
the Liaison Offices so that they become more and more similar to full
diplomatic recognition. I think it is obvious that your Ambassador in
Washington today enjoys a more direct access to our top officials than
any other Ambassador in Washington, certainly, more than the repre-
sentative of Taiwan. We would be prepared to establish trade offices
and other institutional links that you might consider appropriate. I
wanted to emphasize that the course which we have established will
be strictly maintained. Now perhaps I should turn to other matters,
Mr. Prime Minister, unless you wish to discuss these issues further.

Prime Minister Chou: I will dwell on them later. I will dwell on
the other aspects of this issue later. There is only one question I would
like to ask. We hear you intend to assist Taiwan in building an airplane
assembly factory, and we would like to know what form it would
take—rented, leased, a gift, sold on credit or . . .

Secretary Kissinger: You asked me that . . .

Prime Minister Chou: Of course, there is no question the material
would come from you, the United States.

Secretary Kissinger: You asked me that the last time, and in fact
we have the details with us and I will answer you. I will answer you
tomorrow. I will do it at the beginning of our discussion tomorrow. I
don’t have them here with me. I may say now, Mr. Prime Minister, it
is for an airplane of short range. It cannot reach the Mainland. It is a
defensive airplane, and a means of avoiding our having to sell longer
range airplanes to Taiwan and to separate its military procurement to
a greater degree from direct American sales. We have, as you know,
Mr. Prime Minister, a rather delicate process of disengagement to con-
duct—in which the Chinese side has shown great patience and wis-
dom if I may say—but we understand the outcome that our current
policy will have.

Now turning to other international problems. Let me speak first
of our relations with the Soviet Union. There are many detailed issues
which I am prepared to discuss, having to do with specific negotia-
tions. I think the basic point to understand, Mr. Prime Minister, is that
I believe analytically that the Soviet Union and we are pursuing almost
identical policies toward each other and it remains to be seen whose
judgment is better. The Soviet Union is pursuing a policy of relaxation
of tensions with the West for a variety of reasons. One of the reasons
undoubtedly is the Soviet conviction that if they can create the ap-
pearance of détente, the unity of the West will disintegrate and the de-
fense of the West will weaken.
I have no quarrel with many of the comments that we have received from the Chinese side privately, and many of the analyses from the Chinese side that we have seen publicly, about the problem of the direction of Soviet policy. I stated our position vis-à-vis the Soviet Union in a speech before a conference and in my press conference a few weeks ago. I don't know whether the Prime Minister has seen those. I stated then we would resist any aggressive tendencies directed outward. I said we would not permit détente to be used to undermine or weaken our relationships with our friends. And thirdly, that we would resist any attempts by the Soviet Union to use international trouble spots to expand its positions.

While these are our principles, we have a complex tactical problem about how to apply them. One of the problems is that while many of our commentators in America are very heroic in intervening in domestic affairs of other countries they are very unwilling to face the consequences of what these policies would involve. We believe that it is important for us to demonstrate that we have made a major effort to preserve the peace in order to be in a position to resist when aggressive action occurs. When aggressive action occurs, we will act decisively, and if necessary brutally, but we require the prior demonstration that we have been provoked. And I think we have proved this in our handling of the Middle East crisis.

I have read with great care your Vice Minister’s criticisms of the Treaty for the Prevention of Nuclear War, and, of course, I have had the benefit of direct communications with the Prime Minister. I do not quarrel with the specific points made by either the Prime Minister or the Vice Minister in terms of Soviet intentions. And it does not affect . . .

Prime Minister Chou: Why are there so many differing opinions inside your country concerning your President’s action in the Middle East?

Secretary Kissinger: In the Middle East?

Prime Minister Chou: That is, your alert. We are in favor of it.

Secretary Kissinger: I have always believed, Mr. Prime Minister, that the people who understand our foreign policy best are in Peking.

Prime Minister Chou: Thank you for your just and fair words. Put that in the record.

Secretary Kissinger: This record never leaves my office. There are several reasons for this. Actually we have not had many domestic difficulties about this alert. It was relatively minor. In fact, after I testified

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3 See footnote 4, Document 42.
4 See Documents 36, 38, and 42.
before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, a group which does not generally support the Administration, Senator Symington, who almost always is critical of the Administration, went on TV and fully supported the alert; and so did Senator Fulbright.

Prime Minister Chou: I read about that.

Secretary Kissinger: This alert happened in the week in which public excitement about the Watergate problem was very high and some of the critics of the Administration merged those two issues. You have in America now in any event, Mr. Prime Minister, a combination of various forces that produce a rather contradictory pattern in the public discussion of foreign policy—not in the conduct of it. You have a combination of the intellectuals, who dislike the President for other reasons, with the old professional anti-communists of the right, so that, for the first time, some of these right wing groups are being given intellectual respectability. Basically, the alert had very wide public support and there was a public poll which showed that by about two to one the American people favored it.

But the reason, Mr. Prime Minister, we can maintain support for our foreign policy is partly because of its record and partly because of our using this strategy of forcing the Soviet Union into a posture of provocation. Sometimes our judgment may be wrong, but our strategy is clear. We have explained that treaty to you. Our judgment was that it was better to deprive it of the significance that the Soviet Union wanted to give it and to remove it as an issue from a public debate and from international quorums, than to have an endless debate in which public opinion would suffer more damage than it did from the treaty as in fact it was written.

I must point out, Mr. Prime Minister, that this session is a culture shock to my colleagues on the right, except for Ambassador Bruce, who have not been acquainted in the past with our method of talking with one another. In traditional diplomacy, we express ourselves more carefully.

But the primary thing we have accomplished in the Treaty is to link all its obligations but also third countries and to link conventional war to nuclear war in such a way that it is impossible to resort to conventional war without (sic) negating any obligations with respect to nuclear war and finally to make it impossible to resort to any war without prior consultation. And therefore, we have been given for the first time a legal basis to resist in areas where we have no formal obligation.

Therefore, on the night that we went on alert we received a message, as I told you, from General Secretary Brezhnev in which he demanded that we join a Soviet-American expeditionary force to the Middle East and, failing that they would then move unilaterally. They were demanding an immediate reply. We first of all did not reply but went
on alert and replied only after we had been on alert for several hours. And then we told the Soviet Union that a unilateral Soviet move would violate Article 2 of the Treaty for the Prevention of Nuclear War and would be resisted accordingly.

Prime Minister Chou: We were clear about that. But the Soviet Union can evade that and engage in expansionism in other forms.

Secretary Kissinger: There is no question that legal obligations prevent Soviet expansionism. Our problem is how to get into a position to resist, and the strategy we are following is to try to create as many legal obstacles as possible; and, failing that, to use those legal obstacles as American obligations, especially in those areas where we have no formal obligation and therefore would have difficulties domestically.

The Prime Minister might note that I said publicly, in explaining the treaty, that operations such as in Czechoslovakia, or massive movement of arms across the frontier, would be in violation of that treaty and would be so treated by the United States.

Prime Minister Chou: Did you note that your alert also arose dissatisfaction on the part of your Western Alliance? They said you had not told them beforehand.

Secretary Kissinger: Mr. Prime Minister, I was going to talk about our Western Alliance. Our Western allies are distressed when we engage in activities as we did and are dissatisfied when we go on alert and dissatisfied when we conduct a disagreeable policy and dissatisfied when we conduct a half policy. It seems to be our destiny that they are doomed to be dissatisfied. I will give my explanations later.

Prime Minister Chou: Are they also dissatisfied with your journey to the Arab countries? Of course, the Soviet Union would be dissatisfied.

Secretary Kissinger: As a matter of fact, Mr. Prime Minister . . .

Prime Minister Chou: We appreciate that.

Secretary Kissinger: One has to analyze what is meant by dissatisfaction. If you want to play for high stakes with very little risk, then you are likely to be in a continued state of dissatisfaction. The secret dreams of our Western Allies in the Middle East is to restore their position of 1940 without any risk or effort on their part and therefore, to the extent that we are more active, there is a vague feeling of jealousy and uneasiness.

I think, Mr. Prime Minister, the nature of the European so-called dissatisfaction has to be understood. You have met many of the European leaders and you will have your own judgment as to their vision and ability to see matters comprehensively. But each of them faces the problem that for domestic reasons he has to say one thing while deep down he understands that what we are doing is essentially correct. Therefore, they very often, particularly after the event is already over,
take a public position which is at variance of their understanding of the real situation.

On the question of the alert, we received the letter from Brezhnev threatening unilateral action at 10:00 at night, which is 3:00 in Europe. He demanded an immediate reply. The letter was supported by intelligence, which I believe we gave to your Ambassador, that the Soviet Union had alerted seven of eight of its airborne divisions. I think I gave your Ambassador that. Under those circumstances we had no time to consult.

Secondly, speaking very frankly with you, Mr. Prime Minister, there is no point in consulting if there is only one thing you can do. If the European countries had not agreed with us, we still would have had to go on alert. Therefore, we had to proceed unilaterally, and I must say that in situations where we believe that the over-all equilibrium will be disturbed we will continue to behave in this manner if there is no time.

With respect also to the occasional criticism of our Soviet policy by our European allies, this has to be weighed against their equally strong criticism in the previous period. I think it is healthier for them to be worried about how far we might go and to have them in a position where they will try to make greater efforts in their own defense, than to have them pursue the policies which occurred while Ambassador Bruce was in London when they were constantly pushing us to be less intransigent to the Soviet Union and were constantly approaching us with ideas on how to bring about détente. If there is to be détente, we had rather manage it than have the Europeans do so.

But, if the Prime Minister wishes, I will be prepared to have a longer session on our relations with the Western Europeans. Despite the surface phenomena, I believe our relations are going along in a good direction. I am also prepared during this visit to go over with the Prime Minister the specific negotiations now going on with the Soviet Union, but I don’t want to take all the time this afternoon.

Let me make a few comments now about the Middle East and about Southeast Asia, and perhaps we can leave all the other topics for later discussion.

Prime Minister Chou: All right.

Secretary Kissinger: You will remember that I saw your Ambassador the night the Middle East war started, and I explained to him what our basic strategy would be. I told him that for this period we were not in-

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5 On October 25, Kissinger informed Huang Chen of the Soviet alert. (Memorandum of conversation, October 25, 4:45–5:25 p.m.; National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970–73, POL 27 ARAB–ISR)
interested in the merits of the dispute between the Arabs and Israelis, but we were primarily interested in preventing a situation in which the Soviet Union would achieve its predominance in the Middle East. We believed that a Soviet victory in the Middle East, like 1971 in the Indian subcontinent, would have disastrous consequences not only there but elsewhere, and would encourage adventurism on a global scale.

You will see many tactical moves over the next month, and while I am here, I think we should have an opportunity to have a full discussion of the Middle East so you will understand specifically what we will do; but for this purpose, you should understand our basic strategy is to convince the Arabs that they can get weapons from the Soviet Union but a political settlement only from the United States. And therefore, we will always resist proposals that come to us from the Arabs through the Soviet Union. We are not asking for Chinese support on the specifics of the negotiations because the Chinese position is well known. We do think, however, that this basic strategy is in the common interest of both of our countries. We have no interest in a predominant position in the Middle East. That is not achievable, nor is it desirable. We are interested in keeping any other country from having a predominant position.

In this negotiation which we are now beginning, one of the big problems is that the Arab leaders are very active as individuals but are somehow given to excessive romanticism and to great impatience. We have, Mr. Prime Minister, a complex domestic situation with respect to the Arab/Israeli dispute. It cannot be an accident that the United States should become so heavily committed to a nation of two and one-half million at a distance of 6,000 miles which has no strategic or economic importance to the United States. These factors cannot be changed from one day to the next, any more than some of the factors in our relationship can be changed from one day to the next.

Prime Minister Chou: But perhaps Dr. Kissinger being the Secretary of State would be in a better position to change this situation. Perhaps . . .

Secretary Kissinger: Quite true.

Prime Minister Chou: Perhaps you would have more effect in remediing this situation.

Secretary Kissinger: Quite correct, but it has to be carefully organized. It would be a great mistake to fight the battle prematurely before we are organized and on minor issues. And I can tell the Prime Minister that we are as determined to bring about a just settlement in the Middle East as we were two years ago to improve our relationship with the People’s Republic of China. But we are dealing with it.

Prime Minister Chou: But it will be considerably more difficult to obtain that.
Secretary Kissinger: It will be very difficult.

Prime Minister Chou: Madame Golda Meir styles herself a socialist.

Secretary Kissinger: My secret dream is to involve Madame Meir in negotiations with President Thieu.

Prime Minister Chou: They will have to go to London where they will meet their socialist friends.

Secretary Kissinger: She is in London now.

Prime Minister Chou: That is what I was saying. There are all kinds of socialists now.

Secretary Kissinger: It will be very difficult. It will be difficult with Israel and it will be difficult with the Arabs.

Prime Minister Chou: The passing of a United Nations resolution we were reading in your Newsweek magazine.

Secretary Kissinger: That is the international edition. I have not seen it. In the domestic issue there was a different cover.

Prime Minister Chou: You can also see from your expressions that it was extremely difficult.

Secretary Kissinger: If Mrs. Meir only gets ninety-eight percent of what she asks for she considers herself betrayed.

Prime Minister Chou: With regard to the resolution about Israel passed in the United Nations in 1947, the historical roots would go back to the Balfour Declaration. At that time you had heavy domestic pressure. Also there are Soviet intentions. Do you agree with that?

Secretary Kissinger: I agree that in 1947, when Israel was formed, the Soviet supported it because it wanted to create difficulties in the Middle East. No question about that. Nevertheless, while the United States is now supporting a peace settlement which will bring about an Israeli withdrawal from occupied territory, we are for the existence of Israel. We will defend the existence of Israel.

Prime Minister Chou: Does Mrs. Meir understand that if she continues in such an absurd manner that that will increase the possibilities of Soviet troops entering into the Middle East?

Secretary Kissinger: The Israelis are going through a traumatic experience at this moment because they had assumed they could remain militarily supreme for a long time. Even though they won the battles in this war, they have lost their supremacy. So they need a little time to adjust to a totally new reality for them. I don’t know whether the Prime Minister agrees the most important aspect of the ceasefire that was achieved last week when I was in Cairo was not the specific terms—they are important—but that it was negotiated between Egypt and the United States without the Soviet Union.

Prime Minister Chou: I had thought of toasting you on that last night, but I was afraid the correspondents would hear us.
Secretary Kissinger: Yes.

Prime Minister Chou: We also talked to the Egyptians.

Secretary Kissinger: I was going to say, to the extent . . .

Prime Minister Chou: They said you would not do it because you are of Jewish descent. We said you would also look at the problem from the point of view that everything divides into two. There are also good Jewish persons and Karl Marx, whom we believe in, was also Jewish. Perhaps what we said had some effect on him.

Secretary Kissinger: It is very possible. To the extent, Mr. Prime Minister, that you can continue to do this, because there will be difficult periods in which we will not be able to move as fast as they want, but they can be sure we will move in the direction we have discussed here and that we have told them, and to the extent that you feel you could talk to them, it would be very helpful to our common approach.

I think I have already talked too long. On Southeast Asia there are two problems.

Prime Minister Chou: Have you finished with your Middle East issue?

Secretary Kissinger: On the Middle East, I thought we should have another discussion of the detailed tactics in the future. Let me make one point. These negotiations will start soon—we think in December—and there is no possibility of excluding the Soviet Union from the formal discussion. We have discussed with the Egyptians and with the Jordanians that the formal meetings should be conducted as the Paris Peace Conference on Vietnam, which is to say with only a repetition of formal positions as Ambassador Bruce knows only too well. The real negotiations will take place separately between the Egyptian Foreign Minister, who has been especially designated for this task, and myself and the Israelis. But separately.

Prime Minister Chou: We noticed that. Would that have an adverse effect on Syria?

Secretary Kissinger: I was going to say to the Prime Minister that we invited the Deputy Foreign Minister to visit me in Washington. And we have now sent a message to the Syrian Government through the Shah, and also through King Faisal who is paying for their reconstruction, that we would be prepared to talk to them at a higher level, and I am planning to visit Damascus in early December. They have indicated that they wanted to see me.

Prime Minister Chou: What about the knot in Iraq?

Secretary Kissinger: We have to prevent Iraq from dominating Syria.

Prime Minister Chou: But to put it another way, the Soviet Union is trying to dominate Iraq.
Secretary Kissinger: The Soviet Union is trying to dominate Iraq and have one front in the Mediterranean and another in the Persian Gulf. That is why our strategy is—first of all I wanted to say Mr. Prime Minister, we are pursuing in that region from Iran to the Mediterranean, the policy that we discussed with Chairman Mao when I was here last time. Our present policy is to keep as much pressure on the Government of Iraq as we can through Iran and other sources so that it is absorbed as much as possible in its domestic difficulties rather than with others. And as you know, they have a very significant problem with the Kurdish population. They were quiet during the Arab-Israeli war because it was not desirable to have all Arabs concentrate on the problems of the Kurds. But we will now make an attempt to establish the same relationship with Syria that we have established with Egypt, and to negotiate with Syria the Syria-Israeli settlement the same as the Egyptian settlement.

Prime Minister Chou: Anyhow the Soviet Union will not let loose of Iraq.

Secretary Kissinger: No. Unless Iraq throws them out as Egypt did.

Prime Minister Chou: That will take a period of time.

Secretary Kissinger: That is why we have to . . .

Prime Minister Chou: You perhaps will also know that even the Shah of Iran could not help from sort of dealing with the Soviet Union in that he also had to agree to consider the Soviet proposal of a collective security system. Of course, we knew that it was only a tactic to put the Soviet Union off, but he could not help saying that.

Secretary Kissinger: He misunderstood its significance also.

Prime Minister Chou: But this Shah does not seem very confused.

Secretary Kissinger: No. He is very good. One of the outstanding leaders.

Prime Minister Chou: He is in his middle age.

Secretary Kissinger: He is 54.

Prime Minister Chou: A little older than you.

Secretary Kissinger: A little. He understands the situation very well, and he will not make mistakes in practice. His was the only country that was bordering the Soviet Union that did not permit the overflight of Soviet planes during this crisis, and when one of his ministers permitted eight planes to fly over he fired him. It took great courage.

Until Iraq becomes disinvolved from the Soviet Union, we have to keep them isolated and from gaining success through its actions with the Soviet Union. We will see what can be achieved in the discussions with the Syrians in December. We have talked to Jordan and that is not a problem for us, and we have also established a preliminary contact.
with the Palestinians. Our basic strategy is to set up a formal conference which will have some UN blessing and some Soviet participation, and a series of bilateral negotiations in which we will attempt to be the intermediary together with whatever help we can get, but without the help of the Soviet Union.

Prime Minister Chou: Have the Palestinians agreed to participate?

Secretary Kissinger: In the conference? Yes. We will do it in two stages, Mr. Prime Minister. The initial phase of the conference will deal with disengagement of military forces and that does not involve the Palestinians. And since the Palestinians present a major problem for the Jordanians and Israel, we thought it best . . . and since some success should be achieved rapidly, we thought in the first conference there should be only Syria, Egypt, Israel and Jordan dealing with military disengagement. And when the frontiers issue arises, the Palestinians should participate; and they have agreed and so has the King of Jordan. None of this is generally known, Mr. Prime Minister, and I have not discussed this, obviously, with the Soviets at all. But Egypt has agreed to this procedure. And I think it will work.

Prime Minister Chou: Because in the 1947 resolution the issue of Palestine was not solved. For instance, they have their military forces in Syria and other areas. Is it not possible for the Palestinians to participate in the military aspects also?

Secretary Kissinger: They will participate in the military aspects of disengagement after the first phase of the disengagement of forces that are now in contact. The immediate problem is to get some movement. If the negotiation immediately gets bogged down in procedural details, we will be back to 1967 in which the new line develops a sanctity of its own and the Israelis on the West Bank . . . the probabilities for a new outbreak will be overwhelming. We thought we should get a negotiation in the first instance where we are not talking about forces now in contact with each other, that involves only those countries that have forces involved in contact.

Prime Minister Chou: I understand.

Secretary Kissinger: We expect that this first phase will be a matter of a few months. But in the meantime we will continue to talk to the Palestinians. We think it is important that this phase of talks, in which we are involved separately, be kept secret as long as possible because not every country has an interest in having it succeed.

Maybe I should say a word about Southeast Asia. In Southeast Asia we have two problems. One is the problem of maintaining the ceasefire in Vietnam. And the second is the problem of Cambodia. We believe that the resumption of large military operations in Vietnam would be extremely undesirable and have the potentiality of major
involvement by our two countries. We would like to normalize our relations.

As far as Cambodia is concerned, I leave it up to the Prime Minister whether he wishes to have a more extended discussion. I simply want to say we are not, in principle, opposed to Sihanouk. In many of his private statements and public statements, he seems to be under the misapprehension that the United States Government is, in principle, opposed to him. That is absolutely incorrect. If he could return to Cambodia in a position of real independence for himself, we would be very interested in him as a leader. We are not interested in him if he is a captive of one particular faction that is simply using him for a very brief period of time in order to gain international recognition.

Prime Minister Chou: Have you taken note of the recent actions of the Soviet Union?

Secretary Kissinger: Yes. With respect to Sihanouk?

Prime Minister Chou: Perhaps Ambassador Bruce is more familiar.

Secretary Kissinger: I am familiar with it. I have taken note of it. Our interest in Cambodia, insofar as we have interest, is to keep it out of great power confrontation, and we are interested in a truly independent, neutral Cambodia. We want no position for the United States in Cambodia. And we are not committed to any particular group of individuals in Cambodia. I leave it up to the Prime Minister whether this is a subject that he wants to pursue at a later meeting.

Prime Minister Chou: We will have to consider this for a while before we can raise our opinions. I would like to ask now why it is that the two South Vietnamese sides have shown no progress in their Paris meetings on the political aspects.

Secretary Kissinger: I think the same qualities that make the Vietnamese a heroic people make them politically an extremely uncompromising people; and they sometimes combine, at least the ones I know, the worst aspects of Confucianism and the French Lycée. For example, when I negotiated this additional communiqué in June,6 which will be my last one—I will never again negotiate with them—we had everything settled, when both parties conceived a new theory of international law: the order of obligations in which they appear in paragraphs determines the order in which they have to be performed. Each side attempted to push the obligations of the others into the beginning of the document and its own obligations to the end so its opponent would have to perform first. We spent nearly a week on the problem,

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6 Two joint communiqués of June 13 issued by the United States and the Democratic Republic of Vietnam are printed in Department of State Bulletin, July 9, 1973, pp. 50-53.
although no treaty could ever be written if this became an accepted practice.

Prime Minister Chou: The protocol you mean?

Secretary Kissinger: Yes. The protocol in June. Eventually, the objective situation in Vietnam will change for both sides, and then there will be real negotiating possibilities.

Prime Minister Chou: If we go into Cambodia, we will have to link it to the whole of Indochina, and if we are going to discuss it, we can do that later.

Secretary Kissinger: It is up to you, Mr. Prime Minister, and I will be prepared to do it. I will be prepared to discuss the whole of Indochina.

Prime Minister Chou: Of course, compared to the overall international situation, this is but a very small corner now, although it had troubled you for more than four and one-half years since your President came into office.

Secretary Kissinger: That is correct.

Prime Minister Chou: But from the point of view of the overall international strategy, you have taken too much time on that small issue.

Secretary Kissinger: That is true, too.

Prime Minister Chou: And you also said you no longer wished to continue Vietnam negotiations.

Secretary Kissinger: There was one moment, Mr. Prime Minister—the Vietnamese specialize in creating deadlock on irrelevant issues. There was a dispute over who should sign the document, the protocol. We made a proposal, the South Vietnamese made a proposal, and the North Vietnamese made a proposal. We then offered a compromise which accepted the North Vietnamese position, whereupon the South Vietnamese rejected it and moved to our original position, and the North Vietnamese moved to the original position of the South Vietnamese. At that point we had the North Vietnamese position, and the North Vietnamese had the South Vietnamese position. After three days of negotiations.

Prime Minister Chou: But you cannot blame them for this because it was the precedent established by your esteemed Secretary of State John Dulles. Because we have said that we were taken in and we have said this many times to our Vietnamese friends. You know that President Ho Chi Minh was a very eloquent man and he was a very open man too, and in his discussions with our Chairman, he did not agree to say that we had been taken in at that time. We continue to say we should have made greater efforts at the Geneva Conference. We should say that on the first Geneva Conference we should take some of the moral responsibility. Because, if at that time if we had refused to sign unless Dulles signed, he would have signed. But even though he would have signed, SEATO would have been established.
Secretary Kissinger: The lack of signature was not the determining factor.

Prime Minister Chou: No it was not, but it established a precedent. We have to admit our mistakes on that. It can be said to be a twist of history.

Now with one agreeing and one dissenting how are you going to get the Nobel Prize? I wonder who suggested that it go to two persons together.

Secretary Kissinger: It was domestic politics in Norway. Le Duc Tho has written me a very warm letter. It is like two war veterans exchanging ideas. It reminded me of our conversations at the last session of our peace talks.

Prime Minister Chou: Do you think we could take a rest for a few minutes?

(There was then a break from 5:30 to 5:45 p.m.)

Prime Minister Chou: So the two sides, Israel and Egypt, are going to sign at 9:00, Peking time.

Secretary Kissinger: I don’t know the exact time. I know they will sign today.

Prime Minister Chou: That would be 4:00 their time.

Secretary Kissinger: That seems reasonable. They were supposed to meet at 2:00, and I guess it would take until 4:00.

Prime Minister Chou: First, the Soviet Union issued a news report and then they cancelled it.

Secretary Kissinger: They have never acknowledged the agreement, have they? They have not reported it in the press.

Prime Minister Chou: We heard that earlier that Tass had issued a news report saying that there were two different texts of the agreement issued—one in the United States and the other in Egypt.

Secretary Kissinger: That is not true.

Prime Minister Chou: Later on they cancelled that news item and reissued another one according to the Egyptian text.

Secretary Kissinger: Which is exactly the same as the other text.

Prime Minister Chou: It did not go into that in such detail.

Secretary Kissinger: There is only one text. My letter was approved by both the Egyptian Foreign Minister and the Israeli Cabinet before I sent it.

Prime Minister Chou: It was also the same as that you gave to Kurt Waldheim.

Secretary Kissinger: Exactly.

Prime Minister Chou: Is it five or six points?

Secretary Kissinger: Six.
Prime Minister Chou: At the beginning there were reports there were only five.

Secretary Kissinger: That was wrong too. I think we gave your Ambassador a letter 24 hours before it was published.

Prime Minister Chou: So shall we continue? Is there anything else you would like to say?

Secretary Kissinger: I think there are other topics we have discussed in the past, such as South Asia and Iran, that we can keep for another occasion. I wanted to cover the basic issues today.

Prime Minister Chou: In my view, South Asia is always an important aspect. What do you think of the developments there?

Secretary Kissinger: India is making a major effort to improve its relations with us, and we assume also with you.

Prime Minister Chou: Why do they have to insist on detaining those 195 prisoners of war?

Secretary Kissinger: That is the problem—the problem is that I think they want to keep them until Pakistan recognizes Bangladesh and until Bangladesh gives up the claim to try them. Now as part of this negotiation which brought about the settlement, we obtained from India an assurance that those 195 would not be turned over to Bangladesh. We would make it a matter of American Government policy if they broke this agreement.

Prime Minister Chou: There is the need to exert a certain pressure on them in this aspect because it is too unreasonable. Because in Pakistan they have already passed a resolution in their national assembly agreeing to the recognition of Bangladesh, giving the Prime Minister the authority to recognize Bangladesh at the proper time.

Secretary Kissinger: We are supporting Pakistan on the return of the 195. We have made this clear to India.

Prime Minister Chou: We also discussed this issue with Mr. Whitlam when he came this time.

Secretary Kissinger: That is an issue in which he may be willing to support you. Whitlam, I would suspect, would support you on this.

Prime Minister Chou: At the beginning, he expressed his opinion, being more favorable to Bangladesh, and that he did not understand our position. But later, after we explained our position, he did not say anything more. He said he had not read Maxwell’s book, and I gave him a copy.7

Secretary Kissinger: I think the Prime Minister has increased the sales of that book.

7 Neville Maxwell, *India’s China War*; see footnote 11, Document 8.
Prime Minister Chou: Indeed. And we believe that that book was written in a very fair manner because we had never known him before, and we did not provide him any documents. He reached those conclusions entirely on Indian documents. Perhaps it did draw on my letter. I think he did quote my letter to Nehru, but I don’t think he quoted the letter that I wrote—after we had returned the prisoners of war and ammunition—to India and to all other heads of State and heads of government concerned. We sent a letter to the five intermediary states and to all the heads of government. Of course, you would now have a copy of that. He is now commencing to write a book on the Sino-Soviet dispute.

Secretary Kissinger: We have seen articles on that in the London Times.

Prime Minister Chou: He said he is coming again.

Secretary Kissinger: With respect to India, our policy is to see what we can do that they will have greater freedom of action from the Soviet Union but basically we are moving very slowly. We are settling some economic issues with them now—the rupee debt and matters of this kind.

Prime Minister Chou: We believe the rupee debt should be settled rather generously. How many rupees do you have on your hands for food purchases?

Secretary Kissinger: I don’t have the exact figure, but it was settled at I think about 15 percent. It depends on how you calculate it. You can calculate it without interest—it would be about 60 percent—without interest it would be less. The rupees were blocked in India; we could not get them out of India; we have nothing to spend them on in India; and, therefore, what we adopted was what we thought a rather realistic program.

Prime Minister Chou: In your settlement, would you have the portion that was to be returned converted into hard currency?

Secretary Kissinger: No. But we have established fixed categories on which it can be spent in India which was not the case before.

Prime Minister Chou: Can you invest with those rupees in India?

Secretary Kissinger: No. It is mostly for American governmental expenditures in India; for our Embassy and matters like this, and buildings.

Prime Minister Chou: But that should be a very small sum.

Secretary Kissinger: And buildings and things of this kind.

Prime Minister Chou: Would you buy commodities out of India with that sum?

Secretary Kissinger: I don’t think so. I will get the details and let you know tomorrow.
Prime Minister Chou: I believe I have already told you of how they broke the Sino-Indian border negotiations in order to obtain that rupee settlement for buying grains from the United States. Do you remember my telling you that?

Secretary Kissinger: You told me that after these negotiations broke down, that they received a great deal of help. You think they broke them in order to get the help?

Prime Minister Chou: Exactly. Because when I met with the foreign press in India, I told them no issue had been solved, and therefore I had nothing to say to them, the correspondents. But, of course, other correspondents also put questions to me. But a correspondent from your country asked me whether I knew or not that the Indian Minister of Food was in your country waiting to sign. I thanked him for telling me this news, and I understood. And the day after the talks broke down and I went to Kathmandu, Nepal for a visit, I read in the papers that the deal had been signed. And it was decided that by that agreement that India would be buying American food grains with rupees—I think the sum of about 15 million tons; of course, not in one year, that was not the manner of buying grains, but it was going to be done over a period of five years or six years. But the actual deal perhaps exceeded that amount. I think there was something to do with that. They would not break it. Otherwise, they could have signed something (with us) that was very abstract, and in principle, and not go into details. Nehru could have done that but at that time he refused to make any concessions. Because at the end of those talks, I summarized a few points in his words to be taken as the basis for an agreement in principle to be later further discussed in detail, and he still refused to sign. But today you find that the rupees finally can be used in India and only a restricted number.

Secretary Kissinger: It was always the case that the rupee could only be used in India. I think the basic problem was what we called the counterpart fund; these accumulated funds which theoretically give one enormous power in a country where one has them. It is really not the purpose for which they were set up. They were set up so they could be spent there for development projects for the government concerned.

The second problem is that as foreign aid develops more and more countries owe us money; then if, for any reason, we shut off aid we shut off repayment of their debts, so that we are in the position of giving them aid so they can repay debts to us. This whole problem we are now examining, since it has consequences that were never intended.

Prime Minister Chou: I think your President said at one time that all the debts together accounted for nearly $10 billion.

Secretary Kissinger: Yes.
Prime Minister Chou: So perhaps you are preparing for the day when finding it difficult to pursue them, you will just wipe them off as with the stroke of one’s beard.

Secretary Kissinger: No, but we have to do something creative with them because whether they are wiped off or not does not depend on us so completely anymore.

Prime Minister Chou: Correct. Of course, you would know that the Soviet Union whenever it leases something determines what it must be paid back in—for instance, in jute. You would know that, of course.

Secretary Kissinger: Yes, and also in the Middle East.

Prime Minister Chou: You will know that recently that Egypt has had to pay in hard currencies for the ammunition that it obtained from the Soviet Union. Because the Soviet Union told Egypt since you have so many friends who are rich in oil resources, you should pay us in money and not in goods.

And then we saw that you suddenly put a bill to your Congress concerning aid to Israel amounting to $2 billion. Of course, we understand that if you had not done that public opinion in the United States would not have been able to understand.

Secretary Kissinger: We did this as a pressure on the Soviet Union.

Prime Minister Chou: But they wanted money. They did not care for anything else. They, of course, would not pass a bill saying they would provide military arms immediately to Egypt.

Secretary Kissinger: But they were providing a great deal of arms during the war.

Prime Minister Chou: Of course, but for a price. Boumedienne went to the Soviet Union and held sixteen hours of discussion with the Soviets for the same purpose. They wanted to be paid. They gave him some things, but there were also other things they did not give him. One cannot fight well if one relies on such—if that is on what one must rely to fight with.

Have you paid attention to the prospects of the developments in Afghanistan?

Secretary Kissinger: Yes. We have looked at that situation since the coup, and, of course, Prince Daud is well known as having some pro-Soviet orientation; and many of the younger officers with him have no political experience and were trained in the Soviet Union. You are familiar with the fact there was a Soviet military mission there in the last few weeks that inspected the border with Pakistan. We talked to the Shah of Iran, and we also told the Soviet Union that if the Afghans spilled across their border that this would be considered an international development which we would take very seriously. We are concerned with the Pushtunistan agitation.
Prime Minister Chou: They also engage themselves in Baluchistan agitation. The final intention of the Soviet Union is to get it all in the Soviet hand. They have a map. We don’t know whether President Bhutto showed it to you.

Secretary Kissinger: Yes. He showed me the map. It allegedly is an Afghanistan map because it has a very small slice of Soviet territory.

Prime Minister Chou: A piece of Pakistan, a piece of Iran, and a small piece of the Soviet Union.

Secretary Kissinger: The Shah of Iran is very concerned. He is building up his defenses at a considerable rate, and we are giving him more modern equipment. We have talked to Bhutto and so far our help has been primarily in the economic field, and we are now thinking of helping him build a port which is a project which he is extremely interested in. We have not yet fully solved the problems of weapons for Pakistan. We are trying to do it through Iran. And we are also . . .

Prime Minister Chou: I believe Prime Minister Bhutto wants to obtain weapons directly from you.

Secretary Kissinger: Yes. It is a very difficult problem for us because of Congress. We have given him a little, but it is really not very meaningful.

Prime Minister Chou: Can Iran give them some?

Secretary Kissinger: Yes. That is what we are working on now. We had our Ambassador from Iran visit Pakistan to see what arrangements could be worked out.

Prime Minister Chou: So India has such a great influence on your domestic public opinion.

Secretary Kissinger: India has a considerable influence on our domestic public opinion, not so much on the public at large which does not like it, but on the intellectuals which have had a romantic idea about India as a nonviolent country. We are also working with the Shah, as I told you earlier, on the problem of Iraq and the Gulf States. And we have this week, as you may have noted, sent one of our aircraft carriers and an escort into the Persian Gulf in order to demonstrate our presence. There have been Soviet ships there, but we have not had American ships there.

Prime Minister Chou: Anyway, those places are getting tense. You are spending such a huge amount in military expenditures in assisting other countries, could you not appropriate a portion of that—a portion of your expenditures to military assistance to other countries—could you not give a portion of that to Pakistan?

Secretary Kissinger: We are not spending that much, unfortunately. The budget is being decreased by Congress every year. Secondly, a specific prohibition was passed against direct military aid to either India
or Pakistan. India does not need it because they are getting it from the
Soviets. We have to look for indirect ways of doing it. I have talked to
Prime Minister Bhutto about it, and I will look into it again when I get
back to the United States. We agree with the necessity. Our problem is
to find the legal means of doing it.

Prime Minister Chou: Another question is that of Korea. We have
reached a compromise, but we believe the speed has to be slowed down—
that is, the time when the draft resolution should be put to the First Com-
mittee, and the Chairman of the General Assembly, will be postponed.
Because it was originally scheduled to have the discussion in the First
Committee on the Korean issue on the 14th or 15th and you had already
left Washington when you presented it with our Korean friends, and then
we had to tell our delegation at the United Nations. Our delegation was
very enthusiastic about this, as was your Ambassador.

Secretary Kissinger: He is by nature enthusiastic.

Prime Minister Chou: Perhaps something like Ambassador Huang
Hua.

Secretary Kissinger: I did not have that impression from Ambas-
dador Huang Hua.

Prime Minister Chou: But they very quickly agreed.

Secretary Kissinger: We were under the impression you were in a
hurry. We are in no particular hurry.

Prime Minister Chou: Because you had not returned and we had
not met you, and they even went into the details of drawing up the
wording. Perhaps even before you authorized your Ambassador.

Secretary Kissinger: No. I approved the wording. It was sent to me
as a cable, and I approved it.

Prime Minister Chou: Because we knew that you were very busy
and preoccupied with the Middle East at that time, and we did not
think there was the need to be so hasty because we also have to con-
sult with other sponsor countries which Korea had mobilized, and we
thought also that you would have to discuss with your sponsor coun-
tries. In the course of such consultation, it would be bound to leak. For
instance, you will discuss it with Japan. You told Japan.

Secretary Kissinger: “Might possibly leak” is one of the kindest
sentences I have heard. I was told that you were in a hurry. We had no
particular reason to hurry. We were for it, and I approved the sched-
ule, and I would have accepted any schedule you gave us. I am still
prepared to accept it.

Prime Minister Chou: Yes, I think the main thing is we should give
them some time because our Korean friends need to discuss and per-
suade some other sponsor countries. We think it would be very bad if
we two decided after discussing it and tried to impose it on others.
Secretary Kissinger: I agree.

Prime Minister Chou: So I would kindly ask you to convey this to Ambassador Scali, and he could go into further consultations with Ambassador Huang Hua, that is to say that originally the issue was to be put to the First Committee on the 14th and what we mean is we don’t think it need be done in such a hurry—that the date . . .

Secretary Kissinger: The compromise was to be on the 14th on the Korean issue?

Prime Minister Chou: No, it was originally scheduled that the issue would be put to the Committee on the 14th and then all sides would have their say and then go on to the resolutions. But we would propose that it would be better to postpone the discussion of the issue to a later date—later than the 14th. We think it would be beneficial if you could notify your Ambassador at the United Nations, and he and our Ambassador could discuss it and see if they approved. If they thought it was suitable to postpone it then it could be done.

Secretary Kissinger: I don’t know about your Ambassador, but if you and I agreed that it should be postponed, ours will postpone it.

Prime Minister Chou: But you know there is also the question of Korea. We agree with your assessment that our Ambassador seems to be in a hurry and I don’t know why he became all of a sudden so enthusiastic over this. Because originally when our Vice Minister was at the United Nations we agreed he should first consult the nonaligned countries and Korea, and we should not enter this consideration in such haste.

There now has appeared another issue—another aspect—of the issue and that is you are now in China. Because you know that on our side the Soviet Union and its followers are included in the sponsor countries and they would have something to say about this, and would try to create trouble on the basis of the fact that you were visiting China now and might create some confusion in other countries.

Secretary Kissinger: We have no reason to bring it to a decision this week. I don’t know what the parliamentary situation is—how much trouble it would be to postpone it. The Vice Minister knows about the technical details. If it is possible to postpone it, I have no objection. I am assuming the same compromise is still agreed to, and you are just talking about a delay, not about changing the agreement.

Prime Minister Chou: No change of the compromise.

Secretary Kissinger: How much of a delay—two weeks?

Prime Minister Chou: We can ask them to discuss that.

Secretary Kissinger: All right.

Prime Minister Chou: Because in that interim period we can also discuss it more thoroughly with the nonaligned countries. The Soviet
group will definitely try to create trouble on this issue and they will stand on the so-called left. They constantly forget that the United Nations troops were sent into Korea when they were absent from the United Nations Security Council. And Ambassador Bruce . . .

Secretary Kissinger: We will instruct Ambassador Scali as soon as we return to our Guest House to get in immediate touch with your Ambassador that they should both work out a delay for a period.

Prime Minister Chou: If necessary.

Secretary Kissinger: How do they determine what is necessary?

Prime Minister Chou: They can discuss it among themselves.

Secretary Kissinger: Our Ambassador is a little excitable. And unless I tell him the definition of necessity. Let me put it this way—to make it easier I am prepared to go ahead, then he should go ahead. We will leave it up to your Ambassador and hope that my judgment of him is correct—that he is not excitable.

Prime Minister Chou: Well, he is usually not so very easily excited but this time he has been over-enthusiastic.

Secretary Kissinger: That is more than I ever manage to achieve with him. Maybe I should have Scali work on Chinese problems.

Prime Minister Chou: I don’t think this has anything to do with Ambassador Scali this time; perhaps because our two sides have reached agreement, he thought he would express his zeal in carrying out the order. He forgot the other sponsor countries, especially since he neglected the fact that there was the Soviet group among those sponsor countries.

Secretary Kissinger: Ambassador Scali will be instructed so there is no misunderstanding as of Monday morning New York time.8 Should they get together? I will instruct him to meet whenever Huang Hua wants. I don’t know where Scali is this weekend. We will send a message when we reach the Guest House and that will take three to four hours. If Scali is in New York, he should have it by the end of the day Sunday New York time.

Prime Minister Chou: I think it can wait until Monday morning.

Secretary Kissinger: You can assume that at the opening of business Monday, New York time, Ambassador Scali will be instructed. Who gets in touch with whom? We leave it to him. I will tell Scali if he has not heard from Ambassador Huang Hua in the morning he should call him. I shall instruct him first that the compromise remains in effect, but if Ambassador Huang Hua would like a delay, then Scali should cooperate with him to get a delay for the time period that Ambassador Huang Hua recommends. And that Scali should work with

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the sponsors on our side to bring the delay about if it is desired. You can count on that being done.

Prime Minister Chou: Thank you. We don’t want to give the Soviet Union an opportunity.

Secretary Kissinger: I agree, and if there is no necessity, there is no hurry.

Prime Minister Chou: Correct. You are going to Japan. What are your views on Japan?

Secretary Kissinger: My views on Japan are that what we discussed last February are still true—that Japan is at a crucial point and necessity will drive it to decide between a more traditional nationalism and maintaining its present orientation. And it has many temptations. It is very much affected by the Middle East oil situation.

Prime Minister Chou: I believe about 80 percent of its oil comes from the Middle East.

Ambassador Ingersoll: Eighty-five percent I would say; that is only about 40 percent from the Arab countries and 45 percent from Iran.

Prime Minister Chou: Yes.

Secretary Kissinger: It has temptations from the Soviet Union. It has temptations by its own economic strengths. And it is concerned that it will be left alone in any arrangement that we make with the Europeans. This is one reason why we may try to find a formula to associate Japan with our efforts in Europe. The intention is not to link it militarily with Europe but primarily psychologically, to prevent a total sense of isolation.

Prime Minister Chou: And have you expressed support or are you waiting to see the outcome of events with regard to your joint exploration of Siberia?

Secretary Kissinger: One problem is that no one knows exactly how much natural gas there is. There is some dispute between what the Soviets have told us and what some experts have said.

We have just authorized a loan which will be a joint American/Japanese exploration in Siberia to get a precise determination of what is involved. We have agreed in principle to make it a joint project with the Japanese. And we believe, for political reasons, it would be undesirable to have the Japanese so completely dependent on Soviet political decisions. And the Soviet Union will probably be more reluctant to tackle both the United States and Japan simultaneously than Japan alone. We have a problem in our Congress whether we can get any support for these long-term investments in the Soviet Union. And that will not be decided until the early part of next year.

Prime Minister Chou: Their salesmen don’t seem to be very effective.
Secretary Kissinger: Soviet salesmen?
Prime Minister Chou: That is the impression we received both from West Germany, Japan and from you. Is the data and the material of the salesmen credible?

Secretary Kissinger: There are some questions in our mind about the reliability of these figures. The second question we have is to what degree we want to commit massive American investments in the Soviet Union. Our strategy up to now, quite candidly, has been to do enough to give the promise of future investments but not so much as to make a strategic difference in their situation.

Prime Minister Chou: That is a very complicated strategy.
Secretary Kissinger: That is true.

Prime Minister Chou: Ambassador Ingersoll will be, of course, very familiar with the lesson that General Secretary Brezhnev taught Prime Minister Tanaka. He brought out his map and began his lectures.
Secretary Kissinger: He has only one lecture. And I have heard it ten times.

Prime Minister Chou: He came at the same time when Brezhnev went to visit Bonn.
Secretary Kissinger: It is dangerous to underestimate German shortsightedness. My apologies to the Vice Minister.
Prime Minister Chou: Perhaps you say that out of your unhappiness with the present Brandt Government.
Secretary Kissinger: That too, but it is a historical phenomenon. The Germans have had only one leader of stature—that was Adenauer.
Prime Minister Chou: Yes, because he had been active.
Secretary Kissinger: Who, Adenauer?
Prime Minister Chou: Adenauer.
Secretary Kissinger: He knew the importance of it, but he never let himself be deflected. While Brandt, if he persists in his present policy, will have given the Soviet Union veto over German policy.
Prime Minister Chou: There is such a danger. And the opposition party did not carry out the elections very well either.
Secretary Kissinger: No. They had very incompetent leadership. You met their best man but he is not very energetic, Schroeder. He is their best man.
Prime Minister Chou: He is not so very active. Why not? Because of temperament or because of his position in the party?
Secretary Kissinger: Schroeder, he is not the new leader. I have not met the new leader. Schroeder was ill for a while, and he also does not have and is not good in appealing to public opinion. And he was not very strong nor able to take over the party himself.
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Strauss was with Ambassador Bruce in Germany for many years. Strauss is extremely intelligent and a very forceful personality, but he is a South German phenomenon so he has not much support in the north. His self-discipline leaves something to be desired. I think I told the Prime Minister once about what Adenauer said to me about Strauss.

Prime Minister Chou: At that time you did not mention a specific name. I thought it might be him.

Secretary Kissinger: It was Strauss.

Prime Minister Chou: Yes, you can see the clarity of Adenauer’s mind because he must have spoken to you when he was over 80.

Secretary Kissinger: Yes. A month before his death, 88. He was a man of very clear views. He understood the danger for Germany if it maneuvered too much.

Prime Minister Chou: It is time for a short break, and you are going to the ballet. We will have more time tomorrow. Perhaps this evening, if we have something more to discuss, I might pay a call on you.

Secretary Kissinger: It would be very nice.

57. Memorandum of Conversation

Beijing, November 12, 1973, 3:00–5:30 p.m.

PARTICIPANTS

Prime Minister Chou En-lai
Foreign Minister Chi Peng-fei
Vice Foreign Minister Chiao Kuan-hua
Assistant Minister of Foreign Affairs Wang Hai-jung
Two Chinese Foreign Ministry Officials
Tang Wang-shen, Interpreter
Shen Jo-yen, Interpreter
One Chinese Notetaker
Henry A. Kissinger, Secretary of State
Ambassador David Bruce, Chief, U.S. Liaison Office
Ambassador Robert Ingersoll, U.S. Embassy Tokyo
Winston Lord, Director of Planning and Coordination, Department of State
Alfred Jenkins, U.S. Liaison Office

1 Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Kissinger Office Files, Box 100, Country Files, Far East, Secretary Kissinger’s Conversations in Peking, November 1973. Top Secret; Sensitive; Exclusively Eyes Only. The meeting took place in Guest House Villa #3.
Secretary Kissinger: I have the answer for you, Mr. Prime Minister, on the production of planes in Taiwan.\(^2\) It is not a production of airplanes but an assembly for which we supply the parts. And it is for short-range fighter aircraft which will not increase the total number of airplanes on Taiwan. When we stop supplying the parts, they will no longer be able to produce them. So in practice it is different than giving them the airplanes. They have no independent capability for producing the airplane being developed. And that is true of all other co-production arrangements. It is an F5E, and there are to be 100 for a period between 1973–1978.

Prime Minister Chou: In this way Chiang Ching-kuo will be reassured.

Secretary Kissinger: Our impression is that he (Chiang Kai-shek) is not active today.

Prime Minister Chou: It is impossible for him to be, and it is difficult for him to live for another five years. But I am not asking him to die. He can live as long as he wishes. If he wishes he can live to be 100. What I meant was in that way Chiang Ching-kuo will be reassured because he could rule the country until 1978.

Secretary Kissinger: We have no plans on this plane, on this project, beyond 1978.

Prime Minister Chou: You say it is a short distance one. Actually, the radius can stretch as far as 180 kilometers. That is the fighting radius.

Secretary Kissinger: And come back? One way, it is possible, but not to come back.

Prime Minister Chou: If he has a refueling tank, he will be able to come back.

Secretary Kissinger: F5E?

Prime Minister Chou: Yes. It does not matter even if the plane is bigger. I just wanted to make clear whether it is an assembly plant.

Secretary Kissinger: It is an assembly plant, not a production. We supply the parts. They do not produce the parts. So they have no independent capability.

Prime Minister Chou: Is Japan able to produce planes like this or greater?

Secretary Kissinger: Japan has not produced any planes like this, but it certainly has the capability. I have to check but—do you know, Ambassador Ingersoll, if we have some co-production?

Ambassador Ingersoll: Not on the F5s; on the F4s.

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\(^2\) See Document 56.
Secretary Kissinger: They are producing F4s. F4s have radius to reach effectively. The F5 is not a bombing plane. The F4 can be used effectively for bombing.

Prime Minister Chou: Actually, the F5E is also capable of bombing. The only difference is, it is lighter. The F4, which is the Phantom type, can carry greater weight.

Secretary Kissinger: Yes. The F4 can carry greater weight.

Prime Minister Chou: But the distance is the same for both.

