This paper considers alternative views of US interest in Nigeria and Biafra, the range of policy choices open to the US, and the political consequences of the relief courses described in the first paper.

The National Interest. The US has no vital interests in Nigeria or Biafra. Broadly, there are two opposing views of our interests, with many variations. Designed deliberately to heighten the contrast, these are:

1. We have a major interest in the future stability of the region and all Africa. We favor the unity of Nigeria to avoid:

   (a) A blow to the Federation likely to fragment it;
   (b) An environment of continuing hostility that would result in an arms race between the fragments;
   (c) The prospect of great-power rivalries;
   (d) A precedent for secession elsewhere;
   (e) Opposing the majority of African states on a crucial African issue.

   This view does not imply US responsibility for the future of the Federation—which could include military excesses, political repression, civil strife, and other events beyond our control. Likewise, though we are deeply concerned to save lives and relieve suffering, we should avoid involvement in relief which implies, in Africa or elsewhere, that the US has accepted responsibility for the peoples affected.

   We must therefore shield the US from pressures for unwanted direct involvement on ground of little strategic concern—particularly a long-term and large-scale political, financial, and possibly even military responsibility for the survival of a new political entity in Eastern Nigeria.

2. The overriding US concern is to save as many lives as possible. The distended stomachs of starving children, the tragic toll of lives in the tens—perhaps hundreds—of thousands outweigh any other consideration. To the extent that we can, of course, we should keep in mind the important political considerations involved. We should try to organize the relief effort to minimize
the problem they pose. These problems must not, however, be permitted to stand in the way of saving human life.

Both views of the US interest recognize that the safety of 5,200 US citizens in Nigeria could in some circumstances be at stake, and that the US has an obligation to try to protect the $300 million in investment there. Those holding to the second view usually contend, however, that we should sacrifice our investment if that proves necessary to increase the flow of food to the starving. Some would go further and accept, if necessary, the US Government involvement and very real personal risks to our citizens that would be entailed in evacuating the American community.

National Interest and Policy Choices. In examining the full range of policy options to expedite and enlarge relief to Biafra, the first view of national interest suggests that we seek the tacit consent of both sides if possible, and at least consent of the Federal Government. The second view considers the consent of either party important only insofar as it adds to our ability to get food to those who need it. In practice, the policy question on relief comes down to how much we are willing to override the interests of one of the parties and the real implications of the political risks for expanded relief that this would entail on both sides. This question mainly involves our policy toward the Federal Government, since FMG acquiescence is necessary for peaceful access by land or air to relieve the greater human suffering on the Biafran side.

The policy options below are examined in this light and keyed to alternative relief courses outlined in the first paper.
OPTION 1. Enlarging the flow of relief to Biafra with the acquiescence of both parties, but no program in which both explicitly agree.

1. Relief: Continue present night flights (Course A -- 10,000 tons), which have a modest potential for expansion without changes in facilities or equipment. This could be increased to 14,000 tons by expanding night flights with more or larger capacity aircraft (Course B). The latter course, however, would probably lose FMG acquiescence. Strong FMG objections eliminate air drops (Course F) under this option. Surface corridors (Course D) are unlikely because of the conflicting priorities of the two parties.

2. U.S. Political Posture: Maintain recognition of the FMG and give low-key support to the concept of one Nigeria. Unless we give at least minimal support to one Nigeria, FMG acquiescence in relief would be jeopardized. Stronger support for one Nigeria could jeopardize Biafran acquiescence in relief.


4. U.S. Diplomatic Posture: We can play an indirect role in arranging for increased relief supplies, within the tolerance of the two parties. We urge Africans, the Commonwealth Secretariat, and others to lead in peace-making. We can play an indirect but active role in suggesting proposals, as opportunities appear, for resolving or mitigating the conflict, providing physical protection to the Ibos, etc.

PRO

1. Relief: Deliveries into Biafra could reach 14,000 tons monthly.

2. This is the most we can safely do, given Federal and Biafran attitudes, without risking greater involvement on either side.

