DeGuiringaud: You suggested we have this breakfast in order to discuss proliferation.

Kissinger: Yes.

DeGuiringaud: But I have one or two other subjects to put on the table, if you don't object.

Kissinger: No.
DeGuiringaud: One is the future of Djibouti about which we are concerned. The other is the submarine device about which we have talked.

Kissinger: Why not talk about these two first?

DeGuiringaud: Djibouti. You know we are in the process of giving independence to Djibouti, which we call the Territoire Francais des Affars et Issas.

Kissinger: Reflecting all the French cultural political and national qualities of the 19th century! How many call themselves Djiboutians?

DeLaboulave: They call themselves Affars or Issas. That's the problem!

Kissinger: Will you keep troops there?

DeGuiringaud: It is not decided, but it is very likely that we will offer them to instruct their small defense and police force. They already accepted some. Should they accept some base, we have this in mind also. Something like 3-4,000 troops. It is not already decided, but we have it in mind with their agreement. But anything we do in this respect might be in danger from Somalia.

Kissinger: And Ethiopia.

DeGuiringaud: And Ethiopia. It is difficult to say what they will do if we leave a base.

I want to discuss it for two reasons, because Djibouti will need some substantial economic aid.

Kissinger: Why more now?

DeGuiringaud: No more. We are spending 15 billion francs.

Kissinger: It can't be $2-3 billion.

Andreani: It must be old Francs.

DeLaboulage: $20-30 million.

Kissinger: That [$2-3 billion] would be as much as we spend on Israel.
Sonnenfeldt: For 200-300,000 people.

DeGuiringaud: We are still spending a large amount of money for a few people, but we think it will be good to muster some international support. We already mentioned it to the Saudis and they are interested. We mention it to you because it would be a good example to set.

The most important argument is not an economic one but the threat from Somalia or an irresponsible move by Ethiopia.

Kissinger: No question.

DeGuiringaud: Somalia always had the thesis that all that area is Somaliland. There is danger that after independence....

Kissinger: When is that?

DeGuiringaud: Between May and July.

Kissinger: I understand why you're doing it but of course it's an absurdity. The necessity for it is not self-evident.

DeGuiringaud: If you had not urged the idea of self-determination on others.... [Laughter].

Kissinger: You're probably right. And India would be better off. And wouldn't have the atomic bomb, which would make my friend Win Lord infinitely happy.

DeGuiringaud: If you could use your influence, if you still have any, in Addis Ababa.

Kissinger: That last remark is unnecessary. [Laughter].

DeGuiringaud: They have American equipment.

Kissinger: I'm a household word in Addis Ababa.

We have a difficult time knowing who's in charge. They refused Godley.
We have difficulty preventing them from using these arms against Eritrea. You're right, we have little influence. They are probably shifting to Soviet arms; there have been several Soviet missions there.

The only way to stop it is with a force on the ground, which we could support.

DeGuiringaud: But this is unpopular with other Africans who say why a foreign base is an independent state. Of course we have the argument because of the Soviet base in Somalia.

We could, however, urge the Soviets to exert restraint on Somalia.

Kissinger: I think a demarche with the Soviets would be useful.

DeGuiringaud: I have raised it with Gromyko in New York. Mr. de Courcel mentioned it in Moscow, with complete silence on the part of Moscow. The time is for a new statement in Moscow.

Kissinger: This should be coordinated with the new administration.

DeGuiringaud: Yes, this is one of the points I suggested you mention to the new administration when they make their new approach to the Russians -- that they mention their interest, your interest, in the independence of Djibouti, and your fear that any irresponsible move in that part of the world could have irreparable consequences.

If the Russians could control Djibouti, they could control the Red Sea and threaten South Yemen, and the situation could move in an unwanted direction.

Kissinger: I agree. I personally think we have to talk to the Russians about all of Africa. I frankly think, as I said yesterday, they're partly responsible for the situation in the Rhodesian negotiation, by holding out the prospect of military victory. And they could certainly stop a Somali move.

I will talk to Mr. Vance about it.

DeGuiringaud: Your advice is we keep a base there.

Kissinger: My personal view, I have to say, may differ from the new administration.
DeGuiringaud: But we want your personal view.

Kissinger: My personal view is you should keep a base there. It would give everybody an excuse not to act. The Saudis would be relieved.

DeGuiringaud: Of course the Africans don't like it; the cost is great.

Kissinger: The Ethiopians might be glad you have a base there.

DeLaboulaye: We can't do it in the face of an African objection.

Kissinger: They don't object to what Guinea does for the Russians.

DeGuiringaud: The Russians have 2,000 men, 500 tanks and 200 planes.

Kissinger: My recommendation is you at least attempt to keep some troops there. Second, you should talk to the Russians. But talking to the Russians is nothing without some threats. So your talking to them alone is not enough. We would have to support it.

DeGuiringaud: To tell the Russians we would consider any Somali action is a breach of detente.

Kissinger: Exactly. I consider Soviet action in Africa very aggressive. There is nothing they can gain there; but they can do much to hurt us.

[Omitted here are portions of the discussion unrelated to the Horn of Africa.]