Secretary Kissinger: I don’t believe this. I really don’t have the characteristics in mind. We have always considered it, strategically thinking, that the F5 is purely a fighter plane, with no bombing capability. We use it for tactical support.

The F4 is something we call deep interdiction which goes further behind the line and has a strategic impact, but I don’t know the exact characteristics. In our own strategic planning for Vietnam, for example, the F5 was always considered to be used for support of ground troops at the front line with bombs, and the F4 for the interdiction of communications because it has a heavy bomb load, and I thought it had a longer range. I will have to check on that. I will have the answer tomorrow.

Ambassador Ingersoll: The F4 is refuelable.

Prime Minister Chou: It does not matter. It would be pretty good if it could be delayed for another five years, because in that way they can envisage it for another five years. In that case, your recent word will be able to be realized in this way: It will not give rise to the ambitions of a third country. I see it in this way. It does not matter whether it is 100 planes or 200 planes.

And there is, of course, another point. It could be allowed to attack the Mainland, but if they insist on attacking the Mainland, we welcome them. Let them have a try.

Secretary Kissinger: You have our assurance they will not be allowed to attack the Mainland. If they do, they will lose American support completely.

Prime Minister Chou: If they ever try to do that, they will do it unilaterally.

Secretary Kissinger: There will be no attack nor an American-sponsored attack in the future or any attacks that our President can control.

Prime Minister Chou: What you told me yesterday has already been reported to the Chairman. There was one point that I did not explain very much because I did not entirely understand. Yesterday you mentioned that there was a possibility of finding, that you would like to find, a way with regard to our bilateral relations to find some wording similar to the Shanghai Communiqué or slightly altered that would
be able to promote the development of our relations. I did not have the opportunity to issue a communiqué or some other form?

Secretary Kissinger: I wanted to ask the Prime Minister whether he thought it appropriate to issue a communiqué at the end of my visit and if so we will be prepared to do this. My comment was in reference to the establishment of formal diplomatic relations. We cannot go faster than the schedule which I gave you if it is on the Japan formula. However, if we could find a formula which is more flexible, as long as we understand that we will end up there, we are prepared to establish diplomatic relations sooner.3

Prime Minister Chou: Yesterday you mentioned that you also reaffirmed that you would not support the idea of two Chinas. Under this condition, what kind of flexible formula have you in mind? It is also a difficult problem to us. Perhaps you have worked out a good idea.

Secretary Kissinger: No, I have not actually yet worked out a good idea. If the Prime Minister would like, I might submit one to him later today after I have had an opportunity to meet with my colleagues. I have in mind something like the Shanghai Communiqué which would make clear that the establishment of diplomatic relations does not mean giving up the principle that there is only one China.

Prime Minister Chou: She (the interpreter) had made a good guess of what you meant. When we were with the Chairman I dared not explain the statement, but she dared to make an explanation of the statement.

Secretary Kissinger: As I understand it, Mr. Prime Minister, your problem in having diplomatic relations while we have relations with Taiwan is that it might give rise to a two-China policy which we have agreed not to support. What we should search for is a formula for consideration that makes clear that that principle is not being abandoned; that there is only one China by either side.

Prime Minister Chou: She (the interpreter) has guessed very correctly what you think.

Secretary Kissinger: Yes.

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3 On October 11, Lord prepared a briefing memorandum for Kissinger in anticipation of his November visit to Beijing. Although Lord believed a significant gesture was necessary in order to further improve relations with China, he recommended against a formal security commitment to defend China against the Soviet Union. Instead, he argued that the United States should commit itself to a specific target date for normalization during Nixon’s second term. (National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Kissinger Office Files, Box 100, Country Files, Far East, Kissinger Trip to Peking—Papers, November 1973)
Prime Minister Chou: So the elder people are not as good as the younger people.
Secretary Kissinger: She had a long talk with Mr. Lord on the airplane.
Mr. Lord: We had our own counterpart talks.
Interpreter: Another matter was discussed on the plane.
Prime Minister Chou: There is another matter that is mentioned concerning the Consulate General. Perhaps you have not made an investigation concerning this point. As far as we know, there are twelve in all at the moment. Originally there were ten. Recently they have added two.
Secretary Kissinger: I know of one in New York.
Mr. Jenkins: There is one in Atlanta.
Secretary Kissinger: This one must be in honor of Mr. Jenkins.
I have not paid attention to the one in New York. And our interpretation, which we made to ourselves, is the one which I gave you yesterday: that the Taiwan authorities are preparing for the day that we will move toward the sole recognition of Peking; a day which we know is inevitable. At that time, they want to have a representation in America that permits them to continue exchanges with us, and I believe for that reason they have chosen the Consulate General in New York, since it would be inappropriate to have it in Washington. That was our own interpretation.
And our own internal interpretation of it also was that this was envisaged as a possible contact point with the People’s Republic of China whenever discussions would take place.
Interpreter: You mentioned yesterday a point of contact with Chiang Kai-shek.
Secretary Kissinger: A contact point to the United States after we have moved, say from no later than the middle of 1976, and secondly, a possible point at which the Taiwan authorities would negotiate with the People’s Republic of China. This is not based on knowledge but on our interpretation of their motives. This second interpretation may be wrong.
Prime Minister Chou: That is just an idea.
Secretary Kissinger: It is our own analysis of the problem.
Prime Minister Chou: Is there anything you would like to tell me first.
Secretary Kissinger: I have some information now on the rupee negotiations situation which you were interested in. Our difficulty was that we could not spend all the rupees we had accumulated. And, therefore, what we did was to settle for 35 percent of the total amount of rupees in these blocked accounts that could be spent only in India, but
even that will take us twenty years to spend. The real difficulty was
that we permitted such huge debts to accumulate without analyzing
what we could ever do with them. There was also a speed-up in dol-
lar debts that they owed us, but of a much smaller amount. That was
the basic reasoning of that.

Prime Minister Chou: So the phenomenon in India . . . you do not
have the similar phenomenon in other countries.

Secretary Kissinger: Not to quite the same extent. We had it in
Japan, but it is being settled. We do have another phenomenon in other
countries where aid loans that were given over a period of years be-
come repayable and where, in effect, we give more aid so that they can
repay the loans; and when we don’t give aid they don’t repay the loans
so they get aid anyway. For example, we helped Pakistan, which holds
a substantial amount of our money, by rescheduling its debt after the
1971 war which was a way really of giving it additional money.

Two other small items. I understand that Ambassador Huang Hua
has already met a representative from our Mission, and as I understand
from our telegram, they have had a satisfactory meeting. If that is not
correct, we will change it. We will give appropriate instructions. I think
they have achieved an adequate understanding.

Prime Minister Chou: Thank you, and we have heard about this
point.

Secretary Kissinger: Your information is the same.
Prime Minister Chou: The same.

Secretary Kissinger: We will proceed. We have instructed our Mis-
sion that we follow Ambassador Huang’s recommendation so you have
the initiative as to timing.

The only other item I have is that I understand that in these talks
on the private blocked assets, there is only one item that is still unset-
tled which has to do with your proposal that blocked assets belonging
to third country banks be excluded from the settlement. That is one
item that is impossible for us to accept because we could never get
Congressional approval for the agreement if that item were excluded.

Prime Minister Chou: It seems the third countries have already
given us the money. What shall we do? Give them back the money?

Secretary Kissinger: Our people believe that they can sue those
banks and get the money.

Prime Minister Chou: Take for instance, Belgium.

Secretary Kissinger: Yes, I know. That is the primary problem.
Prime Minister Chou: The figure is not very big but they were very
. . . once they established diplomatic relations with us, they gave us the
money.

Secretary Kissinger: But illegally from our point of view.
Prime Minister Chou: For us, it is legal.

Secretary Kissinger: The difficulty for us is it would reduce the pro rata payments from 40 percent to 25 percent which we do not believe Congress would accept.

Prime Minister Chou: Do you mean that by excluding the money given to us already by the third country banks there is only 25 percent left?

Secretary Kissinger: Then I think it would be about 22 percent in blocked assets as against private claims. While with that money it would be about 40 percent. And our experience has been that the Congress would not approve a settlement that was as low as 22 percent.

Prime Minister Chou: But to us the figure is very small. Up to now I still find it difficult to understand the proportion of the taxes levied between those countries which you have given most favored nation treatment and those which you have not. To me, that is if we are not given most favored nation treatment your taxes are different.

Secretary Kissinger: We are in principle prepared to grant you most favored nation treatment. However, we have not been able to do this in the past when there were outstanding claims. If this settlement were made, we would in principle be prepared to grant most favored nation status to the PRC. The difficulty that now arises with most favored nation has nothing to do with China, but people who are adding amendments which are aimed at the Soviet Union which may apply to the PRC even though the people may be favorable to the PRC. Like Senator Jackson. I will have to have a meeting with Senator Jackson as soon as I return to remove those obstacles. I know he has no intention of directing his measures against the PRC. His measures are against the Soviet Union. Insofar as the administration is concerned, we are prepared to grant most favored nation status to the PRC, and we are prepared to grant them the same economic status as the Soviet Union.

Prime Minister Chou: Whereas just now you talked politics with me, as to the point you mentioned, I fully understand it. Because what I want to know is financially speaking does the most favored nation treatment mean the reduction of taxes?

Secretary Kissinger: From the United States? There are not any export taxes. We don’t have any export taxes.

Prime Minister Chou: It is limited to import taxes?

Secretary Kissinger: Yes.

Prime Minister Chou: What is the difference between the taxes levied on those countries which enjoy the most favored nation treatment and those who do not enjoy that treatment?

Secretary Kissinger: I will have to check, but it is substantial and it varies; but in several categories it is very substantial. I will have the answer for you tomorrow.
Prime Minister Chou: You give most favored nation treatment to Japan.

Secretary Kissinger: Yes. We give it to about 100 nations.

Prime Minister Chou: They belong to different categories.

Secretary Kissinger: The socialist states were excluded after the Korean War. This is really the origin of the discrimination.

Prime Minister Chou: And Yugoslavia?

Secretary Kissinger: Yes. We have given it to Yugoslavia and to Poland.

Prime Minister Chou: And Romania?

Secretary Kissinger: No, but we will give it to Romania. Romania has had to wait because in the past in order to get most favored nation status we have had to submit a separate bill to the Congress for each country. We have now submitted a bill to the Congress which gives the Executive Branch the discretion to grant most favored nation status to any country and that bill is still before Congress. We would prefer to be able to do it on a general basis, but, if necessary, we still have the possibility of introducing action for individual countries.

Prime Minister Chou: But as far as the bill for giving most favored nation treatment to the Soviets, it has been postponed.

Secretary Kissinger: No, Prime Minister, this is not a bill to give most favored nation...

Prime Minister Chou: It is demanded by your government.

Secretary Kissinger: It is not a bill to give most favored nation status to the Soviet Union but a bill to give the Executive Branch the discretion to give it to almost anybody and therefore the Soviet Union. I can explain to the Prime Minister the complexity which led us to the postponement of that bill. The reason is that in the Senate we expect an amendment sponsored by Senator Jackson which would not only not enable us to give most favored nation status to the Soviet Union but would also limit the possibility of credits, and is so written that it would also apply to China. Jackson has not thought of this. It refers to emigration. Jackson is thinking of the Jewish problem. We have to find a refinement of this bill. In order to do this we have to get a maximum difference between the House and the Senate so when these two bills become reconciled there is an area of negotiation. Therefore, we first asked the House to eliminate most favored nation completely. When they did not do this, we asked them to postpone consideration of the bill for two reasons. One, to have some control of Soviet behavior on the Middle East, and secondly in order to enable us to discuss with the Senators and Congressmen the fact that we have written a bill which they are aiming at the Soviet Union but which applies to too many other countries and therefore defeats its own purpose. But it will definitely come to a vote no later than the first part of February.
Prime Minister Chou: We will make a study of this question. There is only one item left, and there is no other question as to the blocked assets.

Secretary Kissinger: Yes. One item. That is the only item. I think the other questions can be settled. You raised the third question. We can settle two of them.

Prime Minister Chou: I like to make several clarifications on some international questions. As we have discussed the situation in the Middle East, it is complex. Yesterday you mentioned the two steps to be taken and the first step is to carry out the disengagement of military forces, and the agreement has already been signed between Egypt and Israel.

Secretary Kissinger: No, Mr. Prime Minister. There are three steps in that sense. The first is stabilizing the ceasefire. Then peace negotiations begin. These peace negotiations will have two steps. A first step is what we call disengagement of forces, but whose real purpose is to move the Israeli forces back some distance, and a second step which settles the final border.

Prime Minister Chou: And there is also the question of carrying out the observed ceasefire on the part of Syria. They will also sign it?

Secretary Kissinger: Yes, Syria has already agreed to the ceasefire. But we believe that Syria should become an integral part of the negotiations and our impression is that it is prepared to be.

Prime Minister Chou: Then, when it comes to the discussion of disengagement of military forces will there be a conference held for discussing this question or will it be discussed separately?

Secretary Kissinger: No, it will be the first phase of the peace conference. But, as I explained to the Vice Minister this morning, and I believe to you yesterday, my judgment is that the formal peace conference will not be much more productive than the formal Vietnam Conference. And it is probable that the real negotiations will take place separately outside the formal framework. As I explained to the Vice Minister this morning, the problem is that at the formal conference, the Soviet Union will probably attempt to regain some of the territory it has lost by taking rather extreme positions. Therefore, it may be necessary for us on occasion to create a stalemate in order to demonstrate that this is not the road to a settlement.

Prime Minister Chou: Will Britain and France take part in the conference?

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4 Kissinger is most likely referring to a discussion he had with Vice Foreign Minister Qiao Guanhua during a car ride.
Secretary Kissinger: It is not finally settled yet. I would doubt it because Israel will not participate if Britain and France participate. But Britain and France may move to a position closer to the Soviet position. So it is not such an asset to have them there.

Prime Minister Chou: But in their public opinion they have expressed their desire to take part in the conference.

Secretary Kissinger: There is always, as I told you yesterday, a difference in what they say publicly and what they say privately. Not always, but very often.

Prime Minister Chou: In order to meet their demands at home?

Secretary Kissinger: Yes. We will not exclude them if they want to participate and if the others want them. We have no reason to exclude them. But frankly, I cannot imagine a settlement occurring in a public forum of this composition. With so many different groups represented as it is.

Prime Minister Chou: It seems that among the Arab states they have also quite a few extremist positions.

Secretary Kissinger: Yes. Iraq and, to some extent, Algeria.

Prime Minister Chou: Libya.

Secretary Kissinger: Libya, Southern Yemen. Libya was not exceptionally heroic during the war, but its courage has increased as the ceasefire has been prolonged.

Prime Minister Chou: Libya has not severed relations with you?

Secretary Kissinger: No. They have only made impossible the life of the people who are there. They are very anti-Soviet.

Prime Minister Chou: He is also a friend of Chaing Kai-shek.

Secretary Kissinger: Really? This I did not know.

Prime Minister Chou: A very peculiar phenomenon. But we don’t look into that matter. There are so many queer things in the world. Is that the companies in the United States which have investments in oil sources in Libya?

Secretary Kissinger: There are many European countries that also have investments there, and most of the Libyan oil goes to Europe, not to the United States. Only 12 percent of our oil comes from the Middle East. Most of that comes from Saudi Arabia.

Ambassador Ingersoll: And Iran.

Secretary Kissinger: Six percent. We get another 6 percent from Iran.

Prime Minister Chou: So the total proportion would be nearly 20 percent?

Secretary Kissinger: Yes. Eighteen percent.

Prime Minister Chou: What do you think of King Faisal?
Secretary Kissinger: A complex phenomenon.

Prime Minister Chou: He is also an old friend of mine and I came to know him very well at the Bandung Conference.

Secretary Kissinger: A very complex man. Of a previous period. Very principled, but in a very traditional framework. He is in a very complex situation because he is encircled on the one hand by Iraq on the north and South Yemen on the south. So he is very vulnerable to the radical states. On the other hand, emotionally, he is a good friend of the United States. My impression is that he is attempting to find a way to escape from the policy he adopted in the war. I think he will find a way in the next month or two. I am talking about the oil policy, escape from the oil policy.

Prime Minister Chou: The Japanese oil is from Iran and Kuwait.

Ambassador Ingersoll: They get about 85 percent of their oil from the Middle East as such. About 40–45 percent from Iran and the balance from Iraq and others. Five percent from Indonesia, Borneo and Eastern Europe.

Secretary Kissinger: We have started a major program to reduce, and to eventually eliminate, our dependency on oil from abroad. We believe that we can successfully conclude this within this decade.

Prime Minister Chou: That would be a very grand plan, and you will have to economize in the United States with oil.

Secretary Kissinger: We are doing this. You may have seen the President’s speech.5 There may be an interim period where we have to economize on the use of oil. We are trying to liquify coal, for which we have the scientific way to do this, but we must make it economically feasible. We will use oil shale and rely on Alaskan oil and oil from Canada. With this combination, we believe we can be self-sufficient by the early 1980s.

Prime Minister Chou: The production cost is very high for liquified coal.

Secretary Kissinger: Yes, but we expect to reduce that cost very substantially during this decade. We know the scientific principle. It is primarily a production problem. On engineering problems we are very good.

Prime Minister Chou: Is it true that most of the oil from Venezuela goes to your country?

Secretary Kissinger: Yes, a substantial part.

Ambassador Ingersoll: I was going to say that the increase in the price of oil in the Middle East is making it economical to use this liquified coal and the shale. It is an incentive for us to work harder at it.

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5 On November 7, President Nixon addressed the Nation concerning policies to deal with energy shortages. (Public Papers: Nixon, 1973, pp. 916–926)
Prime Minister Chou: What is Japan going to do?

Ambassador Ingersoll: They wish they knew. They have been trying to diversify for a long time, but they have not many other sources for oil than the Middle East.

Secretary Kissinger: We may be prepared to share with Japan in some common research and development on alternative resources, and also on some joint ventures on nuclear energy.

Prime Minister Chou: But at the beginning, perhaps the cost is also very high.

Secretary Kissinger: Of what? Of nuclear energy, yes. At the beginning, but we have that under study. I think the installations are very expensive, but if the cost of the nuclear fuel can be reduced, of which there is a good possibility, then it becomes much more economical.

Prime Minister Chou: It would be better if there are any by-products.

Secretary Kissinger: Unfortunately, most of the by-products are most useful for nuclear weapons.

Prime Minister Chou: That is also a subject for debate between the two big powers. Do you really believe that the Soviet Union will reduce her quantity of nuclear weapons?

Secretary Kissinger: The first problem is to stabilize the number of nuclear weapons because they are still increasing the number. And, of course, they have the theory that they need nuclear weapons for more than one threat. So we believe in the strategic arms limitation talks. We first have to place a ceiling on the total number of weapons, and then bring about a gradual reduction.

In the first phase of the agreement, the Soviet performance has been, to put it kindly, ambiguous. They are supposed to destroy one category of weapons as replacement for submarine-based weapons called SS7s. They are old. And they have destroyed a few of those, but they appear to have replaced them with mobile missiles which are technically not banned by the agreement but which are certainly not in the spirit of the agreement. If this continues, we will have to take countermeasures, and then the agreement will be meaningless. We will put missiles into airplanes which is also not banned by the agreement.

Prime Minister Chou: About the Korean question. At first, I intended to discuss it at some other occasion, but now I think we had better discuss it. What is your idea of the next step to be taken? I am not referring to the step taken this year. I am referring to the step that will be taken in the future. There is an Armistice Committee at the demarcation line, and this Committee meets often. What do you think will be a way out for that?
Secretary Kissinger: Our problem with respect to the United Nations is that its disappearance would also remove the legal basis for the armistice.

Prime Minister Chou: That is why I was asking. What form would it take in order to settle the question of the Armistice Committee? If you have not anything in your mind, we had better not discuss it today.

Secretary Kissinger: I do not have a concrete proposal, but we are prepared to discuss it over the next year on the schedule we have discussed.

Prime Minister Chou: But there is an advantage here that the Soviet Union has not had a hand in the Korean question.

Secretary Kissinger: I cannot judge on the North Korean side.

Prime Minister Chou: You can or cannot?

Secretary Kissinger: We do not have a judgment.

Prime Minister Chou: But it is possible that there would be minor troubles, but one cannot find a legal basis for that because the Soviet Union is not a participant to the armistice agreement. Because there were only four parties which signed the armistice agreement, but it was fortunate that the Soviet Union was not a participant in that. So over the last twenty years nothing—no troubles had occurred with regard to the armistice agreement. Although Dulles refused to settle this question, peace has been maintained over more than twenty years. This has given Korea an opportunity to move towards peaceful communication. Of course, this is something that will call for a long period of time before it can be settled.

Anyway, a way must be found out how to settle this. We should pay attention to this question.

Secretary Kissinger: We will work with you during the next year to find a solution to the question of the legal basis of the armistice, and we will do that. We will make a major effort before the next General Assembly to come to an agreement with you on that issue. Should we discuss this with Ambassador Huang Chen? Of course, Ambassador Bruce will also be instructed on this.

Prime Minister Chou: But we think that the members of the four nations with the Advisory Committee are very comfortable. They were just stationed there, without asking to withdraw from Korea, whereas the Canadians have been withdrawn from Vietnam and they stayed there for quite a long period of time. The International Committee has been there for a long time with nothing to do. That is why members often came to Peking. Who pays the expenses for those? The Vice Minister also took part in the negotiations then.

I would like to ask you a question. It has been proven that expansionism in the world is doomed to failure. But the Soviet Union
wants to follow in the steps of their predecessors, and they want to overtake them and they are stretching their hands everywhere. Do you think this can be stopped?

Secretary Kissinger: I think it is a difficult problem of this period.

Prime Minister Chou: It is also a crucial issue.

Secretary Kissinger: It is the most crucial issue. I told the Vice Minister in the car today that I had no illusions, for example, that in the Middle East, if it were not for the Soviet Union, you and we would have quite different views. But we have a first objective to prevent the domination by the Soviet Union. I believe if the countries that are potential victims of expansionism cooperate in a formal way, but they have to understand the main lines of each other’s policy. I believe that major military expansionism can be stopped. That is our policy—to resist if the Soviet Union engages in a major military movement. But I think it can be stopped.

Prime Minister Chou: Do you mean that it is not easy to stop political expansionism?

Secretary Kissinger: The political expansionism is more difficult to stop.

Prime Minister Chou: For instance, the so-called friendship treaty between the Soviet Union and India.

Secretary Kissinger: I think the political expansionism can also be stopped if one pursues an intelligent policy and if the countries against which it is directed keep in mind the principal requirement. I think if you, we and Western Europe understand each other, and if we behave intelligently in other parts of the world, we can contain Soviet expansionism. I don’t believe that Soviet policy is very intelligent. It is very brutal, but not very intelligent.

Prime Minister Chou: But sometimes they have put on many masks.

Secretary Kissinger: Yes, but sooner or later the brutality comes forward.

Prime Minister Chou: But so far as the Soviet Union itself is concerned this is perhaps their main aspect.

Secretary Kissinger: Brutality?

Prime Minister Chou: But as for their opponents, things will be complicated. For instance, it will not be so easy for the Western European countries to share their common view.

Secretary Kissinger: Of the three major components that I mentioned, the West Europeans are the weakest link in terms of their understanding. But on the other hand, they are also the most difficult area for the Soviet Union to attack. So they are trying to undermine them by such measures as the European Security Conference and other negotiations. And what
the Prime Minister has to understand is that if in these efforts we keep slightly to the left of the West Europeans, this is a means to prevent them from going further because then they will be afraid we will make a separate arrangement with the Soviet Union and that will worry them sufficiently so that they start thinking about their own defense.

Prime Minister Chou: You also mentioned this point the day before yesterday and also yesterday. But as for this point, the people would not be able to comprehend it.

Secretary Kissinger: I admit to you, Mr. Prime Minister, that this is the great danger in the present course. If at the same time we do two things, if we insist that the discussions are very detailed so that they cannot have many symbolic successes, and if secondly, we resist brutally whenever there is the slightest military threat, that danger can be reduced if not eliminated. I forgot, of course, to mention Japan which is a very crucial one.

Prime Minister Chou: Although it is crucial, the reaction would not be as quick as the European countries.

Secretary Kissinger: No. If they are not submitted to too many temptations by having too many pressures put on them from too many sides, I think they can be kept on their present course. I think you and we have acted wisely in this direction.

Prime Minister Chou: Because it is easier than dealing with the Western European countries.

Secretary Kissinger: Yes. They are a tougher people. And then, of course, we have to build this southern axis through the Near East.

Prime Minister Chou: It seems you will have to make a very great effort towards this end. It is not easy to do that.

Secretary Kissinger: No, but we are prepared to do more with Turkey as soon as its governmental crisis is over.

Prime Minister Chou: So the crisis is not yet over?

Secretary Kissinger: They still don’t have a firm government. And they did not behave very strongly during the Middle East crisis. They permitted Soviet airplanes to fly over their territory.

Prime Minister Chou: It is said so. Is that bridge across the strait built by you?

Secretary Kissinger: It is now open—over the Bosporous—it was opened on October 3. I don’t know whether it was built by us. I don’t know.

Prime Minister Chou: I learned of it from the television.

Secretary Kissinger: Did it say so?

Prime Minister Chou: It did not say so, but perhaps with your help.
Secretary Kissinger: I don’t know. I would not be surprised. I don’t have the same attention for detail as you, Mr. Prime Minister. But I would suspect so. We will find out overnight.6

Prime Minister Chou: Of the four fleets owned by the Soviet Union, three are in the Mediterranean.

Secretary Kissinger: Yes and a part of the Atlantic Fleet came in during the crisis. They had over one hundred ships in the Mediterranean at the height of the crisis. At one point they had over 103. They are now withdrawing them.

Prime Minister Chou: It is difficult for them to move about because they are separated from each other. Not linked together.

Secretary Kissinger: The Russian fleet is the only fleet in modern history that has ever surrendered. It surrendered to the Japanese in 1903.

Prime Minister Chou: The war started in 1904.

Secretary Kissinger: But they surrendered in 1903 because they had to come around from St. Petersburg. They first sank some British fighting vessels, thinking the Japanese had come into the English Channel to stop them. They came all the way around the world.

Prime Minister Chou: From the Cape of Good Hope.

Secretary Kissinger: What today is Vietnam, and steamed straight into a Japanese trap. The Japanese were waiting there.

Prime Minister Chou: You know that the Japanese made a film for the feats he performed in the war. In the film they slandered Lenin. Upon seeing the film, the Soviets were quite indifferent. They also praised the Russian admiral that surrendered. And the Soviets seemed very pleased.

Secretary Kissinger: He was the one who attacked us.

Prime Minister Chou: Togo also appeared in that film. In that film they slandered Lenin, saying he bought ammunition in Europe in order to carry out the uprising of 1905 to tie down the Russian Emperor. It was also said in the film that Lenin helped the Japanese to get information. In that way the Japanese Navy gave money to Lenin to buy ammunition. Out of that Lenin staged the uprisings of 1905 in Moscow.

Secretary Kissinger: It was not staged by Lenin to begin with.

Prime Minister Chou: But Lenin had something to do with it.

Secretary Kissinger: Yes. He took part, but he was not the principal.

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6 The United States was “not involved in financing, engineering or constructing the bridge across the Bosphorus.” (Telegram 223192 to Beijing, November 12; National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Kissinger Office Files, Box 100, Country Files, Far East, Kissinger Trip to Peking—Papers, November 1973)
Prime Minister Chou: It was just a slander by the Japanese, but the present Soviet authorities should stay apathetic about it and should have accepted it. Actually it was sheer slander. And the Soviets should have accepted it as something very queer.

Secretary Kissinger: The impression of our Navy people is that the Soviet Navy lacks a great deal of experience, from observing their maneuvering and their reaction to our action.

Prime Minister Chou: You have the experience of the Carribean Sea.

Secretary Kissinger: And many other experiences.

Prime Minister Chou: They deliberately carried out many demonstrated actions here in the Far East. Their Far Eastern fleet deliberately carried out many actions here in order to tie down your Seventh Fleet. And they also deliberately passed through the S. Straits to the middle section of the Pacific to Midway Island and Guam to make military operations there. After your fleet went there, they also left the place.

Secretary Kissinger: Our impression is that they could not stand up to our fleet on the open sea.

Prime Minister Chou: And sometimes their planes will circle around that area. But your Ambassador is familiar with this fact.

Secretary Kissinger: I know the time they went through these straits. But we never make our fleet movement depend on what they do.

Prime Minister Chou: But sometimes you will have to make some reactions and to make some movements.

Secretary Kissinger: We did it when they tried to build a submarine base in Cuba. Then we took strong action in 1970. We put a destroyer in the mouth of that harbor and we publicly reaffirmed what President Kennedy had said about the Cuban crisis, and then they pulled out their submarine support.

Prime Minister Chou: So much for their opponents. That is, they posed a threat to Western Europe countries and just now you added Japan. And now their focus of contention is in the Middle East. Just what you mentioned just now, the period for the contention will be very short but will last for a period of time. I hope that in this case you would not spend such a long time as four and a half years as you settled the Vietnam question.

Secretary Kissinger: No. It is a different problem. In Vietnam we were directly involved.

Prime Minister Chou: The direct involvement, of course, is one of the reasons, but that was left over. It was left over by your predecessor. But you yourself had made some mistakes. Perhaps you would not agree to what I say. I would not say it very straightforwardly because we understand this possibility. It is inevitable that human beings will make mistakes.
Secretary Kissinger: We may have. I think if the North Vietnamese had proposed the settlement that we achieved in the end in the first year we would have accepted it at any point. Our difficulty was that the North Vietnamese always asked us to overthrow a friendly government and that we could not do. That was the one thing I have always told you, Mr. Prime Minister, that it was a point of honor with us.

Prime Minister Chou: This question again is left over historically. The responsibility should not remain entirely on your present Administration.

Secretary Kissinger: This problem is easier from one point of view and more difficult from another. It is easier because no one is asking us to destroy a friendly government. But now all parties accept the existence of Israel which is essential for us too.

Prime Minister Chou: I think that it would not be so quick that all parties would recognize the existence of Israel.

Secretary Kissinger: All parties to which I have talked accept the existence of Israel.

Prime Minister Chou: But the party with which you have discussions, the number is not so big. You think so. It is not so easy. While the fighting was going on, there was an ill wind of break in diplomatic relations with Israel on the part of African countries. This was part of a just voice on the part of the Africans, and you cannot say they are not correct. Because you cannot expect everyone to be like us who have combined principles with realities. We objected to the establishment of Israel to start with. Now the population of Israel has reached 2.5 million and as far as we know perhaps reached 3 million—can you drive them to the sea? No. So when your press people ask me about it, I answer them, “of course not.” I ask them how can there be any strength in things like that in the world. That is why one is bound to find some way to settle this question. Would that be a reason to have the Palestinians driven out? This question should also be settled.

Secretary Kissinger: I agree this question should be handled.

Prime Minister Chou: It would not be fair if this question would not be settled at the same time. Only when these two questions are settled can there be any co-existence, and a peace to be spoken of. Otherwise, there would be no co-existence. This is why that we agree to your having direct dealings with the Arab States. This is just a first step. But I think, although the first step has been taken, the journey will be even longer than the journey you traveled when you first came to China to prepare for the visit of President Nixon. Because it only took half a year for your President to come for a visit to China.

Secretary Kissinger: I think it will take more than a half a year but not half a year to show progress. We can show progress in less than half a year.
Prime Minister Chou: There might be some progress, but it is not so easy to settle the question because it is very complex.

Secretary Kissinger: The most difficult is Jerusalem. We can settle the Palestinian question. We had some discussion with Sadat and even with the Palestinians. The question is not easy, but the issue regarding Jerusalem is very hard.

Prime Minister Chou: Is it that there is some blind faith in the fact? It seems that the problem of Jerusalem is even harder than the question of Taiwan.

Secretary Kissinger: The question of Taiwan, I think—the nature of its solution is obvious. It is only a question of timing.

Prime Minister Chou: Jerusalem.

Secretary Kissinger: Jerusalem. The nature is not obvious, because both sides consider it a holy city.

Prime Minister Chou: Would it not be better if this city would be shared by both sides?

Secretary Kissinger: That is my solution, but I can find no one to agree with me. I once proposed this to the Israelis. And once I thought I had agreement from the Israelis to give up the three mosques on the hill looking toward Israel, but it turned out the Israelis would not agree to give up one hill and one street because they said it was a holy place.

Prime Minister Chou: That is a kind of superstition. Well, we will not dwell upon this in detail, but anyway, I think the Middle East is not an easy thing to settle.

Secretary Kissinger: I know. It has frontiers, Palestinians, Jerusalem. They all have to be settled simultaneously, except Jerusalem.

Prime Minister Chou: I hope you won’t spend another three years and a half in order to settle this question.

Secretary Kissinger: That is why I think there should be an initial withdrawal of Israeli forces in order to give the Arabs some hope and courage.

Prime Minister Chou: Besides you have also to meet with your domestic difficulties. And only you as the Secretary of State will show the responsibility to settle these questions. Just now we discussed the question of the Soviet expansionism in the world. Actually, there is consensus between the expansion and the old expansionism. Some of your press people asked me if it is possible for you to go back to isolationism. I told them it was absolutely impossible, but they did not believe me. I think the times are different. Although people might talk about it as a congress, the real politics would not be like that.

Secretary Kissinger: I agree that it is objectively impossible, but I do not agree that it is subjectively inconceivable.
Prime Minister Chou: Although some people might think of it that way, actually they would not be able to realize it. If they should become a president themselves they would have to pursue your present policies.

Secretary Kissinger: The danger is that someone may attempt to pursue an isolationism policy and thereby permit expansion of other countries and by the time he realizes what the dangers are he may have paid a very heavy price. I think the probability is that the policy we are now pursuing—in these main outlines, not necessarily in its tactics which are complex—will be pursued in the future.

Prime Minister Chou: It would not do for you not to contract it. What I say is the policy you are pursuing now is not an isolation policy, but you have contracted yourself a bit, retracted yourself a bit on certain questions in order to concentrate on settling the main questions. Your government had overstretched itself.

Secretary Kissinger: I agree.

Prime Minister Chou: You spent a lot of money and a lot of energy but the question had not been solved. If you would ask us as revolutionaries, of course, we would say we agree with your spreading yourself out. From a point of view of a revolutionary, we would be in favor of your spreading yourself out to be loose and vulnerable. But since now we have come together yourself and we are discussing some realistic and practical questions, we must talk about politics.

Secretary Kissinger: It was partly inexperience and partly the weakness of every other country.

Prime Minister Chou: There are so many countries—would you take care of them all? Did you ever expect that there would be a student movement in Bangkok? Does the CIA learn about it beforehand?

Secretary Kissinger: If Dulles had been more polite in 1954 he could have learned a lot.

Prime Minister Chou: It was impossible for him to do so because the developments of things are sometimes independent of human will.

Let’s do some preparation because Chairman Mao has invited you to go there. Mr. Lord can come too.

Secretary Kissinger: Can I take Ambassador Bruce, as well?

Prime Minister Chou: I thought you would bring Mr. Lord along because of your habits. I did not ask.

Secretary Kissinger: If it is difficult . . .

Prime Minister Chou: We will ask. (Miss Wang goes out to inquire.) Perhaps we should call the attention to Mr. Jenkins that, according to news from sources of Chaing Kai-shek the guided missile ship *Oklahoma City* . . . Do you have such a guided missile cruiser?
Secretary Kissinger: All cruisers are named after states.

Ambassador Ingersoll: It is the flagship of the Seventh Fleet.

Prime Minister Chou: At 1:37 this afternoon, the cruiser had approached an island near the Taiwan Straits. It passed through the Taiwan Straits. It was only about 25 kilometers from our territory.

Secretary Kissinger: Mr. Prime Minister, there is no defense against stupidity. I cannot watch every cruiser in the American Navy. I tell you the truth, Mr. Prime Minister, I ordered every airplane to stop flying near your territory. I would have thought that when one ordered airplanes not to fly that they would have thought the cruisers should not go either.

Prime Minister Chou: It is nothing very particular. Only they are nearing our territorial waters. I did not pay much attention to that.

Secretary Kissinger: It should not happen at anytime this close, and it should not happen while I am in China under any circumstances.

Prime Minister Chou: They have intruded into our territory by mistake. Just tell them and ask them to leave.

Secretary Kissinger: I will take care of it tonight. Wherever they are I will move them away. If they can tell the difference between left and right, they will move away.7

(The Chinese side then confirmed that Ambassador Bruce was also invited to see the Chairman.)

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7 On November 12, the USS Oklahoma City passed through the Taiwan Straits on a routine cruise from Yokosuka to Hong Kong. (Telegram 223189 to Beijing, November 12; ibid.)
Beijing, November 12, 1973, 5:40–8:25 p.m.

PARTICIPANTS

Chairman Mao Tse-tung
Prime Minister Chou En-lai
Foreign Minister Chi Peng-fei
Assistant Minister of Foreign Affairs Wang Hai-jung
Tang Wang-shen, Interpreter
Shen Jo-yen, Interpreter
Henry A. Kissinger, Secretary of State
Ambassador David Bruce, Chief U.S. Liaison Office
Winston Lord, Director of Planning and Coordination, Department of State

(There was informal conversation as Chairman Mao greeted the Secretary, Ambassador Bruce, and Mr. Lord in turn while the photographers took pictures. The Chairman said that he had not seen the Secretary in a long time and that he now had a higher position. The Secretary responded that the Chairman looked well, and the Chairman commented that he was fair. To Ambassador Bruce, the Chairman commented that he was advancing in age like him, but younger. Ambassador Bruce responded that he was not much younger. To Mr. Lord, the Chairman noted that he was very young.)

Chairman Mao: What did you discuss?
Prime Minister Chou: Expansionism.
The Secretary: That’s correct.
Chairman Mao: Who’s doing the expanding, him (indicating the Secretary)?
Prime Minister Chou: He started it, but others have caught up.
The Secretary: The Foreign Minister criticizes us from time to time for the sake of equilibrium, but I think he knows the real source.
Chairman Mao: But that expansionism is a pitiful one. You should not be afraid of them.
The Secretary: We are not afraid of them, Mr. Chairman. Every once in a while we have to take some strong measures as we did two weeks ago.
Chairman Mao: Those were not bad, those measures.

1 Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Kissinger Office Files, Box 100, Country Files, Far East, Secretary Kissinger’s Conversations in Peking, November 1973. Top Secret; Sensitive; Exclusively Eyes Only. The meeting took place at Chairman Mao’s residence.
At that time, we were not yet able to persuade Egyptian Vice President Shafei. He came here and said that they had no confidence in you. He said you were partial to Israel. I said not necessarily. I said that those of Jewish descent are not a monolithic bloc; for example, we cooperated with Engels and not with other Jewish capitalists.

The Secretary: The problem in the Middle East is to prevent it now from being dominated by the Soviet Union.

Chairman Mao: They can’t possibly dominate the Middle East, because, although their ambition is great, their capacities are meager. Take, for instance, Cuba. You intimidated them, and they left.

The Secretary: And since then we’ve done that a second time, although we did not announce it.

Chairman Mao: Recently?

The Secretary: Recently. They moved several submarines, and we moved several ships, and they left.

Chairman Mao: I’m very suspicious that this country wants to have some relations with us. At the beginning it was done through delegations sent by Castro. At that time, the head of the Delegation was Rodriguez. He led a delegation of six Latin American compatriots to China to try to make peace with us on behalf of the Soviet Union. The second time they tried to make peace through Ceaucescu of Romania, and they tried to persuade us not to continue the struggle in the ideological field.

The Secretary: I remember he was here.

Chairman Mao/Prime Minister Chou: That was long ago.

Prime Minister Chou: The first time he came to China. (Said in English.)

Chairman Mao: And the second time Kosygin came himself, and that was in 1960. I declared to him that we were going to wage a struggle against him for ten thousand years (laughter).

Interpreter: The Chairman was saying ten thousand years of struggle.

Chairman Mao: I also declared to him that neither of us two were socialists, and that we had been labeled by you (Soviet Union) as being dogmatists and that this is anti-Marxist. So I said let us also give you a title, and that is “revisionism.” (Laughter) And, therefore, neither of us is Marxist. And this time I made a concession to Kosygin. I said that I originally said this struggle was going to go on for ten thousand years. On the merit of his coming to see me in person, I will cut it down by one thousand years (laughter). And you must see how generous I am. Once I make a concession, it is for one thousand years. (Chou and Mao confer.)
And then there was another time, also Romania, and a Mr. Bordeoloski came also to speak on behalf of the Soviet Union. This time I again made a concession of a thousand years (laughter). You see, my time limit is becoming shorter and shorter.

And the fifth time the Romanian President Ceaucescu came again—that was two years ago—and he again raised the issue, and I said “this time no matter what you say, I can make no more concessions” (laughter).

The Secretary: We must adopt Chinese tactics.

Chairman Mao: There is now some difference between you and us. I do not speak with such ease now because I’ve lost two teeth. And there is a difference between your and our activities, that is, we just hit back at everything that comes. And we seized upon the fact that the agreement reached between Prime Minister Kosygin and us has never really been implemented, that is, the September 11, 1969, agreement at the Peking Airport.

The Secretary: I explained to the Prime Minister, going in the car or elsewhere, that our tactics are more complex and maybe less heroic, but our strategy is the same. We have no doubt who is the principal threat in the world today.

Chairman Mao: What you do is a Chinese kind of shadow boxing (laughter). We do a kind of shadow boxing which is more energetic.

Prime Minister Chou: And direct in its blows.

The Secretary: That is true, but where there is a real challenge, we react as you do.

Chairman Mao: I believe in that. And that is why your recent trip to the Arab world was a good one.

The Secretary: The Chairman is learning English.

Chairman Mao: Why is it in your country, you are always so obsessed with that nonsensical Watergate issue? (There is much laughter on the Chinese side as the interpreter tries to explain that she couldn’t really translate the Chairman’s wording for “nonsensical” which really

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2 Not further identified.

3 The two sides agreed to settle the Sino-Soviet border dispute through peaceful negotiations and to maintain the status quo of the border until the dispute was settled.

4 When Scowcroft sent the President a summary report of Kissinger’s meeting with Mao, the President highlighted the sentence, “He [Mao] was scathing of opposition to you because of Watergate which he considered to be a meager, nonsensical incident blown out of proportion.” Next to the highlight, Nixon left a note for Haig: “Al note!” (Memorandum from Scowcroft to Nixon, November 12; National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Kissinger Office Files, Box 96, Country Files, Far East, China Exchanges, November 1, 1973–March 31, 1974)
meant “to let out air.” Prime Minister Chou asks Mr. Lord if he knew the meaning of the Chinese word, “pee.” Mr. Lord said “no” and the Prime Minister said that he could ask his wife. The Chinese side explained that it was an adjective used to qualify the incident.)

The incident itself is very meager, yet now such chaos is being kicked up because of it. Anyway, we are not happy about it.

The Secretary: But not in the conduct of foreign policy, Mr. Chairman, which will continue on its present course, or in our capacity to take actions in crises as we’ve shown.

Chairman Mao: Yes. And even in the domestic aspects, I don’t think there’s such an overwhelming issue for you and the President.

The Secretary: No. For me there is no issue at all because I am not connected with it at all. The President, too, will master it.

Chairman Mao: What I mean by domestic aspects is your inflation, rising of prices, increase in unemployment, because it seems that the number of unemployed has been cut down by an amount and the U.S. dollar is relatively stable. So there doesn’t seem to be any major issue. Why should the Watergate affair become all exploded in such a manner?

The Secretary: There are many complex factors, including the fact that there are many old style politicians who dislike the President because he pursues unorthodox policy. And too many intellectuals have become nihilistic and want to destroy everything.

Chairman Mao: For instance, James Reston and Joseph Alsop are all now triggered against President Nixon. I can’t understand that.

The Secretary: I can understand James Reston because he follows others, and he is always a reflection of the fashionable view. Joseph Alsop—I think—that was a brief aberration, and he will return to his original position very soon.

Chairman Mao: Do you think they are writing articles, for instance, in trying to taste public opinion?

The Secretary: They all like to think that they are running the country. And they play President alternately every other day and take turns at it (laughter). If we had paid attention to them, Mr. Chairman, I’d never have been here on my first trip (laughter). Everything important has been done against their opposition.

Chairman Mao: Yes. People say that Americans can keep no secrets.

The Secretary: That’s true.

Chairman Mao: I think Americans can very well keep secrets.

The Secretary: That’s basically true, Mr. Chairman, but you may be sure that as long as we keep the information in the White House, you can be sure that nothing has ever come out of our discussions.
Chairman Mao: Take the Cuban incident, for instance. Take, for instance, your visit to China. And another situation would be your recent dealing with the Soviet Union. In all these cases, secrets were kept quite well.

The Secretary: That’s true. Things we can keep in my office, we can keep quite well. But there are no secrets with the Soviet Union. We always tell you everything we are doing with the Soviet Union. There is nothing we are doing with the Soviet Union that you don’t know. You can count on that for the future.

The Soviet Union likes to create the impression that they and we have a master plan to run the world, but that is to trap other countries. It’s not true. We are not that foolish.

Chairman Mao: You are always saying with respect to the Soviet Union something we are ourselves are also saying. And your views seem approximately the same as ours, that is, there is the possibility that the Soviet Union wants to attack China.

The Secretary: Well, Mr. Chairman, I used to think of it as a theoretical possibility. Now I think it is more a realistic possibility, and I’ve said it, especially to your Prime Minister and also your Ambassador. I think they above all want to destroy your nuclear capability.

Chairman Mao: But our nuclear capability is no bigger than a fly of this size (laughter).

The Secretary: But they are worried about what it will be ten years from now.

Chairman Mao: I’d say thirty years hence or fifty years hence. And it is impossible for a country to rise up in a short period.

The Secretary: Well, as I have said on many occasions, and as I said to the Chairman last time, we believe that if this eventuality were to happen, it would have very serious consequences for everybody. And we are determined to oppose it as our own decision without any arrangement with China.

Chairman Mao: Their ambitions are contradictory with their capacity.

The Secretary: That may be true.

Chairman Mao: Beginning from their Pacific Ocean, there is the United States, there is Japan, there is China, there is South Asia, and westward there is the Middle East, and there is Europe, and the Soviet forces that are deployed along the lines through Siberia way up to the Kurile Islands only account for one-fourth of their forces.

Prime Minister Chou: East of the Urals.

The Secretary: A little closer to one-half. Two-fifths maybe.

Chairman Mao: Excluding the Middle East, that is. The Middle East would be counted on the other side.
The Secretary: I see.

Chairman Mao: But that includes Kazakstan, the Uzbek Republic, Urquiz and other small republics. Also, some other minority nationality troops stationed in the East.

The Secretary: We know where every Soviet division is. And we have occasionally discussed some of this with you. But I agree with the Chairman . . .

Chairman Mao: (Before translation) They have to deal with so many adversaries. They have to deal with the Pacific. They have to deal with Japan. They have to deal with China. They have to deal with South Asia which also consists of quite a number of countries. And they only have a million troops here—not enough even for the defense of themselves and still less for attack forces. But they can’t attack unless you let them in first, and you first give them the Middle East and Europe so they are able to deploy troops eastward. And that would take over a million troops.

The Secretary: That will not happen. I agree with the Chairman that if Europe and Japan and the U.S. hold together—and we are doing in the Middle East what the Chairman discussed with me last time—then the danger of an attack on China will be very low.

Chairman Mao: We are also holding down a portion of their troops which is favorable to you in Europe and the Middle East. For instance, they have troops stationed in Outer Mongolia, and that had not happened as late as Khrushchev’s time. At that time they had still not stationed troops in Outer Mongolia, because the Chienpao Island incident occurred after Khrushchev. It occurred in Brezhnev’s time.

The Secretary: It was 1969. That is why it is important that Western Europe and China and the U.S. pursue a coordinated course in this period.

Chairman Mao: Yes.

The Secretary: Because in that case, nobody will be attacked.

Chairman Mao: Japan’s attitudes is also good.

The Secretary: That’s very important, yes.

Chairman Mao: And the attitudes of major European countries are not bad either.

The Secretary: Their attitude is better than their courage. (Prime Minister Chou explains something in Chinese to Chairman Mao.)

Chairman Mao: The main trouble now is those small Nordic countries. (The interpreters then corrected.) No, mainly the Benelux countries.

The Secretary: The Benelux countries and the Scandinavian countries, and there’s some ambiguity in the evolution of the German position.
Chairman Mao: In my opinion, Germany is still a part of the West and will not follow the Soviet Union, while Norway is quite fearful of the Soviet Union. Sweden is a bit wavering. Finland is slightly tended to be closer to the Soviet Union.

The Secretary: Because of its geographic position, not because of its conviction.

Chairman Mao: That’s correct. And they were very courageous during that war.

The Secretary: Very.

Chairman Mao: They are the country of one thousand legs.

The Secretary: That’s true.

Chairman Mao: The Soviet Union first carved out a part of their country and then gave it back, and that country is not one to be easily offended. Because they are hemmed in too close to the Soviet/Finnish border.

Prime Minister Chou: Why were they cut off?

The Secretary: They did take part. They were in the Karelian Isthmus.

Chairman Mao: And even during the time of Hitler’s occupation of Poland, Stalin still did not dare attack some of the countries that used to exist along the Baltic Sea.

The Secretary: But he took them shortly afterwards.

Chairman Mao: That was because Hitler attacked Poland, and the Soviet Union seized the opportunity to act in such a manner. They tried an agreement of cooperation. The Soviet Union was able to resist that opportunity to seize these three countries.

Perhaps these three representatives have embassies in your country.

The Secretary: And they still do, Mr. Chairman.

Chairman Mao: And the Soviet Union did not ask you first to abolish those embassies before they established diplomatic relations with you.

The Secretary: That is correct.

Chairman Mao: In 1933.

The Secretary: In 1933, those countries still existed, and we established diplomatic relations in 1933.

Prime Minister Chou: It’s not so convenient for them to go to the United Nations.

The Secretary: They are not in the United Nations.

Prime Minister Chou: They probably have some nationals residing in your country.

The Secretary: Yes. I frankly . . . they have ambassadors and are accredited, but I don’t know what they do.
Ambassador Bruce: They don’t do anything. One of them appears. I think it is Estonia, once a year, and gives an annual day reception (laughter).

