China, October 1971–February 1972

161. Editorial Note

President Richard Nixon and his Assistant for National Security Affairs, Henry Kissinger, discussed the February 1972 visit to the People's Republic of China (PRC) through a series of messages and conversations during and immediately after Kissinger's October 1971 trip to the PRC. On October 20 Alexander M. Haig sent a telegram to Kissinger:

"The President via Haldeman asked me to convey to you on an urgent basis the following message. He did not give any explanation although I sensed it is related to the imagery problem with which we are so well acquainted: He wishes you to insure that in discussing the agenda with your hosts a specific time is arranged for two private head-to-head meetings between, in one instance, the President and Mao with no one in attendance other than interpreters, and in the second instance, with Chou En-lai under identical circumstances. I was asked to convey this to you as soon as possible and would be grateful if you could confirm for the President if and when this has been accomplished." (National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 1035, Files for the President—China Material, China, HAK's October 1971 Visit)

Kissinger’s response, received in the White House on October 21, reads:

"Please tell Haldeman to rest his fevered brain. Our hosts have one or two other things on their minds. Private meetings will be arranged, although I am bound to say anything except the most formal meeting along with Chou is a major mistake. Chou will know the whole negotiating history and the President cannot. Please leave the timing of raising it to me. I shall arrange it before I leave unless I hear to the contrary. Please remind Bush of our understanding with respect to the UN debate. Warm regards. To be delivered without disturbing Gen. Haig at home. No copies for distribution." (Ibid.)

Ambassador to the United Nations George Bush, Kissinger, and Nixon had met on September 30. At this meeting Kissinger said, "I was wondering, we were exploring all possibilities, but if the American speech [in the UN General Assembly] could be put after I've left there, since the debate will go on for 3 or 4 days after I've left there."

Haig passed the information contained in Kissinger’s telegram to Nixon on October 21. Nixon’s handwritten comments on Haig’s summary memorandum read: “Al. Wire Henry—OK for Chou and Mao together, but RN to be alone. Henry not to be present. Otherwise, we differ from RN’s style on other trips and raise the Rogers problem.” (National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 1035, Files for the President—China Material, China, HAK’s October 1971 Visit)

Haig then wired Nixon’s instructions to Kissinger on October 22, adding: “There may be more to this than that simple explanation and I suspect the Sherman story in Sunday’s Post which touched upon the genesis of the Peking and Soviet initiatives was not helpful in any sense. You will recall that Sherman suggested that both trips had long been part of ‘your’ conceptual agenda.” (Ibid.) George Sherman was a Washington Star reporter. Haig is apparently referring to Sherman’s article entitled “Kissinger Mapped Nixon Shift,” Washington Star, October 17, 1971, pages A–1, A–5.

On the same day, Haig sent a message to Kissinger that reads in part: “He [Haldeman] asked me to reiterate to you that the President’s strong preference is for a five-day visit with only one additional stop which would involve an in-and-out on the same day. I assured him you were well aware of the President’s wishes but that obviously you would have to consider Chinese attitude. He asked that I send this to you in any event. Best wishes.” (Ibid. E–13, Documents 42, 45, and 47)

Also on October 22, Nixon, through Haig, requested that Kissinger delay his return to Washington from Monday, October 25 to Tuesday, October 26. Haig wrote: “The real reason is because Rogers insists that your arrival from Peking just before the Chirep vote [in the UN], now scheduled for Tuesday morning, would seriously jeopardize the outcome and in any event would be the subject of considerable criticism should the vote go against us.” (Ibid.) On October 23 Kissinger responded that he could not delay his departure from China, and any delay in Hawaii or Alaska could only increase “speculation.” He added: “As you know, I have never believed that my visit affects the Chirep vote. Whatever impact it has had is already accomplished, it will not be compounded by my return.” After receiving another cable from Haig, October 23, explaining the situation on October 24 Kissinger indicated his willingness to delay for a day in Anchorage, Alaska. (Ibid.) Kissinger arrived in Washington on the afternoon of October 26 and had dinner with Nixon that evening. (Ibid., White House Central Files, President’s Daily Diary) See Foreign Relations, 1969–1976, volume E–13, Documents 42, 45, 46, 47, 49, and 50.

On October 27 Kissinger and Nixon discussed the results of the trip. Kissinger affirmed: “It’s [the China trip] the keystone of your for-
eign policy, Mr. President, you get a good reception in China, which I know you will, you come out with a decent communiqué, you’re in business with the Russians. Then the Russian trip will be a great success.” Nixon observed: “He’s [Rogers] concerned with good reason about what does the communiqué say about Taiwan. But I think if we aren’t smart enough to work out some fuzzy language there then we’re, it’s my understanding that the [unintelligible] won’t be in any communiqué, it will be in the back room.” Kissinger commented:

“Mr. President, you are going to be more sensitive to what you can say than he [Rogers]. You’re not going to say anything that will hurt us. I believe actually on Taiwan they haven’t met you yet, what you should, and we may even want to leave that door open until you get there. If you tell Mao, look, this is what I’m willing to do, but in order to do it we cannot say a great deal. And once they’re seen you and seen that there’s steel there, then I think it will go. They’re not trying to screw you, that’s not the way they operate, they’re not like the Russians. The Russians get you by accumulating little things. The Chinese operate like you do, they go for the big play. They are not interested in, they do not want, when I left Chou said to me, I want you to understand that we have a big investment in President Nixon, everything we do is geared to him. They said, he said, a lot of people have promised us things, but we believe only he can actually perform. And you have to say, now Bill was making a fuss about how they were crowing [after victory in the UN vote]. That isn’t true. Yesterday, Chou and their foreign minister, meeting a group of press, had absolutely no comment. They can’t have any interest in humiliating you.” (Ibid., White House Tapes, Recording of conversation between Nixon and Kissinger, October 27, 1971, 9:40 a.m.–12:22 p.m., Oval Office, Conversation No. 603–1)

162. Memorandum of Conversation¹

Beijing, October 21, 1971, 10:30 a.m.–1:45 p.m.

PARTICIPANTS
Prime Minister Chou En-lai, People’s Republic of China
Chi P’eng-fei, Acting PRC Foreign Minister
Chang Wen-chin, Director, Western Europe and American Department, PRC
Ministry of Foreign Affairs
Wang Hai-jung, Deputy Chief of Protocol, PRC
Tang Wen-sheng and Chi Chao-chu, Chinese Interpreters and Notetakers
Dr. Henry A. Kissinger, Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs
Jonathan Howe, Senior Staff Member, NSC
Winston Lord, Senior Staff Member, NSC

[Omitted here is a 13-page section detailing plans for President Nixon’s February 1972 trip to the People’s Republic of China.]

Dr. Kissinger: Perhaps we should then begin the substantive discussion, if the Prime Minister agrees.

PM Chou: Alright.

Dr. Kissinger: The first subject is the subject of the normalization of relations and Taiwan. I would like to sum up what is my recollection of what I told the Prime Minister when we met in July. I told the Prime Minister that we would withdraw the forces on Taiwan that are related to the war in Indochina within a short period after the war in Indochina. I said that we would reduce the other forces progressively over a somewhat longer period of time and faster if our relations improved.

PM Chou: At that time you didn’t mention a final date.

¹ Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 1034, Files for the President—China Material, Polo II, HAK China Trip, Transcripts of Meetings. Top Secret; Sensitive; Exclusively Eyes Only. The meeting was held in the Great Hall of the People. Kissinger’s topical briefing materials are ibid. Kissinger met with Chou En-lai on October 20 (Monday) from 4:40–7:10 p.m.; October 21 from 10:30–1:45 p.m. and again from 4:42–7:17 p.m.; October 22 from 4:15–8:28 p.m.; October 23 from 9:05–10:05 a.m.; October 24 from 10:28–1:55 p.m. and 9:23–11:20 p.m.; October 25 from 10:12–11 a.m. and 9:50–11:40 p.m.; and October 26 from 5:30–8:10 a.m. A short “informal memcon” of Chou En-lai’s introduction to the Americans accompanying Kissinger on the afternoon of October 20 is also ibid. See Foreign Relations, 1969–1976, vol. E–13, Documents 36–41, 43–44, 48, 51–52, and 54–56. Kissinger’s schedule is in National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 1035, Files for the President—China Materials, HAK’s October 1971 Visit. Memoranda of conversation of meetings held among Holdridge, Jenkins, and Hsiung Hsiang-huai, Secretary to the Prime Minister, are ibid. These meetings focused on preparations for the President’s trip, trade, and exchanges. See Foreign Relations, 1969–1976, vol. E–13, Documents 39 and 43.
Dr. Kissinger: That is correct. We understand the evolution we are aiming for. (Chou nods) I said that we are not advocating a two-China solution or a one China, one Taiwan solution.

PM Chou: Is it likely to realize a situation of one China and two governments as put forward by the State Department? I have thought a lot about it. That is why we directed our spearhead of criticism to the State Department and Mr. Bush. But we didn’t direct our criticism at Mr. Rogers after he put forward this proposition in the name of your government. Only in our press. Only after Mr. Bush put it forward did we put forward a foreign ministry statement on 20 August.

Dr. Kissinger: We noted your statement and truly you used restraint, and I will say a word about it in a minute. You have showed great restraint in what is for both of us a very difficult situation. I will explain it in a minute.

I said that we wouldn’t support or encourage the creation of an Independent Taiwan Movement. If you have any information that any American, official or unofficial, is encouraging such a movement, I understand that you will inform us and you have our promise that it will be stopped. We will oppose—

PM Chou: And the demonstration which took place in front of the UN Headquarters at the beginning of the UN General Assembly, was it premeditated by them or was it world-wide?

Dr. Kissinger: To the best of my knowledge it had no encouragement from the US government, and I am not aware of the fact that it was a world-wide plan. However, I will look into it when I get back, and I will inform the Prime Minister of the results of my investigation through our channel.

PM Chou: These demonstrations for so-called Taiwan independence started with the convening of the UN in New York, and there was a series of demonstrations in other places in the US and Japan and even extending to Taiwan, and they are continuing. And I can send some of the material we obtained about this for you.

Dr. Kissinger: If you will send me the material, I will start an investigation when I get back from here and send you the result of our

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investigation, but I can assure you we are giving no encouragement whatsoever to such a movement.

PM Chou: The CIA had no hand in it?

Dr. Kissinger: As I told the Prime Minister the last time, he vastly overestimates the competence of the CIA.

PM Chou: They have become the topic of discussion throughout the world. Whenever something happens in the world they are always thought of.

Dr. Kissinger: That is true, and it flatters them, but they don’t deserve it.

PM Chou: According to the US set-up, is the CIA under the NSC?

Dr. Kissinger: The CIA is technically under the White House. Technically. Before they engage in the sort of operation the Prime Minister refers to, they have to make a request to a committee of which I am chairman and on which other agencies usually have a voice, but not inevitably.\footnote{Apparent reference to the 40 Committee, a group of high-level officials who reviewed intelligence gathering and covert activity. The 303 Committee became the 40 Committee after President Nixon signed NSDM 40 on February 17, 1970, thus updating NSC 5412/2.} No such operations have been authorized. Nor has such an operation been proposed. I am being candid—this is not information we generally tell other governments.

I cannot absolutely exclude, again speaking totally frankly, that some office does something unauthorized sometimes. It’s extremely improbable and after a period of months we would certainly find out. It’s possible it could happen, but not on a large scale.

PM Chou: The Pentagon is not responsible for them?

Dr. Kissinger: The Pentagon has also an intelligence organization, but it also doesn’t have authority to do these things. Again I would like to propose the following to the Prime Minister. If you have any information of any American engaging in those activities and you give me his name, I can promise you in the name of the President he will be removed. It’s impossible for him to do it without being discovered by you and us. We are talking about unauthorized actions now.

PM Chou: This is a question which we may raise—it’s a little complicated question, because it’s a matter of your internal affairs but also an international problem.

Dr. Kissinger: You can raise it, and we will not consider it an intervention in our domestic affairs.

PM Chou: They have activities throughout the world. That is one question that people throughout the world are most unhappy about,
and that’s why they are not welcome. Because after the Second World
War, the US is taking a hand in all kinds of affairs throughout the world
and this organization had a role to play.

Dr. Kissinger: The CIA?

PM Chou: Yes. Because they have a role and have a payroll, they
must feed their stomachs. So as your President said, and also as Your
Excellency said, after the Second World War you appeared to be very
powerful both militarily and in the matter of economic aid. So the CIA
thought they had the right to look into everything. The result of this
is causing disharmony in the world. Now it is less than the espionage
activities of the Soviet Union. We are freely exchanging views.

Dr. Kissinger: Oh, yes.

PM Chou: It is possible that activities in the China mainland are
comparatively less but not perhaps nonexistent.

Dr. Kissinger: I am not sure it’s in our interest to reassure you com-
pletely, but I will. First, you said, what will CIA agents do if they don’t
make revolution somewhere? Most write long, incomprehensible re-
ports and don’t make revolution.

PM Chou: You can preserve methods without this. We reserve our
judgment on this.

Dr. Kissinger: They are mostly from Yale and they don’t have the
people.

PM Chou: He is from Yale [pointing to Winston Lord]?6

Dr. Kissinger: Does he look like a revolutionary?

PM Chou: Those reports you referred to are intelligence. While
you use the word revolution, we say subversion.

Dr. Kissinger: Or subversion. I understand. We are conscious of
what is at stake in our relationship, and we will not let one organiza-
tion carry out petty operations that could hinder this course, what you
described yesterday evening in your toast.7 You must have noticed that
since my visit in July a whole list of things which used to be routine,
especially in the military, have been changed.

But we will review all those activities once again, and I want to
repeat that we will not consider it an intervention in our affairs if you
will point out those measures that affect you directly, either in respect
to the Taiwan Independence Movement or other, and call them to our
attention. It’s not our policy to subvert the government of the People’s
Republic of China or its policy.

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6 All brackets and ellipses are in the source text.

7 See Document 163 and footnote 2 thereto.
PM Chou: I just raised this question initially. When we discuss the question of Japan, I will raise it again. This is a matter which Taiwan also has complained of. Chiang Kai-shek and his son are very much worried about this.

Dr. Kissinger: Both the People’s Republic and the Taiwan authorities have the same view on this matter.

PM Chou: That’s right. For instance, we have set up the People’s Republic for 22 years. We will not have some of our CIA people go to the US to indulge in activities. Even if a delegation went to the US, we would be very careful that there is no misunderstanding because what we are seeking is friendship between the two peoples. Because to change the system of any particular country, that is the responsibility of that particular country and cannot be done by any foreign countries, and we persist in this.

For instance, we are spending such a great effort to help in Vietnam, but we never entered into Vietnamese affairs. Also in Cambodia. The Government of Cambodia is in Peking, but some members are in Cambodia itself. There are often internal disputes within their government, and sometimes when they ask for our mediation, we say we will not stick our hands into it. But the amount of articles we carry in our press concerning publications and reports regarding the Royal Union of the government of Cambodia is unprecedented in our press and world history. Norodom Sihanouk has already published 21 proclamations to his people, and we have published them in our press and we have published them in full without changing a word. If you say there’s no freedom in our country, that is the greatest freedom. We respect them and do not disrespect their sovereignty because the head of state is in our country.

You may have some experts study this and see if any government dares to do this. How did the British behave towards DeGaulle during the Second World War? The former American Government gave support to the Kerensky government in exile\(^8\) and also supported the government in exile of the three Baltic states. At the same time you are now supporting the so-called government in Taiwan, but you have never given them such privileges in your press. You can refute me in one way. Your press is owned privately while ours is not. That’s the question because there’s a question of profit. But we devote a great amount of space to their publications.

Nevertheless there are some people who say Sihanouk is not free in China and is a prisoner and even worse. I really can find no example

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\(^8\) Reference is to the Russian provisional government, July–October 1917, led by Aleksandr Fyodorovich Kerensky.
of a head of state invited abroad who has such extensive freedom. Sihanouk wants to visit Europe, and we now have a possibility of sending him with our special plane because we have now an exit via the countries in central Asia; as you went last time, Pakistan and Tehran.

Dr. Kissinger: Spectacularly beautiful.

PM Chou: We have established relations with all these countries. He will go all the way to Romania and Yugoslavia. Only Greece we have not established relations with. One thing we cannot do. After our special plane sends Sihanouk to Europe, we cannot guarantee his safety. Saboteurs may come. They may come from the side of the Lon Nol/Matak clique. If it does come from that clique then it will involve you. That is a very natural logic followed in the world. So we are always considering how to guarantee his safety. We can guarantee his safety in China itself. But if he is to go abroad we can guarantee his security on our plane.

Dr. Kissinger: Wouldn’t the French Government guarantee his safety?

PM Chou: He doesn’t want to go there because France does not recognize him.

Dr. Kissinger: Where is he going?

PM Chou: Where I said. Romania, Yugoslavia, Algeria, and probably the United Arab Republic of Egypt. Because activities of saboteurs can be carried out easily. It can happen within the US. They may even put a plastic bomb outside the plane to destroy the plane. When I went to the Bandung Conference in 1955 I almost lost my life.

At that time we chartered an Indian plane, the “Kashmir Princess” from Hong Kong. Because Prime Minister U Nu wanted me to go with him, I went to Burma. He asked Nehru and Nasser to go with him and I changed my route at the last minute while the others went via Hong Kong. The saboteurs thought I was on the “Kashmir Princess” and set a time bomb on the plane. Just as the “Kashmir Princess” was about to reach Bandung, it exploded in mid-air and crashed into the sea.

India, together with authorities in Hong Kong, investigated the bombing. We have evidence that the bomb was placed by a Chinese who was brought over to Hong Kong, and I convinced the Indian Commissioner to go directly with our people to Hong Kong and demand from the Hong Kong authorities that they arrest that man. But such news leaks out, and the Indian told his Embassy, and just as we got to Hong Kong that man flew to Taiwan. So such things are sometimes not the responsibility of that government, and some individuals may do it on their own.

As for international hijacking, we do not approve those activities. It’s too unreasonable. Such adventurous acts are not a good practice, regardless of the motives behind it, whether it is revolutionary or of a
saboteur nature. I say these not as superfluous words but to explain how people of the world think of the CIA. As for we ourselves, we are not very much excited by the CIA. Maybe indirectly. I didn’t know Dr. Kissinger was the chairman of the committee.

Dr. Kissinger: Not for day-to-day things. Day-to-day things I don’t know. I am only told of something that can have major foreign policy consequences. Not the sort of thing the Prime Minister described. I would not even hear about that.

PM Chou: They would seal you off. There are often some organizations that even though you are their chairman the more they seal you off. Chairman Mao has a thesis: those who hail you are not the ones who support you. He said it to Edgar Snow. There are three types of such persons. Those who support you and hail long life; they really support you; others support you maybe a little; and third, those who are double dealers and applaud you but under the table their feet kick you. Such people probably exist no matter the system.

Dr. Kissinger: I see many of those.

PM Chou: This will exist probably 10,000 years hence and even one million years hence, so long as human society exists. When humanity on earth disappears there may be people on other stars. This is a common phenomenon of society. One must be cool-headed and analyze things. And so you said that after the July 15 announcement, the majority supported it, and a minority were against it. I believe that. It’s also true in China. There’s no such thing as unanimous approval of agreement.

Dr. Kissinger: Only for those not worth making. (laughter)

PM Chou: Not really unanimity, but a carefree manner. This may be outside our discussion but this is a heart-to-heart discussion.

Dr. Kissinger: For friendship we must be frank and know how each feels. I appreciate how the Prime Minister feels and he can be certain it will be taken absolutely seriously. We will not let officials subvert the trend we have started.

PM Chou: We must be prepared in our minds. There will be some who will want to subvert it. Only when we have such a preparation can we do our things well.

I think your colleagues have never heard someone on the other side saying such things. So it’s only the second meeting, and I am saying what I want to you. You and Mr. Lord are familiar with this but not Miss Matthews and our new friend [referring to Jon Howe]. You probably thought the Chinese Communist Party has three heads and six arms. But, lo and behold, I am like you. Someone you can talk reason with and talk honestly. Back to Taiwan. I thought it was beneficial to say something about the CIA just then.
Dr. Kissinger: It’s very important because in the relationship of our two countries much depends on confidence. There will be many ambiguous events and it is important to understand what we are really thinking.

A few more words about Taiwan. As I also said last time, we will not support, and indeed we will oppose, the establishment of Japanese military forces on Taiwan, military influence on Taiwan, and to the extent we have influence in Japan we will oppose an attempt by Japan to support the Taiwan Independence Movement.

We will support any peaceful resolution of the issues in the Taiwan Straits, and we will not be an obstacle to it.

We are prepared to move towards a normalization of relations with the People’s Republic of China, and we understand what you have in mind.

All of this the President will reaffirm in restricted meetings to you, Mr. Prime Minister, and to Chairman Mao.

I would like to add a few other observations if I may. With the same frankness with which the Prime Minister has spoken to me, I have to tell him that for us this is, of course, a somewhat painful process. We have worked with the Government of Taiwan for many years and whatever the course of the history that produced this, it is not easy for us to make the changes which we have outlined to you. Also there are many elements in the US who are violently opposed to the policy we are pursuing and who will be even more opposed to it as it begins to unwind.

We recognize that the People’s Republic considers the subject of Taiwan an internal issue, and we will not challenge that. But to the degree that the People’s Republic can on its own, in the exercise of its own sovereignty, declare its willingness to settle it by peaceful means, our actions will be easier. I am not speaking of undertaking to talk towards us as we asked in 1955, but something you do on your own. But whether you do or not, we will continue in the direction which I indicated.

Secondly, I want to say a few words about the discussion in the UN. There are many elements in our bureaucracy who are, of course, pursuing the traditional policies. And since we have not told them all the details of the discussions in July, it has not been possible to instill the discipline that will be the case as the years go on. We have carried out what I told the Prime Minister we would do when I was here in July. And we have tried to keep our rhetoric also at a lower level. I think the Prime Minister will have noticed that the President has not made a public statement on the subject.

Actually, if I can speak candidly to the Prime Minister, and this is not a matter in his control, it would be best for the policies which we
discussed if the Albanian Resolution did not pass this year. In the latest public opinion poll, there are still 62% of the American people who are opposed to the expulsion of Taiwan from the UN. And if the transition—the work of the July 15 announcement was very severe, and if there’s another shock now, the elements opposed to what we are doing will have a rallying point, and they will launch a sharp attack prematurely. I am talking very candidly to you, Mr. Prime Minister. So paradoxically, if the position that has been advanced in the UN should prevail for this year, it will make it easier to carry out the policies we described, and it will make it easier next year to moderate our policies in the UN.

But I want to assure the Prime Minister that we are not looking for a clever way out of what I told him in July. With respect to Taiwan, I think we understand that it’s possible to do more than we can say. And that some things can be left to an historical evolution as long as we both understand the way it’s going. And that, of course, everything is easier for us if the resolution is peaceful. I am sure the President will reaffirm everything that I have said.

PM Chou: The question of the UN I will discuss at some point later. Our central question of concern is Taiwan. The question of Taiwan is a question that was already solved after the Second World War, but then became a question outstanding. Because after the Second World War it was a matter of certainty that in the instruments of surrender and in the signing in 1945 Japan gave up all claims on Taiwan just as it gave up all claims to Manchuria. The difference with Manchuria is that Soviet troops had already entered into Manchuria, and Chinese troops followed immediately after. So there was no question of China’s restoring sovereignty over Manchuria. Although at the beginning the majority of it was occupied by Chiang Kai-shek’s troops, then the whole of Manchuria was lost and became no international problem. The so-called State of Manchukuo existed for 14 years under the military occupation of the Japanese.

The difference about Taiwan is that because of China’s defeat in 1894, China was forced to cede Taiwan to Japan. That is similar to Sakhalin Island that was conceded to Japan after the war of 1905. And it was also like the question after the Prussian War of 1870 when Alsace–Lorraine was conceded to Germany. The First World War was concluded in 1918, and the Germans lost, and Alsace–Lorraine was restored to France, and no questions asked. But during the Second World War Nazi Germany occupied even greater areas of France. After the Allies won victory, all of France was restored.

So when one says that Taiwan was under Japan for a long period of time, it was only fifty years and if you compare to Alsace–Lorraine, it was two years less. It’s clear. I have never been to Taiwan, but I have
been to Salzburg in Alsace–Lorraine and it was clear that the inhabitants there spoke German. You noticed. So the vast majority of people on Taiwan spoke Fukien dialect. Some learned Japanese.

Dr. Kissinger: The Japanese claim is no problem for us.

PM Chou: But there does exist this adverse current in the world, and they say the status remains undetermined. That's entirely absurd.

Dr. Kissinger: That's not been said by any American spokesman since June.

PM Chou: That was trouble provoked by your State Department, and then you forbade them to say more. Britain now wants to raise the level of representation to Ambassador. I can tell you something here, but please don't make it public.

Dr. Kissinger: Nothing here will be made public and not outside the President. This goes only to the President.

PM Chou: I believe that. And I have even more confidence in the young. Old politicians sometimes have too many connections. The British Government says that the government of the United Kingdom acknowledges the position of the government of the People's Republic of China that Taiwan is a province of the People's Republic of China. That is clear and acknowledging the law. Not recognize but acknowledge. So for lawyers there might be a slight differentiation between acknowledge and recognize. That is a question of International Law.

What is more the British Government says as soon as it has declared this, the British Consulate in Taiwan will be withdrawn.

Third, the British Government said they will openly declare this and vote for the Albanian resolution. You know this. When your Deputy Secretary of State was visiting Europe, the British made its attitude very clear. So logically that should be sufficient.

Then there was a reservation that this was not to be made public. That is British diplomacy, that is the way the British Government said they themselves would not promote the theory that the status of Taiwan remains undetermined, but would not try to persuade any government. But when asked its position, the British Government says its position remains unchanged. So that is very interesting.

[At this point there is a short break.]

PM Chou: Sorry, I didn't think of everyone taking break.

Dr. Kissinger: We followed your lead.

PM Chou: So it's clear that if we are to proceed from expediency we can agree with this formula of the British Government, that they will not say unless asked. More people can support this, but we do not consider this acceptable. On this matter one should proceed with an earnest attitude on international problems.

Dr. Kissinger: What will you not accept?
PM Chou: That final reservation, which the British Government said, that its policy will not change. There will be a consequence to that. That state of affairs of being asked whether its position has changed may not occur. From the standpoint of the British Government it should not reserve that attitude, because the British Government is a signatory to the Cairo Declaration. At that time participating were the heads of government of the US, Britain, and China. Also the British were signatories to the Potsdam Declaration.

What about the historical facts? Afterwards the British Government sent someone to take over Taiwan and had a provincial governor established. At that time no difference of view was expressed by the allies. So after the Chinese people had overthrown the rule of the Chiang Kai-shek clique, President Truman declared that Taiwan had returned to the Chinese people, and the US had no interest in territory there. There are documents stressing that. The decision of President Truman at that time was of no concern to the existence or not of Chiang Kai-shek.

Just because of the Korean War he suddenly decided to send in the Seventh Fleet to Taiwan and advisors, and from that time he declared Taiwan and the Taiwan Straits under American protection. He mentioned nuclear devices, that there were devices there.

And so later on in the San Francisco Peace Treaty with Japan he uses a very strange formulation to declare this. In it it was said that Japan renounces all claim to all such and such territories, that is to say, Japan renounces claim to all such territories with the exception of the four principal islands of Japan—Honshu, Hokkaido, Shikoku, and Kyushu and that with the exception of these four principal islands, Japan would not claim any others. Japan renounces claim to the southern side of Sakhalin and the Kuriles, and the position of the Ryukyus, including Okinawa, remained open and also Taiwan and the Spratley islands. But it was not specified in the San Francisco Treaty to whom they belong. It was left to the countries. I don’t know who drew that up.

Dr. Kissinger: Dulles, the Prime Minister’s old acquaintance.

PM Chou: So afterwards individual treaties were made with Japan. At that time Chiang Kai-shek was only a small dynasty hanging on to Taiwan, with American protection, so what could he say? He could only act as he was told to do. He himself sits on Taiwan, but in the treaty with Japan it does not specify who Taiwan reverts to, only saying Japan gives up all claim. If I call him a traitor, I have every reason to do that.

Dr. Kissinger: He claims, too, that there’s only one China but that is the Island of Taiwan.

PM Chou: I am talking about in the Peace Treaty of Japan. I tell the way that it is in the Peace Treaty with Japan.
Dr. Kissinger: I understand.

PM Chou: When you made your agreement with Japan to revert Okinawa and the Ryukyus to the Japanese, Chiang Kai-shek asked why you were not returning them to China.

Taiwan is cursing us about the Ryukyus; not just about Okinawa. Because in history during the Ming and Ching dynasties the rulers of those islands and maybe even earlier...I will not go into the historical facts of that, but I am certain those islands sent gifts to the Chinese Emperor and were looked upon as tributary states. Maybe they were sent envoys to show concern for them. It merely shows relations between states. But in the factual empire days it was looked on as tributary states. Such things occurred in the Ottoman and Roman and Inca Empires in ancient days. All states that had relations with them were looked upon as belonging to them. If that’s to be considered, then the world will be overturned and the world turned into chaos. The ownership of Taiwan and the Pescadores are not stated in the so-called Peace Treaty with Japan, and so it’s null and void.

Chiang did not settle this problem. Later in order to seek protection from Dulles, he no longer mentioned that in his treaty. Particularly after the conclusion of the SEATO treaty and Dulles went to Taiwan and Chiang Kai-shek, he didn’t dare to raise this question.

It’s a ludicrous state of affairs because the situation in Taiwan remained undetermined and the government itself is undetermined. He claims to represent the whole of China, but he was overthrown by the Chinese people. The place he is sitting in now, the status of that island, remains undetermined. From this point of view it can be said his government is hanging in mid-air.

This is a question that must be made clear. We ask the British Government why they insist on that reservation, and the British Government said that during the Conservative Government it was stated in Parliament. But that is not the only reason because a party is capable of changing its policy. For the new to replace the old it is a natural phenomenon. Why is it then that the British Government insists on maintaining what it said 20 years ago? That is because in their minds they think there will certainly be a day when the movement for so-called Taiwan independence will rise up in accordance with the theory that the status remains undetermined. Of course, first of all Japan advocates that point of view and secondly, they have in mind the United States.

So what I would like to clarify with Dr. Kissinger today is that is it the stated policy of the United States Government that it still wants to maintain the point of view that the status of Taiwan remains undetermined or is it the US Government policy that Taiwan is already returned to China and is a province of China? As to how the Chinese people will solve the question of the Taiwan regime, that is of secondary
importance. I have told you that last time. I replied to you already that we will try to bring about a peaceful settlement, the last morning before you left.

Dr. Kissinger: I remember.

PM Chou: So what is your point of view on the theory of the undetermined status of Taiwan? (Pauses) Maybe it's difficult for you.

Dr. Kissinger: It is. (laughter)

PM Chou: I have discovered this.

Dr. Kissinger: I want to formulate my answer with some precision and I don't have the same clarity of mind as the Prime Minister.

Let me separate what we can say and what our policy is. We do not challenge the fact that all Chinese maintain that there's only one China and that Taiwan is part of that China. And therefore we do not maintain that the status in that respect is undetermined. How this can be expressed is a difficult matter, but we would certainly be prepared in a communiqué that might be issued to take note of the fact that all Chinese maintain that there is only one China. So that is the policy of this government.

PM Chou: That is the first point. Any second point?

Dr. Kissinger: That is the point of our policy. The second point is what can be said, and I think I have answered that also. I can also assure the Prime Minister that the phrase "undetermined" will not be repeated.

PM Chou: If in the international arena certain countries, for instance Japan, or some other countries, were to raise this either in the UN or some other public forum in the world, what would your attitude be when they say the status is "undetermined"?

Dr. Kissinger: Let me tell the Prime Minister that I have not discussed this particular question in detail with the President. So I can only give my impression. If I am wrong, I will give him the answer through our channel. I will never deliberately mislead him. (Chou nods)

Let me say two things. First we are not encouraging any government to maintain the position that the status is undetermined. The British Government's position is an independent position and not at our encouragement.

Secondly, if a government raises this issue without our encouragement, we would certainly not support it. And I think the Prime Minister will have noticed that in our UN statements, no matter how distasteful they may have been to him, we took great care, and if the bureaucracy had been more pliable greater care, but we took great care not to mention the independent state of Taiwan. I think I can say to him with some confidence that we will do nothing that will encourage
the elaboration of a two-China or one-China, one-Taiwan policy, in whatever form it’s presented. Our attempt will be to bring about a solution within a framework of one China and by peaceful means.

I will check this with the President and confirm it through our channel. The last sentence I can confirm now, i.e. I can confirm our policy of one China by peaceful means. But not the sentence on what tactical position we will take if another government raises whether the status of Taiwan is undetermined. I can confirm our position to bring about peaceful solution within the framework of one China. To “bring about” may be too active; “to encourage” is more correct. It’s for the Chinese themselves to settle. It’s not something we should actively push. We should try within the framework of one China. What tack we will take if another government raises the status as undetermined, I believe it will be that we will not support it, but I will check it with the President when I return.

PM Chou: Another question which is related to this question, that is when Taiwan, under the rule of the Chiang Kai-shek clique, is returned to the motherland—of course Taiwan was returned to the motherland, but because of the Chiang Kai-shek rule there is a problem—but should it be returned, then the US treaty, which we have never recognized, will it be possible to have it null and void at that time?

Dr. Kissinger: When Taiwan and China become one again by peaceful means then the treaty would lapse. It is not a permanent feature of our foreign policy to be maintained under such circumstances.

PM Chou: From our side our position is that although we have all along considered that treaty to be null and void and do not recognize it, but still our requirement at the time of your withdrawal of all military from Taiwan and as you remove all military installations from there, would be to declare the treaty null and void.

Dr. Kissinger: We understand your position and we hope that by that time the evolution will have reached a point where formal action may be unnecessary.

PM Chou: Only then can there be establishment of diplomatic relations.

Dr. Kissinger: I understand the Prime Minister’s point of view.

PM Chou: That is the present situation of Taiwan no longer exists, and all US armed forces and military installations have been withdrawn from Taiwan, and the Taiwan Straits area. And the treaty which was to protect the Chiang Kai-shek clique will become abrogated. You say “lapsed.” When that time comes there will be no longer difficulties between China and the United States, and only then it is possible for diplomatic relations between China and the United States.

Otherwise it’s not possible for us to go to Washington, to have two Chinese Ambassadors there. Your President and you may come here
because there is only one United States here as far as we are concerned. But I cannot go to the United States because there’s the so-called ambassador of Chiang Kai-shek there. The differences are clear. You would not allow the Chiang Kai-shek ping pong team to perform in front of the White House but it did perform there [Washington] and so while it is there our ping pong team could not go. There is this difference.

Dr. Kissinger: I understand.

PM Chou: But from our point of view what is even more urgent than the Taiwan question is your withdrawal from Indochina. We can discuss this this afternoon. I discussed other thing. For you too it’s a most urgent matter.

Dr. Kissinger: Before we come to that I would like to answer one question.

PM Chou: That will be this afternoon.

Dr. Kissinger: The Prime Minister asked what our position would be once Taiwan has come back to the motherland. When Taiwan and China become one, we can abrogate that treaty. That’s not a problem. Once there is formal unification, there’s no reason for us to have a treaty with a province of China. We will present no obstacle in the way of such a political evolution. If the event that the Prime Minister mentioned in my last meeting should come about, either Chiang Kai-shek or his son should return to the mainland, we will not discourage it. To be very frank with the Prime Minister what we would like most and what we would encourage is a peaceful negotiation after which all the military relationships would be at an end.

PM Chou: Assistance or relationships?

Dr. Kissinger: After there is a political settlement between Taiwan and mainland China, yes. We will not insist on maintaining an American presence or military installations on Taiwan after unification of China by peaceful negotiations has been achieved. And in those conditions we will be prepared to abrogate formally. If there’s no peaceful settlement, which is the second contingency, then it’s easier for us to withdraw our military presence in stages, which I indicated to the Prime Minister than to abrogate the treaty.

PM Chou: I understand. But then Japan would go in.

Dr. Kissinger: We would not stand for that.

PM Chou: That is an important question.

Dr. Kissinger: We have a common interest there.

PM Chou: That is right. What they want to do is replace you.

Dr. Kissinger: Mr. Prime Minister, we have no interest in the military expansion of Japan.

PM Chou: That’s right because they have threatened in the past not only China but all countries in the Pacific. We remember that clearly.
Dr. Kissinger: It would be a very shortsighted policy.
PM Chou: We think the Laird speech in that connection is not very appropriate. 9
Dr. Kissinger: It has been denied that he made it, but never repeated.
PM Chou: He said something like that when he returned to Washington.
Dr. Kissinger: Some friends have asked what I would do after I left this job, and I said I would run a school for unruly boys.
PM Chou: That’s not an easy thing to run such a school. I would not like such a job. Some people don’t listen to you even if they are claiming to be of the same party or claim to listen to you. While there’s humanity in the world there will be such people.
Dr. Kissinger: Let me be more honest with you than I have been with any other foreign leader. I have to select those issues on which to enforce discipline. I am—
PM Chou: It’s not possible to go out in all four directions. Then you will be like Don Quixote.
Dr. Kissinger: Therefore, we choose to enforce discipline only on those statements that have practical consequences. We cannot keep Laird from making statements. But we can keep him from drawing practical consequences.
PM Chou: That’s why we made a point of writing a commentary about Laird. And that was not a government statement. Only a press commentary. We only made two comments on Cabinet members of your government since you left.
Dr. Kissinger: We noticed that.
PM Chou: That is formal commentaries. In the UN those who support us—
Dr. Kissinger: We understand.
PM Chou: Our only formal commentary was that on August 20.
Dr. Kissinger: Some of your less formal are more vehement.
PM Chou: No matter, you know that is “firing empty guns.” When we say “down with imperialism” it’s for the people of the countries concerned. The same when we say “down with revisionism.” If the people of the Soviet Union don’t rise up to overthrow their leaders, it’s empty cannon. We fire one empty cannon at them and they fire back 100 at us. We would not say they are doing it a 100 times. It’s not worth it.

9 See footnote 14, Document 140.
So we must differentiate our comment. When it's actual policy we must be very prudent because in those matters what we say must count; it must be based on principle not just empty cannons. You cannot fire cannon at random, but if you were to then we would be happy no one would believe in those words. You understand this better than the Soviets.

What I ask now is that you affirm that you don’t want Japanese armed forces to go into Taiwan and this must be affirmed only while your armed forces are in Taiwan. Isn’t that so? You had already admitted in the time of President Truman that Taiwan was Chinese territory and you noted her ambitions toward it, and it was also President Truman who sent troops to Taiwan. The Republican Party is not responsible for that but since you are already there you must be responsible for the situation. Because after you went into Taiwan and with the conclusion of the treaty of 1954, this matter became not only a matter of internal Chinese affairs but of international affairs. We do not advocate using armed forces against you. These discussions began first in August 1955. Only now can we say that we are earnestly going into negotiations. When we say of the Japanese going into Taiwan, it includes the military aspects as well as the economic and political aspects. This is something not only we but Chiang Kai-shek is following closely too. Just some time ago the elder brother of Sato, Kishi, went to Taiwan where he was to attend the meeting of The Cooperating Committee of Taiwan, Japan and South Korea. Three pro-Japanese chieftains on Taiwan took part in this meeting.

Dr. Kissinger: Chieftains?

PM Chou: Main people. On the civil side is Chang Ch’un, the Secretary General of the Chiang Kai-shek clique; on the military side is Huang Chieh, the Minister of Defense of the Chiang forces. He still has influence on Chiang Kai-shek’s troops. Chiang Kai-shek is very ill at ease about him. He was my captain at the Whampoa Academy when Chiang Kai-shek was head and he was military commissioner and was director of teaching. In his middle age he was quite able to fight. Chiang Kai-shek is quite fearful of him. But is in quite good health and not dying so Chiang Kai-shek is worried about him. The third man called Ku Cheng-kang is a subordinate of Hui Ting, a member of the Central Committee and also the President of the Japanese–Chinese Friendship Association.10

10 Reference is to Chang Ch’un (Zheng Qun), Secretary-General to Chiang Kai-shek from 1954 to 1972, then Senior Advisor to Chiang Kai-shek; Huang Chieh (Huang Jie), Governor of Taiwan Province from 1962 to 1969, Minister of National Defense from 1969 to 1972, then Strategy Advisor to Chiang Kai-shek; and Ku Cheng-kang (Gu Zhenggang), Honorary Chairman of the World Anti-Communist League (WACL) from 1968.
After you left in the latter part of July, both Chang Ch’un and Ku Cheng-kang visited Japan. At this time Japan made some suggestions to them, that is to find a formula to solve the problem of the UN. But the formula cannot be agreed to by Chiang Kai-shek, that is to say that those three pro-Japanese elements would be willing to turn Taiwan into a subsidiary state of Japan. Towards the latter part of the war of aggression, shortly before the Pacific war, there was a time when President Roosevelt was paying attention to what to do with Southeast Asia, and those three men I mentioned all wavered. If you meet Mr. Service, he will tell you about these three men, and he will tell you the same thing. When I met some days ago more than 60 American friends, I did not mention these men but I saw that Mr. Service knew what I meant, this plot was being hatched by them. There were some young American friends who did not know about this.

So if such a state of affairs cropped up what would be your attitude?

Dr. Kissinger: The Prime Minister always produces dialectic answers in me because I am in the People’s Republic of China. Maybe he is engaging in subtle teaching. The relatively easy part is the projection of a Japanese military presence to Taiwan. It’s out of the question while there are American forces there. And if it happened while there are American forces there, it will require us to reconsider the American presence. In other words, we would oppose it. If it happens at a later stage—

PM Chou: So long as Chiang Kai-shek is still around he will not permit Japanese military forces to go in, but as you know, Chiang Kai-shek is already 85.

Dr. Kissinger: If it happened afterwards the problem would be more difficult, but in any event the US would oppose Japanese forces on Taiwan. This I can say categorically.

PM Chou: Yes, this would not conform to the treaty.

Dr. Kissinger: It would not conform to the San Francisco Treaty and would raise a whole new spectre in the Pacific, but it would cause us to reconsider our whole policy in the Pacific if Japan started sending forces outside its territory.

Secondly, the problem of political and economic expansion of Japan, I have to be honest with the Prime Minister, is a more difficult problem because it’s harder to measure. I can only say that it’s not American policy to let Taiwan become a subsidiary state of Japan.

(Chou nods)

11 John Stewart Service, U.S. Foreign Service officer and China expert who was fired in 1951 due to “reasonable doubt” of his loyalty. In 1957 the U.S. Supreme Court ruled that the dismissal was improper. Service, who died in 1999, retired from the government in 1962 and became a scholar at the University of California at Berkeley.
PM Chou: It would be most disadvantageous to the attempts to relax tension in the Far East. In fact, it’s impossible.

Dr. Kissinger: We understand that. But it’s important we know that even before diplomatic relations we have a means of exchanging views and some visible signs of Sino–American relations, and we think that will affect the situation in Taiwan and also we believe in Japan.

PM Chou: Even now it’s affecting to a certain degree Japan, for instance, the biggest Japanese steel manufacturer. It produces 30 million tons of steel in its own structure alone. Your President has said that in a year or two Japan may catch up with the US in steel production. That is the biggest Japanese steel company. That steel company originally took part in the commission of Taiwan, Japan and South Korea. Now it openly declared that it will not go to Taiwan and on the contrary, accepted our proposition, that is to say, it declared it would give up its deal to have Taiwan as a colony.

