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# NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE ESTIMATE


*The Horn of Africa*

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## THE HORN OF AFRICA

### CONCLUSIONS

A. The Horn of Africa is an area of chronic tensions and instability. State-to-state relations and the interests of the great powers there are affected by a complex mixture of ethnic, religious, political, and ideological conflicts. In the last year or two some of the more serious tensions have eased, and some of the groups in conflict have reached a stalemate. The reconciliation of northern and southern Sudanese has greatly improved relations between Sudan and Ethiopia. Internal dissension in the Eritrean Liberation Front (ELF) has eased pressure on Ethiopian counterinsurgency forces. In Somalia problems within the ruling council are diverting attention from potentially risky irredentist activity.

B. From the US point of view the situation in the Horn appears more favorable than it has for many years. But much of this is transitory. The stability of governments and continuity of policies in this area depend greatly on the quality and strength of the national rulers. This applies especially to Ethiopia, the most important country in the Horn, and the focus of US interests. Haile Selassie, at 80, still rules his Empire with a firm hand, and has made formal arrangements for the succession of his son, Crown Prince Asfa Wossen. But the Crown Prince is not highly regarded and is likely to run into trouble in establishing a successor regime. Much will depend upon the cohesion and loyalty

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of the armed forces, both for fending off possible externally-directed subversion and for putting down challenges from within. The odds favor the Crown Prince's succession, but there is certain to be some turmoil in the process.

C. So far there has been little public opposition in Ethiopia to Kagnew Station, the US communications facility in Eritrea. Although it does not appear to be in much danger from the ELF, there is some danger that an individual or dissident faction—or even a Palestinian group—might take some hostile action against Kagnew. We judge that the Ethiopian Government is likely to permit Kagnew to continue functioning through the period of its lease (1978).

D. In Somalia President Mohammed Siad has managed to stay a step ahead of his numerous opponents, and has purged a number of his foes. His relations with the USSR currently are close, and he proclaims a Marxist-Leninist Somali socialism. The prospects are for prolonged instability. Even if Siad wins this round, there will be further plotting and resistance.

E. Outside influences have always had an impact on developments in the Horn. Tensions stemming from the Arab-Israeli conflict are easing, but Israel will continue to provide important aid to Ethiopia, and will aim to maintain its influential position there. Russian influence in Somalia is considerable, particularly with the Siad faction of the ruling council. Siad would be unlikely to grant extensive facilities to the Soviet military, knowing that this would be unpopular in Somalia. Military aid, the basis of Soviet influence, is likely to continue, but will probably not include much, if any, of the sophisticated equipment Somalia wants. The Chinese have extended large new economic aid agreements to Ethiopia, Sudan, and Somalia, but over the long run are unlikely to gain substantial influence in the Horn.

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## DISCUSSION

### I. INTRODUCTION

1. The Horn of Africa is an area of chronic tension, in which a complex mixture of ethnic, religious, political, and ideological disputes affects state-to-state relations and the interests of the great powers there.<sup>1</sup> Ethiopia and Somalia are very poor countries whose per capita incomes, literacy rates, and social services rank them near the bottom of the world's underdeveloped countries. In both countries traditional social organizations and attitudes are in competition with modern institutions and concepts advanced by the small educated elites.

2. Surface appearances indicate a relaxation of some of the more serious tensions and a stalemate between some of the important groups in conflict. The reconciliation of the northern and southern Sudanese, for example, has improved relations between Ethiopia

<sup>1</sup> The term "Horn of Africa" is used in this paper to mean Ethiopia, Somalia, and the French Territory of the Afars and Issas, with Kenya and Sudan on the borders and often involved in the affairs of the Horn itself.

and Sudan, and affected adversely the fortunes of the Eritrean Liberation Front (ELF). A major split within the ranks of the ELF has served to reduce the effectiveness of its insurgency activities in Eritrea. In Somalia irredentist activity has been in abeyance in recent years.

3. From the US point of view, these are favorable developments and perhaps they are harbingers of further movement towards reducing tensions. But the kind of equilibrium prevailing in the Horn of Africa is quite unstable and fragile, and could be upset suddenly. Some observers of the area note a growing uneasiness or sense of impending change. In part this can be attributed to the political shifts of the past year among the great powers, and changes in great power relations with countries of Africa and the Near East. The US Presidential visits to Moscow and Peking; the emergence of the Chinese in international affairs, and their substantial aid offers; the expulsion of the Soviets from Egypt and the Sudan—all have important implications for the governments of the Horn. Also, in Ethiopia and Kenya people expect changes to oc-

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cur following the deaths of the 80-year old national leaders. In Somalia there is also a strong undercurrent of dissatisfaction, which might bring about changes that would upset the delicate balance of relationships in the Horn of Africa.