The Secretary: You’re quite right. It has not affected our diplomatic relations with the Soviet Union.

Chairman Mao: Let’s discuss the issue of Taiwan. The question of the U.S. relations with us should be separate from that of our relations with Taiwan.

The Secretary: In principle . . .

Chairman Mao: So long as you sever the diplomatic relations with Taiwan, then it is possible for our two countries to solve the issue of diplomatic relations. That is to say like we did with Japan. As for the question of our relations with Taiwan, that is quite complex. I do not believe in a peaceful transition. (To the Foreign Minister) Do you believe in it?

The Secretary: Do I? He asked the Foreign Minister.

Chairman Mao: I’m asking him (the Foreign Minister). (Prime Minister Chou said something that was not translated.) They are a bunch of counterrevolutionaries. How could they cooperate with us? I say that we can do without Taiwan for the time being, and let it come after one hundred years. Do not take matters on this world so rapidly. Why is there need to be in such great haste? It is only such an island with a population of a dozen or more million.

Prime Minister Chou: They now have 16 million.

Chairman Mao: As for your relations with us, I think they need not take a hundred years.

The Secretary: I would count on that. I think they should come much faster.

Chairman Mao: But that is to be decided by you. We will not rush you. If you feel the need, we can do it. If you feel it cannot be done now, then we can postpone it to a later date.

The Secretary: From our point of view we want diplomatic relations with the Peoples Republic. Our difficulty is that we cannot immediately sever relations with Taiwan, for various reasons, all of them having to do with our domestic situation. I told the Prime Minister that we hope that by 1976, during 1976, to complete the process. So the question is whether we can find some formula that enables us to have diplomatic relations, and the utility of it would be symbolic strengthening of our ties, because, on a technical level, the Liaison Offices perform very usefully.

Chairman Mao: That can do.

5 See Document 57.
The Secretary: What can do?

Chairman Mao: (Before translation) It can do to continue as now, because now you still need Taiwan.

The Secretary: It isn’t a question of needing it; it is a question of practical possibilities.

Chairman Mao: That’s the same (laughter). We are in no hurry about Hong Kong either (laughter). We don’t even touch Macao. If we wanted to touch Macao, it would only take a slight touch. Because that was a stronghold established by Portugal back during the Ming Dynasty (laughter). Khrushchev has cursed us, saying why is it you don’t want even Hong Kong and Macao. And I’ve said to Japan that we not only agree to your demand for the four northern islands, but also in history the Soviet Union has carved out one and a half million square kilometers from China.

The Secretary: As I see the problem of diplomatic relations, Mr. Chairman, it’s this. On the question of Taiwan, I believe we have a very clear understanding to which we will stick. So the problem we have is . . . also, the Liaison Offices are doing useful work at this time. So the only question is whether at some point either or both of us thinks it is useful to demonstrate symbolically that our relationship is now normal in every respect. In that case, we should find a formula to make it possible, but it is not a necessity.

Chairman Mao: We have established diplomatic relations with the Soviet Union and also with India, but they are not so very good. And they are not even as good as our relations with you, which are better than our relations with them. So this issue is not an important one. The issue of the overall international situation is an important one.

The Secretary: I agree with the Chairman completely and on that we must understand each other, and I believe we substantially understand each other.

Chairman Mao: Our Chief of our Liaison Office was talking to you about grand principles and referred to George Washington’s opposing Britain.

The Secretary: Yes, he made a great speech to me a few weeks ago. I’d heard it before from the Prime Minister.

Chairman Mao: That set of language can be cut down. And we are now facing a contradiction. On the one hand, we have supported various Arab countries against Israeli Zionism. On the other hand, we have to welcome the U.S. putting the Soviet Union on the spot, and making it so that the Soviet Union cannot control the Middle East. Our Ambassador Huang Chen mentioned this support of the Arab world, but he didn’t understand the importance of U.S. resistance to the Soviet Union.

The Secretary: Well, I took him by surprise, and he repeated the formal position from the United Nations (laughter). And I understand
that publicly you have to take certain positions, and it is not against our common position that you do so. But the reality is that we will move matters toward a settlement in the Middle East, but we also want to demonstrate that it was not done by Soviet pressures.

So, whenever the Soviets press we must resist apart from the merits of the dispute. Then when we have defeated them, we may even move in the same direction. We are not against Arab aspirations; we are against their being achieved with Soviet pressure.

Chairman Mao: Exactly.

The Secretary: And that is our strategy right now.

Chairman Mao: And now there is a crucial issue, that is the question of Iraq, Baghdad. We don’t know if it is possible for you to do some work in that area. As for us, the possibilities are not so very great.

Prime Minister Chou: It is relatively difficult to do that. It is possible to have contacts with them, but it takes a period of time for them to change their orientation. It is possible they would change their orientation after they have suffered from them. They’ve already suffered once, that is with regard to the coup.

The Secretary: You can do good work in Iran, and Iran is active in Iraq. And we have encouraged the Shah to establish good relations with you. Our strategy with Iraq is first to try to win Syria away from it, and then to reduce its influence in sheikdoms along the Persian Gulf. And then when it sees it can achieve nothing by leaning to the Soviet Union, then we will move toward them. But first they have to learn that they gain nothing from their present course.

Chairman Mao: And this country it contains no banks or coasts of the Arab gulf, that is the Persian Gulf. Recently, your naval ships have gone in that part of the world. I said that was good.

The Secretary: They are still there, and we will keep them there a little longer.

Chairman Mao: That is one carrier.

The Secretary: A carrier and escort ships.

Chairman Mao: And the Soviet Union often passes through the Japanese straits, for example, the Tsumi Straits eastward to the vicinity of the Midway Islands. And they go in and out of the Japanese Islands. Sometimes they test their missiles in the Pacific Ocean, too.

The Secretary: Yes.

Chairman Mao: In my opinion, their aim is to tie down a portion of your strength in the Pacific Ocean to avoid your sending a large number of troops westwards.

The Secretary: First, we don’t mind their testing missiles in the Pacific, because this makes it very easy to find out what their characteristics are. As for the fleet, our difficulty about operating in the Indian
Ocean and the Arab Sea has been that we have not had a base in that area. But we have now developed an island called Diego Garcia as a base, and we have also discussed with Pakistan the possibility of building a port. And we are establishing very close relationships with the Shah of Iran. And I believe you will see we will be stationing more ships in the Indian Ocean from now on.

Chairman Mao: Why is it that Iran is favoring the Soviet Union's Asian collective security system?

The Secretary: First, of the leaders in that area that I know, the one who understands the Soviet danger best is the Shah of Iran. And he's buying very large numbers now of military equipment from us in order to defend himself against the Soviet Union and also to be able to protect Pakistan. So if we sat here, Mr. Chairman, he would agree completely with your analysis of the situation. But he has a tactical problem, and he wanted to say that he was for peace in general. I think he made a mistake, but he is not really for an Asian security system.

Prime Minister Chou: He will be arriving in China during the first three months of next year. (The Prime Minister and the Foreign Minister discuss the date.) It's going to be postponed. It is not going to be so early.

The Secretary: He is very much interested in good relations with China, and we have recommended it very strongly. And he sees your attitude and our attitude about Pakistan and Afganistan.

Chairman Mao: It seems to me that the comparatively weaker place in the contemporary international situation would still be Iraq.

The Secretary: Iraq right now is the most difficult place in that area.

Prime Minister Chou: (Laughing) Quadaffi went to Iraq to stir up something there.

Chairman Mao: What have they done now?

Prime Minister Chou: He has gone and returned. He went there to persuade them not to accept a ceasefire.

The Secretary: Quadaffi is not the most stable intellect that leads countries right now.

Chairman Mao: He is a man I do not understand. There's another, that is South Yemen. The President of South Yemen approached me. He said he wanted to sever diplomatic relations with the Soviet Union. He asked me my opinion. I was not taken in by him and said he must be prudent. Now they are tying themselves very closely to the Soviet Union.

The Secretary: Very closely tied to the Soviet Union. And they are stirring things up all over the Gulf.

Chairman Mao: Do you have diplomatic relations with them?
The Secretary: We have technically diplomatic relations with them but no useful influence. But we give assistance to Muscat and Oman and North Yemen in order to contain them. (The interpreter and Prime Minister Chou explain the location of Muscat and Oman to the Chairman.)

Chairman Mao: Let’s discuss something about Japan. This time you are going to Japan to stay a few more days there.

The Secretary: The Chairman always scolds me about Japan. I’m taking the Chairman very seriously, and this time I’m staying two and a half days. And he’s quite right. It is very important that Japan does not feel isolated and left alone. And we should not give them too many temptations to maneuver.

Chairman Mao: That is not to force them over to the Soviet side.

The Secretary: And not force them into too many choices, for example, between us.

Chairman Mao: That would not come about.

The Secretary: Not from our side either (not translated).

Chairman Mao: Their first priority is to have good relations with the United States. We only come second.

The Secretary: We have no objection to good relations between Japan and China. We want to prevent them from moving too close to the Soviet Union.

Prime Minister Chou: And they should not be taken in.

The Secretary: That’s why if they do something in the Soviet Union, we sometimes join them, so they are not all alone in facing the Soviet Union.

Chairman Mao: And we also encourage them to do things together with the United States to avoid their being taken in.

Prime Minister Chou: Recently, Tanaka and others paid a visit to the United States. Was that on the West Coast or in Hawaii?

The Secretary: No, he went to Washington before they went to the Soviet Union during the summer. Our relations now are better than they were when I was here last time. They are no longer so nervous (laughter).

Chairman Mao: They are afraid of you and you should try to lessen their fear. The Soviet Union is doing its utmost to go all out to win them over, but Japan is not so trustful of them.

The Secretary: No, they had a very bad historical experience, and that is very fortunate for all of us. And the Russian temperament doesn’t harmonize very well with the Japanese.

Prime Minister Chou: During Tanaka’s visit to the Soviet Union, the Russians acted very stupidly.
Chairman Mao: They didn’t have any discussions the first two days.

Prime Minister Chou: They lectured them.

Chairman Mao: They only made proposals about the resources of the Soviet Union.

The Secretary: Yes, they did that to us, too. It creates the impression they are trying to buy us. But the proposal is that we have to invest there for ten years, and only after everything is built, then they’ll start paying us back (laughter). We have not yet agreed and there is no prospect of an early agreement to any of their big projects.

Chairman Mao: And that includes most favored nation treatment. Now it is put on the shelf. I thought it was good upon hearing that news. I think it is best to put it on the shelf for a longer period of time.

The Secretary: But we would like to have MFN for China (laughter).

Chairman Mao: Not necessarily. So long as the Soviet Union doesn’t get it, that would be enough (laughter).

The Secretary: The prospects of that legislation are not very promising.

Chairman Mao/Prime Minister Chou: Is that so?

The Secretary: It won’t be taken up again until February. That’s in the House. And then it must be taken up in the Senate. But all in all, it seems it will be finally passed if not next year, the year after. The big problem, Mr. Chairman, is not the MFN clause, because the Soviet Union doesn’t have goods to sell us. The obstacle to Soviet trade is not our duties, but the low quality of Soviet products.

Chairman Mao: But they can give you energy which you need.

The Secretary: Mr. Chairman, that is not exactly accurate. Even if they were able to produce the natural gas they have claimed, and there is still some dispute about that, it would only amount to about five percent of our needs. And it would take ten years to deliver. And within that ten-year period, we will have developed domestic alternatives, including natural gas in America. That makes it much less necessary, in fact probably unnecessary, to import natural gas in quantities.

Chairman Mao: That would be good.

The Secretary: The problem is credits more than MFN. And those we have controlled very rigidly. We haven’t given any credits.

Chairman Mao: I’m lacking in knowledge and cannot understand this problem. I cannot understand this. Probably what you said is correct. At present, the Soviet Union seems in need of such great amounts as $8 billion in credits.

The Secretary: Yes, and we’ve given them up to now $330 million. They want $8 billion dollars just for natural gas.
Chairman Mao: Your President issued the Nixon Doctrine at Guam, I believe, and we see that you are gradually resisting his policy in putting out the flames of war in Southeast Asia. In this manner, you will be able to achieve a greater initiative.

The Secretary: That is correct.

Chairman Mao: What you issued was a new Atlantic Charter. (There was some discussion of the translation of this word and the difference between “Charter” and “Constitution.”) But they mean the same thing. I would think we will realize the basic objective of that proposal within the first half of that year. Most of the Charter is already drafted in the military sphere; we’ve almost completed a draft, and in the political sphere, we’ve almost completed drafting it. The economic one requires more work.

Chairman Mao: In the economic field, there are some contradictions.

The Secretary: Yes. That’s true, but they have to be overcome too, because of the great need, and I think we can work them out. Our press always concentrates on disagreements. Those diplomats who are willing to talk publicly are usually least reliable, and their reports are always published. But basically, we are making good progress.

Chairman Mao: That is why I believe it will be greatly difficult for the Soviet Union to seize Europe and put it on its side. They have such ambition but great difficulty.

The Secretary: I think it is very difficult for them to seize militarily, and if they attempt it, they will certainly have to fight us. (Chairman Mao talks to Prime Minister Chou.)

The greatest danger with the Soviet Union is where they either move land armies quickly, as in Czechoslovakia, or make a sudden air attack in areas where they think we will not do anything.

Chairman Mao: Take, for instance, the manner of their actions in Czechoslovakia. It is completely unseemly. For instance, they engaged in intriguing against Czechoslovakia; they sent civilian aircraft and used troops in the civilian aircraft.

The Secretary: To control the Prague Airport.

Chairman Mao: Later they sent troops there. Others thought they carried civilian passengers in that aircraft, but they sent troops. In that manner, they were able to control the Prague Airport. They sent troops there and reduced Czechoslovakia to inertia.

The Secretary: That’s true. That’s exactly how it happened.

Chairman Mao: And, therefore, in my opinion, with regard to the Soviet Union, it has a great ambition—and that is, it wishes to seize in its hands the two continents of Europe and Asia, and North Africa and elsewhere, but they will have trouble doing that.
The Secretary: As long as countries that are threatened stay united. (Chairman Mao toasts everyone with his tea.)

Chairman Mao: They made use of the opportunities when both of your feet were stuck in the quagmire of Southeast Asia. And in this, your President can’t take all the blame for that. The Johnson Administration was responsible for that.

The Secretary: Where did they take advantage of their opportunity?

Chairman Mao: That is to enter Czechoslovakia.

Prime Minister Chou: And also India.

Chairman Mao: And I don’t pay so much attention to these minor things. That is, they have so-called nonaggression pacts with Egypt, Iraq and India, like the Treaty of Friendship with India. I don’t believe that settles things. Therefore, we would not agree to any such treaties when they propose them to us.

The Secretary: Yes. I have noticed that.

Chairman Mao: And there are some people here who are commenting that you had lost an opportunity to take action when you did not do so when Egypt chased out Soviet military personnel. The commentary goes that at that time you should have assisted Egypt a bit. Upon hearing that I thought further. I thought that because at that time both your feet were in the whole of Southeast Asia, and you had not yet climbed out.

The Secretary: You are quite right, Mr. Chairman. There were two problems. We had our election. And, secondly, we were still in Vietnam, and we couldn’t tackle both at once.

Chairman Mao: That is so. You are now freer than before.

The Secretary: Much more.

Chairman Mao: And the philosopher of your motherland, Hegel, has said—I don’t know whether it is the correct English translation—“freedom means the knowledge of necessity.”

The Secretary: Yes.

Chairman Mao: Do you pay attention or not to one of the subjects of Hegel’s philosophy, that is, the unity of opposites?

The Secretary: Very much. I was much influenced by Hegel in my philosophic thinking.

Chairman Mao: Both Hegel and Feuerbach, who came a little later after him. They were both great thinkers. And Marxism came partially from them. They were predecessors of Marx. If it were not for Hegel and Feuerbach, there would not be Marxism.

The Secretary: Yes. Marx reversed the tendency of Hegel, but he adopted the basic theory.

Chairman Mao: What kind of doctor are you? Are you a doctor of philosophy?
The Secretary: Yes (laughter).
Chairman Mao: Yes, well, then won’t you give me a lecture?
The Secretary: I think the Chairman knows much more philosophy than I. And he has written profoundly about philosophy. I used to shock my colleagues, Mr. Chairman, by assigning essays from your collected works, in my courses in the 1960s at Harvard.
Chairman Mao: I, myself, am not satisfied with myself. The main thing is that I don’t understand foreign languages and, therefore, I am unable to read books of Germans or Englishmen or Americans.
The Secretary: I can’t read German in its original form. I must translate into English, because it is too complicated in its original form. This is quite true. Some of the points of Hegel—quite seriously—I understand better in English than German, even though German is my mother language.
Prime Minister Chou: Because of the intricate structure of the German grammar, it sometimes gets misinterpreted if one doesn’t understand the grammar correctly. Therefore, it’s not easy to understand the German language and especially the reasoning of various works.
Chairman Mao: (To Prime Minister Chou) Don’t you know some German?
Prime Minister Chou: I learned in my youth; now I’ve forgotten it.
The Secretary: German sentences are long, and the grammar is involved. Therefore, it’s easier to understand English than German. One of the characteristics of the German language . . .
Prime Minister Chou: Yesterday, a few of those who know German were joking together that German sentences are so long in length that they are quite a few pages, and one does not understand the sentences until you find the final verb, and the verb is at the very end. That, of course, is exaggerated. One sentence does not take several pages.
Chairman Mao: Did you meet Kuo Mo-juo who understands German? Now we are discussing Hegel, and I give you an opinion.
The Secretary: I don’t know the gentleman that the Chairman was mentioning.
Chairman Mao: He is a man who worships Confucius, but he is now a member of our Central Committee.
Let’s go back to Hegel. In Hegel’s history of philosophy, he mentioned Confucius who he showed great disrespect. He showed more respect for Laotze, but he showed the greatest respect for the philosophy of Indian Buddhism.
The Secretary: I don’t quite agree with him (the Chairman) on that last point. That’s a very passive philosophy.
Chairman Mao: And I also believe that that was not a correct way of saying. And this is not only true of Hegel.
The Secretary: There is a sentimental love affair between Western intellectuals and India based on a complete misreading of the Indian philosophy of life. Indian philosophy was never meant to have a practical application.

Chairman Mao: It’s just a bunch of empty words.

The Secretary: For Gandhi, nonviolence wasn’t a philosophic principle, but because he thought the British were too moralistic and sentimental to use violence against. They are nonsentimental people. For Gandhi it was a revolutionary tactic, not an ethical principle.

Chairman Mao: And he himself would spin his own wool and drink goat’s milk.

The Secretary: But it was essentially a tactical device for him.

Chairman Mao: And the influence of Gandhi’s doctrine on the Indian people was to induce them into nonresistance.

The Secretary: Partly, but also given the character and diversity of the English people, it was only a way to conduct the struggle against the British. So I think Gandhi deserves credit of having won independence against the British.

Chairman Mao: India did not win independence. If it did not attach itself to Britain, it attaches itself to the Soviet Union. And more than one-half of their economy depends on you. Did you not mention during your briefings that India owes ten billion dollars in debt to the U.S., or was that all debts?

The Secretary: That was all debts together. It’s not $10 billion but closer to $6 billion, I will have to check. I thought it was $10 billion to everybody, of which India owed 60 percent. But you may be right. I have to check. (To Lord: can you check, Win?)

Prime Minister Chou: That includes the rupees debt.

The Secretary: Including the rupee debt, that is correct. Yes. And one can mention the dollar debt, too.

Chairman Mao: I recall your President told us the various debts at the World Bank were $10 billion.

The Secretary: Yes. When one includes the unilateral debts and the rupee debts and the bilateral debts, then it is $10 billion and probably a little more even.

Chairman Mao: That is also something you’ve imparted to me. In the past, I had not known that. And if you come to China again, besides talking politics, talk a bit of philosophy to me.

The Secretary: I would like that very much, Mr. Chairman. That was my first love, the study of philosophy.

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6 No follow up by Lord on India’s external debt was found.
Chairman Mao: Perhaps it is more difficult to do now as Secretary of State.

The Secretary: Yes.

Chairman Mao: And they say you are a galloping horse whose hooves never stop (laughter).

The Secretary: He (Prime Minister Chou) called me a “cyclone” (laughter).

Chairman Mao: There is a cyclone around the world.

The Secretary: Your Vice Foreign Minister told me your views, Mr. Chairman, about the Arab world when he talked to me in October, and I paid great attention to them.

Chairman Mao: That is the matter of my discussions with the Vice President of Egypt which was somehow gotten hold of by Lord Chiao (laughter).

The Secretary: He didn’t tell me who he had talked to.

Chairman Mao: It was Shafei. Did you see him?

The Secretary: I saw Sadat and two or three others.

Chairman Mao: At that time I was trying to persuade him to get closer to you, because I noted that after you announced your position as Secretary of State and you’d only been that a few days, you met the Arab Foreign Ministers and later on invited them to lunch. Only the Foreign Ministers of Iraq Syria, Libya, and South Yemen declined. I think even Egypt accepted.

The Secretary: That is right.

Chairman Mao: That is why I was following behind you (laughter). I was very happy that you entertained those Arab Foreign Ministers.

The Secretary: Yes. It was my first official function.

Chairman Mao: And your predecessor, the previous Secretary, I think did not do so.

The Secretary: He was interested, but I don’t think he ever had them as a group.

Chairman Mao: And these Arab countries, which spread up from the Atlantic to the Persian Gulf, account for more than a hundred million people.

Prime Minister Chou: The population is now one hundred and fifty million.

Chairman Mao: And they are composed of 19 countries.

The Secretary: And we are making a major effort to improve our relations with them and take this very seriously.

Chairman Mao: And the difficulties are also great because these countries are both united and engaged in internal struggles. It is not so easy to deal with.
The Secretary: Libya quarrels with all its neighbors. (Prime Minister Chou leaves the room.)

Chairman Mao: Perhaps he’s that kind of cock that loves fighting. That’s the way Khrushchev cursed us. He said we were a cock that liked fighting.

The Secretary: He did not have a very successful visit here in 1959.

Chairman Mao: We fell out by 1959. We began to fall out in 1958 when they wanted to control China’s seacoast and also China’s naval ports. And during my discussions with them, with their Ambassador, I almost slammed the table, and I gave him hell (laughter). And he reported that to Moscow and Khrushchev came. At that time, he put forth the notion of a joint fleet, that is, for the Soviet Union and China to form a joint naval fleet. That was the suggestion he raised. And at that time, he was quite arrogant because he had seen General Eisenhower who was then President, and he attained the so-called “spirit of Camp David.” And he boasted to me in Peking that he got to know the President and the two English words concerning President Eisenhower were that he was “my friend.” (To Ambassador Bruce: You knew that?)

Ambassador Bruce: No, I never knew that.

Chairman Mao: And also a piece of news. Since then, he never came again. But he had been to Vladivostok and he went there from China.

Prime Minister Chou: There he made an anti-China speech.

Chairman Mao: None of the present leaders of the Soviet Union have been as far eastward as Vladivostok. Kosygin himself has said he is not quite clear about matters in Siberia. (The Chinese check the time.)

Prime Minister Chou: It’s been two and one-half hours.

Chairman Mao: And there’s another issue I would like to discuss with you. It seems today we have talked too long. Over two and one-half hours. We have taken up time originally set aside for other activities. (Note: He meant Ambassador Bruce’s reception.) The question I would like to discuss is that I am quite suspicious that if the Democratic Party comes into office, they will adopt the policy of isolationism.

The Secretary: That is a very serious question, Mr. Chairman. I think there may be trends now among the intellectuals and some Democrats in the direction of isolationism. On the other hand, objective realities would force them to understand that there is no alternative to our present policy. Now, what damage would be done until they learned this, and whether they would continue with the same tactical complexity, this I don’t know. But I think they would pursue the present course. (The last sentence is not translated.)

Chairman Mao: Then you seem to be in the same category as myself. We seem to be both more or less suspicious.
The Secretary: I’m suspicious, and I have some questions about some leaders. But I believe the overwhelming necessity of the situation will force us to return to the policy we are now pursuing.

But this, Mr. Chairman, is why I believe we should use this period, when all of us are still in office and understand the situation, to so solidify it that no alternative will be possible anymore.

Chairman Mao: And this is mainly manifested in that one point—that is the advocacy of troop withdrawals from Europe.

The Secretary: Yes.

Chairman Mao: This will be a great assistance to the Soviet Union.

The Secretary: We will not carry it out in our Administration. It occurs in two things, the troop withdrawals from Europe and maybe less of a willingness to be very brutal very quickly in case there is a challenge.

Chairman Mao: What you mean by “brutality” is probably going to war.

The Secretary: If necessary, but . . .

Chairman Mao: I am not happy you are putting up a diplomatic front to me.

The Secretary: If necessary, but our experience has been that, if they know we are going to war, they draw back. Up to now, they’ve always been afraid of us.

Chairman Mao: Because I also think it would be better not to go to war. I’m not in favor of that either, though I’m well known as a warmonger (laughter). If you and the Soviet Union fight a war, I would also think that would not be very good. If you are going to fight, it would be better to use conventional weapons, and leave nuclear weapons in the stockpile, and not touch them.

The Secretary: We will not start a war in any event.

Chairman Mao: That’s good. I heard you put forward the opinion before that you want to gain time.

The Secretary: We want to gain time, but we also want to be in a position that, if the Soviet Union attacks any major areas we discussed, we can resist. And it’s in those circumstances we have to be prepared.

Chairman Mao: That’s entirely correct. As for the Soviet Union, they bully the weak, and are afraid of the tough. (Laughter as he points to Miss Wang and Miss Tang.) And you shouldn’t try to bully either Miss Wang or Miss Tang because they are comparatively soft.

The Secretary: Mr. Chairman, in my experience they are not very soft. They also don’t carry out the Chairman’s advice (laughter).

Chairman Mao: She (Miss Tang) is American, while she (Miss Wang) is a Soviet spy (laughter).
The Chairman then got up unassisted and escorted the Americans to the outer lobby. He said goodbye to the Secretary, Ambassador Bruce, and Mr. Lord in turn, and asked photographers to take pictures. As he shook hands with the Secretary, he said “and please send my personal greetings to President Richard Nixon.” The Secretary said he would do that. Ambassador Bruce and Mr. Lord indicated that it was a great honor to see Chairman Mao. The Chairman mentioned to Mr. Lord that he had met him before, and Mr. Lord acknowledged this.

59. Memorandum of Conversation

Beijing, November 13, 1973, 4:30–7:15 p.m.

PARTICIPANTS
Prime Minister Chou En-lai
Foreign Minister Chi Peng-fei
Assistant Minister of Foreign Affairs Wang Hai-jung
Lin Ping, Director, Foreign Ministry
Tsien Ta-yung, PRC Liaison Office, Washington
One other Chinese official
Tang Wang-shen, Interpreter
Yang Yu-yung, Interpreter
Chinese notetaker
Secretary of State Henry A. Kissinger
Ambassador David Bruce, Chief, U.S. Liaison Office
Ambassador Robert Ingersoll, U.S. Embassy Tokyo
Winston Lord, Director of Planning and Coordination, Department of State
Acting Assistant Secretary Arthur Hummel, East Asian and Pacific Affairs

(Prime Minister Chou En-lai mentioned previous Chinese Nationalist Foreign Minister Wellington Koo.)

Ambassador Bruce: I heard him make a great number of speeches. He is a brilliant speaker.

Prime Minister Chou: And he speaks very good English. Only the young people are able to catch up with him speaking English and like T. F. Tsang who only speaks English, he speaks Chinese. He is also from Shanghai.

1 Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Kissinger Office Files, Box 100, Country Files, Far East, Secretary Kissinger’s Conversations in Peking, November 1973. Top Secret; Sensitive; Exclusively Eyes Only. The meeting took place at Guest House Villa #3. All brackets are in the original.
I received your text of the Communiqué last night and your guidance on working out that text. So we received it at one o’clock in early morning, and then we have to make suggestions and some changes. We still want to preserve and keep your good points. Now, I have also gotten myself involved.

Secretary Kissinger: Is that the text of yours?

Prime Minister Chou: Ours is even shorter than yours. About the same length. I have kept back points. We are having it typed. After we have finished typing it, we will have one person from each side . . .

Secretary Kissinger: As long as your representative isn’t the Vice Minister.

Prime Minister Chou: Obviously if you agree to our views, it will be all right. We have tried our best to take in your main points.

Secretary Kissinger: I think we will have no difficulty. Maybe on our side it should be Mr. Hummel and Mr. Lord.

I have some answers to some of the questions you asked yesterday. First, about the *Oklahoma City*. I would like to be able to say . . .

Prime Minister Chou: The *City* is already in Hong Kong.

Secretary Kissinger (to Lord): Can we find out how they knew about it?

Prime Minister Chou: We learned about this news from the Taiwan authorities because only when they talked about these facts did we know about it. We learn about activities of vessels or planes in Taiwan space because they have islands that are quite close. They use these as instances. They derive merits from it because they make publicity of the fact that ships have come close to them.

Secretary Kissinger: I can only say it was stupidity. The capacity for stupidity seems to be infinite. I can’t think of what new stupidity people are thinking up.

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2 See footnote 7, Document 60.

3 On November 12, Zhou remarked that the USS *Oklahoma City* had entered the Taiwan Straits during Kissinger’s visit. See Document 57 and footnote 7 thereto.
Prime Minister Chou: You are right. And so the vessels that de-
liberately sailed close to Taiwan were also Soviet ships. That shows
they did it deliberately.

Secretary Kissinger: Yes. In this particular case, we knew nothing
about it. It seems inconceivable to us that anyone would do it deliber-
ately. Ships would also be prohibited when planes were.

Prime Minister Chou: But for some occasions you cannot prohibit
it beforehand. You can only settle after it comes up. So there is also a
matter of mutual trust in such a case. Now, Doctor, you have had a
very deep discussion with our Chairman. So in the future I believe our
mutual understanding will be deep.

Secretary Kissinger: We do too, and we consider the meeting with
the Chairman to be extremely important.

Prime Minister Chou: And my discussion with you the day before
yesterday—that is, your discussion with me prepared the way for your
talks with the Chairman. Since we have touched these points, I don’t
think it is necessary to dwell upon these issues.

Now, today, what we have to do is make clarification on some is-
suess and settle some issues. The first point is concerning the Soviet
Union. You said that a big question concerning that is about the pre-
vention of nuclear war, and you hoped there would be no endless de-
bate about it.

Interpreter: You thought it better to complete the treaty than have
endless debate on the issue.

Secretary Kissinger: Yes.

Prime Minister Chou: I think you are right in saying so because on
the whole it is right not to have an endless debate on this issue. But there
is one point on the legal basis of that issue—I think that treaty was not
yet agreed by the Congress. And the second point is that if any strong
evidence should come up there should be some prior consultation.

Secretary Kissinger: Between you and us or between us and the
Soviet Union?

Prime Minister Chou: I was referring to between the Soviet Union
and the U.S. because it was part of your agreement. But the whole
world should be made clear about the principles including your allies.
Otherwise, they will think the two big powers will discuss other sub-
jects behind their back. That’s why there is a wave in the world. That’s
what made it necessary for us to make a comprehensive assessment at
the United Nations. You had contacts with us beforehand, and I am
sure you also contacted your allies before.

Secretary Kissinger: It may amuse the Prime Minister to give you
their state of mind, that some of our allies helped us draft the agree-
ment and they saw it before some of our own people. Some were crit-
ical of their own draft. You can ask Prime Minister Heath when he visits you.

Prime Minister Chou: But you can still remember our position?
Secretary Kissinger: Your position was understood.

Prime Minister Chou: So we had to make criticism because we think it is necessary for Third World countries to have such an understanding on this issue. But you had given your consent to the treaty signed by Latin American countries, the Treaty on a Nuclear Free Zone. You were the first to show your consent. But still you haven’t withdrawn your military bases there in Cuba so Cuba had to file a protest in order to free their hands. In order to satisfy the demands of countries like Mexico, we signed that Treaty but we made a separate statement. We hope that the Soviet Union would sign the treaty. Or would they prefer to stay isolated to the end?

Secretary Kissinger: So far the Soviet Union has not.
Prime Minister Chou: What is the reason? Is it because of Cuba?
Secretary Kissinger: Partly because of Cuba; or maybe they have other expectations in Latin America.

Prime Minister Chou: There is a new issue cropping up in Latin America, that is concerning Chile. Could you exercise some influence on Chile? They shouldn’t go in for slaughtering that way. It was terrible.

Secretary Kissinger: We have exercised considerable influence, and we believe after the first phase when they seized power there have been no executions with which we are familiar going on now. I will look into the matter again when we return and I will inform you. To the best of my recollection when we left there were no executions taking place, but I will check on it.

(To Lord) Get Kubisch to check on this.4

Secretary Kissinger: After the first week—I am talking now up to the time I had left Washington.

Prime Minister Chou: But as you know, our emissary has been staying on.

Secretary Kissinger: Yes, and we appreciate it.

Prime Minister Chou: And just because our emissary is still there, that’s how we have been able to learn about many facts. Mr. Lin Ping

4 Jack Kubisch was Assistant Secretary of State for Inter-American Affairs. Lord prepared a November 20 memorandum for Kissinger on the number of executions in Chile. (National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Kissinger Office Files, Box 96, Country Files, Far East, China Exchanges, November 1, 1973–March 31, 1974) Kissinger wrote that this information “should be watered down,” but accepted Lord’s recommendation that it be shared verbally with Han Xu. (Ibid.)
is our Ambassador in Chile, because their government is much too complicated. Even without the support on the part of the CIA, they perhaps work on the same (perhaps their own virtue).

Secretary Kissinger: No, I wish the Prime Minister were right. I wish the CIA was as competent as the Prime Minister believes.

Prime Minister Chou: But you wouldn't be able to control it.

Secretary Kissinger: Not be able to control the CIA?

Prime Minister Chou: What I meant is did they have a hand in the coup?

Secretary Kissinger: They would not have a hand in the coup, but it is true they could not control the situation.

Prime Minister Chou: They could only control one thing. Remember when your chargé d'affaires in Laos during the recent coup ran to the airport and told the official of the coup.

Secretary Kissinger: That's true. In Laos, we attempted to restrain the situation. In Chile, it was the incompetence of the Allende government. We would not give assistance, would not make their task easier, but we did not have anything to do with the actual coup.

Prime Minister Chou: But that government itself was much too complicated. Allende himself admitted that if one wanted to seize political power in the true sense of the word . . . but on the other hand their subordinates made great publicity. And those Communists in that country who were close to the Soviet Union wanted the Soviet Union to supply them with weapons. Whereas those Che Guevarists in Cuba that took up arms found themselves divorced from the masses by doing quite similarly those activities which they carried out in their Cuban guerrilla forces. They thought that once they had weapons in hand, they could kill some people and burn down some houses. Their putschist group was active in Chile and other countries. Have you ever read the diary written by Che Guevara?

Secretary Kissinger: Yes.

Prime Minister Chou: He had very great influence among the young people in Latin America. And in the American countries on the whole there are two patriots. You can imagine what they are.

Secretary Kissinger: Guevara?

Prime Minister Chou: Another one.

Secretary Kissinger: I don’t know, but they are different. Guevara was an adventurist. Chairman Mao is a student of the Revolution.

(There is further discussion of Che Guevara.)

Prime Minister Chou: We went to the Soviet Union to celebrate October Revolution in 1964 because, at that time, we still placed some hope in Brezhnev, and he also shared our view. Che Guevara also told me he was also opposed to that view of calling a conference to sup-
port the Soviet Union against China. He said when I got back he would anyway oppose it. And after he got back, he came again with the other five delegations to China. He expressed opposition to that conference but he actually took part in that conference. So when he came and met with me—just by himself—he only spoke one thing to me: I don’t like to stay on in Cuba. And after he got back, he went to the United Nations to make a statement. Perhaps you have heard that statement. As a result, you know where he went. He went to the eastern part of Bolivia and there was guerrilla warfare going on there. He went there together with other armed Latin Americans.

Secretary Kissinger: It was not easy for them to meld into the population there.

Prime Minister Chou: It was very difficult for them. And then Che Guevara went there and he intended to carry out guerrilla warfare. The result was that after he got there, he gave me a letter by the Ambassador in Cuba, and he asked us to help him in building the largest kind of broadcasting station which should be able to broadcast to the whole world. I said to myself, was that man mad to think of having large broadcasting station to go along with such a small guerrilla force? Because he signed his letter only with the notation Che. It turned out the letter was really written by him.

(Prime Minister Chou then described Che’s activities in Latin America and the Congo, and Chairman Mao’s connotations on these activities.)

Secretary Kissinger: He was silly. He had no objective or political hope in either place, either in the Congo or in Bolivia. You cannot arrive merely posing as a specialist in guerrilla warfare.

Prime Minister Chou: And besides it was really absurd to think the peasants in Bolivia were all spies. He suspected this person and that person. How could he expect to live on? So there are some sections of people in Chile that are doing things his way. And in 1971, the year before last, his influence was also found in Sri Lanka, where there were Guevarists and Trotskyites.

Secretary Kissinger: This I didn’t know.

Prime Minister Chou: It was reknowned. And in Chile you can find both. And the Soviet Union was not only making use of Che Guevara, they were also making use of Trotskyites.

Secretary Kissinger: It is an amazing turn of history.

Prime Minister Chou: It is a kind of irony.

Secretary Kissinger: Yes.

Prime Minister Chou: But we think it was indeed true that in Chile the government did engage in massacres in the capital, Santiago. Hundreds of bodies were thrown out of the stadium.
Secretary Kissinger: We don’t believe it was this many, but what I will do . . . Mr. Prime Minister, I will look into it, as in Iraq, and I will send you our own honest assessment of the situation when I return. I know there were executions. I think there were less than 100s. I think they have now stopped. I will check and let you know. We will use our influence in that direction.

Prime Minister Chou: But I should think that massacres will give rise to revolution on the part of the people. It is also inevitable that it will be so but how long it will last, we don’t know. There is also reason why the public opinion in the world has shown sympathy for the Latin American countries. It has also enabled the Soviet Union to gain publicity about it. Their Foreign Minister was saying at the United Nations that a trade union official in Chile was about to be hanged, and he wanted the Vice Foreign Minister to say something about it, and he refused. I think that was instigated.

Secretary Kissinger: That was a case where the Soviet Union appealed to us. We looked into it and there was nothing to it.

Prime Minister Chou: Later that man was not killed.

Secretary Kissinger: Yes.

Prime Minister Chou: And as for their economic performance, we often told them to prepare for nationalization, and they didn’t. So as a result of that their production was going down and they made too many promises to the people which could not be honored. That was the way some of the people . . .

Secretary Kissinger: There was no organization. There was no discipline. This, plus total incompetence, led to the collapse of the Allende government. There were great divisions among the factions. These were the basic reasons for the downfall. The Prime Minister correctly described many of the elements. They did everything in fits of enthusiasm without preparation.

Prime Minister Chou: But there is also a good point in that event in Chile. For the past nearly 200 years there, there was the American tradition of not having any military coup in their country. So it would be good.

Secretary Kissinger: It was good that there was a military coup?

Prime Minister Chou: It was good because it could show a bad thing could be turned into good account. That is our way of seeing this thing. We told them about this, but they didn’t believe us. That kind of phenomenon was caused by themselves. We give only limited support to Latin American countries’ revolutions. We are still learning.

Secretary Kissinger: I hope you don’t learn too fast.

Prime Minister Chou: You don’t have to be afraid of that. It takes time to have the people rise up.
Secretary Kissinger: I am in favor of very careful long studies by our Chinese friends.

Prime Minister Chou: I only wrote one letter to President Allende, asking him not to do too many things in hurry. It only concerned economic problems that they should make preparation beforehand. They shouldn’t do everything at once; they should take steps. They should not promise too many things to people; otherwise, they would not be able to honor these things. Because we believe the life of the people can only be improved on the basis of production. Whenever one speaks of Socialism, also think of welfare. And my letter to President Allende was carried in the newspaper, but it was useless because the word of a foreigner meant nothing.

Secretary Kissinger: He also was not master in his own house. He was not a free agent. He could not do what he wanted.

Prime Minister Chou: Latin America is a complicated area and Latin America is quite different from Asia. So there is the expansionist aspect to the Soviet policy which Chairman Mao mentioned yesterday. There was nothing very terrible about it. On the other hand, there is nothing really to be afraid of, either their deceptive tricks or their expansionism, because they will be exposed. It is possible for a time they might succeed in creating some trouble, because in nearly everything they have tried to create some trouble.

We will expose them in the United Nations. Miss Thomas, the correspondent, asked if I would go to the UN. Vice Minister Chiao will probably represent us. I myself have no interest in going there because I am advanced in age and quite useless now.

Secretary Kissinger: It is not obvious to others.

Prime Minister Chou: There is a Chinese saying which goes “Know yourself.” And I should be able to know myself. And since after tonight’s banquet we will still have another discussion, so I will leave the Soviet discussion until then.

Secretary Kissinger: Could I say one thing before we discuss the treaty on prevention of nuclear war, so we understand each other. I understand the necessity of your formal position, Mr. Prime Minister, and we do not object to occasional comments such as were made by the Vice Minister. As long as you and we understand to what use we will put this treaty.

First, it was our judgment that an endless debate in which we refused to discuss the prevention of nuclear war would cost us more than it was worth. But to us the principal utility of the treaty is that it makes it impossible for the Soviet Union to launch a conventional attack against others without violating the treaty to prevent nuclear war. We have integrally linked the prevention of a conventional attack and of
a nuclear attack which had never been done before. And with this link it makes it impossible for the Soviet Union to engage in a military operation against any country if they have not had a prior consultation with us without violating Article 4.

Now many countries have objected to the consultation clause but let us be realistic. If we want to encourage the Soviet Union to attack anyone, we don’t need Article 4 of the treaty to do it. They will be very eager to do it. If we use this treaty, it will be to prevent Soviet aggression, not to encourage it. And it gives us an opportunity to have a legal basis for resistance in other areas where we have no other legal basis.

And as the President has pointed out to you, Mr. Prime Minister, we are undertaking never to use Article 4 against China without prior consultation with China.

I am not asking you to change your public position. I just want to make certain we understand the real position. We intend to use this in support of the objectives that Chairman Mao and I discussed yesterday.

Prime Minister Chou: But there is still one thing. Despite this treaty, do you think it is possible for you to prevent local aggression? That is, to stop a kind of local war.

Secretary Kissinger: Quite frankly, no. It depends on the local situation. But it will make it easier for us to resist in those areas where we do not have a formal treaty.

Prime Minister Chou: That is true.

Secretary Kissinger: For example, Mr. Prime Minister, during this alert we invoked this treaty. We said that if they sent troops to Egypt, that would be in violation of Article II of the Agreement on Prevention of Nuclear War. We showed our reply to leading Senators, and nobody objected to it.

Prime Minister Chou: And this, of course, proves the effectiveness of the relationship between the Soviet Union and your country on this point. And it also provides you with an opportunity to speak to the Congress to increase your defense budget, not decrease it, during the period of the crisis. But you could do the same without the Treaty. That was during the period of President Kennedy. At that time, of course, President Kennedy was not as courageous as President Nixon and perhaps he couldn’t sleep well.

Secretary Kissinger: Kennedy’s nerves were not always good.

Prime Minister Chou: And it was exactly at that time that Khrushchev was about to collapse. And Nehru was getting very cocky. He wanted to put us on the spot, and we tried to keep down his cockiness. Khrushchev supported him. So actually in history, both sides failed. Of course, I think without a treaty, things will be just the same as with the treaty. It is in a certain sense a factor.
Secretary Kissinger: We don’t need the treaty to increase the defense budget. We take action on our own. In the Caribbean, it is easier to take action alone than in countries further away. And the domestic situation was simpler in 1962 than in 1973.

Prime Minister Chou: Let me say it this way. If Arab space should ever be occupied by the Soviet Union, the whole strategic situation will be greatly changed, and I think your colleagues will understand. The West European countries, in that they fail to support you, they said you did not consult them beforehand. They then put the blame on you.

Secretary Kissinger: We don’t consult you beforehand, and you didn’t blame us.

Prime Minister Chou: If I do not tell this to Heath, perhaps Chairman Mao will do so, saying that we do not blame you.

Secretary Kissinger: I would appreciate it if you both would do so. It would be a very good experience for him.

Prime Minister Chou: He has done many good things, so you have to praise him first before you blame him.

Secretary Kissinger: Heath is the best of the European leaders, but he does not understand the importance of NATO as well as you, Mr. Prime Minister.

Prime Minister Chou: [Laughter] There is a Chinese saying. If you stand in the midst of the mountains, you wouldn’t be able to see the whole picture; if you look at the mountain from a distance away, you will be able to see it more clearly.

Secretary Kissinger: His talks here will be very helpful.

Prime Minister Chou: And I think it is necessary to talk to all those leaders who come from European countries. But you should not imagine that local wars will not arise.

Secretary Kissinger: I think it is very possible that they will occur. I have no illusions. I do not believe documents stop wars, although I may sometimes say so.

Prime Minister Chou: You can say this in a crisis, but you don’t say entirely to Congress in this way. But we are in different circumstances. We tend to speak in a more straightforward way than you do.

Secretary Kissinger: I think it is important that we understand each other. But I think it is quite helpful to have different points of view expressed. We should also ask our colleagues to understand that if we always agreed with each other publicly, it would make both of us too vulnerable.

Prime Minister Chou: That is true.

Now, about bilateral issues. Two points. One is about a fact that you mentioned earlier. Should we use wording of the Shanghai Communiqué to move the issue a little bit forward; and, of course, we have
worked hard on one sentence in the text, and you will examine it to see if it is useful or not.

Another point is that your press people expressed a desire for their representatives to be stationed here. There will be no difficulty on our part because there are so many correspondents here. And there will be no doubt that we would welcome the U.S. ones because we have correspondents from many major countries.

Secretary Kissinger: On a permanent basis?

Prime Minister Chou: Yes.

Secretary Kissinger: Shall we put that in the Communiqué? I was hoping to make an arrangement where you would take some newsmen and not give them an exit visa. [Laughter all around]

Prime Minister Chou: No, not in the Communiqué. But if we do it that way, they would go to Japan. But the difficulty lies in the fact that if we have our correspondents going to Washington, they will have to meet with situations where they meet with Chiang Kai-shek correspondents, at clubs and because there are so many press conferences. It took us a great deal of effort to keep Chiang Kai-shek correspondents away from United Nations and our Ambassadors presented many protests to the UN representatives. Now this issue has been settled in quite a forceful manner.

In the past three years, the number of correspondents coming to Peking is extremely big; not stationed here, that is, on a temporary basis. And the number of correspondents from Japan is the biggest. So I think we will have to work out a way to settle this issue. Our part is easy, but how to settle the Washington issue is up to you. Correspondents coming on a temporary basis would be no problem. This question journalists discuss because it concerns public opinion.

What do you think about this question?

Secretary Kissinger: I don’t have a good idea of how to exclude the Taiwan correspondents from press conferences and press groups since they are out of our control. We would, of course, be prepared to have your correspondents in Washington or any other place you want. That doesn’t solve your problem.

Prime Minister Chou: But the Japanese, they do not recognize the legal status of Taiwan correspondents there in Japan. Sometimes the Taiwan correspondents were present, but on formal occasions they were excluded.

Secretary Kissinger: I have given a great deal of thought to our conversation and to the comments the Chairman made on Taiwan, and as with all the things in my experience the Chairman says there were many layers of meaning.

Prime Minister Chou: That is true.
Secretary Kissinger: At least that was my impression. It was not a simple statement. And, therefore, I thought I should study his remarks for a brief time after I return and submit to you possible ideas. It would take account of your position but also some of the things he said in terms of your patience, etc. Because my first impression was that the Chairman’s remarks opened many possibilities which we would like to explore with you. Within a month we would make some tentative suggestions as to how this might develop. And maybe this evening we could exchange some preliminary thoughts on it.

Prime Minister Chou: Good.

Secretary Kissinger: And it is in this context the press question can be handled more easily.

Prime Minister Chou: The second question is about trade. About question of the assets, it was through a kindness on your part the idea that this question should be settled from a political viewpoint, and that is your President’s opinion. You gave us that document in March after your visit here in February.

And the second document which was given to us through the Paris channel was somewhat different from the first one, a slight difference.

Secretary Kissinger: Too many lawyers got into it. [Laughter]

Prime Minister Chou: And you said yesterday that out of the three questions, it is not necessary to discuss two of them. There is only one left to be discussed.

Secretary Kissinger: This is my impression. I mean, the other two I thought could be solved. I am not underestimating Mr. Hummel’s ability to make things complicated. [Laughter]

Prime Minister Chou: And you said you wouldn’t be able to recognize our title; it would not be able to be used in the memorandum.

Mr. Hummel: The use of the term “designated nationals.”

Secretary Kissinger: That is a different issue than the one I discussed with the Prime Minister. I raised with you the issue of third countries accounts.

Prime Minister Chou: The other two issues can be solved.

Secretary Kissinger: That’s my conviction.

Prime Minister Chou: What I mean is, since it is not necessary to discuss the question you accept the term “nationals of the People’s Republic of China.”

Mr. Hummel: [Gives explanation] The legal people have very strong views. Maybe we can get them to change their minds.

Secretary Kissinger: I am bringing in a new legal man in the State Department. I frankly have no opinion on this question. It is purely a legal question. We cannot do it in side letters? Outside this framework?
Prime Minister Chou: But the point here is we have our own term of describing and you have your term. And your term was adopted during the period you were hostile to our country, and if we adopt it, it would mean we think you are right in doing so. And you said several times since you have not recognized China. That is why you blocked our assets. This is also a legal question. Why should you not accept our term?

Secretary Kissinger: I have to be honest with you. I had not heard of this issue until two days ago. It seems to be one of those trivial things in a negotiation that gets settled politically.

Prime Minister Chou: With something that gets your concern.

Secretary Kissinger: I am personally not well enough acquainted to make a decision here. When I return, I will talk to our lawyers.

Prime Minister Chou: Try not to get too many technicians involved.

Secretary Kissinger: And I will talk to Mr. Hummel, and I will see if I can come up with some solution that meets your terms.