So we can see changes are taking place. There are the conditions to make common efforts to prevent the reemergence of Japanese militarism. Those of you who are experienced about Japan since the 30’s after the Mukden incident. At that time Britain was allied to Japan. So Britain came to understand Japan later.

Dr. Kissinger: We are not discussing Japan now, but I will make one comment. I think if we treat each other with confidence there are certain things we can do together, but there is a danger that if the Chinese side acts too impetuously with respect to Japan this will bring about a forging of ties with Japan within the US and US and Japan. One attack on us is that we have sacrificed Japan for China. So some restraint on the Chinese side is necessary.

PM Chou: We are most restrained with regard to Japan because even now a state of war has not past between China and Japan in 26 years. Sato expressed a desire to see China even before President Nixon, but we pay no attention.

Dr. Kissinger: This could have the possibility of influencing the successor to Sato.

PM Chou: That is possible. Let’s not go too far off the topic. Who do you think will succeed him?

Dr. Kissinger: The Japanese are very unpredictable. I think Fukuda.

PM Chou: He was reared by Sato himself.

Dr. Kissinger: As I told the Prime Minister yesterday, not all Japanese leaders who want good relations with China are easy to get along with. I always thought that Nakasone12 was the most nationalistic.

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12 Nakasone Yasuhiro, Director of Japan’s Defense Agency from January 1970 to July 1971, then Minister of Industry and Trade from July 1971 to December 1972.
PM Chou: He was your student, you must know about him.

Dr. Kissinger: I have known him since 1952.

PM Chou: In 1955 he came in the capacity as peace delegate to the conference. Years later he became the Director General of National Defense Ministry. After visiting the US and talking with Laird, he put out his Fourth Defense Plan. We have quite a long experience with Japan.

We have said so much about Taiwan. When we conclude our discussion we can formalize that. The most difficult topic is how we will put it down in the communiqué.

Dr. Kissinger: That’s right. It will require restraint and wisdom. I have more of the latter than the former.

PM Chou: Not necessarily. And your assistants have the ability to do that. Let us meet in the afternoon. You will go back now for lunch. We will meet at 4:00 or 4:30.

Dr. Kissinger: You decide.

PM Chou: 4:30. Once we start talking the talks go on very long.

Dr. Kissinger: But very usefully.

PM Chou: We have exchanged views without reservation.

Dr. Kissinger: That is the same for us.

163. Memorandum From the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger) to President Nixon


SUBJECT
My October China Visit: The Atmospherics

A Cool Arrival

We began our stay in China under what superficially appeared to be chilly circumstances. When we landed in Shanghai on October 20 the weather was partially overcast, and only a handful of PRC officials were on hand to greet us—the same four who had met us last July in

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1 Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 1035, Files for the President—China Material, China, HAK’s October 1971 Visit. Top Secret; Sensitive; Exclusively Eyes Only.
Rawalpindi plus two representatives of the Shanghai Foreign Affairs Office. Their manner seemed correct, but restrained. And in Peking the reception committee was virtually the same as the one which greeted us in July when we arrived secretly, although this time the visit was publicly announced. As before, Marshal Yeh Chien-ying headed the official PRC party, joined this time by Acting Foreign Minister Chi P’eng-fei (whose presence did serve to up-grade the affair).

Our move from the airport to the Guest House (the same one which we stayed in before, incidentally) was similarly chilly. The motorcade skirted the city over roads which were closed to normal traffic and heavily guarded; the sky seemed grey and threatening. We discovered upon entering our rooms in the Guest House that each of them contained an English-language propaganda bulletin carrying an appeal on the cover for the people of the world to “overthrow the American imperialists and their running dogs.” I had a member of my staff hand the one in my room back to a PRC protocol officer with the remark that it must have been put there by accident; subsequently, we collected all these bulletins and presented them to the Chinese, who received them in silence. The Chinese staff at the Guest House on the first day were very cool and impassive—a fact especially noted by our Chinese-speaking members of the party.

Growing Warmth

A thaw began to set in later that day, when Prime Minister Chou En-lai met my entire official party in the Great Hall of the People. Following a photographic session of his staff and mine at the entrance to the conference room, Chou seated us inside behind the inevitable cups of green tea and proceeded to say a few words of personal greetings to everyone in the party. He was extremely cordial during the general meeting which followed. Then at the formal banquet which he hosted for the entire party (including the crew of the aircraft) he shook hands with each one of us individually; he gave what I consider to be an extraordinarily warm welcoming toast (attached at Tab A); and he went around the room after the toast to touch glasses with every American present. Chou had done his biographic homework well on those Americans at his table, and flattered them with references to their educational and professional history or past experience in China.

From this point on the character of the visit was firmly fixed by our Chinese hosts. It was in my judgment a careful, thoughtful, conscientious effort, first:

—to make me and my party feel like truly welcome guests; and second;

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—to get the Chinese public accustomed to the idea that a senior U.S. official and the members of his party were in fact being received as honored guests by the top PRC leadership.

The way my visit was built up by the Chinese leaders, as well as the lengths to which they went to assure that the public and lower-ranking PRC officials got the message, became very apparent as the days went by.

*Publicizing the Visit*

The day after our arrival we learned from foreign press reports that the *People's Daily* (the official Chinese Communist Party newspaper) had on the preceding day carried an announcement of the arrival which reported the composition of the welcoming committee. Although to us the composition of this group was virtually the same as before, no politically-aware Chinese could have missed the point that I was met by very high-ranking PRC personalities indeed.

More significantly, on October 21, the *People's Daily* carried two photographs of Chou En-lai’s meeting with us the day before. One was the group photograph of our two parties standing together outside the conference room, with Chou by my side. The other depicted us sitting down in the period prior to the general meeting during which Chou had extended his personal greetings to me and all the members of the party. These two photographs were very similar in format to those which have been taken when Chou has met innumerable other delegations, except for one thing—they showed Chou extending the same courtesies to me, as the representative of the President of the United States, which he had extended to personalities who were allies or at least neutrals. The average Chinese could not have failed to be greatly impressed, if not shaken, by this juxtaposition. This was the first time any American official had been pictured in the press with PRC officials. This was a clear signal to the populace.

*Anti-American Propaganda*

I should note here that I did not become aware of the *People’s Daily* photographs until late on October 22, and in the meantime had raised with Chou the question of offensive anti-American signs in Peking. I had noticed a Reuters story covering my arrival which had said that the Chinese had had their little joke; my motorcade had driven past a series of Chinese characters at the airport which denounced “American Imperialism.” At my meeting with Chou on the afternoon of October 22, I handed him this story and pointed out the problems that language of this nature would create for you. He responded along the lines of what he had said that morning about the PRC’s anti-U.S. propaganda in general: this was “firing an empty cannon.” However, he seemed to accept what I had said and to take it to heart. More about this later.
Informing Party and Government Officials

On the evening of October 22 an event occurred which I consider quite exceptional, and which must have had the same effect on the Chinese present. We were taken to the Great Hall of the People to see a "revolutionary" version of Peking Opera, and were met there by Marshal Yeh Chien-ying, the Acting Foreign Minister, the Prime Minister’s Secretary, and other leading PRC personalities. These escorted us into the auditorium, where to (I am sure) our mutual surprise, approximately 500 cadres, or PRC and Chinese Communist Party officials, were in attendance. Immediately upon entering the hall, Marshal Yeh and the other top PRC leaders began to clap their hands loudly, inviting a response from the audience. I must in all candor admit that the American visitors did not exactly bring the house down, but the point was surely driven home: these Americans were honored guests who were distinctly personae gratae to the PRC. The Acting Foreign Minister told me during the intermission that the members of the audience were hand-picked from among personnel of the Foreign Ministry and other key PRC departments. These people were ones whom the senior leaders particularly wanted to read the handwriting on the wall.

(It later occurred to us that the applause might have been more prolonged if we had joined in! While this would be inappropriate in our customs—as well as in Chinese tradition—the PRC has emulated their despised Soviet revisionist fellow socialists in this regard: the honored guests are expected to join in, reciprocally—and simultaneously.)

Exposure to the Public

If the Peking Opera event could be taken as Chou En-lai’s means of enlightening the cadres as to the new turn in events, then my trip to the Great Wall and the Ming Tombs on October 23 was his way of bringing the public into the picture. When our motorcade departed at about 9:00 a.m., I found myself escorted not just by protocol representatives, as would have been perfectly proper (and acceptable), but by the Acting Foreign Minister, the Secretary to the Prime Minister and the Mayor of Peking. These ostentatiously led me up the steep inclines of the Great Wall before a scattering of curious onlookers, and later down into the tomb of one of the Ming Emperors before a much larger group of spectators. By this time, the People’s Daily arrival announcement of October 20 and photographs of October 21 had been widely noted; I could see that I was being recognized and that the level of my official escort was being taken in.

It was during the trip to the Great Wall that I believe some payoff from my remarks to Chou En-lai on signs could be noted. As we drove farther into the mountains and the pass narrowed it became more and more obvious that a large number of slogans painted on the rocks along the road had been blotted out. Of course, this could have been
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a by-product of the general down-playing of sloganry since the end of the Cultural Revolution, but my staff assures me that at least some of the blotted-out slogans looked freshly done. Another point of interest about this trip concerns security: at literally every road junction along the entire right-of-way there was at least one uniformed member of the Public Security Forces. This in itself was no small enterprise.

The next day, October 23, brought a further and even more ostentatious appearance before the Chinese public. Our Chinese hosts had arranged a visit for me and the members of my party to the Summer Palace, about a half-hour’s drive west of Peking, and once again I was escorted by senior PRC officials rather than by protocol functionaries. My host on this occasion was Marshal Yeh, who saw to it that he and I were properly displayed together before what the Chinese call “the masses.” The Acting Foreign Minister and the Secretary to the Prime Minister were also present. The high point of this episode was our taking tea aboard a boat poled out onto the Summer Palace lake in plain view of literally hundreds of Chinese spectators. The fact that a strong, cold wind was blowing (on an otherwise perfect day) did not deter our hosts; they clearly wanted this boatride to take place and only a hurricane could have prevented it. When I waved to the crowds of people on the shore, they clapped loudly. Word was sinking in, but I should add, too, that there appeared to be no coaching and that the applause seemed genuinely enthusiastic.

Apropos of our visit to the Summer Palace, Prime Minister Chou told me later in one of our restricted sessions that a North Vietnamese newsman had been there and had taken many photographs. The Chinese, Chou said, had assumed from his appearance that he was one of “them;” they had not recognized him as being a North Vietnamese and were more than a little disturbed to discover his true identity.

Visits to Points of Interest Around Peking

Over the next two and a half days I became involved with the Prime Minister in serious substantive discussions, and found that my movements as a result became rather restricted. Others of the party, however, continued to move about the city and its environs, looking at centers of interest which you yourself might wish to visit. Significant impressions were:

—Along the route to an oil refinery and chemical complex, some 40 km. west of Peking, the people appeared to be forewarned of the motorcade, and showed much interest in it. Sizeable crowds gathered to watch the group pass in villages and major road junctions. There were no evidences of hostility; quite the contrary—the bystanders seemed pleased to see Americans.

—Near the oil refinery, an obvious job of painting over signs had taken place. The road bent between two large brick and plaster billboard-size signs, one of which still contained an innocuous
propaganda exhortation, and the other of which had been splashed
over, obviously hastily, with red paint.

—At the oil refinery itself, the authorities were correct but friendly.
Certainly our people were treated no differently from other foreigners
who have visited the complex.

—In Peking, when several members of the party went shopping
at the Friendship Store (the special store for foreigners), a large crowd
of Chinese gathered quickly to watch, but with evident goodwill. The
sales personnel were extremely friendly and helpful, despite the fact
that as a courtesy to us the store had been kept open past the normal
closing time.

—Another stop which a number of the group made in Peking was
at a hospital where the ancient Chinese practice of acupuncture (treat-
ment of ailments by needles) was being put to modern use. What no-
body expected was that this turned out to be a display of acupuncture
techniques used as anesthesia for three major surgical operations: an
appendectomy, the removal of an ovarian cyst, and the removal of a
portion of a diseased lung. Although none of our people had any med-
ical background whatsoever, they were led as “American friends”
through every stage of these operations. (I am pleased to report that
all operations were a success.) This strikes me as being somewhat be-
yond the ordinary in the reception of foreigners who are not M.D.’s.

The morning prior to the acupuncture episode a free moment oc-
curred for me while Prime Minister Chou and his colleagues discussed
some of the substantive points which I had raised. A suggestion was
made that I should visit the Temple of Heaven, south of the main city
of Peking, which I accepted. The Chinese were able to arrange this on
30 minutes notice, and also saw to it that the Mayor of Peking was
present to accommodate our party to the temple area—the site where
the Emperors of China prayed annually for a good year. Once again
we were on public display before the people of Peking in company
with leading PRC officials.

Additional Impressions

A few other vignettes may help to characterize the spirit with
which the Chinese received us:

—On the evening of October 24 a farewell banquet at the Great
Hall of the People, which was originally to be hosted by the Acting
Foreign Minister, was preempted by Chou En-lai. Chou did not have
to do this, but made the extra effort. As before, he was a most gracious
host. He did not, though, repeat the round of toasts—once the dinner
was over, he and I went into a nearby conference room for a further
discussion of substantive issues.

—As I have previously indicated, the aircraft crew was given the
most hospitable treatment. Sightseeing tours were arranged for the
crewmen, special quarters were constructed for them at the airport,
gifts were provided, and indeed they were accorded the same kind of
meticulous courtesy with which those of us in the Guest House in
Peking became so familiar.
—Repeatedly during my conversations with Chou En-lai a deep and abiding Chinese hatred of the Russians came through. The Chinese are concerned about Soviet power, but utterly contemptuous of the motivations of the leaders who exercise this power.

—Also at frequent intervals during my conversations with Chou, he brought in the fact that Chairman Mao Tse-tung was fully behind the US–PRC contact. This line of Chou’s must surely be seeping through to the members of the Chinese Communist Party hierarchy.

—The (to me) remarkable display of courtesy and warmth which has been accorded us. This ranged from the detailed and meticulous way we were housed, fed, and transported, to the cordiality of our social conversations and tours, to the beautiful gifts and collections of photographs with which each of us were plied upon departure. I realize that the Chinese are traditionally capable of being good hosts under strained circumstances, but the treatment we have received appears to transcend what might have been expected. For us, a rapprochement is a matter of tactics, but for them it involves a profound moral adjustment. This is not easy for them, but they are making it and more.

My final observation once again concerns signs. I have mentioned the offensive sign at the airport noted in the news reports upon our arrival which the interpreter in my car indeed translated for me as we sped past it on our way into Peking as something having to do with “American Imperialism.” When on October 26 we returned to the airport prior to our departure, the offensive characters were gone. The sign was still there, but had been completely repainted; the message had nothing to do with the United States.

Peking’s Commitment to Improving Relations

There are many possible conclusions which might be drawn from the atmospherics of this visit to Peking. In my opinion, one conclusion stands out above all the others: the Chinese leadership is committed to a course leading toward an improvement of relations with the U.S. The People’s Daily announcement and photographs, the display of friendship toward us by top PRC officials before their cadres, the public gestures of friendship, the toning down of anti-U.S. propaganda, and the many instances of personal courtesies extended to us, all underscore this commitment. Any reversal of the direction in which the PRC leadership is moving would at this point probably involve serious domestic repercussions for Prime Minister Chou En-lai and the other senior personalities who have joined with him in this endeavor.
164. Memorandum From the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger) to President Nixon


SUBJECT
My October China Visit: Discussions of the Issues

Chronology
Prime Minister Chou En-lai and I held very intensive substantive discussions for some twenty-five hours, building on the solid base that we had established in our July conversations. We had an additional five hours of talks at two banquets that he hosted for us and I spent many more sightseeing hours with Marshal Yeh Chien-ying, Vice Chairman of the Military Affairs Commission of the Chinese Communist Party, and Chi Peng-fei, Acting Foreign Minister, and other officials which lent greater insight into Chinese thinking.

(Attached at Tab A is a list of my meetings with Chou; at Tab B is a full itinerary of our stay, including all meetings and sightseeing tours.)

Chou and I met ten times at the Great Hall of the People and our guest house. The opening general session included all my substantive assistants plus Messrs. Chapin and Hughes on our side; our other meetings were private, with usually only one assistant on our side. On the Chinese side, Chou was generally flanked by Acting Foreign Minister Chi, their top American expert in their Foreign Ministry, Chang Wenchin, the secretary to the Prime Minister, Hsuing Hsiang-hui, the Deputy Chief of Protocol, Wang Hai-jung, plus interpreters and notetakers.

The first session on the afternoon of our arrival, October 20, was devoted to general philosophy, our overall approach to the People’s Republic of China, the agenda for our discussions, and the major questions concerning your forthcoming trip. This was followed by over ten hours of very intense discussions in three meetings on Thursday and Friday, at which, in addition to your trip, we explored the major issues

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1 Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 1035, Files for the President—China Material, China, HAK’s October 1971 Visit. Top Secret; Sensitive; Exclusively Eyes Only. Sent for information. Dated “11/71.” This text is 45 pages long; a 32-page version is ibid., RG 59, S/S Files: Lot 73 D 443, Personal Papers of William P. Rogers, China. This version is edited much the same way as Kissinger’s report on his July 1971 visit to the PRC (see footnote 1, Document 144) and also lacks references to progress toward a Sino-American communiqué.

2 Both are attached but not printed.
that we had covered in July—Taiwan, Indochina, Korea, Japan, the Soviet Union, South Asia, and arms control, as well as touching on other subjects by way of illustrations. Concurrently one of my assistants and the State Department representative held two meetings on subsidiary issues such as ongoing diplomatic contacts, exchanges, and trade. And the technical people met on arrangements for your visit.

These substantive meetings provided the background and framework to enable me to table a draft communiqué for your visit, which you had seen, at the end of the meeting on Friday afternoon. On Saturday evening, in my sitting room, Chou and I settled the major remaining issues concerning the arrangements for your trip, and Chou said that his Acting Prime Minister would meet with us the next morning to begin the redrafting of the communiqué. The next morning Chou showed up instead and delivered a sharp speech. We subsequently launched right into a rigorous drafting process which Chou decided he had personally to conduct. We consumed the better part of five meetings lasting eleven hours as we went through seven drafts over a sixty hour period which included two rugged nights of drafting and negotiation, from Saturday afternoon through the morning of our departure, October 26. This process and the resulting tentative communiqué I have described to you in a separate memorandum. Discussions on the communiqué, of course, included a great deal of substantive exchange on the draft formulations as well as general philosophy and principles.

At the last session, in addition to clearing up the final issues concerning the communiqué, we resolved other outstanding technical problems such as the announcements concerning my visit and the date of your visit and the general public line the two sides would take.

Major Results

Against the backdrop of my July conversations with Chou there were no major surprises.

The basic premises on which we have both moved to open a dialogue remain. Both sides know there are profound differences but recognize that domestic and international constraints demand a phased resolution of outstanding issues. Meanwhile the very momentum of our joint initiative carries inherent advantages: for them, the burnishing of their global credentials, a general direction on Taiwan, and the prospect of a lower American military profile in Asia; for us, some assistance in reaching and safeguarding an Indochina settlement, and built-in restraint on Chinese activities in Asia; for both of us, less
danger of miscalculation, greater exchanges between our peoples, and a counterweight to the Soviet Union.

Chou confirmed an essential ingredient for launching this process and moving it forward—Chinese willingness, despite their past rhetoric, to be patient on solutions. He was even more explicit than in July that they do not require time deadlines so long as principles are established. Several times he emphasized that the PRC, being a big country, could afford to wait on issues of direct concern, such as Taiwan, while the more urgent matters were those concerning her smaller friends, such as Indochina and Korea, whom one couldn’t expect to have a broad perspective. This line is consistent with Peking’s virtuous stance of championing the cause of smaller nations and refusing to be a superpower with its characteristics of bullying and overinvolvement.

Another consistent theme, as in July, was Chou’s insistence on frankly acknowledging that there is much turmoil in the world and great differences between us. Both in our discussions and in the communiqué drafting, the Chinese showed their disdain for pretending that peace was either near or desirable as an end in itself; for submerging differences in ambiguous formulas of agreement, or for discussing such subsidiary issues as arms control, trade, or exchanges which only serve to make relations look more “normal” than they really are.

Among the general points that I emphasized were the fact that in some areas we could set trends but the policy implementation had to be gradual; that we should not push the process too fast because this would give your domestic opponents a chance to sink your initiative; and that Peking should not try to complicate our relations with our allies.

In brief, the essential outcome on each of the major topics was as follows:

—Your trip. We achieved all of our major objectives, thanks both to our approach of minimizing our requirements and Chinese willingness to do all within their capabilities. The basic technical and substantive framework has been established: the arrangements have been agreed upon in principle; another technical advance will flesh out the details; the substantive discussion clarified both sides’ positions; and a tentative joint communiqué has been drafted.

—Taiwan. Both sides understand the direction in which we are heading and what the U.S. can and cannot do, but we have not yet agreed on what can be said in the communiqué. We will gradually withdraw our forces from Taiwan after the Indochina war. We urge that any solution of the Taiwan question should be peaceful; and we will oppose, within our capabilities, Japanese sway over Taiwan. The PRC
is in no hurry to get all our forces out but wants the principle of final withdrawal established; is most interested in global acknowledgment that Taiwan is part of China and its status is not undetermined; will try for a peaceful solution of the issue; and strongly opposes Japanese influence or Taiwan independence.

—Indochina. Peking will be helpful, within limits. Both in formal and informal talks the Chinese made it clear that they hope we achieve a negotiated settlement and are saying this to Hanoi. They recognize the desirability of tranquility in Indochina for your visit and our relations generally (indeed they consider it the “most urgent” question in the Far East), as well as the link between the conflict and our forces in Taiwan. In addition to sounding these themes, I outlined the history of our private negotiations; stated that Hanoi needed Peking’s largeness of view so that there could be a settlement; and warned that we have gone as far as we can and negotiations had to succeed in the next couple of months or we would carry through our unilateral course which was more risky all-around.

—Korea. We are both clearly sticking with our friends, but the working hypotheses are that neither side wants hostilities and neither Korea can speak for the whole peninsula. Chou pushed for equality for Pyongyang, said that a permanent legal resolution of the Korean war was required, and transmitted an abusive eight point program from their ally. I rejected the latter, said that we were prepared to consider a more equal status, and warned against North Korea’s aggressiveness.

—Japan. We agree that an expansionist Japan would be dangerous, but we disagree on how to prevent this. Our triangular relationship could prove to be one of our most difficult problems. The Chinese are painfully preoccupied and ambivalent on this issue—they seem both genuinely to fear Japanese remilitarism and to recognize that our defense cooperation with Tokyo exercises restraint. The latter point I emphasized, pointing out that Japanese neutralism, which the PRC wants, would probably take a virulent nationalist form. I also warned against Peking’s trying to complicate Tokyo–Washington relations, a seductive temptation for the Chinese to date.

—Soviet Union. The Chinese try to downgrade the Russian factor, but their dislike and concern about the Soviet Union is obvious. I reiterated that we would not practice collusion in any direction, that we would treat both nations equally, that we would keep Peking informed about our relations with Moscow, and that we have many concrete issues with the USSR. Chou accepted the last point, including the fact that some of our negotiations with Moscow would work objectively to Peking’s disadvantage.

—South Asia. The PRC doesn’t want subcontinent hostilities any more than we do. Indeed the Chinese seemed more sober about the

dangers than they did in July. Chou reaffirmed their support for Pak-
istan and disdain for India. In turn I made clear, in our talks and in the
communiqué, that while we were under no illusions about Indian
machinations and were giving Pakistan extensive assistance, we could
not line up on either side of the dispute.

—Subsidiary Issues. The Chinese clearly want to keep the focus on
major bilateral and regional issues and not get sidetracked on more
technical questions that suggest a regular bilateral relationship. Thus
they showed almost no interest in arms control, airily dismissed the
subject of trade, and unenthusiastically included a reference in the com-
muniqué to facilitating scientific, cultural, technical and journalistic
exchanges.

—Prisoners. We can expect some movement before your trip on at
least one of the two CIA agents held by the Chinese, with release of
the two pilots linked to an overall Indochina settlement. Premature
public disclosure would, of course, be ruinous.

Opening Session

A brief rundown of the opening meeting is important, because it
set the basic framework and tone for all the subsequent conversations.

I began by delivering the opening statement which you have seen,
with some of the rhetoric pruned.4 My approach was to sketch the gen-
eral principles which guide our relations toward the PRC and our at-
titude toward your meetings with the Chinese leaders; lay out the
agenda for the following days and secure agreement on how to con-
duct our business; and raise the principal questions concerning the
technical arrangements for your visit.

I described the U.S. attitude toward the PRC as the following:

—You are personally committed to an improvement in relations;
—Our policy is based on the profound conviction that better
relations are in our interest and is not an attempt to create a power
combination;
—We are aware that our two countries have different views and
that neither the PRC nor the U.S. would trade in principles;
—We believe that our two countries share many congruent inter-
ests and that it is no accident that they have had such a long history
of friendship;
—Asian and global peace requires Chinese cooperation and we
would not participate in arrangements affecting Chinese interests with-
out involving the PRC;

4 The opening statement was included in the briefing materials for the October trip.
(National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 1034, Files for the Pres-
ident—China Material, Polo II, Briefing Book, Issues and Statements, October 1971 HAK
visit to PRC)
—We do not accept the proposition that one country can speak for all socialist countries;

—The one issue that divides us (Taiwan) is itself a product of history and if we could agree both on the general direction and a realistic process to resolve this issue, there should be no fundamental obstacle to the positive development of our relations.

I then set forth the case for **gradual resolution of the issues** between us, first implicitly by sketching the reactions to the July 15th announcement both at home and among our friends. I said that while we had set new currents in motion, we could not suddenly overturn traditional relationships; the old must coexist for a while with the new. Chou, here and later, acknowledged this but naturally his emphasis was on the importance of new departures. I added that foreign reaction to the July announcement was generally positive, but not all nations (e.g., the Soviet Union and India) really felt that way. I then emphasized the domestic problems you faced from some of your traditional sectors of support and the courage you have shown and which Reston had so much difficulty in acknowledging in his interview with the Prime Minister. (These were themes that I had instructed our whole party to stress in their social conversations.) Chou acknowledged that the PRC also had internal difficulties.

I then became more explicit about the need for gradualism. We had expected some of the adverse reactions and were determined to carry forward the constructive beginning that had been made in July. Both the PRC and we had been meticulous in implementing our understandings to date and were treating each other as men of honor. Looking to the future we had to sort out the questions which could be resolved immediately, from those on which we could agree in principle but would need time to implement, and those which had to be left to historical processes. We would carry out scrupulously whatever we had agreed to; this phased approach was not a pretext for avoiding fundamental problems but a guarantee that we would be successful in resolving them.

I then suggested an **agenda** consisting of three types of subjects: (1) the major issues such as we had discussed in July; (2) subsidiary issues such as ongoing contacts and exchanges; and (3) the technical arrangements for your visit, the major aspects of which I then touched upon. (See the next section of this report.)

Chou and I then informally agreed on a game plan for the three types of issues that we had already settled in advance through communications and a private talk I had with the senior Chinese representative who had come to meet us at Shanghai.

(This game plan was carefully followed over the next five days: On the technical subjects, I laid out the fundamental considerations and handed over the books we had prepared in advance. The Chinese
studied these and came back with questions in meetings with technical personnel headed on our side by Messrs. Chapin and Hughes. The major issues were referred back to me and Chou and were settled in social and private sessions. Chou and I held a series of private meetings on the major substantive issues and the drafting of the communique. The State Department representative and a member of my staff held two sessions on the subsidiary issue of diplomatic contacts, exchanges, and trade.)

Chou made some preliminary comments on the substantive agenda which foreshadowed his approach on subsequent days. He termed Taiwan the crucial issue for normalizing our relations. He called Indochina the most urgent issue in order to relax tensions in the Far East. He moved Korea to third on the agenda, giving it a higher priority than in July, citing both sides' responsibilities for settling this question which the 1954 Geneva Conference had not treated. His fourth and fifth topics were Japan, which he said had a far-reaching influence on reducing Asian tensions, and South Asia where both sides were concerned. He put relations with the Soviet Union sixth and last; this was not a main issue, as Peking was not opposed to our relations with any other country.

Then, clearly for the record, Chou once again said that they would prefer it if you visited Moscow before Peking. I subsequently repeated for the record that it was we who had set the date for the Moscow summit, and this was based on the ripening of conditions, not on Peking's desires to interfere with U.S.–USSR relations. Chou eagerly assented.

Chou came back to my statement that the old must coexist with the new. He knew that it was impossible for us to cut off all our traditional foreign policy relationships at once, but there was also a need to break with some conventions. He again referenced your July 6 Kansas City remarks about new power relationships and a speech that Prime Minister Heath had just delivered concerning Britain's future role. He said that Heath had shown courage by recognizing the necessities to adapt to the realities of the new Europe, just as you had shown courage in your China initiative. He noted that conservative parties were often the ones to make bold new moves, citing as additional examples Ike's ending of the Korean war, Lincoln's handling of the Civil War, and Britain's expelling of Soviet spies. Following his regular custom, he once again put Chairman Mao's stamp on your visit by saying that when you two meet it should be possible for you to understand each other even though your stands differ greatly.

I then sounded a warning about Peking's making trouble for us with our allies. First, I noted that we supported Britain's entry into the Common Market and a more unified and autonomous Europe. I added that we didn't seek to drive a wedge between the PRC...
and its friends, and it would be shortsighted if either side tried to use the improvement in our relations as a device to destroy the traditional friendships of the other side. This would only cause the two sides to draw back into the rigidity from which they were trying to escape.

Chou rejoined this was only part of the story and could not be accepted absolutely. Since we were entering a new era it was necessary that some relations change; otherwise life would be as it was before. He cited an old Chinese proverb which says that “the helmsman must guide the boat by using the waves; otherwise it will be submerged by the waves.” I replied that we had no intention of avoiding difficult problems, such as Taiwan, but until we were able to cement our friendship we should not give domestic opponents on both sides an opportunity to destroy progress. Many were saying that China was only using the initiative as a trick to destroy our traditional relationships so as to resume the old hostilities from a better tactical position. Chou once again said that times were advancing and that we would either seize upon the opportunities presented or be submerged by the tides of the times.

This exchange set up the basic philosophic tension in our ensuing discussions as we sought, generally successfully, to strike a balance between their imperatives for change and ours for time.

Your Trip

You already know the agreements reached on the arrangements for your visit through my earlier messages, our conversations, and Dwight Chapin’s separate report. Our approach was to scale down our requirements to the minimum in advance, present all technical considerations in writing, let the Chinese come back to us with questions,
and not try fruitlessly to squeeze extra mileage out of them once they told us what they would do.

This approach paid off handsomely. The Chinese appreciated our attitude, knew that we were not bargaining in conventional fashion, carefully clarified the issues so that they knew what was involved, and then agreed to the maximum that their technical capabilities would allow. In each case they met our essential requirements in terms of numbers and facilities, and when we left, there remained only a few issues on the itinerary for me to check with you.

At the opening session I outlined our general approach, stressed that we would not let technical issues interfere with the historic thrust of your visit, and then ticked off the major issues to be resolved:

—On the **itinerary**, I said that we were thinking of a five-day trip with perhaps one other stop besides Peking.
—On **communications**, I stressed the need for secure and rapid communications for the President at all times and said a ground station was the easiest method. Chou asked when a Vice President could take over some of the responsibilities of a President, and he revealed that he had read extracts of *Six Crises*, which showed that you had restrained yourself when President Eisenhower was incapacitated.
—On **security**, I said that we would rely on them as host country, that we had reduced our numbers drastically, and that the primary function would be for our men to serve as liaison with the Chinese security people.
—On the **press**, I explained the dimensions of the corps on other Presidential visits and how we had cut back the numbers.
—Finally I sketched the outlines of the official (12) and unofficial (16) **party**.

I then explained the books that we had prepared which showed the dimensions of past Presidential visits, the reduced optimum plan for your visit to China, and then the bare minimum plan that we had finally made.6 (During this exchange Chou revealed that, after hearing of your liking for it, he had seen the movie *Patton* and believed that you admired the General because he was one to break through conventions.)

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6 Copies and drafts of the materials provided to the Chinese are ibid., White House Special Files, Staff Member and Office Files, Box 30, Dwight L. Chapin, Preliminary China Plan. These materials are described in an October 12 memorandum from Chapin to T. Elbourne, General J. Hughes, General A. Redman, R. Taylor and R. Walker. The materials include information on a typical presidential trip, the “optimum plan” for the China trip, the “absolute minimum” contingent for a trip, and minutes from counterpart meetings held during the October 1971 trip to the PRC. (Ibid.) A copy of the complete book provided to the PRC by Chapin is ibid., NSC Files, Box 1138, Jonathan Howe Trip Files, Notebook: Summary Description of Presidential Trips.
Later in this opening meeting, after I made clear that we would still proceed with the summits in the order that they were announced, Chou moved quickly to indicate that the Chinese preferred the February 21 date. He thus made it clear that there would be no haggling over this issue despite whatever other differences might crop up during the next few days. He also indicated that the Chinese were thinking of a visit lasting seven days instead of the five that I had indicated.

During the first part of our first private meeting the next morning, Chou and I explored further some of the major questions concerning arrangements. We pinned down February 21 as the date for your visit. We agreed to the general concept of meetings during your visit similar to the ones during this one—a general opening session of the two official parties, followed by private meetings between you and the Chinese leaders and concurrently between the foreign ministers, and perhaps another closing general session. And we confirmed that neither side would say anything to the press during or after your visit which was not first mutually agreed upon.

We then discussed the meeting between you and Chairman Mao. Chou said that the Chairman wanted to meet you early during your visit, after greeting the official party, and again towards the end. I said you wanted to meet alone with Mao. He rejoined that the composition of our side was up to us, but that the Chairman was always accustomed to having the Prime Minister present for specifics, although Mao was of course fully at home on general principles.

On the itinerary, we agreed that I would come back to Washington with two formulas, one for a five day visit and one for seven days. He said that he would accompany you wherever you went, made clear that they would expect you to travel on a Chinese plane, and introduced the idea of an overnight visit to Hangchow. There was further discussion of these issues during which I made another pitch for the ground station, and said that I would have to consult with you on the question of the aircraft, since an American President had never traveled on another nation’s plane.

Meanwhile the Chinese technical personnel were studying for twenty-four hours the books we had given them. On Thursday afternoon they began two days of meetings with our counterparts during which they posed a series of questions to clarify the meaning of our presentations.

After a private meeting on late Thursday afternoon, I took Chou aside and expressed Mrs. Nixon’s desire to see his country; he said he would check with Chairman Mao.

During our sightseeing trips to the Great Wall and Summer Palace, the Chinese mentioned Hangchow several times, underlining their hope
you could go there. (Mao will probably be there, for in July Chou had said that you might be meeting him outside of Peking. However, an inconsistency arises since Chou has said that you would meet Mao early in the trip and Hangchow would come at the end of it. Since there will be two meetings between you and Mao, there could be one in Peking early in the visit and one at Hangchow at the end.)

At 9:00 p.m. on October 23 Chou came to my sitting room in the Guest House and proceeded to settle the major outstanding technical issues. He first accepted the overall dimensions of the Presidential party and support group, i.e. some 350 personnel. He said the Chinese had accepted these numbers out of respect for our having cut down the figures drastically in advance. (Chinese acceptance included 80 press. This represents a large incursion for them, but they explained on other occasions that their only concern was whether they could properly accommodate all the journalists, including having sufficient interpreters.)

Having heard our preference for a five day visit and that a trip to Hangchow would increase the numbers, Chou began to back away from that suggestion. He said that we could compromise on a six day visit which included five days in Peking and one day in Shanghai. Knowing of the intense Chinese interest in Hangchow, I said that I would be prepared to raise this issue with you. He then made clear, in typical Chinese fashion, that Mrs. Nixon would be welcome by saying that once she saw the villa in Hangchow she would not want to spend the night in Shanghai.

Picking up a reference I made to the legal aspects of sovereignty, Chou said they would like to buy the proposed ground station and Boeing 747 processing center, and if not they would rent it. I replied that it would be easier to lease it. As I then acknowledged to Chou, this was clearly an example of their “principled” approach on technical as well as substantive questions. They want to do things themselves and maintain their concepts of sovereignty. Within their capability, they would be as forthcoming as possible. Thus, this equipment was admissible so long as it “belonged” to them.

The only comments on technical matters with an edge to them were Chou’s references to security. He made clear that this was the responsibility of the host country and several times noted our requirements with a slight dose of sarcasm. (The Chinese did show some genuine concern about the security problem caused by the large press contingency.)

We settled on the text of the communique for my visit and the October 27 release date and we agreed that the announcement of the date for your visit would be in the latter part of November. After first suggesting that the text of the latter could refer only to “late February,”
Chou was soon persuaded of the need to be specific about the date.

Chou then was once again very firm on your traveling in a Chinese plane, and I said I would discuss it with you. Chou said that the idea of an occasional U.S. envoy to Peking after your visit could be in the communiqué, and I made a pitch for Bruce once the Indochina war was behind us. He stipulated there would be two meetings between you and Chairman Mao. After some further discussion, which included agreement on what I would say at my backgrounder and my informing them of the upcoming Cannikin test, we adjourned the session.

This exchange left only a few loose ends which we have since tied up. At the final session, I confirmed that there would be another technical advance party, led by General Haig, after the announcement of the date of your visit. Since my return, we have informed the Chinese that Mrs. Nixon will accompany you and that we accept a seven day visit, including an overnight at Hangchow. We have also informed the Chinese that we believe the date for the announcement of your visit should be November 23, 1600 Washington time. On the question of your travel within China, we should take some more time to respond so that the Chinese will realize that this is a major decision for us.\footnote{The October 27 announcement of Kissinger’s trip is printed in Department of State Bulletin, November 29, 1971, p. 627. On October 31 Walters met with Huang Chen in Paris and passed along three points: 1) The United States wished to announce the President’s visit on November 23; 2) Mrs. Nixon accepted the PRC’s invitation to accompany her husband on the February visit; and 3) The United States accepted a 7-day visit with 1 night spent in Hangchow. Haig’s instructions to Walters, October 30, and Walters’ memorandum for the record are in National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 849, President’s File—China Trip, China Exchanges. At a November 18 meeting, Huang informed Walters that the PRC proposed making the announcement on November 29 (Washington time). Walters’ memorandum for the record, November 18, is ibid. As instructed by Haig, at a November 20 meeting Walters announced that the United States accepted the November 29 date. Haig’s instructions, November 19, and Walter’s memorandum for the record and attachments, November 20, are ibid. See Foreign Relations, 1969–1976, vol. E–13, Documents 58, 59, 62, 64, and 65. The announcement of Nixon’s trip is in Public Papers: Nixon, 1971, p. 1143.}

These discussions on arrangements for your visit confirmed both that our somewhat unconventional approach of presenting our minimal requirements at the outset made sense and that the Chinese do not engage in haggling over technical details once agreement in principle has been reached. Their acceptance of our numbers, their leasing of the ground station and 747, and their insistence on a Chinese plane for your travel within their country illustrate their basic attitude on arrangements.
Chou might have engaged in some brinkmanship by raising shadow\-es about your trip while we were wading through some of the difficul\-t substantive issues. He did not do this, partly because this is not his style and partly because he needs the visit as much as we do. In any event, while we had some rough and tough private discussions, there was never any doubt cast by either side on the fact that your visit would proceed as planned.

Taiwan

This remains, as we always knew it would, the single most difficul\-t issue. On the one hand Chou says that the PRC, being a large coun\-try, can afford to be patient; that it is showing restraint in the language that it is suggesting in the communiqué for your visit; and that In\-dochina, and even Korea, are more urgent problems, because the PRC can be less generous about its allies’ interests than about its own. On the other hand, the Taiwan question remains one of fundamental prin\-ciple for Peking, as it has for 22 years; Chou is pressing formulations in a communiqué which we still cannot accept; and he has made it clear that there will be no normal relations until this problem is resolved.

Resolution of this issue in a way that allows our relations to move forward over the next few years depends on China’s willingness to ac\-cept our thesis that we can do more than we can say, that to push the process too fast and too explicitly could wreck the whole fabric of our China initiative. While Chou understands our dilemma, he has prob\-lems of his own and he must show concrete progress on this issue for his own domestic and international audiences. Accordingly, our dis\-cussions and our communiqué drafting were dominated by the ten\-sion between the Chinese thrust for clarity and ours for ambiguity.

This was the first substantive issue that we discussed. I opened by reviewing the understandings that we had laid out in July:

—We would withdraw those forces on Taiwan related to Indochina in a relatively short period after the war in Indochina is over.
—We would reduce other forces on Taiwan progressively over a longer period of time, depending on the state of our relations. In re\-sponse to Chou’s query, I said that we would not set a final date on these withdrawals but that both sides understood the evolution.
—We would not advocate a two-China or one China, one Taiwan solution. At this point Chou said that we should not advocate a one- China, two-government solution as suggested by our UN position. He noted the PRC had been very restrained in its attacks on this position.
—We would not support or encourage the creation of an independent Taiwan movement, and we would take action on any information provided to us that Americans officially or unofficially were doing so. Chou interjected his concern over recent demonstrations at UN Headquarters for an independent Taiwan which he claimed were nationwide, even global in scope. I said that as far as I knew the U.S. had nothing to do with this and that I would check into the facts. Chou
took the occasion to criticize CIA actions around the world, and I rebutted briefly.

—We would not support, indeed we would oppose, to the extent we could, the establishment of Japanese military forces on Taiwan or attempts by Japan to support a Taiwan independence movement.

—We would support any peaceful resolution of the Taiwan issue and would pose no obstacle to this.

—We were prepared to move toward normalization of relations with the PRC, keeping in mind Chinese views.

I said that you would be ready to reaffirm all of these points to the Chairman and the Prime Minister in a restricted meeting. I added that this was a painful process for us; we had worked with the government on Taiwan for years and whatever the historical causes, it was not easy to make such changes. Opposition to this policy would certainly arise as it began to unfold. We would not challenge the PRC view that this was an internal matter, but the PRC should settle the issue peacefully.

On the UN, I noted that we had carried out the policy I had outlined in July and that we had kept our rhetoric down. In fact it was better for both of our countries if the Albanian Resolution did not pass this year, for then the process would be pushed too fast and there would be a rallying point for opponents of your China policy.

I then reemphasized that we could do more than we could say on Taiwan, and that some things had to be left to historical evolution so long as we both understood the direction in which we were headed.

Chou then asked a series of questions which underlined that their primary concern is not so much our policy but Japanese intentions and the possibility of Taiwan independence, neither of which we can completely control.

After a brief historical lesson on why Taiwan is Chinese territory, Chou revealed what the British were prepared to do in order to elevate their diplomatic mission in Peking to Ambassadorial level: acknowledge that Taiwan was a province of China, withdraw their consulate from Taiwan, and support the Albanian Resolution at the UN. The British would also agree privately that they would not promote the view that the status of Taiwan was undetermined, and if they received inquiries the British government would say that its position was unchanged.

Chou said this would be sufficient if the PRC acted expediently, but instead they considered it unacceptable. The PRC objected to the British reserving their position if the issue of Taiwan’s status were raised; Chou noted that Britain signed the Cairo and Potsdam declarations declaring Taiwan belonged to China. He reinforced this by relating some more history, including the U.S. role, to demonstrate why the status of Taiwan was not undetermined and to underline PRC
sensitivity to this issue. He then got to his point: what was the U.S. policy? Do we maintain that the status of Taiwan is still undetermined or was it our view that Taiwan had already returned to China and was a province of China? This was the crucial question. How the Chinese people would solve the question of Taiwan was of secondary importance. He added that, as he had already said in July, the PRC would try to bring about a *peaceful settlement* of this problem. He acknowledged that this was a difficult question for us.

