East Africa: Outside Influence and Potential Conflict
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EAST AFRICA: OUTSIDE INFLUENCE AND POTENTIAL CONFLICT

NOTE

The continuing arms buildup in a number of East African countries raises questions as to the stability of the region and the role of rival outside powers. At the request of the Department of State's African Bureau, we examine the prospects for conflict.

This Memorandum was produced under the auspices of the National Intelligence Officer for the Middle East at the request of the Department of State. The initial draft was prepared by State/INR and CIA with contributions from DIA. The final judgments were coordinated with State/INR, CIA and DIA.
CONCLUSIONS

There is at present considerable potential for conflict in East Africa. The risk of warfare arises from the chronic differences between many pairs of neighbors. Jeopardizing the peace are:

- Somali irredentism, which seeks to draw into the Somali-fold those parts of Ethiopia, Kenya, and the French Territory of Afars and Issas (FTA1) peopled by Somali-speaking nomads;
- Instability in Ethiopia, which could lead neighboring countries to side with separatists or opposition elements, thereby provoking retaliation and hostilities;
- Bad feeling among members of the faltering East African Community (Kenya, Uganda, and Tanzania), which finds its most dangerous expression in the Ugandan President's paranoid view of Tanzania.

Mistrust of neighbors and a sense of vulnerability have characterized most of the East African governments throughout most of the last decade, accounting for an ever-increasing arms buildup in the area. The Soviet Union has become the largest supplier of arms to East Africa. The West European input has diminished in the wake of decolonization. In recent years, the US has become a substantial supplier of arms, mainly to Ethiopia. Another supplier, especially to Tanzania, has been China. Several Arab states are giving increasing support to the insurgents in Eritrea.

We believe that destabilizing influences will not diminish and that the risks of armed conflict will increase, since:

- The Soviets and others will maintain an arms flow to East Africa;
- Growing Arab support for the Eritreans makes it doubtful that the insurgents will modify their newly intransigent position on independence;
- The Eritrean conflict will probably reinforce centrifugal tendencies in other Ethiopian provinces;

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1 In this paper "East Africa" covers Ethiopia, Somalia, Kenya, Uganda, and Tanzania.
— Further political stress could jeopardize Ethiopia’s territorial integrity;

— A serious weakening of Ethiopia will increase the odds of Somali intervention;

— The Ethiopian uncertainties will complicate life for the French in the FTAI and may invite subversive moves by the Somalis and/or Eritreans;

— Acquisition of additional arms by Kenya—which fears Somali territorial ambitions—may further encourage the heavy defense spending in Uganda and Tanzania;

— The Ugandan government’s erratic and frequently bellicose behavior could touch off a brief conflict through miscalculation.

There will probably be an endemic risk of minor border clashes for years to come. The more serious threat of Ethiopian-Somali fighting would become increasingly plausible if the situation in Ethiopia were to deteriorate, although economic adversity and other factors restrain Somali adventurism.

We believe that the communist powers seek no direct involvement in East African conflicts, although tensions in the area can serve their purposes. The Soviets’ access to Somali air and port facilities was formalized in 1974, and they would not like to see use of these facilities jeopardized by war. The Soviets may well provide a more restraining influence on the Somalis than do the Arabs. Growing Arab sympathy for the Eritreans and hostility toward the new rulers in Addis increase the chances of Somalia’s securing Arab support if it clashes with Ethiopia.
DISCUSSION

I. SOMALI IRREDENTISM

1. Somalia wants to acquire the Somali-inhabited areas of Ethiopia, Kenya, and the FTAI. The Somalis probably hope to combine diplomatic and military pressures when they judge that either Ethiopia or Kenya is sufficiently weak internally. Somalia is currently resorting to diplomatic means, but it is also operationally integrating into its weapons inventory the sophisticated Soviet military equipment delivered since 1972.