3. It permits African leadership in peace-making and future peace-keeping, and avoids US assuming responsibility for these. While there is little African leverage, African leadership is favored by the overwhelming majority of African states, the OAU, U Thant, the FMG, and the British.
CON

1. Relief: Given the maximum possible flow under this policy, there is still risk that many lives will be lost because of inadequate supply, particularly if a major carbohydrate shortage develops in March. Even this option leaves the relief effort vulnerable to FMG mounting xenophobia, limits the prospects for expansion at best to Courses A and B, and gives the US only limited leverage with the FMG to redress the high present jeopardy to existing programs. The relief agencies, the OAU and the British have been unable to influence significantly the two sides on relief issues. We are thus depending on those who have demonstrably failed, making us increasingly vulnerable to domestic criticism.

2. Any efforts we make toward peace are seriously handicapped by the need to work through others. Moreover, this option does not take fully into account growing Biafran opposition to negotiating under African or Commonwealth auspices.

3. While "one Nigeria" is important to the US, the option does nothing actively toward that goal.

4. It fails to recognize that the present stalemate, with the prospect of more suffering and no end to the war in sight, may have brought Africans and others to accept at least tacitly a more active US role.

5. It offers no more than indirect and ineffectual diplomatic efforts to assure the protection of the Ibos though atrocities would outrage our own public as well as the world.

PROSPECTS OVER THE NEXT SIX MONTHS

1. Relief to Biafra is likely to be limited to 8,000 to 10,000 tons per month by political constraints from both sides.

2. Unless Biafran arms are cut off, war will probably continue, suffering may well increase, and relatively moderate FMG leadership may be replaced by extremists.

3. French will continue and may increase support for Biafra, while the British and Russians continue to support FMG. African support of FMG may weaken.
COSTS OF FAILURE

Starvation and bloodshed will continue, perhaps massively. We would be open to charge we had not done all we could, either to bring war to an end or to feed the hungry. If federal Nigeria fragments, we are likely to face new and dangerous instability in Nigeria and perhaps elsewhere, along with African charges that our planes, humanitarian assistance and private support of Biafra were responsible.
OPTION 2: Enlarging Flow of Relief to Biafra under an Arrangement requiring Federal and Biafran Agreement.

1. Relief: Seek FMG and Biafran agreement to (i) daylight flights into airstrips at Uli (Biafran territory), Obilagu (Federal territory near Biafra) or some other airfield (Course C)—18,000 tons; (ii) overland corridor (Course D)—all required based on Calabar; or (iii) use of water corridor (Course E)—all required when river navigable in 4-5 months.

2. US Political Posture: Be prepared to shift toward greater political support of FMG. FMG has agreed in principle to daylight flights and surface corridors. Biafra has not done so for fear of jeopardizing night flights that provide cover for its arms flights. Thus, strategy requires making certain that FMG acts on its declared willingness to cooperate under circumstances so favorable that public disclosure of Biafra's failure to cooperate could undermine sympathy for it abroad.

3. US Military Posture: Maintain present arms embargo on both sides.

4. US Diplomatic Posture: Be prepared to bargain strong diplomatic backing by new Administration for FMG position in exchange for FMG (a) concrete steps in expanding relief effort and (b) cooperation in achieving negotiated settlement including internationally-policed guarantees of Ibo protection.

On relief, we would work directly with FMG to force Biafra's hand by developing Federally-held Obilagu airstrip. FMG agrees to inspection and transport to Biafran lines, and with our logistic help moves food to point where Biafrans face publicized choice to accept or turn it back. Similar scenarios could be worked out to confront Ojukwu with the need to accept or reject supplies brought by other overland or water routes.

On political side, we mount a major diplomatic initiative to bring about peace negotiations in context of one Nigeria with
Ibo protection. We consult OAU and seek its cooperation, yet not regard its approval as prerequisite. We would press Ojukwu directly. We seek British and especially French cooperation with respective sides.

**PRO**

1. **Relief:** FMG agreement to implement daylight flights and a land corridor is likely. Deliveries to Biafra could be increased substantially and the cost drastically reduced if a surface corridor operated.

2. It seizes the initiative when others have failed, yet invites collaboration of the OAU and others.

3. It reconciles expanded relief with our political interest in one Nigeria.

4. It recognizes FMG veto over relief and crucial role of French arms supply to Biafra, yet forces confrontation with neither.

5. It engages our influence in support of early negotiations, yet need not lead to direct US participation in eventual peace-keeping.

6. While the FMG might be willing to cooperate under this option with the expectation it would be unacceptable to the Biafrans, it would present an opportunity to use leverage on the latter.