I responded by again saying that we must separate what we could say and what our policy is. We did not challenge the premise that all Chinese maintain there is only one China and that Taiwan is part of that China. In that sense we didn’t maintain that the status of Taiwan was undetermined. Expressing this in a communiqué was a different matter, but we were prepared to note that all Chinese maintain there is but one China. We would also make sure that there would be no further statements by our officials that Taiwan’s status is undetermined. In response to Chou’s question about what we would say if other countries were to raise this question, I said that I would have to check this with you. I assured Chou that we were not encouraging any government to maintain that the status of Taiwan was undetermined and that the UK position had not received our encouragement. Furthermore, if a government were to raise this issue we would certainly not support it; I pointed to our UN position which was careful not to address this question.

I again declared that we would do nothing to promote the elaboration of a two-China or one-China, one Taiwan policy in whatever form such plans were presented and that we would attempt to encourage a solution within the framework of one China by peaceful means. This question was for the Chinese to settle and not something we could actively push.

Chou then raised the issue of our defense treaty, asking whether once Taiwan returned to the Motherland it would still have effect. I replied that if Taiwan and China were to become one again by peaceful means the treaty would automatically lapse. Chou repeated that they considered the treaty illegal and that we should withdraw all our forces from the area. I said that we understood their position, that we hoped for a peaceful solution, that the evolution of events would make unnecessary any formal action on the treaty.

Chou emphatically stated that *diplomatic relations* between our countries were not possible until our forces had been withdrawn and the defense treaty had lapsed. They could not send an ambassador to Washington if another Chinese ambassador were there; it was possible for you and me to go to China since Peking considered there was but one U.S. and there was no competing U.S. ambassador in Peking. He...
pointed out that the presence of the Nationalist ping-pong team in the U.S. had prevented the sending of the PRC ping-pong team. (In other contexts the Chinese indicated they still planned to send their team, however.) This problem of there being a GRC ambassador in our country underlies the PRC position about ongoing contacts: i.e. they agree to our sending an envoy to Peking but do not wish to reciprocate; and Chou turned down the suggestion of a return invitation to him as a result of your visit. It may also influence their lukewarm attitude on other subsidiary issues which smack of more normal relations, such as trade and exchanges.

I then pressed further on the need for a peaceful solution of the Taiwan question. We would place no obstacle in the way of a political resolution which saw Taiwan and China get back together again peacefully. Chou commented that if Chiang Kai-shek or his son wished to negotiate, the PRC would not discourage it. I interjected that frankly what we most would like and encourage is a peacefully negotiated solution after which our military relations would automatically be at an end. A peaceful settlement would solve the questions of the defense treaty and our military forces. If there were no peaceful settlement, then it would be easier for us to withdraw our military presence in stages than to abrogate the treaty. The latter was unlikely.

Chou acknowledged these points but raised concerns about the Japanese taking our place. I replied that we would oppose that and that we had a common interest in preventing the military expansion of Japan. To encourage Japanese expansion in Taiwan would be shortsighted, but we had to select the issues on which we were able to enforce our discipline.

Chou cited Secretary Laird’s comments which suggested increasing Japan’s military potential.8 I responded that this was not official U.S. policy, and while we could not prevent such statements, we could make sure that they would not have any practical consequences.

Chou then dwelt further on his fear of Japanese influence in Taiwan, not only military but also political and economic, and he cited contacts between various Japanese elements and officials on Taiwan. I said that it was relatively easy for us to prevent the projection of Japanese military presence on Taiwan while our forces were there; we would continue to oppose these forces after we departed but this was less under our control. If the Japanese began sending military forces outside of its territory, we would be forced to reconsider our entire policy in the Pacific. Political and economic expansion was more difficult to measure, but it was not American policy to let Taiwan become

8 See footnote 14, Document 140.
subsidiary to Japan. Chou warned that this would be most disadvan-
tageous to the relaxation of tensions in the Far East. (Indeed, so con-
cerned was Chou about Japan’s role that in a later meeting he said that
he didn’t want all U.S. forces withdrawn from Taiwan for fear that
Japanese forces would then move in.)

I made the point that if before diplomatic relations there were vis-
ible signs of Sino–American cooperation such as exchange programs,
this could affect the situation on Taiwan as well as in Japan. I also
warned Chou against exploiting U.S.–Japanese differences, saying that
we were coming under attack in some quarters for giving up Japan in
our initiative toward China. There had to be some restraint on the Chi-
nese side. He then claimed that they had shown restraint toward Japan
and said that they would not deal with Sato.

That afternoon, October 21, Chou picked up the United Nations is-
 sue. He dispassionately noted PRC opposition to our position, and I
explained that we had chosen this route over one that clearly indicated
a two-China policy. Chou emphasized that the status of Taiwan was
much more important to them than the UN seat and that they would
refuse to go to the UN if our position prevailed. He then revealed that
they didn’t particularly like the Albanian Resolution either, since it did
not specifically address the question of the status of Taiwan. (At our
final meeting, which as it turned out, occurred at the very end of the
UN debate, Chou pointedly complained that his talking to me at this
time was very embarrassing for China’s friends at the UN.)

When I invited Chou’s views on a successor to U Thant, he offered
nothing, saying that they had not thought about the matter. He did
take the occasion to praise Hammarskjold and indirectly denigrate U
Thant, a sign that the PRC might want an activist Secretary-General.

Chou concluded the brief UN discussion by repeating the need to
make progress on the Taiwan question. I again pointed out that if we
moved too quickly on this issue our opponents could destroy the frag-
ile relationship that we were trying to build with the PRC. I acknowl-
edged the PRC’s need to show some progress, but repeated that if we
went too fast we would tear the whole fabric of our relationship. We
thus had to establish a direction in our conversations, insure that every
step was implemented, and take no steps that were detrimental to our
relationship.

This intensive discussion on Taiwan was later picked up in the
comminiqué drafting process which I have reported separately. Chou
did indeed show some restraint in their language formulations and at-
ttempted to meet some of our concerns. We in turn moved toward their
position by not challenging the one-China position of all Chinese and
by indicating that we would reduce our forces in the Taiwan area.
Chou’s formulations, which I could not accept, would have us actively
express the wish that a one-China solution be brought about by peaceful means and pledge that we would finally withdraw all our forces from Taiwan and the Taiwan Straits.

Chou explained repeatedly that they were not setting a deadline on our withdrawal and, in fact, surprisingly admitted that they hoped we would keep some forces on Taiwan for a while in order to keep out the Japanese.

The Chinese will be patient but at one point toward the end Chou did suggest that if, e.g., six years passed without solution of the Taiwan issue, the Chinese would be forced to liberate by “other means,” his single reference in our discussions to the use of force.

As reported separately, I told Chou that I would talk this issue over with you and see whether we could come back with a new formulation for the communiqué. He indicated little further budging on their part but said that they might be able to change a word or two of their position if we presented a new formula. It will prove difficult and painful to close the remaining gap between us, but I think we can do it successfully.

Indochina

Our discussions on the afternoon of October 21 on this subject were generally similar to those we held in July.

I underscored the reasonableness of our approach, pointing out that our negotiating proposals had addressed every concern of their allies. I stressed the advantages to the PRC of an Indochina settlement, on the one hand, and the risks of continued conflict on the other hand. Against this backdrop I made a somewhat more emphatic pitch than July for Chinese help with Hanoi, while still making it clear that we would not embarrass Peking. Chou, in turn, emphasized the desirability of our setting final withdrawals before your visit (without insisting on a political solution). He reiterated that peace had to be made with Hanoi directly, but explicitly hoped that negotiations would succeed. As in July, he was obviously uninformed about the details of our negotiations with the North Vietnamese.

Chou led off the session by citing Indochina as an urgent issue and the need for final U.S. withdrawals. He asked why we had not accepted, or at least replied to, Mme. Binh’s seven points. He then explained that they could not accept Ambassador Bruce in Peking while a war was still going on. I interjected that we understood this, but given the trust he had in the White House we hoped that the PRC would find him acceptable after the war.

Chou continued that our not setting a date for final withdrawal could prevent your visit to China from being as successful as otherwise, although he made clear that this was not a condition. He repeated
the PRC’s support for the seven points and said that final decisions on
a settlement rested with Hanoi, not Peking. He then inquired why we
had not set a final date and said that this was more urgent than the
UN question or the normalization of Sino-US relations.
Telling the Prime Minister that he had been misinformed about
the negotiations, I proceeded to give him a fairly detailed rundown of
our negotiating efforts over the summer, including the outlines of
our most recent proposal of October 11.9 I did not give him either a
piece of paper or all the details on our proposal, but enough to show
its forthcoming nature. I pointed out how we had met all of the con-
cerns of the North Vietnamese and the PRG, even to the point of us-
using some of their formulations. We had addressed ourselves primarily
to the North Vietnamese nine point proposal, which, according to
Hanoi, superseded the PRG seven points. I told Chou that it was tempt-
ing for us to publish our negotiating proposals since this would dom-
inate public opinion in our country, but that we preferred to try and
reach a settlement. I then sought Chinese influence in Hanoi with the
following arguments:
—We understood that Peking didn’t want to interfere in the ne-
gotiating process. But we questioned whether one small country, ob-
essed with its suffering and conflict, could be permitted to thwart
every sign of progress between the U.S. and Peking because its suspi-
cions were so great that it would not make a negotiated settlement.
—Why would we want bases in one corner of Asia when the
whole trend was toward a new relationship with Asia’s most impor-
tant country?
—If Hanoi showed Peking’s largeness of spirit we could settle the
war within days.

9 At their November 20 meeting in Paris, Walters gave Huang Chen a message for
Chou reviewing negotiations between the United States and North Vietnam. The mes-
gage reads in part: “On October 11, 1971, the United States presented to North Vietnam
a new comprehensive proposal designed to bring a rapid end to the war on a basis just
for all parties.” The message also noted that the United States had proposed a private
meeting between Kissinger and Le Duc Tho for November 1. On October 25 the North
Vietnamese indicated that Le and Xuan Thuy would meet Kissinger on November 20, a
date U.S. officials accepted. On November 17 the Vietnamese cancelled the meeting, and
on November 19 U.S. officials informed Vietnamese officials that Kissinger would not
be coming to Paris. The message to Chou added: “As I told you and Vice Chairman Yeh
Chien-ying, and as we have made clear to the North Vietnamese, the United States is pre-
pared to treat North Vietnamese concerns with generosity. At the same time, the People’s
Republic of China, as a great country, will recognize that we cannot permit ourselves to
be humiliated, no matter what the possible consequences for other policies. We know that
the People’s Republic, like the United States, does not trade in principles. We have no
specific request to make, and we do not expect an answer to this communication.” The
message for the PRC and Walters’ memorandum of record, November 20, are in National
Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 849, President’s File—China Trip,
—We wanted the independence of North Vietnam and the other countries of Southeast Asia. Perhaps there were others (i.e. the Soviet Union) who might wish to use Hanoi to create a bloc against China.

—We had made our last offer and we could not go further. We knew the PRC did not trade in principles, but the proposals we had made would end the war on a basis that would not require it to do so.

Chou then asked a series of questions about our withdrawals, the new elections, and the ceasefire. He frankly admitted, as he had in July, that he had not heard a word about these negotiating proposals. He asked whether we had sent a message with Podgorny10 to Hanoi. When I said that we had not, Chou laughed contemptuously about Russian diplomatic efforts, including their extensive travels since the July announcement. He indicated privately that Moscow had made unspecified proposals in Hanoi which Hanoi had rejected.

Chou said that our withdrawal would be a “glorious act” for us, and I responded that we had to find someone with whom to negotiate. We would withdraw in any event: the only question was whether it would be slowly through our unilateral policy or more quickly as a result of negotiations.

Chou made a distinction between Vietnamese and Indochina-wide ceasefires. He expressed concern that an Indochina ceasefire would freeze the political situation in the entire region (his main problem being Sihanouk’s status, of course). I said that we would not interfere with whatever governments evolved as a result of the ceasefire. We then had a testy exchange on Cambodia where I pointed out that there would not be any need to arrange a ceasefire if North Vietnamese troops would withdraw and let the local forces determine their own future. Chou did not deny their presence; he said that they were there in sympathy for their South Vietnamese compatriots. In order to explain Hanoi’s suspiciousness, he recalled the “deception” of 1954 when the North Vietnamese had been tricked and no election had been held. Getting quite excited, he termed this a “dirty act,” launching into Dulles. I replied that the guarantee for our actions in a peace settlement lay not in clauses but in the difference in our world outlook compared to the Dulles policy of the 1950s.

I again pointed out the generosity of our proposals and the temptation to go public with them. Chou said that he could not comment on our offer since he did not know about it in detail. (Later I said that I was not giving him our detailed proposal since that was up to the PRC’s ally to do. Chou agreed. In a later meeting Chou did acknowledge

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10 Nikolai Viktorovich Podgorny, President of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics.
that our political proposal represented a new element.) He maintained that Hanoi’s preoccupation and suspicion were understandable for a small, deceived country. The North Vietnamese could not be expected to have a large view like the Chinese. (Marshal Yeh on another occasion told me that Hanoi was too proud; having, as it thinks, defeated the world’s largest military power, Hanoi was very reluctant to take advice. In this it was egged on by Moscow. Peking, according to Yeh, genuinely wanted peace, but it did not want to make it easier for Moscow to pursue its policy of encircling China by creating a pro-Moscow bloc in Indochina.)

In any event, Chou said, the settlement was up to us and Hanoi. He again emphasized that it was important to have this problem essentially settled before you came to China.

I then summed up:

— I had made seven secret trips this year to Paris which was not the activity of a government seeking to prolong the war;
— We were no long-term threat to the independence of Vietnam and wanted to make peace;
— We recognized the limits to what the PRC could do and the complications of the Soviet role, but nevertheless if the opportunity presented itself, we would appreciate Peking’s telling its friends its estimate of the degree of our sincerity in making a just peace;
— We could not go any further than our proposals of October 11.

Chou again commented that they hoped we could settle and get out, whereas the Soviet Union wished to pin us down. He said it would be impossible not to mention Vietnam in the communiqué if the war had not been settled. I rejoined that there should be no misapprehension that Vietnam was an extremely sensitive issue for us and that it was impossible to accept a communiqué that was critical of us. When Chou asked why we had not made a public pledge of final withdrawals, I said this would gain us two to three months of favorable headlines, but we were interested in making a settlement rather than empty propaganda victories.

Chou concluded by again wishing us well in negotiations, calling Indochina the most urgent problem with regard to the relaxation of tension in the Far East, and saying that U.S. withdrawal would be a glorious act. I closed with the hope that he understood what we were trying to do even though we recognized that the PRC had to support its allies. When I said that the Prime Minister should teach his method of operation to his allies, he commented that the styles of various countries differed and that they couldn’t impose their will on their friends.

In a subsequent session where Chou was bearing down on the issue of foreign troops, I pointed to the Chinese forces in Laos. He said that these were ordinary workers plus antiaircraft forces needed to protect them. If peace came, the latter could be withdrawn “in a day’s
time." In any event these personnel were building the road at the request of the "neutralists" and would all leave when the job was done.

In our last meeting Chou made the rather remarkable comment that he believed we "genuinely want a peaceful settlement."

Hopefully this issue will have been transformed by the time you go to Peking. We cannot expect Peking to lean hard on its friends. We can expect it to help tip the balance for a negotiated settlement if the other objective realities move Hanoi toward a bargain. If so, Peking will have incentives to encourage North Vietnamese compliance. On the other hand, if the conflict continues, Peking (and Moscow) will not want to see a major offensive—and our reaction—shadowing the summit. Thus the situation on the ground, and our declining role should provide a relatively quiet setting. And the communiqué draft has Peking backing its friends in inoffensive language while we emphasize a negotiated settlement.

Korea

Chou devoted considerable time and passion to this subject, which he placed as number three on the agenda. In East Asia, the three principal "powder kegs," in his view, were Taiwan, Indochina and Korea, with the last two the most urgent. (This had some quality of being for the record to prove loyalty to allies.)

He opened his presentation on the afternoon of October 22 by regretting, as he had in July, that the 1954 Geneva Conference had not settled the Korean question. A ceasefire had been reached but no treaty had been concluded and a serious crisis could therefore arise. He said that the Panmunjom meetings had gotten nowhere, that North Korea had no participation in the UN debate, and that North Korea could participate in UNCURK only under unacceptable conditions. He noted with approval the recent opening of talks between the Red Cross Societies of North and South Korea, and I pointed out that we had helped this process along since the July talks.

Chou continued as follows:

—U.S. military forces should withdraw from South Korea as Chinese forces had done in 1958. He acknowledged that we had already taken out a third of our troops and said that we had paid a great price to do it, i.e., extensive military assistance.

—The 1965 treaty with Japan was even more serious and there was the possibility that Japanese military forces would replace American ones. Officers of Japanese self-defense troops had been going to Korea (I had checked on this since July and Chou was indeed correct).

—If there were increased military strength and hostilities after we withdrew this could not but directly affect relaxation of tension in the Far East.

—Their Korean friends were "most tense" and this could not but affect the Chinese government and people.
Chou then handed over a list of eight points from the North Korean government, published in April 1971. This document is a generally abusive series of demands upon us to withdraw our forces and military support for Korea, give North Korea equal status, prevent Japanese influence, disband UNCURK, leave the Korean question to the Koreans themselves, and let North Korea participate in the UN debate unconditionally. Chou reaffirmed the importance of this question and noted that while big China could live with the problem of its divided status for a while, the PRC could not ask its smaller friends, Vietnam and Korea, to be so patient.

I retorted in extremely sharp fashion. I said that the Nixon Administration was dedicated to improving relations and easing tensions in East Asia, but we reject the translation of this goal into a series of unilateral demands upon us. We were prepared to set certain directions, but we could not accept a paper which listed all the things that the U.S. “must” do and called our ally a “puppet.” The PRC had never done this, and we respected it for standing by its friends. But it was important for North Korea, as it was for North Vietnam, to show some of the largeness of spirit of its large ally.

Chou backed off from the abusive language, stating that it was “firing empty guns.” I said that the substance was more important in any event. I informed him that we had received a communication from North Korea, through Romania, earlier this year and had responded in a conciliatory fashion but had heard no more. I then clarified what the objectives in the peninsula should be. We were prepared to discuss the possibility of a more permanent legal basis for the existing situation in Korea, but we were not interested in a legal situation that made the reopening of hostilities possible (i.e. we would not scrap present arrangements so as to invite aggression). When I noted that our ultimate objective was the reduction of U.S. forces in Korea, Chou again raised the fear of Japanese troops replacing ours. I assured him that our policy here was the same as on Taiwan, namely that it was not our objective to replace our forces with Japanese self-defense forces and that we were opposed generally to the military expansion of Japan. Chou declared that the PRC attached great importance to that statement.

I then pressed Chou further to clarify Chinese objectives. I said that if their goals were to bring about stability in the peninsula, avert war, and lessen the danger of the expansion of other powers, then Chinese and American interests were quite parallel. If, on the other hand, their goals were to undermine the existing government in South Korea and make it easier for North Korea to attack or bring pressure upon the South, then a different situation existed.

In response to his inquiries, I made clear that we would not encourage South Korean attacks against the North, and in the case of clear
South Korean aggression, our mutual defense treaty would not apply. I also said that we were already reviewing the UNCURK question and that we recognized North Korea as a fact of life. Chou stressed that the PRC was interested in equal legal status for both Koreas. Unification should be left to the future.

In our further exchanges I said that it was our policy:

— not to allow Japanese military forces to enter South Korea to the extent that we could control this;
— as tensions in the Far East diminished the number of U.S. forces would continue to go down and could be expected to be small;
— in any event, we would not allow South Korean military attacks while our forces were there;
— as an end of a complicated process, but not as an immediate objective, we could envisage North Korea as a lawful entity in the UN and elsewhere;
— there was merit in North Korea’s having fair representation in discussion about the peninsula;
— as for final reunification, we had not studied this problem but it should be accomplished peacefully.

At the end of our discussion, Chou in effect accepted our position that the issue of Korea would take time but that opinions could be exchanged in the interim. There was some agreement on general objectives although not about specific methods and we had reached no conclusion about the way peaceful reunification should be effected. In addition, we agreed that the two parties in the peninsula should treat each other as equals and that neither one had the exclusive right to unify the country.

Chou again emphasized that keeping Japanese military forces out was paramount. I said that we would attempt to do this, but that if North Korea should start aggression then one could not be sure of the consequences. I made very clear that whatever we could do in Korea depended on North Korean restraint. Chou agreed that all these issues were mutual and that both of us should use our influence with our friends to keep them from military adventures. He cautioned, however, that the era of negotiations, such as the Red Cross meetings, could be the era of “dragging out” and while they would wait on Taiwan, it was harder for their smaller friends to be patient.

In the communiqué draft we agree to disagree. The Chinese back their allies’ eight points and call for abolition of UNCURK. We honor our commitments to South Korea and endorse reduced tension and increased communication in the peninsula. These formulations are preferable to a formal joint position that suggests we are negotiating on behalf of our allies.

Japan

In addition to discussing Japan’s role in Taiwan and in Korea, reported elsewhere, Chou En-lai and I talked about Japan’s future in Asia.
in our afternoon meeting on October 22. We agreed that neither country wanted Japan to rearm and to resume the outward thrust that it had shown in the 1930s and 1940s. But we disagreed on the best way to assure that this would not happen.

Chou suggested that we drop our mutual defense ties and that Japan pursue a policy of neutralism, and I sharply rejoined that this was the best way to encourage a remilitarized, expansionist Japan and that the security we provided exercised restraint. I think Chou recognized the validity of our arguments, but obviously had difficulty acknowledging the virtues of a U.S.–Japan defense relationship. His ambivalence was reflected in his uncharacteristically lame presentation, during which he seemed unsure of himself, his strategic arguments were weak, and he continued to fall back on pat phrases.

At my invitation, Chou outlined Chinese views of Japan:

—Japan’s “feathers have grown on its wings and it is about to take off,” i.e. its tremendous economic expansion was inevitably leading it toward military expansion;
—Its economic assistance to other countries was not to help them develop but rather to establish Japanese economic domination;
—The Soviet Union was looking for Japanese investment and markets and was encouraging it to be more aggressive;
—China was not hostile toward Japan, and great changes have taken place in both countries since the war; the PRC was ready to conduct its relations on the basis of the five principles of peaceful coexistence.

When I questioned Chou on what he meant when he said that the PRC wanted Japan to pursue a policy of “peace and friendship,” he defined this as Japan’s recognizing the PRC’s sovereignty over Taiwan, giving up all ambitions for both Taiwan and Korea, and respecting the independence and territorial integrity of the People’s Republic of China. I responded as follows:

—China’s philosophic view had been generally global while Japan’s had been traditionally tribal;
—Japan had always thought that it could adjust to outside influences and still maintain its essential character;
—Japan was subject to sudden explosive changes, such as going from feudalism to emperor worship and from emperor worship to democracy in very short periods;
—These Japanese traits imposed special responsibilities on those who deal with them;
—We had no illusions about Japanese impulses and the imperatives of their economic expansion;
—The present situation is a great temptation for everybody, especially the PRC and the USSR, since Japan’s orientation has been made uncertain by the July announcement.

I then said that the Soviet Union had made a special effort to exploit the situation and the PRC had too—I cited a People’s Daily
September 18 editorial which said that the U.S. could betray Japan at any moment. I sharply warned that such competition could only encourage Japanese nationalism. The present relationship with the U.S. exercised restraint on Japan; conversely, leaving Japan on its own would be a shortsighted policy. Someone would be the victim, for neutralism in Japan would not take the form of Belgian neutralism which had been guaranteed by others, but rather that of Swiss and Swedish neutralism which rested on large national armies. Both those Americans who believed that Japan would blindly follow the American lead and those other foreigners who tried to use Japan against the U.S. were shortsighted. It was therefore important that both the PRC and the U.S. show restraint on this issue.

I then repeated some of our principal policies toward Japan:

—We opposed a nuclear rearmed Japan no matter what some officials might suggest to the contrary;
—We favored keeping Japan’s conventional rearment to a level adequate only to defense;
—We were opposed to the overseas expansion of Japanese military power;
—We recognized that Japan’s economic development concerned the whole world and not just Japan.

I repeated that for these major principles to be effective there must be restraint on all sides. When Chou claimed that a nuclear umbrella tended to make Japan aggressive against others, I said that the alternative of Japan’s nuclear rearment was much more dangerous. There was no question that if we withdrew our umbrella they would very rapidly build nuclear weapons. When Chou asked whether we were capable of limiting Japan’s self-defense strength, I said that I could not promise this, but that we would have a better opportunity to do this with our present relationship than in a situation when Japan felt betrayed by us and Japanese nationalism asserted itself. I said that we had no incentive to encourage Japan to be dominant twenty-five years after World War II when we had fought against this very concept. If Japan did rearm itself, then the traditional relationship between the U.S. and China would reassert itself.

Chou noted that the Russians were cooperating with the Japanese and trying to use them in Siberia. I commented that I thought that they would pull back once they were confronted with Japanese methods and that in any event it was dangerous for the Russians to whet Japanese appetites for Siberia. I thought both sides would play with each

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11 The People’s Daily editorial of September 18 (reprinted in FBIS, China, September 20, 1971, pp. A7–A10) was one of several articles in the newspaper on that date, the 40th anniversary of Japan’s occupation of Manchuria.
other but neither would reorient itself that completely. Chou again was skeptical on whether the U.S. could control the “wild horse” of Japan, and I again rejoined that while we couldn’t do this completely, we had a better chance of controlling the military aspects under present arrangements than under the neutralism that he was pushing.

We ended up agreeing to disagree, with my commenting that our two countries had certain parallel interests with regard to Japan.

Chou closed by noting that we had helped Japan greatly to fatten itself, which I acknowledged. I pointed out that we did not need Japan for our own military purposes and that whenever Japan wanted us to withdraw military personnel we would do so. However, this would not be cause for Chinese rejoicing.

The tentative communiqué draft clearly delineates U.S.–PRC differences on Japan, consistent with the general approach of the first part of the document. Thus the PRC opposes Japanese militarism and supports a neutral Japan, while we place “the highest value” on friendly relations with Japan and state we will continue to honor our mutual defense treaty obligations. This can only help us with Tokyo and is much preferable to artificial—and suspicious—agreed U.S.-Chinese positions.

South Asia

This issue surprisingly consumed much less time than I expected, and while China clearly stands behind Pakistan, I detected less passion and more caution from Chou than I had in July.

Chou opened up by mentioning an October 7 letter from Kosygin to Yahya which he termed equivalent to an ultimatum threatening Pakistan. He said the situation was very dangerous and asked for our estimate.

I made the following points:

—At first India had a reasonable complaint about the political and economic burden of the refugees coming from East Pakistan. We had moved to meet this problem by providing over one-half of the foreign relief to refugees in India, or nearly $200 million.

—However, India was now trying to take advantage of the crisis as a means of settling the whole problem of Pakistan, not just East Pakistan. The Indian strategy apparently is to change abruptly the situation in East Pakistan so as to shake the political fabric of West Pakistan.

—I then outlined U.S. policy and the steps we had taken to support Pakistan in the consortium, debt relief, and other bilateral areas. I emphasized our total opposition to military action by India, the warnings that I had given the Indian ambassador about cutting off economic aid if they were to move, and the fact that you would repeat these warnings to Mrs. Gandhi when she visited the U.S. I added that we had urged the Russians to exercise restraint. They had told us they were trying to do so, but we were not sure whether this was in fact the case.
—We thought there was a good chance that in the near future that India would either attack or provoke Pakistan into action.
—Finally, I outlined our proposal that both forces withdraw their troops from the border and that Yahya make some political offers so as to overcome hostile propaganda and make it easier to support him in the UN and elsewhere.

Chou thanked me for this information and said that he wished to study the Kosygin letter further before discussing this issue the next day in more detail. He commented that Tito12 had been persuaded to the Indian view by Mrs. Gandhi, and this plus Soviet support would increase the risk of Indian miscalculation.

I then stated that we had no national interest in East Pakistan and only wanted the political solution there to reflect the will of the people. We had made many proposals to India to separate the refugee problem from the political evolution in a way that would not prejudge the future. However, India had made it very clear that they were trying to force political steps on Yahya in so short a time frame that it could only wreck the structure of West Pakistan.

Chou commented that the Soviets were exploiting the situation, as part of their general strategy of exploiting contradictions in Asia so as to free their hand in Asia. He thought this was “a very stupid way of thinking.” I commented that Moscow would learn that gratitude was not one of the outstanding qualities of the Indian leadership.

Perhaps significantly, Chou, despite his promise, never came back to this subject nor mentioned the Kosygin letter again. This might be partly due to the fact that we spent so much time on other substantive subjects and that we now had the communiqué drafting process in front of us. However, there were opportunities to raise South Asia again in our subsequent meetings if Chou had really wanted to.

In any event, China still stands clearly behind Pakistan, as reflected in their formulation in the draft communiqué which reads that “it firmly opposes anyone exploiting the situation in East Pakistan to interfere in Pakistan’s internal affairs, provoke armed conflicts and undermine peace in the Asian subcontinent.” I believe the PRC does not want hostilities to break out, is afraid of giving Moscow a pretext for attack, and would find itself in an awkward position if this were to happen.

Chou surely recognized from my presentation and from our communiqué formulation, which urges India and Pakistan to resolve their differences peacefully, that we have too great stakes in India to allow

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12 Josip Broz Tito, President of the Republic of Yugoslavia and Supreme Commander of the Armed Forces.
us to gang up on either side. Nevertheless he did not attempt in any way to contrast their stand with ours as demonstrating greater support for our common friend, Pakistan.

**Soviet Union**

Chou initiated this topic by asking our views, and I replied as follows:

—We had kept the PRC scrupulously informed over the summer about our relations with Moscow.
—The Moscow summit would now take place because the necessary conditions had been met. There had been various attempts to have the President visit Moscow first, which he had, of course, turned down.
—Our July 15 announcement had not changed the direction of Soviet policy but had improved Russian manners. I had pointed out in my opening statement that this announcement had triggered an extraordinary amount of Soviet diplomatic activity and we were aware that it was designed to outmaneuver the PRC.
—We have a number of concrete issues with the Soviet Union which we have every intention of pursuing, such as SALT and Berlin. The Russians were now pressing us very hard on a European Security Conference.

Chou commented acidly that in the final days of the Berlin negotiations the Soviet Union had made concessions very rapidly and given up all their principles. He said indeed that the Berlin Agreement had turned out to be much more substantive, with Soviet concessions, than we had estimated in our private communications. I responded that we had foreshadowed that the agreement would primarily concern access procedures and asked him what other concessions he thought Moscow had made. He said that the Russians had conceded that West Berlin was a part of West Germany, which they had never done before and which would embarrass East Germany.13

I pointed out that the Soviet Union wished to free its hands in Europe so as to concentrate elsewhere, and Chou admitted this possibility. There was a contradiction in the Soviet policy—on the one hand they wanted to ease tensions so that they could concentrate on the East, but on the other hand their policy was apt to loosen things up in Eastern Europe.

I said that we recognized that the Berlin Agreement increased Chinese problems, and Chou responded “that does not matter.” I assured

13 Reference is to the Quadripartite Agreement on Berlin signed on September 3. Printed in Department of State Bulletin, September 27, 1971, pp. 318–325.
him that we did not make deals for that purpose and that we would keep him informed on the details concerning the negotiations on Berlin. The Soviet Union wanted a European Security Conference to solve their contradictions in Eastern Europe by at the same time dealing on a bloc-to-bloc basis and easing tensions with the West.

I then gave Chou a brief accounting of the Gromyko talks, saying that the European Conference was one of the topics that Gromyko had raised with you, along with the Middle East and subsidiary questions like trade. Concerning the latter I informed him that Secretary Stans would be traveling to Moscow in November. Chou inquired about the Middle East. I told him that if there were any serious chances for settlement I would let him know; prospects were generally gloomy at this point. I added that Gromyko had asked me to tea where we went over the same ground that you and he had covered. In addition, he had discussed U.S. relations with China with the standard Soviet line that Moscow had no objections to our improved relations but would object to our colluding. (On the way to the airport, Marshal Yeh said that he thought the Soviet Union wanted to settle the Middle East so that it could concentrate on China. He therefore hoped we would settle our problems with China quickly.)

I summed up our discussions by echoing some of the themes I had sounded in my opening statement with regard to our policy toward Moscow. I repeated that we would keep Peking informed of anything that might affect its interests; that we would conclude no agreements that would work against Peking (mentioning our deflection of the Soviet proposal for provocative attacks in 1970 as well as the third country aspects of the accidental war agreement); and that anything Peking heard from other sources about what was going on could not be true.

Chou asked if the Russians had talked to us about their border dispute. I replied that they had made an oblique reference to China’s exorbitant claims, but that I had refused to discuss this question. (On the way to the Great Wall the Acting Foreign Minister explained to me the nature of the Sino–Soviet border dispute. It was not true that the PRC wanted to regain all territories lost by China in the 19th century. What the PRC wanted was (a) an acceptance by the USSR that the treaties had in fact been unequal, and (b) a delineation of the border in minor aspects such as putting the demarcation line into the middle of rivers instead of on the Chinese side as the Soviets claim. Also, he said, the Soviets had pushed troops into all disputed territories—this was unacceptable.)

Throughout our meetings Chou often interlaced disdainful and hostile comments about the USSR, but always in the tone that the PRC was not afraid of any confrontation. He referred to their petty negotiating
tactics, their sticking their hands out in various places, and their complicating of efforts for an Indochina settlement (a point reiterated by Marshal Yeh in one of our sightseeing conversations).

As for our policy, the Chinese should be under no illusions that we fully intend to pursue our interests with Moscow while we try to improve our dialogue with Peking, that we have a number of concrete areas of interest with the Russians, and that while we will not conclude any agreement with the purpose of complicating Chinese problems, we can not be held accountable when the objective consequences of such dealings have this effect.

In the draft communiqué the PRC declares it “will never be a superpower” and opposes “hegemony” and “power politics.” Chou specifically suggested we might want to leave in some of our language (which I was prepared to delete) about improving communication so as to lessen the danger of confrontation because this would refer to our relations with Moscow. Both our countries declare against collusion, foreswear hegemony in Asia, and oppose “efforts by any other country or group of countries to establish such hegemony.”

**Arms Control**

Chou reflected the same Chinese disinterest in this subject that was so manifest in July.

I led into the topic when I was outlining our approach toward our relations with the Soviet Union, and I reaffirmed that we were prepared to make with the Chinese any agreement on arms control that we had made with the Soviet Union. I repeated that we would not participate in any agreement that would “lasso” the PRC.

I said, as I had in communications over the summer, that we were prepared to sign an agreement on accidental war, for example, with the PRC. Such an agreement would mean no restraints on China’s military preparations but would provide an opportunity for each side to inform the other about unexplained events. I made clear that we were not urging this on the PRC or making a formal proposal, but were merely letting them know that we were prepared to make a similar agreement with them. I mentioned also our willingness to conclude a hot line arrangement.

Chou responded disingenuously that such agreements as accidental war and hot line did not really apply to them, since they had said they would never use nuclear weapons first. He said, more out of politeness than genuine interest, that he would accept the texts of possible agreements to look them over. I subsequently gave him the text of our accidental war agreement with the Soviet Union.

Chou referred to the Soviet proposal for a five power nuclear disarmament conference, and I recalled that we had in effect rejected this
proposal also. He then inquired about the new Soviet initiative in the United Nations for a *world disarmament conference*. I noted that although it was not a formal proposal, we would have to reply; I thought all countries, whether in the UN or not, would be included. When I asked about the Chinese attitude, he responded that he thought the Soviet proposal might be an attempt to reply to the Chinese initiative for a world nuclear disarmament conference, but pointed out that the Soviet idea concerned general disarmament, not just nuclear disarmament. I commented that Khrushchev had made a similar proposal every year and we did not consider it very useful. Chou then labelled the Soviet proposal unrealistic and an exercise in firing an “empty cannon” (a phrase he had used to describe Chinese propaganda against the U.S.). Nobody really needed to pay attention to it; it would waste the time and energies of nations. I said that we would try to deflect discussion on this initiative into specific subjects and try to treat problems on a regional basis rather than on a global one.

Chinese coolness towards arms control was further demonstrated in the communiqué drafting process. I put into our drafts our willingness to sign with the PRC any arms control agreement that we had made with other major powers and Chou took this reference out. I think we have made a useful record in recent months of making clear to the Chinese that we are not trying to conclude arms control agreements at their expense, that we recognize their current lack of interest in the subject, and that we are always ready to conclude with them any agreement that we have made with the Soviet Union. While I do not think they will want to discuss these subjects seriously in the near future, our stand should be both reassuring to them and a clear demonstration of reasonableness and equal treatment.

American Prisoners in China

As in July, I waited until the final meeting to raise this subject and did so as asking the PRC a favor, not making a formal proposal. You will recall that the PRC holds four men: Downey (life) and Fecteau (20 years) downed on a CIA-sponsored flight in 1952; and Smith and Flynn (no charges), pilots in Vietnam who went over the border in 1965 and 1967 respectively. Since July, I had checked into the actual circumstances concerning Downey and Fecteau whom the Chinese had claimed were CIA agents. They indeed were, and CIA, for its part, would be willing for us to admit their activities if this were required to get the men

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14 See footnote 4, Document 155.
released.\textsuperscript{15} In my talks with Chou, I confined myself to saying that I had found that these men had engaged in activities that would be considered illegal by my country. I thus said that our plea had nothing to do with the justice of the case, on which we conceded that the Chinese had a correct legal position. However, if, as an act of clemency, the PRC would consider that they had been sufficiently punished, this would make a very good impression in the U.S.

Chou responded as follows:

—As he had said in July, the Chinese legal process permitted a shortening of sentences if the prisoners behaved well, which he further defined as confessing to crimes. In response to my question, he said that they had all confessed.

—In about two months time the PRC might consider lessening the sentence of some of the men who had behaved well and they would let us know later what they had in mind.

—They had released early this year the old man, Mr. Walsh. I said that we would do our best to see that anyone released would not engage in propaganda against the PRC, and Chou admitted that Walsh had behaved well since his release.

I then inquired about the two pilots; to my knowledge theirs were unintended intrusions into Chinese territory and they were victims of the war. Chou replied that Peking had to deal with these men “in a different light.” If the pilots were released before the Vietnam war were concluded, this “might give a bad impression” (i.e., Peking believes it has enough trouble already with Hanoi).

Chou concluded by suggesting that they could move on the two agents first, pointing out that they had already served long sentences and that Fecteau’s term was almost completed. I said this would mean a great deal to the American people and we would treat any release as an act of clemency.

\textsuperscript{15} On September 9 Helms informed Kissinger: “This Agency feels that if it would help secure the release of these officers [John Thomas Downey and Richard George Fecteau], an admission to the Chinese of their affiliation with the Agency and the fact that they were on an intelligence mission at the time of their capture would not now present serious security problems.” (National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Agency Files, Box 208, CIA, Vol. IV, January–December 1971) For background to this issue, see Foreign Relations, 1952–1954, vol. XIV, Documents 406, 415, and 435. These two men were discussed during many of the U.S.–PRC ambassadorial talks held in Geneva and in Warsaw. An overview concerning all U.S. citizens held in China was transmitted in Airgram A–28 from Hong Kong, February 4. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970–73, POL 27–7) Nancy Oullette (standing in for Walters) in Paris was given a message by the PRC representative on December 10 stating that Fecteau and Maryann Harbert (who had been detained aboard a yacht in 1968) would be released on December 13. Downey’s life sentence was reduced to a 5-year term beginning in December 1971. Gerald Ross McLaughlin, who had been detained with Harbert, committed suicide in March 1969. The message from Oullette to Haig, undated, is ibid., Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 849, President’s File—China Trip, China Exchanges. See Foreign Relations, 1969–1976, vol. E–13, Document 72.
Thus in the near future we might expect a release of Fecteau and perhaps the shortening of Downey’s life sentence. If we can reach a settlement on the Indochina war, we could get the two pilots back as well. All of this may be possible without our having to make any public statements about the activities of our men. However, it is absolutely essential to keep this information secret, for any public disclosure of Chinese intentions would almost certainly wreck our chances for early releases.

Subsidiary Issues

I knew in advance that the Chinese would be cool to proposals in the commercial and exchange program fields. In the Warsaw talks they resisted our approach of focusing on these side issues, and they made the same point in a note this summer. Even now that we are talking about Taiwan and other major issues, they want to keep the emphasis there and away from areas which suggest a “normal” relationship.

I sought to meet this resistance head on in my opening statement by acknowledging their attitude and explaining ours. We considered progress in these fields not as a substitute for fundamental agreements but rather to give impetus to them. It would keep off balance those who wished to see the new U.S.–China dialogue fail. Chou and I agreed that such questions could be discussed by our assistants while we held private talks on the major issues.

These side discussions touched upon three questions: continuing U.S.–PRC contacts; exchanges between the two countries in the fields of science and technology, culture, sports, and journalism; and bilateral trade (in brief and low-key fashion).

On continuing contacts, the Chinese reaffirmed their backing of a proposal Chou had made in July—the sending of a high-level U.S. representative to the PRC from time to time. On several separate occasions I emphasized your preference for Ambassador Bruce, whom we hoped would be acceptable to Peking once the Indochina war was over. Chou did not confirm or deny acceptability. The Chinese were not interested in more formal contacts such as “liaison offices” or “interests sections” in friendly Embassies on the grounds that the liaison arrangement they had with Japan was entirely non-governmental and that the presence of a Chiang Kai-shek Embassy in Washington precluded their establishing an interests section here.

Cautious interest in exchanges was displayed by the Chinese. Our side explained the rationale for and outlined a broad spectrum of exchanges in a variety of areas, and the Chinese accepted a representative list of possible programs. They indicated that while there would be exchanges, these would be strictly non-government and limited in number from the Chinese side.
When we raised the subject of trade and said we were prepared to liberalize our restrictions further, they said bluntly that they had absolutely no interest in the matter. Indeed they were grateful that the USSR and the U.S. had caused them to be self-reliant.

Of possible follow-up interest was a strong statement against hijacking—whatever the motive—by Chou in one of our private meetings.

The Chinese disinterest in these subsidiary issues probably stems partly from a wish to focus more on the fundamental issues in the U.S.–PRC relationship, and partly from a desire to preserve as much ideological purity as feasible by not appearing to rush into a too-active program of contacts and exchanges with the U.S. As for trade, they may not have defined their goals and probably see little immediate potential in any event.

On the other hand, the Chinese appeared to appreciate our rationale for seeking to make some progress on subsidiary issues: that this would help make movement possible on the more fundamental questions and convince detractors of improved relations that gains could, in fact, be made from this course. Thus they included references in the draft communiqué to sending a periodic envoy to Peking and to facilitating exchange in various fields.
165. Memorandum From the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger) to President Nixon

Washington, undated.

SUBJECT

My October China Visit: Drafting the Communiqué

Prime Minister Chou En-lai and I negotiated a tentative draft communiqué for your China trip (attached at Tab A) in the course of going through seven drafts and eleven hours of meetings during the last two and a half days of my visit. During this process Chou was extremely tough and skillful but also reasonable and broad in outlook. The result of our efforts is an unusual communiqué that clearly states differences as well as common ground between the two countries and reassures the friends of both sides rather than raising anxieties because of the compromise language, which would be subject to varying interpretations. A communiqué along these lines should portray your conversations with Mao and Chou as being between leaders who stuck by their principles but had the largeness of perspective to move relations forward despite profound disagreements.