## II. ETHIOPIA

### A. Political Dynamics

4. Although Ethiopia is one of the more prominent African countries, its potential is limited. There is some basis for economic development (agriculture, grazing, tourism, and perhaps petroleum), but only modest progress has been made so far, and Ethiopia suffers from a host of natural and human constraints and obstacles. Broad deserts, a high plateau with deep gorges, and a lack of roads make internal communication difficult; low literacy rates, shortages of all types of skills, and a scarcity of medical and social services tend to slow the rate of emergence of the population from traditional ways of living.

5. Emperor Haile Selassie is both the chief innovator of, and a major obstacle to, social change. His aim is to modernize the country, but at a pace which is geared to the preservation of the ancient institutions of the Empire, the feudal nobility and the Ethiopian Orthodox Church. Though now 80 years old, he continues to make all important, and a great many unimportant, decisions. His rule depends primarily on the loyalty of the armed forces (his own creation), and on the support of the bureaucracy, the church, and the higher ranks of the traditional nobility—mainly his own Amhara people. The Christian Amharas, a minority in Ethiopia, cling to a privileged position, dominating a collection of diverse peoples—Christian, Moslem, and Animists.

6. National priorities and allocation of budgetary funds are determined according to the Emperor's perception of Ethiopia's most

pressing needs. He is acutely conscious of real and imagined external threats, and worries about encirclement by hostile, often Communist-backed, Moslem states. Over the years the Emperor has favored the development of an army and air force well enough equipped to match any combination of potentially hostile neighbors. Ethiopian forces are equipped almost exclusively with US-supplied weapons and are generally considered to be one of the most effective military establishments in black Africa. Training of selected army units, and of the 8,000-10,000-man Emergency Police is conducted by US, Israeli, and other foreign instructors. Training of the armed forces has been spotty, however, and there are serious deficiencies in logistics and mobility. Most officers and men probably are loyal to the Emperor, but morale generally ranges from fair to poor. Both the army and the Emergency Police are tasked with counterinsurgency duties, while the 32,000-man regular police force attends to usual police activities and is rarely concerned with insurgency problems.

7. The Ethiopian military is heavily dependent on US support. If this support were substantially reduced for any reason, or withdrawn, Ethiopia would probably try to maintain its current level of military strength, first by seeking assistance from such friendly countries as France, Israel, and Great Britain. If such aid were not forthcoming, Ethiopia probably would purchase arms commercially. It probably would get along without turning to Communist sources of aid.

8. The Emperor and most of his advisors see economic development as a desirable goal, but clearly secondary to defense requirements. The Ethiopian approach to economic modernization, a slow and measured one, has paid off in the sense that there have been few hasty, impractical projects, and that the country has not been so troubled by the surge of

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migration to the cities as many other African states. The Emperor's restraining hand, and a succession of competent finance ministers have managed to keep inflation down and foreign debts at a manageable level. Debt service is rising much faster than exports, but repayments are likely to level out in the next few years, and enough foreign aid will be coming in to take care of the debt service and to carry forward the relatively modest economic plans.

9. Even the halting moves towards modernization have created new tensions. Western or locally educated urban elites are impatient at the restraints imposed by the Emperor and the powerful traditional alliance of church and nobility. In recent years secondary and university students have been the most demonstrative of the modernists. The Emperor and his security forces have applied a mixture of toughness and leniency which has generally succeeded in isolating and quelling the student disturbances, without completely alienating the modernists. The Emperor's will has prevailed, but at a cost of frequent disruptions of the educational processes. Student discontent, abetted by others in the modernist camp, is likely to manifest itself again but security forces will be able to contain it. Divisions within the elite are likely to become more pronounced, even while the Emperor lives. After his death, the frustrated advocates of reform will make a major effort to attain influence.

### B. Internal Security Problems

10. Most of the non-Amhara peoples of Ethiopia are not enamoured of the prevailing political arrangements.<sup>2</sup> There is no grievance

<sup>2</sup>There has never been a census of the Ethiopian population. The estimated ethnic composition is 40 percent Gallas; 32 percent Amharas and Tigris; 9 percent Sidamo peoples; 6 percent Shankellas; 6 percent Somalis; 7 percent others. Estimates place the total population at something between 20 and 25 million.

mechanism except personal appeals to the Emperor. The officials they encounter are generally Amharas, unsympathetic and uninterested in local problems. There are no political parties in Ethiopia, and the elected members of Parliament are generally conservative property owners. The non-Amhara educated elite, a small group, are frustrated by the lack of economic and social progress in their provinces, but the bulk of the population does not hold very high expectations of economic betterment. The general tendency is to tolerate existing conditions. Hence, there appears little prospect of an effective popular uprising or serious tribal dissidence, at least so long as a strong central government has at its disposal a substantial military force.