**CON**

1. **Relief:** Though relief deliveries to Biafra would be increased, the second airlift (Course C) would increase deliveries but still fall short of providing the maximum estimated need. The need cannot be met without a surface corridor (Course D).

2. Diplomatic leadership risks creating the impression that we have assumed responsibility for the course of events.

3. This degree of support for the FMG risks Biafran rejection of relief supplies.
4. It invites African resentment at outside intervention.

PROSPECTS OVER THE NEXT SIX MONTHS

1. The prospects for negotiating a second airstrip are probably no more than even. Prospects for surface corridor are still less because Biafran resistance would be strong for military and political reasons. If these could be achieved, however, relief could be expanded substantially through use of a second airstrip in Federal territory and dramatically by a successful land corridor. Otherwise, suffering will continue despite our efforts to break the deadlock.

2. Odds are definitely against a negotiated end to the war. But Biafra is more likely to compromise once it is clear (i) US political help is not on the way, and (ii) there are concrete proposals for internationally-policed Ibo protection, including participation of African friends of Biafra. FMG coalition may grow temporarily stronger and be more willing to negotiate as result of our support.

3. French may continue support of Biafra, though our initiative raises the political cost. The British and Soviets will continue to back the FMG, though our initiative will impede the growth of Soviet influence in Nigeria.

COSTS OF FAILURE: If the FMG failed to cooperate, we would be obliged to expose publicly its refusal. This might weaken the FMG, push it toward greater reliance on the USSR, and jeopardize relief arrangements. Yet if we execute our sanction of disclosure against Biafra, we would probably forfeit its cooperation in expanded relief arrangements, inviting propaganda that would distort our motives.

If our negotiating efforts were unsuccessful, the suffering continued, Biafra stood firm and the French refused to cooperate, the logic of the situation would point us toward a confrontation with the French over the arms supply.
OPTION 3. Meeting Biafran relief needs through pro-FMG policy designed to end the war.

1. Relief: Air drop (Course F) feasible with some risks and could deliver 18-20,000 tons monthly. Biafra might be willing to receive US supplies by air drop, though it now refuses U.K. supplies because of U.K. arms to FMG.

2. U.S. Political Posture: Strong support for the concept of one Nigeria.


4. U.S. Diplomatic Posture: Make our aid to the FMG conditional on reaffirmation of its position that it would agree to (a) a ceasefire at any point Biafra renounces secession, and (b) acceptance of internationally policed protection for the Ibo, including an amnesty for their leadership. We approach Biafra, France, and the four African countries supporting Biafra to persuade them the rebels have a vital interest in a negotiated end of the secession.

PRO

1. Relief: Air drops (Course F) could bring total deliveries as high as 20,000 tons monthly, which would largely meet relief needs unless a major carbohydrate shortage develops. U.S. arms aid to FMG—in psychological as well as material impact—would probably break the stalemate, barring an unlikely French escalation. If in turn the war ends quickly, all relief needs could be met.

2. It would give us significantly more leverage with FMG in seeking both relief concessions and Ibo protection in the final settlement.

3. It gives Biafra both the opportunity and motivation to negotiate while its strength is still intact, and while U.S. prestige would be behind arrangements for effective Ibo protection.

4. It would sustain the Federal coalition and assure the near-term survival of one Nigeria.
1. Relief: It would open us to charges that we feed while our guns kill. But without Biafran cooperation, our relief operation at whatever level would be impaired either because (a) high wastage which might result from air drops or (b) obdurate Biafran refusal to accept food delivered by a land corridor. In either event, starvation would go on despite our considerable political investment. It would provoke an immediate outcry in the U.S. and in much of Europe, where the Ibo defense against great odds has caught popular imagination.

2. The Ibos might continue their resistance regardless of the odds by resorting to guerrilla warfare and incurring a characteristic pattern of reprisals. Our policy would then be considered a failure, however we might have described our expectation when we made the change. We would need to face that fact, or "escalate" by providing more and better weapons. The efficiency of the Federal military forces is low.

3. It would not necessarily, as the British have discovered, buy all the political leverage we would wish with the FMG.

4. It would invite requests for arms from other African countries in similar trouble.

5. Though most Africans would feel we came down on the right side, they would nonetheless be ambivalent at this "great power" intervention. It would destroy the benefits our arms embargo has gained in Africa. We would suffer serious losses in the four African countries supporting Biafra.