Prime Minister Chou: I agree. And the second point is what are we going to do with those bond indebtedness issued in the days when we still have not established diplomatic relations. Even if we had established diplomatic relations with you . . . How do you intend to settle the question of the bond indebtedness?

Secretary Kissinger: The U.S. Government will not legally support any claims connected with those bonds.

[Secretary Kissinger to Mr. Hummel: There is no need for the Chinese side to take a position.]

And we can possibly give you a letter expressing the practice in this matter and our intention.

Prime Minister Chou: You know it is said by your side that on the one hand the U.S. Government cannot support any claims about these bonds, but you say a judiciary man would have the right to ask for these claims.

Mr. Hummel: We have no right to block their claims. There could be attempts through the Bondsmen Protective Association. We hope it will be suitable to the PRC if we do not, as a government, approve or allow these claims, but we cannot prevent our citizens from making claims to the courts for this purpose.

Prime Minister Chou: To make such dealings, whom would they approach: since the bonds were issued by former governments, Chiang Kai-shek or the Ching Government which was non-existent?

Secretary Kissinger: Our judgment is that our courts would not support private claims for the reasons which the Prime Minister gave.

Prime Minister Chou: If they can approach and make representation with those former Chinese governments, to whom would they approach?
Secretary Kissinger: This is an important question. Since we don’t recognize the People’s Republic, how they can sue the People’s Republic is not clear. So they would have to sue Taiwan as the successor government.

Prime Minister Chou: There is also that question. If you gave money to Chiang Kai-shek, that is all right. If you gave loans, are we supposed to return the money? That is the question.

Secretary Kissinger: We are not now giving military aid to Taiwan. We do give Export-Import Bank loans, which are for commercial purposes.

Prime Minister Chou: Well, what are you going to do with the second question? Are you going to consult with your colleagues when you get back?

Secretary Kissinger: Of course, you could agree with Mr. Hummel’s point of view. There is a severe morale problem at this end of the table. I think both our negotiators are trying to prove how tough they are.

I don’t think the problem will get any easier. If you would like, if we can’t settle it here, I will study it immediately when I return. I will make a proposal which in my judgment will be the honest maximum of what we can do. The significance of this agreement is not the amount of money, which is ridiculous. We should prove that we can settle this so we can go on to more substantial things. Therefore, it should be done in a generous spirit so a year from now we won’t even remember what it was.

Within two weeks of my return, we will tell you in our best judgment if and to what extent we can modify our position.

Prime Minister Chou: The third point is concerning the sum of money which amounts to $17 million.

Secretary Kissinger: Yes.

Prime Minister Chou: This issue concerns 15 banks. One is Belgium, England, Switzerland, West Germany, Netherlands, Canada. Six. Starting from 1954 after we have established diplomatic relations with these countries, we issued special orders to return money blocked by the U.S. As early as the 1950s some of them have started to give back money to us. Of course, the main portion of the money was given to us during 1972. The Banque Belge gave back a sum of $10 million. This is the major portion. Was it that things should turn out this way? In the initial years after Liberation, it was our custom and our practice to deposit U.S. dollars in the banks, and in some cases we deposited money in the French banks in China. The bank I referred to now was a case in point. The Charter Bank of Britain also had their branch in Shanghai.

At that time we not only deposited our money in foreign banks in China but also in foreign banks abroad because we used U.S. dollars
in our transactions. Besides, it was a practice of those banks in their international relations they have to register money that was deposited in their banks in New York. Then, after the outbreak of the Korean War, after we sent Chinese volunteers, you blocked deposits in your own banks. (Further discussion of these events.) So perhaps you sent a notification to French banks about blocked Chinese deposits only in dollars. If we had deposited the money in francs, there would have been no problem. We acted in a clumsy way.

Secretary Kissinger: This would not have arisen. We think we need enough to justify our position to our Congress.

Prime Minister Chou: I just wanted to give you the origin.

Because at that time we were inexperienced. Later we changed our way of doing things. We started to deposit our money in other terms. (Further discussion.)

Secretary Kissinger: So I think our legal position . . .

Prime Minister Chou: The amount of money involved is very small.

Secretary Kissinger: $17 million.

Prime Minister Chou: Now we have already got much of this back. Starting from the 1950s we got money back. We have made a study of this question. (Further discussion.) I think there are two ways of doing this. We will return the money to you or to these banks. After you get back, study the legal questions of this matter because we don’t like these issues to be discussed with your Congress. It will be all right to give your . . .

Secretary Kissinger: Let me understand, Mr. Prime Minister. You are prepared to give us the money either through the banks or directly?

Prime Minister Chou: I am quite reluctant to give money back through the banks. They had the kindness to give it back to us, and it would not be right to ask them to give it to you.

Secretary Kissinger: You would give it to us. We have to find some way of accomplishing it. If the sum is available to pay off the private claims, and you avoid having to pay back through private banks, then it will not become an issue in the Congress. The terms of the settlement will have to be taken to Congress, but we do not have to discuss separately the sum of $17 million. The value of the $17 million is that it brings the total up to 40%. That is acceptable to Congress, 20% is not. We do not have to discuss how the 40% is arrived at.

Prime Minister Chou: The MFN issue is like this. If you must take up this matter do not discuss it with the Congress at the same time you discuss MFN with the Soviet Union. We are not in a hurry. We are not willing to have the two issues discussed together.

Secretary Kissinger: We will deal with it separately. We will not deal with it along with MFN status for the Soviet Union. What we are
asking for is the right to ask for MFN for everybody, not individual countries. And this will not help the Soviet Union to gain most favored nation status. The utility of this agreement is that it makes it easier. It helps the general climate. We discuss MFN with the PRC separately and in a different context than the Soviet Union.

We would present this to the Congress on its own merits without reference to MFN. And then we can discuss later the timing of MFN status.

Prime Minister Chou: Anyway, we don’t like to have this question together with the Soviet Union. We would rather have this issue settled not in a hurry.

Secretary Kissinger: We will not discuss MFN for you with our Congress, Mr. Prime Minister, until you personally tell us you want us to do it.

Prime Minister Chou: You have to have a document with the Congress first.

Secretary Kissinger: There are two ways. If we follow present procedure, we have to introduce a bill for each country. If we follow the procedure Congress is now discussing, the Administration will get general authorization to grant MFN to any country it decides is eligible under that bill. We have made no particular claim for the PRC. The only reason the Soviet Union has come up is that there have been so many amendments added. Once that authority is granted, then it is up to us to grant MFN. If it is not granted, then it is up to us to introduce separate bills for each country. That possibility still exists.

Prime Minister Chou: You know when you mentioned postponement of this question of the bill, was it the Soviet bill or . . .

Secretary Kissinger: The bill in general.

Prime Minister Chou: And the general bill would be adopted first?

Secretary Kissinger: It is possible that the bill will never be adopted. In that case, we still have the right to request MFN for individual countries. It is possible that the bill will be adopted with certain restrictions. It would then apply to you even though they are directed against the Soviet Union. For example, about emigration controls. We, therefore, cannot—in any event, we have to make no argument about the People’s Republic in gaining progress on the general bill.

Prime Minister Chou: If the general bill is adopted, it is not necessary to adopt a separate bill about our MFN?

Secretary Kissinger: That is correct.

Prime Minister Chou: Then if the general bill is not adopted, then a separate bill would have to be adopted?

Secretary Kissinger: Yes, that is correct.
Prime Minister Chou: And let’s come back to the question of money. We think it will be suitable only if we give back the money to you, but it will be difficult for our position to give back the money through the banks because the banks have already given it back to us. If we do it that way, it would mean we recognize the blocking of the funds, and we don’t want to settle the question in this way. We can discuss it later.

Secretary Kissinger: I am also certain that you can return the money directly to us. I think it would be absurd to have you return it through the banks so they might sue you or each other.

Prime Minister Chou: Yes. Because we would like to settle this issue from the standpoint of political issues.

Secretary Kissinger: I understand, Mr. Prime Minister, and that we should certainly be able to accommodate. Let us go back and consult with our legal people. There is no sense prolonging this. We will make one proposal and that will be the maximum we can make. I will do that within two weeks.

Prime Minister Chou: And on our side we are not in a hurry. We have a very great inferior balance in our trade. We would like to increase our exports to your country.

Secretary Kissinger: The major use of this agreement is to show major progress in our relationship. There is no economic need for it.

Prime Minister Chou: Yes, many politics will be involved.

Secretary Kissinger: I have two or three minor items, but we can do it later.

Prime Minister Chou: Please.

Secretary Kissinger: You asked about the F–5s. You have extremely good information about the radius but not with a full bomb load. It’s radius is only about 100 nautical miles.

Prime Minister Chou: What do you mean by full bomb load?

Secretary Kissinger: If it carries all the bombs. For ground support it is about a third of the regular bomb load. It can go 600 miles, but then it can carry only two bombs. It cannot carry both fuel tanks and a full bomb load. So it is not basically an offensive weapon.

Prime Minister Chou: What about the Bosporus Bridge? It was not built by the United States.

Secretary Kissinger: I have one humanitarian problem which does not directly concern the PRC. There are a number of American journalists who have disappeared in Cambodia.

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5 See Document 57.
6 See footnote 6, Document 57.
Prime Minister Chou: How many?

Secretary Kissinger: I have the total number here. I have all the details. Some are Japanese journalists. Eighteen journalists. I have taken the liberty of bringing material. All the information we have was given to me by a committee of American journalists who asked me if there were any way on a purely humanitarian basis if this could be given to Prince Sihanouk, or on any other basis, we would be very grateful. It is not a formal governmental request. It is a personal request.

Similarly, we are constantly being harassed about MIAs in China. We believe you, that you have given us a full account—but the families ask us if we have asked you the question. If you could at some point give us a statement, we could say that we have asked you. This does not in any way suggest that we have any question about your response. In fact, if we could say at a press conference that we have asked you and you have assured us that there are no missing in action, that would be sufficient.

Prime Minister Chou: We have been carrying on an investigation concerning MIAs, and up to now we haven’t found any in that area referred to—neither bodies left or information. There are several areas concerned—three areas. One is along the coast, another is quite near the land and still another is far at sea. You refer to the area which you would like us to search. So far we have found no bodies or information. The investigation is still going on. If we should be able to get more information, we will tell you. That is for when you hold a press conference.

Secretary Kissinger: May we say that you have made searches in the areas that we gave you, that you have found no bodies or information, but that the investigation is continuing and if any new information turns up, you will let us know?

Prime Minister Chou: The areas that you have defined are not very big. We have asked them to enlarge the areas for investigation.

Secretary Kissinger: We appreciate this very much, and we will answer in the press conference exactly as you have indicated.

May I suggest that the best way to handle the communiqué is after dinner? Or should they meet while we meet?

Prime Minister Chou: Let’s do it this way. After dinnertime, we will ask some persons from each side to discuss this matter while we discuss other matters, and after they discuss we can.

Secretary Kissinger: Could we have an English text? [Laughter all around.]

Oh, and then there are the Marines.

Prime Minister Chou: How about discussing the question of the Marines after dinner?

Secretary Kissinger: That is a good idea.
Beijing, November 13–14, 1973, 10 p.m.–12:30 a.m.

PARTICIPANTS

Chou En-lai, Premier of the State Council
T'ang Wen-sheng (Interpreter)
Mrs. Yang Yu-yung (Interpreter)
Stenographer
Secretary of State Henry A. Kissinger
Ambassador David Bruce
Commander Jonathan T. Howe, NSC Staff
Mrs. Wilma G. Hall, Notetaker

SUBJECT

Marines, Southeast Asia

Prime Minister Chou: There are a few other matters we should discuss. First, on the matter of the Marines. Do you have them everywhere in the world?

Secretary Kissinger: In every Embassy in every part of the world. I don’t know why it is—it is tradition. The concern our people have is if we remove them in one place, it will set up competition in another place. Then we have to find civilian guards and that’s more complex.

Prime Minister Chou: And in countries that used to be Socialist, do they wear uniforms?

Secretary Kissinger: They wear military uniforms, yes, although we don’t insist on their wearing uniforms.

Prime Minister Chou: On the other hand, do they send their military personnel with arms to your country?

Secretary Kissinger: No. What you have said is absolutely logical. What we have said is traditional. Logically you are absolutely right and if you insist, we would withdraw them without any hard feelings.

Prime Minister Chou: For instance, during Ambassador Bruce’s experience in Britain, Germany and France, did they not ask for any reciprocity?

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1 Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Kissinger Office Files, Box 96, Country Files, Far East, China Exchanges, November 1, 1973–March 31, 1974. Top Secret; Sensitive; Exclusively Eyes Only. The meeting took place at the Great Hall of the People. All brackets are in the original.

2 The Chinese Government expressed displeasure with the use of U.S. Marines to guard the U.S. Liaison Office in Beijing. Telegram 1297 from Beijing, November 1, suggested that their uniformed appearance offended Chinese observers. (Ibid., NSC Files, Box 527, Country Files, Far East, People’s Republic of China, Vol. 8, July 10–Dec 31, 1973)
Ambassador Bruce: In that sense, no.
Secretary Kissinger: But not as guards.
Ambassador Bruce: But our Marines do not wear uniforms. They did. [Ambassador Bruce gives explanation] I think the real difficulty, as I understand it, is that our 6 Marines make a recognizable unit. They are the elite of our military in their own opinion. They are the oldest service with a history that extends back some 198 years. With 400 people at the Soviet Embassy, some must be guards. But I don’t know who the guards are.

The other embassies have their guards too. They are probably KGB. They are not Soviet Marines or at least they are not recognizable to us as such.

Prime Minister Chou: The Soviet Embassy is probably less concerned with security than intelligence or KGB activities.
Ambassador Bruce: I think they probably are KGB guards. You are right.
Prime Minister Chou: And they don’t admit that they are such if you bring up the subject.
Secretary Kissinger: That’s the problem.
Prime Minister Chou: This is the first time I knew of the military being established in diplomatic missions throughout the world. 198 years being established throughout the world. Then when you establish diplomatic relations with a new country, you must notify them of this.
Secretary Kissinger: Yes. Our position has always been that the Embassy is extraterritorial and that we can put anyone in there we want as guards.
Prime Minister Chou: Does that mean that they do not openly make public that they are Marines in other countries?
Secretary Kissinger: In every other country I am familiar with, they wear their uniforms. Because of the concern you have expressed, they are not worn in China. But the guards in embassies all over the world I am familiar with have always been Marines.
Prime Minister Chou: They might not necessarily all be in military uniforms.
Secretary Kissinger: They wore their uniforms here on duty until July 4th.
Prime Minister Chou: They are internal? They don’t stand outside the gate?
Ambassador Bruce: We have a PLA at the gate. They wear their uniform only inside the building.
Prime Minister Chou: So that is something new to me.
Ambassador Bruce: One of their difficulties is they live in an apart-
ment and they put up a poster saying anyone that wants to join the
Marine Corps will have a perfectly wonderful life. [Laughter all
around] They got no recruits. [Laughter all around]

Prime Minister Chou: Then do all other countries agree to your
tradition?

Secretary Kissinger: I know of no exception. Uganda threw out our
Marines two days before everyone left.

Prime Minister Chou: I read about that in the papers.

Secretary Kissinger: But I don’t believe there is any other excep-
tion. It is an easily solved issue anyway.

Prime Minister Chou: Yes, it can be easily solved. First of all, they
would not contact others, that is, persons other than those of the Liai-
son Office, in the name of the Marines.

Ambassador Bruce: I have got to confess that these Marines are a
gay lot of people. There are six of them in one room. [Ambassador
Bruce tells about their dances and the fact that their female neighbors
appreciated it.] [Laughter all around]

[Secretary Kissinger aside to Cmdr. Howe: Can’t you square this
away with Zumwalt? We are not running a rest camp. They have just
got to be brought under control.]

Prime Minister Chou: There is some good from the study of his-
torical matters and traditions but on the other hand, the customs of a
sovereign country must be respected. We must try to find some and
settle between the two. For instance, we are not accustomed to such
matters. In other countries we have internal security but not the PLA.

Secretary Kissinger: I would hate to think what would happen in
Washington if members of the People’s Liberation Army showed up to
protect their office. So I have to say with regard to logic, you are ab-
solutely right.

Ambassador Bruce: [Tells about the fact that when the Marines
couldn’t wear their uniforms, they had to buy civilian clothes and DOD
wouldn’t pay for civilian clothes so they had a morale problem.]

Secretary Kissinger: We shouldn’t spend our time on this. If you
agree to let them stay and you tell us what you want us to do, we will
see what is possible. If those six can’t live without a dance floor, then we
will get six who can. So if you would tell us exactly what you want us
to do, then we can handle them. We will tell them what they can do.

Prime Minister Chou: The first thing we believe is that it would
be best if they do not wear military uniforms. We do not care if they
switch out of civilian clothes in their bedroom. But when they come
out, we do not wish to see them in uniforms. As for their weapons,
they will need them only for internal security purposes. I hope they
will not carry them on the streets or outside the Liaison Office. We do not care if they are not Marines. We would show no preference as to whatever persons you would like to pick. Indeed, we do think it would be quite sensational if the People’s Liberation Army would appear in Washington. [Laughter all around]

Secretary Kissinger: It might even take some attention away from Watergate.

Prime Minister Chou: It might also be interesting to put some of our Red Guards in Washington. Perhaps your long-haired youth would pay visits to them. We think that at the early stage of having established Liaison Offices (our goal) is to work in a harmonious way and not create trouble for each other.

**Southeast Asia**

Secretary Kissinger: I have one point I just wanted to mention. I think a major offensive in Vietnam would be against everyone’s interest, especially if it were done with weapons provided massively from outside. We are certainly using our influence with our friends to maintain restraint.

Prime Minister Chou: With regard to this issue, recently we have received two documents from Vietnam and we have not yet released them. One reason is your presence in Peking. They have made clear in those documents that the provocations are not from them but from Thieu. They have no intention of launching a major offensive now. I have discussed this matter with Le Duan, Pham Van Dong, General Giap and also . . .

Secretary Kissinger: He is my new colleague, although I know Le Duc Tho better.

Prime Minister Chou: And they have all assured me they have no desire to launch a major offensive now. They are sending certain materials southward but that is only for building a road. Some of our people have been south of the 17th parallel in Quang Tri Province and they have seen there that it has been leveled by bombing. They have had to begin from scratch. We accredited our Ambassador to them and he stayed there to present his credentials. They lived in tents. And they are mainly concentrating on building up their production. We not long ago sent a ship with feed grains. They (GVN) attacked it saying that it was filled with military equipment. Actually it was food grains.

Secretary Kissinger: We have no objection to civilian equipment but when it is transported in tanks, we get worried. We are not talking about China.

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3 The name did not sound like Nguyen Duy Trinh but it probably was. [Footnote in the original.]
Prime Minister Chou: We heard that Thieu mentioned 500 tanks and 500 guns from major sides. I asked our friends about this and they said it could not possibly be true. From here I can hear our Cambodian friends complain that they are not receiving enough military support from North Vietnam.

Secretary Kissinger: That has other reasons.

Prime Minister Chou: But according to our account, it is extremely meager. You can hear Sihanouk on this issue.

T'ang Wen-sheng: You left the material you wanted to give the Premier about correspondents in Cambodia on the conference table in the Guest House.4

Secretary Kissinger: I intended that.

T'ang Wen-sheng: Mr. Lord said that and the Premier picked it up.

Prime Minister Chou: From what we know, they have no such intentions.

Secretary Kissinger: We are prepared to help the North in rehabilitation. However much military equipment there is in the North, it is a fair amount. If the North does not get a major amount of military equipment from outside, then it can’t start a major attack.

Prime Minister Chou: That is true. But to our knowledge small frictions have never ceased.

Secretary Kissinger: That is true and that is inevitable.

Prime Minister Chou: Thieu has concentrated all the people in villages. So the population has become very concentrated in small areas without enough land. There is a lack of food. I think it would be impossible for you to provide them the amount of food grains. The population there has always worked for peace so they could return and till the land. And that is where the contradiction arises. And that is where the friction often comes from because the National Liberation Forces want to make it possible for the people to go back to their homelands and till their lands. Thieu is fearful of this and it often results in minor conflicts.

Secretary Kissinger: Minor conflicts are inevitable and we would not involve ourselves in them. If it was a problem like 1972, it would present a problem for us and we would engage ourselves.

Prime Minister Chou: There have been several major conflicts. Like in 1968, 1970, and then February 1971, Route 9 in Laos. There were two

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4 Material on journalists missing in Cambodia was included in a checklist from Kissinger’s trip. (National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Kissinger Office Files, Box 100, Country Files, Far East, Kissinger Trip to Peking—Papers, November 1973)
offensives in 1968. One was Tet and one was that summer. Then in February 1971 there was Route 9 in Laos. And then in 1972, it was on a larger scale south of the 17th parallel and into the four areas.

[Secretary Kissinger to Cmdr. Howe: What’s the name of that place that was besieged?]

[Commander Howe: An Loc.]

Secretary Kissinger: The South Vietnamese had the most incompetent General in military history in charge of that. In four months of fighting, there were four divisions against one brigade, yet he could not move 10 miles to relieve them.

Prime Minister Chou: You mean the General in charge of An Loc?

Secretary Kissinger: The General in charge south of An Loc.

Prime Minister Chou: He wasn’t able to contact them?

Secretary Kissinger: He never made it, no. But he drew beautiful maps with arrows.

Prime Minister Chou: In my opinion, I do not believe there will be major fighting in Vietnam because their views are different from those they held before the ceasefire.

Secretary Kissinger: That would be a serious matter.

Prime Minister Chou: Because you mentioned an evolution we had discussed.

Secretary Kissinger: Yes, but that requires some time.

Prime Minister Chou: It will take several years.

Secretary Kissinger: Yes.

Prime Minister Chou: And exactly what the outcome will be will depend on themselves and also on the political settlement. We think it would be good if there was a political settlement.

Secretary Kissinger: We agree.

Prime Minister Chou: There does not seem to be any major fighting in Cambodia. We think it would be best for you to let go of that area.

Secretary Kissinger: If there is no major fighting, we will not interfere.

Prime Minister Chou: You have no treaty obligations to Lon Nol as you have with Thieu and the military dictatorship in Bangkok has undergone changes but they won’t be of very major portions. It would be relatively better if that area could be one of peace and neutrality.

Secretary Kissinger: I will speak frankly. Our major problem with Cambodia is that the opponents of President Nixon want to use it as an example of the bankruptcy of his whole policy. So if there is a very rapid collapse, it will be reflected in our other policies. That frankly is our only concern.
Prime Minister Chou: Why is it that Senator Mansfield is in favor of letting loose and allowing Sihanouk to return?

Secretary Kissinger: Senator Mansfield is first of all an isolationist in the classical tradition. He is a true isolationist from the Middle West. Secondly, he has a sentimental attachment to Prince Sihanouk which is not related to reality and not reciprocated in any way. Because I think the Prince is a very shrewd calculator.

[Secretary Kissinger to Cmdr. Howe: See if they want to have a leadership meeting about my trip next week. Ask Scowcroft tonight.]

Prime Minister Chou: And because we also know of it. It is futile to do as he has. Because he also knows you will not meet him, he spoke very loudly at the Non-Aligned Nations Conference. He abused not only you but me.

Secretary Kissinger: We are not opposed to Prince Sihanouk’s return.

Prime Minister Chou: But they do not wish to do it that way. The only thing I wish to bring to your attention is that the Soviet Union wants to have a hand in that pie.

Secretary Kissinger: Not with our cooperation.

Prime Minister Chou: They might try to do it with the French. Thank you for bringing his mother here. It was a humanitarian effort.

Secretary Kissinger: That was only the right thing to do.

Prime Minister Chou: And when you were very enthusiastically discussing this matter with Lon Nol, your chargé d’affaires discussed it with Lon Nol and the Commission and said that to enable the Queen to come to China, you might be able to provide the plane and medical personnel. But the French doctors who had been treating her for so long were so emotionally disturbed that they were on the verge of tears. Your chargé understood the situation and let the French do it.

Secretary Kissinger: We finally got our chargé under control. It was the first constructive thing he had been able to do in a year. So he is very grateful to you for giving him this opportunity.

Prime Minister Chou: Because the French were thinking, after having taken care of her for one whole year, you were just brushing them aside.

What do you now think of the situation in Bangkok?

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5 On October 26, the Department of State informed the Embassy in Saigon that Queen Kossamak Nearineak would be flown from Phnom Penh to Beijing, where her son, Prince Sihanouk, was currently residing. (Telegram 211294; National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy Files)
Secretary Kissinger: Thailand will move to a more neutralist position slowly and carefully. I don’t know whether the Prime Minister is aware that the Indians are very interested in Thailand.

Prime Minister Chou: And the Soviet Union.

Secretary Kissinger: Yes, but they want to offer a friendship treaty, the same as they have with the Soviet Union. The Indians have told us they would do it and the Thais have asked our opinion.

Prime Minister Chou: Are you familiar with the new Prime Minister?

Secretary Kissinger: I frankly have never heard of him. I frankly think he will be a transitional figure.

Prime Minister Chou: The King probably trusts him.

Secretary Kissinger: Yes.

Prime Minister Chou: Their Vice Premier and the son of the Premier went together to Taiwan to try to get help from Chiang Kai-shek.

Secretary Kissinger: I know Thanom very well. He is not anti-Chinese.

Prime Minister Chou: Slightly, but this only meant that he would not engage in trade with China.

Secretary Kissinger: The Thais are afraid of China in general because of their population.

Prime Minister Chou: It is the conservative nature of those Chinese. And when the Australian Prime Minister came, he discussed with me the Southeast Asian countries and their establishing relations with China. We discussed if it would be possible to establish relations with Singapore. I wonder if a communiqué or public declaration that none of those Singapore citizens would maintain dual citizenship might set him at ease.

Secretary Kissinger: Would you like me to discuss this with Lee Kuan Yew? I think he takes me more seriously than he does Whitlam.

Prime Minister Chou: That is, we would be willing to establish relations in a pattern which would set other countries at ease because a large percentage of the Singapore population is Chinese.

Secretary Kissinger: I will talk to him.

Prime Minister Chou: And Singapore being a free port, we think it would be better for them to maintain a neutral problem. The Soviet Union is casting a covetous eye on them.

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6 Gough Whitlam visited the People’s Republic of China from October 31 to November 4.
Secretary Kissinger: Lee Kuan Yew is primarily worried about the organization of Communist groups.

Prime Minister Chou: To my knowledge there is none there. There are perhaps some leftists but to my knowledge there are no Communist parties in Singapore.

Secretary Kissinger: But he is not against the People’s Republic. He is afraid you will engage in subversive activities there.

Prime Minister Chou: We are not going to subvert them. We haven’t even subverted Hongkong. Why would we go there. Why give up Hongkong at our door step to go so far. Hongkong has 4 million while Singapore has slightly over one and a half million.

Secretary Kissinger: I will send a letter to Lee Kuan Yew.

Prime Minister Chou: He has not been so bad to us. There is a branch of the bank of China there.

Secretary Kissinger: He is not against you. I know him very well. He is one of the few leaders with whom it is worth talking. Aside from his having power, he has a great understanding of England.

Prime Minister Chou: He is a very eloquent speaker. I believe he was trained by McDonald.

Secretary Kissinger: He was at the London School of Economics.

Prime Minister Chou: Because McDonald had been Governor General of Singapore.

Secretary Kissinger: He always comes to Harvard once every two years.

Prime Minister Chou: You mean the son of Ramsey McDonald?

 Secretary Kissinger: Lee Kuan Yew comes to Harvard and shocks my liberal colleagues by calling them fools. They are not used to Socialists calling them that.

[Note: At 12:30 a.m. on November 14, the meeting adjourned for about 30 minutes and then resumed with additional participants to discuss the communiqué.]

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7 Chou and Kissinger met until 2:20 a.m. to finalize the communiqué. (National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Kissinger Office Files, Box 100, Country Files, Far East, Secretary Kissinger’s Conversations in Peking, November 1973) The final text of the Joint Communiqué is printed in Department of State Bulletin, December 10, 1973, pp. 716–717.
Beijing, November 14, 1973, 7:35–8:25 a.m.

PARTICIPANTS
Prime Minister Chou En-lai
T’ang Wen-sheng, Interpreter
Secretary of State, Henry A. Kissinger
Commander Jonathan T. Howe, NSC Staff
Mrs. Bonnie Andrews, Notetaker

SUBJECT
Japan, Congress, Pakistan

Prime Minister Chou: I wish to discuss with you our assessment of Japan. You mentioned two probable alternatives. There is a third alternative because they are under your nuclear umbrella and they have a very clear conception. And when you arrive on Japanese soil you will see that without the American umbrella, you will see what state they would be in. Then they would be under a different nuclear umbrella. I think that is a tendency that both of us should try to deviate. And the more farsighted statesmen of Japan must see the danger.

Of course, we don’t think it would be possible for you to tell them all of your own plans with regard to your nuclear umbrella over Japan. You have a defense treaty with them and you can’t tell them all the details but we feel you can come very close to them. Because at the present they cannot leave your nuclear umbrella or your energy resources. And to them their needs are not confined to energy but to all resources of their economy. Their main shortcoming is that some of their statesmen tend to be shortsighted, but I believe that in the turmoil of the world persons of great stature will gradually emerge. You have also included them in the economic aspect of the new Atlantic Charter. That will reassure them. They will meet with new difficulties and they have various odd notions.

Secretary Kissinger: They specialize in that.

Prime Minister Chou: You cannot ask too much out of consideration of their foundations. If the foundations are comparatively shallow,
then you must have imagination and also when you have such hodgepodge public opinion. They are perhaps not second to us. (To you.)

Secretary Kissinger: Their public opinion is even more complex than ours and their government has even less freedom of action. In foreign affairs our government has greater possibility for action.

Prime Minister Chou: Although Congressional action has limited your President to war only 60 days, it would be temporary.

Secretary Kissinger: Yes. And in practice, it will not make much difference, because what will they do if we go into a war?

Prime Minister Chou: But you would have to report that to them.

Secretary Kissinger: Yes, but you can’t hide a war.

Prime Minister Chou: Some of your measures do not seem too scientific.

Secretary Kissinger: Once we are in a war, they cannot stop us.

They could have always stopped us in Vietnam by withholding appropriations. But while they made unbelievable amounts of noise, they voted the appropriations each year.

Prime Minister Chou: That is the result of your constitutional system because various members wanted to make their views known to their constituents.

Secretary Kissinger: You saw Senator Magnuson. 3

Prime Minister Chou: And this time the second visit of Senator Mansfield has been postponed. When there is a good time you might reconsider and tell us the result. We will also determine when the appropriate time would be. We don’t think it would be good to have it put off indefinitely.

Secretary Kissinger: I agree. We don’t have any objections to Mansfield.

Prime Minister Chou: And Senator Jackson.

Secretary Kissinger: Jackson will be quite an experience. I meant, it would be helpful.

Prime Minister Chou: He is a Republican?

Secretary Kissinger: No, he is a Democrat. If I may make a suggestion as a friend about Senator Jackson. He is a friend of mine. You will find that he agrees with you completely about the Soviet Union but he has enemies in America who are more pro-Soviet but who are not against you. So, he should be handled in a way that when he comes back from here he doesn’t take such an extreme position that he alienates men like Senator Fulbright whom we need and who is his enemy.

3 See footnote 3, Document 41 and footnote 7, Document 43.
Prime Minister Chou: [Laughs questioningly] Oh?

Secretary Kissinger: It is a complex situation, but I think he should come.

Prime Minister Chou: Another issue would be that of South Asia which the Chairman mentioned to you the other night. And that is that we will be in great favor of your assisting Pakistan and building a naval port in Pakistan. Of course, that would take time but it would be a significant step. And as you told us, and as Prime Minister Bhutto and other Pakistani friends have mentioned, you are also considering how to assist them in military ways. We cannot help them much because our arms are lightweight. We have small arms but not heavy arms. You have heavy arms. The Soviet Union is always wanting to break through that knot. In South Asia it would be through India/Pakistan. And in the Middle East—it would be Iraq. And we can see that at present their greatest ambitions are there and to link the chain.

Secretary Kissinger: We have a tough time with our Congress on Pakistan—and their attitude is ridiculous. You should talk to Senator Mansfield when he comes.

Prime Minister Chou: They are probably favorable toward India.

Secretary Kissinger: Yes.

Prime Minister Chou: Perhaps it is the national character of the Americans to be taken in by those who seem kind and mild.

Secretary Kissinger: Yes.

Prime Minister Chou: But the world is not so simple.

Secretary Kissinger: On Senator Mansfield. If he comes, I might perhaps offer another thought. And we know it is difficult for him not to see Prince Sihanouk but it could help us if he does not receive too much ammunition from the Chinese side on Cambodia.

Prime Minister Chou: We understand. Perhaps he is partial on certain matters.

Secretary Kissinger: Right, he is singleminded.

Prime Minister Chou: But as a man, he is quite honorable.

Secretary Kissinger: Yes, he is a fine and decent man.

Prime Minister Chou: And when he feels that your President is correct or when you are able to convince him, he is not obstinate. Perhaps you now, as Secretary of State, can play that role. Because you will now meet with Congress.

Secretary Kissinger: Yes and now I am doing that systematically. And as the Prime Minister may have noted, many Congressmen have made favorable comments supporting our foreign policy since I became Secretary of State. And when I return, I will meet with four Congressional Committees and with the leaders.
Prime Minister Chou: We wish you success and also success to the President.
Secretary Kissinger: Thank you and thank you for the reception we have received as always.
Prime Minister Chou: It is what you deserve. And once the course has been set, as in 1971, we will persevere in the course.
Secretary Kissinger: So will we.
Prime Minister Chou: That is why we use the term farsightedness to describe your meeting with the Chairman.
Secretary Kissinger: We maneuver more than you but we will get in the same direction.
Prime Minister Chou: That is dialectic but we understand. Perhaps you need to maneuver. We want to be more straightforward.
Secretary Kissinger: We don’t complain. On the release time on the communiqué, would 10:00 Japan time in the evening be convenient?
Prime Minister Chou: It is most convenient.
Secretary Kissinger: We will adjourn then.
Prime Minister Chou: Please convey our regards to your President and his wife.

The meeting adjourned at 8:25 a.m. As the Prime Minister was leaving, the following exchange took place:
Prime Minister Chou: Give my regards to Prime Minister Tanaka and Foreign Minister Ohira.
Secretary Kissinger: Can I?
Prime Minister Chou: Yes, of course. That is why I mentioned it.
Secretary Kissinger: I will do so.

62. Memorandum From the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger) to President Nixon


SUBJECT
My Visit to China

1 Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Kissinger Office Files, Box 96, Country Files, Far East, China Exchanges, November 1, 1973–March 31, 1974. Top Secret; Sensitive; Exclusively Eyes Only.
Overview

The four-day visit to the People’s Republic of China was a positive success on all planes. The two and three-quarter hour session with Chairman Mao (the fact that it was the longest session with a foreign official in recent years is of itself very significant); fourteen hours of private meetings and several more of informal conversation with Prime Minister Chou; additional talks with Vice Minister Chiao Kuan-hua on sightseeing tours; and six hours of counterpart meetings on technical bilateral issues added up to the following:

—Confirmation and deepening of the close identity between you and the Chinese leaders’ strategic perspectives on the international situation. As I pointed out after my February 1973 trip, we have become tacit allies. We share essentially the same views about the Soviet strategy (though the Chinese are firmly convinced of Soviet hegemonial ambitions while we still hold out the possibility that our combination of firmness and negotiation can steer Moscow on a constructive course); the necessity of a strong American world role and defense capability; and the strategic importance of Europe, Japan, the Middle East, and the Near East–South Asia axis.

—A positive joint communiqué that expands our existing bilateral relationship and establishes the framework for further forward movement. The key element in the document—is the breakthrough proposed by Chou on Taiwan that requires only that the “principle” of one China be respected as we normalize relations. We now have to explore how to give concrete expression to this concept which could provide an opening for maintaining a substantial bilateral tie with Taiwan as and when we establish diplomatic relations with the PRC.

—Clear statements by Mao and Chou of support for your firm diplomacy and their strong hope that you will surmount domestic difficulties. They were scathing in their criticism both of the neoisolationists in the United States and those whom they consider are exaggerating and exploiting Watergate to attack you.

—Recognition by the Chinese of your position that a military flareup in Indochina will have adverse effects on our mutual interests. Chou strongly suggested that they have throttled way down their assistance to North Vietnam and Cambodia. He stated that there would be no major offensive in South Vietnam in the near term. On Cambodia, the Chinese seemed content to let the parties further exhaust themselves on the battlefield to get into a negotiating mood; he did not pick up my offer to listen to their (or Sihanouk’s) ideas on a settlement.

2 See Documents 17 and 18.
3 See footnote 7, Document 60.
—A continuing warm reception for our party, including truly major coverage of our activities in the Chinese press.

Progress with Some Caveats

These elements constitute substantial forward progress. The driving force on the Chinese side remains their preoccupation with the Soviet Union which infuses their discussion of every major international issue. Their crucial calculation is the steadiness and strength of America as a counterweight.4 In this regard your strong handling of the Middle East, particularly the alert,—Chou called you more courageous than President Kennedy as a leader—was an ideal prelude to my visit.5 It served the same purpose that your policy during the 1971 Indian subcontinent [crisis] did in the period between my first trip and your summit conversations.

Your strong policies, the Chinese concerns about encirclement, our developing mutual trust and reliability the past few years, our profound exchanges at the highest levels have all combined to move us forward at a steady pace. In addition, the two major obstacles to improvement in relations have been eased: last January’s Vietnam settlement all but removed Indochina as an impediment, though Cambodia is a lingering problem; and the Chinese continue to show patience on Taiwan and may have supplied us with a breakthrough on this trip with their one China principle formula in the communiqué.

We cannot by any means be complacent about our relationship, however. The following caveats are in order:

—The Sino-Soviet Split. We have been in probably the ideal situation with regard to the two communist giants: they both want and need to deal with us because they cannot deal with one another. We are walking a delicate tightrope of public détente with Moscow and tacit alliance with Peking. This will continue to require the most careful handling. The meticulous care and feeding of the Chinese on our Soviet policy has paid off, but Peking sees our détente pursuit as at least objectively threatening its security, whatever our motives. And even if we don’t make mistakes, events beyond our control could turn one or the other against us or propel them toward each other.

4 Nixon underlined this sentence and in the margin next to it wrote, “K—the key.”

5 On a memorandum summarizing two of Kissinger’s meetings with Zhou Enlai, Nixon underlined and put an exclamation mark next to the following statement about Zhou’s reaction to the U.S. nuclear alert during the 1973 Mideast crisis: “He again praised your alert, saying that you were more courageous than Kennedy.” (Memorandum from Scowcroft to Nixon, November 13; National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Kissinger Office Files, Box 96, Country Files, Far East, China Exchanges, November 1, 1973–March 31, 1974) The memorandum of conversation containing Zhou’s original statement is printed as Document 59.
—The U.S. Domestic Scene. Our domestic situation clearly troubles the Chinese. For the short term they are worried about the attacks on you and hope you will overcome them. More fundamentally, they are wary of our domestic and Congressional mood which they see potentially leading to American disengagement from the world. Once they become convinced that we cannot or will not act as a major force on a global scale, we will lose our principal value to them. In this case, Taiwan and other bilateral pursuits notwithstanding, they would be likely to explore other alternatives.

—The Chinese Leadership Succession. Mao and Chou both looked well and demonstrated their usual mental prowess (Mao more than ever). But they are old, and there appears in any event to be some domestic challenge to them, though probably mostly on domestic issues. We just don’t know much about their politics—nor does any other outside country. We have no idea who will succeed the present leadership or what their foreign policy tendencies will be. The one element we can be certain of is that they will not be as far-sighted or as sophisticated as Mao and Chou, who may well be the most impressive twosome in history. A worrisome aspect is the fact that on all our trips we have dealt with a restricted circle of Chou and his lieutenants. We have had virtually no contact with other elements of the political leadership, such as the Shanghai radicals. Since a reasonable case can be made for accommodation with Moscow or some other option than their present course, we have no assurance that the PRC will continue its policy toward us when Mao and Chou depart. This puts a premium on solidifying our relationship while the current leadership is directing their policy.

The Joint Communiqué

As I have already reported, the communiqué we issued is a positive document and contains a possible breakthrough on the fundamental question of Taiwan.

The Shanghai Communiqué established a framework and principles for our relationship. Since your trip we have given these concrete expressions. This communiqué further accelerates momentum in these areas:

—It expands the principle of opposing hegemony from the Asia-Pacific region to “any other part of the world.” This reflects our parallel strategic interests and sends some clear, though sufficiently muted signals to Moscow.

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—We have extended the process of consultation “to maintain frequent contact at authoritative levels” and “to engage in concrete consultations”. In addition to suggesting closer collaboration in general, it balances off somewhat our consultation procedures with the Russians under the Agreement to Prevent Nuclear War.

—We have agreed to expand “the scope of the functions of the Liaison Offices”. This will result in larger missions performing wider tasks. They are becoming embassies in all but name.

—We will work for the further development of trade. This has already reached the level of some $900 million in exports to the PRC (and less than $100 million Chinese exports to us). We made major progress on the principal technical issues which should expand trade further.

—We have arranged “a number of new exchanges for the coming year.” This program is important both substantively in promoting mutual knowledge and awareness, and symbolically in highlighting the progress of our relations.

In addition, Chou tabled language that provides the framework for the central bilateral problem in the coming period, Taiwan: “... normalization of relations between China and the United States can be realized only on the basis of confirming the principle of one China.” This suggests that we might be able to continue a substantial relationship with Taiwan when we establish diplomatic relations with Peking so long as we maintain the “principle” of one China. They may be willing to settle for considerable autonomy for Taiwan and continuing U.S. ties so long as the nominal juridical framework reflects the one China approach. Our task now is to come up with some formulas that can begin to move toward this goal. They are clearly ready to hear from us; I said that we would get back to them within a few weeks.

Thus once again the Chinese have demonstrated their patience and shrewdness with respect to this delicate issue. Just as the Shanghai Communiqué formula allowed us to launch our bilateral relationship so may this one allow us to proceed eventually to diplomatic relations while continuing close ties (as yet undefined) with Taiwan.

More generally, this communiqué follows the pattern of previous ones by fleshing out the framework already established and shaping a fresh framework for the next stage.

The Meeting with Mao

I have already sent you the highlights of this extraordinary session. The Chairman looked much healthier and thinner than last February when in turn he looked much better than during your trip. (It is

7 In the margin next to this and the previous sentences, Nixon wrote: “K—very significant.”
now clear in retrospect that he was quite ill when you saw him.) He moved and walked unaided and used his hands continuously and expressively as he talked in his slow, low, gravelly tones.

Mentally he was extremely impressive, improving his previous performances. He led the conversation, covered all major international issues with subtlety and incisiveness and an unerring knack at striking the essential chords in a seemingly casual way. By the time he was finished he had sketched their strategic vision comprehensively and laid down the essential elements of their policies region by region. He went from issue to issue in an ostensibly random, but always purposeful, manner. And all of this was done without a single note of his own or prompting by Chou, who once again was clearly deferential in his presence.

The Chairman obviously enjoyed himself. Throughout he employed his earthy phrasing and bawdy humor to illustrate a point or color a tone; the females present laughed easily, almost coquettishly and were again at ease in his presence. After the conversation had gone beyond one and three quarters hours, several on the Chinese side looked at their watches and made tentative moves to close out the meeting, but Mao prolonged the talk and toward the end engaged in exchanges on philosophy.

Indeed one of the striking aspects of the visit was the fact that this time Mao presented the bulk of the Chinese positions while Chou generally stuck to details and asking questions and making comments on our positions. Before, Chou had taken his cue from Mao but made extensive substantive presentations of his own.

The Chairman was vigorously supportive of you as I have reported. He praised your strong policies, singling out the recent alert and Middle East policy generally. He found your actions much firmer and steadier than the Cuban missile crisis scenario.

He discussed the Watergate events in bawdy fashion, calling it no more than a breaking of wind (the interpreter had amusing difficulty).\(^8\) He considered the incident meagre, yet much chaos was being made of it and “we are not happy about it.” He pointed out that other domestic policies, especially economic, were going well. I assured him you would surmount your current troubles and explained the domestic political tides.

Mao was also concerned in general about trends in America toward disengagement. He asked me if we would revert to isolationism if the Democrats took office. I said that many (not all) of them would want to move in that direction but objective reality would prevent them at some point; the problem was how much damage would already have

\(^8\) Nixon underlined most of this sentence.
taken place before they checked this trend. On the whole I thought that future Administrations would have to pursue the same general course, though perhaps in less complex fashion than your tactics. I emphasized that in any event these concerns pointed up the need to solidify U.S.-Chinese relations now so there would be no alternative for successors.

The world wide preoccupation with the Soviet Union once again dominated his conversation. Almost every subject was linked to this theme. He painted the global Soviet threat and recounted how he had contemptuously rejected their offers, direct and through emissaries, for improved relations. I rehearsed our own, less direct policy with Moscow. The Chinese still remain somewhat suspicious of our approach, especially of the objective dangers of false détente; the Chairman compared our policy to shadow-boxing in contrast to their more straightforward opposition. I also acknowledged that the Soviet threat to China seemed to have increased since my last visit. I repeated our opposition to these pressures and the dangers we saw in a Soviet attack. He made clear that they didn’t want a war but were prepared if necessary.

Indeed, Mao seemed basically optimistic about containing the Soviet Union, citing his familiar axis of potential or tacit allies in China, Japan, the United States, Europe and the Near East–South Asia axis. He again stressed the importance of our working closely with these countries—maintaining close ties with Japan; keeping our military presence in Europe; and countering Soviet influence in the Middle East (as we were now doing), Pakistan, Iran, India, the Persian Gulf and the Indian Ocean. I outlined our efforts to support these various countries; offset Soviet influence; maintain a strong national defense; keep forces in Europe; anchor Japan securely, etc.

We discussed several specific countries. He was very worried about Soviet influence in the radical Arab states, especially Iraq. He applauded your efforts to increase our influence in the region. He criticized their Chief of their Liaison Office in Washington for his recent lecture to me on the Middle East which rehearsed their standard pro-Arab line. The Chairman made clear that Ambassador Huang should have comprehended the more important U.S.-Soviet strategic aspect of the regional conflict.9

Mao was both patient and somewhat inscrutable on Taiwan and diplomatic relations. He said that the Taiwan issue “is not an important one; the issue of the overall international situation (i.e., the Soviet Union) is an important one.” The PRC would not rush us on this question or that of diplomatic relations, he stated. After all, their relations

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9 Nixon highlighted the last two sentences of this paragraph, and wrote and underscored, “Note.”
with us were better than those with countries like the USSR and India, with whom they have diplomatic ties; the Liaison Offices “could do.” But Mao also made some elusive references (including on maintaining ties with the Soviet Baltic states) that suggested flexibility to allow us to move more rapidly. I followed up for clarification with Chou, and we emerged with the language in the Communiqué.

Mao strongly suggested that they would not use force against Taiwan, pointing to their restraint on Macao and Hong Kong. He didn’t believe in peaceful transition with the counter-revolutionaries, but Peking could wait 600 years to absorb the small island. In any event the question of relations with us should be separated from this issue and shouldn’t take so long.

I will shortly send you the full transcript of this remarkable conversation.

Meetings with Chou

I have already given you the highlights of my conversation with Chou. They were stimulating, and he was impressive as always, but his role was considerably more subordinate to Mao’s this trip. As I have indicated in earlier reports, our first meeting was taken up largely by my presentation of our position on major international issues, with Chou commenting and probing. The second session was largely a holding action of questions from him while they prepared for my meeting with the Chairman. And the meetings on the final day largely consisted of his elaborations of Mao’s basic lines; sensitive exchanges about the strategic international scene; discussion of bilateral matters, including trade; and negotiation of the communiqué.

Following are the major points that emerged from these sessions:

—He strongly praised your Middle East policy and our growing dialogue with the Arabs. He indicated he had been helpful with Egypt. He suggested we talk directly to Syria; was suspicious of Iraq; urged inclusion of the Palestinians in the negotiations; and shared our positive view of the Shah. On the alert he compared you favorably with President Kennedy and suggested the incident gave us a chance to increase our defense budget.

—On Vietnam, Chou said that the North Vietnamese leaders have assured him they have no desire of launching a major offensive. He claimed the material moving south was for rebuilding roads and building up production. From what the Chinese know, Hanoi has no intention of launching a major attack. He alluded to the gradual political evolution that I

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10 Memoranda from Scowcroft to Nixon containing highlights of Kissinger’s meetings with Zhou are in National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Kissinger Office Files, Box 96, Country Files, Far East, China Exchanges, November 1, 1973–March 31, 1974.
had told him on previous visits we could live with. I underlined the dangers of a North Vietnamese offensive.

—Chou declared that their friends in Cambodia were complaining about lack of military support from Hanoi which according to him is “extremely meagre.” He didn’t foresee major fighting in Cambodia; favored a political settlement; and thought the area should be peaceful and neutral. He also indicated opposition to Sihanouk’s return and a Soviet desire to have their “hand in the pie.”

—Chou pointed to vigorous efforts by Moscow to the south of China. He urged support of Pakistan and approved our building a port there. I reaffirmed our policies and said that we were also trying gradually to improve relations with New Delhi to counter Soviet influence there.

—Discussion on Korea was restricted to the ongoing discussions in the United Nations. The Chinese had just given us a satisfactory compromise solution in New York and needed time to line up their allies. I agreed that we would work closely with them on timing so long as they stuck by their substantive position.

—He thought we should come closer to Japan on defense matters (i.e., the nuclear umbrella) and indicated he agreed that it was preferable for us to join the Japanese in Siberian development than to leave them alone. I emphasized the importance of keeping the Japanese tied to us and not subjected to too many pressures.

—Chou criticized Allende’s rashness in Chile and Che Guevara’s adventurism. In response to my comments, he in effect said that the PRC would not cause trouble in Latin America.

—I went over our Soviet strategy in some detail, including our rationale for the agreement which you had used during the Middle East alert. He continually sounded their by now familiar preoccupations.

—Chou strongly supported NATO and our troop presence in Europe. He said he would continue to educate European leaders, beginning with Heath who will visit Peking soon.

—I reaffirmed our intentions on Taiwan in political terms and outlined our plans concerning our military presence.