1 Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 1035, Files for the President—China Material, China, HAK’s October 1971 Visit. Top Secret; Sensitive; Exclusively Eyes Only.

2 On October 14 Nixon and Kissinger discussed the communiqué and upcoming talks with the People’s Republic of China. Nixon told Kissinger that “we’re in a stronger position, particularly in Cambodia, than they are, and a lot stronger than we were in October. I’d be tougher on Cambodia and I’d be tougher on Laos.” He continued: “But with Japan, I believe that we have got to frankly scare the bejeezus out of them more on Japan. It’s just my sense as I read through this [an early U.S. draft of the communiqué]. I can see what they’re doing. He’s [Chou En-lai] talking with strong language. But on the other hand, here’s the key thing, they have got to become convinced that a Japan and going further, a non-Communist Asia, without the United States is potentially more dangerous than an Asia with the United States. Now, you made that point, but I’d hit it right on the nose, say we’re going to stick around.” Later Nixon stated: “For example, we’ll take the Taiwan thing; we know what has to happen. Korea, we will work that out in an oral way. Except, I’d work that out orally. But also—But I would state very, very firmly, ‘Now look, the United States is a Pacific power and an Asian power, and we are going to maintain a presence there.’” (Ibid., White House Tapes, Recording of conversation between Nixon and Kissinger, October 14, 1971, 3:05–5:40 p.m., Old Executive Office Building, Conversation No. 289–18) The editor transcribed the portion of the conversation printed here specifically for this volume.

Our position on Taiwan (page 6) is the only remaining issue. Although we significantly narrowed our differences on this most painful issue, including a clear effort by Chou to show some restraint, I said that I could not accept the final Chinese compromise formulation, that I would have to check with you, and that we would go back to them with counter-language. The rest of the communiqué remains tentative, of course, and is subject to change because of events during the next four months and your talks with the Chinese leaders. But we now have a working draft which should be acceptable to both sides, though causing both some domestic problems, and which could never have been produced under the time and publicity pressure of your stay in China.

The Process

Tabling of Conventional U.S. Draft

As reported in separate memoranda, we spent the first three and a half days of talks establishing the basic framework of arrangements for your visit and exploring in depth the various substantive topics we had covered in July. With this backdrop I tabled a draft communiqué—which you had seen—the evening of October 22 (Tab G). It was highly conventional, stressing fuzzy areas of agreement and using vague generalizations. Its basic thrust was to glide over differences and emphasize common ground. I purposely held back our formulations on specific areas like Indochina, Korea, South Asia, or the military forces on Taiwan. On the evening of October 23, Chou gave me his initial reaction. It was that it could serve as a basis for discussion, that naturally they would want to add their views in some places to show differences, and that he would send his Acting Foreign Minister to undertake the redrafting process the next morning.

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4 Nixon and Kissinger also discussed Taiwan on October 14. Nixon supported the idea of stating that the PRC and ROC should agree that only one China existed, and that the United States and PRC “agree there should be a peaceful solution.” Kissinger pointed out that the PRC would not accept any commitment to a peaceful solution. He added that ending the U.S. treaty commitment to Taiwan “can’t even be considered now” and “the thing we have to hope for is that there will be an evolution that leads to a negotiation.” Kissinger feared that “one of two things are going to happen. After the election either Peking is going to get impatient and then there’s going to be a blow up in their relations with you because their demands [unintelligible]. Or Chiang will die and they’ll be negotiations. Or Mao and Chou will die and there’s such a goddamn turmoil in Peking that no one will know any more what the hell is going on any more.” Nixon replied: “So the only thing I think is that we have to remember that everything always comes out. I don’t think we can have a secret deal, if we sold out Taiwan, you understand? I know what we’re doing, but I want to be very careful.” (National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, White House Tapes, Recording of conversation between Nixon and Kissinger, October 14, 1971, 3:05–5:40 p.m., Old Executive Office Building, Conversation No. 289–18) The editor transcribed the portion of the conversation printed here specifically for this volume.
China, October 1971–February 1972

Sharp Chinese Response

On the morning of October 24, Chou showed up personally instead and delivered a scorching one-hour presentation—as he indicated—at the explicit instructions of Mao. His basic theme was that the Chinese believed in revolutionary progress rather than a Metternich-type peace that stressed stability at the expense of justice and was bound to be short-lived because of its essential oppressiveness. Progress required struggle not peace, or peace only after struggle. The world is in turmoil and the small would inevitably overturn the big. We could not continue to hang onto our old friends if we were entering a new era.

Chou clearly had been ordered by Mao to emphasize the Chinese revolutionary dogma and reject our effort to submerge differences and accent cooperation. He said that our basic approach was unacceptable. Our fundamental differences had to be set forth in a communiqué; otherwise the wording would have an “untruthful appearance.” Our present draft was the sort of banality the Soviets would sign but neither mean nor observe. The Chinese kept their promises; they were not afraid to state disagreements.

I replied very harshly, saying that Chou’s position hadn’t surprised me, but that such language of infallibility and preaching was intolerable for a communiqué. I pointed out that the Chinese wouldn’t respect us if we started our new relationship by betraying our old friends, and that problems had to be solved by history, not force. I said that we could accept the basic approach of each side’s stating its view so long as we also staked out common ground so as to indicate progress. I emphasized that we would reject language that tended to put us on trial or to humiliate an American President. After explaining the difficulties with drafting a communiqué from scratch during your visit, I concluded by saying that the choice was up to Chou, reminding him that he had said to an American group that it didn’t matter if your trip failed. Chou affirmed their wish for a successful visit and asked for a break. He then agreed to launch into a drafting process.

This exchange foreshadowed our basic positions in the negotiating process we then embarked upon. Chou’s emphasis was on sharp delineation of our respective positions while my objectives were to dilute the rhetoric and shorten the length of opposing views, and expand areas of agreement.

Chinese Counter-draft Stressing Differences

The Chinese worked on a draft all day and, after stuffing us with roast duck at a banquet, tabled their first draft that evening (Tab F). It contained very strong rhetoric on their general approach to international affairs and sharp formulations of Chinese views on specific issues. Despite my needling, Chou was at first reluctant to hand his
draft over. I responded that I agreed with the basic concept of both sides plainly stating their views and then common positions, but that the Chinese views were phrased in the most intransigent fashion and you would not travel all the way to China to hear propaganda that one could read in the newspapers.

I then voiced our principal objections. In the general section, we could not have an American President sign a document which said that revolution has become the irresistible trend of history or that “the people’s revolutionary struggles are just.” Nor would we brook reference to racial discrimination—while we were equally opposed to it, mention of it in this communiqué would be certainly interpreted as a critique of American domestic problems. There was almost no mention of agreed principles in international or bilateral relations.

On specific issues, the Chinese draft had us both stating that Vietnam was the most urgent question for the relaxation of tension in the Far East. It cited China as “the reliable rear area” and Chinese backing for the Indochinese peoples’ “fighting to the end for the attainment of their goal”—clearly unacceptable phrasing while Americans were dying or held prisoner in Indochina. The Chinese called for the complete withdrawal of U.S. troops from South Korea and Japan and the unconditional return of Okinawa. The draft had both sides agreeing that Taiwan is the “crucial issue” obstructing normalization of bilateral relations. And the Chinese had linked periodic visits of U.S. envoys to progress on Taiwan; this I rejected too.

I stated that the total impact of their draft would be disastrous and inconsistent with our self-respect—the rhetoric must be toned down and some progress shown. I delayed our scheduled departure from the next morning to the next afternoon. Our side then went back to our Guest House to redraft the better part of the night.

Muting the Rhetoric and Expanding the Positive

Our counter-draft (Tab E), which we presented the morning of October 25, took out their most offensive language, put in our own positions and beefed up areas of agreement. On specific regional issues we kept the structure of each side’s expressing its views and then a common position, albeit rather vapidly. I defined our objective as being to state differences without being offensive and showing a positive direction without raising false hopes. I again put off our departure, to the next morning. The Chinese took our draft away, and we once again endured a lengthy wait until dinner time that night when we got the second Chinese draft (Tab D).

Because of time pressure we had but two hours to deal with what remained a tough version. There was still much objectionable Chinese rhetoric and not enough positive material. The Chinese had also changed the structure, lumping regional issues with general
views under each side’s position and not attempting to state explicit agreed positions on these specific questions. Chou explained his reasons:

(1) We should not state common positions for appearance sake, but only when they in fact exist—this wasn’t really the case for the regional issues.

(2) The agreements were so vague as to lead each side to explain its position in contradictory manner giving rise to post-summit controversy.

(3) It gave impressions of Sino–U.S. condominium which was in neither party’s interest.

I pointed out with melancholy that the Chinese draft still accentuated our differences in provocative fashion. We had to decide whether we were starting a new period in our relationship or employing new tactics in a continuing struggle. We would be condemned for signing such a document which still had a largely negative cast to it, appealed to revolution, and spoke of supporting the Vietnamese people to the end. I then gave them our third draft (Tab C) proposing once again reduction of their offensive phrasing, e.g. on revolution and backing the Indochinese peoples’ struggles, and restoring some positive language of agreement. I also was somewhat more forthcoming on Taiwan which now was clearly emerging as the most difficult issue. Making clear that I was stretching my instructions, I used language that said the U.S. would not challenge (rather than merely noting) the views of all Chinese that there is but one China and indicated progressive reduction of U.S. forces on Taiwan.

During two hours of sparring Chou elaborated some of the philosophic underpinning of their approach to the communiqué. He drew a clear distinction between principle and policy execution, in effect paralleling our approach that we could set a course on certain issues but time was needed to resolve them. In this session particularly, but also in others, he emphasized that while they had to have principles like troop withdrawals or sovereignty over Taiwan, they clearly could do without time deadlines. They were in no hurry but the direction must be clear. Chou was startlingly frank and concrete with respect to our military withdrawal from Taiwan—not only would they not press for a timetable, they actually preferred that some U.S. forces remain so as to keep the Japanese forces out!

After very candid exchanges, the Chinese took away our draft for revision at 11:35 p.m.

Agreement on a Tentative Draft

At 4:45 a.m., October 26, we were given a third Chinese draft (Tab B) which was a considerable improvement. It muted some of their rhetoric in the direction of our changes and kept most of our additions
of positive language. On Taiwan, they clearly made an effort but their formulation was still beyond what I could accept.

We met at 5:30 a.m. with four or five fundamental issues remaining. I pointed to a few phrases which remained annoying and to the deletion of our reference to our honoring our commitments to Korea.

Chou said that it was a difficult situation because they had accepted without change our statements of principle, such as individual freedom and peaceful competition (this was true) while we were trying to dilute their formulations. There was no question that the two sides have deep differences and they should be stated. He suggested that it was extremely difficult to reach agreed language before I left, that this text was tentative, and that some work could be left until your visit. I rejoined that the more we could settle now the better. Chou agreed but stressed the need for confidentiality. He then again displayed reasonableness as he made a further effort to curb some of their language and agreed to restoration of our Korean language.

We also had another long exchange on Taiwan during which he made clear he could budge no further. He pointed out that they had used great restraint on this question, had thought hard about reformulations which could meet our concern, and were not stipulating any timetables. However, there had to be some concreteness or the Chinese people would not understand. He agreed with me that their objective was to be explicit on this question while ours was to be ambiguous. In turn I said I was already operating on the margin of my authority with the formulation I had proposed and was extremely doubtful that you would consider their language. We left it that I would discuss this with you and might propose a new formulation, in which case they might be able to change a couple of words.

By 8:10 a.m., we had reached agreement on the tentative draft at Tab A except for Taiwan (underlined portion) as well as cleaning up remaining technical issues such as public announcements and statements. I reaffirmed to Chou that knowledge of this communiqué would be confined to the White House. They clearly want secrecy about this document for the same reasons we do, as well as not to derogate from Mao’s authority before he has had a chance to talk to you.

The Result

The draft communiqué should serve us better than the conventional type which contains contrived and ambiguous language. It is an honorable document in which both sides vigorously and inoffensively set forth their differing views on the world scene and specific issues. This reflects the basic reality, which you have been stressing, that there

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5 Printed in the text below in italics.
are fundamental differences between us and the Chinese. The communiqué then states how despite these differences, we have common interests in our conduct of international relations and bilateral dealings and how we propose to further them. There is thus both realism and forward movement.

This paper should prove more reassuring to our friends than a blander document where they would search for hidden meanings or understandings. U.S.–PRC joint positions on such questions as Indochina, Japan and Korea would be all but meaningless given our differences and could only be expressed in language that each side could interpret as it wished. Such agreements would either be an artful exercise in semantics or suggest we and the PRC were negotiating on behalf of third countries (which, moreover, the communiqué states that we won't do).

Instead, while the PRC supports its allies, we go clearly on record as honoring our commitments to Korea and placing the highest value on our relationship with Japan and honoring our mutual defense treaty obligations. On the Asian subcontinent our neutrally-phrased position compares with Peking's pro-Pakistan stance—this should help us marginally with India while not really hurting us with Pakistan, for whom we remain the only real Western friend. On Indochina, we restate our standard position, and this issue may well have been transformed by the time of your visit.

Some of the Chinese rhetoric in the document is unpleasant and this, combined with what inevitably will be a painful section on Taiwan, will cause us some problems. But Chou took out the most offensive language such as supporting revolutions and opposing racial discrimination and generally rounded off the Chinese statements so that they are very mild in comparison to standard Maoist expressions.

The Chinese hardly need the communiqué as a propaganda vehicle. They have many other instruments for that purpose (including now the United Nations). Indeed the language on Chinese positions, while naturally still grating on American ears, can only look restrained to any audience familiar with the usual public lines. In fact, it is difficult to see how Chou could have gone much further on the language and still preserved his international and domestic positions. He recognized the points I made about our own domestic problems and took them into account in his redrafting. Furthermore while he let us edit his formulations, he did not attempt to change ours—he even reinserted some language of ours that we had dropped because we had deleted some of their phrases.

Another positive element was Chou’s restraint in terms of making any demands on us. While there is some vigorous rhetoric on general principles, the Chinese do not, for example, specifically call for the withdrawal of our forces from Korea or Japan. Indeed Chou time and
again emphasized that, while in principle foreign forces should be withdrawn, the PRC was not specifying any time limits.

Thus the Chinese are willing to pursue their objectives by banking on the thrust of history. They will continue to be tough, but they essentially accept our arguments that we can often do more than we say, that the process must be gradual, and that some issues must be left to evolutionary pressures. This involves great risks for them, at home and abroad, given their past public demands and dissidents in their own camp.

Furthermore, they are clearly gambling on your re-election. Chou specifically pointed out toward the end that they could be in real trouble if your Administration was not in power to implement our understandings. He shares what he described as your wish that you preside over the 200th anniversary of America’s birth.

All of this does not mean that Chou was easy to deal with—he emphatically was not. But nevertheless he was able to empathize with our difficulties and he made an effort to produce language to meet our concerns. Nor is the communiqué without domestic and international problems. But it is fair to say that the problems for Chou and the PRC are at least as great.

In short, if we can navigate the Taiwan issue successfully, we should have a communiqué that is realistic, clear, dignified, reassuring to our friends and positive for the further development of U.S.–Chinese relations.

**Tab A**

**JOINT COMMUNIQUÉ (Tentative Draft)**


Accompanying the President on his visit were (Mrs. Nixon), U.S. Secretary of State William Rogers and Assistant to the President Dr. Henry A. Kissinger.

President Nixon met with Chairman Mao Tse-tung of the Communist Party of China on and . The two leaders held conversation for hours and had an exchange of views on Sino-U.S. relations and world affairs.

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6 A typewritten note at the top of the page reads: “Final Draft, 10/26–8:00 A.M.” The “Joint Statement Following Discussions with Leaders of the People’s Republic of China” (commonly known as the Shanghai Communiqué), February 27, 1972, is printed as Document 203.
During the visit, further talks were held between President Nixon and Premier Chou En-lai. The two sides held extensive, earnest and frank discussions on the normalization of relations between the United States of America and the People’s Republic of China, as well as on other matters of interest to both sides.

Also taking part in the talks on the Chinese side were:

Also taking part in the talks on the U.S. side were:

President Nixon and his party visited Peking and viewed cultural, industrial and agricultural sites, and they also toured _______ and _______ where, continuing discussions with Chinese leaders, they viewed similar places of interest.

During their meetings and talks, the leaders of China and the United States reviewed the international situation in which important changes are taking place and great upheavals exist and expounded their respective positions and views.

The Chinese side stated that wherever there is oppression, there is resistance. Countries want independence, nations want liberation and the people want progress—this has become the irresistible trend of history. All nations, big or small, should be equal; big nations should not bully the small and strong nations should not bully the weak. China will never be a superpower and it opposes hegemony and power politics of any kind. The Chinese side stated that it firmly supports the struggles of all the oppressed people and nations for freedom and liberation and that the people of all countries have the right to choose their social systems according to their own wishes and the right to safeguard the independence, sovereignty and territorial integrity of their own countries and oppose foreign aggression, interference, control and subversion. All foreign troops should be withdrawn to their own countries. The Chinese side expressed its firm support to the peoples of Viet Nam, Laos and Cambodia in their efforts for the attainment of their goal and its firm support to the seven-point proposal put forward by the Provisional Revolutionary Government of the Republic of South Viet Nam and the Joint Declaration of the Summit Conference of the Indochinese Peoples; it firmly supports the eight-point programme for the peaceful unification of Korea put forward by the Government of the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea on April 12, 1971 and the stand for the abolition of the “U.N. Commission for the Unification and Rehabilitation of Korea;” it firmly opposes the revival and outward expansion of Japanese militarism and firmly supports the Japanese people’s desire to build an independent, democratic, peaceful and neutral Japan; it firmly opposes anyone exploiting the situation in East Pakistan to interfere in Pakistan’s internal affairs, provoke armed conflicts and undermine peace in the Asian sub-continent.

The U.S. side stated that peace in Asia and peace in the world required efforts both to reduce immediate tensions and to eliminate the
basic causes of conflict. The U.S. side believes that the effort to reduce
tension is served by improving communication between countries that
have different world outlooks so as to lessen the risks of confrontation
through accident, miscalculation or misunderstanding. Countries should
treat each other with mutual respect and with a willingness to compete
peacefully, letting performance be the ultimate judge. No country should
claim infallibility and each country should be prepared to re-examine its
own attitudes for the common good. The U.S. side desires to work with
others to build a just and secure peace: just because it fulfills the aspi-
rations of peoples and nations for freedom and progress, secure because
it removes the danger of foreign aggression. The United States supports
individual freedom and social progress for all the peoples of the world,
free of outside pressure or intervention. The U.S. side stated that the peo-
pies of Indochina should be allowed to determine their destiny without
outside intervention; that its constant primary objective has been a ne-
gotiated solution, and that in the absence of a negotiated settlement it
envisaged the ultimate withdrawal of all U.S. forces from the region con-
sistent with the aim of true self-determination for each country of In-
dochina. The existing commitments between the U.S. and Republic of
Korea would be honored; the United States would support all efforts of
the Republic of Korea to seek a relaxation of the tension and increased
communication in the Korean peninsula. The United States placed the
highest value on its friendly relations with Japan and it would continue
to honor its mutual defense treaty obligations. The United States urged
India and Pakistan to resolve their differences through peaceful negoti-
ations; all attempts to use armed force to settle international problems
are contrary to the interests of the people of this region.

There are essential differences between China and the United
States in their social systems and foreign policies. However, the two
sides agreed that countries, regardless of their social systems, should
conduct their relations on the principles of respect for the sovereignty
and territorial integrity of all states, non-aggression against other states,
non-interference in the internal affairs of other states, equality and mu-
tual benefit, and peaceful coexistence. International disputes should be
settled on this basis, without resorting to the use or threat of force. The
United States and the People’s Republic of China are prepared to ap-
ply these principles to their mutual relations.

It would be against the interests of the peoples of the world for
any major country to collude with another against other countries, or
to behave in such a way as to suggest that it had an exclusive sphere
of interest.

With these principles of international relations in mind the two
sides stated that:

—progress toward the normalization of relations between China
and the United States is in the interests of all countries;
—both wish to reduce the danger of international military conflict;
—neither seeks hegemony in the Asia–Pacific region and each is opposed to efforts by any other country or group of countries to establish such hegemony; and
—neither is prepared to negotiate on behalf of any third party or to enter into agreements or understandings directed at other states.

The two sides reviewed the long-standing serious disputes between China and the United States. The Chinese side reaffirmed its position: The Taiwan question is the crucial question obstructing the normalization of relations between China and the United States; the Government of the People’s Republic of China is the sole legal Government of China; Taiwan is a part of Chinese territory which has long been returned to the motherland; the liberation of Taiwan is China’s internal affair in which no other country has the right to interfere; and the U.S. troops must withdraw from Taiwan. The Chinese Government firmly opposes any activities which aim at the creation of “one China, one Taiwan,” “one China, two governments,” “two Chinas,” an “independent Taiwan” or advocate that “the status of Taiwan remains to be determined.”

The U.S. side declared: The United States acknowledges that all Chinese on either side of the Taiwan Straits maintain there is but one China and that Taiwan is a province of China. The United States Government does not challenge that position; it hopes that the settlement of the Taiwan question consistent with this position will be achieved through peaceful negotiations and states that it will progressively reduce and finally withdraw all the U.S. troops and military installations from Taiwan.

The two sides agreed that pending the normalization of relations between the two countries, the Governments of the two countries would respectively take measures to facilitate the exchange of visits between the two peoples and their contacts in the scientific, technical, journalistic and cultural fields.

The two sides agreed that the U.S. Government will send a senior representative to Peking at irregular intervals for concrete consultations to further the normalization of relations and carry forward negotiations on issues of common interest.

The two sides were gratified to have this opportunity, after so many years without contact between the leaders of their two countries, to present frankly to one another their respective views on a variety of issues. The two sides expressed the hope that the gains achieved during this visit would open up new prospects for the relations between the two countries. They believe that the normalization of relations between the two countries is not only in the interest of the Chinese and American peoples but also contributes to the relaxation of tension in Asia and the world.
President Nixon and his party expressed their appreciation for the gracious hospitality shown them by the Government and people of the People’s Republic of China.

166. Paper Prepared by the National Security Council Staff

Washington, undated.

Concrete Commitments to the PRC Made During HAK October 1971 Visit

1. We will propose within 10 days a proposed date, within November 20–24 period, for the announcement of the date for the President’s visit.2

2. We will provide Dr. Kissinger’s October 27 briefing transcript to the Chinese as soon as possible.

3. We will consider Taiwan language and if we have a concrete formula will give it to the Chinese, either via General Haig or perhaps just before President’s visit. Also we must decide whether to keep our language about reducing risk of war through accident or miscalculation.

4. HAK will look into the recent demonstration at U.N. headquarters (and allegedly throughout US and other countries) on behalf of the Taiwan Independence Movement, to see who was behind it and if it were premeditated and global. We will let Chinese know the results of the investigation.

5. HAK will confirm with President and let Chinese know what our position would be if another government raises the point that the

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1 Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 1035, Files for the President—China Material, China, HAK’s October 1971 Visit. Top Secret; Sensitive; Exclusively Eyes Only. No drafting information appears on the memorandum. The only notation is a handwritten “W Lord.” An updated and more detailed paper, “Checklist of Understandings with PRC,” was prepared by Lord on March 16, 1972. It included commitments made during the February 1972 trip to the PRC and listed the date and persons involved, the nature of the agreement, and status. (Ibid., Kissinger Office Files, Box 87, Country Files, Far East, Commitments to the PRC) An updated version of the March report, June 17, 1972, is ibid. See Foreign Relations, 1969–1976, vol. E–13, Document 116.

2 See footnote 7, Document 164.
status of Taiwan is undetermined. HAK said that we would never encourage 2 China or 1 China, 1 Taiwan movement and would attempt to bring about a solution within the framework of 1 China by peaceful means, but he had to check on what tactically we would say if another government raised the Taiwan status issue.

6. HAK will let Chinese know if Kishi conversations dealt with U.N./Taiwan question or other relevant issue. HAK said he thought Kishi talks centered on economic issues.

7. We are trying to stop possible Chinese nationalist plane overflight of China designed to complicate US–PRC relations. If it occurs it will be without our permission and against our opposition.

8. HAK will make full review of reconnaissance flights like CINCPAC’s SR–71 plane during HAK visit. Until HAK’s return these were stopped.4

9. We will let PRC know whether Mrs. Nixon will go to China.5

10. We will let Chinese know the length of visit and number of stops, including whether Hangchow is to be included.

11. HAK will discuss with the President the issue of what plane he uses to travel within China.

12. We will provide technical information on ground station and the equipment which will be in the 747.

13. We will let Chinese know if our current Mideast negotiating effort shows any chance of success.

14. We are studying UNCURK question and will let Chinese know results of our study either through channel or at very latest when President goes to China.

3 Japanese Prime Minister Kishi met with Haig and Nixon on October 22 and discussed textiles, Okinawa, Chinese representation in the UN, the President’s upcoming trip to the PRC and Soviet Union, and other topics. Two memoranda of conversation, October 22, are in National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, White House Special Files, President’s Office Files, Box 86, Memoranda for the President.

4 On October 22 Haig informed Kissinger in Beijing (apparently in response to a query from Kissinger) that one SR–71 mission flew over Southeast Asia on October 21, passing as close as 40 nautical miles to the PRC–DRV border and 20 nautical miles from Hainan Island. Haig wrote: “We are holding such flights until further notice. You will not be pleased to learn that this series of flights apparently is not covered or reviewed in any way by 40 Committee. It is a CINCPAC operation.” (Ibid., NSC Files, Box 1035, Files for the President—China Material, China, HAK’s October 1971 Visit)

5 See footnote 7, Document 164.
In October 1971 the People’s Republic of China (PRC) replaced the Republic of China (ROC) in the United Nations General Assembly and Security Council. As documented in *Foreign Relations, 1969–1976, volume V*, most of the maneuvering in the United Nations concerned the Important Question and Albanian Resolutions. Items placed before the United Nations General Assembly (UNGA) that were Important Questions (IQs) required a two-thirds majority to pass. In December 1961 the General Assembly approved a resolution sponsored by the United States, Australia, Colombia, Italy, and Japan, making the issue of Chinese representation an Important Question, thus reducing the likelihood of the Republic of China’s expulsion. (UNGA 1961, United Nations doc. A/L 372, Resolution 1668 (XVI), adopted on December 15, 1961) The Albanian Resolution, so named for one of its primary sponsors, called for expelling the ROC and seating the PRC in the General Assembly and Security Council. Until the 1963 General Assembly session the Soviet Union had been a sponsor of the Albanian Resolution. After 1963 the Soviets voted for, but did not sponsor, the resolution.

On September 17, 1969, the General Assembly agreed to consider the Albanian Resolution, sponsored by 13 other nations as well as Albania, entitled “Restoration of the lawful rights of the People’s Republic of China.” On October 17 the United States, joined by 17 other nations, introduced a resolution reaffirming the 1961 General Assembly decision that China’s representation was an Important Question. For the first time, the Soviet Union did not speak publicly in support of PRC admittance into the United Nations. The U.S.-sponsored Important Question Resolution passed on November 11 by a vote of 71 to 48, with 4 abstentions. However, the Albanian Resolution also garnered a slim majority. An attempt in the Assembly’s Credentials Committee to declare invalid the credentials of the ROC was defeated by a vote of 5 to 3, with 1 abstention. See Department of State, Bureau of International Organization Affairs, *U.S. Participation in the U.N.: Report by the President to the Congress for the Year 1969*, Department of State Publication 8540, October 1970, pages 59–62.

In 1970 the United States and its supporters continued to support the Important Question Resolution. On November 20 the resolution passed 66 to 52, with 7 abstentions. The Albanian Resolution also passed 51 to 49, with 25 abstentions. The Soviet Union requested a vote in the Credentials Committee on ROC representation. The measure to accept the ROC credentials passed on October 26, by a vote of 5 to 2, with 1 abstention. See *Yearbook of the United Nations, 1970*, volume 24 (New York: United Nations Office of Public Information, 1972), pages 194–200.

Department of State officials struggled in July and August to obtain ROC acceptance of a plan to allow the People’s Republic of China
China, October 1971–February 1972

to enter the United Nations (and almost certainly obtain a seat on the Security Council) while the Republic of China would remain in the General Assembly. Secretary of State William Rogers met with ROC diplomats in late July, stating that the “only chance of preserving membership of ROC in UN is for US to support a resolution which would provide representation for your government and government of Peking and at least to acquiesce in majority view that government in Peking should hold seat on SC.” (Reported in telegram 139288 to Taipei, July 31; National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970–73, UN 6 CHICOM)

President Nixon and his Assistant for National Security Affairs Henry Kissinger wanted the Department of State to take the lead on the UN fight, telling Ambassador to the UN George H.W. Bush to “fight hard” to keep the ROC in the General Assembly. (Ibid., Nixon Presidential Materials, White House Tapes, Recording of conversation among Nixon, Kissinger, and Bush, September 30, 1971, 9:22–9:54 a.m., Oval Office, Conversation No. 581–2) The President asked Rogers to handle the UN issue: “I think getting me involved puts in too direct a deal, particularly when we’re working out the Peking, too direct a case and I’m just, you know, they’ll try to play it as if we’re playing it against Peking, which is really not the case.” (Ibid., Recording of conversation between Nixon and Rogers, October 17, 1971, 6:13–6:26 p.m., White House Telephone, Conversation No. 11–105) On another occasion, Nixon told Rogers that he wanted to avoid personal involvement in the UN issue, and he wished to enable Rogers to gain support from conservatives for his role in attempting to keep the Republic of China in the United Nations. (Ibid., October 14, 1971, 3:05–5:40 p.m., Old Executive Office Building, Conversation No. 289–18)

The timing of the UN vote on Chinese representation and Kissinger’s October trip to the People’s Republic of China became a source of concern as it became apparent that the vote would be held earlier than U.S. officials had anticipated—in late October rather than in November. In numerous conversations, Nixon and Kissinger wondered whether the trip would reduce the chances for the ROC to remain in the United Nations. On September 30 Kissinger concluded that “I think basically the votes are set now. I do not think that objectively it affects the votes of anybody.” Nixon responded: “I know that, I know that. People will use things for excuses.” They also debated attempting to change the date of Kissinger’s trip to China but felt that going to the People’s Republic of China immediately after defeat in the United Nations would be even more difficult. Ultimately Kissinger felt that there was little chance of winning the UN vote: “I mean I thought as long as we were going to lose we were better off losing on the old stand. But I think we’re farther behind than they [the Department of State officials] think. You have to consider that these diplomats, when they talk to us, they’ll try to make it sound as good as possible. Why annoy us for weeks before the vote?” (Ibid.,
Recording of conversation between Nixon and Kissinger, September 30, 1971, 2:25–2:50 p.m., Oval Office, Conversation No. 582–3)

On October 12 NSC Staff Secretary Jeanne Davis sent a memorandum to Department of State Executive Secretary Theodore Eliot for distribution to all diplomatic posts: “You may be asked by host governments about ChiRep implications of Kissinger trip to Peking at end of this month. If so, you should stress that sole purpose of trip is to make arrangements for Presidential visit and that there is no connection between Kissinger trip and ChiRep issue. The U.S. is firmly supporting the continued membership of the ROC in the UN.” (Ibid., NSC Files, Kissinger Office Files, Box 87, Country Files, China Trip, October 1971)

Nixon was not optimistic concerning the future of the Republic of China in the United Nations, stating on one occasion that “my view is that the time for Taiwan to go out is next year, it shouldn’t go this year, it’s not good for the Chinese.” (Ibid., White House Tapes, Recording of conversation between Nixon and Kissinger, October 14, 1971, 3:05–5:40 p.m., Old Executive Office Building, Conversation No. 289–18) On October 25 the General Assembly approved the motion for priority (61 in favor, 53 opposed, 17 abstentions), then defeated the Important Question Resolution (55, 59, 15). Bush’s motion for a separate vote on expulsion of the Republic of China lost (51, 61, 16), and the Albanian Resolution was adopted (76, 35, 17). Information on the debate and final vote is in Yearbook of the United Nations, 1971, volume 25 (New York: Office of Public Information, United Nations, 1974), pages 126–137.

168. National Intelligence Estimate¹


COMMUNIST CHINA’S WEAPONS PROGRAM FOR STRATEGIC ATTACK

[Omitted here are the table of contents and a 1-page “Note on the Evidence.”]

¹ Source: Central Intelligence Agency, Job 79R1012, NIC Files. Top Secret. According to a note on the covering sheet, the Central Intelligence Agency and intelligence organizations of the Departments of State and Defense, the NSA, and the AEC participated in the preparation of this estimate. All members of the USIB concurred with the estimate except for the representative from the FBI, who abstained on the grounds that the subject was outside his jurisdiction. For the full text of this NIE, see Tracking the Dragon, p. 678
SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS

The Stage and Direction of the Chinese Effort

A. After some 15 years of effort, China is now beginning to deploy strategic weapon systems. Starting from scratch with a limited industrial, technical, and scientific base, and denied Soviet assistance after 1960, the Chinese had to proceed on their own with the development of requisite skills, the construction of basic facilities, and the design and testing of nuclear weapons and delivery systems.

B. China clearly intends to attain the status of a major nuclear power, accepting the economic burden involved and the risks of slowing basic economic development through diversion of scarce resources and skills to specialized defense tasks. This is evident on the China scene today where activity in both general purpose and strategic military programs is at an all time high. Though any forecast of China’s future must allow for additional periods of disruption and upset, it seems reasonable to assume that the existing high priority for strategic programs will endure in the years ahead.

C. Obviously, China’s efforts in the military field will be limited by available skills and resources. But we lack the data to place any useful ceiling on the level of the Chinese effort. Based on the pattern of Chinese military programs to date, the Chinese seem sensitive to the dangers of trying too much too fast in their strategic programs in a country whose population growth threatens continuously to outstrip economic growth. While stressing the wide-ranging and ambitious nature of China’s present effort, we should also stress its relatively moderate pace. The Chinese have been deliberate in testing weapon systems and in no apparent rush to undertake costly and large-scale deployment of weapon systems of limited capabilities. No doubt the large issues of priorities and costs serve to trouble Chinese internal politics at the highest levels, [1½ lines of source text not declassified].

D. No elaboration of the rationale for developing a strategic force nor any discussion of strategic doctrine has appeared in China. Evidently some principles other than Mao’s “peoples’ war” doctrine guide the costly and wide-ranging strategic weapon programs now underway in China. It seems most likely that Peking seeks through the development of a substantial nuclear force to enhance its claim to great power status, to deter the USSR and the US from the resort to force against China, and to insure for China a leading and dominant political role in Asia.

Strategic Missiles

E. It is probable that China has now deployed some CSS–1 medium-range ballistic missiles (MRBMs), [1 line of source text not declassified]. This missile has a range of about 600 n.m. and probably uses
non-storable liquid propellants. We estimate that there might be about 10 units deployed [less than 1 line of source text not declassified].

F. A second missile, the CSS–2, has a range of at least 1,400 n.m. and probably uses storable propellants. We believe that the development stage of this system is well advanced and that it probably has reached the point of deployment, although there is uncertainty about this. While the CSS–2 is superior to the CSS–1 in range and reaction time, it probably does not incorporate any great improvement in accuracy [2 lines of source text not declassified].

G. The Chinese are developing another liquid-propellant missile. This missile, which appears to have sufficient range to provide full coverage of the USSR, could be ready for deployment by late 1973 or early 1974. This system, referred to as the “Ching-yu” missile, is a two-stage vehicle with the first stage probably incorporating the design and technology of the CSS–2. Its maximum range is unknown, but our calculations, [less than 1 line of source text not declassified] suggest that any capability against the continental US would be marginal at most.

H. Further down the road, China is almost certain to deploy a large intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM) capable of full coverage of the continental US. China could have a large, liquid-propellant ICBM ready for deployment as early as 1974 but more likely a year or two later. When full range testing into the Pacific or the Indian Ocean occurs, we should be able to learn more about the performance of the system and to make more confident estimates of its probable initial operational capability.²

I. In addition to these four liquid-propellant missiles, China has a large and ambitious program underway for the development and production of strategic missiles using solid propellants. If flight testing begins within a year, solid-propellant strategic missiles—most likely in the MRBM or IRBM class—might be ready for deployment as early as 1974, but 1975 or 1976 is more likely in view of the special problems involved.

Submarines

J. China has also shown an interest in nuclear-powered ballistic missile submarines (SSBNs), and it is building shipyards which appear capable of producing and servicing such submarines. We judge that China could have SSBNs equipped with solid- or liquid-propellant missiles as early as 1976. But this would require a crash effort and early success in overcoming a multitude of support, training, and operational

² Smith of the NSC Staff had written to Kissinger on April 7, 1971, informing him of 1970 tests of what was probably the PRC’s first ICBM. (National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 522, Country Files, Far East, China, Vol. VI)
problems. Thus, even if they now have a prototype under construction, the first Chinese SSBN probably will not be operational until after 1976.

Bombers

K. Production of TU–16 medium bombers began in late 1968 and has reached a level of two per month. About 30 of these aircraft are now operational. The TU–16 can carry a 6,600 pound bombload to a radius of about 1,650 n.m., but it is relatively slow and highly vulnerable to sophisticated air defenses. While there is no doubt that some TU–16 crews are now sufficiently trained to deliver thermonuclear (TN) bombs to designated targets, it will be at least a year and probably longer before the Chinese have two or three regiments with crews trained to perform coordinated missions against modern air defenses.

Nuclear Bombs and Warheads

L. To arm its delivery systems, China has concentrated successfully on the development of a [less than 1 line of source text not declassified] TN device and could now have bombs and warheads with this yield in stockpile. It could also have fission weapons [less than 1 line of source text not declassified]. It is likely that the Chinese are working to expand production of fissionable materials, and although there is a broad range of possible error in estimating the output of these materials, it seems clear that China will have ample fissionable material, particularly after 1973, to arm the strategic delivery systems it is likely to deploy.

Space

M. The two earth satellites launched by China over the past 18 months marked the beginning of what probably will be an ambitious space program. Over the next few years, we expect continued launches involving larger and increasingly sophisticated payloads, partly in response to urgent military needs for targeting and geodetic data.

Projected Forces

N. We expect whatever strategic forces China now has deployed to be augmented gradually over the next two years, principally by a build-up of CSS–2 units and by the continued series production of TU–16 medium bombers. Beyond 1973 and for the period five years ahead, there is much uncertainty (Section VI attempts to project to that period). But one thing is certain: the force will be weighted heavily on the side of systems capable only of reaching targets in Asia (including US installations there) and the USSR. A capability against the continental US may begin to emerge, however, toward the end of this period.
[Omitted here is a 39-page Discussion section, which was divided into the following sections: I. Communist China’s Nuclear Weapons Capabilities; II. Communist China’s Strategic Missile Program; III. China’s Bomber Force; IV. Ballistic Missile Submarine Systems; V. China’s Nascent Space Program; and VI. Projected Strategic Forces.]

169. Memorandum of Conversation

Washington, October 29, 1971, 5:23–6:03 p.m.

PARTICIPANTS
Chow Shu-kai, Foreign Minister, Republic of China
James Shen, ROC Ambassador to U.S.
Henry A. Kissinger, Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs
John H. Holdridge, Senior Staff Member NSC

SUBJECT
Mr. Kissinger’s Visit to Peking, the UN Vote on Chirep, and U.S.–ROC Relations

Ambassador Shen asked Mr. Kissinger how his trip to Peking was. Mr. Kissinger said that he wished that he could inform his visitors that Chinese hospitality no longer existed on the Mainland, but he was, in fact, treated very well. However, he wanted to tell them on behalf of the President and of himself personally that he and the President couldn’t feel worse about the UN vote, and couldn’t understand why it had come so quickly. Why had this been? Foreign Minister Chow explained that the other side had wanted to exploit the atmosphere in the UN, which was favorable, and at the last moment had withdrawn a number of speakers. In addition, some of those who spoke had shortened their speeches.

Mr. Kissinger interjected at this point to ask how many people in Taiwan would receive reports of the present conversation. Foreign Minister Chow said that he would send the report only to President Chiang and the Prime Minister.

1 Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 522, Country Files, Far East, China, Vol. IX, Secret; Sensitive. The time of the meeting is taken from Kissinger’s Record of Schedule. (Library of Congress, Manuscript Division, Kissinger Papers, Box 438, Miscellany, 1968–1976, Record of Schedule) Chow and Shen also met with Rogers, Pedersen, Green, De Palma, and Moser at the Department of State on October 29. The 4-page memorandum of this conversation is in National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970–73, UN 6 CHICOM.
Mr. Kissinger then went on to say that he had been given to understand that the vote at the earliest would be on October 29. He had heard from Ambassador Bush that the vote would probably be on the 2nd or 3rd of November, and under these circumstances he had thought that if he could come back and say he had been received well at the same time that the vote was being prepared, he could demonstrate that the vote had not been influenced by his visit and turn it into a plus. In fact, he had considered going to New York himself for this purpose.2 Therefore, he had been stunned when he had received word that the vote had taken place.3

Continuing, Mr. Kissinger explained that his second visit to Peking had been arranged last summer, but when the coincidence of the UN vote with the second trip became apparent, he had had a meeting with Ambassador Bush, who had said he couldn’t delay the beginning of the debate but could string out the proceedings—this was easy. He, Mr. Kissinger, personally didn’t know the situation in “that madhouse” (the UN), but thought that this would have been possible. He realized that the ROC could not agree with what we were doing with Peking, but the last thing we wanted was to have the ROC out of the UN. In fact, in February and March the President and he were sitting on everything concerning the UN vote so as to delay it as long as possible. Then, as the ROC knew, we had sent a special emissary to Taiwan. Mr. Kissinger indicated he had felt earlier that once the ROC’s position had changed, it would be done for.

Mr. Kissinger noted that it had never come into anybody’s mind that the UN vote would take place while he was in Peking. As he had told the Ambassador, whatever he had done, he had done openly. He was not the ROC problem; he didn’t want the ROC out of the UN, nor did any people deserve what had happened less than they.

Foreign Minister Chow asked, had Mr. Kissinger been surprised at the outcome? The Foreign Minister referred to Mr. Kissinger’s remark that once the ROC position had changed, it would be done for. Mr. Kissinger explained that he had meant maybe over the next five years, in which time many other things could happen. What he questioned was the strategical judgment which we had used, that is, was it right to move with so much publicity, rather than to work quietly with some centers so we could take a position not so visible out in front? Starting from early September, we might have talked to somebody like Lee Kuan-yew, who didn’t want the PRC in the UN.4

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2 Kissinger’s handwritten addition to this sentence reads: “while in Peking.”
3 Kissinger’s handwritten addition to this sentence reads: “was [unintelligible].”
4 Kissinger wrote next to this sentence: “and promised him advanced warning if we changed our position. He could care less about all our legal arguments.”
Foreign Minister Chow expressed agreement, but noted that in Singapore’s vote Lee Kuan-yew had to go along with Malaysia.