2. Somalia at present could seize and hold a portion of Ethiopia or Kenya. But it would eventually face a retaliatory action in which its neighbors' larger populations and resource bases would weigh heavily. Somalia would also face international diplomatic pressures to return the seized territory. The Somalis do not want a prolonged war:

   — Their ailing economy could not support sustained military action;

   — The Ethiopians and Kenyans could exploit political and economic strains within Somalia;

   — Somalia could not count on sustained resupply from the USSR.

The Ethiopian-Somali Arms Balance

3. Ethiopia, as long as its internal cohesion lasts, has an overall advantage over Somalia. The Ethiopian armed forces are twice the size of Somalia's, although the balance along the border is more nearly equal. Ethiopian military personnel, especially pilots, are generally better trained, and the Ethiopians have the edge in antitank capability. However, the combat readiness of Ethiopian forces has been severely impaired over the past year because of the breakdown of discipline and the disarray in the chain of command. Moreover, fighting in Eritrea has severely strained military logistics and strategic reserve capabilities.

4. The Somali armed forces are numerically superior in artillery, radar, and armor. Although the delivery to the Ethiopians of M-60 tanks is helping redress somewhat the armor imbalance, their greatest impact will be psychological. When all of Somalia's MIG-21s become operational, its armed forces will have the edge in air power (which could be offset if the Ethiopians obtained air-to-air missiles for their jet fighters). The Somalis have SAM-2/Guideline defensive missiles in place around Mogadiscio.
5. Both countries have serious maintenance, logistics, and communications deficiencies, which suggests an early stalemate in any fighting.

The Kenyan-Somali Arms Balance

6. The Kenyan armed forces could deal effectively with a renewed insurgency in Kenya's Somali-inhabited North East Province, but not with a conventional attack. Kenya's army is less than one-third the size of Somalia's. It is inferior in almost every category of equipment, especially armor and aircraft. The Somali forces could take and hold some Kenyan territory for a limited period of time. Long, exposed Somali supply lines would be vulnerable to a Kenyan counterattack, however, and any new equipment could improve Kenya's counterattack capability.

7. One constraint on the Somalis has been concern about possible Ethiopian action in support of Kenya. Kenya and Ethiopia have had a mutual defense agreement since 1963. But the preoccupation of the new Ethiopian government with Eritrea reduces the chances of such assistance.

Siad Bides His Time

8. Somali President Siad is basically cautious. He believes that time is on his side, given Ethiopia's internal troubles and the uncertain political succession in Kenya. He fears that a premature military attack would unify the Ethiopians against the foreign threat. Instead he hopes that Ethiopian domestic turmoil will reach the point of national disintegration. Siad also believes that Kenya's political and economic strengths will be dissipated when President Kenyatta passes from the scene. He visited Kenya last September in another futile attempt to interest Kenyatta in a federation with Somalia (and thus wean it away from its alliance with Ethiopia).

—And Pursues the Diplomatic Gambit

9. In the meantime Siad is trying to improve his country's international image and thereby gain support for Somali irredentist claims.

10. The Organization of African Unity (OAU). Siad is exploiting his role as the current OAU chairman to overcome lingering suspicions of Somalia's African credentials. (Somalia's newly emphasized Arab ties may have contributed to the defeat of its candidate for OAU secretary general at the June 1974 summit.) He has also been on the road in the past year—to Burundi and Uganda to reinforce existing bilateral ties, and to 14 West African countries to gain exposure in a region where he is little known. Siad sought to downplay Somalia's close Soviet ties, to gain support for Somalia's claim to the FTAI, and to argue for giving the OAU more authority to deal with border disputes.

11. The Arab League. Siad is by no means ready to disown Somalia's Arab links, however. He hopes the Africans will accept Somalia as a bridge between the OAU and the Arab League, particularly as a conveyor of African demands for relief from the high cost of oil. He has suggested Mogadiscio as the site of the next Arab summit.

12. The West. Siad has also made overtures to the West, especially to Italy, the European Community as a group, and to the US. He hopes eventually to obtain US economic aid (and to that end might revoke the charters of Somali ships trading with North Vietnam and Cuba) and to enlist US help in persuading Ethiopia to make concessions on its Somali inhabited Ogaden region.