6. We run a danger that the French will respond with increased arms for Biafra.

7. We invite the charge of "a quick kill of a valiant, long-suffering black nation fighting for its life."

PROSPECTS OVER THE NEXT SIX MONTHS

1. Some interruptions and at least a temporary slow-down in relief supplies to Biafra would result. By the end of the period, the war would have ended, or the end would probably be in sight, permitting a dramatic expansion of relief to meet the need fully on both sides.

2. Atrocities are possible under any sequence of events. However, the FMG would cooperate in trying to control these problems and in enlarging relief.

3. Our action would inhibit the expansion of Soviet in-
fluence in Nigeria, please the British (while mildly embar-
assing them), and set a higher price than the French are
likely to pay in support of Biafra. It might well lead the
French to urge the Biafrans to negotiate.

COSTS OF FAILURE

If, despite strong U.S. support for the FMG, the war does
not end quickly, we would suffer acute embarrassment abroad
and mounting criticism at home. As in other options, failure
to end the war soon would endanger the FMG coalition, threaten
the breakup of Nigeria, increase regional instability, and
enhance the suffering of the people we are trying to help. If
extended guerrilla war develops, the costs would be high.
OPTION 4. Enlarging flow of relief to Biafra without regard for the consequences in Nigeria, but avoiding any more of a pro-Biafran stance than is implied by the relief effort alone.

1. Relief: Air drops (Course F) could be expanded quickly to the maximum (20,000 tons monthly), without concern for Federal reaction.

2. U.S. Political Posture: Maintain recognition of FMG, attempt to maintain diplomatic relations, and salvage as much as possible of U.S. influence and investment in Nigeria. Maintain policy of non-recognition of Biafra and continue to keep discreet U.S. official contacts with Biafran officials.


4. U.S. Diplomatic Posture: Try to assure protection for or evacuate 5,200 Americans in Nigeria while emphasizing to FMG that (a) no change in political policy is involved, (b) our motivations are entirely humanitarian, and (c) nothing besides food and medicine is being dropped. Warn the U.K. in advance of the addition of air drops, and concert with them regarding the protection of the far larger number of U.K. and other nationals. Maintain the present stance of cooperation with the FMG except where the FMG reaction makes it impossible.

PRO

1. Relief: Air drops (Course F) could largely meet relief needs unless a major carbohydrate shortage develops.

2. It would still, at least temporarily, most of the criticism that the U.S. relief effort is inadequate.

3. It probably would enable us to maintain some kind of a position in Nigeria, though a sharply reduced and uncomfortable one.

CON

1. Relief: Resentment at the change might interrupt the relief effort on the Federal side, with increased suffering. Federal opposition to air drop would make it increasingly risky as FMG air intercept capabilities improve. Moreover, the loss of Federal acquiescence in the night airlift to Biafra would create new risks for it.
2. Our action would be regarded in both Nigeria and Biafra as a pro-Biafran step.

3. Our citizens and investments in Nigeria would be subjected to severe risks, regardless of precautions; only evacuation of virtually all of our citizens could ensure their safety. Unfortunately, the precautions taken, and even more so the act of evacuation, would cause deep distrust of our motives and damage the credibility of our insistence that no policy change was intended.

4. We would lose restraining influence we might otherwise bring to bear on treatment of Ibos, assuming an FMG military victory. We would reduce our ability to seize opportunities to press for peace.

5. It would risk, though to a lesser degree, the consequences of an explicitly pro-Biafran position that are summarized below under Option 5.

PROSPECTS OVER THE NEXT SIX MONTHS

1. Relief to Biafra could be expanded, but with increased risk so long as the war lasts. In Federal areas, the international relief effort would suffer serious interruptions.

2. We would probably be able to maintain some kind of presence in Nigeria, but a reduced one.

3. The resentment in Africa against our citizens and policies would probably spread during this period.

COST OF FAILURE

The costs in this case are less those of failure than of success—those deliberately incurred as the price of increasing the tonnage of relief supplied. If the FMG is able to overrun Biafra, without restraints on the treatment of Ibos that we might otherwise have obtained, the value of the added tonnage in humanitarian terms will be thrown in doubt. If Biafra is successful by virtue of FMG collapse, a responsibility will be imputed to us by most Africans and many in the UK which will probably weigh much more heavily in the balance, in purely political terms, than the gratitude of the Biafran Government.
OPTION 5. Enlarging flow of relief to Biafra without regard for consequences in Nigeria, while seeking ceasefire and an arms embargo from all sources to both sides.

