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DEPARTMENT OF STATE
BRIEFING MEMORANDUM

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s/s *CJM*

June 5, 1971

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To: J - Ambassador Johnson

From: SCI - Herman Pollack

Meeting with Dr. Kissinger Tuesday
June 8, 5:00 p.m. on Post-Apollo Cooperation

Where We Are

8/9/71-11/30

On February 11-12 Minister Lefevre led an ESC delegation to its second meeting in Washington with the U.S. delegation which you chaired. By letter of March 3 he confirmed the European views expressed during that meeting and restated the matters on which the ESC wanted confirmation of the U.S. position.

Unbeknownst to us, in a meeting on February 22 with the President in which David, Flanigan and Ehrlichman participated the general conclusion was reached that Post-Apollo cooperation with Europe would entail significant transfer of technology, possibly unwarranted and undesirable, as well as managerial headaches of serious dimension. Whether warranted or not this meeting acquired the de facto status of a Presidential decision not to proceed with the Post-Apollo program, and efforts within the Department to prepare a constructive response to Lefevre's letter to you of March 3 were paralyzed.

To break this paralysis the Secretary on March 23 sent a memorandum (Tab A) to the President informing him that we planned to continue our efforts to engage European participation in the program, but stating that he felt it prudent to check "to ensure our efforts continue to be in accord with your views".

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A month later Dr. Kissinger held a meeting at which David, Flanigan, Fletcher, et al., were present where it was agreed that NASA would prepare within two weeks an assessment of the extent to which cooperation with the

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Europeans would entail the transfer of technology, together with a statement of possible alternatives to Post-Apollo cooperation with the Europeans. The NASA report (now in your office)* was finally prepared on June 2 and is to be the subject of a meeting called by Dr. Kissinger for 5:00 p.m., ~~Monday~~, June 8.
Tuesday

* TAB E

In the meantime you sent a message on April 6 to Lefevre (Tab B) regretting you had not yet answered his letter and assuring him that you would be in touch with him "as soon as possible". Inquiries from Brussels as to when the letter might be dispatched were made on April 9 and again on May 7. On May 14 we replied that an answer was unlikely "before the end of May".

Also, in the meantime, on May 21 the INTELSAT Conference came to a successful conclusion.

The NASA Assessment of Technological Transfer

Basically the NASA study of June 2 concludes that the transfer of technology inherent in Post-Apollo cooperation with Europe need not involve unacceptable risks to the U.S. and would be more than compensated for by the economic and engineering benefits from European participation. There would be more technological transfer involved in the European development of the space tug than would be the case in European development of the shuttle's vertical tail. However, NASA has concluded that even in the case of the space tug the transfer can be limited and controlled through U.S. performance of certain tasks.

This is to say that the NASA study does not substantiate those who in the February 22 meeting with the President argued against the Post-Apollo cooperation program on the grounds of unwarranted or uncompensated technological transfer.

Where Are We?

It seems to me that, except for the passage of an awkward and inordinate period of time in which we have been unable to resume our discussions with the Europeans, basically, the events recited above have not contributed

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to the development of this subject. No telling argument has been advanced which would suggest a change in either the affirmative or the negative with respect to whether we proceed with the negotiations with the Europeans.

As Jim Fletcher put it to you at the May 3 luncheon the decision as to whether to engage the Europeans in the Post-Apollo program rests essentially on foreign policy considerations. I believe that the foreign policy considerations (Tab C) set forth for you on May 5 by SCI and EUR remain valid and compelling.

In Europe the interest and enthusiasm for participation in the Post-Apollo program seems to have lessened since its high point last February. Nonetheless, the Europeans have continued to press for a statement of the U.S. position, and face the need to reach basic decisions as to their own space program which will be affected fundamentally by their choice whether to participate in the Post-Apollo program.

What Next?

Launch Assurances. Regardless of the outcome of pending deliberations on cooperation with the Europeans in the Post-Apollo program there should emerge from the process a decision in principle to provide the Europeans now with a clear and forthcoming statement of the U.S. position with respect to the availability of launchers. Our preference would be to have such a position incorporated in your response to Lefevre which would continue to make it contingent upon substantial European participation in the Post-Apollo program. However, in fact we believe that our interests are such that the U.S. position is not so contingent. In the event we do not move forward with the Post-Apollo negotiations we believe that a new launch availability position should be announced as an independent and self-sufficient matter.

The absence of such a policy has been a thorn in the side of our space relations with Europe for the better part of a decade. Our present position was motivated largely by a desire to bring into being a single global communication system under the definitive arrangements of INTELSAT. The recent successful conclusion of the INTELSAT negotiations makes possible a renovation of our policy in a

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In the event the discussion of technical considerations, including technological transfer, is indecisive, I urge you make a major presentation of the foreign policy considerations and of the President's public record (Tab D) which argue in favor of engaging if possible the European participation in the program. On the assumption that there will continue to be qualms on the part of at least some of the key participants you might make a major point of the tentative nature of the ongoing discussions and of the opportunity for continuing review and final free decision this fall.

In such circumstances it may prove best not to make a special point of our detailed views on launch availability for this is not necessarily the proper audience or the prime occasion on which to float that proposal. It is one preferably best handled by careful interdepartmental staff effort first.

In the event the general tenor of the meeting continues to be negative with respect to cooperation with the Europeans in the Post-Apollo program I suggest you disassociate yourself from the sense of the meeting and urge that the White House participants provide the President promptly with a proposed response to Secretary Rogers' memorandum of March 23.

However, in the event the sense of the meeting seems to be emerging with a negative White House recommendation to the President you may wish to seek an agreement in principle to the necessity for an independent and self-sufficient statement on launch availability being made to the Europeans in fairly prompt fashion. An agreement in principle to the desirability of such a statement would be helpful to the subsequent development of interdepartmental consensus on the content of the statement.

In the event of a trend toward a negative conclusion the question of alternatives will become relevant. You might take the position that cutting off the discussions with the Europeans will indeed have serious adverse repercussions which can best be ameliorated by a forthcoming and positive position with respect to other outstanding space issues, e.g., launch availability and the aeronautical satellite.

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In the event the consensus of the Kissinger meeting is in the negative with respect to Post-Apollo cooperation we shall send you our views as to how to inform the Europeans and manage the subsequent relationships with them.

Attachments:

- Tab A - The Secretary's Memorandum to the President, 3/23/71
- Tab B - Message to Lefevre, 4/6/71
- Tab C - Memorandum on Foreign Policy Considerations, 5/5/71
- Tab D - Presidential Views, 3/20/71 memorandum

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Drafted by: SCI:HPollack:ans
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