—At his own initiative, Chou said he would not attend the United Nations session next fall.

—I described to Chou, as I did later to Mao, our domestic mood and its impact on foreign policy.

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11 Nixon underlined the phrase, “that it was preferable for us to join the Japanese in Siberian development than to leave them alone,” and, in the margin next to it, wrote and underscored, “note.”
Bilateral Technical Issues

Counterpart negotiations conducted on our side by Acting Assistant Secretary Hummel focused on trade and exchange matters. We presented to the Chinese our view of the importance to the evolution of normal economic relations of concluding the private claims/blocked assets problem—agreed to in principle during my visit last February. In the only harsh aspect of all our discussions (apparently reflecting the acerbic personality of negotiator Lin Ping, formerly Ambassador to Chile during the Allende period and now Director of the Foreign Ministry’s Bureau of American and Oceanic Affairs) the Chinese side attacked our proposed technical language defining the source of their blocked assets as being an unwarranted reference to the former “hostile” attitude of the U.S. toward the PRC. More substantively, they demanded that we exclude from the settlement $17 million blocked in third-country banks, some of which has been repaid indirectly to the PRC despite our warnings to the banks of the illegality of such action. Our side indicated that these positions were unacceptable, primarily because exclusion of the third-country blocked assets from a settlement would reduce the sum of the total available for repaying our domestic claimants to a level unacceptable to the Congress, but as well because of the disastrous precedent for our international banking relations of such actions.

In my final session with the Premier, we made some progress on this matter. I reiterated the desirability of resolving the claims/assets problem, but the unacceptability of the Chinese position on the third-country bank question. We concluded by agreeing to further exchanges on the technical issues in the coming weeks in an effort to reach a final resolution of this matter in about a month.

The Chinese were relaxed about the most favored nation issue. Chou probed about the relationship between the present Congressional obstruction of this aspect of the trade bill because of the Soviet internal scene and extension of MFN to Peking. They do not mind delay. Their only concern is to keep the Soviet and Chinese aspects separate in Congressional and public discussion.

Scientific, cultural, and public affairs exchanges were discussed, with agreement reached on twenty specific programs which will be implemented in 1974. Included in this total is a visit to the U.S. by a delegation of Chinese mayors, and acceptance by the PRC of our proposal that a group of American state governors tour China. As well, the PRC proposed another Congressional delegation visit in the summer of next

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12 Memoranda of conversation of the counterpart negotiations are in National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Kissinger Office Files, Box 87, Country Files, Far East, PRC Counterpart Talks, 1971–73.
year by a bipartisan group of fifteen. We will be presenting suggestions to you shortly on which Representatives and Senators might most usefully be included in this group. (We suggest this trip not be mentioned to members of Congress at this time, as it will generate a flood of requests, making it difficult to organize purposefully a group which will most effectively support your programs.)

We also proposed longer-term cooperative programs with the PRC in the areas of agricultural research, earth resources surveying, and language study. They indicated only that they would consider these ideas.

We also requested agreement from the Chinese side to our making a public statement regarding American servicemen missing in action in the vicinity of the PRC as a result of the Indochina hostilities or our past military activities in the Taiwan area. Premier Chou indicated to me that his officials were making a detailed search for information regarding a number of MIAs. He also agreed to our publicly stating that we have discussed the problem of MIAs, that the PRC has been conducting searches, that no new information has been turned up, that they are continuing to investigate, and that they will provide us any new information which comes up. We can release this statement at an early press conference. This should clear the air on a lingering problem of concern to MIA families and their Congressmen.13

I raised with Premier Chou the issue of permanent U.S. press representation in Peking.14 He replied that they saw no problem with our newsmen in their capital; but there is concern with possible awkward confrontations in Washington between PRC newsmen and reporters of Taiwan's official Central News Agency. We will look into ways that this latter problem might be handled and then present further proposals to the Chinese.

Finally, we managed to resolve a potentially difficult issue concerning the U.S. Marine security contingent in our Liaison Office. The Chinese have complained of some of the social activities of the guard, which they feel calls public attention to their presence as a foreign military unit on PRC territory. Their sensitivity seems derived from the historical experience of foreign troops on Chinese soil during the last century which were part of the treaty post system of forced foreign access to the country. Lower level officials had almost demanded that we remove the Marines from China, but in my talks with Premier Chou it was agreed that the guard can remain based on our assurances to keep them low profile. We may replace some of the more exuberant of the

13 Nixon highlighted the last two sentences of this paragraph and in the margin wrote, “follow up.”
14 Nixon highlighted the first sentence of this paragraph and in the margin wrote, “K—don’t press this—it is not in our interest in view of press attitudes.”
young men who have proved restive in the austere Peking environment with older, seasoned troops.

The Atmosphere

Our reception in Peking was as cordial as it has been on my last several trips. While the government still does not bring out welcoming crowds, in private contacts they are with few exceptions affable and responsive—yet never intimate. The Premier sent five officials to Pakistan to escort us to Peking—three of whom were on my first secret visit—and held a welcoming banquet on the first night that included, in all, almost 200 people on the Chinese and American sides. I gave a return banquet for the same guests the final night of our visit. Both events took place in the Great Hall of the People and, as during your trip, featured a Chinese military ensemble playing American and Chinese tunes.

Press play of our negotiating sessions was extensive in the PRC’s electronic media and newspapers. My meeting with Chairman Mao was given banner-headline treatment, including the Chairman’s wish that I convey his greetings to you. Other sessions were also reported on the front page of the *Peoples’ Daily*.

I did little sight-seeing this trip, although a morning’s visit to the Temple of Heaven and a walk through the streets attracted a lively and curious crowd. One morning we visited an agricultural commune on Peking’s southern outskirts. While this was evidently a model facility and reasonably liveable, it nonetheless gave a clear sense of the limited capitalization of China’s farms, the minimal economic amenities of the people, and their enduring burden of physical labor. The second evening we were given a performance of a revolutionary ballet, “The White Haired Girl.” This propaganda pot boiler gives depressing evidence of the intellectual impoverishment of contemporary life in the PRC. One sees little evidence in the media or intellectual life of the brilliance and far-sightedness of China’s top leaders with whom we deal nor of China’s rich culture.

While a comfortably familiar pattern has now evolved in our periodic trips to Peking, and while we now have regularized contacts with the highest leaders in the PRC which—on the basis of past exchanges of view—facilitates the development of parallel policies in our international relations, we continue to have dealings with a highly restricted element of the leadership. While we have no indications from our talks of tensions and differences of policy orientation among various leaders, signs of conflict and debate persist in the press. Thus, in a situation where we can expect the passing of Mao and Chou in the next few years, there are grounds for concern about the depth and continuity of our relationship.
Minutes of Secretary of State Kissinger’s Staff Meeting

Washington, November 19, 1973, 12:05 p.m.

[Omitted here are comments unrelated to China.]

[Secretary Kissinger:] Now—about China.

The newspapers report that we came to China in order to establish diplomatic relations, and that we did not achieve that objective. That is total nonsense. The last thing we could afford at this moment is diplomatic relations with China. It is not that we are short of domestic debates at this moment in this country. So that the absolutely last thing we attempted to do in China is to settle the relationship between Taiwan, Peking and the United States.

First of all, the diplomatic relations with China are a surface phenomenon. Between the liaison offices and these periodic exchanges, our relations with the Chinese are fuller than with most governments in the world with which we do have diplomatic relations. I can think of nothing that we are missing in our relations with the Chinese as a result of not having formal diplomatic relations. So that at no stage in the discussion did the issue of formal diplomatic relations come up.

The purpose of the discussion was, first, to exchange—well, as far as we are concerned, we have dealt only with three men; with Mao, Chou and Chai Cheng-wen (?). No senior American has ever dealt with any authoritative person other than those three.

It is therefore essential that we meet with them periodically for the sort of conceptual review that the Chinese appreciate, and in which we have found their assurances in the past absolutely reliable—that what they say at these meetings they will do over a six-month period or a year’s period, we have found one could absolutely rely upon.

So the purpose was to review the international situation in the light of events since our last meeting. Secondly, to maintain the momentum in our relationships, both symbolically and substantively.

I would urge any of you who are interested to compare the Shanghai Communiqué with the communiqué that was published last week. Now, for a variety of reasons we were not eager to get too much press attention to the differences between the Shanghai Communiqué and

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1 Source: National Archives, RG 59, Transcripts of Secretary of State Kissinger’s Staff Meetings, 1973–1977, Entry 5177, Box 1, Secretary’s Staff Meetings. Secret. Kissinger chaired the meeting, which was attended by all the principal officers of the Department or their designated alternates.

2 The notetaker was unsure of the third name that Kissinger mentioned. Kissinger was likely referring to Qiao Guanhua.
this communiqué, because we did not want to get involved or we didn’t want to shake up Moscow more than has already been the case in recent weeks. I think if you take the key paragraphs of the Shanghai Communiqué and the key paragraphs of this communiqué, you will see a qualitative advance in almost every essential category.

The common objectives in the Shanghai Communiqué were confined to the Northeast Pacific. In this communiqué, they were extended to a global basis. In the Shanghai Communiqué we talked in a general way about consultations. In this one we talked about authoritative exchanges and concrete consultations. And there was a major change in the Chinese position with respect to diplomatic recognition, which in the past they have made dependent on a whole series of very concrete conditions, and which in this communiqué they made dependent only on the acceptance of one China.

So essentially we went further than I actually thought we would go on this trip. And we went to the absolute maximum of where we could go, given the international situation and given our domestic situation.

[Omitted here are comments unrelated to China.]

With respect to China, that policy is essentially on a good track. But we have established it with two aged leaders, and we have absolutely no clue as to what anyone else in China thinks about it, except that the necessities of their position would tend to drive them in the direction that they are now pursuing, although whether successors will have the tactical skill is not so clear.

[Omitted here are comments unrelated to China.]

64. Memorandum of Conversation

Washington, November 19, 1973, 5 p.m.

SUBJECT

Ambassador Shen’s Call on the Secretary
Ambassador Shen began the meeting by noting the Secretary had spent more time in Peking than in any other country. The Secretary commented that he had spent three days in Peking but that this had always been planned. The other stops were added. He reminded Shen that he had intended to visit Peking in August but that the timing of the trip kept slipping.

Ambassador Shen asked how the visit had gone. The Secretary responded that the Communiqué said everything there was to say, and that there was no substantial change from previous visits. Our statement on Taiwan repeated the section in the Shanghai Communiqué. The Peking statement on Taiwan was somewhat different but, the Secretary said, he had not had a chance to explore what it meant since it was put in on the last day. When Shen asked why the PRC had added that sentence at the last moment, the Secretary said he did not know and asked Shen what he thought. Shen said that he could not say since he was not there, but wondered about the significance of the difference between the PRC statement in this communiqué and the earlier longer and more detailed statement in the Shanghai Communiqué. The Secretary noted that the statement “normalization of relations can be accomplished on the basis of confirming the principle of one China” did not say that we had to withdraw our military forces or break diplomatic relations with the ROC.

The Secretary then asked again what Shen thought; “You have a Chinese mind, what does it mean to you?” Ambassador Shen responded that they want the U.S. to do something to confirm that there is one China. The Secretary then said that he had not discussed the statement with the Chinese, adding only that Premier Chou En-lai had said it was a new point. The Secretary emphasized that it was not an agreed point but a PRC statement and reiterated that he would have to study it.

Ambassador Shen asked why the U.S. statement in this Communiqué had not repeated the Shanghai Communiqué expression of interest in a peaceful settlement. The Secretary assured him this had no significance. The U.S. is absolutely firm on the defense commitment, the Secretary continued, and we have made that abundantly clear.

Referring to the Secretary’s banquet toast, Ambassador Shen noted that the Secretary had assured the Chinese that U.S.–PRC friendship would be a constant factor in U.S. foreign policy. Shen wondered why the Secretary had given this assurance and whether Chou had made a
similar pledge. The Secretary said that Chou had given substantially the same assurances and commented that surely Ambassador Shen would not have expected him to say that there would be a change in our policy. In response to Shen’s question about stability on the mainland and possible PRC concern that U.S. China policy could change under a new administration, the Secretary said that there was some concern about what future administrations might do. As for the stability of the PRC, “What can you say when the leaders are 75 and 79.” He added that he had no idea who would be the next PRC head of State.

Shen then asked what would happen next in U.S.–PRC relations. The Secretary assured him that nothing dramatic is going to happen and that the U.S. has no immediate intention and no plan to do anything. Shen commented to the Secretary that in an earlier conversation he had said that there would be no change until 1974 and asked if the timetable had been changed. The Secretary reminded Shen that 1974 is only a month away, but reiterated that there was no timetable. His reference to 1974 was just a general statement. The newspapers have picked up the idea of diplomatic relations, the Secretary continued, but the idea that we are compulsively seeking diplomatic relations is “nonsense.” “What difference does it make?” he asked, “We have as much exchange as we need.”

Ambassador Shen then asked if the Secretary had seen the ROC Ministry of Foreign Affairs statement on his trip. The Secretary said he had and that he found it fairly mild. Shen commented that the ROC could make it stronger if it was what we wished. He then asked what expanding the functions of the Liaison Office would include. The Secretary noted that we had no trade or commercial attachés there now and that expanding the functions would include things like that. In response to Shen’s question, he added that we were not thinking in terms of military attachés. Shen then asked if the reference in the Communiqué to frequent high-level contact meant that there would be high-level visits from Peking to the U.S. The Secretary pointed out that Shen had drafted enough communiqués to know that not everything in them means something concrete. He added, however, that he did not intend to go to Peking as frequently as he had up until now.

Asked where this leaves us, the Secretary replied that this leaves us where we were before. The PRC’s major concern is the USSR not Taiwan. Taiwan was barely discussed. When asked to confirm that the U.S. was moving in the direction of diplomatic relations, the Secretary said “by little steps at a time.” Shen then asked how many more steps there were to take. The Secretary responded that we have no plan and that he did not see it coming in 1974. He repeated that the PRC has more pressing problems which preoccupy them more than Taiwan. He
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noted that he had seen Mao Tse-tung three times. During the second
meeting there had been no mention of Taiwan. In his last meeting it
was mentioned, but with no sense of urgency. Commenting on the Secretary’s statement that it was the Soviet Union that preoccupied the
Chinese, Shen asked if he was also concerned about the Soviet Union.
The Secretary replied that he was not as concerned as the PRC is and
observed that they never dug air raid shelters when we were confronting them.
The Secretary again asked Shen what the Communiqué meant to
him. Shen said that they want the U.S. to do something to confirm the
principle of one China and then in time they would take care of Taiwan either unilaterally or with U.S. acquiescence. The Secretary dismissed this as “impossible.”
Ambassador Shen then observed that the ROC would like some
reassurance from the U.S. He said that he had nothing specific in mind
but asked if the Secretary would consider some expression or gesture
of support. The Secretary said that after dealing in the same year with
the Arabs and Israelis and three kinds of Vietnamese, he had no new
ideas to suggest. Emphasizing the need for reassurances, Ambassador
Shen commented that before the Secretary went to Peking, there were
some people in Taipei who thought that he would establish diplomatic
relations. When the Secretary observed that Taipei should be relieved
that he did not, Shen noted that the Secretary had said that he intended
to complete the process. The Secretary replied that this would not occur rapidly or in the next few weeks or months. He repeated that he
did not have the same compulsion as the press. Before leaving for
Peking he said he told the press he had no intention of establishing
diplomatic relations on this trip. Shen commented that he could understand that the Secretary could not put a time limit on this U.S. position and emphasized that his own government had every intention
of remaining friends and allies of the U.S. In reply, the Secretary reiterated that we have no plans to establish diplomatic relations with the
PRC and that we will not give up the defense commitment.
Once the U.S. recognizes the PRC as the sole legitimate government of China, Shen asked, how could the U.S. maintain a defense
treaty with part of a country? The Secretary replied that there may be
many variations to this interesting question but reminded Shen that it
is the PRC which feels the need to move toward diplomatic relations.
We are not spending sleepless nights on this issue. Asked if he thought
the PRC was spending sleepless nights on this issue, the Secretary
replied, “Probably not;” they are pretty cold-blooded and do only
enough to satisfy their domestic requirements.
Shen asked for the Secretary’s advice on what the ROC should do.
The Secretary responded that the ROC has pursued a wise policy, show-


ing great restraint and wisdom. Painful as it may be, the ROC should continue this policy. He said he had no other suggestions.

Turning again to the PRC statement in the Communiqué on confirming the principle of one China, Shen asked the Secretary what his “Chinese advisers” thought it meant. The Secretary replied that his Chinese advisers did not know a damned thing. The statement may mean we can keep diplomatic relations with the ROC as long as we acknowledge that there is but one China, he said. On the other hand it may mean nothing. The Secretary added, however, that in his experience such PRC statements usually mean something. They are very subtle. Asked if he thought the Chinese considered him subtle, the Secretary commented that by Chinese standards they probably think he is of average intelligence which is a great compliment. The Secretary went on to say he wanted to explore what the Chinese meant by confirming the principle of one China. This will take time, he continued, and even when we find out what they want, we won’t necessarily do it.

The Secretary ended the conversation by noting that after meetings such as he had in Peking, often nothing happens for a while. He noted in this connection that Ambassador Huang Chen had just returned home.

65. Memorandum From Richard H. Solomon of the National Security Council Staff to Secretary of State Kissinger


SUBJECT

The Current State of U.S.–PRC Relations: Parallelism in International Affairs; Shaky Bilateral Ties

A number of [less than 1 line not declassified] reports, and concurrent developments at our Peking Liaison Office, lead me to summarize the current state of U.S.–PRC relations. Basically, while your discussions with the top Chinese leadership over the past two and one-half
years have developed a certain conceptual consensus which now im-
parts a parallelism to our respective foreign policies, our bilateral ties
are developing at best slowly and have uncertain stability for the fu-
ture. Events of the past six months suggest that strong political and bu-
reaucratic forces within China are limiting the institutionalization of a
durable relationship between the U.S. and the PRC. Available evidence
suggests Chairman Mao and Premier Chou have found it difficult to
get their views on U.S.–PRC normalization accepted both ideologically
and operationally by the Chinese bureaucracy, thus raising for the U.S.
the question of the survivability of our relations with Peking after Mao
and Chou have passed from the scene.

In conclusion, this analysis suggests a number of actions you may
wish to take in order to strengthen the development of stronger bilat-
eral ties with the Chinese.

Official PRC Fears of U.S.-Soviet “Collusion”

A [less than 1 line not declassified] report confirms your speculation
of last summer that the results of the Brezhnev Summit in June (cou-
pled with Congressional action on the Cambodia bombing question)
led to a cooling of Peking’s attitude toward us. [4 lines not declassified]

[less than 1 line not declassified] assessed the implications of the just-
concluded Brezhnev Summit in Washington in an official analysis. He concluded that the U.S. had stepped
up its collusion with the Soviets, heightening pressure on the world’s revolutionary forces. [1 line not declassified] Previous [less than 1 line not
declassified] reporting on this document also indicates that Mao at the
same time criticized for bogging down
the development of China’s new contacts with the U.S. in a sea of daily
trivia which could sour the relationship. Mao added that if his officials
did not keep in mind the major issues which required accommodation
with the U.S., then excessive attention to the minor issues would lead
to internal squabbling within the Chinese government.

[2½ lines not declassified] Then, in September 1973—after the Tenth
Party Congress—an official document was circulated which formally criticized analysis and reaffirmed the correctness of Mao’s “revolutionary line in
foreign policy,” which was admitted to be a matter of “struggle be-
tween the two lines” [of revolution versus “revisionism”] within the
Party. [3½ lines not declassified]
The one difficult conclusion that must be drawn [less than 1 line not declassified] is that even officials closely identified with Chou—and who presumably are privy to your exchanges with both the Chairman and the Premier—have doubts about the direction of our policy and the wisdom for the PRC of Mao’s pro-U.S. policy. One can only speculate about the questions which may exist in the minds of those officials further removed from the Chairman and Premier. The argument which we by implication attribute to the late Lin Piao—that China can better preserve her security by mitigating its conflict with the Soviets than by balancing the Russian threat with a closer relationship with the U.S.—may have more appeal than we are aware, and is likely to have continuing attraction for those who do not share Mao’s pathological hatred of the Soviets.

The “Sea of Trivia” Which Continues to Impede U.S.–PRC Bilateral Ties

The above information comes at a time when we have a worrisome record for 1973 of petty difficulties in developing smooth working relations with PRC officials via our Peking Liaison Office, together with indications that the Chinese are not prepared to deepen their exchange contacts or other dealings with the U.S. in a way that would begin to build durable ties between the two countries.

In a recent cable (Tab B)4 Ambassador Bruce has written of his “deep concern” with “recent picayune incidents such as refusal to issue temporary duty visas for USLO replacements, obviously exaggerated complaints over the Marine Guard, long delays in answering requests for appointments with officials, and various indications of a marked lack of reciprocity here for our sensitive treatment of PRCLO representatives in the United States.” To this evaluation must now be added concern about the implications of the recent PRC demand that we withdraw from USLO one of our most effective young FSOs who was involved not long ago in a fatal traffic accident in which he was not evidently at fault.

In terms of substantive issues, concern should also be expressed about the way the Chinese bureaucracy handled the claims/blocked assets problem. While there was some basis for suspicion of our proposals regarding the mechanics of a settlement of this issue, the ad hominem and uncompromising way in which the ascerbic Lin P’ing (Director of the American Division of the Foreign Ministry) presented the PRC position in the counterpart talks during your November trip to Peking gives little confidence that the Chinese bureaucracy is enthusiastic about promoting U.S.–PRC normalization.5 Mao and Chou apparently have good reason to be concerned about the Foreign Ministry souring our developing relationship.

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4 Attached but not printed is telegram 1695 from Beijing, December 29.
5 See footnote 12, Document 62.
In terms of the exchange program, one can only add that available evidence indicates great reluctance on the part of the PRC to develop meaningful, longer term scientific and cultural contacts. They have shown little interest in having additional American cultural groups such as the Philadelphia Orchestra come to China to develop a positive public mood about our new relationship. They have been equally unresponsive to our proposals that they send their scientists or scholars to the U.S. for periods of substantive research. Indeed, one recent [less than 1 line not declassified] report indicates that a plan to send Chinese physicists to American laboratories to do work on basic nuclear science has been scrapped in favor of closer cooperation with European researchers.

There appear to be two reasons for the reluctant and at times self-righteous posture the Chinese have taken in our bilateral dealings—both related to the continuing unsettled state of PRC domestic politics: One is a long tradition of the bureaucrats and Party cadre to be cautious about appearing too enthusiastic in support of “rightist” policies. The political struggles of the past two decades have taught them that “the line” always swings back to “the left”; and when it does those who were active supporters of a less revolutionary stand become vulnerable to political attack. The current indications of on-going political factionalism in the wake of the Cultural Revolution and the Lin Piao affair—even though apparently directed against “the left”—suggest that the political atmosphere within the Chinese bureaucracy would engender caution about actively supporting the policies of aged leaders which eventually may be vulnerable to radical criticism. The second reason is that the current debate in the PRC about Confucius has a strong element of criticism of the intellectual community. U.S.–PRC exchanges involve, above all, China’s intellectuals; and it seems likely that exchanges will have to remain at a tenuous level for a considerable period of time, until (if at all) the Chinese sort out a positive role for their scientists and academics that will permit this “bourgeois” element of their society to have greater contact with the “outside.”

The one area of our bilateral relations where progress has outpaced expectations is trade. Even here, however, we have received reports of frustration on the part on Chou En-lai about conservative and unimaginative economic policies on the part of the bureaucracy which have hindered the growth of China’s export potential. This situation led the Premier last fall to sack his Minister of Foreign Trade and replace him with a man presumably more responsive to official guidance.

What Is To Be Done?

This analysis has been based on the assumption—now strengthened by the [less than 1 line not declassified] report at Tab A⁶—that

⁶ Attached but not printed.
Chairman Mao and Premier Chou continue to encounter difficulties in bringing their bureaucracy fully behind the process of U.S.–PRC normalization. What, if anything, can we do about such a situation? While obviously we are in a position of largely having to follow the lead of the Chairman and the Premier, there are a number of initiatives we could take which might help them to confront bureaucratic foot-dragging in their own house and identify a larger slice of their top leadership with the policy of U.S.–PRC normalization than has been the case thus far:

—State is now considering a démarche to the Chinese Liaison Office at the Assistant Secretary level raising our concern about the overall trend of developments regarding our Liaison Office in Peking. I suggest that this would be most effective if done in parallel with a personal message from you to the Premier, transmitted via Ambassador Bruce, which indicated in general terms your concern about recent trends and their implication for both the workings of the Liaison Office and more generally for the prospect of normalized dealings between the U.S. and PRC which will stand the test of time.

—The PRC is planning to send a trade delegation to the U.S. this spring. You might personally invite an important high political official—either Vice Premier Li Hsien-nien, or Minister of Foreign Trade Li Ch’iang—to head up this delegation.

—During your next trip to China you should seek opportunities to meet with a broader range of PRC officials than has been the case in the past. This might include a trip to several key provincial cities where you could meet with key regional leaders.

Recommendations:

1. That we prepare a draft message from you to Premier Chou expressing your personal concern about prospects for institutionalizing normalized U.S.–PRC relations (to be coordinated with any State démarche to PRCLO about recent developments regarding the functioning of USLO).

2. That we take steps to explore the possibility of inviting a high-level PRC official to head the trade delegation which will visit the U.S. this coming spring.  

3. That we include in planning for your next trip to the PRC events which would hold the possibility of meeting with a broader range of Chinese officials, perhaps including a tour of several key provincial cities.  

7 Kissinger initialed the Approve option under recommendations 1 and 2.
8 Kissinger checked Disapprove option and wrote, “Let’s wait.” Beneath the recommendation, Kissinger ordered, “There is to be no State démarche without my clearance.”
66. Memoranudum of Conversation¹

Washington, January 23, 1974, 6:15–6:45 p.m.

PARTICIPANTS

Dr. Kissinger: Are we ever going to see your Ambassador again?

(Away)

Ambassador Han: He is enjoying the Spring Festival in China now.

The Secretary: I thought we might have a brief meeting to go over two problems. One is this issue on the Paracel Islands, and the other is my trip to the Middle East. Let me talk about the unpleasant one first. I bet you think I’m going to talk about the Middle East now, but I’ll fool you.

There are only two points I wanted to make with respect to the Paracel Islands issue.² The South Vietnamese government is making a number of representations to international organizations, to SEATO as well as to the United Nations. We wanted to let you know we do not associate ourselves with those representations. We are concerned, however, about the prisoners, and we noted that your government has indicated that the prisoners will be released at an appropriate time. We wanted to urge that this appropriate time be very soon, especially as there is an American included in that group. And that would certainly defuse the situation as far as the United States is concerned. That’s really all I wanted to say about that issue.

(To Mr. Hummel) Or is there more, Art?

Mr. Hummel: For domestic political reasons we would like to say that we have been in touch about this American.

¹ Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Kissinger Office Files, Box 96, Country Files, Far East, China Exchanges, November 1, 1973–March 31, 1974. Secret; Sensitive; Nondis. The meeting was held at Kissinger’s office in the Department of State.

² Chinese forces captured Gerald Emil Kosh, an employee of the Department of Defense, during a battle between South Vietnam and China over competing claims to the Paracel Islands.
The Secretary: We will say it only in response to questions. (Mr. Lord mentioned to the Secretary that there was some question as to the exact status of the American.)

Ambassador Han: I would like to say a few words about this matter. First, we call these islands Hsi Sha because that is our territory. We make clear in our statements that we are a socialist country; we never invade other’s territory, but we don’t let others invade our territory.

The Secretary: That’s not true of every Socialist country.

Ambassador Han: We have always said that we will not attack if we are not attacked, but if we are attacked by others, we will counter-attack. So what we say is clear.

As for when the prisoners will be released, our statement said that at an appropriate time they will be released. It was the Foreign Ministry statement.

But as a personal observation, I would just like to express surprise that there should be an American citizen at that particular area at that particular time. We don’t know the actual circumstances—whether he was there or not or whether he was captured or not.

The Secretary: He was not there on any permanent basis; he was there at the request of the South Vietnamese on some temporary, technical mission, precisely because we thought it was a quiet period. He was only going to stay a day or so, very briefly; then he found himself caught. There are no Americans permanently or even temporarily on these islands. This was an unfortunate incident.

Ambassador Han: As for whether he was taken prisoner or not, we are not aware of it.

The Secretary: Could you attempt to confirm this for us?

Ambassador Han: We will see what is the circumstance.

The Secretary: We would appreciate it very much. The U.S. has taken no position in supporting the South Vietnamese claims to these islands. I wanted to make this clear, also.

Now, a few words about my trip to the Middle East, or did you want to pursue this other subject?

Ambassador Han: With regard to Mr. Hummel’s suggestion whether to publicize this to the media would this be quickly, right away?

The Secretary: We can wait. What do you want? You report to Peking. Not having said anything up to now, we can survive another 24 hours. We can take the heat. We will give it until Friday morning, but the more quickly you can let us know, the better. Eventually, we will have to say that we have talked to you.

3 January 25.
Ambassador Han: After we have reported to the government, we will see what the reply is.

Mr. Hummel: All we have in mind is to say that we have talked, not to make the other points that the Secretary raised.

The Secretary: We will wait until Friday. We can give you until Friday a.m. to see whether you get an answer. We have been accused of so many things, we can be accused of neglecting an American interest for a day.

Shall we talk about the Middle East for a few minutes?

Ambassador Han: Please.

The Secretary: There is really not all that much to say because I think we are pursuing the policy the Prime Minister has urged upon me, which is to reduce Soviet influence in the Middle East. I have the impression that it is reasonably successful. You know from our public discussions the nature of the agreements. But I thought you may be interested to know that the Egyptians are very dissatisfied with their relationship with the Soviet Union, and they are very interested in improving their relationship with the Peoples Republic. And I have strongly recommended that they do this. They would like you to establish a MIG-21 factory in Egypt. They will pay you for it; it’s up to you. I thought you should know their interest in improving relations with the Peoples Republic.

In Syria, we are just at the beginning of the process, but it is basically what I described with the Prime Minister, to keep them separate from Iraq.

I think it was your Prime Minister who urged me to become active in the Middle East. I don’t know whether he thinks we have become too active now (laughter).

Ambassador Han: We do not know about the content of your discussions with the Prime Minister in Peking, but I do know of the talk that Vice Minister Chiao had with yourself and Ambassador Hummel in New York.

The Secretary: It was in the same spirit; the Prime Minister went into greater detail.

Are you ever going to get a vacation?

Ambassador Han: Starting today, there are three days of the Spring Festival.

The Secretary: We are retaliating. We are bringing Ambassador Bruce home for a few weeks. It’s not a question of reciprocity; I just want his advice, including European problems. I may send him to Europe as a matter of fact for a few weeks.

Ambassador Han: I remember you mentioned this the last time.

Is that all?

The Secretary: Yes.

Ambassador Han: Thank you for receiving us.
67. Memorandum From Richard H. Solomon of the National Security Council Staff to Secretary of State Kissinger


SUBJECT
Confucius and the State Governors’ China Trip: Is Peking Debating Foreign Policy?

PRC Liaison Office personnel called on me yesterday to report no progress in our efforts to set a date for the state governors’ visit. Several weeks ago Jim Falk of the Domestic Council and I initiated efforts through the National Governors’ Conference to form a delegation, based on the agreement in principle of November that a group could visit the PRC by June of this year. We subsequently presented the Liaison Office a list of the likely members of the delegation, and indicated that mid-May would be the most convenient time for the governors. We also gave the Chinese a draft press release patterned on the previous Congressional releases, and requested their comments. During yesterday’s call, the PRC officials said that they had been instructed by Peking to inform us that the draft press release was inappropriate, both because it implied too much of an official exchange—rather than people-to-people contact—and because no time for the visit has as yet been set. In short, we were told that the PRC is not prepared at this time to move ahead with semi-official exchanges. (For this reason I have not initiated any planning activity for the next Congressional visit, also agreed to in principle during your last trip to Peking.)

This development is but one of a range of indicators that our bilateral relations with Peking are immobilized: Other facilitated cultural and scientific exchanges are in abeyance; USLO has had turn-downs of eight applications for visas for U.S. officials—including Ambassador Ingersoll; and the Chinese appear to be delaying a response to your latest proposal for settlement of the claims/blocked assets problem. What is going on in Peking?

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1 Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 528, Country Files, Far East, People’s Republic of China, Vol. 9, Jan 1, 1974-. Secret; Sensitive. Sent for information. Kissinger initialed this memorandum at the time, and later quoted it in his memoir, Years of Upheaval, p. 680. All brackets are in the original.

2 In telegram 17433 to Beijing, January 25, the Department reported on the visit that Chi Ch’ao-Chu and Hsu Hsin-Hsi of the PRC Liaison Office paid to Solomon. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy Files, 1974)

3 On January 12, the Liaison Office informed the Chinese Foreign Ministry that since it had received no response to its request for a visa, Assistant Secretary Ingersoll was regretfully canceling the Beijing stop of his tour of East Asia. (Telegram 67 from Beijing, January 12; ibid.)
Have the Chinese Been Debating Foreign Policy?

Press material is now coming available which suggests that foreign policy has been actively debated by the leadership in Peking—thus leading to a stand-down of our bilateral contacts with the PRC. A Red Flag article of November which has just been translated suggests—in the Aesopian language of the on-going polemic on Confucius—that the military in China have questioned the policy of rapprochement with the U.S. The most significant passage states that the Chou figure in the historical debate criticized his opponents,

"for advocating the policy of ‘making friends with neighboring countries [i.e., the Soviets] and attacking the distant ones’ [the U.S.] in order to preserve their own hereditary prerogatives, and went further in putting forward the policy of ‘making friends with distant countries and attacking the neighboring ones.’ San Sui’s [Chou’s] line won the approval of King Chao [Mao],” and he was accordingly appointed as a guest minister in charge of military affairs.

“However, although San Sui [Chou] had become Prime Minister, he was actually perched on the top of the crater of a volcano that could erupt at any time. In the Chu state the power of the old aristocrats [the regional military commanders?] was still rather powerful.”

Subsequent to the publication of this article, China’s regional military commanders were shuffled around, suggesting that Chou’s “volcano” did not explode under him.4

More recently, a January Red Flag article entitled “Confucius in Moscow” implies by historical analogy that leaders within China are cooperating with the Soviets to attack Mao/Chou policies. The article even asserts that the “Soviet social imperialists” are supporting Confucius together with the “Kuomintang reactionaries on Taiwan.” (Perhaps Peking has already received word of the Soviet approach to the Nationalists via the Chinese professor they invited to Moscow in December, although the timing of the article’s publication would not be strong evidence in this direction.)5 The article concludes that, “The farce in Moscow of worshipping Confucius has merely drawn a calm response [in Peking],” and asserts that the Soviets will get nowhere in their effort to find supporters in China. The recent expulsion from Peking of five Soviet diplomats on charges of spying seems to add

4 A briefing memorandum from David Mark of INR to the Acting Secretary of State, January 2, reported that the Chinese Government had abruptly shifted command in eight of China’s eleven military regions, thus culminating “a long effort to reassert central and civilian authority.” (Ibid., Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Kissinger Office Files, Box 87, Country Files, Far East, China—Reports Sensitive)

5 On December 31, 1973, Jiang Jingguo informed McConaughy that the Soviet Union had approached a ROC citizen about the future of Taiwanese-Soviet relations. (Memorandum from Smyser to Kissinger, January 10; ibid., Box 524, Country Files, Far East, China, Vol. XII, Oct 25, 1973–)
weight to the interpretation that the dominant leadership in Peking is concerned about Soviet game-playing within China—or at least wants to make a visible point that the Russians are still the primary enemy.

By all evidence, Premier Chou appears to be in the dominant position in Peking, although the continuing signs of debate in the press suggest that he is having to defend his policies against on-going criticism. Given these recent indications that foreign policy has been at issue, our present interpretation is that the lack of PRC responsiveness to us on bilateral issues reflects the Premier’s desire not to give his challengers the added ammunition that would come with a more visible relationship. If the present signs of Chou consolidating his position persist, however, one would anticipate some further movement in U.S.–PRC relations, such as a favorable decision on the claims settlement and more receptivity to exchanges and official travel. My present guess is that the current state of immobilism will persist well into the first half of 1974, at least until a National People’s Congress has been convened to give further institutional legitimacy to the Premier’s policies and supporters.

68. Notes on a Conversation Between Secretary of State Kissinger and Time Incorporated Editors and Correspondents


[Omitted here are Kissinger’s statements about wiretaps, Secretary Schlesinger, and the Soviet Union.]

China in dealing with us has been meticulous but there has been no advance. When I was there in November I committed a fantastic faux pas when I started talking about Confucious with the Chinese.2

1 Source: Department of State, RG 59, Lot 89 D 436, Papers of William H. Gleysteen, Box 8132, PRC Related Papers, Jan–Mar 1974. No classification marking. Drafted by George Vest, Special Assistant to the Secretary of State for Press Relations.

2 In the third volume of his memoirs, Kissinger says that this exchange occurred during a dinner in the Great Hall of the People. (Henry Kissinger, Years of Renewal, pp. 160–161) No record of the dinnertime conversation was found. For the unsuccessful effort by the NSC staff to verify this anecdote, see Solomon to Scowcroft, March 6, 1974; National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 528, Country Files, Far East, People’s Republic of China, Vol. 9, Jan 1, 1974–. Confucianism also became a topic of conversation during a couple of Kissinger’s more formal November 1973 meetings, although neither fits the description here. See Documents 56 and 57.
They got excited and it led to a ½ hr argument with Chou taking the lead, arguing it had nothing to do with their world. We can now see this still is an issue.

There is enormous instability in China. Their Ambassador has been called back for months, now. Still, Mao is associated with our steps toward normalizing and Chou is the primary actor.

Whenever I read over what Mao has said to me I realize his enormous intellectual discipline. Even his jokes have meaning. He told me a joke, I missed the point and responded with one of my own. He repeated his joke, and I told another. Then for the third time he repeated his joke, to make sure I did not miss the meaning. He and Chou are integrally linked to an improved US-China relationship. It has its benefits. Thus Kosh was released on the Tuesday after we said on Friday that we expected him to be released.3

The internal problems of China are eating at the leadership. Their obsession with the Soviets is greater now than in any of my previous visits. All foreigners are in trouble. An Algerian dance group got into bureaucratic difficulty and cancelled out. Only a Canadian symphony carried through their visit. Our LO is confined to contacts with officials. A diplomat invited a Chinese official to lunch and was told he was unavailable that day or any other day.

3 See footnote 2, Document 66.

69. Memorandum From Richard H. Solomon of the National Security Council Staff to Secretary of State Kissinger


SUBJECT

Chinese Now Move to Public Phase of the “Confucius/Lin Purge:” Problems of the American Press Response

On February 2 the People’s Daily published an editorial signalling the opening phase of a mass campaign, keyed to the anti-Confucius/
Lin Piao polemic of the past six months, which apparently will move to purge the remaining sources of opposition to the Mao/Chou “mainstream” leadership as it attempts to re-establish the predominant role of the Chinese Communist Party. The editorial makes explicit that Chairman Mao himself is behind the new phase of the campaign, that it is directed against “ringleaders of various opportunist lines” who have been intriguing “in dark corners behind people’s backs,” and that it is necessary to “arouse the masses” in order to “carry the struggle to criticize Lin Piao and Confucius through to the end.”

The editorial stresses that the new phase of the campaign will be “a test for every leading comrade” as part of the process of “destroying the roots of Lin Piao’s revisionist line.” It thus seems clear that high leaders are likely to fall during this new phase of mass criticism. Given developments of recent months (the reshuffle of the regional military commanders, and subtle attacks aimed at Chiang Ch’ing—such as the criticism of Beethoven and Schubert), it seems most likely that the targets will be some combination of military leaders and ideological “leftists”—the groups which seemed to be forming an alliance of convenience last summer to defend themselves against the Mao/Chou mainstream in advance of the Tenth Party Congress. The exact pace of this new phase of mass attack, and specific identification of the victims, however, is not yet evident. It is becoming clear, however, that the Chinese are “battening down the hatches” for a period of rough political weather, and are becoming increasingly sensitive to foreign observation and comment as they go through a semi-public purge.

In this context, it is clear that the publication of the January 30 People’s Daily attack on Antonioni (which the PRC Liaison Office widely distributed to journalists in Washington and New York) was an act of “guidance” to the U.S. about how to interpret the present criticism campaign. To recapitulate my reading of this piece, it seems to make three points: those in China who want to “restore the past” of the Cultural Revolution are in trouble; Chairman Mao’s foreign policy of opposition to the Soviets and friendship for the U.S. is still operative; and Americans who now highlight China’s current difficulties will only be working to the benefit of the Russians and against U.S.–PRC friendship.

It should be noted, however, that press reports out of Hong Kong are misinterpreting the current thrust of China’s internal political movement. The most recent and disturbing article, front paged on

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2 The People’s Daily criticized Michelangelo Antonioni, the Italian filmmaker who had made the movie China. At approximately the same time, the newspaper also attacked “bourgeois” composers like Beethoven and Schubert. (Memorandum from Solomon to Kissinger, February 4; ibid., Box 528, Country Files, Far East, People’s Republic of China, Vol. 9, Jan 1 1974–)
today’s *New York Times* interprets the *People’s Daily* editorial of February 2 as signalling a return to the Cultural Revolution, i.e., a resurgence of China’s “left” and hostility to all foreign influence. Given the gratuitous manner in which the PRC has called attention to recent developments (by mailing copies of the Antonioni attack to our press) it seems likely that we will see numerous stories begin to circulate in coming days playing up the line that U.S.–PRC relations are in real trouble in the face of a radical resurgence in China.

In these circumstances, we have basically two options: to let our press speculate about domestic PRC developments and their implication for the U.S. without official guidance; or to “deep background” the media on the view that current developments in China are not directed against U.S.–PRC normalization. My own view is that the best approach would be for you to “deep background” the press on where we stand with the Chinese, and at the same time enjoin the bureaucracy from speculating in public about developments within the PRC. Such a backgrounding session might make the following points:

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We see no indication that Mao or Chou are in trouble; indeed, the recent reshuffling of the regional military commanders and the rehabilitation of Teng Hsiao-p’ing suggest that the Chairman and Premier are strengthening the return to regularized, civilian leadership.

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We see no indication of a shift in China’s foreign policy line away from the trend of U.S.–PRC normalization. As the PRC sorts out its internal affairs, however, it may be that the Chinese will want to temporarily downplay contact with foreigners.

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We must respect the right of the Chinese to deal with their own internal affairs without speculation by officials of foreign countries.

Recommendation:³

That you “deep background” appropriate members of the press on developments in the PRC.

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³ Although Kissinger initialed this memorandum, indicating that he had seen it, he marked neither the Approve nor Disapprove options. On March 13, Kissinger gave “deep background” comments during a luncheon at the *Washington Post* building. On the subject of China, he said, “What about Ambassador Bruce? He asked some time ago if he could come back for consultation. While here I got his judgment on Europe. His presence here had nothing to do with China. The Chinese have been going to great efforts to signal to us that their own policy initiative to the U.S. is unchanged. It is true that they don’t seem at the moment to have the time to cultivate our relationship as they did last year.” (Memorandum of conversation; ibid., Box 1028, MemCons-HAK & Presidential, March 1–May 8, 1974)
70. Memorandum From W. R. Smyser of the National Security Council Staff to Secretary of State Kissinger


SUBJECT

Backgrounder on Chinese Internal Developments

I concur with Dick Solomon’s recommendation (Tab A)\(^2\) that you brief selected journalists on a “deep background” basis about current developments in China.

But I want to add two obvious words of caution, in case they have not already occurred to you:

—I think there will be a great temptation in the next few months for members of the press to attack our China effort as “another element of détente that has not worked out as promised.” Chinese hardening on travel and Chinese domestic turmoil will provide ammunition adequate for this though not as good as the ammunition that the Russians have provided.

—Some people could argue that your backgrounder represents an effort to stave off that kind of attack.

I think this means that, if you give the backgrounder, it must be done on a highly selective basis, perhaps even on an individual basis with journalists who have come to see you on some other topic.

Let me add that this underlines the need for you to keep an independent China expertise here if you choose to let Solomon go. Hong Kong has already shown that it does not understand the issue either in Chinese or American terms. USLO in Peking will do no better, I fear. The Department and much of our press will be swept away by their analysis, and without independent capacity we will not be able to counter them from here.

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\(^1\) Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 528, Country Files, Far East, People’s Republic of China, Vol. 9, Jan. 1, 1974–. Secret; Sensitive; Eyes Only. Urgent; sent for information.

\(^2\) Tab A is a copy of Solomon’s February 5 memorandum, Document 69.
71. Letter From the Acting Assistant Secretary for East Asian and Pacific Affairs (Hummel) to the Acting Chief of the Liaison Office in China (Jenkins)\(^1\)


Dear Al:

This is a genuinely informal letter designed to let you know some of our thoughts, and some items of pending business that we are working on. I don’t expect you to take any particular action on any of the items discussed herein.

As things are working out here, the center of gravity in U.S.–PRC relations seems to have followed Henry into the State Department. Win Lord and I have wound up jointly doing the staff work for most of our important business with your clients. The Secretary, of course, retains very close control of all the important aspects of the relationship. However, his necessary preoccupation with a host of other matters—for instance the Middle East and now the Energy Conference—makes it difficult to get his attention on day-to-day problems. Brent Scowcroft and Dick Solomon of course still play active roles in PRC affairs.

Here follow some status reports.

(1) Before Ambassador Bruce’s arrival, Henry on two occasions told Han Hsu that he would be asking Ambassador Bruce to give attention on a temporary basis to some of our European problems. On one of these occasions, Henry jokingly said he was “retaliating” for the prolonged absence of Ambassador Huang Chen.\(^2\) You will have seen State 28116 regarding the announcement that Ambassador Bruce will be occupied for about a month with Western Europe.\(^3\) He has already been intimately involved with the Secretary in the difficult and fascinating proceedings of the Energy Conference.

(2) There was considerable confusion about Deputy Secretary Rush’s possible trip to Peking. As early as January 7, Henry mentioned

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\(^1\) Source: Department of State, Papers of William H. Gleysteen: Lot 89 D 436, Box 8132, PRC Related Papers, Jan–Mar 1974. Secret; Eyes Only; Official–Informal. In an attached note to “Bob” (probably Ingersoll), Hummel referred to this letter as an attempt to start “a normal dialogue with that abnormal post.”

\(^2\) See Document 66.

\(^3\) Telegram 28116 to Taipei, February 13. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy Files)
to Han Hsu that Ken Rush might be planning such a trip. Han’s reaction was noncommittal. Your telegram of February 12 was most welcome because it helped to focus attention on the problem. To put it bluntly, it was up to Ken Rush to talk this out with Henry, and the result, as you will have seen, is a belated request for a visa. None of us are optimistic about the result.

(3) We all regret the delay in responding to your sensible suggestions about talking to the Chinese about future space requirements. We got all tangled up (the current cliche is “wrapped around the axle”) with various options for Henry of how and whether to mention possible longer-term requirements. Henry put the whole problem on the back burner for discussion with Ambassador Bruce and the result is as you have seen in our telegram. I wish we had been able to get this simple answer to you earlier. Our retraction of the first authorization to start discussing immediate needs resulted from a “hold everything until I return from the Middle East” reaction by Henry to a proposed telegram on long-term requirements.

(4) We have been toying with the idea of trying to have a frank—American-style rather than Chinese-style—dialogue between myself and Han Hsu concerning some of the procedural problems that we have had with the PRC. The object would be two-fold: (a) to talk frankly about some of the things that bother us (rejection of TDY assignments, long delays in issuance of visas for consultation, your difficulty in getting appointments in Peking, and the somewhat twisted use of the principle of reciprocity), and (b) most important, a sincere and heartfelt appeal for better understanding on both sides so that our relations can progress smoothly to a higher stage, without misunderstandings caused by the real differences between our social systems.

I invented this idea in the first place a couple of months ago. However, I am now not sure that point (b) above will come through in a sufficiently positive way to the authorities in Peking. It seems quite possible that Lin P’ing and others might distort the whole approach so that instead of constituting a positive and sincere appeal, it would appear merely as a list of accusations and complaints. I would welcome any thoughts that you have.

(5) We have heard in New York that Ambassador Huang Hua may be returning to Peking for what he says is a routine consultation of about six weeks. Such a trip makes sense at this time of year and I don’t

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4 As reported in a memorandum of conversation, January 7. (Ibid., Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Kissinger Office Files, Box 96, Country Files, Far East, China Exchanges, November 1, 1973–March 31, 1974)

5 Hummel is likely referring to telegram 240 from Beijing, February 11. (Ibid., RG 59, Central Foreign Policy Files)
want to read too much into it. However, the thought has crossed my
mind that from Peking’s point of view the UNGA session last year may
not have been satisfactory, and their UN tactics may be up for criti-
cism, internally. We should be alert to any signs that Vice Minister Chiao
or Ambassador Huang Hua are in trouble, possibly for compromising
on Korea or for failing to get a majority on Cambodia.

(6) By the time you get this, you will have seen a White House
announcement of Ambassador Unger’s nomination to succeed Walter
McConaughy in Taipei.6 We planned to have only a routine an-
nouncement but we have run into a peculiar angle. When McConaughy
was nominated in 1966, the announcement, and also his letters of cre-
dence, called him “Ambassador to China”. This time, we think it is
only accurate to call Ambassador Unger “Ambassador to the Republic
of China”. This difference may be noticed, but on balance we feel that
it is better to use the more accurate and less ambiguous phraseology.

(7) Henry has approved a scenario for further military with-
drawals from Taiwan, which we are slowly and painfully working out
with the different agencies in Washington. This will involve telling the
ROC everything that we plan during the coming year, on the theory
that only by exposing a whole package can we reassure the ROC that
this is all we have in mind. We will soon be authorizing Ambassador
McConaughy to discuss withdrawal of U–2’s, the schedule of with-
drawal of the two USAF squadrons, [1½ lines not declassified]. We will
try to send you a copy of the instruction when it goes to Taipei.