Mr. Kissinger declared that he did not blame himself for being in Peking; his visit was ambiguous, and could have worked as much for the ROC as against it. Peking also found it troublesome, because the leaders there had to explain to their own people why they were talking to him at the same time we were voting against them at the UN. He did feel badly, though, about our tactics. Looking over the list of the countries who voted against us, it was hard to see why a miserable country like Guyana, which we could buy, voted against us. Mr. Kissinger observed that there was no sense in making a foreign policy issue out of this, and he didn’t want to be crude, but there were ways of handling this sort of thing. But when we went the diplomatic route, things were different. Take Lee Kuan-yew, for example; the only thing of interest about him was whether he would be left high-and-dry if we changed our position. Going through the list of those who voted against us, we had killed ourselves by using normal diplomatic channels. What he, Mr. Kissinger, deserved criticism for was that he had not supervised our tactics as much as he should. Two months ago he had asked Ambassador Bush for a list of those whom he thought would support us, and some countries clearly shouldn’t have been on it. For example, Cyprus, where Makarios has two nationalities to deal with; he couldn’t agree to dual representation. Mr. Kissinger remarked that he didn’t know what had happened in the case of Trinidad and Tobago, but he had felt that Belgium, also with two distinct elements in its population, wouldn’t vote for us even though it had been listed as doing so.

Foreign Minister Chow stated that Belgium had changed its vote at the last minute. Mr. Kissinger retorted that many countries had voted the way they intended to, but had made the judgment that if they were going to get the U.S. sore, it would be better to get us sore at the last minute. Returning to the question of whether he had been surprised at the outcome of the vote or not, Mr. Kissinger said that he had sent back a cable from Peking to delay the vote unless we were certain we could win, and when this cable had been sent on Wednesday night, he had thought we were indeed going to win. It should have been possible in this nut house to be able to find a means of delay. To be candid, he was really mad.

Foreign Minister Chow mentioned that the UN now had a weak President, who didn’t know the procedures. Mr. Kissinger said, yes, this was Malik, whom he knew. Foreign Minister Chow thought that

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5 Reference is to Adam Malik, Indonesian Minister of Foreign Affairs and President, 26th Session of the UN General Assembly.
Malik may have been scared and unwilling to offend people such as the Russians. There were, of course, many ways of bringing about a delay. Mr. Kissinger asserted that if he had been given the assignment, he could certainly have stretched out the debate. The last two days were too late, however. His instructions of September 29 were to get the vote into November. He didn’t care how, but didn’t have to rack his brain—it would have been possible to delay the Political Committee for a few days. The airplane business could have been gotten in (the hi-jacking of a 747 to Cuba), and a Security Council meeting convened. No one should say that we couldn’t screw it up; we had done so hundreds of times.

Mr. Kissinger added that when he had gotten the message about the vote he had been absolutely beside himself. He believed that if he had had a week in between, the situation would have been different. He didn’t know how he would have gone about it, but countries such as Guyana wouldn’t have played around. Keeping the ROC in the UN was something which we wanted, and which State wanted, but we had gotten the rug pulled out from under us at the ROC’s expense. Mr. Kissinger hoped that the Foreign Minister and the Ambassador would not report all of what he had said. Foreign Minister Chow remarked that there were no Chinese expressions to parallel many of the expressions used by Mr. Kissinger. Ambassador Shen said that the report of this conversation would be sent only to President Chiang.

Foreign Minister Chow raised the question of where we would go from here. Mr. Kissinger declared that we were not going to give up in Peking our defense commitment to the ROC.\textsuperscript{6} Foreign Minister Chow should tell his President and Prime Minister that this wasn’t going to happen, and that he wanted them to know this. As to where we would go from here, we would certainly maintain our usual cordial relations. If Ambassador Shen invited him to dinner and put this in the papers, he would be delighted.

Mr. Kissinger asked Foreign Minister Chow if he, himself, had been surprised at the vote. Foreign Minister Chow replied that, frankly, he had not been surprised—he had thought from the beginning that the trend was against them. Mr. Kissinger referred to the fact that one of those voting against the ROC was Botswana, a country of only 300,000 people. Foreign Minister Chow noted that the ROC had an Ambassador in Botswana, and also had sent an agricultural team there. Mr. Kissinger remarked that countries such as Botswana and Guyana drove him crazy—they had no business voting against us. We couldn’t do much about the Arab states, although countries such as Oman and

\textsuperscript{6} This sentence was underlined in an unknown hand.
Qatar probably didn’t know where China was. All these were countries which had leaped to his, Mr. Kissinger’s mind. Anyway, he hadn’t gone into our tactics, and had assumed that our experts knew what they were doing. He had suffered under the impression that he could get into this matter when he came back, and that we would come out ahead. If he had been able to say to the President that it was possible to be received in a friendly way in Peking while fighting it in the UN—.

Foreign Minister Chow noted that he didn’t know what was going to happen now, with Peking coming into the UN. He could see a ground-swell of resentment in the U.S., not only in Congress, but from the man-in-the-street. Mr. Kissinger agreed, observing that what got people mad was the behavior of African delegations after the vote.

Foreign Minister Chow indicated that with respect to the future relationships between the U.S. and the ROC, it would be most important for the ROC to strengthen its bilateral relations with the U.S. and Japan. He was relieved that Sato for the moment had weathered the storm. Mr. Aichi had left New York for home yesterday, but he didn’t know what to say to Sato because he didn’t know Sato’s future. Anyway, the vote of no confidence in Sato had been rejected. For the ROC, bilateral relations with the U.S. and Japan were of preeminent importance.

Foreign Minister Chow went on to say that there had to be a calm atmosphere on Taiwan so that there would be no sharp flight of capital or panic in the market. In practical terms, if the ROC could withstand the initial shock, keep the economy stabilized, and maintain industrial production, the ordinary people couldn’t care less whether the ROC was in the UN or not.

Foreign Minister Chow remarked that he was happy to see that the Senate had rejected the Cooper–Church Amendment and the repeal of the Formosa Resolution. Now, if the President could reaffirm the U.S.–ROC Mutual Defense Treaty at a press conference—. Mr. Kissinger promised that the President would indeed reaffirm the Treaty. Foreign Minister Chow said that there should be no doubt in the minds of the ordinary people on this score. Mr. Kissinger raised the possibility in addition that we might just have somebody ask if U.S. commitments to Taiwan had been affected by the UN vote, to which Ziegler or somebody else could say “no.”

Foreign Minister Chow observed that even if Taiwan’s security was assured, the question of its economic viability remained important.

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7 Les Janka underlined the three previous sentences and also wrote on the first page “NB–p. 5, 7, 8,” indicating the pages that contained his underlining.
They didn’t want a flight of capital and falling investments. At the moment, economic expansion was halted prior to the beginning of the new year, and if the flow of foreign investments was not resumed there would be difficulties. As long as they still had a stable environment in the Government and military, though, he was confident that the economic problems could be handled.

Mr. Kissinger informed Foreign Minister Chow that he had just talked to Governor Reagan, and the ROC had certainly made a deep impression on the Governor. Foreign Minister Chow went on to say that the ROC’s trade this year had been $400 million, and it still needed to trade with the Common Market countries. Mr. Kissinger asked if it was still possible for the ROC to trade with these countries, and asked about the possibility also of the ROC maintaining trade missions. Foreign Minister Chow said that they were trying to do this. They were not going to undertake rash measures against countries like Botswana. He had personally received the Foreign Minister of Botswana, who had been in New York himself, and had been told that, so sorry, the Botswana vote was a cabinet decision.

Mr. Kissinger informed the Foreign Minister that the President had done a lot on the ROC’s behalf. We had switched the Israeli vote, where people had said there was no hope. The President had also called Morocco and Mexico and others on the telephone and had written about ten letters. He himself had made about three or four phone calls. Mr. Kissinger added that he personally had gotten in touch with Prime Minister Heath, and had said that we understood the UK couldn’t work with us, but also should not work against us.

Again recalling the voting pattern, Mr. Kissinger recalled that Uganda, which had a Communist friend on its border, Tanzania, had voted against us. Why was this? Foreign Minister Chow mentioned that the other side had worked ‘round the clock and had wined and dined delegates; some had just simply been bought. Mr. Kissinger commented that two could play at that game. Anyway, it was a mistake not to look at the tactics. The Peking trip had not been a problem, not one country had changed its vote as a result. Mr. Kissinger added that he had thought the earliest the vote could have come was that same day, October 29. Foreign Minister Chow commented that we had lost momentum. One evening when the Soviet Mission had drawn the proceedings out the UN President could have called for a continuation the next morning.

Mr. Kissinger agreed, saying that we could have asked for adjournment. We then could have focused on the airplane hi-jack incident. In this madhouse if one didn’t pay attention to the New York Times, we could delay. In addition, October 25 was a U.S. holiday, and we certainly could have used this as a delay. Mr. Kissinger noted that he was
speaking very candidly, and relied on the Foreign Minister and the Ambas-
dassador not to repeat what he was saying. He reiterated that he was
very unhappy over the outcome of the voting. What we had done in
Peking had to be done, because it fitted into our strategy, but our strat-
egy was not to get the ROC out of the UN; rather it was to keep the
ROC in. Did the Foreign Minister and the Ambassador think that we
wanted a PRC delegation running around New York next week?

Foreign Minister Chow remarked that we had to defend Tokyo
from pressures which were very heavy. With respect to Mr. Kissinger’s
Peking visit, he was of course in a closed society but had he noticed
anything? Mr. Kissinger replied that he had seen literally nothing. As
far as he could see, Chou En-lai had the same assurance that he pos-
sessed before. He was the chief person with whom Mr. Kissinger had
dealt, and there was no visible change in his appearance or position.
Mr. Holdridge mentioned that the PRC had made quite an effort to put
Mr. Kissinger and the members of his party on public display, sug-
suggesting that they wanted the people to understand that the policy of
improving relations with the U.S. enjoyed official sanction.

Foreign Minister Chow asked if Mr. Kissinger had seen or heard
anything of Lin Piao. Mr. Kissinger replied that, no, he had not; nor
had he asked about Lin Piao. In response to a question from Foreign
Minister Chow about the convening of the National People’s Congress,
Mr. Kissinger stated that somebody had mentioned to him that it would
be convened within the next year. Peking literally had not looked any
different, and there had been no added military people in the streets.
In fact, the military presence seemed less than had been the case in
July.

Foreign Minister Chow returned to the subject of the UN voting
and the question of getting a delay. Belgium had been very funny about
this, and because the ROC was negotiating with the Belgians, they had
delayed their announcement. They had tried to delay it somehow, but
on the 25th couldn’t delay more. In a way they were quite decent, and
if they had voted earlier could have voted for or abstained. Mr.
Kissinger asserted that he had never had any illusions about Belgium.
He had told his people more than two months ago he had never
thought that they would vote for us. He had been stationed there at
the end of World War II, and knew their leaders, some of whom had
been students of his. With two big leftist parties, they just delayed so
we wouldn’t be any madder at them than necessary.

Foreign Minister Chow declared that the ROC needed by hook or
crook to stabilize its international relations. He referred to the King of
Saudi Arabia as having gone all out for the ROC. Baroody was a clown,
but the policy of the King was unquestionable. Foreign Minister Chow
went on to say that in key centers the ROC had to arrest further
erosion. Mr. Kissinger informed the Foreign Minister that Ambassador Shen and he were staying in close consultation. We couldn’t help the ROC too much openly, but could do a great deal behind the scenes. Foreign Minister Chow said that if there was evidence of U.S. support for the ROC, he hoped that after the initial period the shock would wear off. Mr. Kissinger assured the Foreign Minister that he would produce this evidence of support. The following week he would get a question put to Ziegler as to whether the UN vote affected U.S. support for Taiwan, and Ziegler would say no.8 The main thing that we should all do was not to attack each other. The ROC should do what it wanted to, but we would get this thing set next week, which was important for Peking to hear. If Ambassador Shen came to say that he had problems with certain countries, we would look into them. Foreign Minister Chow indicated that he was not planning to return to Taiwan too soon, in order to try and have a clearing period. He was not going to engage in a post-mortem.

Ambassador Shen wondered when the President’s next press conference would take place, to which Mr. Kissinger said that the President would repeat our support for the ROC, but we would also get a statement out the following week. This matter should not be left unsettled, and if the Foreign Minister and the Ambassador agreed, we would come out with something on Monday or Tuesday.8 The President would raise it again in his press conference.9

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8 Janka underlined the two previous sentences.

9 Attached but not printed were memoranda dated November 3, 11, 12, and 13 from Janka to Ziegler, requesting that he make explicit the U.S. treaty commitment to the ROC. On November 13 Janka wrote to Kissinger that Ziegler had not yet made the statement promised to the ROC officials. This issue was revisited on November 15; see Document 172.

170. Memorandum From John H. Holdridge of the National Security Council Staff to the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger)\(^1\)


**SUBJECT**

Memorandum of Conversation Between Governor Reagan and President Chiang Kai-shek\(^2\)

At Tab A is a State memorandum to you forwarding a memorandum of the conversation October 11 in Taipei between Governor Reagan and President Chiang Kai-shek.\(^3\) The principal points of interest are:

—Governor Reagan reaffirmed, on behalf of the President, our defense commitment to and continued interest in the ROC, and explained the rationale of the President’s trip to mainland China.

—As regards the President’s Peking trip, Chiang said he did not question the President’s good intentions, but thought such a trip could not be justified unless essential to avert a major crisis, which does not now exist. Given the Soviet military presence on Peking’s northern border, it cannot soon pose a serious threat to other Asian countries.

—Chiang was certain that Peking would aim its major efforts at extracting U.S. concessions on Taiwan.

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\(^2\) On February 16 John M. Dunn, Military Assistant to the Vice President, informed Haig that Mike Deaver, an assistant to California Governor Ronald Reagan, had called to indicate Reagan’s interest in making a trip to the Philippines, Japan, and other East Asian nations in the fall. “It was Mr. Deaver’s understanding that the President had discussed the possibility with Governor Reagan of extending the trip to add certain other countries.” (Ibid., Box 830, Name Files, Gov. Reagan) In a February 23 memorandum to Kissinger, Haig noted that he had asked Holdridge to develop scenarios for the trip. (Ibid.) Holdridge’s March 11 memorandum discussed Reagan’s possible visits to South Vietnam, Taiwan, and South Korea. Kissinger’s handwritten comment on the memorandum reads: “I suggest Reagan go to Taiwan, October 10 [China’s National Day] and that we handle rest of trip. Advise [illegible].” (Ibid.)

\(^3\) Attached but not printed. Reagan and McConaughy met with Chiang and Acting Foreign Minister Tschen Hiong-fei at the President’s residence in Shih-lin at 10 a.m. The memorandum of conversation was forwarded to the White House by Eliot on October 26. (Ibid., Box 522, Country Files, Far East, China, Vol. IX)
—Chiang asserted that the trip would only enhance Peking’s prestige, and would be especially hurtful to his government.

—Chiang wanted the President to know that he and his people would never permit a Chinese Communist takeover of Taiwan, and would fight to the last man if necessary to prevent it.

In a meeting with Nixon on November 17, Reagan observed that “the situation in Taiwan was understandably unsettled as a result of the China initiative but that in the final analysis he felt the people of Taiwan understood the reasons for the President’s trip to Peking.” (Memorandum for the President’s File, November 17; ibid., White House Special Files, President’s Office Files, Box 86, Memoranda for the President) According to the President’s Daily Diary, Nixon, Haig, and Reagan met in the Oval Office from 11:06 a.m. to 12:30 p.m. (Ibid., White House Central Files)

171. National Security Study Memorandum 141


TO
The Secretary of State
The Secretary of Defense
The Director of Central Intelligence

SUBJECT
Implications for U.S. Policy of the Participation of the People’s Republic of China in Multilateral Diplomacy

The President has directed that a study be made of the implications for U.S. policy and strategy of participation by the People’s Republic of China in the United Nations, related agencies, and in multilateral negotiations. The study should provide a comprehensive survey of both the problems and the opportunities which the United States may face as a result of the entry of the People’s Republic of China into multilateral diplomacy.

1 Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, NSC Institutional Files (H-Files), Box H-188, NSSM Files, NSSM 141. Secret. Copies were sent to Moorer, Gerald Smith, and Russell E. Train (Chairman, Council of Environmental Quality). The memorandum was initialed by Haig. In a November 16 memorandum to De Palma, Cargo wrote that De Palma was to chair the group. (Ibid., RG 59, S/S Files: Lot 80 D 212, National Security Files, NSSM 141)
The study should, inter alia:

(a) Identify those conferences and negotiations (e.g., disarmament, trade, environment, law of the sea) in which the question of PRC participation is likely to create problems or opportunities;

(b) Identify major specific problems before, or likely to come before, the UN or its related agencies in which Chinese participation could significantly affect the U.S. position; and

(c) Identify and discuss the alternative courses of action available to the United States, including initiatives which the United States might take toward the People’s Republic of China in connection with the specific international problems or activities identified in the paper. The discussion should include the advantages and disadvantages of each.

The study should be prepared by an Ad Hoc Group comprising representatives of the addressees and the NSC staff chaired by the representative of the Secretary of State. The views of the U.S. Ambassador to the UN, the Council on Environmental Quality and the Director of the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency should be obtained where appropriate. The study should be submitted not later than December 1, 1971 for consideration by the NSC Senior Review Group.

Henry A. Kissinger

172. Memorandum of Conversation

Washington, November 15, 1971, 12:08–12:49 p.m.

PARTICIPANTS

Ambassador James Shen, Republic of China
Henry Chen, Counselor, ROC Embassy
Henry A. Kissinger, Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs
John H. Holdridge, Senior Staff Member NSC

1 Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 522, Country Files, Far East, China, Vol. IX. Top Secret; Sensitive. Kissinger and Shen met in Kissinger’s office. The time of the meeting is taken from Kissinger’s Record of Schedule. (Library of Congress, Manuscript Division, Kissinger Papers, Box 438, Miscellany, 1968–1976, Record of Schedule) On a November 17 covering memorandum prepared by Holdridge, Kissinger indicated that he did not want further distribution of this document. Henry Chen, Political Counselor at the ROC Embassy, relayed a summary of this meeting to Charles T. Sylvester (EA/ROC) on December 1, to which was attached an unsigned December 10 note, which reads in part: “This one is marked for a very restrictive distribution because we know from earlier conversations with them that the Chinese were told by Kissinger to hold the information very closely and the implication was clear that State should not be informed.” (Memorandum of conversation and covering note; National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970–73, POL CHINAT–US)
SUBJECT

Mr. Kissinger’s Trip to Peking and US-ROC Relations

Mr. Kissinger said that he owed Ambassador Shen something. He had been telling Mr. Ziegler for two weeks to “get that thing done”: (get a statement into a press briefing to the effect that US support for the ROC and for the Mutual Defense Treaty has not been affected by the Chinese representation vote in the UN), and then the thought was to get it into the President’s press conference instead. However, the President forgot which reporter to ask, and asked the wrong fellow. The statement definitely would be made, though, either by Ziegler or by the President. We would see if it could be made next week. It was in our interest, and there was no question but that it would be done. We were not playing games.2

Continuing, Mr. Kissinger indicated that one of the problems in getting the statement made was finding an opportunity for a question which did not suggest that we had stimulated it. But the subject had not come up, and there was no good way to make the point. Mr. Kissinger noted that he would see if he could get Ziegler to do it in the next day or two. We didn’t want it done ostentatiously so it could be said that the White House had planted the question. We wanted it to come up in a normal way. Ambassador Shen observed that if the matter was, in fact, coming up this was satisfactory for him.

Ambassador Shen asked Mr. Kissinger for information concerning his, Mr. Kissinger’s trip to Peking. Mr. Kissinger began by referring, first, to the story in the New York Times of November 15 alleging that contact was being established between Washington and the PRC UN Delegation in New York.3 He firmly denied that any such contact was being established, or that we had any intention of doing so.

Ambassador Shen called the matter unimportant, adding, however, that at some point some contact was needed in order to take care of the many small details concerning the President’s trip. Mr. Kissinger denied that we would have any such need. We of course had means of contacting the PRC, but not at New York. Ambassador Shen wondered whether the US might wish to contact the PRC in New York on

2 See Document 169. At his November 30 press conference, Kissinger declared: “Our defense commitment remains unaffected. The question which I was asked was ‘Will we settle the future of Taiwan in Peking?’ My answer to that was: ‘It is our judgment that the future relationship between the People’s Republic and Taiwan should be worked out between Taiwan and the People’s Republic. So this is our policy, but it is without prejudice, as I have pointed out, to existing commitments.’” (Department of State Bulletin, December 20, 1971, p. 709)

bilateral matters—was this likely? Mr. Kissinger stated firmly that this was unlikely. It was his personal view that they did not want to create the impression their delegation in New York would be a Chinese Embassy. Their objective was to break up US relations with the ROC, but something like this would not be in their book. It would suggest acceptance of “two Chinas.”

Ambassador Shen turned again to the subject of Mr. Kissinger’s visit to Peking, asking for information as to what had gone on. Mr. Kissinger declared that he was having a helluva time convincing Ambassador Shen and the Japanese that what had happened was less than meets the eye. He had had to spend much time on technical matters, for example communications and similar details, in preparation for when the President went to Peking. He had no information to offer with respect to the Lin Piao thing. They hadn’t mentioned it, and we didn’t raise it.

Ambassador Shen asked, had Mr. Kissinger possibly heard anything from third country diplomats? Mr. Kissinger replied that he hadn’t seen any third country diplomats, nor had he seen any journalists. He of course had had access to international reports, but all his conversations with Chinese officials had more or less gone over the same ground as last time. As expected, they had stated their views to him with respect to Taiwan.

Ambassador Shen asked, had there been any changes since last July in the PRC attitude with respect to Taiwan? Mr. Kissinger said he hadn’t noted any, and had received no impression that they were planning any military operation against Taiwan. Ambassador Shen requested Mr. Kissinger to reiterate this statement which Mr. Kissinger did. Ambassador Shen went on to say that he did not find this unduly surprising, with the Chinese Communists having the Russians on their back. Mr. Kissinger commented that he had been about to say the same thing. He didn’t know how much the PRC attitude was a matter of self-restraint or of necessity.

Ambassador Shen wanted to know whether Mr. Kissinger’s impression in Peking on the second time was like that of the first—that Chou En-lai was in control, and there was no threat to his position. (Note: In referring to Chou En-lai, Ambassador Shen called him “Chow,” rhyming with “now,” although in previous conversations he had spoken of him as “Chou,” rhyming with “go.”) Mr. Kissinger stated that this was his impression. Again he had to say that he could only judge from the way Chou acted, but he didn’t know if any other person could possibly have spoken with confidence equal to that of Chou’s. Ambassador Shen remarked at this point that Chou En-lai had at one time been an actor on the stage. He had been a female impersonator in Peking Opera. (Mr. Kissinger left the room to receive a
telephone call, and Ambassador Shen explained to Mr. Holdridge that Chou En-lai had been an amateur performer, not a professional.)

Returning to the room, Mr. Kissinger noted that it was very tough for him to tell, but his guess was that Chou acted in a way to suggest that he was in complete charge. Mr. Holdridge referred to the fact that the PRC leaders had made a point of putting Mr. Kissinger and the other Americans on public display in Peking, which suggested confidence in their ability to implement a controversial policy. Ambassador Shen recalled that there had indeed been many pictures of Mr. Kissinger and Chinese leaders visiting public places.

Ambassador Shen asked, when was the President going to Peking? Mr. Kissinger said that the date had not been announced yet, but would be no later than two months before the President's Moscow visit, or the end of March. He would let Ambassador Shen know before the public announcement.

Reverting to the subject of Taiwan, Ambassador Shen wondered whether Mr. Kissinger had been discouraged over Chou En-lai's talk about Taiwan. Mr. Kissinger replied that, no, he hadn't been, nor were we going to give up our defense commitment to Taiwan. Chou En-lai knew this. Ambassador Shen asked if this wasn't an inconsistency, to which Mr. Kissinger remarked that this was Chou's problem. Mr. Kissinger went on to say that he was assuming Chou was moving toward the US for his own necessities and not for sentimental reasons, and so long as these necessities existed, Chou would find a way to overcome or ignore the inconsistencies.

Ambassador Shen asked, what did the US want them, the ROC, to do? Mr. Kissinger responded emphatically that we wanted them to stay alive, and to maintain their integrity and their identity. We would do what we could to support them, and to keep them in as many international organizations as possible. He didn't know what specific things Ambassador Shen had in mind, but we were not going to change our bilateral relations with the ROC.

Did Mr. Kissinger visualize a second Marshall Mission, Ambassador Shen inquired? Mr. Kissinger replied, "absolutely not." Any such initiative would not come from us, but we were pretty well protected because Peking wouldn't accept a new Marshall Mission anyway.

Ambassador Shen wondered what Mr. Kissinger thought of rumors in Hong Kong to the effect that the ROC had opened contact with the PRC. To this, Mr. Kissinger observed that if the ROC asked us about contacts, we might say to make them but would not take the initiative. Speaking personally, Mr. Kissinger said he thought that the ROC would be very ill-advised to do this—they would be under no pressure or even advice from this Administration to make contacts with the PRC. If they did this, it was their problem.
Ambassador Shen asked Mr. Kissinger how far ahead was he looking—was it five, or maybe ten years? Mr. Kissinger said that he felt ten years was a long time, and a period of five years was more likely. However, this was only because so many things could happen, for example, after the death of Mao China could split into five to ten competing power centers. Ambassador Shen agreed.

In elaboration of what he had just said, Mr. Kissinger observed that no one could predict what could happen after Mao’s death. If Lin Piao had indeed been ousted, how would the succession to Mao be managed? Who would take what positions? We simply didn’t know the answers to these questions. Ambassador Shen speculated that Mao might be succeeded by collective leadership involving a part of the army, to which Mr. Kissinger declared that collective leadership hadn’t worked in the USSR and might not work out any better in the PRC. Since a civil war had barely been avoided with Mao’s authority, how could it be avoided without Mao?

Ambassador Shen expressed the opinion that the President’s visit would work more to Chou En-lai’s advantage than to the President’s. Chou needed help in the struggle for power, and while Yeh Chien-ying had been brought into the picture to fill the image vacuum created by Lin Piao’s fall, Yeh was not capable of commanding the allegiance of much of the Red Army. Mr. Kissinger commented that Yeh had not struck him as being an energetic man. Ambassador Shen pointed out that Yeh was 72 or 73. Previously he had had much to do with Southeast Asia and the Vietnam war. Yeh was a Hakka, from the eastern Kwangtung Coast, and had been given authority over Kwangsi, Yunnan, Laos, Cambodia, and Vietnam. Yeh’s prestige could be particularly useful now. As people on Taiwan looked at what was happening on the mainland, it appeared to be an attempt by Mao with Chou’s assistance to put down the army, which had become too powerful, and too demanding. There was a chance that the army might “run away” (get out of control). Chou had succeeded in dislodging Liu Shao-ch’i because Liu didn’t have any army support, but in trying to dislodge the army now he could run into serious repercussions because Lin Piao had the support of half of the PLA. Did this mean the PLA air force, Mr. Kissinger asked? Ambassador Shen replied that he didn’t know, but the air force was squarely in the middle of things in countries such as the PRC. Mr. Kissinger observed that such was not the case in the US—we kept it from being so.

Referring to what Mr. Kissinger had said about seeing five years ahead, Ambassador Shen asked, then what? What would be the set-up on mainland China, and would there be a separate status for Taiwan? Was the status of Taiwan going to change? According to Mr. Kissinger, one of two possible situations could occur: the first was that there could
be negotiations between Peking and Taiwan, and the other was that
Taiwan would develop more and more in the direction of a separate
status. (Ambassador Shen said he felt that this could happen.) Con-
tinuing, Mr. Kissinger spoke of a third possible situation—that of civil
war breaking out on the mainland, with Taiwan aligning with one of
the factions later on.

Ambassador Shen remarked at this point that by moving into re-
lations with Peking the US was precluding such things from happen-
ing. Mr. Kissinger asserted that the ROC would see that the rela-
tionship that we developed with the PRC would not be a love-feast. We
would be courteous with one another, but many points of difference
would remain.

Ambassador Shen asked for Mr. Kissinger’s thoughts on what the
ROC should do now—sit tight and work harder? Mr. Kissinger’s reply
was, “what are your choices?” For now the ROC should work hard, sit
tight, and see what happened. In Mr. Kissinger’s opinion, the ROC
should not do anything precipitate. He assured Ambassador Shen that
if they waited until we were in Peking, they would see that we would
not sell them out. Whatever happened would happen very slowly. They
would be very foolish to commit suicide in order to avoid death. Amb-
assador Shen asked if Mr. Kissinger saw death coming, and Mr.
Kissinger answered “no.” His judgment was that if the ROC could
maintain itself, the situation could change in a dramatic way. We had
no intention of withdrawing recognition from it.

Ambassador Shen mentioned that if the US–ROC defense pact was
reduced to a shadow, the ROC would have difficulty buying military
spares from the U.S. In fact, he had already been informed that the De-
partment of State was holding up approval on the sale of some mili-
tary spares. Mr. Kissinger expressed considerable surprise at this, and
strongly declared that such was not our policy. He told Ambassador
Shen to give him concrete examples, and reiterated that it was ab-
solutely not our policy to cut the ROC off from equipment or spare
parts. Mr. Holdridge confirmed that there was no such policy.
Mr. Kissinger once again requested Ambassador Shen to give Mr.
Holdridge any facts about the ROC being unable to get equipment or
spare parts. We were not going to do things like this; if we were going
to do them, it would be much more honest to tell the ROC. But we
were not about to throttle their defenses. There might be some doubt
about new weapons, but that was the case even before the Peking trip.
This was definitely not our policy on parts. As an indication of our at-
titude, Mr. Kissinger mentioned that we had approved the training of
ROC sub crews.

Ambassador Shen noted that in talking about equipment he meant
M–48 tanks, and the parts he had in mind referred to those for use in
smaller tanks which were already on Taiwan. Mr. Kissinger reiterated that this was not our policy, and that Ambassador Shen should give Mr. Holdridge the facts. With these in hand he could call the State Department and be able to respond if they said there was nothing to it. Unless there was some technical reason, for example, the parts in question were not made anymore, the ROC would get them within one month.

Ambassador Shen recalled that in a previous conversation he had asked if Mr. Kissinger saw normalization with the PRC as coming during the President’s first term, or later, and that Mr. Kissinger had said later. Did the UN thing have any effect on this time-table? Mr. Kissinger replied in the negative. Nothing which had occurred in the UN had any effect on the timing. To a surmise by Ambassador Shen that if anything would happen, it would take place in 1973, Mr. Kissinger said that he didn’t think anything would happen in 1973 either. Again, nothing had been affected by the UN vote. Ambassador Shen remarked that he expected to see the President here in the White House in 1973. Mr. Kissinger agreed.

As a final point, Ambassador Shen mentioned that the ROC was seriously interested in staying on in the world bank group. Mr. Kissinger stated that he had spoken the day before to Secretary Connally on this, who had said he would do everything to keep the ROC on in the IMF, World Bank, etc. Secretary Connally had talked to the ROC Ambassador in Saigon, had been much impressed with him, and had said following this conversation that he would move heaven and earth on the ROC’s behalf. Mr. Kissinger again said that his advice to the ROC was to sit tight. He did not see any blow to them next year or in the next year and a half, and could say with certainty or almost certainty there was nothing on the horizon right now. Ambassador Shen asked if he might come in from time to time, and Mr. Kissinger strongly assented.

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4 See Documents 237 and 245.
173. Memorandum From the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger) to President Nixon


SUBJECT
My November 23 Meeting with Ambassador Huang Hua, Permanent PRC Representative to the UN

I met secretly with Ambassador Huang Hua, Peking’s Permanent Representative to the United Nations, for two hours in New York on Tuesday night, November 23. He was accompanied by their Deputy Permanent Representative, Ch’en Ch’u, who is also the Director of the Information Department in the PRC Ministry of Foreign Affairs, and an interpreter. On our side were Ambassador Bush, General Haig, and Winston Lord.

The meeting served to establish this new channel for UN matters as agreed to by both governments through our regular channel, to make arrangements for future communication, and to begin discussions on such UN issues as South Asia, a new Secretary-General, and the Middle East. The Ambassador, whom I had met in Peking in July and has since been the PRC Ambassador in Ottawa, was affable but cautious. He generally cited his government’s public statements as the approach they would take in New York. It was abundantly clear from Huang’s

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1 Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 849, President’s File—China Trip, China Exchanges. Top Secret; Sensitive; Exclusively Eyes Only. A notation on the memorandum indicates that the President saw it.


3 On November 16 Walters met with Chinese officials at the PRC Embassy in Paris where he passed along Kissinger’s suggestion that they open a second channel of communications through the PRC’s UN delegation in New York. Kissinger’s message reads: “The US intends to use Paris as the primary channel for communications on major and longer-range policy issues and sensitive questions unless it receives a contrary view from Peking. There will be, however, a number of policy issues arising in New York requiring early decision on which a more rapid contact may be necessary than would be possible through our arrangement in Paris.” Instructions to Walters, November 15, and memorandum of record and message for the Chinese, November 16, are in National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 849, President’s File—China Trip, China Exchanges. At a November 20 meeting in Paris, the PRC accepted the plan for talks in New York, to be held with Huang Hua. Walter’s memorandum of record, November 20, is ibid. Lord contacted Huang at the Roosevelt Hotel on November 21 to arrange for a meeting by Howe on the 22. Lord’s memorandum for the record, November 22, is ibid. Howe provided the PRC representatives with information on a suitable meeting place for the November 23 meeting with Kissinger. Howe’s memorandum for the record, November 22, is ibid. See Foreign Relations, 1969–1976, vol. E–13, Documents 62, 67, 68, 69, and 70.
performance that the PRC was surprised to gain admission to the UN this year, that it was not particularly enthusiastic about its entrance, and that its delegation is feeling its way in an unfamiliar environment.

Following are the highlights of the session, which took place in a small apartment on the East Side, hastily arranged by CIA.

The Private Channel and Public Performance

We confirmed our agreement with the Chinese that Huang Hua and I would secretly exchange views on “relevant major questions of principle within the scope of the work of the United Nations.” We will communicate only on subjects of major importance, such as South Asia, at least until your visit, when various issues may become clearer. When consultations are necessary, we will decide on an ad hoc basis how each issue should be handled between us, and establish understandings which could then be implemented by Ambassador Bush in New York. I pointed out that it was in our mutual interest that we don’t appear to be cooperating visibly, and I made clear that we did not seek a great deal of contact.

After complimenting the Ambassador on how the PRC had turned aside requests from Democratic candidates to visit China, I emphasized the need for restraint in public statements between now and your visit. I said our side would avoid polemics, and pointed to their opening UN speech on November 15 as fodder for domestic opponents of your China policy. Many parties would like to derail your initiative; therefore while both sides would clearly stand by their convictions, we both had to be alert to this problem. I said that Vietnam was a particularly sensitive subject, a pointed reference to statements coming out of Peking during North Vietnamese Prime Minister Pham Van Dong’s current visit there.

South Asia

This took up the bulk of our time. I explained our approach both generally and in the United Nations; Ambassador Huang Hua referred to their public statements and reaffirmed PRC support for Pakistan.

I said that we knew what the Indians were up to, and I repeated our intention to cut off assistance if they clearly launched aggression. We were alleviating the suffering and economic dislocation of the refugees, having given more to this effort than the rest of the world put together; we had earmarked $250 million for humanitarian relief in East Pakistan; and we favored a political solution of the problem and had taken many steps in this direction.

Reemphasizing that we would not accept military aggression by India, I outlined what we were currently doing to prevent hostilities,
including our approaches to New Delhi, Moscow, and Islamabad, our consideration of UN action, and our approaches to the British and Germans.

Ambassador Huang Hua pointed to Chou’s statements to me, their note in the other channel, their Foreign Minister’s speech during Bhutto’s visit in Peking, and their recent speech in the UN as representing Peking’s basic position. This adds up to strong backing of Pakistan, including military assistance, but falls short of a commitment to send troops in the event of hostilities.

I outlined the type of resolution we were considering, and he said that they would have to study it. He inquired, and I confirmed, that we would probably not propose a Resolution but would work toward one that might have a restraining impact. He indicated the PRC’s enthusiastic resignation to the prospect of Security Council action, saying it was out of their hands. I pointed out that it was in our mutual interest not to appear to have positions too close on this issue, thus establishing the fact that we will have to be more evenhanded than they.

I assured him that we would not force the pace on this issue and would give them advance information on anything that we know would occur. My efforts to elicit more precise positions on their part were fruitless, as he clearly was restricting himself to their public statements and to assessing the situation as it evolves.

Ambassador Huang asked for our assessment of the military situation and I gave him the rundown of our latest intelligence estimates.

Successor to U Thant

I said that we would take into account their views on U Thant’s successor, making it clear that I did not expect an answer at this time.

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4 In their November 20 meeting with Walters in Paris, the PRC representatives handed over a note claiming that India was interfering in Pakistan’s internal affairs, and that the PRC supported President Yahya Khan’s proposal for a mutual withdrawal from the border areas. The note concluded: “Should Pakistan be subjected to aggression by India, China will support the Pakistan Government and people in their just struggle. China already made public its above stand during the visit of the Pakistan Delegation to China. China has also agreed to continue to provide military assistance. It is hoped that the United States will exert its influence to prevent the further deterioration of the situation through persuasion.”

5 After receiving instructions from Haig, on November 28, Walters met with Huang Chen on November 29 to discuss the situation in South Asia. He detailed U.S. diplomatic efforts regarding India and Pakistan and provided a draft Security Council resolution. Haig’s instructions and Walters’ memorandum of record are in National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 849, President’s File—China Trip, China Exchanges. On December 3 Howe delivered a note to the PRC’s UN delegation in New York, updating them on U.S. efforts and suggesting that Kissinger and Huang Hua meet on December 10 to discuss South Asia, a successor to UN Secretary General U Thant, and other issues. Message for the Chinese and Howe’s memorandum for the record, December 4, are ibid. See Foreign Relations, 1969–1976, vol. E–13, Documents 71, 72, and 73.
He asked our views, and I said that we had not made any final judgment but had a slight leaning toward Jacobson at this point. The only candidate we had ruled out was Herrera.

He stated that they were unfamiliar with all the candidates and were still studying the situation. He pointed out that our official rejection of Herrera had put them in an awkward position when they were asked about his candidacy. I said that we would give them advance warning of any new official positions on the various candidates that we might take. He wondered whether there was anything to the suggestions that U Thant might stay on for a brief interim period while a successor was chosen; Ambassador Bush and I knocked down this possibility, saying that a decision was needed by January 1.

*The Middle East*

He raised this subject, asking in particular how it might be treated in the United Nations. I briefly recounted the negotiating history—the bilaterals with the Soviet Union, the Four Power talks in the UN, and our recent intermediary role. Ambassador Bush and I pointed out that no serious discussion had really been held among the Four Powers. I mentioned in low key that we would not be opposed to their participation in this forum, and he emphasized that the PRC was not interested in joining these talks.

I said that we had hoped that negotiations would move away from discussions of theoretical formulations toward concrete progress, and I pointed out the difficulties which had arisen over an interim settlement which we had thought was important to show movement. Our immediate efforts in the UN debate would be to prevent exacerbation of feeling on both sides, as well as more rigid commitment by the Israelis to existing lines. I explained that making too absolute demands on Israel had the practical tendency of making it easier for it to dig in.

*Taiwan Independence Demonstrations*

I preempted this subject, knowing their sensitivities and the fact that there had been some recent demonstrations around their hotel. I reaffirmed that there was no US official involvement in these demonstrations. We could and would not interfere in demonstrations so long as they were legal and orderly. I pointed out that you had been the target of larger demonstrations than they. Ambassador Huang did not press the issue, but pointed out that there had been increasing Taiwan independence activities recently in the US and in other places, such as Japan. I repeated what I had told Chou En-lai, namely that we would not encourage or participate in such movements.

The meeting ended with agreement on future contacts and additional pleasantries. I repeated that we would do anything that we could to make their stay in New York more comfortable.
174. Telegram From the Embassy in the Republic of China to the Department of State

Taipei, November 30, 1971, 1130Z.

5869. Eyes Only for the Secretary and Assistant Secretary Green.

Subj: Conversation of Vice Foreign Minister Yang Hsi-kun With Ambassador.2

1. Following is an account of an important presentation which Foreign Vice Minister Yang Hsi-kun made to me end of last week at a tete-a-tete luncheon. Its extremely sensitive nature will be self-evident. I feel any additional distribution should be severely restricted but undoubtedly White House should be aware of it. I hope that Green will be in a position to discuss it with me preliminarily when I see him in Honolulu next week.

2. H.K. Yang launched almost immediately into discussion of critical situation facing GRC following October 25 expulsion from UN. He recalled he had told President Chiang last winter that withdrawal from UN would mean “eventual political suicide” for GRC. Expulsion amounted to about the same thing as withdrawal, and he feared that the increasing isolation that the Chinese Communists can force on the GRC from their improved position within the UN will mean the rapidly increasing besiegement and eventual strangulation of the GRC unless drastic change is undertaken immediately.

3. Yang continued that he has spoken very privately and frankly to President Chiang since his recent return after the UN debacle. Yang had found President Chiang impressively open-minded and willing to listen. Yang said he had spelled out the full depth of his misgivings and had indicated in a general way the sweeping nature of the changes which he felt would be mandatory if not only the GRC but the future of the people on Taiwan is to be preserved. He characterized the

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1 Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970–73, POL CHINAT–US. Secret; Priority; Nodis.

2 This was not the first time that Yang had spoken with Americans about the Republic of China’s foreign policy and domestic politics. In July Yang met with McConaughy to discuss his efforts to have the ROC “keep its representatives in any diplomatic capital or in UN or any multinational organization where they will be accepted.” Yang noted that Chiang was in “virtual isolation” in order to consider “the crises facing the GRC.” (Telegram 3541 from Taipei, July 20; ibid., UN 6 CHICOM) On November 3 Yang made similar statements to Green (memorandum of conversation; ibid.) and to U. Alexis Johnson and Brown (memorandum of conversation; ibid., U. Alexis Johnson Files: Lot 96 D 695, Memcons, 1971).
President as not necessarily concurring in any proposed changes but as showing a profound awareness of the existing realities and dangers and a willingness to examine the case for far-reaching changes in the existing structure.

4. Yang said he had told the President that it is of paramount importance to issue in the near future a formal declaration to the world that the government on Taiwan is entirely separate and apart from the government on the Mainland and that henceforth the government here will “have nothing to do with the Mainland.” The declaration should prescribe a new designation for the government here, namely “the Chinese Republic of Taiwan.” It would be stipulated that the term Chinese did not have any political connotation but was used merely as a generic term stemming from the Chinese ethnic origin of the populace on Taiwan. It would be used in a way similar to the manner in which the various Arab countries use “Arab” in their official governmental titles.

5. Yang said that most of the President’s top advisers around the President see the need for some sort of sweeping move to counter the ChiCom drive to isolate the GRC internationally and force general recognition of ChiCom right to take over Taiwan as an integral part of China. It does not mean they necessarily endorse his formula but they are showing some resilience in the face of the crisis and are open to persuasion.

6. He said that the principal negative, stand-pat influence was exerted by Mme. Chiang who seems determined not to budge an inch from the old claims, pretensions and “return to the Mainland” slogans. He believes she still wields considerable influence on the President. He said she in turn is greatly influenced by her nephew, K.L. Kung, the son of Mme. Chiang’s elder sister and her deceased husband H.H. Kung. He said K.L. Kung from the security of his New York residence is waging a reactionary campaign for the GRC to stand absolutely rigid. He termed K.L. Kung’s influence extremely malign. He said that K.L. Kung is very vocal in various influential quarters. Yang said that he had refused to see K.L. Kung on his trips to New York in recent years despite various requests from Kung. Yang spoke contemptuously of the Soong–Kung family group as fanatically advocating a die-hard line, although he said most of them were among the first to retreat to safety when the Communists moved.