Somalia's Economic Problems

13. The poor state of Somalia's economy contributes to Siad's reliance on diplomacy rather than military action. Somalia's fundamental poverty has been aggravated by socialist mismanagement, higher oil costs, general inflation, and a serious drought.

14. No economic remedies are in sight. Soviet assistance has been limited and in some cases unproductive. A major factor in Somalia's decision to sign its Friendship Treaty with Moscow last July was the Soviet offer of budgetary support, relief on oil costs, and debt rescheduling. Somalia presumably hoped that its accession to the Arab League
In February 1974 gave it a claim on Arab oil money. But the most promising donors, Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, and Libya, dislike Siad's close Soviet ties and doubt his commitment to Moslem values and culture.

15. A government reorganization last December seems, in part, to have been another effort by Siad to improve the country's economic performance. His replacement of military officers with technocrats better qualified to make economic decisions has caused unhappiness in the defense forces. Military malaise, economic discontent in urban areas over high food prices and rationing, and religious tensions (stemming from the execution of ten Moslem sheikhs) have fostered opposition to Siad. He could conceivably try to distract attention from domestic problems with military adventures in the Ogaden. But it is more likely that these problems will constrain a military move.

Prospects for Detente

16. Ethiopia's military rulers have stated that they intend to grant more political autonomy to all the country's provinces, although it is uncertain how much real decentralization will be tolerated. At some future time Addis Ababa might revive plans for joint Ethiopian-Somali development of the Webi-Shebrelli River region and exploration of the potential oil and gas deposits in the Ogaden.

17. More autonomy might defuse the Ogaden issue, but the Somalis would regard it as only a temporary palliative, with no substantial impact on their determination to bring the nomads under the Somali flag. Nor is Somalia likely to agree to proposals for economic cooperation that imply Somali recognition of Ethiopia's jurisdiction over the Ogaden.

Outlook for Future Military Action

18. Siad has so far resisted the pressures of those Ogadeni Somalis undergoing guerrilla training in Somalia to start insurgency against Ethiopia. But he might change his mind if the internal Ethiopian situation continues to deteriorate, or if additional Ethiopian army units in the Ogaden are sent to Eritrea.

19. If the Somalis should take advantage of a breakdown of order in Ethiopia to move into the Ogaden, they could count on the sympathy of most Arab states. Protests would come from the black member states of the OAU (especially Kenya and its supporters), but the OAU's ability to act might be impaired by divisions between its Arab and black African members.

20. Kenya would probably offer Ethiopia limited assistance in defense against Somali incursions. The Kenyans fear that a Somali takeover of the Ogaden might lead to a renewal of Somali insurgency in northeastern Kenya.

II. THE ETHIOPIAN REVOLUTION

21. The ruling Provisional Military Administrative Council (PMAC) is an unstable coalition of disparate military figures ranging from illiterate privates to highly educated officers. As it tries simultaneously to cope with the Eritrean insurgency, defend the Ogaden against the Somalis, and implement far-reaching internal reform, serious strains are developing. Also, the chain of command has never been firmly reestablished since the first mutinies in early 1974.

22. Anti-PMAC dissidence is steadily increasing. Although the uncoordinated opposition groups do not yet pose a threat, a serious crisis—provoked by a military debacle in Eritrea or widespread resistance to land reform—might present an opportunity to overthrow the PMAC leadership. Even if the PMAC is ousted, indefinite military rule (perhaps interspersed with periods of military-guaranteed civilian government) is the most likely pattern for the coming years.

23. It is too early to say, of course, whether the regime which eventually emerges will be able to maintain Ethiopia's territorial integrity. A weakening of the central government has historically encouraged centrifugal tendencies in the provinces. A contracting Amhara center, surrounded by weak,
autonomous or independent states, would invite outside intervention and destabilize the East African region.

**Eritrea**

24. The currently high level of insurgency in Eritrea stems as much from PMAC weaknesses as from insurgent capabilities. An Ethiopian regime which managed to overcome its internal divisions, demonstrated an ability to govern, and possessed some diplomatic skills might be able to prevent Eritrean secession. Federation might eventually prove to be an acceptable compromise. Although some insurgent leaders may balk at a formula that falls short of total independence, the Tigrinya-speaking, Christian half of the population might prefer to maintain some political ties with Ethiopia to balance the influence of Arab states on the Muslim half.