1. Relief: Night relief flights (Course B) and supplemental airdrop (Course F) could be mounted without regard for consequences in Nigeria which could deliver up to 20,000 tons monthly into Biafra. We would seek a ceasefire to pave the way for effective arrangements for the movement of relief supplies.

2. US Political Posture: While trying to maintain diplomatic relations with FMG and salvage whatever US influence and investment we could, we would recognize that our position in Nigeria would probably suffer irreparable damage. We would develop official contacts with Biafran officials, while stopping short (as have the French) of according recognition.

3. US Military Posture: Maintain present embargo of arms to both sides.

4. US Diplomatic Posture: Warn and evacuate those US citizens who are willing to leave Nigeria. Assert forcefully that we want to retain friendship of Nigeria and cooperate with its government but that the demands of humanity call for a ceasefire and immediate negotiations. Attempt to maintain present cooperation with FMG if its reaction permits. We would initiate a major diplomatic effort to obtain a ceasefire, suspension of arms shipments to both sides, and agreement of the parties to enter without preconditions into negotiations. We would offer, in concert with other countries if possible, to expand greatly the flow of relief to both sides as soon as the ceasefire took place.

PRO

1. Relief: As under the previous option, increasing the present rate of deliveries to the maximum (see Course B) and adding air drops could bring total deliveries to Biafra as high as 20,000 tons monthly, which would probably meet relief needs unless a major carbohydrate shortage develops.

2. This course would also still, at least temporarily, most of the criticism that the US relief effort is inadequate.

3. In the event a ceasefire could be achieved it would remove most of the obstacles to an adequate flow of relief.

4. Even should it be possible to mount an adequate relief effort without an end to the war, which is unlikely, the tragedy of the war itself would remain. This proposal seeks to stop the war in the most direct fashion.
5. The situation has so deteriorated that it can no longer be solved by the disputants, the Africans, the Commonwealth or by the UN—which is unwilling in any case. We may be the only country able to make an initiative of this kind credible. The initiative would be likely, at minimum, to force the U.K. to follow a similar policy.

CON

1. Relief: Humanitarian assistance from the US to Nigeria would probably be interrupted or terminated by Federal action, with increased suffering. Relief to Biafra might become more risky owing to Federal action.

2. This initiative is not, in fact, "neutral," whatever it may purport to be and has little prospect for bringing about a ceasefire or an effective embargo on arms. To embargo arms to both FMG and Biafra, and to try to bring them to the conference table on equal terms, is to deny the established government the essence of its cause while conceding the secessionists theirs. The position would be regarded throughout the world, and in Nigeria and Biafra, as pro-Biafran.

3. The reaction in Nigeria would probably be literally violent. It would be imprudent to adopt the initiative without being prepared to evacuate our citizens and lose US investments. Demonstrations and isolated acts of violence against US citizens and property might occur elsewhere in Africa.

4. The FMG might not cease fighting and come to the conference table. Conceding that domestic pressures might force the U.K. to follow our lead (with consequent danger to their own, more numerous citizens and larger investment), the Nigerians would have little serious difficulty in buying arms on the open market. In all probability they would do so.

5. Moreover, the Nigerians could probably count on the Russians, whose influence would grow, to the detriment of the West.

6. If the FMG continued to obtain arms, so would Biafra. And the French would probably help. Less probable, but possible is that the shock of the US (and perhaps U.K.) action would so damage the FMG that it would be unable to continue war. The war might then end, but further fragmentation of Nigeria would be likely. The US would be widely considered responsible, both in Nigeria and elsewhere in Africa.
7. US relations with the U.K. would suffer. The leadership of both parties would regard the US move as a "stab in the back," whatever their back-benchers might say. U.K. support for US policy in other parts of the world might be impaired.

8. US relations with most of Africa would be damaged. This is an African issue of major importance. With more than 2,000 ethnic groups in Africa, secession is a nightmare for many African leaders--one that a successful precedent would make much more real.

PROSPECTS OVER THE NEXT SIX MONTHS

1. More relief could be delivered to Biafra, but with increased risk so long as the war lasts. The relief effort in Nigeria would probably be seriously impaired.