7. Yang said that when Chang Chun was in Japan last summer, he had a very significant talk with Prime Minister Sato and ex-Prime Minister Kishi. After that talk Sato and Kishi transmitted a closely-guarded message to President Chiang through Chang Chun to the effect that the only hope for the future of the Republic of China was to adopt a course of separation, giving up all Mainland claims and pretensions.
The message strongly urged President Chiang to adopt such a course. He felt sure that CCK knew of the message but he believed that neither Vice President C.K. Yen nor Foreign Minister S.K. Chow knew about it.

8. Yang said that in his view the President in making the sort of declaration described should concurrently, or very soon thereafter, use his emergency powers to set aside the Constitution and dissolve all of the parliamentary type bodies. He should then set up a new unicameral provisional representative body to be composed of two-thirds Taiwanese and one-third Mainlanders. A new cabinet should be formed with some Taiwanese and some younger men included. He said a new image needed to be created with the government freed of the outworn trappings, encumbrances and shibboleths of the party and the establishment. He said the emergency decree of the President should provide for an island-wide referendum with universal suffrage to determine the future status of Taiwan and provide for a constituent body. Yang indicated further that he felt that the President might do well to make these fundamental moves next spring just before the end of his current term, and then move up to an emeritus position as head of the reformed party and revered elder statesman (somewhat parallel to Mao’s position), with C.K. Yen taking over as Chief of State and Chiang Ching-kuo as Premier.

9. Yang identified George Yeh and Y.S. Tsiang as associated with his thinking. He identified as top officials who are concerned, realistic and open-minded, but not yet committed: Vice President C.K. Yen, Presidential Secretary General Chang Chun, Director of the National Security Council Huang Shao-ku, and Secretary of the KMT Chang Pao-shu.

10. Yang said no member of the current cabinet is informed of his thinking and none of them are involved or likely to take a position. He spoke rather deprecatingly of Foreign Minister S.K. Chow as not inclined to become exposed and he said K.T. Li and Y.S. Sun were nonpolitical in the sense he was talking about. He added that former Foreign Minister Wei Tao-ming was entirely out of the picture, also.

11. Yang said that although President Chiang is increasingly convinced of the imperative requirement for some early and radical ac-

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tion, he is not likely to move without the application of a powerful persuasive effort by the US Government. He felt that Vice President Agnew would be the right man to present the US position and make the major effort, supported of course by myself. He felt that Agnew even with direct message and mandate from President Nixon would need the help of an advance group of private American citizens who are old and close friends of President Chiang and completely trusted by him. (Presumably he has in mind such personages as Dr. Judd, Admiral Radford, ex-Senator Knowland and General Wedemeyer.) He said even Americans who know China can hardly visualize how difficult it will be for the President to fly in the face of all the deepest traditions and articles of faith by which he, his government and his people have lived since departure from the Mainland. Such a reversal of the course would be traumatic in the extreme. But he felt that the President is showing incredible adaptability and flexibility for a man of such advanced age. He had not yet given in to the urgings of his wife and he is keeping his options open.

12. Yang indicated that he had shared some but not all of what he had just said with Ambassador Christopher Phillips at USUN Headquarters. I gather that Phillips is the only other American representative who has been even partially clued in. Yang said he knew he did not need to urge on me the extreme and vital sensitivity of the subject and the absolutely overriding need of total security. Any leak would be disastrous and he hoped the number of persons informed could be kept to the absolute minimum of those who had to know in order to support the handful of senior officials who should be involved on the US side.

Comment: I have reported this conversation at length because it seems so pertinent to the kind of study you have requested regarding the prospect of US–Taiwan relations. I should emphasize, however,
that although H.K. Yang is an important and highly responsible official, his views reflect the outer dimension of tolerable concepts and undoubtedly go beyond the point where practical considerations are likely to lead the government in the near future. Yang himself is imaginative and broad-gauged; he is also bold and seems to feel adequately protected to pursue his proposals. However, he tends to underrate the practical complications that inescapably concern the principal ROC leaders, or he rather casually seeks to enlist external intervention to help overcome resistance from his fellow countrymen. For example, there is not much real prospect that President Chiang would sweep away institutions and commitments of the past and establish a legislature composed of two-thirds Taiwanese and one-third Mainlanders. Similarly Yang probably underestimates the domestic and foreign consequences of changing the ROC’s international identity.

14. Nevertheless, Yang’s views strike me as highly important, both as an indication of the direction in which some responsible officials are thinking and as a symbol of the considerable ferment developing on Taiwan concerning the future. In brief, the evolution of US China policy and the UN defeat have precipitated some of the thinking that many would not have expected at least until President Chiang departed the scene.

McConaughy
175. Response to NSSM 141


[Omitted here is the table of contents.]

PRC AND US OBJECTIVES AND ATTITUDES

Introduction

The PRC will combine three elements in its multilateral diplomacy. It will make common cause with the less developed world and attempt to marshal sentiment against “superpower domination” and “collusion”. Yet, since the PRC is in fact a big power with interests that differ from those of the small countries, it will in some cases act pragmatically and take stands that substitute ideology to practical interest. Finally, sooner or later the PRC will, like everyone else, find it necessary to engage in some logrolling in order to accomplish its objectives. We expect the first of the elements will be the most prominent for some time.

The combination of Third World leadership aspirations with pragmatism is the essence of the Chou line which emerged victorious after the Cultural Revolution. It would take a major internal change in China to alter those essentials of PRC policy.

The PRC’s immediate political objective will be to make sure that the ROC does not remain in any UN-related organizations or participate in international conferences. It will press for international recognition that Taiwan is an integral part of China and will insist that the ROC cannot take part in international organizations or conferences under any name. At the same time, there may be a wide range of organizations and conferences in which it will choose not to participate actively. These may include for the foreseeable future the international financial institutions.

Although it may hold back until it can appraise the results of the President’s visit, we can anticipate a major PRC effort to isolate the US on the Taiwan question within the UN and possibly gain UNGA approval for a resolution recommending the end of the US “occupation” of Taiwan.

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1 Source: National Archives, RG 59, S/S Files: Lot 80 D 212, National Security Files, NSSM 141. Secret. The response was submitted by De Palma, Chairman of the Ad Hoc Working Group for NSSM 141, on December 3. A December 3 note in the file by Herz stated: “The NSC staff has agreed that NSSM 141 should be regarded essentially as a briefing paper.” The NSC staff distributed the paper on December 7 with a covering memorandum that stated that it would be discussed at a Senior Review Group meeting on December 8. No meeting was held however. (Both ibid.) NSSM 141 is printed as Document 171.
It is apparent that the PRC is not yet familiar enough with the issues and tactical problems to engage itself actively on all subjects before the UN and in international conferences. It will therefore enter multilateral diplomacy slowly, sending representatives to selected agencies and conferences where it sees clear opportunities to pose as the friend of the weak against the strong, or to achieve specific national interest objectives. Examples include the Economic and Social Council (ECOSOC), the Economic Commission for Asia and the Far East (ECAFE) and conferences on the environment and law of the sea. The PRC may refuse to participate in organizations or conferences in which participation would tend to compromise its non-superpower image or would conflict with already announced PRC policy: e.g. disarmament conferences limited to militarily significant countries.

Given its desire to become the leader of the “Third World” and its antagonistic posture vis-à-vis the US, USSR and Japan, the PRC will be especially radical on colonial and economic development issues, placing ideology and propaganda ahead of practicability. Similarly, it will press for radical disarmament measures, both to embarrass the US and USSR and, when necessary, to protect itself against lesser measures which would interfere with its own nuclear aspirations (much as the French have done). In a number of cases, we can expect that disagreements between the PRC and the USSR may impede progress toward desired goals (e.g. disarmament) or may add more heat to already difficult situations (e.g. Southern Africa). This will add to our difficulties, but in some cases it could also afford us opportunities since commonsense solutions offered by us will contrast better with unworkable, propagandistic Communist proposals.

Yet in the long run, to succeed in the leadership role it seems to be intent on asserting, Peking will have to demonstrate that multilateral diplomacy can, with PRC participation, produce results and reach agreements more satisfactory to the Afro-Asian states than those reached prior to PRC entry into the UN. Therefore, although we anticipate that PRC statements will continue to reflect a sharp tone whenever there is a tempting ideological target, the need to achieve results should eventually force the PRC to adopt more pragmatic bargaining positions and become more willing to reach compromise settlements, especially when such settlements are acceptable to the Third World.

We do not know to what extent the PRC intends to use international forums for negotiation of Asian problems. In this paper we discuss only the problems and opportunities in connection with possible UN discussions of the Korea and Taiwan issues, and more briefly Vietnam and Cambodia. PRC attitudes toward Japan will also be a problem for us in the multilateral context, but are not discussed here. It must be noted, however, that the entry of the PRC into the UN makes
the Japanese goal of a permanent seat on the Security Council more
difficult to attain.

What we ourselves do in the UN and related international bodies
should be designed in general to:

—facilitate an early and active participation by the PRC in a wide
variety of UN activities where its presence is inevitable or where a ba-
sis for cooperation with it exists;
—discourage the PRC from looking at these institutions from a
purely political and propaganda point of view and try to engage it in
substantive discussions of mutual advantage;
—preserve a place for the ROC on the international scene, at least
as a party to economic arrangements.2

Peking’s participation in the UN offers some potential opportuni-
ties to further US policy objectives. While at first Peking is likely to
crowd the Soviets toward more radical positions, the PRC may also in
some cases tend to push the Soviets closer to positions taken by other
major powers. For example, if Peking should endorse the more radi-
cal Arab positions on the issue of a Middle Eastern settlement the So-
viet may find it advisable to work for more realistic solutions in keep-
ing with the mainstream of Arab policy.

In the field of arms control, even though its initial contribution is
likely to be largely propagandistic, the participation of the PRC could
lead to its engagement in mutually advantageous arrangements, for in-
stance on non-proliferation.

Peking’s participation also creates at least a theoretical possibility
for reexamining the original UN concept for peacekeeping, centered on
the role of the Military Staff Committee. While it will take time to es-

tablish Peking’s interest in formal peacekeeping measures, we may find
it useful ultimately to explore the feasibility of revitalizing the UN
Charter’s original peacekeeping concept. Even if this proves impossi-
ble, we shall want to see if Peking’s presence enhances the possibility
of moving the Soviets toward agreement on reasonable arrangements
for consent-type peacekeeping missions.

It goes without saying that if Peking displays an interest in UN dis-
cussions relating to population, drug abuse, and environment, these dis-
cussions should also benefit from the PRC’s presence. It may take some
time to determine Peking’s stance on this array of issues, however.

2 Note: The evolving US/ROC relationship is the subject of a separate study. Pend-
ing availability of that study, which will provide the basis for decisions about defend-
ing the ROC’s position in multilateral organizations, we assume that we will wish to
keep the ROC engaged in multilateral diplomacy where it is reasonable and feasible, but
without a great expenditure of diplomatic capital. [Footnote in the source text. See Doc-
ument 208.]
Perhaps the most interesting possibility opened up by Peking’s participation is that of some form of UN political mediation between India and Pakistan. On the assumption that none of the five permanent SC members will see its interest served by an outbreak of major hostilities between India and Pakistan, the Security Council could perhaps play a role in preventing major hostilities and promoting a political settlement in East Pakistan. Peking’s link with Pakistan will balance Moscow’s with India and might conceivably establish a basis for a UN effort in which the five Permanent Members could help restrain Indian military moves while permitting a political solution in East Pakistan.

No difficult policy choices have surfaced in preparing this paper. The problems are essentially tactical, how best to obtain PRC cooperation in particular cases, how best to deal with expected troublesome PRC actions, how best to protect some remaining ROC positions without a major expenditure of diplomatic capital. Common sense usually suggests the limits within which the answers will have to be found. It is clear that we must soon consult with the PRC on the next UN Secretary General. We shall have to deal with them when the India/Pakistan and Middle East issues are discussed in the UN. Tactical decisions will also soon have to be made on how to open the door for PRC participation in the discussions of arms limitation and oceans policy.

[Omitted here are 46 pages of text divided into the following sections: On-Going Negotiations (Arms Limitations, Ocean Problems, Peacekeeping, and Outer Space); Political Issues (Korea, Middle East, India-Pakistan, Southern Africa, Taiwan, Vietnam, Cambodia, Micronesia, Specialized Agencies); Economic and Social Issues (Environment, Drug Control, Other Economic and Social Questions, and Red Cross Conference); and Institutional Arrangements (PRC and ROC Adherence to Conventions, UN Finances, Secretary General, and PRC Personnel in UN and Specialized Agencies).

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3 On December 22 Wright, with the concurrence of Kennedy and Holdridge, suggested to Kissinger that he issue a NSDM that “instructs the bureaucracy to deliberately eschew progress on the issues, in so far as this is constructively possible, until the President’s visit has clarified the new US–Chinese relationship, and perhaps provided a better basis for cooperation than that which now appears to exist.” Kissinger did not issue the NSDM. Wright’s memorandum and the draft NSDM are in National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 1036, Files for the President—China Material, China—general—November 1971–February 26, 1972.
176. Memorandum of Conversation¹

New York, December 10, 1971, 6:05–7:55 p.m.

PARTICIPANTS
Ambassador Huang Hua, PRC Permanent Representative to the United Nations and Ambassador to Canada
Ch’en Ch’u, PRC Deputy Permanent Representative to the United Nations and Director, Information Department, Ministry of Foreign Affairs
T’ang Wen’sheng, Interpreter
Shih Yen-hua, Interpreter
Henry A. Kissinger, Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs
Ambassador George Bush, US Representative to the United Nations
Brig. General Alexander M. Haig, Jr., Deputy Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs
Winston Lord, Senior NSC Staff Member

Dr. Kissinger: I see you in the newspapers all the time. You’re a great publicity expert. And very argumentative.

Ambassador Huang: No, I always argue in self-defense.

Ch’en Ch’u: He counterattacks in self-defense.

Dr. Kissinger: Preemptive attack.

Mr. Ambassador, what we have is not strictly UN business, but our contact in Paris is not there.

Miss T’ang: Mr. Walters?

Dr. Kissinger: He is not in Paris right now. He is going to be with the President in the Azores.

This may turn out to become UN business, but we wanted the Prime Minister urgently to know certain things we are doing. Therefore we have taken the liberty of this slightly irregular procedure. (Ambassador Huang nods.)

The apartment is slightly improved over last time. Next time we meet we will really have a suitable place. (Looking at a Chinese scroll on the wall) There seems to be a wandering Chinese painting that we hang up every time we have an apartment. (Chinese laughter.) I hope those sentences are friendly.

Ambassador Huang: I can’t see them from such a distance.

¹ Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 849, President’s File—China Trip, China Exchanges. Top Secret; Sensitive; Exclusively Eyes Only. According to a December 15 attached covering memorandum from Lord, Kissinger approved this memorandum. No summary of this meeting for the President was found.
Ch’en Ch’u: (Looking at the scroll) It is an ancient poem.

Dr. Kissinger: I have some great colored pictures of you (Ch’en). I will send them to you. They were taken at the Great Wall.

Let me explain to you what we have done in various categories. Incidentally, just so everyone knows exactly what we do, we tell you about our conversations with the Soviets; we do not tell the Soviets about our conversations with you. In fact, we don’t tell our own colleagues that I see you. George Bush is the only person outside the White House who knows I come here.

You know we have made a number of public declarations about India. I held what is known as a press background this week in which I pointed out that India is at fault. I will give you the text of it before you leave so that you can read it. And we will continue to pursue this line publicly.

You know what we have done in the United Nations so there is no point in reviewing this with you.

In addition we have taken other measures. We have canceled $87 million of loans to India and $14 million of military equipment.

Ambassador Huang: $40 million or $14 million?

Dr. Kissinger: $14 million. But in addition, there is $17 million due to be purchased which fell through because we aren’t issuing new licenses. So the net cancellation amounted to $31 million. In fact, we have canceled the entire military equipment line to India. There is no military equipment going to India. This means specifically we have canceled all radar equipment for defense in the north.

Then we have two other items due to be signed this week that we are not signing, and that we have no intention of signing. One is an agreement for $72 million worth of food, PL 480.

Miss T’ang: PL 480?

Dr. Kissinger: That’s a food program, a specific program. Another is $100 million in loans. And we are working, using our influence, at the World Bank to defer loans of $75 million which are becoming due. Our Ambassador (looking toward Bush) thinks we are never doing anything.

Ambassador Huang: You mean Mr. Bush thought that you are doing nothing?

Dr. Kissinger: He thinks we just sit in the White House and do nothing.

Ambassador Bush: I think I do all the work and that they do nothing.

Dr. Kissinger: What he really thinks is that we are pursuing an evenhanded policy. That’s what our press spokesman says.
Now I want to tell the Ambassador, for the Prime Minister, about a number of communications we have had with the Soviet Union.

Ambassador Huang: You mean in the sense of the first question just discussed, i.e., the question of the India-Pakistan subcontinent?

Dr. Kissinger: Yes, India–Pakistan. We have had the following contacts—the Soviet Ambassador is back in Moscow, so I have to deal with the Chargé. Last Sunday I called the Soviet Counsellor Vorontsov to the White House.

Miss T'ang: Soviet Counsellor?

Dr. Kissinger: Mr. Vorontsov. He’s the Chargé. And I told him that the Soviet support of Indian aggression endangers the relationship between the Soviet Union and the United States. Incidentally, these conversations are known only in the White House and only to you.

On Monday, President Nixon sent a letter to Secretary General Brezhnev in which he said that Indian aggression with Soviet support is unacceptable to the United States, and that if pursued this would complicate for a long time the international situation and would have an adverse effect—this is a quote—on the whole range of our relationships. (Ambassador Huang checks the translation.)

Mr. Brezhnev sent a reply—we sent the letter December 6 and we received the reply December 9th in the morning. The letter was phrased in conciliatory language and it proposes a ceasefire and “an immediate”—this is quoting again—“resumption of negotiations between the Government of Pakistan and the East Pakistan leaders concerning a political settlement.” (Miss T’ang asks and Dr. Kissinger repeats)—this is a quote—“concerning a political settlement in East Pakistan.” The continuation of the—quote—“the negotiations should, naturally, be started from the stage at which they were discontinued.” I said this meant on the basis of a united Pakistan.

Miss T'ang: You said . . . ?

Dr. Kissinger: I said orally that on March 25 there was a united Pakistan, and he (Vorontsov) said yes. Incidentally, we inform the Pakistani Ambassador of everything we do. I don’t know whether he informs you.

Yesterday, December 9, we learned that the Soviet Minister of Agriculture was in Washington and that he was a friend of Brezhnev who wanted to see the President.

Ambassador Huang: His name?

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2 For documentation on the 1971 India-Pakistan conflict, see Foreign Relations, 1969–1976, volume XI.

3 All ellipses are in the source text.
Dr. Kissinger: Matskevich. These gentlemen (the Chinese) have a
file on everybody. Someday I must find out what they know about me;
it is more than I do. (Ambassador Huang gestures in mock denial.)

During this discussion, which lasted 15 minutes and was primarily
a statement by the President, the President emphasized that Pak-
istan is a friend of the United States and that if India were to continue
its attacks and launch an attack against West Pakistan, it could lead to
a US–Soviet confrontation.

Today, on December 10, we sent forward a reply to Brezhnev. We
pointed out that—this is based on the information we have that the
Pakistani commander in East Pakistan has asked for a ceasefire—we
said if there is not a ceasefire in West Pakistan as well, “we would
have to conclude that there is in progress an act of aggression directed
at the whole of Pakistan, a friendly country, toward which we have
obligations.”

In order to underline what we have said, we worked with a num-
ber of countries to provide aid to Pakistan.

Ambassador Huang: But this is not in the letter that you are
quoting.

Dr. Kissinger: No, I am telling you about this. This is terribly com-
plex. We are barred by law from giving equipment to Pakistan in
this situation. And we also are barred by law from permitting friendly
countries which have American equipment to give their equipment to
Pakistan.

So we have worked out the following arrangements with a num-
ber of countries. We have told Jordan and Iran and Saudi Arabia, and
we will tell Turkey through a channel other than the ones with which
Ambassador Bush is familiar. We said that if they decide that their na-
tional security requires shipment of American arms to Pakistan, we are
obliged to protest, but we will understand. We will not protest with
great intensity. And we will make up to them in next year’s budget
whatever difficulties they have.

On this basis, four planes are leaving Jordan today and 22 over
the weekend. Ammunition and other equipment is going from Iran.

Ambassador Huang: You mean over the weekend?

Dr. Kissinger: We don’t know the exact time, but immediately we
understand. And six planes from Turkey in the near future. This is very
confidential obviously, and we are not eager for it to be known. At least
not until Congress gets out of town tomorrow.

In addition, we are moving a number of naval ships in the West
Pacific toward the Indian Ocean: an aircraft carrier accompanied by
four destroyers and a tanker, and a helicopter carrier and two de-
stroyers. I have maps here showing the location of the Soviet fleet in
the Indian Ocean if you are interested. These are much smaller ships. They are no match for the US ships. (Showing Ambassador Huang the map) Here is a merchant tanker...a submarine...

Ambassador Huang: (laughing) I’m no expert.
Dr. Kissinger: I’m not either. There is no difficulty.
There is not much in the Soviet fleet. What is the total number, Al? (to Haig) I’ve read it somewhere.
Ambassador Huang: There’s a cruiser coming in now.
Dr. Kissinger: Their ships are not much.

I now come to a matter of some sensitivity. We have received a report that one of your personnel in a European country, in a conversation with another European, expressed uncertainty about the Soviet dispositions on your borders and a desire for information about them. We do not ourselves concentrate on tactical intelligence. We only have information about the general disposition, and we collect it at irregular intervals by satellite. But we would be prepared at your request, and through whatever sources you wish, to give you whatever information we have about the disposition of Soviet forces. I don’t have it with me, but we can arrange it easily wherever you wish and in an absolutely secure way.

Secondly, the President wants you to know that it’s, of course, up to the People’s Republic to decide its own course of action in this situation, but if the People’s Republic were to consider the situation on the Indian subcontinent a threat to its security, and if it took measures to protect its security, the US would oppose efforts of others to interfere with the People’s Republic. We are not recommending any particular steps; we are simply informing you about the actions of others.

The movement of our naval force is still East of the Straits of Malacca and will not become obvious until Sunday evening when they cross the Straits.

I would like to give you our assessment of the military situation on the subcontinent. I don’t know whether you have any assessments. I would like to give this to you and then tell you one other thing.

The Pakistani army in the East has been destroyed. The Pakistani army in the West will run out of what we call POL—gas and oil—in another two to three weeks, two weeks probably, because the oil storage capacity in Karachi has been destroyed. We think that the immediate objective must be to prevent an attack on the West Pakistan army by India. We are afraid that if nothing is done to stop it, East Pakistan will become a Bhutan and West Pakistan will become a Nepal. And India with Soviet help would be free to turn its energies elsewhere.

So it seems to us that through a combination of pressures and political moves it is important to keep India from attacking in the
West, to gain time to get more arms into Pakistan and to restore the situation.

We sent yesterday the relevant paragraphs, the non-rhetorical paragraphs, from Brezhnev’s letter to President Yahya for his opinion. (To Ambassador Huang and Miss T’ang) Why don’t you read what we told him? It is an unusual method of proceeding, but we have to understand each other. This is just a quotation, an extract. (To Miss T’ang) Don’t write it down word for word, Nancy.

You don’t need a master spy. We give you everything (handing over his file). We read that you brought a master spy with you. You don’t need him. He couldn’t get this by himself. (Chinese laughter) Next time he (Ambassador Huang) will show me one of his dispatches, but it will do me no good at all, since I can’t read it. (Chinese laughter)

(To Ambassador Bush) Don’t you discuss diplomacy this way.
Ambassador Bush: I’m trying to understand it. I’m waiting for the Chinese translation.

(Miss T’ang continues to read out the cable to Yahya).

Dr. Kissinger: This is to our Ambassador, but it goes through a secret channel. No one in the bureaucracy sees it. (Miss T’ang keeps reading.)

I went over this with the Pakistani Ambassador. I showed it to him to see if he thought it was alright.

Miss T’ang: And then you sent it.
Dr. Kissinger: So we are being open and we are doing it in friendship.

Miss T’ang: (Repeating) “disassociation”.
Dr. Kissinger: Let me explain, Mr. Ambassador. If the Russians advocate negotiations as they were in March, that means they cannot accept Bangla Desh. (To the Ambassador) You can read the next page.

Miss T’ang: It says “exclusively eyes only.”
Dr. Kissinger: There’s a better one that says “burn before reading.”
(Dr. Kissinger confirms the translation.)

(Miss T’ang keeps reading) I wanted you to know so that you know exactly what we tell them. Now they have replied to us. Can I read it to you, which is the answer from Yahya?

Ambassador Huang: Yes.
Dr. Kissinger: He said that subject to the provisions of paragraph 2 of my communication—in other words these two provisions concerning negotiations being done in a united way—India and Pakistan should agree to an immediate ceasefire with the separation of armed forces standing fast; and the UN or another international organization should provide observers to see that the ceasefire is effective; and
India and Pakistan at any effective level should immediately open negotiations aimed at a settlement of the war and troop withdrawal; and coincident therewith there would be negotiations looking toward the political satisfaction of Bengali aspirations, that is, a political settlement. (Miss T’ang repeats, then interprets)

So now you know everything we know. Our judgment is if West Pakistan is to be preserved from destruction, two things are needed—maximum intimidation of the Indians and, to some extent, the Soviets. Secondly, maximum pressure for the ceasefire.

At this moment we have—I must tell you one other thing—we have an intelligence report according to which Mrs. Gandhi told her cabinet that she wants to destroy the Pakistani army and air force and to annex this part of Kashmir, Azad Kashmir, and then to offer a ceasefire. This is what we believe must be prevented and this is why I have taken the liberty to ask for this meeting with the Ambassador.

One other thing. The Acting Secretary of State—the Secretary of State is in Europe—called in last night the Indian Ambassador and demanded assurance that India has no designs, will not annex any territory. We do this to have a legal basis for other actions.

So this is where we are.

Ambassador Huang: We thank Dr. Kissinger very much for informing us of the situation on the subcontinent of India–Pakistan, and we certainly will convey that to Prime Minister Chou En-lai.

The position of the Chinese Government on this matter is not a secret. Everything has been made known to the world. And the basic stand we are taking in the UN is the basic stand of our government. Both in the Security Council and the plenary session of the General Assembly we have supported the draft resolutions that have included both the ceasefire and withdrawal, although we are not actually satisfied with that kind of resolution. But we feel that the draft resolution which had support in the Security Council and especially the one which we voted in favor of in the General Assembly, reflect the aspirations of the overwhelming majority of the small and medium countries. And in the plenary session of the General Assembly this draft resolution was put forward by Algeria and Argentina and 38 more and it was adopted by a majority of 104. The opposition consisted in effect of only two—the Soviet Union and India. The others were either their followers or their protectorates. We feel that this reflects the aspirations, it shows where the hearts of the people in the world turn to.

Miss T’ang: (To Dr. Kissinger) Do you understand?

Dr. Kissinger: Oh, yes.

Ambassador Huang: It shows what the majority of the people in the world support and what they oppose. Because if India, with the
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aid of the Soviet Union, would be able to have its own way in the sub-
continent then there would be no more security to speak of for a lot of
other countries, and no peace to speak of. Because that would mean
the dismemberment and the splitting up of a sovereign country and
the creation of a new edition of Manchukuo, the Bangla Desh. It would
also mean aggression by military forces and the annexation of sover-
eign territory.

Therefore we believe that the draft resolution that was put forth
in the General Assembly in the UN put forward two minimum prin-
ciples, two minimum criteria. One is ceasefire; the other is withdrawal.
And in his speech in the General Assembly with regard to this matter;
Deputy Minister Ch’iao Kuan-hua has explained this question in a
more comprehensive and fuller way. We should persist in this stand,
and we hold that any action that may be taken by the UN cannot go
below the resolution passed by the General Assembly. It cannot be any-
thing that carries less than that resolution.

And on this point of view, in my personal opinion, we feel the po-

tition taken by the United States Government has been a weak one.
From what I just heard in the letter to Yahya Khan and your conver-
sation with the Indian Ambassador and also your communications with
the Soviet Union, we have found that you have not put forward both
the principles of ceasefire and withdrawal.

Dr. Kissinger: That’s not correct. We put forward both principles.
There are two separate problems, in all due respect. We don’t want in
the principle of withdrawal to have West Pakistan go the way of East
Pakistan.

Ambassador Huang: And then there’s this question that the British
put forward that they wanted the leaders of the Pakistan government
to enter into political negotiations. You also mentioned that, picked up
their position that negotiations should begin.

Dr. Kissinger: Not to Brezhnev.

Ambassador Huang: And you mention negotiations should start
from where they were continuing.

Dr. Kissinger: Brezhnev said that. What I showed you was a ques-
tion to Yahya. We have not agreed with Brezhnev.

Ambassador Huang: But Brezhnev’s proposal is essentially the
same one that Mr. Malik has been saying here.

Dr. Kissinger: That’s true.

Ambassador Huang: In fact, it means legalizing of the new refur-
bishment of another Manchukuo, that is, to give it legal status through
the UN, or rather through the modalities of the UN.

This goes against the desires of the people in Pakistan, against the
desires of the peoples of the world that was expressed in the voting of
the General Assembly on this issue. The Soviet Union and India now are progressing along on an extremely dangerous track in the subcontinent. And as we have already pointed out this is a step to encircle China.

Dr. Kissinger: There is no question about that.

Ambassador Huang: And you also are clear about our activity, that is we are prepared to meet attacks coming from the east, west, north, and south.

Dr. Kissinger: When we have an exchange program between our countries, I hope to send a few State Department people to China. I'll send you a few of our State Department people for training. I may look weak to you, Mr. Ambassador, but my colleagues in Washington think I'm a raving maniac.

Miss T'ang: We didn't finish.

Ambassador Huang: We are prepared for attacks on the east, west, north, and south. We are prepared to engage in guerrilla warfare once again with millet and rifle, and we are prepared to begin our construction over again, after that eventuality. And the private attitude adopted by Brezhnev which we see now, in which he talks about so-called political negotiations is in fact direct and obvious intervention in the internal affairs of a sovereign country and something we feel is completely unacceptable, is inadmissible.

Of course we have nothing here about the military situation in the India-Pakistan subcontinent except what we read in the newspapers. But from our experience of a longer period we feel that the struggle waged by the people in Pakistan is a just struggle and therefore it is bound to have the support of the Chinese people and the people of the world. Whoever upholds justice and strives to defend their sovereignty, independence and territorial integrity . . .

We have an old proverb: “If light does not come to the east it will come to the west. If the south darkens, the north must still have light.” And therefore if we meet with some defeats in certain places, we will win elsewhere. So we keep persevering. So long as we persevere in principle and a just struggle, then final victory will still be ours. I don't think there's need for any more elaboration on that, because the history of the Chinese people's revolution itself is a good example.

Dr. Kissinger: Mr. Ambassador, we agree with your analysis of the situation. What is happening in the Indian subcontinent is a threat to all people. It's a more immediate threat to China, but it's a threat to all people. We have no agreement with the British to do anything. In fact we are talking with you to come to a common position. We know that Pakistan is being punished because it is a friend of China and because it is a friend of the United States.
But while we agree with your theory, we now have an immediate problem. I don’t know the history of the people’s revolution in China nearly as well as you do. I seem to remember that one of the great lessons is that under all circumstances the Chinese movement maintained its essence. And as an article on the Chungking negotiations makes clear, it is right to negotiate when negotiations are necessary and to fight when fighting is necessary.

We want to preserve the army in West Pakistan so that it is better able to fight if the situation rises again. We are also prepared to attempt to assemble a maximum amount of pressure in order to deter India. You read the New York Times every day, and you will see that the movement of supplies and the movement of our fleet will not have the universal admiration of the media, to put it mildly. And it will have the total opposition of our political opponents.

We want to keep the pressure on India, both militarily and politically. We have no interest in political negotiations between Pakistani leaders and East Pakistani leaders as such. The only interest that we possibly have is to get Soviet agreement to a united Pakistan. We have no interest in an agreement between Bangla Desh and Pakistan.

We are prepared also to consider simply a ceasefire. We are prepared also to follow your course in the UN which most of my colleagues would be delighted to do and then Pakistan would be destroyed. If we followed your course of insisting on ceasefire and withdrawal and do nothing then Pakistan will be destroyed, and many people in America will be delighted. If you and Pakistan want this then we will do it. That is no problem for us. That is the easiest course for us.

So we will...we agree with your analysis completely. We are looking for practical steps in this issue which happens to be a common fight for different reasons. We will not cooperate with anyone to impose anything on Pakistan. We have taken a stand against India and we will maintain this stand. But we have this problem. It is our judgment, with great sorrow, that the Pakistan army in two weeks will disintegrate in the West as it has disintegrated in the East. If we are wrong about this, we are wrong about everything.

What do you think of ceasefire without political negotiations? The only reason we want political negotiations at all is to preserve East Pakistan, not to weaken it.

Ambassador Huang: Are you prepared to take the step in the UN of putting forward a proposal simply for ceasefire, along this course?

Dr. Kissinger: No, that’s why I’m talking to you. Let’s be practical—by tomorrow the Pakistan Army in the East will have surrendered. Therefore should one have a resolution for a ceasefire in the West?
Ambassador Huang: Why should we not condemn India for its aggression against East Pakistan? Why should there not be a demand for the resolution already passed in the General Assembly which calls for withdrawal? And if it is . . . if you find it impossible to condemn India . . .

Dr. Kissinger: We do. We don’t mind condemning India.

Ambassador Huang: . . . A step should not be taken backward from the resolution already passed in the General Assembly. 4

Dr. Kissinger: There are two separate problems. The resolution in the General Assembly is one for the whole problem—that can be maintained. We are not saying we accept the occupation of East Pakistan; we don’t have to accept that. But this would be a resolution for a ceasefire only. And the Arabs would not accept the occupation of their territory even though there is a ceasefire. So . . . but we are not here to tell you . . . When I asked for this meeting, I did so to suggest Chinese military help, to be quite honest. That’s what I had in mind, not to discuss with you how to defeat Pakistan. I didn’t want to find a way out of it, but I did it in an indirect way.

But this is for you to decide. You have many other problems on many other borders. What is going to happen is that the Pakistani commander in East Pakistan, independent of anything we did, has asked the UN to arrange a ceasefire in East Pakistan. We will not take a stand in opposition to you on this issue. We think we are on the same side. So . . .

Ambassador Huang: We feel that the situation on the subcontinent is very tense and is in the process of rapid development and change. And therefore, as I expressed earlier, we will immediately report what you tell me.

Dr. Kissinger: I don’t want the Prime Minister to misunderstand. We are not looking for a way to get out of the situation. We are looking for a way to protect what is left of Pakistan. We will not recognize Bangla Desh. We will not negotiate with Bangla Desh. We will not encourage talks between Pakistan and Bangla Desh.

We have the immediate practical problem—is it better to have a ceasefire or is it better to let the military events continue? In either event both of us must continue to bring pressure on India and the Soviet Union.

(There is an exchange in which Dr. Kissinger confirms to Bush that he talked to Bhutto, that he was meeting him the next morning)

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4 The General Assembly passed Resolution 2793 (XXVI) on December 7 by a vote of 104 to 11, with 10 abstentions. It called for an immediate cease-fire and the withdrawal of all troops from the territory of the other. See Yearbook of the United Nations, 1971 (New York: Office of Public Information, United Nations, n.d.), pp. 143–161.
and that Bush’s appointment with him was confirmed for later this night.)

I shall tell him (Bhutto) he should take his direction from you on whatever resolution he wants and that we will support him. I shall tell him to disregard any American official except me and General Haig. He doesn’t have to take his direction from you, but I will tell him to check with you. Usually you criticize us for sticking too much to our friends, so we will not in this case create the wrong impression.

Ambassador Huang: As for Bangla Desh, has Ambassador Bush recently met with anybody from Bangla Desh?


(Ambassador Bush then explains the incident that led to Ambassador Huang’s query. Mr. Choudury, who used to be in the Third Committee of the UN, three weeks ago asked Ambassador Bush for an appointment in his capacity as a judge in Pakistan. Ambassador Bush had his staff check the man out. Choudury then made a personal call but brought along three men with him. When they started mentioning Bangla Desh, Ambassador Bush told them to wait a minute, pointing out that Choudury was seeing him as a judge. It was a humiliating experience for Ambassador Bush. He had not seen the men since. Ambassador Bush had told them that they should wait a minute, that he was inhibited from discussing such matters. Mr. Choudury left two to three weeks ago. Ambassador Bush repeated that Ambassador Huang was referring to a story in the New York Times. He pointed out that Mr. Choudury is around a great deal of the time including in the delegates’ lounge. He added that it was very embarrassing to him.)

Ambassador Huang: I am clear now.

Dr. Kissinger: In any event, no matter what you read, no one is authorized to talk to the Bangla Desh. We don’t recognize Bangla Desh and will not recognize it.

Ambassador Huang: I thank Ambassador Bush very much for his explanation.

Ambassador Bush: One of the men had defected from the Pakistan Embassy in Washington and came here. Ambassador Shahi would kill me.

Dr. Kissinger: My former personal assistant is now working for Senator Muskie. There are many defectors around these days.

Mr. Ambassador, I am going to the Azores on Sunday afternoon with the President for 48 hours. General Haig has my complete confidence, and we have very rapid communication. So if you have some communication for us . . .

But I want Peking to be clear that my seeing you was for the purpose of coordinating positive steps, not to prepare you for negative steps.
Ambassador Huang: I don’t have anything else.

Dr. Kissinger: Good. I wish happier occasions would bring us together. We have particular affection for Pakistan because we feel they helped to reestablish contact between the People’s Republic and the United States.

So we are prepared to listen to any practical proposals for parallel action. We will do our best to prevent pressure against any country that takes unilateral action. I shall speak to Mr. Bhutto tomorrow in the sense that I have indicated to you.

Ambassador Huang: Of course, we will also contact Mr. Bhutto and, of course, as you later clarified yourself, we of course will give no directions. Yahya Khan is the President, and we only have friendly exchanges.

Dr. Kissinger: Of course. The word “direction” was not well-chosen.

Ambassador Huang: We think that is all there is today. What we need to do is to relay this to Prime Minister Chou En-lai.

(There were then a few minutes of closing pleasantries while the Chinese waited for their automobile.

Ambassador Bush clarified to the Chinese the public disclosure in the newspapers of the five-power meeting on U Thant’s successor.

Ambassador Huang confirmed that Deputy Minister Ch’iao, as well as Miss T’ang and others, would be returning to Peking on December 16 at the close of the General Assembly session. Miss Shih, who was present for the meeting, would replace Miss T’ang as principal liaison with the U.S. side.

Dr. Kissinger also asked Ambassador Huang whether his secretaries could make social contact with the girls in the Chinese delegation, saying that they wanted to, but that he had prohibited them on the grounds that it might be embarrassing to the Chinese. Ambassador Huang indicated that this would be alright.

Dr. Kissinger asked if the Chinese were going to stay in the Roosevelt permanently, and Ambassador Huang asked if Dr. Kissinger had any suggestions for a new locale. Dr. Kissinger then offered to help the Chinese by getting someone in Governor Rockefeller’s organization in touch with someone on the Chinese delegation. He explained that Governor Rockefeller controlled a great deal of real estate in New York and knew of many openings and could be of great service. Dr. Kissinger would make sure that contact was made Wednesday or Thursday of the following week after he got back from the Azores. Ambassador Huang then named Hsing Sung-yi as the contact on this question, noting that he had already seen many places.)
177. Memorandum of Conversation

New York, December 12, 1971, 3:50–4:20 p.m.

PARTICIPANTS

Ambassador Huang Hua, PRC Permanent Representative to the United Nations and Ambassador to Canada
T’ang Wen-sheng, Interpreter
Shih Yen-hua, Interpreter
Brig. Gen. Alexander M. Haig, Jr., Deputy Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs
Winston Lord, Senior NSC Staff Member

General Haig: I understand there was some excitement around your hotel.

Amb. Huang: Yes, twice. There were demonstrations for and opposing Bangla Desh, for and opposing Indian aggression.

General Haig: At least it’s kept evenly divided.

Amb. Huang: I would like you to convey the following message. (Amb. Huang reads from a printed text and the interpreter translates):

“The Chinese side has carefully studied the opinions put forward by Dr. Henry Kissinger last time. We agree to the principle he has spoken of, that is, in order to implement the UN resolution of the General Assembly within the framework of a united Pakistan, an immediate ceasefire must first be effected both in East and West Pakistan which will be followed by troop withdrawal by both sides. For this purpose we also agree to the convening of an emergency meeting of the Security Council. However, in so doing, one must not show the slightest sign of weakness toward the Soviet Union and India. The ceasefire and withdrawal will be realized in steps and no recognition must be given to Bangla Desh. For our part we are stepping up support and assistance to Pakistan. And we must adhere to the principle that no recognition be given to Bangla Desh.”

That is roughly our reply to the talk we had last time.

General Haig: That is very good.

I thought it would be helpful if I tell you what we have done since we last met. On Friday, we sent a very strong warning to the Soviet Union, and we told them that if we had no indication from them that

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1 Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 849, President’s File—China Trip, China Exchanges. Top Secret; Sensitive; Exclusively Eyes Only.
2 On the same day, the PRC message and a brief summary of the meeting was relayed by Colonel Kennedy to Kissinger, then en route to the Azores with President Nixon. (Ibid.)
they would act constructively in this situation we would proceed within the framework of the Security Council along the lines that we proposed, that is with a ceasefire and withdrawal. After this warning we had not heard from them, so we proceeded with a very strong public statement. After setting in train moving to the Security Council, we received an urgent message from Moscow. In that message they indicated that they were most anxious to find a solution and a way out of the situation. We have not received the details of their proposal.

So we intend, as you know, to proceed in the United Nations with the General Assembly resolution in the Security Council. We will ask for a ceasefire and withdrawal.

Here are the other steps we have taken. The movement of the forces of the Seventh Fleet is underway and will go through the Straits of Malacca tomorrow and proceed to the Indian Ocean by Wednesday.

We are informed that the King of Jordan has sent six fighter aircraft to Pakistan and intends to send others up to a total of fourteen very soon. The Government of Iran is sending aircraft to Jordan to replace those aircraft Jordan sends to Pakistan. We are informed that Saudi Arabia and the Iranians are sending small arms and ammunition. And there is some indication that the Government of Turkey is sending up to twenty-two aircraft. We, of course, are doing all we can to facilitate this.

I think the most important indication that we have is that the Soviet Union now is very concerned. We intend to watch that situation very carefully. We have no intention of weakening the US position in any way on this situation.

Where we go from the UN Security Council Resolution of ceasefire and withdrawal, and ultimately ceasefire, will be largely the result of the wishes of Pakistan, but without pressure from the United States of any kind.

Now the Soviet response to us was again very conciliatory. They informed us that they sent Deputy Foreign Minister Kuznetsov to New Delhi and that he met with Madame Gandhi, and they are very anxious to arrive at some way out of this situation. We intend to stay very, very firm with the Soviet Union on this issue.

Amb. Huang: That’s all up to now?

General Haig: That’s all up to now, yes.

I think it is very important that the People’s Republic understand that we have taken a full range of steps which have been very cognizant of the interests we have in preserving the integrity of Pakistan, and that your side recognize that these measures have been strenuous, given the realities of the political situation here domestically. And it is in our view quite important that your government recognize we have done every step with full coordination with you. We have told you
each step. We don’t think it is helpful to characterize the measures we have taken as weak or vacillating, because that is not an accurate characterization of the steps we have taken and are prepared to take.

Amb. Huang: Do you have other plans with regard to the Security Council?

General Haig: At this moment none other than to insist on a vote in the Security Council along the general outlines of the General Assembly resolution and to hold with that. If this does not succeed, then we will move with ceasefire alone and leave it at that.3

I would welcome anything the Ambassador has to offer in terms of what the People’s Republic will see as coming at that point.