You may be interested to know that Han Hsu, in conversation with
Henry and Win and me recently, said that he had not received any word
of any of the conversations that Henry held in Peking in November. We
also know from comments by PRCLO officials that they have no infor-
mation about my counterpart talks in Peking, except for the list of agreed
exchanges. I found this rather surprising, but Henry observed privately
in his inimitable style: “they must be following my practice.”

I have shown this letter to Ambassador Bruce, and will show it to
Winston Lord.

I have felt for some time that we should do a better job of keep-
ing you and John informed on an interim basis, before instructions are
finally released through our sometimes cumbersome processes. I would
welcome a freer flow of Eyes Only letters between us.

Best regards to everyone,

Sincerely,

Arthur W. Hummel, Jr.7

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6 Unger was nominated on March 14, 1974.
7 Printed from a copy that bears Hummel’s typed signature.
Printed on one side only

72. **Telegram From the Liaison Office in China to the Department of State**

Beijing, February 19, 1974, 0345Z.

284. Subject: PRC Cancellation of DepSec’s Visit. Ref: State 032525.

1. USLO was most disappointed to learn that we will not have opportunity to meet with Deputy Secretary in Peking, but Chinese decision that present time “not convenient” came as no surprise. Since planning for visit first began in December the ideological campaign to criticize Lin Piao and Confucius has moved into a new stage involving mass participation on a scale unseen since the Cultural Revolution. Although the campaign thus far has remained under firm control, the debates over central versus regional control, party versus military and the course of China’s educational and cultural development have produced internal tensions which would make high visibility visit by a senior American official difficult at this time. We continue to feel that Chou remains in control of the situation, but a slightly lower profile on his part may be considered prudent for the time being.

2. While the ideological debate has thus far not significantly affected foreign policy, current ultra-nationalist themes in field of culture and attacks on Western influences have already delayed decisions on cultural exchanges with U.S. and other countries and produced much greater caution on part of decision makers. Criticism of Western music and Antonioni film are probably more relevant to internal political struggles than foreign policy, but Chou and MFA probably see Deputy Secretary’s visit as a complicating factor best avoided in China’s present atmosphere.

3. While we feel the above mentioned domestic political concerns are overriding factors in PRC decision on Deputy Secretary’s visit, we would also not exclude possibility that there may be growing impatience in Peking over pace of development of Sino-U.S. relations. Signals such as appointment of new U.S. Ambassador to Taiwan and indication that we foresee no qualitative change in our relationship with ROC in the near future probably make it more difficult for the architects of the policy of Washington–Peking détente to advocate a high level visit in the absence of likelihood there will emerge concrete evidence of further progress.

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1. Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy Files. Secret; Priority; Exdis.

2. In telegram 32525 to Beijing, February 18, the Department reported that Han Xu had told Hummel that the dates for Rush’s visit were not convenient, but the Chinese would welcome a future visit by Rush at an appropriate time. (Ibid.)
4. Nevertheless, Han Hsu’s statement that PRC would “welcome” visit by Deputy Secretary “at appropriate time” is encouraging sign that fundamentals of PRC policy toward U.S. have not changed. Needless to say, we second Han Hsu’s welcome for a visit at the earliest feasible time. Jenkins

73. Memorandum From the President’s Assistant for National Secretary Affairs (Kissinger) to President Nixon


SUBJECT
Withdrawal of US Forces on Taiwan

State and Defense have studied the question of when to withdraw the most significant part of our forces from Taiwan—[less than 1 line not declassified] our two F–4 squadrons [1 line not declassified]. Removal of these forces will reduce our presence on the island to about 2800 men who could all be termed logistics, support, and communications personnel. I originally believed all these moves could be accomplished by the end of 1974—without liability to the GRC.

However, removing the second F–4 squadron by the end of this year would create serious problems for GRC Prime Minister Chiang Ching-Kuo. Even if suitable replacement aircraft (F–5Es) were diverted to the GRC (from both Korea and Vietnam), his Air Force could not assimilate them due to training problems, and in the interim his air defense capability would be substantially degraded. The spirit if not the letter of our Enhance Plus agreement with the GRC would be called

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1 Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Institutional Files (H-Files), Box H–245, National Security Decision Memoranda, NSDM 248. Top Secret; Sensitive. Sent for action. Kennedy, Smyser, and Solomon sent this memorandum to Kissinger on March 7, with the recommendation that he sign and send it to the President. (Ibid.) A stamped notation at the top of the page indicates the President did see it.


3 The Republic of China had assisted the United States in implementing the “Enhance Plus” program (an effort by the United States to expand and improve the armed forces of
into question, and this could be interpreted in Taipei as forcing on them an agreement made in Peking. The impact of the diversions would also fall heavily on the GVN.

To avoid these problems, State and Defense—with my approval—recommend that you delay withdrawal of the second F–4 squadron for five months, until the end of May 1975. The delay of five months will allow the GRC to train its F–5E pilots and crews while still under a USAF umbrella. Prime Minister Chiang would presumably be able to accommodate this schedule, and we would have more time for diversions, allowing us to depend on planes now earmarked for Korea rather than Vietnam.

Otherwise, the NSDM at Tab A allows us to withdraw other units on Taiwan by the end of this year, and directs CIA and Defense to review US communications and intelligence activities on Taiwan as a basis for making decisions about further personnel reductions on the island.

Recommendation

That you authorize me to sign the NSDM at Tab A, delaying the withdrawal of the second F–4 squadron by five months to May 1975 but withdrawing most of our other units and personnel by the end of 1974; and ordering studies of further reduction in communications and intelligence personnel.\(^5\)

\(^4\) See Document 74.
\(^5\) Nixon initialed the Approve option.

74. National Security Decision Memorandum 248


TO

The Secretary of Defense
The Director of Central Intelligence
The Deputy Secretary of State

\(^1\) Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, NSC Institutional Files (H-Files), Box H–245, National Security Decision Memoranda, NSDM 248. Top Secret; Sensitive. A copy was sent to the Chairman of the JCS.
SUBJECT
Changes in U.S. Force Levels on Taiwan

Having reviewed the studies and recommendations developed in response to NSSM 171,2 the President directs the following changes in deployments and status of US forces based on Taiwan:

—withdraw one of the two F–4 squadrons by July 31, 1974, using Peace Basket F–5As to meet the related US obligation to replace 20 of the 48 F–5As borrowed from ROC under Enhance Plus;

—withdraw the second F–4 squadron by May 30, 1975, complying with the related US obligation to provide F–5Es as replacements for 28 of the Enhance Plus F–5As by using diversions of ROK earmarked F–5Es as temporary replacements until ROC co-produced F–5Es are available;

—withdraw our [1½ lines not declassified] on alert status on Taiwan;

—place Tainan Air Base on a caretaker basis, [less than 1 line not declassified] and reduce support personnel as appropriate;

—submit for Presidential review plans to reduce MAAG size, staffing, or structure in consonance with the F–5E program, and;

—submit for Presidential review any change in staffing or structure of Taiwan Defense Command.

To permit determination of force level changes in the intelligence and regional communications activities, the President directs that:

—The Secretary of Defense, in coordination with other agencies as appropriate, review US communications activities on Taiwan in terms of need and recommend changes in mission, manning and organization deemed necessary for greater efficiency and effectiveness.

—The Director of Central Intelligence review and assess the value of all US intelligence activities [1 line not declassified] and recommend changes in mission, requirements, manning and organization considered appropriate to improve efficiency and effectiveness.

These reviews with recommendations are to be submitted by April 15, 1974.

Henry A. Kissinger

75. Memorandum of Conversation

Washington, March 20, 1974, 4:05–4:25 p.m.

PARTICIPANTS
Han Hsu, Acting Chief, PRC Liaison Office
Chi Chao-chu, Interpreter
Secretary of State Henry A. Kissinger
Winston Lord, Director, Policy Planning Staff, Department of State
Arthur W. Hummel, Jr., Deputy Assistant Secretary for East Asian Affairs
Department of State

Secretary Kissinger: It’s been a long time since I have seen you. Are we ever going to see your Ambassador?
Ambassador Han: I think so.

Secretary Kissinger: I thought we should meet briefly before I go to the Soviet Union so that your Prime Minister will have some idea of what we are doing and to give you some of my views.

First, on my trip to the Soviet Union—I think it will not be a happy trip because we are not in complete agreement about my activities in the Middle East. I keep telling them I am merely following your Vice-Minister’s advice. Seriously, they are very much interested in joint activities with us in the Middle East, but we are not. Thus, this will be a difficult subject. We may agree to something on paper that looks like joint action, but it will not be substantive. We have no concrete ideas on this subject. In fact, I will pursue the strategy that I have outlined to you.

Secondly, we will discuss strategic arms limitation. The negotiations have not been making very much progress, and we may discuss some limited subject like multiple warheads. I have no idea of what progress will be achieved, but I don’t expect much. We will inform you after my return.

They want to discuss force reductions in Europe. No substantive agreement on this is likely. There may be token progress but nothing of strategic significance. Even that may not be achieved on this visit.

Then on bilateral subjects with the Soviets, we may come to agreement on cooperation on an artificial heart and maybe on another space mission—matters of a technical kind.

At any rate, there will be no great surprises.

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1 Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Kissinger Office Files, Box 96, Country Files, Far East, China Exchanges, January 1, 1973–March 31, 1974. Top Secret; Nodis. This meeting was held in the Secretary’s office.
What the Soviets want from us is overtly cooperative relations in the Middle East. They have also asked us for a complete ban on nuclear testing which we would then ask others to observe. We will reject this.

These are the major issues with the Soviets. Do you have any questions?

Ambassador Han: No.

Secretary Kissinger: Then on the Middle East, in effect we are pursuing the strategy I discussed with your Prime Minister, to engage the U.S. more directly in order to restrict Soviet influence. We also wish to break up the ties between Iraq and Syria. We are making some progress in that matter. We hope we may get a disengagement agreement with Syria by the end of April. We have Israeli representatives coming here, the Syrians will come later, and then I may go back for another Middle East trip. You can see that your Vice-Minister has started me on a course of very extensive activities. Will he be coming to the special session of the General Assembly?

Ambassador Han: We have no news now.

Secretary Kissinger: On the subject of Europe, your Prime Minister should know that there is less here than meets the eye. We must frankly state our views but that does not change the basic structure of our relations.

On our bilateral relations with you, I want the Prime Minister to know that we are prepared to proceed along the implications of the last communiqué we signed in Peking. We would be prepared to discuss that here, or if later this year. I should make my annual visit to Peking to pursue the subject then.

But I would like your government to know that what I have discussed with your Prime Minister is unchanged with respect to basic orientation, and we have understood the changes he made in the draft last year to which he specially called our attention.

One matter that I had mentioned to him in Peking was certain withdrawals we would carry out with regard to Taiwan this year,

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2 See footnote 7, Document 60.

3 On February 16, Solomon sent Kissinger a memorandum that detected “a number of public and private signals which seem to constitute a low-key warning to us about future problems in the development of U.S.–PRC relations.” Solomon suggested “you may wish to consider some form of personal message to Premier Chou giving him whatever reassurances you can about our commitment to follow through on normalization, despite the President’s domestic difficulties.” (National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Kissinger Office Files, Box 96, Country Files, Far East, China Exchanges, November 1, 1973–March 31, 1974)

4 Kissinger reported to Nixon on his discussions with Zhou on the communiqué; see Document 62.
F–4s, Phantoms. There is going to be a delay of a few months in the withdrawal of the second squadron. It will be withdrawn by May of 1975 for technical reasons. We are just delaying somewhat the schedule that I gave the Prime Minister by a few months. But they will definitely both be withdrawn and the first one is coming out by the end of June, on schedule.

Also, you might tell our friends in Peking that we are working on the Korean matter in the spirit of the discussions we had last year.

Ambassador Han: Those are the major items I have. Some of these things were mentioned in the discussions with the Prime Minister. We were not there and do not know about this. We will report what you have said.

Secretary Kissinger: One other subject. India has come to us with a desire to improve relations with the United States in order not to be so tied to the Soviet Union. We may be starting discussions with them to see how this may be brought about. We will keep you informed of any developments. We are likely to have some technical discussions with them on economic relations and other things. No military matters obviously. But our strategy is to attempt to wean them away from the Soviet Union.

You have not been back to Peking since you arrived in Washington?

Ambassador Han: No.

Secretary Kissinger: I have been there more often than you have. I am getting practically to be an Arab. When the Foreign Minister greets me at the airport next time, I may embrace him.

I remember with great pleasure my conversations with Chairman Mao and Prime Minister Chou. We are proceeding in the spirit of those discussions. Please communicate my best wishes to our friends in Peking.

Ambassador Han: Thank you. I will do that.

Secretary Kissinger: Are you properly treated here?

Ambassador Han: Yes, all right.

Secretary Kissinger: (Pointing across the room) What do you think of this piece of art?

Ambassador Han: (Laughing). I don’t understand it.

Secretary Kissinger: That’s why I have it here.

Ambassador Han: I have seen it in several of the published photographs taken in your office.

Secretary Kissinger: (Pointing to art object on shelf) Perhaps you have noticed that. That was given to me as a gift by your government when I visited in November.

Ambassador Han: We will make a full report of what you have said. I know you are very busy.
76. Memorandum of Conversation

Washington, April 12, 1974, 2:30 p.m.

PARTICIPANTS
Leonard Unger, United States Ambassador to the Republic of China
Maj Gen Brent Scowcroft, USAF, Deputy Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs
Richard H. Solomon, Senior Staff Member, NSC
John A. Froebe, Jr., Staff Member, NSC

SUBJECT
Reaction to Ambassador Unger’s Appointment, Future Moves in U.S.–PRC Relations, Present Problems with Taipei, ROC–Soviet Contacts, Use of Backchannel

Reaction to Ambassador Unger’s Appointment

Ambassador Unger: I am going to a land neighboring that which I just came from—Thailand. I appreciate the opportunity to get from you whatever background and guidance that I haven’t gotten elsewhere.

General Scowcroft: You certainly must have most of it by now. I’m delighted to see you. Your name is famous.

Ambassador Unger: It has become famous in Taipei but I don’t take that as flattery. I know they are pleased. It gets them out of the jitters.

General Scowcroft: It has helped in that respect. But it has caused concern farther north.

Ambassador Unger: How seriously does Peking take that?

General Scowcroft: With slight disappointment at what they hoped would be a continuing decline in our relations with Taiwan.

Ambassador Unger: But they know that our relations with the ROC will continue. They might even see some benefit in having someone of prestige there, since he would be better able to work constructively with Taipei.

General Scowcroft: On the other hand, they probably face some domestic pressure on the Taiwan question. Although Chou and Mao can look at this question philosophically, they have problems with their own domestic constituencies.

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1 Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 524, Country Files, Far East, China, Vol. XII, Oct 25, 1973–. Secret; Sensitive. The meeting took place in the White House. According to an attached April 19 memorandum by Froebe, Scowcroft approved this memorandum of conversation.

2 Leonard Unger was appointed Ambassador to the Republic of China on March 14 and presented his credentials on May 25.
Ambassador Unger: In the past month the PRC has seemed to be reconsidering their approach to the Taiwan issue.

General Scowcroft: The leadership in Peking can’t appear to be caving in to the imperialists. Dick Solomon, as our tea-leaf reader, might have something to add on this subject.

Mr. Solomon: Your appointment to Taipei probably has impacted on their current domestic leadership problem. The evidence is seen in the different way they handled this year the celebration of the February 28, 1947 uprising on Taiwan. Last year they talked of “peaceful” liberation. This year they pulled back somewhat from that formulation. We believe that there is a policy dispute in Peking over the Taiwan question. We also have other signals that they are concerned.

General Scowcroft: We have been walking this tightrope on our China policy. We are firm that we will maintain our commitment to the ROC. At the same time, we will continue to normalize relations with Peking.

Advance Notice to Ambassador Unger on New Moves with Peking

Ambassador Unger: In Taipei I would like to have maximum information for myself. I would also like to have maximum advance consultation on new moves toward Peking. I realize that this may not always be possible. But some advance consultation might help ameliorate any ROC tendencies to make trouble.

General Scowcroft: We will do whatever we can.

Ambassador Unger: I know how some Washington decisions are made, and that advance consultation is not always possible. But I believe that in this case whenever advance consultation is possible it would help keep the ROC from becoming embittered and would help keep them on the reservation.

General Scowcroft: We will make every effort to keep you informed. We would also appreciate your evaluation of their reactions.

Ambassador Unger: Yes. I consider this a standard part of my task out there.

General Scowcroft: It would help us walk this narrow line.

Present Problems in U.S.–ROC Relations

Ambassador Unger: On the program side, there does not seem to be a great deal going on. Our big package was what Ambassador McConaughy put before the ROC just before he left. I feel that we will get through this all right.

3 Unger is referring to the changes to the U.S. force levels on Taiwan; see Document 74.
General Scowcroft: I agree—but they will probably try to extract a price.

Ambassador Unger: But if the price is not too steep, I would hope that we could accommodate them wherever possible.

Similarly, on the economic side if the present well-being can be maintained, this will reduce the political complications. We have, for example, the recent Exim Bank delays in processing loans for the ROC.

General Scowcroft (to Mr. Froebe): Is the Exim Bank still holding up the loans?

Mr. Froebe: I will have to check on that, sir.

General Scowcroft: I believe Exim is beginning to move again on these loans.

**Japan–PRC Civil Air Agreement**

Mr. Solomon: Another current issue of interest to us is the Japan–PRC Air Agreement.

Ambassador Unger: I believe we should continue to stay out of that arrangement.

General Scowcroft (to Mr. Froebe): Where does this stand at the present time?

Mr. Froebe: The negotiations now seem to be in their last week or two. A Japanese team is now in Peking winding up the negotiations. Prime Minister Tanaka seems determined to push through to a quick conclusion, both because he wants to show continued progress in normalizing relations with Peking and because he wants to clear this away as a source of dispute within his own Liberal Democratic Party. His objectives also relate to the major political test he faces in next June’s Upper House elections.

General Scowcroft: How far apart are the two at this point?

Mr. Froebe: The crunch issues are still the two involving Japan’s air links with Taiwan—China Airlines’ continued use of that name and retention of ground facilities at Japan’s civil airfields. The PRC has shown some flexibility on these issues, but at this point the Tanaka Government seems disposed to move to close the gap on these issues and to confront the ROC with a fait accompli. The ROC at the same time is attempting to face the Tanaka Government down. According to a ticker report today, the ROC Foreign Minister issued a five-point statement taking a fairly hard line and threatening unspecified consequences, although his language was sufficiently ambiguous to allow Taipei a face-saving way out.

Mr. Solomon: Interestingly, Finance Minister Fukuda within the past few weeks has come out publicly in support of Tanaka’s approach on the Civil Air Agreement.
Mr. Froebe: I may not have seen that report, but almost all other reporting has indicated that Fukuda has scrupulously maintained a neutral position on this question, presumably in order not to alienate the support of some right-wing groups in the LDP such as the Seirankai.

Mr. Solomon: The airline name issue involved in this question is quite important in traditional Confucian terms—the rectification of names.

Giving GRC Better Idea of Future Course of U.S.–PRC Relations

Ambassador Unger: The GRC probably would like me to speak to the question of the future pace of our normalization of relations with Peking. I am hoping to talk with the Secretary before leaving and to get his guidance on this score.

General Scowcroft: Yes—although I’m not sure how specific he would be willing to be on this subject.

Ambassador Unger: I don’t believe that I have to break new ground. We are still hewing to the basic decision that we took at the time of the Shanghai Communiqué. As long as there are no sharp departures, I believe that my existence in Taipei will be reasonably calm.

General Scowcroft: We here will try to keep calm and quiet—although we can’t commit ourselves in advance.

Ambassador Unger: Are there any particular questions that I should watch?

General Scowcroft: I don’t believe so. I think you understand very well what we are about. We have a basic strategy, the tactics of which must be adapted according to the circumstances of the particular moment.

ROC–Soviet Contacts

Mr. Solomon: I would suggest that Soviet interest in Taiwan might be worth keeping an eye on. We have learned through a special channel which might not have come to your notice that the ROC Embassy Minister Counselor for Political Affairs recently expressed interest in contacting Federenko (former Soviet Ambassador to the UN) through an academic intermediary here. I don’t think this business was developed to the point of a meeting, however. In addition, the Soviets last December invited a ROC national who resides in the U.S. to Moscow, where they indicated their interest in further contacts with Taiwan. You may also be aware that the Soviets seem to be playing games in South Korea as well.

Ambassador Unger: I know that Ambassador McConaughy’s judgment is that it would be exceedingly unlikely that Premier Chiang

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4 See footnote 5, Document 67.
Ching-kuo would authorize any probes with the Soviet Union. Nevertheless, I agree that we must watch this aspect of the question.

**Use of Backchannel**

Just on procedures—I have not asked for a meeting with the President because I didn’t feel this was necessary at this point.

General Scowcroft: At this point, probably not. But it might be useful in the future. You are enough of a celebrity to make this inadvisable at present.

Ambassador Unger: But if I feel it might be necessary in the future, I will come in to you to that effect.

General Scowcroft: When are you leaving?

Ambassador Unger: April 28. I will be in the Department through next week. Following that, I plan to spend a couple of days in San Francisco to see people at the Asia Foundation and other institutions there. In Hawaii I intend to see Admiral Gayler. That will get me to Taipei no later than May 4 or 5.

General Scowcroft: Any time that you want to use a backchannel feel free to do so. If for example you want to sound us out on something informally, this will enable you to do so without getting the wide circulation that usual State channels would involve.

Ambassador Unger: Very good. As you know, I have some experience with this from Bangkok.

General Scowcroft: You could also use a backchannel if you want to get to the Secretary on something that you did not want to have such wide distribution.

(After closing amenities, Ambassador Unger took his leave of General Scowcroft.)

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77. **Memorandum From Richard H. Solomon of the National Security Council Staff to Secretary of State Kissinger**

Washington, April 12, 1974.

**SUBJECT**

The PRC and Termination of the U.N. Command in Korea

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1 Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Kissinger Office Files, Box 96, Country Files, Far East, China Exchanges, April 1–August 8, 1974. Top Secret; Sensitive. Sent for action.
You will recall that last summer, in preparing our position on the Korean issue for the fall session of the U.N. General Assembly, you indicated to PRC officials that we would be willing to reconsider the future of the U.N. Command (UNC) if UNCURK were dissolved in a non-contentious manner. On June 19, 1973 you handed a note to Ambassador Huang Chen which contained the following paragraph:

Following the 28th session to the U.N. General Assembly, the United States will be prepared to discuss ways in which the question of the U.N. Command might be resolved, with the understanding that any adjustment of security arrangements will not result in a diminution of the security situation on the Korean Peninsula.

The PRC in fact played an important role in managing the Korean issue at the General Assembly session in November in such a manner that UNCURK died a quiet death. Thus, the Chinese undoubtedly expect some indication from us of our intentions regarding the future of UNC. Indeed, as noted below, both the North Koreans and the Chinese have already staked out initial positions on the UNC in public statements issued late last month.

The USG position on the future of the U.N. Command is embodied in NSDM 251, which you signed on March 29. It directs that we seek ROK concurrence to a substitute arrangement in place of the UNC which would contain the following elements:

—Substitution of U.S. and ROK military commanders for the Commander-in-Chief United Nations Command as our side’s signatory to the 1953 Korean Armistice Agreement. The ROK and North Korean representatives should then become the principal members of the Military Armistice Commission.

—Tacit acceptance by the other side of a continued U.S. force presence in South Korea for at least the short term, in return for a Shanghai-type communiqué committing ourselves to reduce and ultimately withdraw U.S. forces as the security situation on the Peninsula is stabilized.

—A non-aggression pact between the two Koreas.


—Avoidance of other changes in the Armistice Agreement.

Once the ROK has agreed to these points (or we have negotiated a mutually acceptable alternative arrangement based on them), we

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2 See Document 37.
3 Material on NSDM 251 is in National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, NSC Institutional Files (H-Files), Box H-246, National Security Decision Memoranda, NSDM 251.
would pursue a two-track negotiating strategy based on Seoul carrying the burden of contacts with Pyongyang, while the U.S. attempts to backstop the ROK and place constraints on Pyongyang through consultations with Peking.

Ambassador Habib presented our negotiating proposal to Foreign Minister Kim Dong Jo on April 9. He expects agreement with Seoul on a package proposal which could be presented to Pyongyang and Peking “within a few weeks.” While you thus may not want to indicate to Teng and Ch’iao in great detail the contents of our proposal pending agreement with the ROK, it seems important that you give them a clear signal that we are moving on this issue. In addition, you may wish to give them a general feel of what we have in mind regarding an alternative arrangement to the UNC. A series of talking points on this subject written from the above perspective are included at the end of this memo.

While Peking was decidedly helpful to us last fall in handling the Korean issue at the U.N., the unsettled state of China’s domestic political scene and the more strident tone of her recent foreign policy statements have injected some uncertainty into our estimate of what role Peking may be willing or able to play on the UNC issue over the coming months. On March 27 the *People’s Daily* indirectly expressed support for a proposal put forward by North Korean Foreign Minister Ho Tam two days earlier calling for a peace treaty to be negotiated directly between North Korea and the United States. The PRC editorial directly supported the following position:

The U.S. government should remove the beret of “UN Forces” from the U.S. troops stationed in South Korea, pull out lock, stock, and barrel together with all their arms and equipment, stop its military assistance to the Pak Chong-hui clique of South Korea, and cease instigating this clique to make savage provocations against the northern half of the republic.

Our guess is that Peking will respond in generally favorable terms to our alternate arrangement for abolition of the UNC if it can be presented to Pyongyang as a transitional arrangement which would hold out some possibility for the eventual realization of North Korea’s maximum goal of a complete U.S. withdrawal from Korea.

The North Koreans have sought to press the idea of a peace treaty negotiated between Pyongyang and Washington by appealing directly to our Congress for support. Pyongyang’s observer mission to the U.N. made attempts in early April to get our U.N. mission to transmit an official proposal from their Supreme People’s Assembly to the Congress. USUN turned aside the North Korean appeal for assistance in
transmitting the proposal. You should indicate to the Chinese that North Korea’s attempts to deal with the U.S. directly will not be welcomed until there is a reciprocal willingness on the part of Peking to have contact with Seoul, and that Pyongyang’s efforts to sow distrust between the U.S. and ROK will not create a climate conducive to the negotiation of new security arrangements between North and South Korea.

Pyongyang will probably attempt to have the Korean issue debated in the General Assembly again this year in order to apply pressure on the UNC issue. You should emphasize to the Chinese our belief that it will be most effective if North and South work out their differences in direct, confidential talks rather than polarizing the situation by public debate in an international forum. Thus, we believe it is most useful to progress on this issue if Seoul and Pyongyang can reach agreement on an alternative to the UNC in private talks. Their agreed position can then be endorsed by the U.N. Security Council.

78. Memorandum of Conversation

New York City, April 14, 1974, 8:05–11:00 p.m.

PARTICIPANTS

Teng Hsiao-p’ing, Vice Premier of the PRC
Ch’iao Kuan-hua, Vice Foreign Minister of the PRC
Ambassador Huang Hua, PRC Permanent Representative to the UNGA
Chang Han-chih (F) (Acted as Interpreter)
Lo Hsu (F) (Acted as Notetaker)
Kuo Chia-ting (Acted as Notetaker)
Henry A. Kissinger, Secretary of State
Joseph P. Sisco, Under Secretary of State
Brent Scowcroft, Major General, National Security Council

1 Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Kissinger Office Files, Box 96, Country Files, Far East, China Exchanges, April 1–August 8, 1974. Top Secret; Sensitive; Exclusively Eyes Only. The meeting took place at the Secretary’s suite at the Waldorf Astoria Hotel. On April 12, Kissinger received a memorandum from Solomon discussing the political background of Deng Xiaoping’s trip. Solomon suggested that his trip was part of a campaign to make China the leader of the “have not” nations. In addition, Deng was “to take the temperature of the Sino-U.S. relationship while in New York.” (Ibid.) The same day, Lord and Hummel also sent Kissinger a memorandum in anticipation of his meeting with Deng. (Ibid.) All brackets are in the original.
SUBJECT
Secretary’s Dinner for the Vice Premier of the Peoples Republic of China

(The Chinese party arrived at 8:05 and were escorted to suite 35A by Mr. Freeman. When the party was seated, the conversation began.)

Secretary Kissinger: It is a very great pleasure to meet you, Mr. Vice Premier. I understand that the Vice Foreign Minister has taken up the same step recently as I . . .

(At this point the press was admitted to take photographs and the conversation was broken off briefly.)

Vice Premier Teng: This is a very large group of press we have here.

Secretary Kissinger: They are asking me to shake hands. (Shakes hands with the Vice Premier and the Vice Foreign Minister.) They want us all three to shake hands at once. Your photographers are much better disciplined than ours, I’m afraid.

Vice Premier Teng: We shouldn’t listen to their orders.

Secretary Kissinger: But we have to listen to their orders. Otherwise they will print the worst picture that they take.

(The press was escorted out of the room.)

How long will you be staying in the U.S.?

Vice Premier Teng: We will be leaving the day after tomorrow.

Secretary Kissinger: Will the Vice Foreign Minister be going with you?

Vice Premier Teng: We will be traveling together.

Secretary Kissinger: How will you be going? By way of the Pacific or by way of Europe?

Vice Premier Teng: We will be going through Europe. Do you mind if I smoke?

Secretary Kissinger: Please go ahead. I have never taken to smoking myself, I’m afraid.

Vice Premier Teng: You’ve missed something. You ought to try it.

Secretary Kissinger: I concentrate on other vices. How is your back coming along, Ambassador Huang?

Ambassador Huang: So-so.

Secretary Kissinger: Have you used the doctor that I arranged for you?

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2 Qiao, like Kissinger, had recently gotten married.
Ambassador Huang: I am keeping him on standby.
Secretary Kissinger: He’s afraid if he uses our doctor he will install a microphone in his back.
Vice Premier Teng: I believe of all who are present here tonight your earliest acquaintance was Ambassador Huang.
Secretary Kissinger: Yes. He met me at the Peking Airport in 1971. He may have forgotten this but he gave me some very valuable lessons on how to negotiate. When we meet with the Russians to discuss a communiqué, they suggest that each side put forward its maximum position and that we then try to discuss a way of bridging the difference. But Ambassador Huang suggested that we write our real positions down at the outset, and that in this way we could more easily reach agreement. And it was as he said it would be.
Vice Premier Teng: You’ve had quite a few years of experience in dealing with the Soviet Union.
Secretary Kissinger: Yes. Quite a few years. It is always very fatiguing and always the same. On the first day the atmosphere is very pleasant. On the second day there is an explosion. On the last day, two hours before the departure, when they see that we will not abandon our position, they become accommodating and pleasant. It is always the same.
Vice Foreign Minister Ch’iao: (In English) Dialectics!
Secretary Kissinger: Well, I don’t want to get into that with the Vice Foreign Minister. You still owe me a poem.
Vice Foreign Minister Ch’iao: That’s right.
Vice Premier Teng: I also have quite a bit of experience with the Soviet Union.
Secretary Kissinger: Oh, in what years?
Vice Premier Teng: Well, I have been to the Soviet Union seven times.
Secretary Kissinger: Then you have been there once more than I have. Tell me, are they always so very difficult? Do they yell at their allies as well as at others?
Vice Premier Teng: In my experience we could never reach agreement.
Secretary Kissinger: We can reach agreement but only very slowly. Their idea of arms control is that we should start from the base which we have now, but they should have five years in which to do what they want.

(At this point Mrs. Kissinger entered the room and was introduced to the guests.)

We’ve just been talking about negotiations with the Soviet Union. The Vice Premier has been to the Soviet Union on seven occasions. His
experience has been that the Soviets never agree to anything. We have reached some agreements with them.

Vice Premier Teng: You are more advanced than I am.

Secretary Kissinger: But I know that, now that I have explained all this, the next time I am in Peking the Vice Foreign Minister will yell at me just to see what the result is.

Vice Premier Teng: You must have had quite a few quarrels with him by now.

Secretary Kissinger: Negotiations with him are always hard but reasonable. And we can reach agreement. For example, on the Shanghai Communiqué, we spent many, many nights going over the details of the language together.

Vice Premier Teng: Each side should speak its mind. That is what is most important.

Secretary Kissinger: But in those negotiations I had had so much mao tai that I was negotiating in Chinese.

Vice Premier Teng: Then you have that in common with the Vice Foreign Minister. He also likes to drink mao tai.

Vice Foreign Minister Ch’iao: If you had drunk a lot, it was not my fault.

Secretary Kissinger: But you were not defeated in those negotiations.

(Pause)

You know, I have had some complaints from Mr. Gromyko about your speech the other day.3

Vice Premier Teng: Was he very dissatisfied?

Secretary Kissinger: He felt he was being attacked and he wanted me to answer on both our behalfs.

Vice Foreign Minister Ch’iao: (In English) Very clever tactics!

Secretary Kissinger: But even if you listen very carefully to what I am going to say tomorrow, you will not hear much criticism.

Vice Premier Teng: I got acquainted with Mr. Gromyko in 1957 for the first time.

Secretary Kissinger: Has he changed much since then? What is your opinion?

Vice Premier Teng: He is not one of the people who decide policy in the Soviet Union.

Secretary Kissinger: That’s right. In my experience he has been used as a straight man for Brezhnev. He never expressed an opinion

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3 A translation of Deng’s UN speech, in which he condemned both superpowers, is excerpted in *The New York Times*, April 12, 1974, p. 12.
himself on the negotiations except on technical matters. Lately he has become somewhat more assertive because he is now on the Politburo.

Vice Premier Teng: Brezhnev was also not one who decided policy before 1964.

Secretary Kissinger: Correct. And he was not supposed to understand foreign policy at that time. After what he did to Khruchshev he has been very, very careful about going away on vacation.

(The party went into the dining room and was seated.)

Whenever you need any advice, you just ask Mr. Sisco.

Ambassador Huang: Mr. Sisco is an expert on the Middle East.

Secretary Kissinger: I'm sure that you know all my associates here tonight. Sisco handles political affairs for us. He is the number three man in the Department of State. And, of course, you know General Scowcroft of the National Security Council. Commander Howe, you remember, worked for him. I wanted him here because he handles all matters connected with my work at the White House. And Mr. Sisco is my alibi on the Middle East.

Vice Foreign Minister Ch’iao: You mean if you achieve success, it belongs to you but if you fail, the failure is Sisco’s!

Secretary Kissinger: But the one who is really responsible for what has happened in the Middle East is the Vice Foreign Minister. Last year we talked about the Middle East question, and I have followed the outlines of that conversation since in what we have done.

Vice Foreign Minister Ch’iao: Last time I met you, we talked according to what Chairman Mao had said to the Egyptian Vice President. You have two hands. You should use both. Give one to Israel and one to the other side.

Secretary Kissinger: We have been following the policy we discussed then.

Vice Premier Teng: That is true. Both hands should be used.

Secretary Kissinger: Exactly!

Vice Premier Teng: In your view is there any hope for disengagement now between Syria and Israel?

Secretary Kissinger: I hope that in the next three weeks we will make considerable progress on this. As you know, I talked yesterday with the Chief of the Syrian Military Intelligence and today I talked to the Israeli Ambassador. In about two weeks, I will go to the Middle East and try to do for the Syrians and the Israelis what I did with Israel and Egypt. And for your information, the Syrian has told me that after disengagement has been achieved, they will turn towards Iraq and work to reduce the Soviet Union’s presence in Iraq. You remember that I discussed this with Chairman Mao and Premier Chou as a long-term strategy.
Vice Premier Teng: Exactly so! President Asad of Syria has visited Moscow lately. What influence do you think that will produce on the situation?

Secretary Kissinger: The Soviet Union has been very eager to play a major role in the negotiations, and they have been conducting themselves with the delicacy for which they are well known. For example, when I was in Moscow, Brezhnev yelled at me for three hours, saying that they must take part in the negotiations. The difficulty is that the Arabs and Israelis do not want the Soviets in the negotiations. While I was in Moscow I sent Asad a telegram asking what he wanted. He replied he wanted the same handling as we had given in the case of the Egyptians. I believe he went to Moscow to balance off the visit of his representative to Washington. But we have no impression of any change in the Syrian position. In fact, Gromyko suggested that I should meet him in Damascus, but when I asked the Syrian in Washington what he thought about this, he said he was not in favor of it. Everything now depends on whether we can succeed in getting the Israelis to agree to withdraw from part of the Golan Heights. (Note: The Chinese interpreter omitted the words “part of” in the Chinese.)

Secretary Kissinger: This is mao tai. Mr. Vice Premier, we welcome you to New York. It is a very great pleasure to see you here.

Mr. Sisco: This is the first time I've had it.

Secretary Kissinger: If you were like the Vice Foreign Minister you would drink it bottoms-up every time.

Mr. Lord: I believe that with mao tai we could solve the energy crisis!

Vice Premier Teng: But could we also solve the raw materials crisis?

Secretary Kissinger: I think if we drink enough mao tai we can solve anything.

Vice Premier Teng: Then, when I go back to China, we must take steps to increase our production of it.

Secretary Kissinger: You know, when the President came back from China he wanted to show his daughter how potent mao tai was. So he took out a bottle and poured it into a saucer and lit it, but the glass bowl broke and the mao tai ran over the table and the table began to burn! So you nearly burned down the White House!

Actually, in about two weeks I'll be in the Middle East again.

Vice Foreign Minister Ch’iao: Do you think that the change in the Israeli Cabinet will affect your mission?

Secretary Kissinger: It will make it more difficult. I have relied most in the past on Madame Meir and Defense Minister Dayan. Both now will be replaced. Nevertheless, I believe we will succeed. It is, of
course, an extremely difficult negotiation because the Israelis are very difficult to deal with. But if the Syrian disengagement succeeds, then we can go back to the Egyptians and seek a peace agreement. The Egyptians are very determined to separate themselves from Moscow as much as possible. Do you have much contact with the Egyptians? Have you seen them recently?

Vice Premier Teng: We’ve not seen them in recent months. It seems as though your success to date is mainly the result of your method of using both hands. Will it be the same with Syria?

Secretary Kissinger: Syria does not have quite as strong a leadership, so it is different. It will be more difficult but we hope for success.

Ambassador Huang: What is the attitude of the Syrian Defense Minister, Mr. Mustafa Talas?

Secretary Kissinger: I do not believe I have met him. I know the Foreign Minister and the President, of course, and the Chief of Intelligence. It is possible that the Defense Minister would be more pro-Soviet. All Syrian military equipment comes from the Soviet Union. But, they have to pay for it! Our strategy is that after settling the Syrian problem, we will go back to the Egyptians for a peace agreement. And then, after that, we will go back to Syria.

Vice Foreign Minister Ch’iao: The key point is that we hope you will give more word to the Israelis so that they will be persuaded to withdraw from the Golan Heights.

Secretary Kissinger: We have to do this in stages. What we want to do now is to withdraw from part of Golan. This way we can get them to do it. If we ask too much at this point, this would lead to a stalemate, and the Soviets would come back in. We do not support the Israeli position on staying on the Golan Heights.

Vice Premier Teng: This is a very important point.

Secretary Kissinger: We have not supported it.

Vice Premier Teng: Otherwise, there would be no progress and then the Soviets would certainly come back in.

Secretary Kissinger: If we are successful in these disengagement talks, we can hope to reduce Soviet influence in Syria, as we did in Egypt. And, we intend to do more with Egypt.

Vice Premier Teng: If the Soviet Union succeeds in Syria, then the Soviets will have three places in the Middle East on which they can rely: Syria, Iraq and Southern Yemen.

Secretary Kissinger: We are trying to prevent this from happening in Syria. And, we are already working on Southern Yemen. We think the Egyptians will help us in this.

Vice Premier Teng: Chairman Mao touched on this point in his discussions with you. Our attitude is that, on the one hand we support
the Arabs, but, on the other hand, we work with you to fix the bear in
the north together with you.

Secretary Kissinger: That is exactly our position. If we can get into
a position in which we can disagree on the Middle East, that would
show there had been progress. Afterwards, that is after there has been
a settlement, of course, we can expect to have some disagreements.

(The Chinese interpreter had some difficulty with this sentence
and there was a brief discussion in Chinese over how to interpret it.)

Secretary Kissinger: I have not seen Ambassador Huang Chen
since he returned, but I plan to see him next week.

Vice Premier Teng: There has been no change in the relationship
we have so far. (Note: The Vice Premier’s original statement did not
contain the words “so far.” These two words were added by the Chi-
nese interpreter.)

Secretary Kissinger: We continue to attach the utmost importance
to good and friendly relations between the United States and the Peo-
bles Republic of China. We intend to pursue the course of normaliza-
tion of our relations, as I have said in my talks with Chairman Mao
and Premier Chou.4

Vice Premier Teng: This policy, and the principles on which it is
based, are personally supported by Chairman Mao. I believe that from
your two long talks with Chairman Mao you ought to have this un-
derstanding. The last time you met him you talked for three hours, I
believe.

Secretary Kissinger: We went into great detail in those discussions,
so I never pay any attention to the newspaper accounts of our rela-
tionship. In our experience, the Chinese word always counts.

(The Secretary toasted the Vice Foreign Minister.)

Vice Premier Teng: Now that you have drunk all this mao tai, your
speech tomorrow is bound to be excellent.

Secretary Kissinger: It will be moving! I shall probably attack the
superpowers! I am glad that the Vice Premier has confirmed what the
Vice Foreign Minister has already said to Ambassador Bruce in Peking.
Our relationship has not changed.

Vice Premier Teng: I have read the record of your talk with Chair-
man Mao Tse-tung. It was very explicit. You had a discussion of the
relationships between the United States and China from a strategic

4 When Kissinger later recounted this conversation to Nixon over the telephone,
he said, “I have the feeling Chou is on the way out. They didn’t mention him once
during the evening. And every time I brought him up they changed the conversation
to Mao.” (National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, Kissinger Telcons, Box 25,
2 March–April 1974)
point of view. The only difficulty is on where the Soviet strategic focus is. On this point, we have some differences, but these differences do not matter, for practice will show where the true focal point is.

Secretary Kissinger: Exactly. Wherever the first focal point is, the next focal point is obvious. If the focal point is in Europe, then the next is on China. If the focal point is China, then the next one is Europe. If the focal point is on the Middle East, then the next is also obvious.

Vice Premier Teng: In the East we have talked to the Japanese—our Japanese friends—about this. They do not seem to realize this point. They seem to think that the Soviet intentions in the East do not include them. For example, in our discussion of the Tyumen project—the exploitation of oil fields in Siberia—the Japanese said they would have to reconsider their position so as not to offend the Chinese. But they did not really think that their interests would be affected by this development.

Secretary Kissinger: The Japanese do not yet think in strategic terms. They think in commercial terms.

Well, I am particularly glad tonight to see my old friends from China. Speaking from our side, we can confirm every detail of our discussions with Chairman Mao and with Premier Chou, and we can confirm the direction on which our policy is set. We have had some debate with our European allies to make them realize the facts and to be realistic. But this does not influence our desire to construct a strong Europe. But you, as old friends, understand this. The French have been taking a rather short-term viewpoint. You have talked to them recently, I believe. But this cannot influence the realities of the United States and the Soviet position vis-à-vis Europe. This is nothing but a quarrel within the family.

Vice Premier Teng: Just so. There are minor quarrels, but the unity remains.

Secretary Kissinger: Well said!

Vice Premier Teng: But if you were to show more consideration for the Europeans, would there not be a better result?

Secretary Kissinger: Depends to whom. They are very much divided.

Vice Foreign Minister Ch’iao: What we mean—we are not much qualified to speak on the European question—what I mean is, mostly consideration for France. Speaking frankly, we know that you have some opinions against the French. But must it be so open? That’s the first point. The second is that we wonder whether you could show more consideration to the French. They have a very strong sense of self-respect and national pride.
Secretary Kissinger: The problem is that we started out working with France because we have believed the French were in many ways most supportive of Europe and they were the best on this point. So with regard to every move we made in the Middle East we went to the French and got their approval. Then we discovered they were opposing us on every point—every detail—behind our backs. In our last conversation the Vice Foreign Minister said that we have a coordinated strategy. But the French have no strategy, only tactics. So in the Middle East they have been working to undermine us. This is of no advantage to anyone, not even to the French. So we decided that it would be useful to make it public—to bring it out in the open where the issues could be clarified.

Vice Premier Teng: That is good—if it does not continue in the open.

Vice Foreign Minister Ch’iao: I tell you quite frankly that when I read your talk to the wives of the Congressmen I was very alarmed.

Secretary Kissinger: You know, I have never persuaded anyone of what really happened on that occasion. It is the perfect example of what happens in an unplanned ceremony. I arrived at my office and found that I was scheduled to talk to the Congressional wives, so I screamed at my colleagues and objected. But it was on the schedule, so I went to see them. I thought that no three of them could ever agree on what I said and that I would be safe. About two-thirds through the talk I joked that I was glad to see no press there. It was then that I found that there were press there. Everyone thinks this was very carefully planned. But you are right. I do not intend to repeat that particular speech.

(The Secretary rose to give a toast.)

Mr. Vice Premier, Mr. Vice Foreign Minister, Friends:

This is an informal occasion and not one for formal speech-making. But as I look back on my experience in government, I continue to believe that the most important mission I have engaged in was my first trip to Peking. The normalization of relations between the United States and the Peoples Republic of China is the most important event of our Administration, and it is a major factor in the protection of world peace. Many things have happened in this country and in the world since that first trip, but each time we meet we confirm our commitment to each other. The United States remains committed to all the undertakings and all the strategies which we have discussed. We believe that the progress and independence of the Peoples Republic of China is a fundamental factor in world peace. We appreciate the constructive and frank nature of all our discussions. I would like to express the joy of all my colleagues in welcoming another friend from the Peoples Republic of China.
Now I ask you to drink with me to the health of Chairman Mao, to the health of Premier Chou, to the health of our honored guests here tonight, and to the friendship between the American and Chinese peoples!

(The party was seated.)

(Pause)

I am always at a disadvantage with the Vice Foreign Minister. The Vice Foreign Minister has studied philosophy. And he has studied Hegel, but I have only studied as far as Kant. I am sure that it’s all right with the Vice Foreign Minister if I criticize France, but not Germany. He would not let me get away with that!

Vice Premier Teng: Why is there still such a big noise being made about Watergate?

Secretary Kissinger: That is a series of almost incomprehensible events, and the clamor about it is composed of many people who for various reasons oppose the President.

Vice Premier Teng: Chairman Mao told you that we are not happy about this. Such an event in no way affects any part of our relations.

Secretary Kissinger: I assure you we have carried out our foreign policy without regard to the Watergate incident, and we will continue to carry it out regardless of Watergate.

Vice Premier Teng: We do not care much about such an issue.

Secretary Kissinger: In our foreign policy we continue to have very wide support from the American public. When I first met the Prime Minister I spoke of China as the land of mystery. Now the U.S. must seem a very mysterious country.

Vice Premier Teng: Such an issue is really incomprehensible to us.

Secretary Kissinger: It has its roots in the fact that some mistakes were made, but also, when you change many policies, you make many, many enemies.

(The Vice Premier rose.)

Vice Premier Teng: I should like to propose a toast.

First, I should like to thank the Doctor for giving us a dinner with such a warm welcome. Since the President’s visit and Dr. Kissinger’s visits to China, and since the signing of the Shanghai Communiqué, relations between our two countries can be said to be fine. Of course, our hope is that basing our relations on the Shanghai Communiqué we can continue to develop our relations. I should like to propose a toast to Dr. Kissinger and to the friendship of the American and Chinese peoples.

(Everyone was seated.)

Secretary Kissinger: Of course, we always read a great deal in the Hong Kong papers about Chinese domestic developments.
Vice Premier Teng: There is much news in the newspapers, of course. But it is not reliable at all, as you just said. I touched on this point in my speech the other day at the U.N.

Secretary Kissinger: We do not pay much attention to newspaper reports.

Vice Premier Teng: Doctor, are you familiar with Confucius?

Secretary Kissinger: Well, generally, but not in detail.

Vice Premier Teng: Confucius, in short, was an expert in keeping up the rites, and very conservative. His ideology has been binding the Chinese for over two thousand years. These ideas have a deep influence on the ideology of the people. If we wish to emancipate the people’s ideology from old thinking, we must remove Confucius. This is a move to emancipate the people’s thinking.

Secretary Kissinger: Our newspapers have said that this is directed against individuals, living individuals, and not against ancient individuals.

Vice Premier Teng: There is some ground in what they say. When you criticize a conservative ideology, then, naturally, it will affect some working staffs—some people who represent the conservative ideology being attacked.

Secretary Kissinger: I have been observing your foreign policy for a long time, and I conclude that it has always been consistent. We, of course, do not comment on your internal policies and your internal situation.

Vice Premier Teng: Those comments in the newspapers are not reliable.

Secretary Kissinger: Of that, I am sure.

Mr. Gromyko asked me about the situation in China, and I told him we see no change in your foreign policy.

Vice Foreign Minister Ch’iao: [in Chinese to Mr. Freeman] How is your reading of the 24 Dynastic histories coming along?

Mr. Freeman: [in Chinese] I haven’t yet finished them. We all have little time for reading now.

Vice Foreign Minister Ch’iao: [in Chinese] Well, nobody could read those books through to the end.

Secretary Kissinger: What is this—a private negotiation going on?
Mr. Freeman: The Vice Foreign Minister asked me whether I had been reading the 24 Dynastic histories, and I was about to tell him that you leave us no time for that kind of reading.

Secretary Kissinger: Yes, they have no time for any reading, not even reading of my instructions. Where are the books kept?

Mr. Freeman: They are in the Department of State library, displayed prominently in the handsome case in which they were stored when the Government of the Peoples Republic of China presented them to us.

Secretary Kissinger: I must go down and see them. Perhaps I will do it this week.

Well, shall we go out to the sitting room and have some coffee and tea?

(The party adjourned to the sitting room.)

The last time I was in this room was when the Arab-Israeli war started. Sisco woke me up at 6:00 a.m. He said, if you can get on the telephone you can perhaps stop it. I thought anyone with this kind of judgment deserved to be promoted.

Vice Foreign Minister Ch’iao: The last time we met here also, didn’t we?

Secretary Kissinger: I have this for when I come up to the U.N. Mr. Lord is still working on my speech for tomorrow, but I tell you if I say anything significant at all that will be a mistake.