25. But continued political disarray in Addis Ababa increases the likelihood of Eritrean independence and possible further fragmentation. Eritrean Muslims are themselves divided along tribal lines. The conservative Afars, for example, have little in common with radical insurgents and might insist on an autonomous state. An independent Eritrea would be even more unwieldy if it absorbed other Tigrinya-speaking areas in northern Ethiopia, especially the province of Tigre (whose ex-governor is cooperating with the Eritrean insurgents) and parts of Begemdir and Wollo provinces.

**The Gallas**

26. The Gallas, Ethiopia's largest single ethnic group (40 percent of the population), pose another potential threat. The Gallas are split internally—by clan, wealth, dialect, religion, and the degree to which they have assimilated Amhara culture—and are scattered throughout the country's provinces. Although Galla plotting against the PMAC continues, the conspirators' goals seem to be the easing of grievances rather than the creation of a separate state. The Gallas would lack the easy access to foreign support enjoyed by peoples concentrated on the peripheral areas bordering the Red Sea and Somalia.

**Implications for the FTA!**

27. An independent Eritrea might combine forces with Somalia to press France to relinquish the FTAI. The French, however, want to play a significant role in the Indian Ocean, and Djibouti's strategic importance has increased with the imminent reopening of the Suez Canal and the forced French withdrawal from southern Indian Ocean bases. Reinforced French garrisons in the FTAI, while incapable of preventing limited incursions, could halt and eventually repel any invasion. Concerned now about the longevity of Ethiopia's PMAC and its ability to resolve the Eritrean fighting, the French are reportedly trying to improve relations with the Eritrean insurgents and to gain support from neighboring Muslim states for a continued French presence. If faced with a possible Somali takeover, Red Sea littoral states would be torn between their anti-imperialist sentiments and their distaste for a Soviet-backed Somali presence on one side of the Bab-el-Mandab.

28. In the long run, there is a question whether France would have the political will to stay on in the face of a major challenge requiring another colonial war. In the meantime, the French seem disposed to stay indefinitely.

**III. OTHER POTENTIAL AREAS OF CONFLICT**

**Ugandan Attack on Tanzania**

29. The greatest potential for conflict among Uganda, Tanzania, and Kenya stems from the erratic behavior of Ugandan President Amin, who continuously encourages belief in threats where none exist. He frequently uses the slightest pretext for making bellicose accusations that Tanzania, alone or in conjunction with Ugandan exiles, is planning an imminent attack on Uganda. On these occasions Amin puts his forces on increased alert and sometimes sends reinforcements to the border. His impulsiveness could result in further border skirmishes, such as occurred in 1972 when Tan-
Zambia's President Nyerere supported an unsuccessful Ugandan exile attack. Since then, however, Nyerere has not gone beyond providing the exiles asylum in Tanzania.

Ugandan-Kenyan Tensions

30. Uganda has close relations with Somalia, and Kenya is concerned that Amin might undertake some supportive military action if Mogadiscio instigated a renewal of the insurgency in Kenya's North East Province or ordered the Somali army into action. If Somalia asked for support, Amin might be willing to reinforce his troops on the border to tie down some Kenyan forces.

31. Other factors contribute to tensions between Uganda and Kenya. Amin shares many Ugandans' resentment toward Kenya. Ugandans consider that the countries' former close economic association permitted Kenya to industrialize and prosper at Uganda's expense. Kenya controls the major land routes to the sea, and Kenyatta has not hesitated to use this leverage. On a personal level, Amin also resents Kenyatta's prestige in Africa.

32. The presence of Ugandan exiles in Kenya could trigger incidents. Amin might respond to any Kenya-based attempt to overthrow him with a show of force on the border. A miscalculation by either side or an accidental confrontation between opposing troops could lead to fighting.