Amb. Huang: We have the same views on this question, that is to preserve the unification of Pakistan and in the Security Council we are in favor of the draft resolution along the lines of the resolution adopted at the General Assembly meeting, that is ceasefire and troop withdrawal. If the Soviet Union vetoes that resolution, then we must adhere to the principles that ceasefire and troop withdrawal constitute an integrated whole, but they can be effected by steps, that is the ceasefire must first be effected immediately in East Pakistan and West Pakistan.

General Haig: Both sides.

Amb. Huang: Then that would be followed by troop withdrawal.

General Haig: I would like to give the Ambassador a copy of the White House text which was issued today.

Amb. Huang: We heard the news, but we didn’t have the full text.

(General Haig hands the text over at Tab A.)4

Amb. Huang: We have nothing more to say.

General Haig: Very good.

Amb. Huang: I will take leave then.

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3 After receiving unsigned instructions on December 17, Walters met with PRC diplomats in Paris the next day to update them on United States efforts involving India and Pakistan. Walters’ instructions and memorandum of record, December 20, are ibid. See also Foreign Relations, 1969–1976, vol. E–13, Documents 73 and 74.

4 The attached White House statement reads in full: “On December 7th, the General Assembly by a vote of 104 to 11 with ten abstentions called on India and Pakistan to institute an immediate cease fire and to withdraw troops from each other’s territory. Pakistan has accepted the resolution. India has refused. In view of India’s defiance of world opinion expressed by such an overwhelming majority, the United States is now returning the issue to the Security Council. With East Pakistan virtually occupied by Indian troops a continuation of the war would take on increasingly the character of armed attack on the very existence of a member state of the United Nations. All permanent members of the Security Council have an obligation to end this threat to world peace on the most urgent basis. The United States will cooperate fully in this effort.”
General Haig: I hope the Ambassador will feel free at any time to contact us. It is important that we continue to exchange views as we proceed.

(There was then some continued small talk and light conversation as the Ambassador waited for his car to arrive. General Haig mentioned that Ambassador Bush would like to know if the Chinese wish to conduct bilateral discussions on the question of a successor to Secretary General U Thant. Ambassador Huang replied that they were ready for both bilateral and multilateral consultations. He added that this was their attitude with respect to the other three permanent members of the Security Council also.

Other topics of conversation included the fact that Ambassador Huang and his colleagues had been very busy the last few weeks, the heavy social schedule imposed on Ambassador Huang which he termed a “punishment,” the heavy traffic in New York City, and a brief rundown by General Haig on the latest reports on the military situation in the South Asian subcontinent.)

178. Memorandum From John H. Holdridge of the National Security Council Staff to the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger)¹


SUBJECT
P’eng Ming-min Between the ROC and PRC: Prospects for “Formosan Independence”

Recently we have received two intelligence reports on contacts between P’eng Ming-min and both the ROC and the PRC.² P’eng is the most visible leader of the Taiwan Independence Movement. As you know, he escaped from Taiwan last year and is now in Ann Arbor, Michigan.³

¹ Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 524, Country Files, People’s Republic of China, Vol. II. Secret. Sent for information. Initialed by Holdridge and Solomon. According to the attached NSC Correspondence Profile, the memorandum was “noted by HAK” on December 17.

² These reports have not been located.

³ See Documents 65 and 91.
In August the ROC sent an emissary to the United States to establish contact with P’eng. The emissary appeared to have been briefed by Chiang Kai-shek himself.4

The man urged P’eng to return to Taiwan and cooperate with the GRC. P’eng turned down the invitation because he found the conditions set by the ROC unacceptable. The emissary had told P’eng that if he would accept the continued validity of the “return to the mainland” policy, and of ROC control of the military forces on the island, he would be permitted to become active in provincial political affairs. The emissary expressed fears that if P’eng did not cooperate the ROC would use increasingly repressive measures against the Taiwanese population.

More recently, P’eng himself took the initiative of calling John S. Service before his trip to China to ask Service to arrange with Chou En-lai for a (P’eng) visit to mainland China, or to otherwise enable P’eng to establish direct contact with authorities of the PRC. Chou En-lai is reported to have said to Service when P’eng’s message was raised: “Any friends of P’eng who have not taken part or approved of the Taiwan independence movement can come here and then report back to P’eng.”

FBI reporting has revealed that P’eng attempted to get his mistress out of Taiwan through the ploy of having the woman marry an American soldier who would bring her to the U.S. as his wife. The ROC authorities are aware of the ploy, and have moved to block the woman’s exit. They have expressed to USG officials the hope that pressures will not be applied from the U.S. side to allow the woman to leave the island. P’eng thus may find his situation in this country increasingly frustrating at a personal level, compounding what must be his political frustrations about lack of support for Taiwan independence by U.S. authorities and the world community in general (as demonstrated by the U.N. Chirep vote).

Taiwanese close to P’eng describe the man as an opportunist. At least one could assume that a man as politically active as P’eng—finding the direct road back to Taiwan unattractive, and disappointed by the U.S. position on Taiwanese independence—might begin to think about making some kind of an arrangement (à la Sihanouk?) with the PRC. Certainly P’eng’s initiative toward Chou En-lai suggests that he may be thinking in this direction.

4 Solomon had relayed news of contacts between the Nationalist representatives and Peng on November 23. (National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 1317, NSC Secretariat Files, Richard H. Solomon Chronology File, 1971)
The fact that Chou at present has adopted a “hands off” policy toward those associated with Taiwanese independence gives one more indication of mounting PRC anxiety over the possibilities of an independent status for the island. As times goes by, however, and as the difficulties of recovering the island become more obvious, PRC leaders may seek ways of using a man like P’eng to sustain their claims to the island and to the “Chineseness” of its people.

In an article in the New York Times on October 27, P’eng gave evidence of the current state of his thinking about “Formosa’s” future. He listed five basic conditions shaping a settlement of the island’s status:

1. The U.S. cannot maintain its military presence on Taiwan permanently.
2. The PRC cannot simply annex the island.
3. The ROC cannot continue to sustain its rule over the island on its present “absurd basis.”
4. The people of the island cannot live in a state of hostility with the mainland.
5. “The unique history and identity of the people on Formosa cannot be disregarded, nor their aspiration to decide their own destiny denied.”

P’eng then added that, “the Formosan people want to live in the most friendly association with the Chinese people, and would spare no effort to establish the closest economic, commercial, cultural and even political ties with China.”

Where this all comes out at the moment is uncertain. On the assumptions that P’eng does not just withdraw from politics and that the Taiwan issue is not settled between the PRC and the present ROC leadership on a bilateral basis, one can foresee three possible futures for P’eng and his strivings for “Formosan independence”:

1. **Cooperation with the post-Gimo leadership.** With Chiang Kai-shek’s passing, the successor ROC leadership may move to broaden its base of support from the Taiwanese population. In such circumstances, P’eng might be offered more acceptable terms for a return to Taiwan than the ROC offered him this fall. P’eng thus might help to link the KMT to the local population and strengthen the de facto autonomy of the island.

2. **Co-optation by the PRC.** In circumstances of increasing personal frustration and political isolation, P’eng might be tempted to play the role of a Sihanouk with Peking, using a relationship with PRC authorities for public claims that he has worked out “the most friendly association with the Chinese people” which would give a measure of

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local autonomy to the Taiwanese within a larger context of “political ties with China.” [The quoted phrases are from P’eng’s October 27 New York Times article.]³

The PRC leadership might seek to accommodate P’eng to such a public, “united front” role if they felt it would strengthen their current assertions that the Taiwanese people wish to be “reunited with the motherland.” This approach may become increasingly attractive to Peking if it finds that avenues toward a negotiated solution to the island’s status favorable to their interests are not forthcoming.

3. A link between the PRC and ROC (¿). A third, but less likely, alternative might involve P’eng in negotiations between Peking and (post-Gimo) Taipei. If some formula could be found for Taiwanese “autonomy” within a one-China framework acceptable to both the ROC and Communist leaderships, the key political problem would be holding the loyalty of the Taiwanese. Naturally they would fear that the ROC was selling out their interests to the mainland. In such circumstances, P’eng—as the most visible leader of the Formosan autonomy position—could play a key role as a public figure supporting a negotiated solution to the Taiwan question. His backing could play a major part in preventing a Taiwanese revolt against a PRC–ROC deal, for he is one of the few men whose public cooperation would imply sufficient local autonomy for the Taiwanese to ease fears of direct “communization” of the island.

³ Brackets in the source text.

179. Memorandum From the Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs (Johnson) to the Deputy Director for Plans, Central Intelligence Agency (Karamessines)¹


SUBJECT

Proposal by ROC Vice Foreign Minister for Covert Emissaries to President Chiang

¹ Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Agency Files, Box 285, Department of State, 1 Sep–31 Dec 1971, Vol. XIII. Secret; Sensitive. This memorandum and attachments were forwarded by Deputy Executive Secretary Curran to Haig on December 27. A short handwritten note, attached, reads: “12/28/71, Laura: No distribution. Gen. Haig has copy with him for HAK. Holdridge has seen. Col. Ken.”
Thank you for your memorandum of December 14, 1971 regarding Vice Foreign Minister Yang Hsi-kun’s proposal that “old and trusted” friends of President Chiang be sent covertly as emissaries of President Nixon to induce Chiang to change ROC policies to those that Yang regards as more realistic. Yang’s conversation [1 line of source text not declassified] parallels a recent talk he had with Ambassador McConaughy, too. As you correctly note, Yang is in the forefront of ROC officials advocating significant changes in ROC policy not only in foreign affairs but also in domestic political reform. Although respected and valued as a technician and as a source of fairly frank assessments, not unexpectedly, he has not been able to move President Chiang as far or as fast as he, Yang, thinks desirable. As he did several times during Chirep earlier this year, he has once again proposed that the US add its weight on the side of reason and push the ROC and President Chiang to move further and faster.

We do not think that it is necessary for the ROC to move so far and so fast as Yang advocates in order to maintain the viability of Taiwan in the face of its recent setbacks on the international scene. Further movement is clearly necessary, but much already seems to be in the works. As we did during Chirep, we are prepared to give the ROC our assessment of various situations, our analyses of the courses of action open to it and our judgments about their relative chances of success. As the decisions are clearly ones for the ROC itself to make and as many of them go to the heart of its claims to political legitimacy, we would be reluctant to have the US push very hard on particular policy lines. We are prepared to point out to the ROC the value of certain positions it has adopted for maintaining US public and Congressional support for our policies toward the ROC and to inquire into ROC intentions in areas that impact on US interests. Likewise we are prepared to warn of the dangers inherent in other courses of action being considered. This stops short, however, of pressuring the ROC to adopt certain policies at our behest.

As for the channels of communication urged by Yang, we have some reservations. Ideas about policy changes for the ROC are not new and their assessments of what is necessary to accomplish certain objectives have been quite realistic and certainly so far at least the past
year. While we would not now want to rule out completely the possibility of a high-level emissary if some future situation should seem to require that kind of US intervention, we think that using our Ambassador as the channel to President Chiang for US views is probably more effective and more compatible with the low-key posture which we think is the appropriate US role at this time.

We think [less than 1 line of source text not declassified] could usefully inform Yang that his views have been given consideration at appropriate levels within the US Government. He might go on to say that we generally plan to rely on our Ambassador as the primary channel for conveying the views of the US Government to President Chiang and the policy-making levels of the ROC.\(^5\)

**UAJ**

\(^5\) The message was conveyed to Yang on January 7, and on January 12 Johnson received a memorandum of the conversation. After reviewing these materials, Green wrote to Johnson on January 21, and expressed concern that “Yang does not seem to have clearly gotten the message.” He suggested that Johnson reiterate the Department of State’s views. The memorandum of conversation and Green’s memorandum are ibid.

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### 180. Memorandum of Conversation\(^1\)

Key Biscayne, Florida, December 30, 1971, 10:30 a.m.

**PARTICIPANTS**

- Dr. Henry A. Kissinger
- Chou Shu-kai, Foreign Minister, Republic of China
- Director Cheng, Republic of China
- His Excellency, James Shen, Republic of China
- Ambassador to the United States
- Coleman S. Hicks, notetaker

The conversation began with light banter among the participants.

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\(^1\) Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 523, Country Files, Far East, China, Vol. X. Secret; Sensitive; Eyes Only. The meeting was held at Kissinger’s villa at the Key Biscayne Hotel. A short attached note reads: “Coleman: This is ready to go to file. JHH doesn’t think it’s necessary to have HAK read it through. Eileen.”
Chou: It is very nice of you to take the time to see us here in Key Biscayne. I have just come from Japan and you, of course, will be meeting the Japanese in San Clemente. I have three questions that I would like to ask you. First, how secure is Taiwan from Communist attack? Second, will you press us to negotiate with Peking? And number three, I would like to raise matters regarding confiscation of property. The Japanese are very excited about these concerns.

Kissinger: Well, I won’t tell you anything until the Ambassador promises to invite me to another Chinese dinner. (Laughter)

Chou: What we are seeking is reassurance from you about these matters. We are concerned that the Communists can gain control of the air.

Kissinger: Let’s settle the defense question first. At my press conference in November I commented that our defense commitment was unimpaired.2 I have also said that to Chou En-lai, and our defense commitment has not been affected by our dealings with Peking. If you are attacked, we will come to your defense. Personally, I don’t think China can maintain control of the air.

Chou: But we are in a situation where the quantity and quality of the Communist military capacity is going up and our impression is that the military assistance program is standing still. This results in a change of the military balance.

Kissinger: There has been no stoppage of our military assistance program to the Republic of China.

Chou: This is encouraging but there is concern about it.3

Kissinger: Can you give me particular items? I will check into it.

Chou: We are interested in excess equipment, F–104s, tanks and so forth. We do not seek offensive weapons.

Kissinger: I can reassure you that no steps have been taken to limit the military assistance program to the Republic of China.

Chou: There are rumbles in the lower levels at the State Department about tie-ups in the program.

Kissinger: Look, the lower levels of the State Department are prone, as you have probably seen, to take credit whenever it is due

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2 Kissinger held a short press conference on November 29 to announce the date for the President’s trip to the PRC, where he was asked about the U.S. defense commitment to the ROC. (Department of State Bulletin, December 20, 1971, p. 709)

3 In a January 14 memorandum, Holdridge informed Kissinger that “Chou’s comment probably represents a form of mild pressure on us to avoid delays or disapprovals rather than discontent over an actuality; [less than 1 line of source text not declassified] reporting has indicated considerable anxiety in the ROC Defense Ministry that we might tighten or reduce the flow of military assistance.” (National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 523, Country Files, Far East, China, Vol. X)
someone else but at the same time to undermine support for Presidential policies. The President has a warm personal feeling for the Republic of China. The steps we have taken with the Communists have been necessary. They are cold-blooded, calculated diplomatic moves. They have nothing to do with sympathy.

Chou: Well, I hope you can stir things up on this military assistance program.

Kissinger: I thought everything was in normal channels. What did Rogers say when you talked to him this morning?

Chou: (unintelligible)

Kissinger: I, of course, don’t know the exact details about the military balance between you and the Communists, but personally I don’t believe that the Communists have the capacity to use their military force outside their borders. But if so . . .

Chou: Another issue relates to the submarines.

Kissinger: I approved that two months ago.

Chou: All the key matters relate to training. Secretary Rogers appears to be apprehensive about this.

Kissinger: We have approved this. Why would it be in our interest not to go ahead and do it? Of course we will do it.

Chou: The next issue I would like to raise with you is the handling of the Senkaku Islands. When you talk to the Japanese in San Clemente, may I encourage you to consider our position? The Japanese watch very carefully the U.S. role in the Pacific and seek consultation with you. We have a difficult domestic political situation regarding the Islands. Peking wants to develop an anti-American campaign on Taiwan. We need help from our friends. The Islands don’t make any difference to Japan but they do to the people of Taiwan. Perhaps you could discuss these withered pieces of rock—there is no oil there—with the Japanese.

Kissinger: We will raise it with the Japanese.

Chou: We hope to keep them quiet about it.

Kissinger: You don’t want the Islands back; you just want to avoid a big fuss about them, is that right?

Chou: Yes, that’s right. It is like Outer Mongolia. The Japanese have an interest in Outer Mongolia. If we were on the Mainland, we might

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4 All ellipses are in the source text.

5 Holdridge informed Kissinger that the Department of Defense had passed to the ROC the White House’s request that no crew members arrive in the United States prior to March 11, 1972. (National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 523, Country Files, Far East, China, Vol. X)
be over-sensitive about Outer Mongolia and Tibet. The important thing is that they remain politically autonomous.

Kissinger: You are interested in Tibet. (Laughter)

Chou: In our bilateral relations we will continue to play it cool. We have told the Japanese that, for instance, we will trade with everyone. We will even trade with the socialist countries like East Germany. We would rather trade, of course, with our friends, but . . .

Kissinger: Will you negotiate with the Mainland?

Chou: No.

Kissinger: People have asked me often about my comments on this in my press conference at the end of October. To be honest, I thought that my comments would be helpful to you. I was trying to remove that item from the agenda in Peking during the President’s visit. What I indicated was a policy of allowing the Mainland and Taiwan to settle the problem politically themselves, without the use of force. You will get no pressure from us to settle this matter as long as President Nixon remains in office. I think this is the best possible formula from your perspective. If we were to say that we would not accept a political solution, the result would be a big international incident—problems at the United Nations; in short, a big issue. As long as no pressure is put on you for a political settlement, why isn’t this formula the best possible policy?

Shen: When you say that it is an internal Chinese affair that gives the impression though that you are washing your hands of it.

Kissinger: I didn’t say that we were washing our hands of it. I said merely that we would put no pressure on you to make a political settlement and that we would tolerate no force on the part of either side in resolution of the dispute. It seems to me to be a very practical solution. Regardless, I don’t think that Chou En-lai will renounce force. He isn’t about ready to ask us to act as an intermediary in this matter.

Shen: The last thing anybody would be interested in would be having you act as an intermediary.

Kissinger: It is important to do a little Chinese thinking here, to look at the matter in a complicated light. This issue will come up at the UN year after year. We will continually say that our policy is to tolerate no use of force in settling the political matter. What can go wrong?

Shen: But we need desperately to maintain our defense capacities. If they lag, it might lead the Communists to a miscalculation.

Kissinger: We have already talked about the defense matters. Personally, I don’t see a military capacity by the Mainland Chinese which would be effective against you. They are not about ready to use their
air force against you. They are too scared of the Russians; why would they bother to take you on? You know, a hundred miles of water to cross is quite difficult.

Chou: But they might use tricks. They might link this issue to the prisoners of war or the Vietnam problem. Of course, we know that you are smart enough not to be taken in.

Shen: People on Taiwan are concerned. What we are confronting here is largely a psychological question.

Kissinger: Whatever materials are in the military pipeline on our systems program, we will deliver on. To be frank, I don’t know the details of exactly what is, but, Mr. Foreign Minister, when you were Ambassador in Washington, we did what you wanted, didn’t we? What you needed, we gave you. You appear to think that the Communists are quite flexible. I don’t. I believe that their domestic problems are very serious, that they will not renounce the use of force in the Taiwan issue, and also that they will not use Vietnam to pressure us on a political settlement.

Chou: There are many rumors about . . .

Kissinger: Yes, of course, I hear all these rumors. There is one that I made a deal with Chou in China that we would withdraw troops from Taiwan before his visits. Have we? Let me ask you this: Have we withdrawn any troops? I certainly don’t think so, to the best of my knowledge. There may have been some rotations, but no withdrawals.

Chou: (The Foreign Minister made some comments about General Barnes which were not intelligible.)

Kissinger: You get all the stories that aren’t true.

Chou: (The Foreign Minister discussed some aspect of dealing with the Japanese—more was not understandable.)

Kissinger: We will talk to Sato and Fukuda in San Clemente and attempt to restrain their activities in the Islands. You stick to your guns and be sure to keep us informed on all your dealings with the Communists.

Shen: We have certainly learned our lesson. We have talked to the President three times, to the Vice President once.

Kissinger: You have showed great dignity and character. Of all the sons-of-bitches in the world, you are the last of all who deserve what has happened this year.

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Chou: Thank you very much for taking the time to meet with us today.

Kissinger: You must understand that what we do, we do with a heavy heart. We don’t do it to betray our friends. We take actions vis-à-vis the Communists only because those actions are required. I assure you again that you will get no pressure from us on any political deal with the Mainland.

[At this point the party retired from Dr. Kissinger’s villa and began to walk back to the hotel, where the Chinese boarded their vehicle. During the walk, Dr. Kissinger spoke with the Foreign Minister about several problems. Dr. Kissinger emphasized again his impression that the formula of no-military action, but an openness to political accommodations, was the best possible formula for the Chinese Nationalists. On the UN issue, he acknowledged that the United States had engaged in what turned out to be a bad strategy vis-à-vis the timing of the second return from China. He indicated that he thought a two-week delay would have been possible had the matter been handled more properly. General comments were made about the Japanese vis-à-vis the United States; their touchiness on the China trip, their trading role with Taiwan, etc.]^7

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^7 Brackets in the source text.

181. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in the Republic of China^1

Washington, January 1, 1972, 1800Z.

27. For Ambassador. Please deliver soonest following letter from President Nixon to President Chiang Kai-shek. Signed original follows by pouch. USG does not intend make text public and requests GRC respect confidentiality of message. GRC may, however, announce receipt of letter of assurance from President. Further, Department will consider possibility of authorizing release certain extracts from letter if GRC

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^1 Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970–73, POL 7 US/NIXON. Secret; Priority; Exdis. Text received from the White House on December 15.
wishes to do so. These extracts should be cabled back for clearance prior to release. Signed original is dated Dec 31.

Begin message. Dear Mr. President: As I prepare for my forthcoming trip to meet and talk with leaders in Peking and Moscow, I would like to share with you some thoughts concerning the conversations I expect to have there.

It is my earnest hope that the visit to Peking will contribute to the development of a more stable and peaceful situation in East Asia and in the Pacific area. I recognize, of course, that the principles which move the leaders in Peking are in many cases diametrically opposite to our own. I hope, however, that my conversations with them will be a step toward relaxing the longstanding tensions between Peking and Washington.

Gradually and over a longer period, such discussion can result in a reduction of tensions in Asia, which would benefit all nations in that area.

You may be absolutely certain, Mr. President, that in taking steps toward the goal of a peaceful Asia, the United States will not overlook the interest of its allies and friends nor seek any accommodations at their expense. I have very much in mind the interests of your government. We intend to honor all of our treaty commitments, including that with the Republic of China. As I said in assuming office, and have frequently repeated since, the United States has no intention of disengaging from Asia.

The talks in Peking will focus on bilateral questions affecting that government and ourselves, of which there are many. Given the existence of the deep and complex differences which exist in our relationship, the question of establishing formal diplomatic relations between our two governments most assuredly will not arise.

The events which are now taking place in East Asia will have a profound effect on the nations of the Pacific for the remainder of this century. I look to your continued understanding of our purposes, Mr. President, to help ensure that these events will move us all in the direction of a stable and enduring international order.

It is my hope that my visit to Moscow in May 1972 will also contribute to greater international stability. In Moscow, as in Peking, the United States will not deal over the heads of its friends and allies in any matter where their security interests might be involved. For example, there have been no, and there will be no, bilateral United States–Soviet negotiations on mutual withdrawal of forces from Europe. I hope, however, that some concrete progress might be made, either before or during my Moscow visit, in such bilateral areas as arms control and economic relations.
May I assure you, as always, of my highest personal regards and warm good wishes for your continued excellent health.

Sincerely,

Richard Nixon

End message.2

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*McConaughy delivered the message to Acting Foreign Minister H. K. Yang on January 3. (Telegram 5 from Taipei, January 3: ibid.) On January 9 Yang gave McConaughy a copy of Chiang’s January 6 reply, which reads in part: “I am confident that, with your wisdom, rich political experience, and your thorough understanding of the true nature of the Chinese Communist regime, you would certainly have full cognizance of Peiping’s treacherous tactics and intrigues in its international activities, and would not be beguiled. I am also confident that in all decisions vis-à-vis the Chinese Communists you will not only take into account both the traditional friendship and common interests of our two countries, but also bear in mind the long-term national interest of the United States and her position in world history.” (Telegram 132 from Taipei, January 10; ibid.) The signed original was delivered by Ambassador Shen on January 11. (Ibid., Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 751, Presidential Correspondence File, Republic of China, Corres. Pres. Chiang Kai-shek) Shen apparently delivered the letter in his meeting with Rogers, where they discussed the summit in San Clemente between Nixon and Japanese Prime Minister Sato. (Telegrams 7012 to Taipei, January 12; ibid., RG 59, Central Files 1970–73, POL 7 US/NIXON) Kissinger informed Nixon of the contents of Chiang’s response on January 11. (Ibid., Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 38, President’s Daily Briefs)*

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**182. Editorial Note**

Officials in the Department of State, the Department of Defense, the Central Intelligence Agency, and the White House were concerned that no reconnaissance or related activities against the People’s Republic of China (PRC) complicate President Nixon’s trip to China. In a January 3 letter to Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Admiral Thomas Moorer, U. Alexis Johnson pointed out that Deputy Secretary of Defense Packard had agreed in November 1971 to “hold all surface and air surveillance activities at least 12 nautical miles (NM) from the PRC-claimed Woody and Lincoln Islands in the Paracels Group.” Johnson stated that the PRC had issued a warning on December 24 alleging that a U.S. naval vessel violated its territorial integrity. He noted that the ship had not come within 12 nautical miles of the islands themselves, but that the PRC claim was based on “the straight baseline method between the islands, that is drawing a line between the islands and marking off the 12 NM limit from that line.” Johnson asked: “if it would be feasible for our ships, at least for the time being, to avoid entering the claimed area around Lincoln and Woody Islands, it would
avoid the problem of additional ‘serious warnings’ in this period before the President’s visit to Peking.” (National Archives, RG 59, Bureau of Diplomatic Security: Lot 96 D 695, U. Alexis Johnson Files, Chrono-Official, January 1972)

In early January Kissinger approved monitoring potential GRC activity and the proposal that, “If there is any increase in noise level, have State request McConaughy to approach Chiang Ching-kuo and emphasize that sabotage activities such as those alleged to have occurred in Kwangtung during October would be unhelpful to President Nixon.” Kissinger wrote: “Let’s decide this when it happens.” The memorandum from Jessup to Kissinger and attached CIA reports are in National Security Council, Nixon Intelligence Files, Subject Files, China. On February 12, McConaughy reported to Rogers that “As instructed Ambassador made representation to Vice Premier Chiang emphasizing need for full GRC cooperation in safeguarding good atmosphere for President’s visit to PRC and supplying us with any information that might have even indirect bearing on security of President or environment of visit. Ambassador noted that we expected Chicoms to maintain non-offensive posture during period which should make it easier for GRC to do same. Ambassador made clear he was referring to action by GRC sympathizers on mainland, coastal activity by GRC armed forces, or even moves in places remote from cities President will visit that would put GRC in position to be plausibly blamed for untoward incident.” McConaughy concluded that Chiang gave “categorical assurances that GRC would refrain from any actions of an offensive or provocative nature.” (Telegram 712 from Taipei, February 12; ibid.) No incidents were reported around the time of Nixon’s trip to the PRC.

183. Memorandum of Conversation

Beijing, January 3, 1972, midnight.

PARTICIPANTS

Prime Minister Chou En-lai
Acting Foreign Minister, Mr. Chi P’eng-fei Vice Foreign Minister

1 Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 1037, Files for the President—China Material, Haig Trip—Memcons, January 1972. Top Secret; Sensitive; Exclusively Eyes Only. Haig was in the PRC January 3–10 with a team of Americans who made technical arrangements for Nixon’s February visit. The meeting was held in the Great Hall of the People.
Mr. Chang Wen-chin, Director of the West European, American and Australian Affairs, MFA
Mr. Han Hsu, Director, Protocol Department, MFA
Miss Nancy T’ang (Interpreter)
General A. M. Haig, Jr.

Haig: I am very honored that the Prime Minister is seeing me personally.

Chou En-lai: Yes, because I heard from Minister Fei and the Director of West European, American and Australian Affairs, who both told me that you had important matters to convey.

Haig: Yes, Dr. Kissinger and the President asked me to request an audience to give you, in blunt terms, a soldier’s assessments of recent events in South Asia and discuss them in context of the President’s visit.2

Chou En-lai: How is Dr. Kissinger? I heard he had a slight cold.

Haig: He has had a touch of the flu but is much better today.

Chou En-lai: You have to be careful here too because it is snowing. I don’t know whether it has snowed in Washington yet.

Haig: We have had no snow yet. Usually by this time we would have had snow.

Chou En-lai: This is your first visit to China, I suppose?

Haig: Yes, both myself and Mrs. Hartley.3 We are very honored to be here. I said today that my father-in-law came to China some 48 years ago for his first visit to China.

Chou En-lai: 48 years ago. Very interesting. I believe he is still well? Your father-in-law? So you can now write him a postcard from Peking.

Haig: Yes, his trip was 48 years ago. Mr. Prime Minister, I thought what I would like to do is not belabor any of the special details that we have passed on in our messages but the Prime Minister will recall that we took a number of steps during that period.

Chou En-lai: Yes, I remember that you conveyed certain messages through a certain channel.

Haig: We believe and we have very strong confirmation that those steps were effective in convincing the Soviet Union to influence the Indians to accept a cease-fire rather than to proceed with attacks against West Pakistan—in other words to stop short of what had been their goal against Pakistan. One of those steps was Dr. Kissinger’s reference

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2 Haig’s opening statement based on undated talking points is ibid., Haig Trip—January 1972, Talking points—private meeting.
3 Apparent reference to Muriel Hartley who was assigned to the NSC staff.
to the possible cancellation of the President’s Moscow trip if the conflict continued. Since the cease-fire has gone into effect, we have made a very careful assessment of the overall implications of recent events on the subcontinent and we have concluded that up until recently the Soviet policy on the subcontinent has been, in general, to keep the subcontinent divided. This was manifested in their performance during the earlier conflict between India and Pakistan but we think they have decided on a rather precipitous shift in their policy to adopt one in which they would now seek to encircle the PRC with unfriendly states. We believe that this modified Soviet strategy has evolved as a result of recent events and has caused them to overhaul their former strategy for the subcontinent. We also noted when the crisis developed that the Soviets tried very hard to divert us from the course that would converge with the policy of the People’s Republic. In short, they sought to influence us to maintain a hands off policy. During the period when this crisis started to develop, they invited Dr. Kissinger to visit Moscow personally on several occasions as guest of Mr. Brezhnev. They also offered to reach agreements with us in the accidental attack and provocative attack areas, all of which we rejected. We rejected these approaches by the Soviet Union on two grounds—one was on the grounds of principle. We felt we had certain obligations with respect to Pakistan and we felt we could not tolerate use of force to dismantle that country. But we also rejected the Soviet approaches because we felt that the future viability of the PRC was of the greatest interest to us and a matter of our own national interest.

Again, speaking the blunt language of a soldier, I would not be so naive to infer that this is a precipitous shift in our attitude which has suddenly developed after the years of differences which have divided us. Rather, we have arrived at these conclusions because we are convinced that the Soviet strategy is first to neutralize the People’s Republic and then turn on us. Therefore, our interests are self interests. I would want this clearly understood.

Since the cease-fire has gone into effect between India and Pakistan, we have carefully assessed subsequent Soviet actions and we are convinced that they intend to continue their efforts to encircle the People’s Republic. We say this based on a number of factors. Included among those factors are their repeatedly announced support for the Bangladesh, and their offer to move advisers and assistance into East Pakistan, the recently announced visit of Soviet Foreign Minister Gromyko to Japan and, above all, their stepped up expression of support for Hanoi in its conduct of the war, as well as increased Soviet materiel support for Hanoi. In the context of what I have just said, I would also like to comment very briefly on the recent decision of the U.S. Government to launch a series of limited aerial attacks against North Vietnam.
This was a decision that was taken only with the most careful thought and with the greatest reluctance. We believe that our policy with respect to the war in Southeast Asia is very clear at this point. We have undertaken every reasonable step to bring the conflict to an early conclusion. On the 11th of October, we transmitted to Hanoi the most forthcoming set of proposals for settlement of that conflict that we could conceivably develop, including the offer to have the current leader in Vietnam step down prior to a post-settlement election. In the face of these proposals, no one can doubt that we have any intention of maintaining our presence in South Vietnam. We have told Hanoi that we would withdraw and withdraw totally and they understand this. Despite these proposals of October 11th, we have yet to receive any response from Hanoi nor have we even received from them an expressed willingness to discuss these proposals in Paris as we have offered to do.

Instead, from Hanoi, we have seen a step-up of attacks in Cambodia and Laos. We have seen increased attacks against our unarmed reconnaissance aircraft over North Vietnam. We have seen the continued development of Hanoi’s supply route through the demilitarized zone and we have seen rocket attacks against populated centers in South Vietnam. We have seen increasing numbers of missile attacks from sanctuary in North Vietnam against our air forces in Laos. These actions we could not but interpret as an effort by Hanoi to humiliate the United States—a humiliation that no great power can accept. In this context, our retaliatory strikes were launched. Also in this context, future U.S. air activity over North Vietnam will be directly related to Hanoi’s future actions. For our part, our strongest wish is to settle the conflict as quickly as possible and on terms, the fairness of which cannot be doubted. On the other hand, we cannot subject ourselves to the kind of humiliation which Hanoi’s actions seem designed to achieve.

In the context of what I have just said, we have concluded that the continuation of the war in Southeast Asia can only give Moscow an opportunity to increase its influence in Hanoi and to further the encirclement of the People’s Republic. We feel strongly that Moscow is urging Hanoi in the direction of continued military action and as such, they are forging another link in the chain which is designed to constrain the People’s Republic. In all of these circumstances, we also believe that President Nixon’s visit takes on a new and immediate significance which transcends its earlier importance. In the context of the events I have just described, i.e., the immediate effect to the People’s Republic and the revised Soviet strategy, the President’s visit is not only one of long term historic significance—the original motivation and the guiding force underlying the visit—but now we see an immediate significance which must now be considered with respect to the President’s visit. In the light of our own strategic interests—America’s strategic
interests which I described earlier—we are convinced of and dedicated to the proposition that the viability of the People’s Republic should be maintained. We have accepted this premise in full consideration of those things which divide us. We recognize that these differences are both ideological and practical in nature. On the other hand, just as Dr. Kissinger outlined to you earlier, Churchill was willing to cooperate with Stalin in order to cope with the greater danger of Hitler Germany. We feel that the United States and the People’s Republic must concert at this critical juncture. We are prepared to use our resources as we did during the crisis between India and Pakistan to attempt to neutralize Soviet threats and to deter threats against the People’s Republic.

In sum, this is an overly generalized and soldier’s blunt elucidation of Dr. Kissinger’s and the President’s views. It suffers from brevity and hence the oversimplification which a more careful exposition would avoid. We have considered some of the implications of this assessment and we have asked ourselves in the short term what the United States could do within the context of this assessment to deal with some of the events which we think could occur in the future. One of the steps we are prepared to do unilaterally and without any reciprocity on the part of the People’s Republic—is to provide you with our assessments of the Soviet threat which exists against the People’s Republic to the degree that our own technical resources are able to do so. I would emphasize that these would be steps taken without condition and without reciprocity and Dr. Kissinger has asked me to inform you that when he arrives with the President he would be ready to discuss the modalities of furnishing this information, perhaps through a third country or through whatever other means you might prefer.

An additional implication of the assessment I have just provided is the fact that we have a major problem developing within the United States which your Ambassador to the United States, Ambassador Huang Hua4 can confirm, and Miss Tang has observed first hand also. This is a strange merger of forces within the United States—all dedicated to either preventing the President’s visit to Peking or to contributing to its failure. The forces which have converged are composed of first the American Left which is essentially pro-Soviet and if it is not truly dominated by Moscow in that sense of the word, it is at least strongly attracted toward Moscow and future U.S. alignment with Moscow. In this instance, the Left has been joined in a strange wedding with those conservative elements who are strong supporters of Taiwan. A third area of difficulty for us in the United States is a degree

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4 Huang Hua was one of the PRC representatives at the United Nations.
of bureaucratic haggling concerning the wisdom of the initiative to visit Peking.

All of these factors have converged in a way which poses a very serious threat to the success of the visit. In the short run, these forces would hope to prevent the visit at all—in the longer run, they would hope to prevent or deter the normalization of relations between the People’s Republic and the United States. For this reason, President Nixon and Dr. Kissinger are all the more concerned about making President Nixon’s visit a success not only in reality but also in the appearance of the visit itself. Thus, we feel it must succeed in both fact and in appearance.

Unfortunately, most American journalists are shallow idiots. They draw their editorial line from the immediate atmospherics of the situation and from what is essentially the instantaneous reporting of a set of circumstances rather than from a careful analysis of the realities and implications of these realities. For this reason, it is crucial that there be no public embarrassment to the President as a result of his visit to Peking. It is in our mutual interest that the visit reinforce President Nixon’s image as a world leader. I have brought several journalistic efforts of recent weeks from some of our more important newspapers, such as the New York Times, which I would like to leave with the Prime Minister so that he can see how these forces have been working in the United States against both the normalization of relations and the President’s visit. In the light of these trends, we would hope that between now and Dr. Kissinger’s visit that perhaps certain steps could be taken—one might be some strengthening of the positive aspects of the Joint Communiqué which was worked out so satisfactorily during Dr. Kissinger’s visit. We are thinking along the lines of a possible reference to trade or something that would give an immediate sense of accomplishment as a result of the visit, such as increased scientific or cultural exchanges.

Finally, the most crucial issue in the Public Communiqué which would be released at the time of the President’s visit is the unresolved issue of the status of Taiwan. You will recall that Dr. Kissinger left without this language being agreed upon. We have looked at this problem from two perspectives. The first is what we will actually do about Taiwan in the future and second, is what we will say about Taiwan in conjunction with the President’s visit. In order for us to be, very bluntly, anti-Soviet and pro-People’s Republic, we must have the support of the American conservatives. As I pointed out, this support is intimately linked today to the issue of Taiwan. At this point, I would like to categorically reaffirm what Dr. Kissinger told you about our future policies towards Taiwan:

First, we will do nothing to encourage or support the movement towards an independent Taiwan. Second, we will do nothing to
encourage or to support Japanese efforts to manipulate the future of Taiwan either through the independence movement or a Japanese presence in Taiwan. And third, we will withdraw war-related U.S. forces from Taiwan as soon as the war has been concluded. Also, over the longer period we will gradually reduce our presence there.

In summary, the United States finds itself caught between the dilemma of a Left Wing which is dominated by forces friendly to the Soviet and by the Right Wing which is dominated by pro-Taiwan forces. For this reason, and in the light of all the considerations I have mentioned tonight, we would urge you to reconsider very carefully the language in the Joint Communiqué that pertains to Taiwan and, hopefully, to agree to a formulation that is somewhat less truthful and somewhat less precise than the language which Dr. Kissinger carried away with him during his last visit. I have brought another version of the paragraphs pertaining to Taiwan which I would like very much to leave with you, on an ad referendum basis. Perhaps when Dr. Kissinger arrives there can be further discussion on this subject. In the interim, Dr. Kissinger felt that you should have our assessment of what we consider to be the overriding strategic implications of Soviet actions and strategy. We have made some very careful soundings since Dr. Kissinger’s return and we know that the language that was considered during his visit would cause an uproar in the United States. This, we feel, would only strengthen the very forces that are working against the visit itself and the implications of that visit for the future of both of our countries.

That concludes the strategic assessment of the President’s and Dr. Kissinger’s or rather my interpretation of that assessment. I must apologize for its bluntness but I felt that you would appreciate this kind of candor. Candor was certainly the characteristic of Dr. Kissinger’s discussions here and especially those with the Prime Minister.

I do have several minor administrative matters to raise in this very restrictive forum and in such a way that the rest of our party would not be privy to them. With your approval, I will discuss them now.

Chou En-lai: Yes. Go ahead.

Haig: First, Dr. Kissinger considers that it is essential that he attend all the meetings between the President and yourself and whatever meetings might occur between the President and the Chairman. That is the first item.

Secondly, Dr. Kissinger again asked me to emphasize the essentiality of having concurrent meetings at the level of the Foreign Ministry and the Department of State which would occur whenever the President would meet with you and with the Chairman. It might pose a challenge of some magnitude to have sufficient substantive topics to cover but we are confident that together we can accomplish that constructively.
Next, I would like to reiterate what I have given to your very hospitable representatives today and that is that the composition of our party is made up of many technicians. Some of them are not governmental. They are all great advocates of their particular specialty. They may, during their visit here, be the source of some abrasive demand or requirement which would run counter to our mutual best interests. I want to emphasize if there are any demands of that kind that develop at the technical level you should not feel obliged to accept them but rather bring them to me so that no technical matter can be permitted to act as a source of irritation or detract from the success of this visit.

Each of our representatives who has been to China before now has returned with the greatest respect and admiration for the hospitality and for the professionalism and skill of your representatives. I am determined to keep that high level of cooperation and respect alive during this visit and I am prepared to take whatever steps you or your representatives might feel necessary to insure it. Therefore, I would again urge that anything your side feels may be counterproductive is brought directly to my attention.

One last very minor thing, Mr. Prime Minister, is that Dr. Kissinger was concerned because just before I left a female television personality called him and told him she was going to contact your Ambassador in New York and try to get him on her show and to use Dr. Kissinger’s name to get him on the show. Dr. Kissinger wanted you to know that he had not given approval for this and felt that this was totally a Chinese matter as to whether the Ambassador appears or not.

Chou En-lai: We have not gotten news of this yet.

Haig: The commentator is a Miss Nancy Dickerson

Chou En-lai: So she approached Ambassador Huang Hua about that?

Haig: If she has not already, she will probably do so soon and she may use Dr. Kissinger’s name.

Chou En-lai: That is a small matter.

I thank you for your rather clear notification. Of course, you have said you have not gone into great detail but we understand the general idea. And, of course, we must report this to Chairman Mao Tsetung and also must consult with other colleagues. Therefore, I am not able to give an official reply. However, I would like to comment on what you have said. The first thing is just as you mentioned that the coming together of our two countries would be beneficial to the promotion of the normalization of relations between our two countries and also to the relaxation of tension in the Far East. We believe this will not only be beneficial to the U.S. but also to the People’s Republic of China and also to the peoples of our two countries and to the people in the Far East.
China, October 1971–February 1972

The second point is that Soviet meddling in the South Asian subcontinent and in Indochina, in my opinion, is not due to a change in the strategic policies of the Soviet Union but rather a necessary consequence of reaction on the part of the Soviet Union toward the coming closer between China and the United States. And I mentioned this to Dr. Kissinger during his first visit to China—that we were anticipating to shoulder, to bear the consequences of this coming together of U.S. and China and that we were prepared for this and we do not, therefore, find it to be unexpected. For instance, the question of the subcontinent. It was because the Sino–American Communiqué of July 15—the first announcement of July 15th, your time, was published that the Soviet–Indian Treaty, a so-called treaty which was actually a military alliance, came into being after having been delayed for two years. It was finally signed in Delhi in August and it can be said that Pakistan did not deal with that very earnestly at that time.