11. There are, however, two special problems of internal security which have no easy solution—the Ogaden and Eritrea. The Ogaden, an arid wasteland in the southeast, is inhabited by a half-million nomadic Somalis, many of whom cross into Somalia on seasonal migrations. Somalia does not recognize the Ethiopian border, which was drawn by colonial powers. In the early 1960s, following Somalia's independence, Mogadiscio sponsored an intermittent guerrilla war in the Ogaden, which culminated in a brief border conflict between Ethiopia and Somalia. At the moment an uneasy truce prevails, the legacy of a détente policy carried out by a previous civilian government in Somalia. An Ethiopian army division is in the Ogaden, and on rare occasions it clashes with small bands of Somali nomads.

12. The Government of Somalia still lays claim to the Ogaden (as well as to Somali-inhabited lands in Kenya and the French Territory of the Afars and Issas), but is too weak militarily to seize it. Recently Ethiopia and Somalia have held a number of discussions over the disputed territory. It is highly unlikely that any Ethiopian government would cede any Ogaden territory to Somalia. The

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Government fears to set a precedent for other dissatisfied groups, and regards the Ogaden as strategically important. National pride is heavily involved on both sides.

13. The Somali Government has sent off to North Korea a number of recruits for guerrilla training, some of whom (including tribesmen from the Ogaden) have already returned. There is a good chance, therefore, that the insurgency will be revived, although this would probably not involve regular Somali forces, and would not cause insurmountable problems for Ethiopian Armed Forces in the Ogaden. A potentially complicating factor is the oil drilling activity, conducted by an American firm in the southern part of the Ogaden. Oil discovered so far has not been in commercially exploitable quantities. If there were a major oil strike, the Ethiopians would pay considerably more attention to physical security in the area.

14. While the unsettled status of the Ogaden ties down a quarter of the Ethiopian Army, even larger numbers of Ethiopian security forces are engaged in combatting the current low level insurgency in Eritrea. These forces, which include the Second Division of the Army, the village militia, and 3,500 men of the Emergency Police, go through the motions of search and destroy, hoping that the ELF will eventually destroy itself by fratricide. The ELF began its activities nearly 10 years ago, when Ethiopia formally annexed the federated ex-Italian colony, thereby reducing Eritrea to provincial status. The subsequent influx of Amhara administrators and their disregard for Eritrean sensitivities estranged a good part of the educated elite. Some of this elite went into exile in Arab countries and organized the ELF. By the mid-1960s scattered bands of ELF guerrillas were roaming the mountains and lowlands of Eritrea, collecting "taxes" from peasants, disrupting communications,

harassing officials, and attacking isolated Ethiopian Army and police units.

15. The ELF continues to carry out harassment operations, but within the past year it has been torn by factional feuding to the extent that most of its energies and weapons are directed at rival groups. There are now two major divisions of the ELF and a number of factions within each. Apparently the quarrels originated as a contest for control among the leaders living in exile, which soon was extended to the units in the field. A few of the contending factions seem to have identifiable characteristics, i.e., Christian, non-Christian, tribally-based, or closely connected with particular Arab backers. Christian elements appear to be declining in importance. Several attempts by Arab governments to mediate have failed.

16. In addition to the problems created for the ELF by its internal fissures, its capabilities have been adversely affected by other factors as well. Until quite recently, the ELF could count on using Sudan as a channel for moving arms, supplies, and recruits in and out of Eritrea and for safe haven. For some time friendly or indifferent governments in both Yemens permitted trans-shipment of supplies to Eritrea, and radical Arab regimes in Iraq and Syria provided ELF exile leaders with funds and access to broadcasting and other propaganda facilities. Somalia, and more recently Libya, also have provided some support. Currently, Sudan is on friendly terms with Ethiopia, and this makes ELF activities in Sudan much more difficult. Other diplomatic efforts of Haile Selassie have been partially successful in cutting down ELF access to Yemeni ports, and in dissuading China from aiding the rebels.

17. Because ELF internal difficulties have intensified, its policies and actions have become highly unpredictable. The main danger

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at this point is that one or more of the factions may suddenly undertake new and dramatic acts of violence to gain new adherents, or out of sheer frustration. The most likely object of ELF terrorism would be installations, offices, or personnel of the Imperial Ethiopian Government. Several years ago specially trained teams of ELF terrorists launched such a program, which included bombings, sabotage, and hijacking of Ethiopian commercial aircraft. At that time the terrorist program came to an abrupt halt after some conspicuous failures, and some effective Ethiopian counteraction. Another resort to terror in Eritrea probably would not gain much for the ELF. But terrorism in Addis Ababa—which is home to a number of international organizations including the Organization of African Unity (OAU) and the UN Economic Commission for Africa, and a frequent conference site—would be conspicuous and would damage the reputation of Haile Selassie and his government.