Ugandan Limitations

33. The Ugandan army's confidence that it has weaponry superior to its adversaries might make it adventurous and give it an initial advantage, but it appears unlikely that it could sustain cross-border operations for long. Sustained offensive action would be limited by logistical deficiencies, which result both from the depressed state of the Ugandan economy and poor military management. The Ugandan army also suffers from the low quality of officers, lack of discipline, and frequent reorganizations and personnel shifts, mostly resulting from Amin's continuing purges.

34. In contrast, the Kenyan and Tanzanian forces have better leadership and have time to prepare defenses along the Ugandan attack routes.

Kenyan-Tanzanian Relations

35. Kenya's and Tanzania's economic interests are opposed, and their political orientation differs. Many Tanzanians consider Kenya as a society which retains many undesirable traits of the days of British rule, while Kenyans believe that China and the USSR have all too much influence in Tanzania. Nonetheless, Kenyatta and Nyerere have a personal relationship which usually enabled them to smooth over differences and each government considers the other nation a bastion of stability in contrast to Uganda. Even if there were a military takeover in either country, the new rulers would probably be preoccupied with maintaining themselves in power rather than initiating military adventures.

IV. THE SOVIETS IN EAST AFRICA

36. Outside powers, drawn to East Africa for a number of reasons, have materially altered the balance of forces there, and by their involvement have given international significance to local confrontations. No estimate of the prospects for war between Somalia and its neighbors or other lesser conflicts in the area can ignore the Soviet factor. An assessment of likely Soviet behavior toward Mogadiscio or Addis Ababa depends in turn on wider considerations of Soviet policy.

37. Regional rivalries provide opportunities for the Soviets to promote themselves as an arms supplier and to gain access to military facilities. These same rivalries also can limit Soviet freedom to act, since close identification with one party in a dispute generally restricts influence with another. Furthermore, Soviet influence is nowhere so great that Moscow can exercise unlimited control over internal or regional developments. The prospect of becoming embroiled in regional disputes that it does not want and could not stop thus injects
an element of caution into Soviet conduct in East Africa.

38. The Soviet Union has found military aid to be the most effective means of gaining influence and cooperation. It has become the major arms supplier to Somalia and Uganda, has signed significant new arms agreements with Tanzania, and in the past has made periodic overtures to Kenya and Ethiopia. In the economic sphere, in contrast, the Soviets have been less active except for fishing and port construction. Moscow has extended economic credits to all East African countries, but has done little to encourage their use.

39. The Soviet Union's interests in East Africa are political and strategic and in most respects are extensions of Soviet interests in the nearby Arabian Peninsula and Indian Ocean. Moscow's East African interests are:

— reducing Western influence, power, and presence;
— gaining political influence on the southern edge of the Arabian Peninsula and the Red Sea littoral, and supporting and protecting its flanks in the Middle East;
— securing access to support facilities for its naval forces in the Indian Ocean;
— countering Chinese influence.

USSR and Somalia

40. The Soviet Union's focal point in East Africa has been Somalia. By meeting Somalia's needs for military aid where the West has been reluctant, the Soviets have gained a significant political position and convenient access to Somali military facilities.

The Soviet Contribution

41. Soviet influence in Somalia has gradually increased since 1969 and appears to have reached a peak with President Podgorny’s visit and the signing of a Friendship Treaty in July 1974. This treaty, like those the Soviets signed with Egypt, Iraq, and India, underwrites Moscow's economic and military aid commitments and possibly reduces frictions in the day-to-day administration of aid agreements.

42. The Soviet Union is Somalia's major source of arms. This supply is limited mainly by Somalia's ability to absorb and effectively utilize relatively sophisticated weaponry and by Moscow's desire to maintain some balance in the region. During the past year, nevertheless, Moscow has begun supplying surface-to-air missiles and MIG-21s. In addition, the Soviets have provided training to the Somali Air Force and are building a large airfield for it near Mogadiscio.

43. The Soviets have become important economic aid donors, but the total value of their economic credits (about $90 million extended, $47 million drawn) is less than that offered by the Chinese (around $132 million extended, $43 million drawn).