Vice Foreign Minister Ch’iao: Not because of the mao tai!

Secretary Kissinger: I thought with your permission, Mr. Vice Premier, we might review a few problems. We have already talked about the Middle East, and now I would summarize our discussion as follows: We agree with your assessment that the three Soviet strong points in the Middle East are Syria, Iraq and South Yemen. We are bringing about substantial changes in Egyptian foreign policy. For your information we have reason to believe that the Egyptians will abrogate their treaty with the Soviet Union this year. This is, of course, very confidential. But I have never read a leak in a Chinese newspaper! We will start soon to give some economic assistance to Egypt. We are thinking in terms tentatively of about $250 million and the World Bank at the beginning may add another $200 million. And we are organizing support in Europe for Egypt as well. We are working with Chancellor Brandt on this. Next week, as you know, he will visit Egypt. We are also approaching the British and the Dutch.

The Egyptians may need some help if the Soviet Union cuts off its military assistance. We plan to give some assistance through Saudi Arabia and Kuwait. We hope Yugoslavia will be willing to give the Egyptians some spare parts. I do not know whether China—they would like to build MIGs themselves. It is up to you, but I think they would be
responsive to discussion of this point. They are working with us on the South Yemen problem. Syria will work on the Iraq problem, and so will Iran, which is also active in Oman. We think we can reduce Soviet influence in the area systematically.

The Soviets are extremely anxious about our efforts. I may agree with them to some face-saving thing, which would not, however, affect the substance. For example, I may agree to meet Gromyko in Geneva before I go to the Middle East. I will not tell him anything and, in fact, I will not be able to tell him anything because I will not yet have gone to the Middle East. I will do this to prevent them from agitating their supporters in Syria.

I also had a very good talk with Boumediene last week. He was very impressed with his visit to China. This did not surprise me at all. I believe he will also help us in Syria.

That is about where we stand on the Middle East at the moment. I will be going to the Middle East in about two weeks, depending on the situation in Israel. I will probably also go to Iran and to Kuwait and to one or two of the little sheikdoms in the Persian Gulf. We will probably deepen our bilateral cooperation with Iran. This is all in line with what I have discussed with Chairman Mao and Premier Chou.

Vice Foreign Minister Ch’iao: Where do we stand on the Pakistani tanks? Has the Shah agreed to supply them?

Secretary Kissinger (to Sisco): What is the status of that?

Mr. Sisco: The Shah is looking at it very systematically.

Secretary Kissinger: We are trying to do what we can to modernize their tank inventory.

Vice Foreign Minister Ch’iao: But hasn’t Iran helped India recently more than it has helped Pakistan?

(Mr. Lord mentioned to Secretary Kissinger Iran’s efforts to ease India’s problem on oil prices.)

Secretary Kissinger: It has provided some economic, but not military aid. This has to do with oil and the energy situation. The Shah is a very tough-minded individual.

Vice Foreign Minister Ch’iao: Is there any new situation in Iraq?

Secretary Kissinger: We are leaving them to sit there. We are keeping them occupied so they can’t intervene in Syria. We told President Boumediene that at the right moment we were prepared to make a move toward Iraq but it is a little premature at the moment. After Syria is a little closer to us we can approach Iraq.

Vice Premier Teng: When the Vice President of Egypt visited China, we touched on this question of giving some assistance but we never got into details. They did not raise it directly with us.

Secretary Kissinger: Because they are not ready yet.
Vice Foreign Minister Ch’iao: But, they raised the question of light weapons.

Vice Premier Teng: In this respect, our power is very limited.

Secretary Kissinger: We recognize that. Should the Egyptians talk to you? Or do you want to stay out of it?

Vice Premier Teng: We adopted a positive attitude when we talked to them.

Secretary Kissinger: Wouldn’t it be better to talk directly with the Egyptians than through us?

Vice Premier Teng: We’ve kept very good relations with the Egyptians, so that would be easy.

Secretary Kissinger: That is very useful! Very good!

Vice Foreign Minister Ch’iao: Isn’t there some way in which you can provide more military help to Pakistan?

Secretary Kissinger: On the military side, we have a domestic problem—the problem of Congressional opposition. But, we are encouraging Iran and attempting to ease Iran’s problems in helping them.

Vice Premier Teng: Why has Iran rendered more help to India than to Pakistan?

Secretary Kissinger: That is inconceivable! Is it possible?

Mr. Sisco: No.

Secretary Kissinger: I will look into it.

Mr. Sisco: The Iranians have tried to ease the Indian situation with regard to oil—to calm them down.

Secretary Kissinger: In all my discussions with the Shah he has always considered India a major threat to his security.

Vice Premier Teng: The reality probably is so.

Secretary Kissinger: Yes. But now there is so much money in the Moslem countries we will see what we can do to get Pakistan military aid.

Vice Foreign Minister Ch’iao: Let me be frank with you. Our Pakistani friends feel that the indirect assistance (since you have problems giving them direct assistance) comes too slowly.

Secretary Kissinger: They are right. There are so many legal restrictions which we face. But, we are doing everything which we can.

Vice Premier Teng: I feel that you could do much more.

Secretary Kissinger: If you have some concrete suggestions on how to accomplish that, we would be happy to consider them.

Vice Premier Teng: I have no concrete suggestions. But, we understand that our Pakistani friends are a little anxious.

Secretary Kissinger: You are right. This is the case of a curious and complex situation in our own country.
Vice Foreign Minister Ch’iao: I might mention another problem. In the last few days since we left Peking, the tripartite talks between India, Pakistan and Bangladesh have reached agreement. I wonder how you feel about this. We think this is a good thing. The issue of the Pakistani prisoners has finally been settled.

Secretary Kissinger: We think Bangladesh is not an Indian satellite. When relations are normal between India and Bangladesh, contradictions between them will emerge. I have also always believed that India will live to regret what it did in 1971. Do you plan to establish relations with Bangladesh now?

Vice Premier Teng: There is no obstacle to that now.

Secretary Kissinger: We are trying to move India further away from the Soviets.

Vice Premier Teng: There have always been good relations between the peoples of Bangladesh and China.

Secretary Kissinger: Yes.

Vice Foreign Minister Ch’iao: I have a question. How do you view the current situation between the Soviet Union and India? Are relations looser or has there been no change?

Secretary Kissinger: I think there has not yet been a significant change, but India is trying to loosen its relations with the Soviet Union. It is trying hard to get closer to us. It is my impression that their policies are not so closely coordinated with the Soviet Union as they were before. So, the situation is not like before in that respect.

Vice Premier Teng: How was your trip to Moscow?

Secretary Kissinger: That was the next question I wanted to discuss. You know that the President will be going to Moscow in June. We discussed arrangements for the visit and the agreements we might reach during it. The trip followed the pattern I have described to you. That is, there was a very good first day and the last half day was very good. But, the day and a half in the middle was not so good at all. It is very curious. I have been to the Soviet Union six times. I have always had the experience of being yelled at, but I have never made any concessions after having been yelled at; so I conclude that Mr. Brezhnev does it for the Politburo and not for any concrete purpose.

Vice Premier Teng: Why did they suddenly hold a long session of the Politburo?

Secretary Kissinger: Let me review what is being planned for the Summit. There will not be any major agreements this year, in my opinion. But, we plan agreement in the following areas: First, on medical research, primarily in the area of heart disease. I think this will not change the course of history. Another agreement which we plan is in the area of space flight. As you know, we have planned a joint space
flight for 1975. Now we are planning one for 1977. The second agreement I wanted to mention is on the exchange of long-term economic information. This is called a long-term economic agreement, but it does not involve any quantities. Just an exchange of statistics.

They have proposed to us also that we agree to stop all underground testing and appeal to all other countries to stop. We totally rejected a joint appeal to any other country. We may agree, however, to limit underground tests but not to ban them. We think this will not affect the Peoples Republic of China, since you do not test much underground anyway.

Vice Premier Teng: Even if you signed an agreement with the Soviet Union that would not affect us.

Secretary Kissinger: Whatever we do with them will be bilateral, and there will be no appeal to the Peoples Republic of China.

Vice Foreign Minister Ch'iao: (In English) You have done it right.

Secretary Kissinger: The level of permitted underground tests which we fix will be set above 100 kilotons. Frankly, we have set a limit above what we want to test. Since we hadn’t planned to test anything above that limit anyway, there will be no effect on us. This is not a major move. That leaves the Strategic Arms Limitation Talks. Oh, one other agreement which they have proposed to us is not to build—you see under our Strategic Arms Limitation Agreement, each side can build two defensive sites. They have suggested that we not build the second. At the moment each side has one.

In the field of Strategic Arms Limitations, I personally do not expect any agreement. The position of the two sides is too far apart. In effect, what the Soviet Union has proposed to us is that they give us a limit but not have one immediately for themselves. The limit they have picked for us is what we already have in our arsenal. Their limit, which they propose for themselves, is what they will have in five years. On the basis of this proposal, no agreement is possible. There would have to be a radical change in positions for an agreement to take place. I think that is unlikely. So this is why I have been speaking as I have to the press about this question.

Incidentally, you may have read in the American newspapers that we are behind the Soviet Union in strategic weapons. This is nonsense. In the number of warheads, that is, the number of warheads in our strategic forces alone, not including our Air Forces in Europe and Korea and elsewhere, the U.S. superiority to the Soviet Union is approximately four and a half to one. Simply counting the warheads on missiles we are ahead three and a half to one. If you add the B–52s, then we are four and a half to one. If you add aircraft carriers, tactical fighters and our Air Forces, we are ahead five and a half to one. Also, our missiles are much more accurate than theirs. But you read so much
nonsense in the American press. Even I sometimes get scared when I read these reports! So far the Soviet Union does not have any multiple warheads on its missiles. They are testing them, but they do not have them. I will give you some figures sometime on this in a smaller group. I can't have Hummel find it out!

Vice Premier Teng: I also feel in this respect it is hardly possible that you could reach agreement.

Secretary Kissinger: I may be wrong, but I see no sign that an agreement will be concluded. We may be able to achieve an optical agreement. The issue of inspection is very hard. We have made an interim agreement. Frankly, the number of launchers is not so very important. Each launcher has many weapons on it. For example, each missile on our submarines has 10 warheads that can be independently targeted with very great accuracy. So you can't make judgments on the basis of the numbers alone any more. Therefore, an agreement is quite difficult. The Soviets have still not started to test multiple warheads on their submarine-launched missiles. On land, they are testing three types. We think that by year-end they may complete the testing of one of these. But, then they must produce it. They have not done so yet.

Vice Premier Teng: As far as we are concerned in our relations with the Soviet Union, that is, on the eastern part of our border, there has been no change. It is still the same. There seems to be no change in deployments.

Secretary Kissinger: I think there has been a slight change, but I am not sure. I thought they had added three divisions recently, but I will check.

Maj Gen Scowcroft: Yes. That's right.

Secretary Kissinger: Three divisions are not significant.

Vice Premier Teng: Basically, they have not changed.

Secretary Kissinger: That is our impression as well.

Vice Premier Teng: There are one million Soviet troops deployed on our very, very long border, and they are scattered all over the place. They use this simply to scare people with weak nerves! I believe that, when you discussed this with Chairman Mao, he said even one million was not enough for defensive purposes and for an offensive purpose they must increase them by another million.

Secretary Kissinger: It depends on what they want. If they want to take all of China, that is right. It depends on what their objective is.

Vice Premier Teng: If they occupy some places on the border, what is the significance of that? They would simply get bogged down.

Secretary Kissinger: I have no estimate that they have any such intent, but it could be that, at some point, they would try to destroy your
Vice Premier Teng: Chairman Mao has said that our nuclear power is only that much (holding up narrow gap between thumb and forefinger). But, we thank you very much for telling us all this.

Secretary Kissinger: Are there any outstanding problems in our bilateral relations which we should discuss?

Vice Premier Teng: Ask the Vice Foreign Minister if there are any outstanding problems.

Vice Foreign Minister Ch’iao: There is nothing significant. The departure and the return of the heads of our respective liaison offices is a normal occurrence.

Secretary Kissinger: Chairman Mao told me that he would call Ambassador Huang Chen back to Peking for consultations. We were not surprised.

Vice Foreign Minister Ch’iao: When I met Ambassador Bruce before leaving Peking I told him that this coming and going by him was something normal and it had no significance.

Secretary Kissinger: No, it was not significant. I wanted his advice on some European matters. And, we announced it that way.

Vice Foreign Minister Ch’iao: I said to Ambassador Bruce once, wondering about his involvement with Europe—he said—I liked his answer—that just because he knew the grandfathers of the European leaders, this was no reason to put him in charge of European affairs. But I am sure this was not a criticism of you.

Secretary Kissinger: Ambassador Bruce is a good friend of mine.

Vice Foreign Minister Ch’iao: I asked Ambassador Bruce if this was true and he said yes.

As for our bilateral exchange program—in cultural exchange, that is in our people-to-people cultural exchanges, there have been some slight delays, but just for normal reasons.

Vice Premier Teng: Anyway, we are going along the track of the Shanghai communiqué.

Secretary Kissinger: So are we.

Vice Premier Teng: Do you think of any issue on bilateral affairs which we should discuss?

Secretary Kissinger: (To Hummel) Is there anything else? . . . (To Teng) On Korea, we are now talking with the South Koreans about the removal of the UN Command. We think you and we should stay related to the armistice in order to influence our friends in this situation. (Note: The Chinese interpreter rendered the sentence simply as “we should influence our friends in this situation.” She did not mention the armistice agreement in this context.) We are also prepared in principle
to make a statement on the withdrawal of our forces along the lines of the Shanghai communiqué statement. But, we cannot withdraw immediately. After we have worked out the details with South Korea, we will let you know informally. We appreciate your acts with respect to the UN Command last year very, very much, and particularly appreciate the meticulous way in which you carried out our understanding. Our Ambassador to the UN is a little excitable—Scali—but Ambassador Huang will understand. He had several heart attacks along the way. He has very great respect for Ambassador Huang.

I want you to know I have been thinking about the phrase in the last communiqué which we issued in Peking. We can discuss the meaning of this through Ambassador Huang Chen, or later in the year, if I take my annual trip to Peking.

Vice Premier Teng: (The Vice Premier indicated inconclusively that this topic could be discussed with Ambassador Huang Chen.) What is to be done on the Taiwan question?

Secretary Kissinger: We are continuing to reduce our presence there as I told you. We are thinking of methods of how we can give effect to the principle of one China as expressed in the last communiqué. We have not worked out all our thinking yet, but we are willing to listen to any ideas you have. You drafted the phrase.

Vice Foreign Minister Ch’iao: I think on this question, I understand the essence of the question. I participated in the drafting of the communiqué and in the drafting of this language. The essential meaning is as Chairman Mao told you. The normalization of our relations can only be on the basis of the Japanese pattern. No other pattern is possible. So, I might also mention that, with regard to the present relations between our two countries, my view is that our relationship should go forward. It should not go backward. I talked frankly on this with Ambassador Bruce. We had a friendly talk on this.

Secretary Kissinger: I am aware of what you said to him. We keep this very much in mind.

Vice Premier Teng: With regard to this question, there are two points. The first point is that we hope we can solve this question relatively quickly. (Note: Chinese interpreter rendered this in English as “as quickly as possible.”) But, the second point is that we are not in a hurry on this question. These points have also been mentioned to you by Chairman Mao.

I suppose we have discussed everything that we have to discuss tonight. We have taken up a great deal of your time. You must be tired. Tomorrow, you must speak at the UN.

Secretary Kissinger: I must make sure to say nothing at all. I think I am on the verge of achieving success in this—with the dedicated assistance of my associates. Please give my regards and those of the Pres-
ident to our friends in China and especially give my respects to Chairman Mao and the Prime Minister.

(The dinner ended at approximately 11:00 p.m. The Secretary escorted his Chinese guests to the elevator.)

5 Afterward, Kissinger told Nixon, “I had a good talk with the Chinese last night. You know the highest-ranking official ever was here. They fully reaffirmed our policy and he went on and on about your visit. And he strongly reaffirmed the course that was outlined.” (Ibid.)

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79. Memorandum From the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger) to President Nixon

Washington, April 24, 1974.

SUBJECT
Nuclear Sales to the PRC

The Under Secretaries Committee (USC) has reported to you that several U.S. companies are seeking authorization to negotiate the sale of nuclear power reactors and uranium fuel to the PRC (Tab B). No Communist country has purchased Western power reactors, and as far as the PRC is concerned, the necessary intergovernmental agreements regulating the sale and transfer of nuclear equipment and fuel are not in place.

The USC’s study has concluded that the export of light water reactors and slightly enriched uranium fuel would be consistent with our policy of facilitating the development of trade with the PRC, would have no adverse strategic implications, and would not be contrary to our obligations under the NPT.

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1 Source: Ford Library, NSC Institutional Files (H-Files), Box H–53, NSDM 261, Nuclear Sales to the PRC. Secret. Sent for action. A stamped notation on the memorandum indicates Nixon saw it. According to an attached, undated draft of this memorandum, Scowcroft and McFarlane revised it on March 26. McFarlane further revised the recommendation section on April 24. Solomon and David Elliot sent this memorandum to Kissinger under a March 22 covering memorandum summarizing it.

2 Attached but not printed. On October 31, 1973, the Chairman of the Under Secretaries Committee requested that an interagency working group, under the leadership of the Department of State, study the question of nuclear sales to the People’s Republic of China. Deputy Secretary of State Rush, Chairman of this group, submitted the report to the President on February 14, 1974. (Memorandum from Rush to Nixon, February 14; ibid.)
In order that these exports might proceed, the USC recommends that we should indicate to the Chinese our willingness to conclude a standard bilateral intergovernmental agreement for nuclear transfers. This agreement would provide for the application of safeguards, as we require for all nuclear exports to any country.

Future requests for nuclear exports to Communist countries would continue to be considered on a case-by-case basis.

I recommend that you approve the USC’s recommendations, including the imposition of U.S. safeguards, until such time that the PRC takes its seat in the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) and becomes subject to its safeguards. (If the PRC, subsequently, were to withdraw from the IAEA, the U.S. safeguards would again become operative.) The Joint Congressional Committee on Atomic Energy would be informed if the PRC indicates interest in negotiating the bilateral intergovernmental agreement.

Recommendation

That you approve our offering to conclude with the PRC an intergovernmental atomic energy agreement with standard safeguard provisions, thereby establishing the necessary conditions for possible sale of U.S. nuclear power reactors and fuel. Subject to your approval, I will sign the necessary implementing directive at Tab A.

3 The draft NSDM is attached but not printed. Nixon initialed the Approve option. The attached correspondence profile indicates that he made this decision on May 1. For the signed NSDM, see Document 83.

80. Telegram From the Liaison Office in China to the Department of State

Beijing, May 24, 1974, 0435Z.


1. After having been here a year I would like to make some personal comments on the Sino-American relationship, derived almost entirely from my own untutored reflections on the subject.

1 Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Kissinger Office Files, Box 96, Country Files, Far East, China Exchanges, April 1–August 8, 1974. Secret; Immediate; Nodis.
2. First and foremost in domestic and foreign speculation is the power position of Chou En-Lai. I cannot believe he has in any degree whatever forfeited his unique standing with Chairman Mao; only an ingrate would repudiate a loyalty, extending over half a century, that has so largely contributed to the present prestige of the PRC chief and his cult, not to mention the spectacular manner in which the Prime Minister has handled the complex internal and external policies of this country.

Moreover, from every credible source there is testimony to the deep affection entertained by the Chairman for his gifted colleague. They are undoubtedly two old men in a hurry, anxious to secure, if such be possible, an orderly succession to the regime they have invented and administered.

3. Chou has always played second fiddle to Mao. No one has ever accused him of ambition to supplant his master. Why then are rumors so prevalent about the decline of his influence?

4. I think they are chiefly inspired by enemies who, afraid to attack the deified Chairman, would like to fish in troubled waters in case of Mao’s decease, if Chou, the twin bastion of present stability, survived him. If Chou were to predecease Mao, the resultant shape of the succession might be simpler to fashion.

The real question is whether any individual could soon replace this duumvirate except by an improbable military coup. The more likely immediate solution might be administration by a collectively faithful for an unspecified time to the doctrines so amply propagated by the Chairman.

5. I do not decry the notion that there are also young men in a hurry, to whom the memories of the early vicissitudes of the CCP, and the stirring exploits of the Long March are like notes of scarce-heard bugles. But the discrediting or even the overthrow of Chou seems to me beyond compass, even if they plot to precipitate chaos.

6. Therefore, I am inclined to think the two, or even one, if the other dies, will persevere in trying to establish the governmental apparatus on a base so firm it cannot easily be dismantled.

The relief of Chou from his ceremonial functions is a natural development, particularly in view of his age, and the exhausting life—some say an average workday of 18 hours—he has led for decades. I read nothing significant of a schism between him and the Chairman in this change of pattern. Of course, if the Prime Minister becomes physically incapacitated to carry on his reduced burdens that is another matter.

7. Given a continuance of moderately good health for Chou what should we expect in the next few months to mark the Chinese-American relationship? Has there indeed been a “cooling off”, a disappointment amongst Chinese leaders of their expectations of its fruitfulness for their country? The answer to this is, in my opinion, a
modified “Yes”. Some of the veiled attacks against Chou are launched by those who for doctrinaire reasons oppose his opening windows to the West, as well as by those who clandestinely disapprove the extent of the rift with the USSR. These considerations animate his opponents who dare not attack the sacrosanct Chairman.

8. What foundation is there for the disappointment to which I have referred? Primarily, I think it is ascribable (1) to latent fears that our détente with the USSR will lead us into actions and agreements inimical to the national interests of the PRC. (2) To a suspicion that we will not within the next couple of years proceed to a full diplomatic recognition of the PRC, and a withdrawal of our Embassy from Taiwan. (3) To impatience with our alleged lack of interest in a decisive solution of the problem of Cambodia, where their own diplomacy has recently taken a sharp turn toward more support for the Khmer Rouge, and a downgrading of Sihanouk, though they will keep him in the picture. (4) To fear of the repercussions on U.S. policy vis-à-vis China because of our concern with crises elsewhere, and our domestic political tribulations.

9. I think it would be futile to elaborate on these four points, but they should be borne in mind. Chinese officials sometimes talk to foreigners other than Americans in this strain.

During the past two months I have had conversations individually with more than forty Ambassadors stationed in Peking; their refrain, regardless of their political sympathies, has been much as I have stated. I do not take this as necessarily representing the authoritative view of Chinese policy-makers, for these diplomats have little access to them, but I believe it does fairly accurately mirror current PRC attitudes toward us.

Bruce
81. Memorandum of Conversation

Washington, June 24, 1974, 8:10–9:15 p.m.

PARTICIPANTS

Huang Chen, Chief of the Liaison Office of the People’s Republic of China
Tsien Ta-yung, Political Counselor
Chi Ch’ao-chu, Interpreter
Henry A. Kissinger, Secretary of State
Arthur W. Hummel, Deputy Assistant Secretary for East Asian and Pacific Affairs, Department of State
Winston Lord, Director, Policy Planning Department of State
Richard H. Solomon, Senior Staff Member, National Security Council

SUBJECT

Tour d’Horizon Discussion on the Eve of the Secretary’s Departure for Europe and Moscow

Ambassador Huang: You are going tomorrow?

Secretary Kissinger: Yes, I depart tomorrow morning. Did my colleagues tell you what we have planned to cover in this session?

Mr. Lord: This is to preview the Soviet trip, our improving relations with the NATO allies—we haven’t discussed the specific topics.

Secretary Kissinger: Right. I just wanted to tell you that I can see no agreement of major significance coming from this trip [to the Soviet Union]. I don’t want to make you unhappy; we could make a special effort to speed up our negotiations.

Ambassador Huang: In saying that, I recall your discussions with Vice Premier Teng Hsiao-p’ing in New York.2

Secretary Kissinger: No agreement is now foreseeable on strategic armaments—nothing major.

Ambassador Huang: Secretary Schlesinger also said that in general terms in a speech on the 18th.

Secretary Kissinger: There would be some negotiating progress, but I do not expect the conclusion of an agreement on this trip. If there will be some progress, it will be in limiting the number of missiles on which the Soviets can put MIRVs.

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1 Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Kissinger Office Files, Box 96, Country Files, Far East, China Exchanges, April 1–August 8, 1974, Secret; Sensitive. The meeting took place in the Secretary’s office at the Department of State. All brackets are in the original. In a June 24 memorandum, Lord informed Kissinger, “I genuinely believe that a failure to touch base with the Chinese before you leave for Moscow could cause very serious damage to our relations with Peking.” Kissinger acceded to Lord’s request and agreed to this meeting with Huang. (Ibid.)

2 See Document 78.
In addition, we will discuss limits on underground testing. That also is a totally unresolved issue. The issue concerns what level to put the threshold [of underground nuclear explosions]. As far as an underground quota is concerned—the number of tests—we will not accept a quota. We will not accept a threshold higher than 200 kilotons. The Soviets want a much higher threshold.

We will not write into an agreement any recommendation for universality [of limits on underground testing].

The third category concerns [ABMs]. You know that in the ABM agreement each side can build a second site in addition to the one they have already constructed. We will probably agree that both sides agree to forego the second site, although they can move [the ABM installation] from one site to the other.

We also may begin negotiations on environmental warfare through climatic changes.

As for the rest, all the other subjects we will discuss are technical in nature: energy, exchanges of information, research and development. There will be no agreement on U.S. financial investment in the Soviet Union. (To Winston Lord:) Send Ambassador Huang a list tomorrow. (To Ambassador Huang:) We will send you a list of each issue with a one paragraph explanation.3

So this is what we expect from the summit. The Soviets will press us on Middle Eastern problems. Our position is that the countries of the region should solve these problems themselves.

Ambassador Huang: I want to inform you of one thing. Mr. Ilichev, head of the Soviet delegation to the Sino-Soviet border negotiations, will return to Peking for discussions tomorrow. This gentleman has been away for almost a year. He is returning at his own initiative on the eve of President Nixon’s visit [to Moscow]. This is being done just for you to see. We do not expect anything to come of his return. We do not think he is bringing any new position.

Secretary Kissinger: Subtlety is not their strong point. When I was in Syria the Russians asked what time I would be leaving. The Syrians said I would depart at 12:00. The Soviets then announced their arrival for 1:00. My departure was then delayed, and they had to delay their departure several times.

Ambassador Huang: Another issue: As I mentioned to you at the Mayflower Hotel, we informed Senator Jackson that our invitation to him was at your suggestion . . .

3 Not found.
Secretary Kissinger: Your invitation hasn’t changed his behavior toward me at all.

I understand that regarding the Middle East my colleagues have already briefed you. Our strategy is to continue on our present course. We may have to let the Geneva Conference reconvene, but not before September. We will continue to deal with each issue bilaterally, as we have done thus far.

I appreciate your kind invitation for my wife and I to join you for dinner. If you will permit it, I will set a date when I return, sometime in the second half of July. But I accept now with great pleasure. The only reason I don’t want to set a date now is that my schedule is not yet settled.

Ambassador Huang: I know you are very busy.

I was just joking with my colleagues, noting that at the time your press was attacking you, expressing their lack of confidence in you, I cast a vote for you [through my invitation].

Secretary Kissinger: I appreciate that. You know I have a rule that I never accept embassy invitations. This rule does not apply to Liaison Offices, however.

Ambassador Huang: Haven’t you accepted any embassy invitations?

Secretary Kissinger: Not invitations for receptions or dinners in my honor. However, I have gone several times to receptions if a Foreign Minister was in town. Once I accepted an invitation from the Indian Embassy, but that was in honor of Senator Mansfield.

Ambassador Huang: I also invited your wife, the dinner is in her honor as well. And you should bring your colleagues and friends.

Secretary Kissinger: She has many more friends than me—can you accommodate six hundred guests?

Ambassador Huang: At the reception at the Mayflower there were more than six hundred.

There is also one issue regarding Senator Mansfield. I should tell you about his visit to China, inasmuch as you expressed your concern about it at the Mayflower. At the Mayflower you said it would be best if he could go to China before the Congressional delegation. Subsequently Peking decided that Senator Mansfield’s visit should be postponed until after September—we have already informed him of this. We will welcome him a second time. This time he can stay longer, and travel to many more places. But during July and August we will be very busy. Senator Jackson will be going soon. We have given Senator Jackson priority as he has not been to China before. In addition, the Senator and Mrs. Mansfield dislike hot weather, and that is the hottest time of the year. So we suggest that he come after September.
In addition, I told him frankly that if he goes at the present time it is likely to give rise to speculation about Cambodian peace negotiations. He knows our position: we support the Cambodian people in continuing their struggle. We don’t want to involve ourselves in peace negotiations. The present time is not convenient, but he can come after September.

Secretary Kissinger: Do you think the Cambodian situation will be solved by September?
Ambassador Huang: I cannot predict anything. You know our position.
Secretary Kissinger: At my press conference today I was asked when I would take another trip to China. I replied that I have been going about once a year. I would be glad to go for an exchange of views sometime in the second half of this year.
Ambassador Huang: We will welcome you.
Secretary Kissinger: For me it would be best if I could go after October 1.
Ambassador Huang: At your convenience. We will welcome you.
Secretary Kissinger: Should we propose a time? Or would you like to?
Ambassador Huang: At your convenience. Let us know a time that would be convenient to you.
Secretary Kissinger: When I am back from this current trip I will propose a time—perhaps in mid-October.
Ambassador Huang: There is time. When you come back just tell us your tentative dates and I will report them to Peking.
Secretary Kissinger: When you have considered our proposal regarding the UN Command in Korea, inform Mr. Hummel in my absence.4
Ambassador Huang: We haven’t received any word yet.
Secretary Kissinger: My theory is that if you have something to tell us, you will tell us. My colleagues are afraid you are too shy. They keep sending me notes to remind me to ask you about various issues.

4 On June 13, Lord gave Han Xu a paper expressing U.S. willingness to consider abolition of the UN Command in Korea. In place of the UN structure, the United States suggested that the U.S. and ROK military commanders substitute for the Commander in Chief of the United Nations Command, that the two Koreas enter into a non-aggression pact, and that the People’s Republic of China and North Korea accept the continued presence of American forces in Korea as an interim measure. (Memorandum of conversation and attached proposal, June 13, 5:40–6:10 p.m.; National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Kissinger Office Files, Box 96, Country Files, Far East, China Exchanges, April 1–August 8, 1974)
Ambassador Huang: I'm sure I will tell you [when we have a reply].

Secretary Kissinger: When I'm back from Moscow, I will see you after the first few days. I will travel in Europe after leaving the Soviet Union, to reassure our allies and also to see the World Cup soccer matches. I will be back on July 9—I will be away almost as long as your absence. You are not going to leave Washington suddenly?

Ambassador Huang: I cannot tell. I just obey orders.

Secretary Kissinger: Our press speculates a good deal about a loss of interest on our part in our relations with China. This is not true. We maintain our interest in the policies which we have discussed with your leaders.

Ambassador Huang: You know our People's Daily published your talk at the Mayflower Hotel.

Secretary Kissinger: I noticed that. I was very pleased.

Ambassador Huang: (to Tsien Ta-yung:) Is there anything else?

Mr. Tsien (in Chinese to Ambassador Huang:) He did very well in the Middle East.

Mr. Chi: The Ambassador just asked if we have any notes to hand to you, as your colleagues just did. Mr. Tsien said that in the Middle East you did very well in your shuttle diplomacy. You were warmly received. We approve of this.

The Ambassador mentioned to your colleagues before we came in a cartoon he had seen in the Washington Post around June 17th. It shows a pyramid with President Nixon and President Sadat running up one side, and Brezhnev going down the other side. There is an American flag at the top. There is only one problem with the cartoon. Dr. Kissinger should be just ahead of President Nixon.

Secretary Kissinger: We were encouraged by some good Chinese advice.

Ambassador Huang: You are very busy. You will be leaving about eight tomorrow morning?

Secretary Kissinger: I am sorry to have kept you waiting. I had to testify before a Congressional committee.

Ambassador Huang: Mrs. Kissinger is not well? Please give her my regards.

(The meeting then concluded.)
82. Memorandum of Conversation

Washington, July 15, 1974, 11:45 a.m.–12:20 p.m.

PARTICIPANTS
Huang Chen, Chief of the Liaison Office of the People’s Republic of China
Tsien Ta-yung, Political Counselor
Chi Ch’ao-chu, Interpreter
Henry A. Kissinger, Secretary of State
Robert S. Ingersoll, Deputy Secretary of State
Winston Lord, Director, Policy Planning, Department of State
Richard H. Solomon, Senior Staff Member, National Security Council

SUBJECT
The Secretary’s Meeting with PRC Liaison Office Chief Huang Chen After the Moscow Summit

As the Chinese were escorted into the Secretary’s office, the Secretary commented on Ambassador Huang’s summer suit.

Ambassador Huang: It’s summer!

Secretary Kissinger: Fortunately, we now have a house with a swimming pool so we can endure the summer weather.

Ambassador Huang: I’m also fortunate in that my house also has a pool.

Secretary Kissinger: One of my colleagues said the other day (after the Wu Shu performance) that, one, we should avoid a quarrel with the Chinese, and, two, if we ever do get into a fight with them never engage in hand-to-hand combat.²

Ambassador Huang: Yes, I saw that remark quoted in the papers.

Secretary Kissinger: The little girl in the Wu Shu troupe was just adorable. Everyone was good.

I think you know that I sent a message to Prime Minister Chou through Ambassador Bruce saying that I hope he gets well soon.

¹ Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Kissinger Office Files, Box 96, Country Files, Far East, China Exchanges, April 1–August 8, 1974. Secret; Sensitive. The meeting was held in the Secretary’s office at the Department of State. All brackets are in the original. On July 9, Lord prepared briefing materials for this meeting. (Ibid.)
² The 48-person Wu Shu Martial Arts and Acrobatic Troupe visited the United States on a four-city tour as part of the cultural exchange program between the People’s Republic of China and the United States. The members performed at the Kennedy Center from July 10 through 14. On July 12, they visited the White House for a meeting with the President.
Ambassador Huang: The Premier has received your letter of concern. He has asked me to express to you his thanks. He is now convalescing in the hospital. When the Premier met Senator Jackson\(^3\) he told the Senator that he had been invited to China at the recommendation of the President and Secretary of State. The Premier sent his personal greetings to you and the President [via Senator Jackson].

Secretary Kissinger: I think it was a good move [that you invited the Senator to China].

Ambassador Huang: It was on your recommendation.

Secretary Kissinger: Even though the Senator is critical of me, I think it is a good thing to have had him in China.

Ambassador Huang: As far as I know, you are a good friend of the Senator’s.

Secretary Kissinger: I am on good personal terms with him. I will see him later this week. He is running for President [which is why he is critical of me in public]. One good way to get your name into the paper is to raise my name.

Ambassador Huang: Has the Senator decided to run for President?

Secretary Kissinger: Not formally. But seriously, he is a friend of mine. On general policy direction I agree with him. Sometimes his tactics are rather crude, however. He lacks a certain measure of subtlety. In terms of objectives I agree with him. I don’t disagree with his orientation to the Soviets. I just approach them in a more complicated way—but to achieve the same objectives. On that issue we’re in complete agreement. His tactics are more those of frontal attack; mine are more complicated.

In Moscow, Gromyko said that they had finally discovered my policy to be more complicated than they had at first thought. Now they will have to consider how to deal with this situation. I don’t think they have solved this one.

Ambassador Huang: You have dealt with them for some time, so you understand them.

Secretary Kissinger: I know them well.

I wanted to talk to you about the Summit meeting, and one or two other matters:

At the Summit there couldn’t have been any surprises for you, at least in the published documents.

Ambassador Huang: You told us your estimate [of the projected results] when we met before you left.\(^4\)

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\(^3\) Senator Jackson’s visit to China, July 1–6, is reported in telegrams 1126, 1128, and 1131, all from Beijing, July 5. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy Files)

\(^4\) See Document 81.
Secretary Kissinger: Yes; it came out exactly as I told you. I’ll be glad to comment on any aspect of the situation—but it went just as I told you.

One thing that did come up was their attempt on a number of occasions to involve us in documents or agreements which had an escape clause regarding China. They made one proposal to us which was for a treaty of friendship and cooperation to go to each other’s assistance if either was attacked by a third party. This we will certainly refuse. You are the only other government we have mentioned this to—except for Britain.

Ambassador Huang: Was it a treaty of “cooperation,” or “mutual assistance?”

Secretary Kissinger: The former. The key issue was to come to the aid of the other if one was attacked by a third party. They gave us no text, however. The way it came up was that Brezhnev mentioned it to the President when I wasn’t there—he didn’t dare raise it while I was present. Then Brezhnev afterwards mentioned it to me; he said he had discussed it with the President. I said I could not see such a situation arising. I made a joke. I told them about the Treaty of Björkö. The Czar and the German Emperor signed a treaty between themselves, but it lasted only for one day. We will not negotiate [with the Soviets] on this subject.

Ambassador Huang: We really don’t have any worries on this. [Mr. Chi incorrectly translates the Ambassador’s phrase as “worries.” It is more accurately rendered as “we don’t care about this.”]

Secretary Kissinger: If Japan attacks you, then both we and the Soviet Union will help you. [Laughter]

I mentioned this to you so that they won’t raise mischief with it. But we will not negotiate on this issue.

Ambassador Huang: For us it’s not a question of worrying. We don’t care about such things. [Mr. Chi comments on his inaccurate translation.]

Secretary Kissinger: This is a question of mentality, and that is significant. On many levels [such a treaty] is a stupid thing to offer. If we signed such an agreement, none of our European allies would trust us—this is not just a question of China. So it is significant from that point of view. But at any rate, we won’t proceed with it.

As for the rest, now that the SALT discussions are in a longer time frame, we plan to begin discussions in Geneva about September 1. Then sometime in October I may go to Moscow again. But the only reason I might go would be to discuss SALT. But the timing depends on the Geneva discussions. It also depends on how long your delegate to the United Nations [Vice Foreign Minister Ch’iao Kuan-hua] is in New York. I don’t dare leave the U.S. while your delegate is at the UN.
Ambassador Huang: You are old friends. There is no need to worry. [Laughter]

Secretary Kissinger: This is our present plan. There are also some basic figures I want to give you, so that you can give them to Peking.

Ambassador Huang: I remember that you discussed these figures with Vice Premier Teng in New York.

Secretary Kissinger: [The strategic balance is] four and a half to one, four to one in our favor.

Ambassador Huang: I remember your comments to the Vice Premier: 3.5 to 1 in strategic forces; if you add the B-52s it’s 4.5; if you add your carriers it’s 5.5.

Secretary Kissinger: When the Trident submarine system comes in, it will shift the balance even further in our direction. The Soviets have not yet deployed one single multiple warhead. They are still testing this system. One type has been a complete failure. Another type is nearly completed, but it is only like our early model. They have a perfect record on their [MIRVs for] big missiles: all failures.

(Ambassador Huang interjects: They are trying to surpass you.) There is no possibility of that. After ten years, after 1978, when the Trident, the B-1 bomber are produced, the curves will separate even farther.

Ambassador Huang: The Russians still have the mentality of wanting to surpass you.

Secretary Kissinger: But their technology is not as good as ours.

Ambassador Huang: Of late we have been reading press reports by the former Chief of the Joint Chiefs, and by Mr. Nitze, criticizing you.

Secretary Kissinger: Zumwalt. When I read them I get scared myself! We don’t have the practice in our country of sending our military leaders off to the provinces. [Laughter] This is just nonsense. Every time we get in a difficult situation [Mr. Chi translates this as “crisis situation”] we put our navy forward and dare them to take us on. But each time they do not dare to do so.

Ambassador Huang: That is a good thing.

Secretary Kissinger: These [press] statements are really nonsense. They count the number of ships, but don’t count the relative fire power on them. So I would pay no attention to them. We certainly didn’t act as if we were scared last year in the Middle East crisis. [Ambassador Huang interjects: I understand.] We will continue to act exactly the same way.

About the return of Ambassador Bruce: He is a good friend of mine. I like to get his advice on the general international situation. His return is not related to U.S.–PRC relations.
Ambassador Huang: This is quite a normal situation—for a vacation, for discussions. I just told Mr. Lord that our Deputy Chief, Han Hsu, is going back in a few days. [Secretary Kissinger interjects: You haven’t been back in awhile.] But as you said, Ambassador Bruce can come back twice. I haven’t been back once this year.

Secretary Kissinger: You were giving me a complex. Each time I saw you [last year] you would tell me you were going back. [Laughter]

Other Matters: Last time I mentioned Korea. In Indochina, we want to keep the situation as quiet as possible. In Laos, with the Premier sick we want to keep things peaceful, we hope we can avoid instability.

Ambassador Huang: Regarding Korea, we have received no reply as yet. Concerning Laos, we also were happy about the establishment of the coalition government. We hope it can continue. I also understand that Prince Souvanna is ill, but I hear from the Laotian Ambassador here that he is improving. I was a friend of the Ambassador in Paris. His [Souvanna’s] illness came on suddenly. He [the Laotian Ambassador] is coming to my residence soon. [At this point Ambassador Huang makes a move to depart.]

Mr. Chi [to the Secretary]: The Ambassador looks forward to meeting you at his residence [when he holds his party for you].

Secretary Kissinger: We will give you another date—after August 1—as the first date was inconvenient.

Ambassador Huang: Mrs. Kissinger should bring her friends.

[On this note, the meeting concluded.]

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5 Huang is referring to a proposal received from the U.S. Government on June 13. See footnote 4, Document 81.

TO

The Secretary of Treasury
The Secretary of Defense
The Secretary of Commerce
The Chairman, Atomic Energy Commission
The Director of Central Intelligence
The Deputy Secretary of State
The Director, Arms Control and Disarmament Agency
The Assistant to the President for International Economic Policy

SUBJECT

Nuclear Sales to the PRC

The President has reviewed the report of the Under Secretaries Committee of February 14, 1974 on Nuclear Sales to the People’s Republic of China (PRC). He has approved the recommendations that:

—The PRC should be informed that we are prepared to negotiate an Agreement for Cooperation Concerning Civil Uses of Atomic Energy which would authorize the export of U.S. light-water reactors and slightly enriched uranium. The Agreement would call for the application of bilateral safeguard rights which would be suspended in favor of those administered by the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) if the PRC joins that organization. (The U.S. safeguards would again take effect should the PRC withdraw or IAEA safeguards cease to be effective.)

—The Joint Committee on Atomic Energy and other interested Congressional committees should be informed of our offer to the PRC at such time as the Chinese express interest in negotiating an Agreement for Cooperation.

—Following Congressional notifications, interested U.S. companies should be authorized to proceed with discussions with the PRC.

1 Source: Ford Library, NSC Institutional Files (H-Files), Box H–53, NSDM 261, Nuclear Sales to the PRC. Secret. Copies were sent to the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and to the Counsellor to the President for Economic Policy. Nixon approved this NSDM on May 1; see footnote 3, Document 79.

2 See Document 79 and footnote 2 thereto.

3 In a memorandum of March 22, Solomon and David Elliot advised Kissinger, “we have strong doubts that Peking will, in fact, be interested in signing a bilateral agreement with us which includes safeguard measures—at least at present.” Kissinger wrote on the last page of their memorandum, “After Pres. approval [of the NSDM] let me consider how to inform Chinese.” (Ford Library, NSC Institutional Files (H-Files), Box H–53, NSDM 261, Nuclear Sales to the PRC)
on the possible sale of light-water reactors and slightly enriched uranium fuel.

—Nuclear exports to Communist countries by the U.S. or other COCOM countries should continue to be treated on a case-by-case basis, and U.S. or IAEA safeguard standards and procedures for equipment or materials transferred or produced therefrom shall be applied to all recipient countries.

Henry A. Kissinger

84. Paper Prepared in the Central Intelligence Agency


[Omitted here are the title page, the table of contents, and two quotes from Mao about the future.]

CHINA IN 1980–85 AND IN THE YEAR 2000

Principal Judgments

Neither in the period 1980–85 nor even by the year 2000 will China be a superpower in the class of the US or the USSR. But, barring Soviet attack, China will have become a great power, probably the greatest in East Asia.

The most menacing contingency for China is that of a Soviet military attack. Soviet leaders may be seriously tempted, but the chances...
of either a Soviet invasion or a Soviet nuclear strike in the decade ahead (through 1985) seem to us to be not very high, perhaps no more than one in five. Furthermore, a Soviet attack will probably be increasingly discouraged, in the period 1985–2000, by the growth of Chinese strategic power.

Another threat to Chinese development will be instability in the top leadership. Peking is already in another period of purges and uncertainty, and a still more serious situation will probably follow the anticipated departure of both Mao and Chou in the next few years, as divergent groups compete for position. After a period—possibly prolonged—of post-Mao or post-Chou instability, the intense nationalism of the leaders of all groups will probably enable a “collective” Party leadership, even as it changes composition, to pursue a coherent and constructive set of policies—although with continuing periodic “course corrections” to left or right.

Chinese Communist ideology seems certain to continue to play a critical role in shaping China’s programs of political, economic, and social development. While some of the most distinctive elements in “Maoism” are likely to be softened in the interests of modernization, Chinese ideology will continue to be more puritanical and combative than that of almost all other Communist states.

Economic prospects depend chiefly on China’s degree of success in controlling population growth and stimulating greater food production. More likely than not, China will be making progress in these respects by 1980–85, and will have doubled industrial production by 1985. While everything could go wrong economically in the event of weather disasters or a military defeat, the food/population problem should be eased by the year 2000, and by that time the industrial base to support economic development should be about four times the present size. Nevertheless, in economic strength, China will still trail far behind the US and the USSR, and, probably, will still not have caught up with Japan and Western Europe.

By 1980–85, the Chinese strategic weapons force will probably include some hardened silos for ICBMs capable of reaching both the European USSR and the continental US, but the emphasis is likely to be on a combination of land-based semi-mobile systems (totaling no more than a few hundred missiles), plus, perhaps, a handful of ballistic missile submarines. As of the year 2000, even if the US and USSR have

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3 NIE 13–8–74, June 13, stated that the PRC nuclear weapons program had slowed since 1971, and predicted that by 1980 China would be able to strike the continental United States with a few nuclear weapons. (National Intelligence Council, Tracking the Dragon, pp. 633–674)
increased the gap in strategic capabilities between themselves and China, the latter’s strategic nuclear forces—backed up by immense conventional defense capabilities—will constitute a formidable deterrent.

Throughout this century, Peking’s foreign policy will probably continue to be shaped in large part by hatred and fear of the USSR. In the short term, China’s effort will be concentrated on avoiding a war with the USSR and reducing the Soviet military presence on the border. To this end, the Chinese may make the necessary compromises to get a border settlement, without changing their view that the USSR is their main enemy.

A broader—though still limited—accommodation between the two powers will remain a possibility, especially in the longer run: movement in that direction could be induced by mutual Chinese and Soviet interest in lessening the temper of controversy. Such movement could have considerable significance for US strategic and other interests, even though such a Sino-Soviet détente would almost certainly stop far short of anything resembling the Sino-Soviet alliance of 1949–53. The Chinese will in any event continue to compete fiercely with the USSR, worldwide, probably making even more trouble for the Soviets around the world than they do now.

Throughout this century, China will attempt to use US influence to deter the USSR from attacking China and to offset Soviet efforts to encircle or contain China. The Chinese will try to avoid direct military confrontations with the US, and are likely to support some US positions which cut across Soviet policies. In pursuing these courses, the Chinese leaders will almost certainly not become pro-American, or seriously interested in an alliance with the US. The chances will indeed be greater that the Chinese leaders will become more assertive, initiating challenges to US interests in various countries and situations. The degree of their assertiveness will depend in large part upon the Chinese leaders’ assessment of the overall value of the Sino-American relationship in countering the USSR. In any event, Taiwan will be high on Peking’s list of priorities and will remain a painful issue between China and the US; with the passage of time the Taiwan problem will—if still unresolved by negotiations—increasingly tempt Peking’s leaders to resort to military force.

Maoist revolutionary impulses will probably sustain Chinese activism toward various developing countries through 1980–85. China’s ability to exercise its power will remain greatest in East Asia—that is, in the peripheral arc of Japan and Southeast Asia. Peking’s main line in Southeast Asia will probably be a combination of conventional diplomacy and subversive support of insurgency, the short-range goal being to encourage the development of a chain of benevolently neutral neighbors. With respect to Japan, Chinese leaders will almost certainly
seek to encourage those forces and factors working for a "soft" Japan, rather than a hostile or nuclear-armed Japan. As of the year 2000, the Chinese will probably be the dominant power in East Asia and will be able to compete with both the US and the USSR for influence in the Middle East, Africa, and Latin America.

As for China’s form of leadership, there are real possibilities of either a military dictatorship, coming after a period of high instability, or a neo-Maoist dictatorship riding in on a resurgence of fundamentalist "Maoism." The more likely leadership, however, is a “collective” dominated by Party careerists. On this view, the Party Chairman will not have Mao’s degree of authority, but—somewhat like Brezhnev’s present situation—will be obliged to rule by consensus. From what we know of the candidates for the leadership in both 1980–85 and 2000, these leaders will be hard, dedicated men, determined to make their China strong and influential, but ready to deal with the West when they consider this to China’s interest.

[Omitted here are the introductory notes, the body of the study, and an annex on possible future leaders.]