18. Thus far the ELF has ignored the US installations at Kagnew Station on the outskirts of Asmara, Eritrea's main center. Kagnew facilities, including the vast antenna fields and the large dish antennas are highly vulnerable to sabotage or surprise attack and offer an obvious target to the ELF. Installations are scattered over a wide area with villages and public roads interspersed. Large numbers of people in the course of their daily business come in proximity to buildings and equipment on the base. It would not be difficult to lob a few mortar shells into critical parts of the base area or to attack US personnel. And it would be even simpler for some of the local employees to bring explosives into the base if sabotage were the ELF goal.

19. Only a few Americans in the last couple of years have even had contact with the ELF. In those instances, the rebels were mainly concerned with publicizing their cause and

reassuring themselves about American neutrality in their struggle against the Imperial government. Despite the ELF propaganda themes, broadcast over Arab radio stations, which link "imperialist America with Zionist Israel and feudal Ethiopia" in an unholy trinity, and the fact that many of the ELF terrorists are trained in countries where bitterly anti-American attitudes are common, there is no indication that any ELF leader or faction is planning hostile action against the US base or personnel.

### C. The Imperial Succession

20. The greatest uncertainty hanging over Ethiopia, and over the Horn of Africa generally, is the Imperial succession issue. The Emperor at 80 is vigorous and fully in control of all of the instruments of power. Many of the institutions of the Empire are his own creation, molded and refined during his more than 50 years in power to fit his highly personalized style of governing. He has made formal provision for the succession by the constitutional designation of his only surviving son, Crown Prince Asfa Wossen, as the heir. More important, the Emperor appears to have the acquiescence of all of the important figures in the Ethiopian establishment.

21. But there are some disquieting aspects. The Emperor has not exerted himself to assure a smooth transition. Haile Selassie's very success in devising an effective personal apparatus for governing is a weakness in terms of the succession, because it cannot be transmitted readily to a successor. Moreover, the Crown Prince is an uncertain quantity. At 56, he is in reasonably good health, but is inexperienced in the arts of governing and is not consulted in any way. Some foreign observers have doubts about his capacity to handle the job. Also there is the baleful historical heritage of political violence on virtually every previous succession, though the

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last one occurred over 50 years ago. A few powerful Amharic and Tigrean nobles boast of claims to the Solomon-Sheba line of succession which are at least as good as the Crown Prince's, though there is no evidence of plans to advance these claims. Lastly, there is in Ethiopia a considerable accumulation of grievances by restive individuals, factions, cliques, tribes, and regions. These discontented elements are awaiting the Emperor's death to put forward schemes, reforms, and proposed changes, and many have exaggerated expectations of Asfa Wossen's receptivity to new ideas, and of his ability to bring about rapid change.

22. Much would depend upon the cohesion of the armed forces which might assume an expanded role. Currently the army is held together mainly by respect for and fear of the Emperor, and by personal allegiances based on family, clan, or marriage. Considerable rivalries have already been generated within the officer corps by the Emperor's practice of playing off military leaders against each other. The possibility of factional feuding among the top officers, and among the powerful nobility outside of the armed forces, is very strong. Should the army unite in support of the Crown Prince (or another candidate) then the transition to a new regime could be fairly smooth.

23. While it is difficult to make any confident predictions about the course of events which would follow the death of Haile Selassie, the best estimate would seem to be that Asfa Wossen will succeed to the throne, probably without serious initial challenge. Even if he blunders a bit, he would benefit from advantages that no previous Ethiopian monarch has had at the outset; a national army instead of feudal levies; a centralized bureaucracy and a national treasury rather than unruly vassals and feudal dues. He can probably also rely upon a powerful church, which

is normally subservient to the throne, and a nascent sense of nationalism among the Amharas and some Tigreans and Gallas. He would probably seek to govern in a less direct and arbitrary fashion than did his father, and by so doing would assuage many who oppose the notion of absolute monarchy.

24. Yet, the honeymoon, if there is one, would probably not last long. A certain amount of turmoil is probably inevitable as the new government sorts itself out, and as a host of important groups and factions seek to mold it to their advantage. How serious the turmoil becomes, and whether the successor can hold together the Ethiopian Empire, depend upon the character of Asfa Wossen, the continued loyalty and unity of the armed forces, and the willingness of particularist factions to work for a common cause. Most of the challenges that arise will be internal, within the ranks of the establishment. But there will be peripheral incidents, which could complicate events at the center. The Eritrean rebels would almost certainly attempt some dramatic move against Imperial authority in their province, and the Somalis might decide to test the intentions and firmness of the new regime, by stirring up trouble in the Ogaden or elsewhere. If the Imperial forces retain a good degree of cohesion, they could probably handle these or other outbreaks.