2. The chances are against the success of the arms embargo or effort to get the parties to the conference table.

3. The damage to the US position would thus probably take place with no offsetting advantages either to the relief effort or in shortening the war.

COSTS OF FAILURE

The US would become anathema in Nigeria, losing ground to the USSR and risking harm to our citizens and the loss of our investments. The US relief effort in Nigeria might be interrupted or worse. The US would suffer a serious loss of position in Africa and with the U.K.
OPTION 6: Enlarging the flow of relief by recognizing Biafra.

1. Relief: Continue expanded night airlift (Course B) with possible air drops (Course F) either as a partial supplement to or in lieu of the night airlift, without regard for the Federal reaction. (18-20,000 tons, almost meeting need).

2. U.S. Political Posture: Support Biafran independence and Biafra's position for early peace negotiations without pre-conditions, pressuring Biafra to work toward maximum cooperation with Nigeria.

3. U.S. Military Posture: Maintain the present embargo of arms to the FMG, while prepared to provide arms to Biafra if necessary to protect Ibo lives.


PRO

1. Relief: Airlift and air drops could bring total deliveries to as much as 18-20,000 tons monthly (about 60 percent of the maximum need) if not interdicted.

2. It would recognize that the sacrifices and suffering of the Biafrans may validate their quest for independence. Given the intense rivalry, hostility, and distrust between Nigeria and Biafra, it may not be possible to recreate a united Nigeria which includes Biafra.

3. It might end the war by bringing the FMG to negotiations or collapse.

4. It would give us an important position of influence with a dynamic state in West Africa.

5. French recognition could follow, as well as that of several additional African states.

CON

1. Relief: Increased FMG efforts to interdict flights could interfere with airlift relief deliveries to Biafra. All FMG
support for relief to Biafra will stop and any US relief support to FMG must be channeled through other parties acceptable to the FMG.

2. Our recognition would not necessarily assure Biafran survival, even if we provide arms and equipment. The Nigerians could probably count on the Russians, who are now supplying them with sophisticated weapons, to increase the supply of material. Soviet influence would inevitably grow, to the detriment of the West.

3. As in the previous option there is no reason to be confident that the Nigerians would cease fighting and come to the conference table. Conceding that domestic pressures might force the UK to follow our lead (with consequent danger to their own, more numerous citizens and larger investment), the Nigerians would have little serious difficulty in buying arms on the open market. In all probability they would do so.

4. The reaction in Nigeria would be violent. We would need to arrange in advance for the evacuation of 5,200 Americans in Nigeria, with high risk and possible US military involvement, and risk the $300 million of private US investment. Demonstrations and acts of violence against US citizens and property might occur elsewhere in Africa.

5. With no further reason to hope that it can retain US support for a united Nigeria, the FMG is likely to increase their efforts to interdict relief flights into Biafra, increasing the risk and causing interruptions that will increase the suffering.

6. US relations with the U.K. would suffer. Even more than under the previous option, the leadership of both parties would regard the US move as a "stab in the back." U.K. support for US policy in other parts of the world might be impaired.

7. The shock of the US action might be sufficient to damage Nigeria internally to the point where the FMG would be unable to continue prosecuting the war. In that event, the war might come to an early end, but the further fragmentation of Nigeria would be likely. The US would be widely considered responsible for the consequences, both in Nigeria and elsewhere in Africa.

PROSPECTS OVER THE NEXT SIX MONTHS

1. More relief could be delivered to Biafra, but with high risks while the war lasts. In Federal areas, the international relief effort would probably collapse.
2. The chances are against the parties getting soon to the conference table.

3. The Biafran experience may be sufficiently distinctive among African secessionist movements that it will not in and of itself lead to repetition outside Nigeria. The differing circumstances, internal and external, for each country - not Biafra's survival - will be decisive. Nevertheless, few African leaders would agree, and most would regard our recognition as undermining their territorial integrity by encouraging secession. Indeed, Biafran independence would almost certainly do so.

COST OF FAILURE

If Biafra failed we would lose substantial prestige in Africa and elsewhere. We would damage our relations with African states, seriously with some. It is conceivable that our recognition and full support, including arms, may be the most effective means of saving large numbers of Ibo from dying of starvation. This course may also cause greater human suffering, and we would be forced to still deeper involvement in an effort to alleviate it.