85. Editorial Note

On July 18, 1974, NSC Staff member W. Richard Smyser submitted to the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs, Henry Kissinger, a memorandum with the title, “Where Do We Stand in Asia?” In regard to China, Smyser wrote, “Solving the two-China problem between Peking and Washington looked easier when all the governments were strong. Now détente is under fire at home; Chou En-Lai is sick in Peking; even CCK [Chiang Ching-kuo] is starting to have problems with his military. Before we work out a normalization formula, the politicking may get a lot nastier than we had hoped. We cannot count on either the PRC or the ROC to remain on course with us in the difficult and complex process of normalization, or to be able to tolerate all the upcoming tactical uncertainties. Fortunately, the Russians will probably be too inept to pick up the pieces. Also, many Asian governments are now moving toward Peking, so the shock waves of our normalization may not be too severe. But our initial objective of normalizing relations without substantial adverse impact at home or in Asia will be difficult and perhaps impossible to reach.” Kissinger wrote and underscored, “Good job” on Smyser’s memorandum. (National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 1338, Unfiled Materials, 1974)
On August 9, after Richard Nixon’s resignation, Gerald Ford became President of the United States. Later that day, he met with Huang Chen, Chief of the PRC Liaison Office, and affirmed his desire to continue Nixon’s policy of improving relations between their two countries. (Memorandum of conversation, August 9, 5:25–5:40 p.m.; Ford Library, National Security Adviser Memcons, Box 4, July–September 1974) The next day, Kissinger sent Ambassador Bruce a letter to be delivered to Chairman Mao from President Ford indicating that the new administration would continue the policies expressed in the Shanghai Communiqué. (Backchannel message from the White House to Bruce, August 9; ibid., Kissinger–Scowcroft West Wing Office Files, 1969–1977, China, unnumbered items [1]) Bruce reported in backchannel telegram 66 to Kissinger, August 10, that he delivered the letter to Qiao Guanhua, who had been entrusted by Zhou to receive it. (National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Kissinger Office Files, Box 96, Country Files, Far East, China Exchanges, April 1–August 8, 1974)

86. Memorandum of Conversation

Washington, September 25, 1974, 2:50–3:20 p.m.

Participants

Ambassador George Bush, Chief-Designate of the United States Liaison Office in Peking
Lt. General Brent Scowcroft, Deputy Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs
Mr. Richard H. Solomon, Senior Staff Member, NSC

Subject

Ambassador George Bush’s Courtesy Call and Briefing Before Assignment in Peking

The conversation began with Ambassador Bush expressing his personal concern about the state of health of former President Nixon. He made some observations about the lack of balance in the U.S. media—and indeed in public attitudes in general—about the entire Watergate
affair and Mr. Nixon’s resignation. He noted the positive contributions Mr. Nixon had made during his tenure, and commented on the fact that his (Bush’s) ability to represent the U.S. in China was one of these positive contributions. At the same time, there was no question that Mr. Nixon had his dark side, and this had dragged him down into the mud; but Ambassador Bush could not accept the lack of balance in the way that the press and certain individuals responded to the Nixon situation.

Mr. Solomon commented that, curious as it seemed, the Chinese showed such a degree of balance. Ironically, their capacity to evaluate historical figures in a balanced way was revealed in the way they talked about Stalin, as Mr. Bush would see when he was in China. [At this point in the conversation General Scowcroft was interrupted to take a telephone call from Mr. Nixon. When he returned he remarked that the former President sounded rather weak, and noted that it was the personal dimension of what had happened to Mr. Nixon that was particularly upsetting.]

At this point Mr. Bush directed the conversation to his forthcoming assignment in the PRC.

General Scowcroft: When you first get there you may feel a bit of frustration which I hope you are mentally prepared for. You will find yourself rather isolated. However, you will find it a most fascinating, a marvelous experience. You will see some real action while you are there. I don’t know when, but we are in the middle of a period of transition, although we don’t know exactly how it will develop.

Our official contacts with the Chinese have been very narrow—you are going up to New York next week with the Secretary—you’ll see Vice Foreign Minister Ch’iao Kuan-hua. But we don’t have much dealing with the next generation in the leadership. Anything that you can do in this regard in the way of developing contacts will be helpful, although of course you can’t do anything that they don’t want you to do.

Ambassador Bush: When I was up at the U.N. we brought them out to my family home; they toasted my mother. Ambassador Huang Hua was asking all kinds of questions: Why did they have a toll bridge? Why is our industry so concentrated? We didn’t push them into a relationship, but we found them responsive. Of course they don’t want to see a brash American running around Peking.

General Scowcroft: Those people understand subtlety. But don’t hesitate to write us of your impressions, your feel of the situation in Peking.

Ambassador Bush: You normally get the routine cables which are sent through State channels?
General Scowcroft: Yes—although you probably know that you have a private channel to us here, to the Secretary and the President, which should be used for sensitive material.\(^2\)

Ambassador Bush: If I don’t plow any new ground?

General Scowcroft: You should use both channels. You can make general reports via the State channel, and then send sensitive or specific elements via the White House channel. Basically, the communications use the same circuits, they just use a different encryption system. The CIA man out there holds the key. But anything you don’t want to get into the bureaucracy you should send via the White House channel.

Ambassador Bush: Lord, Habib, and Hummel mentioned that much of the China business is done here in Washington. I hope you will keep me informed. I don’t want to be out there like Adlai Stevenson [who was never told about the Bay of Pigs operation by President Kennedy when he was our Ambassador to the U.N.].

General Scowcroft: When we have any meetings with the Chinese here we’ll certainly inform you. This will not be a problem.

Ambassador Bush: Is Art Hummel aware of this channel?

General Scowcroft: I think he must know one exists, although he doesn’t normally read that material. But you know you have John Holdridge out there as your deputy. He is outstanding; he spent four years on the NSC.

Ambassador Bush: He came up to the U.N. several times. He briefed us on developments with Al Jenkins.

Mr. Solomon: He has been here through the entire development of our relations with Peking, and knows all the material.

General Scowcroft: I’m glad that you are reading into the past record. It is fascinating.

Ambassador Bush: It’s very useful. It also will be helpful to be at the dinner in New York next week.\(^3\)

How do you feel about our relationship—not just about the future but its current state.

General Scowcroft: We are on track—well, I’d say that we are in a period where things are a little bit stagnant. There are no major problems, the relationship is just not active. I feel they are having their own preoccupations, sorting things out internally. They are ambivalent

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\(^2\) Scowcroft is referring to the Voyager channel, which circumvented the State Department by sending messages to the White House. James Lilley discusses this channel in *China Hands*, pp. 173–175.

\(^3\) A dinner with Qiao Guanhua and Kissinger was scheduled for October 2. See Document 87.
China, June 1973–September 1974

about Taiwan, partly because of anticipations that we have built into the relationship. But there is not the closeness of contact that we had a year ago.

Ambassador Bush: Contact on trips [by Secretary Kissinger] or at USLO?

General Scowcroft: It applies to either case.

Ambassador Bush: Does USLO feel there has been a pullback?

General Scowcroft: I’d say it’s more a matter of no movement. For example, last year we tried to get something going on Cambodia. We tried to wrap things up a year ago, but the effort passed without getting anywhere and has faded.

Ambassador Bush: When I had a recent discussion with Huang Chen I remarked that as [Republican] party leader perhaps I could have discussions in Peking on that wavelength. I told Huang I would be glad to give him my views on our political situation. I thought that might be a useful way to draw them out on their own political situation. When I was up at the U.N. Huang Hua said that now I should be called “Chairman Bush.” I said there was a helluva difference between that and the position of Chairman Mao. Huang Chen replied that they would be interested in political discussions both here and in Peking.

General Scowcroft: I’m sure they are intensely interested in our political situation. Understanding theirs is often rather difficult to do. If you compare the letters their leadership sent to President Nixon and President Ford you get some interesting nuances.4

Mr. Solomon: They have shown a remarkable degree of loyalty and personal warmth to Mr. Nixon.5 The way they communicate their political situation to us is indeed subtle. During Secretary Kissinger’s July, 1971 trip to Peking Chou En-lai made a comment about the gifts which had been brought to Chairman Mao, Lin Piao, and himself on behalf of the President. He replied, “You may say that Chairman Mao

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4 The Chinese note to Ford congratulated him on becoming President and declared, “We are glad to note your indication that you will continue to adhere to the principles of the Shanghai Communiqué, and we would like to avail ourselves of this opportunity to reiterate that, as in the past, we shall act according to the spirit and principles of the Shanghai Communiqué which we jointly released during President Nixon’s visit to China.” (Ford Library, National Security Adviser, Kissinger/Scowcroft West Wing Office Files, China Exchanges, Box 4, unnumbered [2])

5 Zhou Enlai’s message to Nixon stated, “Both Chairman Mao and I have happy memories of your 1972 visit to China, during which we held frank and beneficial talks and issued the Shanghai Communiqué. The unlocking of the doors to friendly contacts between the Chinese and American peoples and the promotion of the relations between our two countries towards normalization are the common desire of our two peoples. The efforts which you have made in this connection will not be forgotten.” (National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Kissinger Office Files, Box 96, Country Files, Far East, China Exchanges, April 1–August 8, 1974)
and I accept the gifts with pleasure.” This was the first subtle indication that we had of Lin Piao being in trouble.

General Scowcroft: They are fascinating people, very nice—no, civilized. At the same time they can be quite vicious in their politics. This will be a great experience for you.

Ambassador Bush: This assignment will give me a chance to start reading again.

General Scowcroft: Yes, you have been doing things at a different pace during the past several years. If there is anything that we can do for you just whip me off a cable. Anything that you send through the White House channel will be as private as talking here.

Ambassador Bush: I will. There is one point: Henry and General Haig said that I might want to beef up my staff, increase it somewhat. Do you know anything that might be behind this—new facilities? Or is there something currently being planned on this?

General Scowcroft: Well, first there is a matter of pressure we get from other departments, particularly Agriculture and Commerce. When the Liaison Office was set up we sent in what was assumed to be an initial cadre to get the facility in operation. We haven’t changed things much since then—except Jenkins, we haven’t replaced him yet I don’t think.

Mr. Solomon: The communiqué published at the end of the Secretary’s November visit last year contained the sentence about “expanding the scope of the functions of the Liaison Offices.”6 Exactly what this means has never been clearly spelled out. It was intended to convey a sense of accelerating the development of our relations. In fact, the Chinese have expanded their staff here in Washington substantially in the past year. They now have over 70 people. With that 400 room hotel they are living in they have plenty of room for expansion. On our side, however, we are faced with constraints posed by the lack of residential housing units in Peking. We had some people living in a hotel there for more than a year.

Ambassador Bush: I gather there was some talk being given to finding a larger plot of ground in Peking, or to renting additional space.

General Scowcroft: Well, this is the kind of issue you will be grappling with directly soon. We wish you the best of luck.

After a final exchange of pleasantries, which included Ambassador Bush recalling some of the courtesies the Chinese had shown his family when they visited his house in the outskirts of New York City, the session concluded.

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6 See footnote 7, Document 60.
87. Memorandum of Conversation¹

New York City, October 2, 1974, 8:15–11:35 p.m.

PARTICIPANTS
Ch‘iao Kuan-hua, Vice Foreign Minister of the PRC
Huang Hua, PRC Permanent Representative to the United Nations
Chi Tsung-chih, Deputy Director, West European Department, PRC Ministry of Foreign Affairs
Chang Han-chih, Deputy Director, Asian Department, PRC Ministry of Foreign Affairs (Interpreter)
Kuo Chia-ting, Second Secretary at the PRC Mission to the U.N. (Notetaker)
Henry A. Kissinger, Secretary of State
Philip Habib, Assistant Secretary of State for East Asian and Pacific Affairs
George Bush, Chief-Designate of the United States Liaison Office in Peking
Winston Lord, Director, Policy Planning, Department of State
Arthur W. Hummel, Jr., Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for East Asian and Pacific Affairs
Richard H. Solomon, Senior Staff Member, National Security Council

SUBJECT
Secretary’s Dinner for the Vice Foreign Minister of the People’s Republic of China

(The evening began at 8:15 as the Chinese were escorted into the Secretary’s living room for informal discussion and drinks before dinner.)

Vice Foreign Minister Ch‘iao: We are late.
Ambassador Huang: The car came on 57th Street and the traffic was bad.

(At this point photographers entered the room to take pictures.)

Secretary Kissinger: My Chinese is getting better. We can’t smile; we are mad at each other. (Laughter)

I must say the Vice Foreign Minister fired full cannons today [in his General Assembly speech], no empty cannons.²

Vice Foreign Minister Ch‘iao: I suppose what I said you had already anticipated?

¹ Source: Ford Library, Kissinger–Scowcroft West Wing Office Files, 1974–1977, China Exchanges, Box 4, unnumbered (4). Top Secret; Sensitive; Exclusively Eyes Only. The meeting took place in the Secretary’s suite at the Waldorf Towers. All brackets are in the original. Hummel, Lord, and Solomon sent Kissinger a briefing memorandum for this meeting on September 27. (Ibid.)

² On October 3, The New York Times reported on Qiao Guanhua’s speech at the United Nations in which he attacked détente and criticized both superpowers. (“China, in U.N., Hails Arabs’ Oil Weapon,” p. 1)
Secretary Kissinger: No. You are establishing a degree of equivalence between us [the U.S. and the Soviet Union].

Vice Foreign Minister Ch’iao: No, this is wrong. If you study the speech more carefully . . .

Secretary Kissinger: We’ll have to study it more carefully.

Vice Foreign Minister Ch’iao: It [the characterization of the U.S. and the Soviets in the speech] was like that in the past. I feel this speech was more unequal than in the past.

Secretary Kissinger: I want the Vice Foreign Minister to understand that we appreciate equal treatment, but not on all occasions. (Laughter)

Vice Foreign Minister Ch’iao: We both speak with touches of philosophy, so our speeches are not easy to understand.

Secretary Kissinger: I don’t say there was full equivalence, but more so than in the past. But this is a compliment to you. Of all the General Assembly speeches, I read only yours.

Vice Foreign Minister Ch’iao: I also can tell you that yours was studied most carefully—although I was not here when you delivered it.

Secretary Kissinger: Mine did not touch on China.

Vice Foreign Minister Ch’iao: I know. That was also the case in the past. As for myself, I have to give you some criticisms. If I don’t, then I’m not on good grounds for criticizing our neighbor [the Soviet Union].

Secretary Kissinger: I just want you to know that we won’t feel neglected if you don’t. (Laughter)

Vice Foreign Minister Ch’iao: The day before yesterday I met Ambassador Malik. He said he would come to hear my speech. I replied, “You can’t run away.” So today he just threw a copy [of the speech] down on the table.

Secretary Kissinger: I was worried that I didn’t go to his reception, as I went to yours. However, Malik solved my problem as he came to yours.

Vice Foreign Minister Ch’iao: Yes. I recall that last night the three of us sat in a triangle, in a circle. You can draw the circle in many ways.

Secretary Kissinger: But it still comes out the same. We keep it constant; it comes out the same.

Vice Foreign Minister Ch’iao: Well, but frankly, since we met last April there have been many changes.

Secretary Kissinger: Before we get to these, there is one aesthetic point I wanted to raise. You said we overthrew the government in Cyprus. We did not. We did not oppose Makarios. It would serve no political purpose for us [to have overthrown him]. The only problem is that his talents are greater than the island he runs. But that’s a vice
of most Greek politicians. Basically this is just for your information—it is not an important point. This was not an event which we desired. Once it happened, our basic desire was to keep the Soviet Union out, not to permit them to undermine the situation. I liked your description of their policy [in the G.A. speech] very much.

Vice Foreign Minister Ch’iao: Speaking of the Cyprus events, I have one question. You surely knew something of the situation before the event. Why didn’t you take steps to prevent it? In our view it was a stupid event.

Secretary Kissinger: Yes. If I get you to come and visit Washington I could explain our system of government. (Laughter) There are many intelligence reports which float around, but if no one brings them to me I assume they do not exist. I can assume that a subordinate will leak to the press one I do see. What they don’t leak are the ones I do not see.

When the coup occurred I was in Moscow. My people did not take these intelligence reports seriously as such reports had been very numerous in the past. Every three months there was a rumor of a possible coup. An intelligence officer even told Makarios about these rumors, but he didn’t believe them. He was away on a weekend holiday. If I had known about the report, I would have stopped it [the coup]. Once the coup occurred, I assumed that Turkey would intervene, as there was no government in Cyprus and Greece was unstable. Our press is violently anti-Greece. They were criticizing us [for our attitude on Greece]. The reason I didn’t criticize Sampson was that we assumed we could get rid of him in any 36-hour period. But we knew that the Soviets had told the Turks to invade. We didn’t want them [the Soviets] to have any other excuse to involve themselves in the situation. But the “Second World” in Europe, and the American press, kept egging on the Turks.

So it is an unfortunate situation, but it will come out all right. The Soviets can’t do anything for either party. We will move to a settlement in a few weeks once the Greeks calm down.

Actually our problem is in calming down the Greek population in the U.S. We already have the basis for an agreement with the Greeks and the Turks, but if Congress cuts off aid, then they will remove our basis for a settlement. So if you have any influence with the Congress please use it. (Laughter) Fortunately there are more Chinese here than Greeks. They have better discipline.

Vice Foreign Minister Ch’iao: Well, it really was a bad situation at the beginning, after things first happened. As for the situation later, we can’t criticize you.

Secretary Kissinger: I agree, the beginning was bad. But later it became better. The worst thing that the Chinese can say about a person is that he is stupid. (Laughter)
Vice Foreign Minister Ch’iao: Since you have contacts with the two sides, what do you think about the question of the withdrawal of Turkish troops? Will they make a demonstration of good will?

Secretary Kissinger: As I know that you don’t leak to the press (Ch’iao: On that you can rely) I will tell you. It is really contingent on our Congress. While I am on my Middle Eastern trip I will go to Ankara. While I am in Ankara the Turks will make a gesture of good will—like withdrawing five to seven thousand troops, or withdrawing from some territory. Then we will ask Clerides and Denktash to agree to principles for a political dialogue, for political talks. These principles essentially have been agreed to already. The Greek government will then express approval that political talks are starting. Then, nothing will happen until after November 10, which is the date of the Greek elections. They don’t want anything to happen before then. After the election, we will put the issue in a larger framework, one which will solve such questions as territorial rights in the Aegean Sea, etc. This is all agreed to, but our Congress may upset these plans. If these maniacs will only leave the situation alone! I’m convinced that eighty percent of the madmen in the world live in the Eastern Mediterranean. So I can’t be sure [of the outcome of the situation].

(At this point in the conversation, at 8:40 p.m., the living room conversation broke up and the group resumed the discussion at the dinner table.)

Secretary Kissinger: We have a number of new friends here tonight. Ambassador Habib is our new Assistant Secretary for East Asia. Of course you know George Bush. (Ch’iao: Our old friend.) He may not be used to the frankness with which we discuss issues. (Laughter) I always tell our Chinese friends the outlines of our policies. There have been no disappointments thus far. It is so rare to meet officials who understand what we are doing.

Incidentally, I joked with the Mongolian Foreign Minister that I would visit his country. He took me seriously and extended me an invitation. Should I pay his country a visit? (Laughter) Seriously, there are no U.S. interests in Outer Mongolia, other than creating a sense of insecurity in other capitals. I don’t have to pursue this. I want your frank opinion.

Vice Foreign Minister Ch’iao: Considering this question, our position has been the same since the Yalta Conference. I’ve always told this to the Doctor. Maybe I am wrong, but you talked with Premier Chou about this.

Secretary Kissinger: Yes, but I don’t know how you would view American efforts to establish relations with Outer Mongolia. I know your historical view and what it represents.

Well, I can defer a decision until a later occasion. The only reason to go is to show activity in this area. But if you object—to a visit by
China, June 1973–September 1974

me—I won’t go. Diplomatic relations, that we’ll do. (To Ambassador Habib:) Where do we stand on this?

Ambassador Habib: We have had no response.

Mr. Solomon: I believe their northern neighbor objects to Mongolia establishing relations with us.

Vice Foreign Minister Ch’iao: There are two aspects to the situation there. We maintain diplomatic relations [with the Mongolian People’s Republic], so there is no question of law. But this is really just a puppet state. It is in a situation of being occupied. So in such circumstances you will have to decide [whether or not to visit].

Secretary Kissinger: No, I can tell you now that it won’t be done.

You spoke of changes regarding Cyprus. Are there any others—our two countries?

Vice Foreign Minister Ch’iao: Not just our two countries. Primarily I was referring to the world besides our two countries. As for changes in your country, I believe we have explained our view. This is your domestic affair, and it won’t affect relations between our two countries.

Secretary Kissinger: Exactly. We will pursue the policies that we have agreed to. During the course of the evening I want to discuss some specific issues with the Vice Foreign Minister. As for the specific understandings, we will completely uphold them.

What changes do you see in the world since April?

Vice Foreign Minister Ch’iao: (Pauses to reflect on a reply.) Superficially, Cyprus was the most drastic change. But our analysis is that two areas are in upheaval: the Balkans and the South Asian subcontinent.

Secretary Kissinger: Cyprus makes much noise, but no strategic difference—unless we are prevented by domestic developments from conducting our foreign policy. The situation will probably come out with the Turks in a slightly stronger position.

In the Balkans, do you mean pressure on Yugoslavia? (Ch’iao: Yes.) You know that I will visit Yugoslavia in November. We told you about my visit to the Soviet Union. From there I will go to India, Pakistan, Romania, and Yugoslavia. So how serious do you think the pressures are on Yugoslavia?

Vice Foreign Minister Ch’iao: You know, that friend of ours is an opportunist. If you don’t create some counter pressures they will take advantage of the situation. The situation is not as calm as it looks.

Secretary Kissinger: I agree. Especially after Tito dies. But the Soviets would not consider a move against Yugoslavia on the order of what they did to Hungary or Czechoslovakia. We would not treat such a development in the same category as Hungary or Czechoslovakia. We would take such a development with great seriousness. In fact, I plan to discuss this situation when I visit [Peking].
Vice Foreign Minister Ch’iao: I don’t know how you view the situation in South Asia. Of course, we have discussed this many times.

Secretary Kissinger: I separate the strategic consideration from tactics. Our strategic analysis is the same as yours. For a “peace loving” people, the Indians create a great sense of insecurity. If they were not pacifists I would really worry about them. (Laughter) They are attempting to create a situation of great imbalance in strength with their neighbors.

They have repeatedly urged me to come for a visit. I have postponed one three times already. The general intention [of my visit] is to produce a greater degree of independence of Indian foreign policy in relation to the Soviets—and to create some discouragement on the part of the Soviets regarding their investment in India.

Practically, what will come out of the visit? We will set up a scientific and economic commission, but there will be no American financial commitment—other than that already in the budget. But Congress won’t approve it, and we won’t fight for it. (Laughter)

Ambassador Huang: Did you promise to give a certain amount of wheat to India?

Secretary Kissinger: We haven’t made any promises yet. The amount we are now considering is substantially below the figures you read in the newspapers. (Mr. Lord: A half million tons.) But we haven’t committed this yet. They have asked for three million tons. That is less than we are giving to Egypt. We are giving the Egyptians 600,000 tons, Syria 200,000–250,000. I just want you to understand our relative priorities in relation to the populations involved. In Pakistan, we hope to have the most constructive talks possible. I hope to pursue the line which we discussed in Peking. Don’t believe the statements you read by our Cabinet members. This particular one made two statements, and his second one was worse than the first. In the first he called the Shah “a nut.” Then he said he had been quoted out of context, and that only in some circumstances did he consider the Shah to be “a nut.” (Laughter)

On oil, we have good relations [with the Shah]. Our negotiations will have a positive outcome.

What is your assessment of South Asia?

Vice Foreign Minister Ch’iao: We have discussed this many times. Our views are similar to yours, although perhaps we view the situation as more serious [than you do].

Secretary Kissinger: Will there be a military outcome?

Vice Foreign Minister Ch’iao: Our feeling is that our friend [the Soviet Union] is more shrewd in his actions than you are. Their activities are more covered up. They make better use of domestic
contradictions in various countries. Perhaps you don’t pay attention to such things closely enough.

Secretary Kissinger: Perhaps because I know their leaders I don’t rate them too highly. My judgment is that they usually prevail with brutality, not cleverness. But this is an interesting point. How do they use domestic contradictions?

Vice Foreign Minister Ch’iao: In one respect they use contradictions between the various countries in the region, especially Pakistan, Afghanistan, and Iran. Don’t you feel the question of Baluchistan, promoted by Afghanistan, has gone further than before.

Secretary Kissinger: Not Pushtunistan? I thought...

Vice Foreign Minister Ch’iao: Openly the Afghanistanis are talking about Pushtunistan, but they also make use of Baluchistan.

Secretary Kissinger: I’ll look into this situation. I’ll talk to the Shah when I see him. He has a Baluchi area on his border.

Vice Foreign Minister Ch’iao: Generally I agree with you [about the Soviets]. They are doing some stupid things. Eventually they will have to resort to brutality, but before they reach this point they take advantage of the situations.

Secretary Kissinger: Is it true that the three Soviet border negotiators have all had nervous breakdowns?

Vice Foreign Minister Ch’iao: That’s probably just a story. Didn’t you see that our comrade Ilichev, after he returned to Moscow, went to Cyprus?

Secretary Kissinger: He went to Greece also.

I’m tempted to accept the Soviet proposal on a conference on Cyprus just because it is comprehensive. We won’t, but you described their situation very accurately.

Chang Han-chih: Yes, the phrase [in Ch’iao’s U.N. speech] was they were acting like “ants on a hot pot.”

Secretary Kissinger: When Gromyko came [to Washington] he raised the idea of a joint guarantee for Cyprus. I said let’s try this on Poland first.

Vice Foreign Minister Ch’iao: Very good idea.

Secretary Kissinger: I hope for your emotional stability that you don’t follow the European Security Conference. There is the issue of peaceful change of frontiers—this is the German problem. We support the German formulation. When Gromyko was in Washington he told us he had said the Germans told him that they would support any position we two could agree upon. I said I would think about it for a few days. I then checked with the Germans. They said they had told the Soviets no such thing.
Gromyko then called me from New York. He said he had a compromise formula which he told me he had checked with the Germans. I then checked with the Germans and they said Gromyko had discussed a different proposal with them.

This is stupid. These little tricks don’t bring changes about. A clause in a treaty won’t change things.

Vice Foreign Minister Ch’iao: Didn’t you agree that the last stage of the European Security Conference would be a summit conference?

Secretary Kissinger: We haven’t agreed to this. We don’t want our European allies to agree and then have us being the only ones who don’t agree. So we follow the opinion of Europe. We don’t care for such a summit. The idea of 39 heads of state in one room is more than my constitution can bear. They’ll all have to talk.

My opinion is that there will be one. (Ch’iao: This year?) No, in March or April next year. That is a guess—certainly not before.

Now they are debating “Basket Three.” That will take six weeks just to state the issues, not even to get into negotiations.

We are not in a hurry. We just don’t want the European Security Conference to do any damage. We are passive. We don’t want it to do very much.

Vice Foreign Minister Ch’iao: South Asia?

Secretary Kissinger: As I said last year [in Peking], we support Pakistan’s territorial integrity. We are arranging to have 300 Pak tanks rebuilt in Iran. We will contribute to the expenses, and the Shah will pay for the remainder. On my visit we will try to arrange for the training of Pak military men on Iranian weapons so that they can be used interchangeably. (To Ambassador Bush:) You are learning more about international politics this evening than you ever did at the U.N. (To Ch’iao:) Senator Fulbright thinks you don’t give enough emphasis to the U.N. My staff, when they read a statement in my U.N. speech on torture, said I should apply this criterion to the way I treat my staff. (Mr. Lord: So far there has been no change. [Laughter]) Given our bureaucracy it was a miracle this didn’t appear in the final text.

We understand completely your views on Pakistan. Strategically we agree, but practically we have some difficulties which I have described to you. We are thinking of ways to overcome them after November. It is an absurd situation: India, a big country, can import arms in great quantity. But if you supply arms to Pakistan then you are “threatening peace.”

Vice Foreign Minister Ch’iao: We have discussed the Subcontinent many times. I don’t want to appear to attach too much importance to the situation there. But it is important to you. I discussed this with Senator Jackson. He wanted to talk about Diego Garcia. I told him that
considering the present situation in South Asia, we understand your position on Diego Garcia. But suppose the Soviets one day realize their ambition of gaining a direct passage into the Indian Ocean. Then Diego Garcia will be of no use.

Secretary Kissinger: There is one point. We think of South Asia as closer to China than to the U.S.

Vice Foreign Minister Ch’iao: Yes, but there is another side to the question. We don’t have anything in the Indian Ocean, no fleet. You know that Pakistan for a long time was in an antagonistic position against us. But we lived through that. Some day the Soviets may control all of South Asia . . .

Secretary Kissinger: We would oppose that. I don’t say we would approve of such a situation.

Vice Foreign Minister Ch’iao: Even if this happened, we don’t think this is the focal point of Soviet strategy. There has been no change in this, they have not shifted [the focal point of their efforts] to South Asia. They can only have one key point. If too many areas are called “key areas,” then there will be no key area.

Secretary Kissinger: You see, my education stopped with Kant. So you are ahead of me! (Laughter)

Anyone’s strategic situation will be affected by the Soviet situation. If the situation in one area becomes favorable to the Soviets, it can affect anyone’s strategic situation, even though the focal point may be in Europe.

Vice Foreign Minister Ch’iao: Specific situations may have changed, but the world situation has remained the same.

Secretary Kissinger: But my point is that if any one country falls to Soviet hegemony it will affect the overall situation.

I agree that Europe is a major strategic concern of the Soviets, but there is nothing in Europe that can’t wait for a few years.

Vice Foreign Minister Ch’iao: And what about the East? Isn’t it the same?

Secretary Kissinger: My judgment is that in the East there is greater time urgency for the Soviets.

Vice Foreign Minister Ch’iao: I really don’t agree.

Secretary Kissinger: I’d be delighted—I’m just giving you my assessment. I don’t insist on it. It is my genuine belief. But the problem is the same either way. If the Soviets have a strategic success in the East, it will affect the West. If they have a strategic success in the West, it will affect the East. So the situation is the same [for both of us].

Vice Foreign Minister Ch’iao: True. Whatever happens in different areas of the world it will affect other areas. But the focal point is still important.
Secretary Kissinger: Well, we will see in two or three years.

Vice Foreign Minister Ch’iao: Maybe we won’t be able to tell in just two or three years.

Secretary Kissinger: Is this glass for mao-t’ai? (The Chinese: It is too big!) We want to torture the Vice Foreign Minister. Because we didn’t have a Cultural Revolution our bureaucracy has to make decisions by committee. Winston Lord has formed a mao-t’ai committee. (Laughter)

Mr. Vice Foreign Minister, when you come to Washington we have a superb serving person at Blair House. He has an exquisite sense of timing. He clatters plates just as the toast is being given, especially when an American official is giving the toast. (Laughter)

Ambassador Huang: I had a similar experience in Ghana.

Secretary Kissinger: You were Ambassador to Ghana? (Huang Hua: Yes.)

Mr. Foreign Minister, to your health, to our friendship.

Vice Foreign Minister Ch’iao: You have done outstanding work in the Middle East, but it is only the beginning.

Secretary Kissinger: I agree. The situation is getting more complicated now. I’m going there next week. The next step has to be made with Egypt, then with Palestine, and then with Syria.

Vice Foreign Minister Ch’iao: We had heard that if it is not possible for you to supply sophisticated weapons to Egypt, then you would give the Soviets a loophole.

Secretary Kissinger: I’ll discuss this matter in a smaller group when I am in Peking.

Mr. Foreign Minister, these annual dinners are useful, and pleasant personal events.

Vice Foreign Minister Ch’iao: They are not really annual. This is our second one this year. I think you know that we will welcome you on your visit.

Secretary Kissinger: You mentioned international changes. Of course, we’ve had internal changes. It was no accident that three hours after taking the oath of office President Ford received the Chief of your Liaison Office. He reaffirmed the continuity of our policy.3 Tonight I want to reaffirm that continuity. A few years ago we set ourselves certain objectives. Despite changes in the international situation, we will hold to these objectives, including the full normalization of relations.

We have kept in touch with you on major international events. We intend to continue to do this. I look forward to continuing such talks.

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3 See Document 85.
I would like to propose a toast: To the friendship of the Chinese and American peoples. To the health of Chairman Mao. To the health of the Premier. (All rise and toast.)

Vice Foreign Minister Ch’iao: Just now you talked about the world situation. As we described it in the Shanghai Communiqué, we are opposed to hegemony. Last time Doctor was in Peking we elaborated on this point: oppose hegemony. This is our basic principle.

Although domestically the U.S. has undergone many changes, you have told us such changes would not affect our relations. We believe that.

We talked about normalization of relations the last time Doctor was in Peking. You talked with Chairman Mao about this. He said that the Japan formula was the only way we could consider normalization. You asked the Premier at dinner what he [Chairman Mao] had meant by this.

Secretary Kissinger: I’ve learned that there is always more to what the Chairman says than appears at first glance.

Vice Foreign Minister Ch’iao: I remember you told the Premier there were “many layers” to what the Chairman says.

I would like to toast to the friendship of the peoples of China and the U.S., and to the continuation of this friendship. To President Ford. We wish to say he is already one of our friends. When he was in China he left a deep impression on us. So let us drink to the health of President Ford—I don’t like to toast you as “Secretary of State.” I prefer your title of “Doctor.”

Secretary Kissinger: That is a more lasting title. (All rise and toast.)

Secretary Kissinger: (in German to Ch’iao:) You forgot to toast Ambassador Bush.

Vice Foreign Minister Ch’iao: Doctor just reminded me to toast Ambassador Bush. I forgot . . .

Secretary Kissinger: I just wanted you to remember him. He’s one of our best men. A good friend—also a Presidential candidate.

Vice Foreign Minister Ch’iao: Ambassador Scali invited me to attend Ambassador Bush’s farewell party on the 11th. Unfortunately I’ll be leaving on the 8th. So I will take this opportunity provided by Doctor to welcome Ambassador Bush, to drink to the success of his mission. I am sure you will fulfill your mission. I hope you will like Peking. (All rise and toast Ambassador Bush.)

Secretary Kissinger: He could have had any post he wanted. He selected Peking.

Vice Foreign Minister Ch’iao: (to Ambassador Bush): How’s your mother?

Ambassador Bush: She is fine. She wants to come to Peking at Christmas time to visit her little boy.
(At this point, 10:30 p.m., the dinner conversation broke up and the group retired to the Secretary’s living room.)

Secretary Kissinger: Let’s talk a few minutes about your last point. I want to explore this further. (At this point the serving personnel came in with coffee and liqueurs.) I’ll wait until after they have finished serving.

Are they going to have passionate debates in the General Assembly? On Korea, is it possible that our two Ambassadors can work out something as they did last year? Your Ambassador [Huang Hua] is such a master. The Soviets asked me how it was worked out last year on Korea. They still don’t understand how you did it.

I don’t think you have given us a reply to our last proposal [on Korea].

Vice Foreign Minister Ch’iao: I’ll be very frank with you. You wanted us to convey your last proposal to the [North] Koreans. We did this. We didn’t receive a further response. Finally this question was put on the U.N. agenda. So now we will have a debate with each side speaking on its own separate views.

Secretary Kissinger: I understand. Didn’t we have a debate last year? (Huang Hua: In the First Committee.) The question is whether we can have some way of eliminating the United Nations Command without abrogating the Armistice. This is basically what we are after.

Vice Foreign Minister Ch’iao: Do you have any specific form in your mind?

Ambassador Habib: Our proposal is that the Armistice in its present form be maintained, with South Korea and the U.S. . . .

Secretary Kissinger: Yes, with the People’s Republic, which is already a signatory, and North Korea on the other side.

Vice Foreign Minister Ch’iao: You understand that we keep on good relations with the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea. On this issue we have to respect their views. Of course if you have more detailed views, more comprehensive views on this question, we will convey them to them.

Secretary Kissinger: Our problem is that we cannot accept abolition of the United Nations Command if there is no legal basis on both sides for the continuation of the Armistice. For your information, we

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4 See footnote 4, Document 81. On July 31, the Chinese Government rejected the U.S. proposal as an obstacle to peaceful Korean reunification. (National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Kissinger Office Files, Box 96, Country Files, Far East, China Exchanges, April 1–August 8, 1974) In response, U.S. officials conveyed to the PRCLO a truncated version of the June 13 proposal: the UN Command could be abolished if North Korea and China accepted the U.S. and ROK commanders as “successors in command.” (Memorandum from Hummel and Solomon to Kissinger, August 27; Department of State, Papers of William H. Gleysteen: Lot 89 D 436, PRC Related Papers, July–Sept. 1974)
have had several approaches from North Korea—from the Romanians, the Egyptians, even David Rockefeller, he is perhaps the largest power involved (laughter)—but we can’t respond to their initiatives until the issue of the U.N. Command is resolved. In principle we are not opposed [to having contact with them]. You can convey this to them.

Vice Foreign Minister Ch’iao: Regarding all these details on the Korean question, we don’t feel they are of great significance. As you know from your discussions with Chairman Mao, this is not a major issue if you look at it in terms of the overall world situation.

Secretary Kissinger: As I told the Chairman and the Premier, we are not committed to a permanent presence in Korea. This is not a principle of our foreign policy. But we also don’t want the speed of our withdrawal to create a vacuum into which some other power might project itself.

Vice Foreign Minister Ch’iao: It seems as if Japan does not feel the behavior of [ROK President] Park is satisfactory.

Secretary Kissinger: I wouldn’t pay too much attention to that.

Ambassador Habib: There has been no major change in their relationship.

Vice Foreign Minister Ch’iao: True. Japan’s policy regarding Korea is formulated according to many considerations.

Secretary Kissinger: But any sudden change in Korea could stimulate Japanese nationalism. You have to watch that former student of mine, Nakasone.

Vice Foreign Minister Ch’iao: How is it that you have so many bad students?

Secretary Kissinger: Like Ecevit.

Vice Foreign Minister Ch’iao: History will lay [responsibility for] all this on your shoulders! (Laughter)

Secretary Kissinger: Should Scali be in touch with Ambassador Huang Hua? Will there be confrontations?

Vice Foreign Minister Ch’iao: There will be confrontations, but it can also be said that there will not be confrontations.

Secretary Kissinger: But we know the vote. We don’t care about the speeches. Ambassador Huang can perhaps create diversions.

Ambassador Huang: The differences in this respect are too great. It is beyond my capability [to resolve them].

Secretary Kissinger: Perhaps you can consider this [matter further]. We attach some importance to this question.

Vice Foreign Minister Ch’iao: I don’t think it will bring any complications if the resolution [favorable to North Korea] passes.
Secretary Kissinger: But if it does, it will create complications in Korea, in Japan, or elsewhere.

Vice Foreign Minister Ch’iao: I met Foreign Minister Kimura\(^5\) [in New York]. We touched on this question, although we didn’t go into any details. We’ll wait a little while and see how the situation develops.

I want to repeat this—I wasn’t using diplomatic language: We keep on good relations with the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea. This is mainly their position. This is not just a matter of just what China wants.

Secretary Kissinger: We have our Korean friends too. But if we have a general understanding then we can influence the situation.

We have reports that you may be interested in contacts with South Korea.

Vice Foreign Minister Ch’iao: They may not be accurate.

Secretary Kissinger: Let us return to the topic in your toast.

On my visit to Peking I want to talk more concretely about this issue, and work out a timetable. We think late 1975 or early 1976 would be a relatively good time for the completion of this process. But we are prepared to discuss its precise nature beforehand.

We understand your basic position. Your basic position is that normalization should be on the Japanese model. But as you correctly pointed out, there are many layers of meaning. In particular, our conditions are not the same as Japan’s. The history of our relations [with the Republic of China on Taiwan] are not the same, our internal situation is more complicated, and our legal requirements are complex. We want to move so that our public opinion does not have a bad feeling about our relations with China.

In general, given our concern with hegemony, it is important that we not be seen as throwing our friends away. I am now giving you our considerations, not a specific proposal.

As I interpret the Japanese formula, this would involve us having embassies in our respective capitals. There would be no embassy in Taipei. Ambassador Unger would then be unemployed. (Laughter) One point which Chairman Mao mentioned intrigued me. We understand that there would be no ambassador in Taipei, but he mentioned that there were ambassadors of the Baltic states in Washington and that this wasn’t a situation of any importance.

Vice Foreign Minister Ch’iao: It is my understanding that Chairman Mao talked about this mainly as part of a discussion of political subjects. It was not closely related [to the discussion of normalization].

\(^5\) Toshio Kimura was the Foreign Minister of Japan for part of 1974.
Secretary Kissinger: Not exactly, but it puzzled me. That’s why I asked [about his remark].

Vice Foreign Minister Ch’iao: I remember that Chairman Mao discussed with you that whether or not we have formal diplomatic relations is not so important. We have diplomatic relations with India, but our relations with them are cold. With you, although we have no diplomatic relations, our contacts are warm. We can either solve this problem, or just leave it as it is. But concerning our relations, if you wish to solve this problem there is only one model, the Japanese model.

Secretary Kissinger: Let me ask two questions. First, you say that the quality of our relations does not depend on whether we have solved this problem. Whether we have liaison offices or embassies, our relations depend on other problems.

Vice Foreign Minister Ch’iao: I remember in your discussion with Chairman Mao this was also touched upon. The major basis of our relationship is that we seek common ground on international problems. Of course in our relations this problem [of Taiwan] lies between us. Diplomatic relations are affected by this situation, but it is not of too great significance. (Secretary Kissinger: We don’t have . . .)

For example, you started your visits to Peking in 1971. In 1972 you came with President Nixon. Then in 1973 we made further progress, but we still have this issue [of Taiwan]. So our relations do develop to a certain extent, but then we do confront this question. As this problem does exist, when you think of a timetable, then there is the question of the Japanese model. So I believe that in April, Vice Premier Teng Hsiao-p’ing mentioned that there were two aspects to our position: We hope that our relations can be normalized; but we are not in a hurry.6

When Senator Fulbright visited China he asked this question: Can we have further development of our relations? As far as our relations are concerned, before normalization our relations will meet some obstacles. When I was discussing this issue with Senator Fulbright I gave an example. Each year I come to the United States, but I can only go to New York, not to Washington. (Secretary Kissinger: I’ll lift the travel restriction on you. [Laughter]) He invited me to Washington. I said I can’t come because Chiang Kai-shek has an Embassy there. (Secretary Kissinger: You know that President Ford would welcome a visit by you. You could just come from the airport directly to the White House and then back again if you wished.) Thank you, but I think President Ford will understand my problem.

Secretary Kissinger: Let me tell you our problem. We are in no hurry either. The question is whether our difficulties are ripe for overcoming.

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6 See Document 78.
We see several problems. First, what sort of office we will maintain in Taipei after normalization. One obvious possibility is a liaison office there, which has the additional advantage that for the first time in four years we would do something which Senator Jackson can’t oppose.7

Vice Foreign Minister Ch’iao: This idea was his own. He did not talk with me about it, or with the Vice Premier. After he left China I read this [proposal of his] in the press. I was quite surprised.

Secretary Kissinger: Another possibility is a consulate. But we have a second problem which is more difficult. The defense relationship. We clearly cannot have a defense relationship with part of a country—at least we are not aware that you can. (Laughter)

Vice Foreign Minister Ch’iao: You can create this.

(A secretary enters the room and hands Secretary Kissinger a message.)

Secretary Kissinger: Please excuse me for five minutes. This is the second call I have had from the President tonight. He’s about to go to bed. (The Secretary departs the room for about ten minutes.)

Vice Foreign Minister Ch’iao: (to Ambassador Bush): When are you going to Peking?

Ambassador Bush: On the 15th. My wife is now studying Chinese at the Foreign Service Institute. She talked to Huang Chen in Washington and used some of her Chinese. He laughed, and she thought it was a compliment. (Laughter) When will you be going?

Vice Foreign Minister Ch’iao: On the 8th.

Mr. Lord: Will you be going to Germany?

Vice Foreign Minister Ch’iao: Yes. I’ll be there [in Peking] to greet Ambassador Bush. I will toast you (to Ambassador Bush).

Ambassador Bush: I have a weak stomach, and can’t drink too much.

Vice Foreign Minister Ch’iao: Ambassador Bruce came to enjoy mao-t’ai—with beer.

(There was then some light discussion about the visit of the Fulbright delegation to China, including Senator Humphrey’s late night swim in West Lake at Hangchow.)

Ambassador Bush: These Congressmen must be confusing to you. (Ch’iao: Not very much.) They come back and argue among themselves—they loved the warm hospitality, the food, and then they come back and argue about what they should have said.

7 Following his trip to China, Jackson advocated raising the Liaison Office in Beijing to an Embassy and reducing the Embassy in Taipei to a Liaison Office. (“Closer China Ties Urged by Jackson,” The New York Times, July 9, 1974, p. 11)
Vice Foreign Minister Ch’iao: We are happy to have the opportunity to meet American friends of different views.

(The Secretary re-enters the room.)

Ambassador Huang: Ambassador Bruce is now in the United States? I met General Haig at the President’s United Nations reception.

Secretary Kissinger: Yes. We will have a strong NATO team. Two close personal friends [will represent us there].

The President sends his warm regards to the Chairman and to yourself [the Vice Foreign Minister]. He apologizes for interrupting me.

We had just reached the interesting legal question [before the telephone call interruption] of how to have a defense treaty with a portion of a country. This would be an interesting question for Ambassador Huang Hua to present to the U.N. It would call on all his subtlety.

(Laughter)

Let me discuss our problem. We obviously can’t—our problem is how to present a new relationship with you where we have not just abandoned people who we have had a relationship with, for whatever reason—to ensure a peaceful transition. This was emphasized by Chairman Mao and the Premier in our talks.

We have to keep in mind that what has distinguished our relationship from that which we have with the Soviets is that there is no organized opposition. There is no Senator Jackson on China policy. It is not in our interest with respect to the hegemonial question to make our relationship controversial. If it will, then it is best to defer [the issue of normalization] for a while. This distinguishes us from Japan.

So there are two issues of principle: the nature of the office we will maintain [in Taipei]; and the nature of the guarantee for a peaceful transition.

Vice Foreign Minister Ch’iao: On the question of a peaceful transition on Taiwan, maybe your understanding is different than mine. In our view these are two different problems: the Taiwan question and relations between our two countries, and then our relations with Taiwan. Our idea is to separate these two questions. As for our relations with Taiwan, as Chairman Mao said, the main idea is that we don’t believe in the possibility of a peaceful transition. But in our relations with the United States, that is another question.

Talking about a peaceful transition, there are also two aspects. That is, at present our [U.S.–PRC] relations, now you recognize Taiwan . . .

Secretary Kissinger: That is why when our [domestic] transition came, the President received the Chief of your Liaison Office, while the Deputy Secretary of State received the Ambassador from Taiwan.

Vice Foreign Minister Ch’iao: I’m not finished. The transition in our relations can be smooth. But the possibility for a smooth transition
in our relations with Taiwan is very small. I recall that this was the focal point in your discussion with Chairman Mao.

Secretary Kissinger: But I recall that he said the transition [in PRC relations with Taiwan] could take a hundred years—by then Bush will be Secretary of State. (Laughter)

Let me sum up your points: The transition in U.S.–PRC relations will go smoothly. As for the transformation of the form of government on Taiwan, this will be over a long period. It does not have to occur immediately, but it isn't likely to be smooth. Do I understand your position correctly. (Ch'iao: Yes.)

Then why don't we consider these problems further, and then discuss them in Peking.

There's one other question on which I wanted the Vice Foreign Minister’s views, Cambodia. You agree that we should postpone debate for a year? (Ch'iao: We can’t have our way.) I feel sorry for the Vice Foreign Minister surrounded by so many small, intractable countries. He can only have his way with the great powers. What would he do if a hundred Laotian elephants headed north? (Laughter)

The Ambassador (Huang Hua) should take a vacation, visit his family. He is so subtle that he cuts you but you don’t know it until you have moved your limb. (Laughter)

Vice Foreign Minister Ch'iao: Let’s think of this problem another way. Sooner or later the Lon Nol government will quit the stage. (There is some discussion of how to best translate the Chinese phrase to “quit the stage.” The Secretary says there is no elegant way to translate the idea. Everyone laughs.) That is to say, the U.N. debate is something that neither of us can control. So if the GRUNK is admitted, Lon Nol will be expelled. Why not let it happen? It will pave the way for you in solving this problem.

Secretary Kissinger: Especially as there are not many royal governments in Peking nowadays.

What is your idea—this is not a proposal—in order to end the war in Cambodia, to convene an Asian conference, including the People’s Republic, the United States, the Soviet Union, Japan, and Cambodia, to solve the problem.

Vice Foreign Minister Ch’iao: At the present moment I don’t see what benefit such a conference would bring.

On this question, I’d go back and say that we have spent too much time settling small old problems which are a legacy of the past. As for yourself, you spent so much energy on Vietnam and finally a settlement was reached. Now there is Cambodia.

What I now say may turn out to be only empty words, but in my view the final result [of the present situation in Cambodia] is clear;
it is only a matter of time. You see you solved the Vietnam question, and now only Cambodia is there each year as an obstacle. So now this question is not worthwhile, but it doesn’t matter very much. Events have their own laws.

Mr. Solomon, didn’t Fulbright raise this question?

Mr. Solomon: No.

Ambassador Huang: You discussed Vietnam with him.

Vice Foreign Minister Ch’iao: I said [to Senator Fulbright] that your aid [to Vietnam] was a mountain, while ours was a small hill. I told Fulbright that on the whole we took a restrained attitude [toward the Vietnam situation].

Secretary Kissinger: Our attitude is that we are prepared to restrict our military aid to replacements.

We believe we should announce my trip to the People’s Republic when I return from India—about November 8. I’ll be in touch with the Ambassador.

Vice Foreign Minister Ch’iao: On these technical issues we don’t have many problems. I’ll consult with my government [regarding the timing of your trip].

Secretary Kissinger: Are there any questions I haven’t raised?

Mr. Lord: Our European relations are better than they were in April.

Secretary Kissinger: You said last time that we were too harsh on the Europeans. Our relations are better.

Vice Foreign Minister Ch’iao: We have seen this. I think you remember that Chairman Mao also wished that you remain longer in Japan.

Secretary Kissinger: I never thought I’d hear him say that!

Vice Foreign Minister Ch’iao: So we are glad to see that, in comparison to April, you have improved your relations with Japan and with Europe. You had talks with Heath?

Secretary Kissinger: Yes. He was very impressed with his trip to China. I bought him a Chinese antique bowl as a present.

Vice Foreign Minister Ch’iao: Do you think he will lose [the upcoming elections]?

Secretary Kissinger: I’m afraid so. We have particularly strong relations with the Conservative leaders, although the Labor leaders are easy to get along with on a day-to-day basis.

Vice Foreign Minister Ch’iao: Many thanks for your hospitality this evening. I can only reciprocate in Peking.

(At this point, 11:35 p.m., the Chinese got up to depart. They were escorted to the elevator by the Secretary and the other American participants where final farewells were expressed.)