25. The departure of Haile Selassie would bring some changes in Ethiopia's role and status in Africa. The Emperor is both a world figure and an African elder statesman. In order to cultivate and preserve that image he has on occasion taken a softer stance on important national issues than many of his advisors would have wished. Any successor regime in Addis Ababa would lack his confidence and assurance in international affairs, and would be likely to take more abrasive actions towards Somalia and other states with which it disagreed. The chances of renewed

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border clashes with Somalia would increase, and probably also the chances of Somali-inspired dissidence within Ethiopia. Moreover, there are certain historical imperatives that would give continuity to Ethiopian foreign policy. Any Ethiopian Government which included a strong Amhara element would see itself defending a Christian bastion against malicious Moslem neighbors. Post-Haile Selassie Ethiopia would probably welcome economic aid from whatever source, but would continue to be wary of Arabs and Communists. Ethiopians are likely also to become more wary of Westerners, and to take positions on international issues more in keeping with a general African consensus.

### III. SOMALIA

26. Somalia is much smaller and even poorer than Ethiopia, but is relatively unified in its ethnic, linguistic, and religious (Islamic) composition. Of its three million inhabitants, the largest portion are nomads and only a small number are settled farmers. There are few towns or cities worthy of the name, and most of these are beset with serious unemployment and underemployment problems. Educated—i.e., literate—Somalis number only a few thousand and the only elites beside the tribal chiefs are military officers and government officials. Beyond the borders of the Somali Republic are some 850,000 Somali nomads living mainly in the northeast province of Kenya, the Ogaden area of Ethiopia, and in the French Territory of the Afars and Issas (TFAI). There is a consensus in Somalia favoring the proclaimed national goal of Greater Somalia—i.e., annexing the lands where Somalis predominate—but little sense of urgency in pursuing irredentism.

27. Despite these unifying factors, Somalia is a politically unstable state. Conditions of life in this harsh, semidesert environment have fostered a strong sense of individualism,

loyalty to clan and kin rather than to nation, and a tendency to resist regimentation and government control. Clans and kin-groups are often at odds with one another, and internal peace is preserved largely through a traditional system of clan-administered justice. The parliamentary democracy which prevailed from independence in 1960 until the military coup of 1969 gave expression to Somali individualism and provided a rough balance of the clans in government, but nepotism and corruption eventually destroyed public confidence in the system.

28. In the current government, executive and legislative powers are wielded by the Supreme Revolutionary Council (SRC), a self-appointed group of some 20 military officers plus a few police officers. Major-General Mohammed Siad is the President of the Council, and theoretically is bound by Council decisions. In practice he is establishing a pre-eminent position for himself, and has begun to issue decrees in his own name. He is encountering resistance from within the Council, however, and is not yet in a position to disregard his colleagues. Siad is a professional soldier who rose from the ranks to the position of Commanding General of the Somali National Army. In true Somali fashion he has favored close relatives and members of his clan, both in governmental appointments and in the Council's frequent squabbles.

29. The Somali leadership is intensely nationalistic. In the early days of the military regime (1969-1970), it leaned towards a Qaddafi-type of Islamic puritanism. This tendency now seems somewhat blurred as evidence of corruption and high living comes in. But there is still a residue of idealistic fervor, mostly connected with Siad's Somali socialism. This concept, still fuzzy, is defined by the President as an adaptation of Marxism-Leninism to Somali society. Most large foreign businesses have been nationalized, and

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local merchants have suffered from scarcity of goods as a result of government imposed regulations.

30. Much of the rhetoric about socialism appears to be a smoke screen to conceal a continuing jockeying for power among individuals and clans. Siad holds the upper hand, but the issues and personalities involved, and the line-up of opponents are not at all clear. The Somali Government, however inefficient in other matters, is quite good at maintaining security, and in keeping the quarrels of the SRC *in camera*.

31. The current state of confusion in the SRC makes it difficult to offer any very clear long-range projections on political affairs in Somalia. If Siad emerges as the pre-eminent national leader, there will be a smoldering resentment among the losers, which will flare up eventually. Siad does not seem to have acquired any substantial national popularity or any political power base, aside from his connections in the army. His rule is therefore likely to be challenged. If Siad is ousted from the presidency or forced to work within a council which he does not dominate, the Somali Government would probably be quarrelsome, inefficient, and unstable.

#### Relations with the USSR

32. In 1963, when a poverty-stricken Somali Government was embroiled with Ethiopia in clashes in the Ogaden, Somalia appealed to all of the world powers for arms. Only the Soviets made an offer acceptable to the Somalis, providing a military credit of some \$35 million and sending a few instructors and advisors. Since then, and particularly since the overthrow of civilian government in 1969, the Soviet presence in Somalia has grown considerably. It is hardly surprising that the military government in Somalia has taken a stance more pro-Soviet than its civilian predecessors. In part it is a reaction against the pro-Western

attitude of the previous civilian regime in Somalia. The military rulers claim that the US and other Western states had benefited unduly from their close relations with Prime Minister Egal and his civilian officials. Also, US military aid to the arch-enemy, Ethiopia, and the continued Russian military assistance to Somalia weigh heavily on the attitudes of Siad and the SRC.