The Quid

44. In return for their assistance, the Soviets now have apparently unrestricted access to the northern port of Berbera, which is the port most frequently used to support the USSR's Indian Ocean naval force. The importance Moscow places on Berbera was underscored by the recent visit of Soviet naval commander Admiral Gorshkov to Somalia. Although there are no ship repair facilities ashore, Soviet tenders provide in-port maintenance and minor repairs. In addition, the Soviets use the port for crew rest, have a barracks ship, and have constructed a barracks compound. There is also a Soviet naval communications relay facility near Berbera.

45. There are indications that the Soviets are building a facility at Berbera to handle cruise missiles for their Indian Ocean naval force. The facility is the first of its kind discovered outside the USSR and when completed will improve the reload capability of Soviet ships and submarines equipped with cruise missiles. Moreover, recent evidence shows that within two miles of the Berbera facility the Soviets are building a new airfield with a runway apparently long enough for the biggest Soviet aircraft.
46. The Soviets would undoubtedly like to stage periodic naval reconnaissance flights from Somalia, possibly following the pattern established in Guinea, from which they periodically operate TU-95 Bear-D reconnaissance flights. Indeed, the Soviets already have taken advantage of Somalia's strategic location by stationing naval reconnaissance aircraft (the IL 38s) in Somalia during their naval exercises last month.

The Soviet Presence and the War Issue
47. Despite Moscow's military quid pro quo with Mogadiscio, the Soviets have sought to dampen Somali irredentist ambitions. The USSR prefers to take advantage of regional tensions without encouraging actual hostilities that might endanger its access to Somali facilities.

48. Should the Somalis decide to go to war, the Soviets would counsel restraint but probably would stand behind Somalia, at least in a limited engagement. The Friendship Treaty commits the USSR and Somalia to consult in the event of a threat of war. This provision gives Moscow grounds for urging restraint but does not obligate it to come to Somalia's aid.

49. For leverage, the Soviets will probably continue discreetly to limit resupply of ammunition, spare parts, equipment, and petroleum in order to restrict Somalia's ability to conduct a protracted war. But to soften the repercussions of such action Moscow would probably offer to back Somalia in any subsequent negotiations and would replace equipment lost during the fighting.

50. Moscow's refusal to endorse Somali's irredentist claims probably has been a contributing factor to Soviet unpopularity in some government circles. However, Siad and those officials who feel the Soviet presence is beneficial appear to have the upper hand in the Somali government at this time. Nevertheless, Siad remains sensitive to criticism from his Arab and African friends regarding his close ties with the Soviets. The Soviets also are being blamed increasingly by some Somalis for Siad's unpopular domestic moves.

USSR and Ethiopia
51. The Soviets clearly have favored the recent revolutionary changes in Ethiopia, but have so far adopted a cautious approach to the PMAC. Although the Soviets have reportedly discussed the possibility of military aid with the Ethiopians, no commitments have been made, primarily because of Moscow's desire not to offend Somalia. But the Soviets may believe they have some leeway to deal with Addis Ababa without serious damage to their Somali relationship.

52. Future Soviet initiatives most likely will be tied to Ethiopian internal developments. Moscow would favor and might even support a regime that reduces its ties with the West. But unless the Ethiopians made a radical break with the US, including the ouster of US military personnel, the Soviets would probably refrain from becoming deeply involved and would continue to view the Addis Ababa regime as basically unstable.

53. Moscow's treatment of the Eritrean problem has likewise reflected caution. The Soviet press criticized the "secessionist rebels" and the Soviets have reportedly pressed the South Yemenis to stop supporting the Eritreans. It is unlikely, however, that the Soviets will offer Addis Ababa arms to fight the rebels.

USSR and Uganda
54. The Soviet Union renewed its military aid program to Uganda last year following a reduction in Western aid, and quickly became the country's principal arms supplier. The Soviets are providing modern equipment, including MIG-21s. As a result of Moscow's generosity, Uganda's neighbors, especially Zaire and Kenya, have become suspicious of Moscow's (as well as Amin's) intentions. It is highly doubtful, however, that Moscow wants Uganda to become a serious threat to its neighbors. The Soviet risk in supplying the quixotic Amin with this equipment is partly offset by the latter's growing dependence on Soviet good will.

