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Department of State

TELEGRAM

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ACTION NODS-00

INFO OCT-01 ISO-00 /001 W

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FM AMEMBASSY KINSHASA
TO SECSTATE WASHDC NIACT IMMEDIATE 3767

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NODIS CHEROKEE

FROM VANCE

E.O. 11652: XGDS-1

TAGS: POL

SUBJECT: VANCE MISSION: FOURTH MEETING WITH MOBUTU JULY 23

REF: STATE 172996

1. FOLLOWING RECEIPT REFTEL, I TELEPHONED MOBUTU AND ARRANGED TO SEE HIM AGAIN EVENING JULY 23. HE INVITED ME TO STAY FOR DINNER WITH THE FAMILY, FOLLOWING WHICH WE HAD MOST USEFUL TALK ON STATUS OF OUR JOINT PLANNING FOR ASSISTANCE TO ANGOLA.

2. I TOLD MOBUTU THAT WE HAD REVIEWED AND FORWARDED TO WASHINGTON THE LIST OF EQUIPMENT REPLACEMENT REQUIREMENTS GIVEN US BY HIS GENERALS AS WELL AS THE CATEGORIES OF EQUIPMENT THEY HAD DESIGNATED AS BEING MOST URGENTLY NEEDED. I SAID I HAD THIS MORNING RECEIVED INSTRUCTION REITERATING THE NEED TO PUT TOGETHER A PROGRAM NOT TO EXCEED \$6 MILLION, ALTHOUGH WE DID NOT EXCLUDE THE POSSIBILITY OF SOME ADDITIONAL ASSISTANCE NOW. IN EXPLAINING THIS LIMITATION I OBSERVED THAT OUR ABILITY TO HELP WAS SUBJECT TO CERTAIN OBVIOUS CONSIDERATIONS, NOTABLY THE LIMITATION ON FUNDS AVAILABLE, THE COST AND TIME REQUIRED FOR SHIPMENT, AND THE RISK OF LEAKS THAT ARISES IF LARGE QUANTITIES OF MATERIEL ARE SENT ALL AT ONCE. I STRESSED THE IMPORTANCE OF THE LAST POINT, NOTING THE NEED TO MOVE IN SUCH A WAY

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AS TO AVOID EXPOSURE, WHICH COULD SERIOUSLY HARM OUR EFFORTS TO HELP, MOBUTU SAID HE UNDERSTOOD THESE CONSIDERATIONS, BUT THAT HE CONSIDERED THAT MUCH LESS THAN THE EQUIPMENT FROM FIVE OF HIS PARA-BATTALIONS (FOUR FOR ROBERTO AND ONE FOR SAVIMBI) WOULD NOT RPT NOT REDRESS THE BALANCE. HE ALSO REITERATED HIS HOPE THAT THE ITEMS ALREADY SENT ANGOLA FROM HIS MOBILIZATION RESERVE AS WELL AS THE KEY ITEMS FROM HIS PARATROOPS WHICH WE CANNOT SUPPLY IN THE PRESENT EMERGENCY PROGRAM WOULD BE REPLACED SUBSEQUENTLY.

3. I SAID IT WAS IMPORTANT THAT I PROVIDE WASHINGTON WITH AS PRECISE A VIEW AS POSSIBLE OF HIS ORDER OF PRIORITIES WITHIN THE BROAD PRIORITY CATEGORIES OF EQUIPMENT HIS GENERALS HAD GIVEN US (ON HIS INSTRUCTION, IT IS CLEAR, THIS SO WE COULD DETERMINE THE MOST USEFUL TYPES OF ASSISTANCE BOTH FOR A \$6 MILLION PROGRAM AND FOR ANY AID WE MIGHT BE ABLE TO PROVIDE ABOVE THAT. I THEN REVIEWED WITH MOBUTU THE LIST PROVIDED BY THE GENERALS AND HE INDICATED HOW HE WOULD REFINE HIS RELATIVE PRIORITIES. HIS MOST URGENT NEED REMAINS 5,000 M-16 RIFLES WITH ONE-TWO MONTHS' AMMUNITION, ALL OF WHICH HE HOPES CAN BE AIR SHIPPED TO ZAIRE AS SOON AS POSSIBLE. HIS SECOND PRIORITY IS ANTI-TANK GUNS TO REPLACE MORE THAN HAS ALREADY BEEN SHIPPED SOUTH TO COUNTER THE SOVIET-SUPPLIED ARMORED VEHICLES HE SAID WERE HAVING DEVASTATING EFFECT ON THE FNLA. MOBUTU WENT ON TO DESIGNATE A NUMBER OF OTHER PRIORITY REQUIREMENTS FROM THE LIST AND INDICATED WHICH SHOULD BE SHIPPED BY AIR AND WHICH BY SEA. WE HAVE INCORPORATED HIS VIEWS BOTH IN A \$6 MILLION PACKAGE AND IN A LARGER PACKAGE WHICH WE HAVE DEVELOPED AS REQUESTED REFTEL AND ARE SENDING BY SEPARATE TELEGRAMS [REDACTED].

4. IN DISCUSSING ZAIRIAN MILITARY AID TO ANGOLA, I TOOK THE OCCASION TO REMIND MOBUTU ABOUT US RESTRICTIONS ON THE TRANSFER FROM ONE COUNTRY TO ANOTHER OF EQUIPMENT (I HAD IN MIND HIS PARATROOPERS HAVE SOME OLD MAP EQUIPMENT.) SUPPLIED UNDER MAP. BOBUTU SAID HE UNDERSTOOD THIS AND REITERATED HIS ASSURANCE THAT NO US MATERIEL, NO MATTER HOW OLD IT MIGHT BE, WOULD BE SENT TO ANGOLA.

5. [REDACTED]

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