33. Military aid is the main basis for Soviet influence, although the USSR has extended somewhat more in economic aid (\$87 million) than in military (\$50 million). Soviet military advisors and instructors in Somalia number at least 300 and perhaps as many as 600. The military aid relationship has given the Soviet navy access to Somali port and shore facilities, and Soviet military aircraft use Somali airfields. Since the beginning of 1969, more than a quarter of the Soviet navy's port calls in the Indian Ocean have been to Somali ports: more than three times as many as to any other Indian Ocean country.<sup>3</sup> There is evidence that Soviet naval ships may already be using some of the ship service facilities which the USSR finished building in 1968 in the port of Berbera. In recent months Soviet influence in the Somali security services has increased. A high KGB official has visited Mogadiscio, and subsequently the Somali chief of security services (a relative of President Siad) paid a more extended visit to Moscow.

34. From the Soviet point of view, Somalia is hardly a sterling example of a progressive or socialist state, but to be thrown out now would be particularly damaging to Soviet prestige. In fact, there is some evidence that Siad a few months ago was seriously considering either diluting the Soviet presence, or turning to China as a principal backer. He seems to have shifted back to a close association with

<sup>3</sup> In this period Soviet naval combatant ships made 45 port calls to Somalia out of a total of 171 calls in the entire Indian Ocean area.

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the Russians, perhaps because he feels the need for powerful foreign backing at a time of domestic troubles. It is difficult to assess the state of Somali attitudes towards the USSR, because Somali opinions of the Russians vary considerably. There have been, and still are, tensions in daily relations. Some of the SRC would like to chuck the Russians out, and a good many civilians share this view. Siad has apparently succeeded in purging some 80 discontented high- and medium-ranking officers of the army and police, and has shipped them off for lengthy tours of "training" in the USSR, a kind of enforced exile. Other Somalis, apparently with Siad's favor and support, have been sent for study in Moscow.

35. Despite these evidences of a close working relationship between Siad and the Soviets, Moscow is probably well aware of the fragility of the Somali regime, and will try to maintain enough flexibility to avoid another humiliating ouster as in Ghana or Sudan. The USSR will continue to provide military aid, but is unlikely to furnish much, if any, of the sophisticated equipment the Somalis would like to have. It would not seem to be in the Soviet interest to furnish enough equipment for the Somalis to stir up serious trouble with neighboring countries. Moreover, the Somali military is not yet well enough trained to use effectively the tanks, artillery, and planes already provided.

36. From the foregoing it is pretty clear that the Russian position in Somalia is essentially a shaky one. Any foreign presence in Somalia in this era of rising national sensitivity would be insecure. Yet, the Soviets undoubtedly hope to gain some advantages there, probably in the form of greater use of Somali facilities for military purposes. In spite of increased Soviet interest in further access to such facilities, the USSR does not appear to have base rights in the traditional sense of

the word. Siad would be unlikely to grant such rights, knowing that this would be highly unpopular in Somalia.

#### IV. NEIGHBORING COUNTRIES

##### A. The French Territory of the Afars and Issas (TFAI)

37. This small territory contains the port of Djibouti, terminus of the only railroad from Addis Ababa to the sea. The Ethiopians find the present arrangement of French rule satisfactory, but would fight to prevent the Somalis from gaining possession of Djibouti. The government in Mogadiscio expects that sooner or later this territory will either become independent, or that Somalia will annex it. The Somali Army would fight the Ethiopians to prevent control by Addis Ababa. Because these attitudes are appreciated by the French, they have held onto this territory, long after leaving all other former colonies on the African continent. At African gatherings, the issue of French control over TFAI is frequently raised, but most Africans are sufficiently aware of the delicacy of the situation not to press very hard.

38. The French for years have said that they have no intention of leaving, and this is probably still true. They manipulate the local political elections in a fashion to maintain a balance between the pro-Ethiopian Afars, and the local Somali clan, the Issas. If the French were to lose control of the situation, as nearly happened in 1966, they might opt for an early departure, despite the predictable consequences of a serious clash between Ethiopia and Somalia. Somalia has the capability to create some trouble in TFAI, but has not felt able or willing to bear the risks of a full-scale military encounter with Ethiopia. In a contest with Somalia over the TFAI, the Ethiopians would probably have the military advantage.

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## B. Kenya

39. The Northeast Province of Kenya, a semidesert, is inhabited mainly by nomadic Somalis, who carried on a low-level guerrilla war against the Kenya Government in the mid-1960s. After this petered out, the Kenyans made some efforts to bring their Somali citizens more closely into national society. Some road-building and well-drilling projects, and programs to settle the nomads, have been partially successful. The province is generally peaceful, and the Somalis are represented in the Kenyan Parliament, but the Kenyan Somalis have not developed a sense of allegiance to Nairobi. To the extent that their political views are known, they lean towards eventual incorporation into Somalia.