55. Soviet motivation appears to be largely political opportunism in the wake of declining Western...
influence in Uganda. The Soviets are striving to encourage Amin's anti-Western posture and to preempt any move by the Chinese to secure active influence. Looking beyond Amin, Moscow undoubtedly hopes that continued Soviet military aid will increase the dependence of the Ugandan armed forces on the USSR.

USSR and Tanzania

56. The Soviet Union has shown interest during the past year in expanding ties with Tanzania. The Soviets signed new arms agreements with Dar es Salaam— their first since the mid-1960s—which may have put the total value of Soviet military aid above that of China, Tanzania's major arms supplier until now. The agreements reportedly provide for $74 million worth of Soviet arms, including MIG-21s and surface-to-air missiles.

57. Moscow's interest in Tanzania transcends its desire to compete with the Chinese. Tanzania possesses potentially valuable ports, and the Soviets probably hope that by being generous in their military aid they can persuade Dar es Salaam to reconsider its opposition to port calls by naval ships from non-littoral countries.

58. The Soviets also value Tanzania's location near southern Africa, where the accelerating pace of change in the Portuguese colonies and Rhodesia is spurring Moscow's interest.

USSR and Kenya

59. Soviet-Kenyan relations continue to be cool. The Kenyans blame the Soviets for increasing the danger of war by providing arms to Somalia and Uganda. The Soviets have tried to allay Nairobi's fears by claiming that the arms are intended only for defensive purposes and by suggesting that the Kenyans could also receive some. So far, however, the Kenyans have put their requests for arms to the UK and the US.

60. In addition to offers of arms, the Soviets have shown an interest in expanding ties between the Soviet and Kenyan trade unions. The Soviets also approached the Kenyans about allowing Soviet technicians to visit Mombasa on a regular basis to supervise the repair of Soviet fishing vessels.

V. THE CHINESE IN EAST AFRICA

61. The Chinese have long placed a premium on improving relations with East African governments and since the mid-1960s have been cautious to avoid entanglement with anti-regime groups. All signs point to a continuation of this policy. The Chinese are equally wary of involvement in disputes between African states. Peking's military aid to East African countries will probably continue at current levels. Political factors as well as resource limitations are likely to preclude any major new programs in the military sector.

62. China's policy toward East Africa is motivated by its desire:

— to counter, where possible, the growth of Soviet influence (as in Somalia);
— to retain its lead over the Soviets where its investments are substantial (Tanzania);
— to cultivate new African partners as part of its campaign to play a major role in Third World matters.

63. China can be expected to continue to keep a careful watch over the growth of Soviet and Western military power in the region. The Chinese are particularly wary of the potential strategic threat of a Soviet naval presence in the Indian Ocean. There are clear indications that China favors a US naval presence in the area although the Chinese try to make political capital by verbally attacking the intrusion of both superpowers into the region. Thus China supports an Indian Ocean "zone of peace."

Tanzania

64. Tanzania was the point of entry for China in East Africa in 1964 when the political situation provided an opening for Chinese assistance, first to the island of Zanzibar and later to the mainland. The country has remained the focus of China's most extensive activity in Africa, primarily because
of the magnitude of the TanZam railway project. Even after the railway is completed, however, China will remain Tanzania's major economic aid donor. China has also been Tanzania's principal supplier of military assistance. Peking hopes that close cooperation with Tanzania will convince other developing countries of China's value as a friend and partner.

Kenya and Uganda

Neither Kenya nor Uganda figures prominently in Chinese policy planning. Peking maintains studiously correct relations with Nairobi, but it has not moved toward any major programs there. Given Kenyatta's disposition to keep Chinese presence at a minimum, bilateral relations will probably continue to develop at a relatively slow pace.