40. The Kenyans are worried about a revival of Somali irredentism as an active movement. President Siad in June stopped off on his return from the OAU meeting hoping to discuss with President Kenyatta the prospects for cession of Somali-inhabited Kenyan territory. The matter was not discussed, because Kenyatta did not care to go into it. Kenya, like Ethiopia and most other African states, is a firm backer of the proposition that boundaries, however irrational, are sacrosanct. Officials in Nairobi are aware of the training by North Korea of Somali guerrillas, and are, therefore, giving renewed thought to defense of the Northeast Province. The Kenyan army and police are small forces, with modest armament and poor logistic capabilities. They could probably turn back any attempted Somalia invasion, however, and Kenya has the added advantage of a defense treaty with Ethiopia. If the death of the aged Kenyatta were to bring on a confused political situation in Kenya, the Somalis in Kenya or the Government of Somalia would be tempted to take advantage of it, to enlarge the Somali state.

## C. Sudan

41. The reconciliation now underway in Sudan between northerners and southerners, and the development of friendly relations between Sudan and Ethiopia are among the more encouraging events in this area of the world. For long the real and imagined support of Ethiopia for the southern Sudanese rebels had estranged relations between Khartoum and Addis Ababa. Sudanese support for the ELF in past years served to reinforce mutual suspicions. There is a long history of antagonisms between Sudan and Ethiopia, revolving around religious and cultural differences. The current atmosphere of friendship depends largely upon the good relations between President Nimeiri and Haile Selassie, made possible by Nimeiri's reversal of policy towards the USSR and towards the rebellion in the south. Some government officials, as well as important political factions in both countries, are still highly suspicious of each other and quite ill at ease with the détente, despite its obvious advantages for both countries. The détente, in its present state, may not outlive either of its prime advocates. Since the Emperor is old, and Sudanese politics are normally turbulent, the prospects for continued good relations between Sudan and Ethiopia are only fair. Yet, even an abrupt end of the détente would not necessarily bring hostilities.

## V. THE INVOLVEMENT OF OUTSIDE POWERS

42. The unstable and uncertain relationships among the peoples and governments in the Horn of Africa are also considerably affected by the actions of outside powers. More than in most other areas of Africa, the Horn is a stage for activity by the great powers. The US has long held a position of influence in Ethiopia; the USSR has recently built up its influence in Somalia; and the Chinese have


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renewed offers of economic aid for all countries in the area. Italy remains an important source of aid to Somalia, although neither this nor the presence of a large number of Italians in Somalia has given Italy any significant degree of influence there. On still another level of involvement, the Arabs and Israelis are participants in the disputes and contributors to the tension of the Horn. For some years, Haile Selassie has been concerned over the apparent alliance of the USSR, radical Arabs and Somalis to dominate the Red Sea area. Hence, the Emperor has sought closer relations with Israel and the US.

#### A. Arabs and Israelis

43.



44.



#### B. The USSR

45. We do not know how their recent expulsion from Egypt has affected the Soviets' view of their role in the Horn of Africa. However, Somalia has for some time been the focal point of their activity in the area, and this suggests, in any event, that Moscow has long seen some strategic and political opportunities there.<sup>4</sup> Somalia has been far the most receptive country in the Horn to Soviet initiatives. In large part, of course, Somalia's importance to the USSR is a function of its location on the Indian Ocean littoral, and of broad Soviet interests in this general area. As Soviet interest and involvement in the region have developed, Somalia's importance has increased somewhat because of its potential to provide deep water and shore facilities for Soviet naval vessels. This potential would be further enhanced if the Suez Canal were to be reopened and the Red Sea were again to become an important international trade route.

46. The close relationship with Somalia has not cost the Russians much in Ethiopia. Ethiopians do not like the Soviet military aid to Somalia, and are fearful of its eventual effects. But Haile Selassie values his non-aligned image enough to keep correct relations with Moscow, makes occasional trips to Russia, and hopes for a more forthcoming Soviet economic

<sup>4</sup> See NIE 11-10-71, "The Uses of Soviet Military Power in Distant Areas", dated 15 December 1971, ~~SECRET~~.

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aid program. Only a small part of the Soviet credit of \$100 million extended to Ethiopia in 1959 has been utilized. A long-standing Soviet aim in Ethiopia has been to get the Americans out of Kagnew, and some Soviet officials have suggested to Ethiopians that if this were done, Moscow would provide a generous military aid package. The Ethiopians are unlikely to be responsive to such an offer.

47. In the early 1960s the USSR, newly on the scene, had offered sizable sums in economic aid to the states of the Horn. After the mid-1960s, however, both Soviet and African interest in such programs fell off. The Soviets still are not very keen on greater involvement, but their interest has revived at least enough to maintain a competitive position with other powers. The general Soviet attitude is cautious, perhaps because earlier Soviet projects were not entirely successful. The petroleum refinery in Assab, Ethiopia, is obsolete and inefficient. Soviet economic aid programs in Somalia in the 1960s were hastily improvised and economically unsound—an overly large meat-packing plant, and a fish-processing plant in a country where the fish catch is very small.

48. In Sudan, the Soviets have been fulfilling their economic commitments despite their total loss of political influence. In Ethiopia, they are studying the feasibility of a new refinery and are beginning some minor aid projects. In Somalia, after a good deal of foot-dragging, the Soviets have extended some \$23 million in new economic aid, including a long-discussed dam, power, and irrigation complex. This limited activity appears to be a response to Chinese initiatives, and is directed towards minimizing Chinese political influence.

### C. China

49. The Chinese are still an unknown quantity to the Africans. During the years of the

Cultural Revolution, Chinese and Africans had few contacts, and most moderate Africans retained a residual fear derived from intemperate statements of Chinese leaders about sponsoring revolution in Africa and from Chinese activities in support of guerrilla movements. These fears have either greatly diminished or disappeared altogether, as the PRC during the past couple of years has placed greater emphasis on cultivating political and economic ties with black African governments and has virtually ceased to support subversion against them. Haile Selassie went to Peking in 1971 and subsequently established diplomatic relations, because of Chinese promises to cease aid to the ELF, and because of his interest in enhancing his position as a Third World leader.

50. As evidence of their new, more reasonable policies, the Chinese have been generous in granting aid to African states. Since early 1970 Peking has extended about \$275 million of economic aid to Ethiopia, Somalia, and Sudan. The implementing of these aid commitments has been fairly slow in the eyes of some recipients, but the problem is mainly the difficulty in finding feasible projects, rather than deliberate foot-dragging on the part of the Chinese. The political accompaniment of the aid has been a very low-key appeal to Africans to join with China to resist the encroachments of the great powers. (China represents itself as another struggling Third World country, recovering from the ravages of imperialism.) So far this policy has brought China some benefits, mainly in terms of goodwill and a greater receptivity to Chinese international positions on major issues.

51. Chinese policy in the Horn, as elsewhere in black Africa, is essentially opportunistic. Carefully selected economic aid projects, and increasing (though still small) Chinese purchases of the Horn's major export commodities—e.g., Ethiopian coffee and Su-

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danese cotton—suggest a growing Chinese awareness of the interests of countries in the area of the Horn. But even if China continues to show this sort of interest and is willing to continue spending money there, it will face the traditional resistance of the countries of the Horn to foreign influence.

## VI. IMPLICATIONS FOR THE UNITED STATES

52. Generally speaking, the situation in the Horn of Africa is more favorable now in terms of US interests than has been the case for some years. The willingness of Sudan and Yemen to resume diplomatic relations with the US suggests a lessening of the tensions which persisted for so long after the Arab-Israeli war of 1967 and which affected US relations in the area of the Horn. The disarray of the ELF and an improvement in the general security situation in Ethiopia can also be counted as favorable factors. Even in Somalia, where US influence has been close to zero for years, the regime has in recent weeks hinted at the possibility of improvements in relations, but the US relationship with Ethiopia is likely to continue to be an impediment to good relations with Somalia.

53. But there is an ephemeral quality to much of this. Governments and their policies in this area are generally highly dependent upon individuals at the top. The removal of any of these could abruptly change the atmosphere. The greatest uncertainty is the aftermath of the Emperor's death. The chances are that a successor government would continue to look to the US as its primary backer, particularly if the succession comes while the Soviets are still conspicuously involved in Somalia. If a successor regime in Ethiopia faces some difficulty from internal or external challenges, as is likely, it would look primarily to the US for additional emergency support,

and would probably base its subsequent relations with the US on the degree and speed of the US response.

54. The US lease on Kagnew Station runs through 1978. There is still no significant public opposition to the installation. Many Ethiopians accept it as a communications and scientific research establishment rather than a military base. Its contribution to the local economy also is a factor in its acceptance. A few Ethiopian students, intellectuals, and nationalists want the US to leave, but many Ethiopians—particularly among the governing class—are more concerned to have the US maintain its presence, despite propaganda attacks from ELF, radical Arab, and Communist media. There is some danger, however, that an individual or dissident faction of the ELF—or even a Palestinian group—might take some hostile action against Kagnew. The reduction of US personnel by about a third in the spring of 1972 had no significant impact on US relations with Ethiopia or on local acceptance of Kagnew. Currently US personnel number about 2,200, including dependents. We judge that the Ethiopian Government, which understands that Kagnew is a *quid pro quo* for continued US military aid, is likely to permit Kagnew to continue functioning through the period of its lease.

55. There are reasons other than Kagnew for continued US interest in maintaining friendly relations with Ethiopia. Though there are few US investments in Ethiopia, military access to Ethiopian airfields and ports is likely to continue to be of interest to the US. There is no other state in the area so willing to associate itself forthrightly with the US. Ethiopia, even without Haile Selassie, is likely to be an important and influential African state, although the new regime will have to establish its own credentials.

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