Peking seems skeptical of close involvement with Uganda's erratic Amin. Prospects for much cooperation are poor; China could not compete with the Soviet Union in providing Amin with sophisticated military hardware even if it were inclined to do so. Nor is China likely to suggest increased economic ties with a regime whose commitment to development is negligible.

Somalia

In Somalia the Chinese run a poor second to the Soviets. Only in economic aid have the Chinese surpassed the Soviets, as noted in paragraph 42 above. Somalia can be expected to seek continued Chinese activity as a balance to the Soviets. On their side, the Chinese can be expected to bide their time, hoping to profit from some future misstep.

Ethiopia

Some of Ethiopia's new military rulers have shown interest in Chinese development models and may request increases in the economic credits that Peking extended to Haile Selassie's government. There have also been reports that the PMAC

2 The construction of the 1,200 mile railway is the largest financial and technical assistance project that Peking has ever undertaken.

VI. THE ARAB STATES IN EAST AFRICA

For the past decade and a half, East Africa has been one of the arenas in which Israel and the Arab states have maneuvered for support by means of trade, aid, and political pressure. With the steady erosion of the Israeli position and the increasing power accruing to the oil-producing states, the Arabs have been increasingly involved with other East African issues.

The Arab states have not marched in lock step, although on Arab-Israeli issues and on support for Muslim minorities they have maintained something of a common front. But it is on the issues of the Soviet presence and radicalism in East Africa that the interests and policies of the Arab states diverge.

Somalia

The Arabs are the Soviets' only significant competitors in Somalia. Since its adherence to the Arab League in February 1974, Somalia has been the primary recipient of Arab aid in East Africa. But the most generous Arab donors are conservative states which have made new aid—apart from drought relief—conditional upon a reduction of Soviet influence. Siad is willing to make some concessions to the Arabs (for example, he recently made Arabic an official language), but not to the point of jeopardizing Soviet military assistance. Nevertheless, in the event of a cooling in Soviet-Somali relations, Siad might look to Arab countries for spare parts and surplus Soviet weaponry.

Ethiopia

Until 1973, Ethiopia was the cornerstone of Israel's East African policy. In return for a bal-
anced diplomatic stance in the Arab-Israeli dispute, the Israelis supported Ethiopia with economic aid, military training and advisers. Ethiopia's diplomatic break with Israel in the midst of the 1973 war was forced by Arab pressure, but many Arabs are skeptical of the permanence of the split. Israel undoubtedly views the upsurge in Eritrean fighting with misgivings, and fears an Eritrean success would establish another hostile Arab power on the shores of the Red Sea.

73. After the break with Israel and the ousting of Haile Selassie, the Arabs began a flirtation with Ethiopia. But the appeal of the new government in Addis Ababa decreased following the political executions in November 1974 and deteriorated further when its hard line on Eritrea committed the PMAC to a resumption of military operations against the insurgents.

74. The Arabs are now maintaining some distance from Ethiopia's military government, and are providing increasing assistance to the Eritrean insurgents. Egypt, Sudan, Saudi Arabia, and Yemen (Sana) have generally sought a negotiated settlement in Eritrea and have tried to counter inroads by militant Arab states (Iraq, Syria, Libya and South Yemen) and communist countries. But Saudi Arabia might step up its aid to the insurgents if Ethiopian policy toward Eritrea becomes increasingly repressive. A large influx of arms from Saudi Arabia—or Libya or Iraq—might enable the rebels to resume the offensive.

Other States

75. Shortly after Idi Amin seized power in Uganda, he ended the previous close relationship with Israel. Since then, Uganda has taken a violently anti-Israeli position, established a close relationship with Libya, and has received some military aid from Egypt. Tanzania has been sending high-level delegations to the Arab world in an attempt to acquire financial aid, and so far has reportedly received a loan from the Arab League. Kenya has attempted to maintain a continuing, albeit unpublicized, relationship with Israel. Continuing Israeli military sales are a symbol of this link. Nonetheless, Kenya is also trying to improve its relations with the Arabs, even to the point of establishing diplomatic ties with an Arab outsider such as South Yemen.