Of course, this is not something that either China or the United States could do for them as their friend. And, therefore, when later on in December, the situation had already become rather urgent, when we heard of Dr. Kissinger’s information about the policy as adopted by the United States, we considered that although it was rather late at that time already, we considered that that was the only possible policy that could be adopted at that time. Of course, now, the question of the subcontinent has become complicated. And we believe that it will continue to develop. And if the United States Government has any other new further opinion with regard to this situation, we are willing to hear it. Because the obstruction of India’s advance toward West Pakistan is only a temporary phenomenon. And with the development of the already complex situation on the subcontinent, will undergo still more changes. And, therefore, in the interim period from now until the visit of your President to China, if the U.S. Government has any new information it would like to convey, we are willing to exchange opinions on the situation in the area.5

5 On January 4 Haig sent an abbreviated version of this conversation to Kissinger, along with another message summarizing his efforts. (National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 1015, Alexander M. Haig Special Files, Haig China Trip File [Haig Advance Party, Dec 29, 1971 to Jan 10, 1972]) Kissinger’s January 5 reply stated in part: “With respect to South Asia, you can tell them we will communicate further thoughts through Paris channel. At present the primary objective is to gain time and to arm Pakistan. We have used our influence with Turkey and France in this regard; we welcome any PRC efforts. We are starting economic assistance programs again and on a larger scale.” (Ibid., Box 1037, Files for the President—China Material, China—AH January 1972 visit) See Foreign Relations, 1969–1976, vol. E–13, Documents 75–77.
I would like to say also, very frankly, that our opinions differ from yours on Vietnam. We believe that it was not necessary for the U.S. Government to bomb North Vietnam in such a way as President Nixon has never done since he has taken office, as he did around Christmas last year. And, in addition, this action was taken after President Nixon had withdrawn I believe around 400,000 troops from South Vietnam, and, therefore, this action made it even more unacceptable to the people of the world, including the people of the United States and this was also reflected in the press of the United States. And this also occurred at precisely the time when President Nixon declared to the world around Christmas that he wished to move toward relaxation of tension and toward peace in the world. And if we should say that Soviet forces in the Indian Ocean and in the South Asian subcontinent have increased, we should say that they were led into that area by India. But if we should say that the Soviet Union was given an opportunity to increase its influence and its force in the Democratic Republic of Vietnam then we should say that it was assisted by the recent action of the United States. Because as I remember, when Dr. Kissinger was here discussing things with us, he expressed particular admiration and appreciation of the fifth point put forth by Madame Binh of the Republic of Vietnam. The basic spirit of that clause was to change South Vietnam and Indochina into a non-allied area, i.e., an area which would maintain peaceful and friendly relations with all sides. And this would be beneficial to the relaxation of tension in Southeast Asia. It would also be beneficial to the improvement of relations between the United States and China. However, now the U.S. bombing has increased the Soviet influence and tension in this area. Of course, this is not of great consequence to us but it is quite bad for the local area. It will make the situation in all of Southeast Asia tense and it will also be a matter of great concern to the people of the U.S. and the world and it will not be favorable toward the ending of the war in that area.

Originally, we were waiting to convey these views to President Nixon and Dr. Kissinger when they come later on but since you have now mentioned these matters, we think this is also another opportunity to advance some of our opinions. Of course, this is also just an initial exchange and I believe we will have another opportunity to ex-

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6 Concerning Vietnam, Kissinger’s January 5 message to Haig reads in part: “With respect to Southeast Asia you should stress that in our view Moscow is blocking negotiated settlement. We have made sweeping proposal; Hanoi cancelled meeting set for November 20. You can reaffirm everything I said on my visits, particularly our readiness to accept non-aligned Southeast Asia. The only reason in our view the war continues is for Soviet, not U.S. aims. No patriotic Vietnamese need fear of eventual domination.”
change opinions. And, of course, as you said, this exchange is limited to us two.

And as for the third factor, we have taken into consideration the fact that you have certain internal problems which we see from the press and also Dr. Kissinger mentioned it during his previous visits and we have also felt the three forces which you mentioned. I would also like to ask something very bluntly and to you as you are a military man. Is it that the Pentagon also has differing opinions?

Haig: Some elements in the Pentagon have differing opinions but those who are the most responsible and strategic thinkers are in full agreement with this initiative and the visit of the President.

Chou En-lai: As for the two questions—the two issues that Dr. Kissinger raised about the Joint Communiqué.

The first is essentially a question of trade. We understand this proposal and we can also see from American opinion that they are also attaching importance to this question and this is also an issue that carries weight.7

The second is the suggestion you have brought from Dr. Kissinger about the wording of the part about Taiwan. In our opinion, the paragraph that we have written down—I am not speaking about the part the Chinese says but the part that the U.S. side says. We believe that in the wording of that part we have fully taken into consideration the present dilemma that you just now mentioned between the United States Government and the forces you mention from the Left and the Right because this is a force of crucial significance to the United States but since you have brought a new opinion, we would be willing to take it into consideration, because as we have mentioned before we are always willing to get the work done as best as possible because you must work with a view toward the future. And also Dr. Kissinger has already given some hints about this question to the press—five points, isn’t that so?

Haig: Five points?

Chou En-lai: You have not seen them? A Minister of Japan—we found it in the Japanese press. They were representatives of the Democratic Socialist Party—the leader of that party.

Haig: He did talk to him.

Chou En-lai: And he announced these five points to the Japanese press.

7 Kissinger’s January 5 message to Haig reads in part: “On the communiqué the ball is in their court. The trade section can wait till we get there as long as they understand what we have in mind. An additional area for strengthening is cultural and scientific exchanges where we might mention some specific projects. Please raise this.”
Haig: I don’t recall Dr. Kissinger using five points.  
Chou En-lai: We have been trying to get a copy. 
Haig: I will find out about that. I did not sit in at the meeting.  
Chou En-lai: We will try to get a copy and give you an English translation. Of course, it quoted Dr. Kissinger and these words came from the Japanese. As for the specific questions you later mentioned (administrative questions), we don’t think there is any question to that because we believe during his second visit Dr. Kissinger mentioned these points. I believe we can cooperate very well on them. Of course, you can continue discussions with Acting Foreign Minister Fei, either directly or you can have separate group discussions with various other people. Of course, we will not do anything to embarrass you and if anything comes up at lower levels, they will not be settled there. They will be brought to you. 

As for your plans for this present visit to China, there are two suggestions. One was that you would spend a great portion of your time in Peking and then go to Shanghai and Hangchow for a visit. Another would be you would stay here for a short time—then go to Shanghai and Hangchow and come back here. In my personal opinion, it would be better to have all issues decided in Peking and then go to other places. It would be economizing on the time. But, of course, if you would like to wait for a reply from Washington before you would like to finalize certain details or if you have other political matters to discuss later on, then a return trip would be better. Either question is entirely up to you to decide. 

Haig: I think, at first glance, we would favor a longer time here and then the trip to the other two locations and depart from there. I think we will know that better after we have had discussions of the schedule tomorrow morning at the plenary sessions, after which we could decide. But I believe that this would be the best way to proceed.

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8 Kissinger’s January 5 message to Haig reads in part: “On Taiwan, you should take any counter draft ad referendum. They do not want to use Paris channel for this so do not suggest it.” He also wrote: “I am puzzled by reference to Japanese Social Democrat. Given Japanese propensity to leak, you can be sure I said nothing. Memcon is being sent to you separately. I am not sure about Chou’s question about reaffirmation of my commitments to him. Withdrawal of Southeast Asia related part of forces within a reasonable period after end of Indochina War. Gradual withdrawal of remainder as tensions ease. No support for Japanese return to Formosa or introduction of Japanese troops there. No further reference to status of Formosa being undetermined. No encouragement of Taiwan independence movement.” (Ibid.) Kissinger sent a message to Haig, January 4, that included a version of the memorandum of conversation between himself and Ikko Kasuga, Chairman of the Japanese Democratic Socialist Party. Haig discussed the contents of Kissinger’s January 5 message in his meeting with Acting Foreign Minister Chi Peng-fei on January 6. The memorandum of conversation is in National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 1037, Files for the President—China Material, Haig trip—memcons, January 1972. See also Foreign Relations, 1969–1976, vol. E–13, Document 78.
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Chou En-lai: I am sorry to have taken up too much of your sleep.
Haig: I am honored that you have taken this time to see me.
Chou En-lai: I am also very happy to have been able to meet you.
Anyway, if you are going to contact Dr. Kissinger, please send my re-
gards to him.
Haig: I will do so.

184. Message From the President’s Deputy Assistant for National
Security Affairs (Haig) to the President’s Assistant for
National Security Affairs (Kissinger)¹

Beijing, January 8, 1972

On evening of January 6 entire group was presented to Prime Min-
ister and Marshal² in three segments (Advance Group, Technicians and
air crew). He spoke to advance party for period of nearly 30 minutes
presenting guarded expressions of friendship for American people and
emphasizing again PRC limitations which preclude great power status.

Following meeting with Prime Minister, we were given sumptu-
ous duck dinner. Concurrently, I had to step into technical arrange-
ments which were totally stalled due to contract squabble on both satel-
lite and production center. Technicians worked until dawn and finally
arrived at solutions which appeared to satisfy PRC officials. It now ap-
pears that we can wrap up these details based on the most unortho-
dox legal arrangements conceivable. I have pushed this to a solution,
despite considerable reservations on part of Redman³ and network
technicians. We departed at 3:00 PM, January 7, for Shanghai and will
leave China on schedule on January 10.

At 11:00 PM Thursday night, January 6, I was informed that Prime
Minister again wished to see me. Thirty minutes later, I was informed
he was ready and Muriel and I were ushered into a room in the Great

¹ Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 1015,
Alexander M. Haig Special File, Haig China Trip File [Haig Advance Party, December
29, 1971 to Jan 10, 1972] Part 1 of 2. Top Secret; Sensitive; Exclusively Eyes Only. The
message is incorrectly dated January 8, 1971.

² The full memorandum of conversation is ibid., Box 1037, Files for the President—
E–13, Document 79.

³ Reference is to General Albert Redman, Commander of the White House Com-
munications Agency.
Hall where Prime Minister and a host of Chinese officials were assembled, including Fei, Chang, Hsiung, Han Hsu and Wang Hai-jung.

After a most cordial exchange of small talk, Prime Minister started to read from a paper which was presented as Chairman’s formal reply to my message of Tuesday A.M. The reply was tough and polemic in tone, especially on the subject of Vietnam and our assessment of that situation. The December air action was the subject of special attack. The Prime Minister stated it had, in fact, “brought an unfavorable element into the visit”. The Prime Minister’s language in this regard was guarded and most carefully chosen. He also attacked Soviets and expressed agreement with our South Asian policies. He took strong exception to our expressions of concern for PRC’s viability and independence. The Prime Minister insisted this is their problem and they need no help from us. Prime Minister also insisted that our strategic assessment of Soviet South Asian strategy is in error and that Soviet expansion into that area has always been a Soviet objective. Your trip in July merely provided pretext for concluding military pact (not friendship) with India which had been in readiness for two years. Prime Minister insisted relations between United States and PRC were not normalized and that we diverged on a number of issues in fundamental ways. He also stated our concern for Nixon image as world leader was misplaced since Nixon image will evolve from his actions—not theatrics. In any event, PRC will do nothing to embarrass President during his trip.

Inter alia, Prime Minister made following specific points:

—Expressed appreciation for my frankness.
—PRC people desire normalization but hostile forces are intensifying their destruction and sabotage.
—USSR hastily made concessions in Berlin after announcement of President’s visit and concurrently concluded military alliance with India.
—There has been no shift of Soviet policy of contending for hegemony in South Asia.
—Subcontinent will remain in turmoil.
—There is a fundamental difference between PRC and United States on Vietnam questions.
—China firmly supports struggle of Vietnamese people and U.S. should withdraw now and accept seven points.
—Relations between U.S. and China are not normal.
—PRC does not object to further consultations on Taiwan and will do its best to take our difficulties into consideration in draft. At same time, this is the crucial question for PRC and yielding to forces opposed to normalization will bring no benefits.

—PRC will consider putting references to future trade in communiqué and cultural and scientific exchanges as well. Expect our side to bring some views on these issues when party comes.

—Requests text PRC reply be given to Kissinger and President upon return of our party.

In view of foregoing and strong attack on Southeast Asian problem and fact that several PRC officials were in attendance, I replied in a manner designed to not accept unreasonable PRC polemics but in a way also designed to wind the exchange down rather than to launch a new round.

I therefore told Prime Minister I was responding briefly on a personal basis, believing only you and President should respond officially for our side:

—Language of Tuesday’s and Thursday’s messages was my own—blunt and that of a soldier.
—Re Southeast Asia, it does appear that we differ since from our perspective it is Hanoi and Moscow that are blocking peace. Furthermore, over the longer view it is our view that PRC and U.S. interests will converge in Southeast Asia.
—Re viability of PRC, my language was not designed to convey that we were presuming to assume role of PRC protector but rather that our own interests now have led us to conclude that China’s continued viability is in our own self-interest—this being a simple statement of fact.
—Re “President’s image”—I was speaking strictly in context of affording enemies an opportunity to place obstacles in way of our policies. Imagery has never been a factor in President’s calculus for decisions as his past performance confirms.
—Re Taiwan, more detailed discussions should be held in February.
—Re trade, scientific and cultural matters in communiqué, we will have modest proposals in February and we recognize issue of trade is long-term proposition.
—Re South Asia and elsewhere, experience has shown both of us that good intentions may not be enough. In that area, the U.S. was slow in recognizing the dangers, how it behooves both sides to be equally cognizant of dangers, both there and elsewhere, and to concert where indicated before the situation turns sour.
—Finally, I noted that our technical talks had been characterized by candor and frankness. Some of the substantive topics on the President’s agenda cover points of past disagreement which lend themselves to standard rhetoric which contributes to further misunderstanding. I therefore urge the same kind of frank exchanges which have characterized discussions during our visit. (This was indirect slap at PRC rhetoric on Vietnam which Prime Minister seemed to accept, though perhaps not too happily.)

Prime Minister then touched upon history of Korea and Vietnam, carefully pointing out that Democratic Presidents led U.S. in and Republican Presidents must lead us out. He again launched attack on air action; noted there is still room for changes on Taiwan language—referred to trade, cultural and scientific matters as “rather minor” which
can be settled. Prime Minister concluded by pointing out that situation in Vietnam is different from that which pertained in Korea. In Korea, he was involved and agreement could be reached with U.S. Now the participants are different.

The meeting concluded at 2:15 A.M.

We depart this evening by train for Hangchow and will remain out of direct contact with the aircraft for next twenty four hours. Should you have anything urgent, please instruct aircraft crew to contact me by phone in Hangchow.

Warm regards.

185. Memorandum From the Chairman of the Under Secretaries Committee (Irwin) to President Nixon


SUBJECT

Results of Initial Steps Toward Augmentation of Travel and Trade Between the People’s Republic of China and the United States, and Recommendations for Further Steps to be Taken

The memorandum and study appended at Tab A respond to your request of June 9, 1971. They were delayed in preparation, with the agreement of the NSC Staff, to allow further time for assessment of U.S. initiatives vis-à-vis the People’s Republic of China, and in part because of the difficulties encountered in the reconciliation of widely divergent viewpoints.

The most important problem dealt with is the question of a) whether the PRC should be afforded equality with the USSR in respect to commodities and products of technology available for export to them under general license and b) if so, when these actions should be accomplished. On point a) the majority, including State and Commerce, believes that full equality should be afforded as part of a general process of bringing our trade policies with the PRC and the USSR into alignment. Defense objects on the grounds that different levels of

2 See Document 131 and footnote 14 thereto.
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military, industrial and technological development of the PRC require
different criteria for decontrolling items for general license export to
the PRC until such time as experience provides a basis for bringing our
trade policies in closer alignment. On point b) the majority, including
Defense and Commerce, believes that the principles of gradualness and
reciprocity should be given full weight.

The Department of State believes that the earlier and more thor-
oughly our policies on trade with the PRC are brought into line with
those toward the USSR, the greater the likelihood of favorable impact
upon U.S.–PRC relations. State therefore favors early implementation
of the recommendations in this paper.

The recommendations of the Committee are summarized in my
report which is attached. They are more fully described with their rel-
ative advantages and disadvantages in Annex A to my report.3

Where different viewpoints occurred, the agency dissenting from
the majority viewpoint has in each case presented its position in a foot-
note. Such footnotes express the view of the author agency only. Because
of the desire to allow full expression of dissent, and the inability of the
drafting committee to accede unanimously to dissenting viewpoints, I
believe that the current format of the memorandum is more responsive
to your desire to see all the options than any other practical alternative.
Accordingly, the suggestion of Secretary Laird to redraft the memora-
dum (Tab B) was partly but not wholly accommodated.3

The concurrence of the Department of Commerce which explains
its position more fully is appended at Tab C.4

John N. Irwin II

3 Attached but not printed.
4 Attached but not printed. Holdridge forwarded these materials to Kissinger on
February 2. In a February 10 memorandum to the President, Kissinger summarized three
recommendations presented in the Under Secretaries Committee’s report: 1) Place the
PRC in the same commodity control group as the Soviet Union; 2) Abolish the FAC reg-
ulations requiring U.S. firms in COCOM nations to obtain licenses from the Treasury
Department for the export of strategic goods to the PRC; and 3) Delay consideration of
the sale of aircraft, cotton textiles, PRC and U.S. claims, and ship or aircraft visits until
after the trip. (National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Kissinger Of-
Fice Files, Box 86, Country Files, Far East, U.S. China Policy, 1969–1972) In a February 11
memorandum for the record, Eliot wrote that Haig had called him to inform him that
the President had approved the recommendations. (Ibid., RG 59, General Files on NSC
Matters: Lot 73 D 288, NSC–U/SM Memoranda, 1972) Ziegler announced the relaxation
of export controls on February 14. (Department of State Bulletin, March 6, 1972, p. 291)
Kissinger also informed the Departments of Justice, Treasury, Defense, Commerce, State,
and the CIA through NSDM 155, issued on February 17. (National Archives, Nixon Pres-
idential Materials, NSC Files, NSC Institutional Files (H–Files), Box H–232, NSDM Files,
NSDM 155)
186. Message From the Government of the United States to the Government of the People's Republic of China


President Nixon, in his speech of January 25, reaffirms once again the United States desire to find a negotiated settlement to the Indo-China War and presents a plan whose outlines have already been given to Prime Minister Chou En-lai by Dr. Kissinger. With the view towards keeping the record of current United States actions concerning the conflict in Southeast Asia complete, the U.S. Government is enclosing a copy of the new detailed plan designed to bring the war to an end on a basis that is just for all parties. This action completes each of the commitments made by Dr. Kissinger to the Prime Minister with respect to the conflict.

The United States has now taken every reasonable step to meet North Vietnamese concerns and respect the sacrifices and interests of all parties. These proposals go to the limits of United States generosity. They make it clear that there is no reason for the conflict to continue.

The North Vietnamese nevertheless seem intent to keep on trying to embarrass the United States by a major military offensive; the timing of their plans is noteworthy.

The People's Republic of China should understand that the United States would have no choice but to react strongly to actions by the North Vietnamese which are designed to humiliate us. Such developments would be to no one's benefit.

The United States believes that all concerned countries have an interest in helping end this war and that its proposals mean that no country need trade in principles in promoting this objective.

This note is sent in the spirit of frankness and mutual understanding which have characterized our exchanges thus far.

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1 Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 849, President's File—China Trip, China Exchanges. No classification marking. This message, a 3-page "Republic of Vietnam and United States Proposal for a Negotiated Settlement of the Indochina Conflict," and information about communication, aircraft, and other preparations for the President's February 1972 trip were sent to Paris on January 24, under a covering letter from Haig to Walters. (Ibid.) The 3-page document was replaced with a later version, which was sent at 2 a.m. on January 25 under a covering memorandum from Haig to Walters. (Ibid.) See also Foreign Relations, 1969–1976, vol. E–13, Documents 80 and 81.


187. Memorandum From the Defense Attaché in France (Walters) to the President’s Deputy Assistant for National Security Affairs (Haig)


Chinese Ambassador handed me following this afternoon. He seemed slightly embarrassed but offered no comment to accompany it. He, Wei and Tsao were very cordial throughout.2

“The Chinese side has studied Dr. Kissinger’s message of January 26, 19723 on the Vietnam question and deem it necessary to reply as follows:

“1. During the exchange of views between China and the United States, we made clear on many occasions the Chinese government’s principal stand on the Indochina question and repeatedly pointed out that the question of the three Indochinese countries, and first of all the Vietnam question, should be settled between the United States and the concerned parties of Indochina. China has never asked the United States to make any commitments to her with respect to this question, nor has China ever made any commitments to the United States. It was stated in the message that the United States had presented a new plan for resolving the Indochina war and that ‘this action completed each of the commitments made by Dr. Kissinger to the Prime Minister with respect to the conflict’. What could be your intentions in saying so? We are most surprised.

“2. The United States proposals are by no means reasonable steps, but are, as the Vietnamese side has pointed out, a fraud for dragging out the war and continuing its interference in Vietnam’s affairs. It was asserted in the message that ‘these proposals go to the limits of United States generosity’. This is in effect an ultimatum demanding that the Vietnamese people submit.

“3. The United States has launched a war of aggression against Vietnam and thus insulted Vietnam, and it is not a question of Vietnam humiliating the United States. Being the victims of the war of aggression, the Vietnamese people have the inalienable right to hit back at the aggression at any time and in any form. The Chinese people will not flinch from even the greatest national sacrifices in giving resolute support to the Vietnamese people. The message alleges that the Vietnamese side is trying to humiliate the United States. This is a sheer
confusion of right and wrong. The United States of America should under-
stand that its declaration that it would react strongly can intimidate
no one, and that the end result can only be detrimental to the United
States itself.

“4. It was asserted in the message that it was believed the United
States proposals mean that no country need trade in principles in pro-
moting the objectives of ending the war. This assertion was directed at
China. We believe we should tell Dr. Kissinger that these words of his
mean precisely that he wants us to abandon principles and exert pres-
sure on the Vietnamese side on behalf of the United States. This is ab-
solutely impossible. If the United States truly wishes to end the war in
Vietnam it should forthrightly accept the reasonable seven-points pro-
posal of the Vietnamese side. Neither war threats nor petty maneuvers
will be of any avail. As was mentioned in the message, frankness has
characterized our exchanges thus far, and it is exactly in this spirit that
we are applying to you.’’

188. Memorandum From the President’s Deputy Assistant for
National Security Affairs (Haig) to the Defense Attaché in
France (Walters)1


Please request appointment at first opportunity with Chinese Ambas-

sador and convey to him the following message:2

“The U.S. side wishes to respond as rapidly as feasible to the ques-
tion raised in the response of the People’s Republic of China to the U.S.
communication dealing with its eight-point peace proposal for South-
east Asia.3 The U.S. side affirms that there is no reciprocal obligation
between the Governments of the People’s Republic of China and the
United States with respect to this problem. The use of the term ‘com-
mitment’ was intended to convey that in Dr. Kissinger’s discussions
with the Prime Minister, he had revealed that the U.S. side had devel-

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1 Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 849, Pres-
ident’s File—China Trip, China Exchanges. Top Secret; Sensitive; Exclusively Eyes Only.
By wire. A handwritten notation on the document reads: ‘‘WH 20114 [less than 1 line of
source text not declassified]

2 According to Walters’ 1-page memorandum for the record, he delivered this mes-
sage to Huang Chen in Paris on February 1. (Ibid.) See also Foreign Relations, 1969–1976,
vol. E–13, Document 84.

3 See Documents 186 and 187.
oped an eight-point plan for the settlement of the conflict in Southeast Asia and that at an appropriate time, it might be published. Dr. Kissinger had also pointed out that pending publication of its eight points, the U.S. side could not divulge the details of its proposal to the People’s Republic of China but that it would inform it of the details as soon as appropriate. Thus, the term ‘commitment’ merely referred to the fact that the U.S. side was completing that portion of the conversation dealing with the eight-point peace proposal. The term ‘commitment’ in this context connotes a unilateral promise rather than reciprocal obligation. Nevertheless, the U.S. Government believes that it has offered through its eight-point proposal a fair and honorable formula for the solution of the conflict in Southeast Asia.”

189. Memorandum From the President’s Deputy Assistant for National Security Affairs (Haig) to the Defense Attaché in France (Walters)¹


Please deliver following message to Chinese, hopefully before your departure.² If not possible, please have your secretary deliver at first opportunity.

“The United States side has seen recent reports to the effect that Special Adviser Le Duc Tho may be visiting Peking during the period just before the arrival of President Nixon and his party. If these reports are true and if Special Adviser Le Duc Tho expresses an interest in a

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¹ Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 849, President’s File—China Trip, China Exchanges. Top Secret; Sensitive; Exclusively Eyes Only. A typewritten notation on the document reads: “(Transmitted 2/5/72 for delivery by Gen. Walters on 2/6/72).”

² Walters’ undated memorandum for the record reads in full: “On the morning of February 6th I called at the Chinese Embassy in Neuilly and delivered the message which I had received the previous evening and which indicated that we had heard that Le Duc Tho might be visiting China just before President Nixon’s visit and that if he wished to discuss the Indochinese question, Dr. Kissinger would be prepared to meet with him. I was received by Tsao and Wei. Ambassador Huang Chen was not present. I was received cordially and with the usual rites. They promised to transmit this message that afternoon. I told them that I was going to the United States for a few days later that morning. They asked how they could get in touch with our side during my absence. I explained that Miss Ouellette was skiing but if called she could return at once to Paris and transmit any message to our side which they wished but that I myself would be back at the latest Thursday morning February 10th. They seemed fully satisfied with this and cordially wished me Bon Voyage.” (Ibid.)
private meeting, Dr. Kissinger would be prepared to discuss the situation in Indochina in the spirit of generosity and justice. The Chinese side could count on the meticulous observation of secrecy. This is not a request for any action by the Chinese side and is simply for its information. No reply is expected.

“As the time for President Nixon’s visit to the People’s Republic of China nears, the U.S. side wishes the People’s Republic of China to be aware of the nature of the toast which President Nixon will make at the opening banquet on February 21st. The President’s remarks will be in the spirit of Prime Minister Chou En-lai’s October toast at the banquet for Dr. Kissinger and his party. He will stress the themes of the traditional friendship between the peoples of China and the peoples of the U.S. and the need to make a new beginning between our countries. He will avoid any reference to current disputes, and he will not claim any similarity of views where none exist. This information is being provided now so that the Chinese side will know of the President’s approach to this important initial event.”

190. Memorandum From the Defense Attaché in France (Walters) to the President’s Deputy Assistant for National Security Affairs (Haig)¹


On February 11, 1972 during call on Chinese and after handing them your message regarding easing of trade restrictions I was given following:²

“The Chinese side has studied the U.S. side’s February 1 message on the Indochina question.

¹ Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 849, President’s File—China Trip, China Exchanges. Top Secret; Sensitive.
² A February 11 telegram from the White House to Walters reads in full: “Dr. Kissinger is requesting that the following information be brought to the attention of the Prime Minister. 1. The White House will announce on Monday, February 14 that the U.S. Government is further easing its trade regulations with respect to the People’s Republic of China. This will have the effect of bringing the People’s Republic of China into a comparable position with that of the Soviet Union. 2. With respect to the Indian subcontinent, the President will take no policy decisions until after he has had a full exchange of views with the Prime Minister. The U.S. continues to approach this region with the attitude of pursuing an approach which parallels that of the People’s Republic of China.” (Ibid.) See Document 185.
"1. The Chinese side has noted the following clarification made in the U.S. message:

"'The United States side affirms that there is no reciprocal obligation between the governments of the People’s Republic of China and the United States with respect to this problem.'"

"2. As for what is called in the U.S. message a unilateral promise, the facts are: In his discussion with Premier Chou En-lai, Dr. Kissinger revealed of his own accord that the U.S. side had submitted an eight-point plan to the Vietnamese side, and at the same time said that it would not be appropriate to show the Chinese side the documents of the secret U.S.–Vietnamese negotiations, including the details of the U.S. eight-point plan. Premier Chou En-lai on his part did not ask for that either. Dr. Kissinger also indicated that the U.S. side was not inclined to publish the eight-point plan, nor was it mentioned that the Chinese side would be informed of the details of this plan as soon as appropriate.

"3. Above is simply to clarify the situation and there is no need for a reply from the U.S. side."³

Comment: They were obviously embarrassed by tone of message. Said it was their New Year and produced lavish cake with rose on top. We toasted New Year in Roseflower wine. They could not have been more cordial. Ambassador Huang Hen leading joviality.

³ A February 11 memorandum from Walters to Haig, which was probably sent as a backchannel message, reads in full: “Chinese today handed me following message ‘The Chinese side has received the US side’s message of February sixth, in which it mentioned that Mr. Le Duc Tho might visit Peking just before President Nixon’s arrival in China and indicated that the US would be prepared to discuss the Indochina question with Mr. Le Duc Tho. In this regard, we wish to reaffirm our consistent position: The negotiations on the Vietnam question are a matter between Vietnam and the United States, in which no other countries have the right to intervene. China supports the just struggle of Vietnam, but will definitely not meddle in the Vietnamese-US negotiations.’” Walters also prepared a memorandum for record of this, the 41st meeting with the Chinese in Paris. Both memoranda are in National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 849, President’s File—China Trip, China Exchanges. See also Foreign Relations, 1969–1976, vol. E–13, Document 85.
191. Message From the Government of the United States to the Government of the People’s Republic of China


The U.S. side would like to comment on the Chinese message of February 11, 1972.2

1. As the Chinese side is aware, the U.S. side has voluntarily undertaken to keep the People’s Republic of China informed of significant events that could affect the People’s Republic of China. This has been done without any request for reciprocity but rather with the intention of placing the relationship between our two peoples on a new basis. The U.S. side has meticulously implemented this unilateral undertaking concerning several areas of the world. Given this general policy it was natural for the U.S. side to continue this procedure with respect to a U.S. peace overture in Indochina.

2. As for previous conversations, both sides have undoubtedly kept careful records; they make clear what transpired on specific issues such as the degree of specificity concerning the U.S. approach in its eight point plan. There is no need to continue further exchanges on this matter.

3. The U.S. side would like to reiterate that it has engaged in these exchanges not to enmesh the People’s Republic of China but rather to symbolize the new approach necessary to effect the fundamental change in relationships that it is U.S. policy to pursue. At the same time, this attempt to bring about trust requires a measure of mutual confidence and becomes difficult if isolated phrases assume an exaggerated significance which was never intended.

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1 Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 849, President’s File—China Trip, China Exchanges. Top Secret; Sensitive; Exclusively Eyes Only. The date was handwritten. Another handwritten notation at the top of the page reads: “Gen. Walters, Per our conversation the following message should be passed to the Chinese.” According to Walters’ undated memorandum for the record, he passed this message to PRC diplomats in Paris at 6 p.m. on February 17. (Ibid.) See also Foreign Relations, 1969–1976, vol. E–13, Document 87.

2 See Document 190.
192. Conversation Between President Nixon and his Assistant for National Security Affairs

Washington, February 14, 1972, 4:09–6:19 p.m.

[The President met with André Malraux, translator Sophia K. Porsen, and Henry Kissinger. A broad-ranging discussion of 39 minutes not related to China was not transcribed.]

Nixon: When he [Malraux] said, you know, he said: “You will meet a colossus, but he’s [Mao’s] a colossus facing death.” And then he said: “You know what will impress him most about you? That you are so young!” [laughter] Isn’t that something! God almighty, that’s a commentary on the leadership of the world these days. It’s all too damn old. But—

Kissinger: You will find, Mr. President, that these people are the—

Nixon: What would he think if he could see Kennedy?

Kissinger: He would have thought Kennedy was a lightweight.

Nixon: You think so?

Kissinger: Mao would have had total disdain for Kennedy. He would have felt about him the way De Gaulle did. De Gaulle had absolutely no use for Kennedy.

Nixon: Oh, I found him very interesting.

Kissinger: These historical figures can’t be bluffed, and they won’t fall for pretty phrases. And these Chinese, I mean the only security they have at this moment is our understanding of the international situation. The tactical details are relatively unimportant. And you will find that even Chou, of course, I’ve never met Mao, will always begin with a general discussion—

Nixon: You know, it’s a very strong speech—

Kissinger: And, but not—

Nixon: One thing to note that is very important, though I even felt that Malraux who is basically, you know, has raised hell about Vietnam and not to mention anything else, and I know all that. But is also, everybody is ready to say the United States should get the hell out here, and everybody says . . . But I think you’ve got to always try to

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1 Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, White House Tapes, Oval Office, Conversation No. 671–1. Secret. This transcript was prepared by the editor specifically for this volume. Nixon and Kissinger spoke shortly after a meeting with author André Malraux, a conversation that takes up the first half of this tape recording. A memorandum of the conversation with Malraux is ibid., White House Special Files, President’s Office Files, Memoranda for the President. Alexander Butterfield was also present for part of the discussion between Nixon and Kissinger.
stand very firmly on the point, do you want the United States as an island with no—

Kissinger: No foreigner wanted us to get out anywhere. It’s our domestic—

Nixon: He didn’t want us to get out of Japan. He didn’t want us to get out of Europe. He wants the United States to play a role, a role in the world. He only says let it be an intelligent role.

Kissinger: It’s our domestic critics who don’t understand anything, who want us to get out—

Nixon: I don’t believe it; it’s a matter of fact. I believe, I believe, well, the Chinese I noticed there throughout the thing, the United States should withdraw from all nations. They don’t really believe that. They can’t really believe that.

Kissinger: Well you, Chou said to me, we need a general principle, but the troops we are worried about are the million troops on our northern frontier. While we’re there, Mr. President, I should seek an occasion to give them some information about the disposition of Soviet forces on their frontier.

Nixon: They’re worried; I should say so.

Kissinger: You shouldn’t do it. But I’m going to get from Helms . . .

Nixon: I think that what I would like to do though, the way I would do it, is to say—

Kissinger: You ordered it.

Nixon: I ordered this for our trip and I would like for Dr. Kissinger to give it to [unclear] or whoever you want.

Kissinger: Yes, but only at a private meeting.

Nixon: Oh yes, at a private, well, I’ll say it.

Kissinger: No, you should say it at a private meeting, not in a plenary session.

Nixon: Well, I hope it wasn’t too painful for you. It is hard when a man has a—I mean, you feel for the poor guy, he’s got such a [unclear] fighting it all the time.

Kissinger: I found it—

Nixon: I admire a guy who goes over physical disability. You know, it’s painful for him to talk?

Kissinger: I found it fascinating; I didn’t find it at all painful. First of all, I completely agree with him in his analysis of these people. Now, you have a tendency, if I may say so, Mr. President, to lump them and the Russians. They’re a different phenomenon—

Nixon: No, I know.

Kissinger: They’re just as dangerous. In fact, they’re more dangerous over an historical period. But the Russians don’t think they’re
lovable, and the Russians don’t have inward security. The Russians are physical, and they want to dominate physically. What they can’t dominate, they don’t really know how to handle. The Chinese are much surer of themselves, because they’ve been a great power all their history. And, being Confucians, they really believe that virtue is power.

Nixon: [unclear]

Kissinger: Now, their present philosophy is different from Confucianism, but the basic principles, that if you have the correct principles, you can dominate the world. It’s still inbred in their civilization.

Nixon: I realize that. I think—

Kissinger: No, as far as he’s concerned, that’s correct, but I just, I’m just taking the liberty of saying this for the action when you deal with them. I think, in a historical period, they are more formidable than the Russians. And I think in 20 years your successor, if he’s as wise as you, will wind up leaning towards the Russians against the Chinese. For the next 15 years we have to lean towards the Chinese against the Russians. We have to play this balance of power game totally unemotionally. Right now, we need the Chinese to correct the Russians and to discipline the Russians.

Nixon: You know, looking at the situation in Vietnam, I suppose if we had only known the way the war would’ve, was going to be conducted, that we would have to say that it was a mistake to get into it. The way—

Kissinger: Yeah. Oh, yeah—

Nixon: The way it was conducted, correct?

Kissinger: That’s right.

Nixon: Because the way it’s been conducted has cost us too much, compared to what it would cost to let it go. However, having taken it where we found it, we had no other choice. You know, you wonder, after you read Malraux and, of course, you remember De Gaulle saying, and we were there at the palace—

Kissinger: Mr. President—

Nixon: He said you should get out; you should wipe your hands of it and so forth.

Kissinger: I am sure that historians . . . you wouldn’t have had the China initiative without it. It’s the demonstration of strength. The Chinese are torn about us. The reason we had to be so tough in India–Pakistan, for example, is to prove to them that we could be relevant in Asia. On the one hand, they want us out of Asia as a threat. On the other, they need us close enough so that they know we can do something. They don’t want us back on the West Coast, because if we’re back on the West Coast we’re just a nice, fat, rich country of no concern to them. And I am convinced that the history books, if we don’t
collapse now this year, if the whole thing doesn’t fall apart, is going to record the U.S. withdrawal from Vietnam on the same caliber, at least, of De Gaulle’s behavior in Algeria. It took him 5 years to get out of there. And after all, I think that game isn’t, isn’t over. I think we’ve, they’ve come to us now, that’s a fact. That’s a significant fact—

Nixon: Damn right. Well, whatever it is you said this morning, you saw much more through it than I did, and Bob [Haldeman] saw it too, that regardless of how it comes out, it gives us a two-edged sword for our enemies at home. My God, the fact that they asked for this meeting—

Kissinger: And it won’t break up right away. They cannot possibly want me at a meeting, unless they have something to say. It’s not their style. So, what we’re gonna to get out of this is another series of meetings.

Nixon: Of course, you say another series of meetings. We have to remember that now time is running out. There isn’t a helluva lot we can do about it, is there?

Kissinger: Well, but they must know that, too. I mean, we’re coming now to the—

Nixon: Yeah.

Kissinger: We’re going to get it to a point where you’ll have to say yes or no to some difficult [unclear]—

Nixon: Yeah, that’s right. We do want to remember that the meetings are enormously important to us in terms of the POWs. And they’ve got to know that.

Kissinger: Well, we, Mr. President, you always correctly express concern, are they stringing us along? If we have to draw up a balance sheet of the meeting, I think we gained a helluva lot more from the secret meetings than they did. In fact, I don’t see what they gained out of the secret meetings. They didn’t prevent Cambodia. They didn’t prevent Laos. They didn’t prevent anything we really wanted to do. They gave us a tremendous coup in public opinion, which is an important weapon in this war. And they settled six of eight points. I think we’re not too far. If they are willing to maintain a non-Communist structure in the south for a while, I think we can find a solution.

Nixon: He [Malraux] obviously feels that China is inevitably going to dominate Southeast Asia. Do you agree?

Kissinger: I think that’s true.

Nixon: You think so? Maybe they’re just going to gobble them up?

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Nixon: You think so? Maybe they’re just going to gobble them up?

Kissinger: No, but I think 800 million people confronting 30 million people—

Nixon: No, but I meant how? By subversion?

Kissinger: By subversion, by cultural example.
Nixon: So they’ll go Communist? You also ought to remember that there’s a strong pull the other way. One system works a little bit better than the other one [laughs].

Kissinger: Yeah, but it’s a—

Nixon: That, of course, is the big argument.

Kissinger: But we’ll be so weak—

Nixon: The reason Japan will not go the other way is the Japanese are going to like their living too damn well to turn toward the Communist system. Don’t you agree?

Kissinger: I think the Japanese could do surprising things. I don’t think they’ll do it. They’ll begin competing with the Chinese. But I think for our immediate problem is we can get out of it with an interim period where we are not the ones that have thrown our friends to the wolves.

Nixon: I agree.

Kissinger: There is a possibility—I don’t think the Chinese are in a condition for 5 years to put real pressure on Southeast Asia, and even then—

Nixon: What do you think of his argument to the effect that the Chinese foreign policy is all posture?

Kissinger: There’s a lot to that, but—

Nixon: I brought up, you know, that deal of his, which I thought was a nice little point. Where he said they had 2,000 dancers and 300,000 people in the street for the King, for the President of Somalia.2

Kissinger: Our concern with China right now, in my view, Mr. President, is to use it as a counterweight to Russia, not for its local policy.

Nixon: I agree.

Kissinger: As a counterweight, to keep it in play in the subcontinent for the time being. But above all as a counterweight to Russia. And, the fact that it doesn’t have a global policy is an asset to us, that it doesn’t have global strength yet. And to prevent Russia from gobbling it up. If Russian dominates China, that would be a fact of such tremendous significance.

Nixon: Well, quite frankly, Henry, if Russia or China dominated Japan that would have to be a factor and have enormous significance to us.

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2 According to the memorandum of conversation, Nixon and Malraux discussed a passage in the latter’s book that concerned a visit by the Prime Minister of Somalia to the People’s Republic of China. Malraux observed that this was “nothing but speeches and receptions for small chiefs of state. What, in fact, Malraux asked the President, had the Chinese done in Africa?” (Ibid.)
Kissinger: That’s right. I think, Mr. President—

Nixon: It would be in our interests; it is important to us to maintain the Japanese alliance.

Kissinger: The decision you made that Sunday morning, when we asked you what you would do in case China came in, and you in effect said we’d back it. That is the decision some future president may have to make, or it may be you in your second term. And I think it’s gonna be tough one, but we may be able to bring it off without the decision having to be made.

Nixon: Yeah. Malraux, of course, has seen every top leader in the world. I suppose going over back to 1918. He’s 70 years old. He started to write, when he was 20, in 19[unclear]. You know he spent 3 years in prison in Cambodia for stealing sacred art, trying to take a sacred art object out of the country when he was 22 years old. But you know it’s really a nice thing, in a way, for this old man. Any, I say “old man,” but this man who has seen so much, who is out, you know on the shelf, to be invited over here, to—

Kissinger: I thought your questions were very intelligent.

Nixon: I was trying to keep him going, because—

Kissinger: Well, you did it very beautifully.

Nixon: I know he was having a hard time talking.

Kissinger: That, incidentally, is a good method to use with Chou too, because that’s not too strong, understated.

Nixon: We’ll try to be a little more subtle about it.

Kissinger: No, no, well, maybe a little more—

Nixon: Except that we cannot, we cannot be too apologetic about America’s world role. We cannot, either in the past, or in the present, or in the future. We cannot be too forthcoming in terms of what America will do. Well, in other words, beat our breasts, wear a hair shirt, and well, we’ll withdraw, and we’ll do this, and that, and the other thing. Because I think we have to say that, well, “Who does America threaten? Who would you rather have playing this role?” I mean there’s a lot of people that could look at their hole cards here. There’s a lot of things they’ve got to consider about the American role that they—

Kissinger: Yeah, except they will do it, they will separate what they want you to do immediately from the principles.

Nixon: Yeah.

Kissinger: And that’s perfectly . . . I mean, we shouldn’t, you should say we’ll withdraw from all these places, except on Formosa

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3 See Documents 176 and 177.
you have to repeat those five things I told them, because that they
pretty well expected. And the degree to which you say it will make
them easier on the communiqué. It’s easy for Connally and Rogers to
talk big. They haven’t dealt with these people. And—

Nixon: I haven’t talked to Connally, but you went and you saw him. You said that it was not satisfactory.

Kissinger: Well, he said, Alex [Butterfield], did you find that book
for the President, the briefing materials?

Butterfield: [unclear]

Nixon: Well, what I was getting at [unclear]. We have to, we have
to, of course, have in mind, not only in the communiqué but the pos-
sibility that the secret record or anything could come out.4

Kissinger: They won’t make it come out. Well—the secret record—
all we said was that we wouldn’t encourage the two Chinas.

Nixon: All we say, we certainly can say we won’t encourage two
Chinas. We can say that our withdrawal, we can withdraw all our
troops from Formosa when the, two-thirds of them, when the war in
Vietnam is over, and a third we will in effect [unclear]—

Kissinger: We won’t let Chiang, we will not—

Nixon: We will not encourage an attack on the mainland—

Kissinger: And we will oppose Japanese troops from going—

Nixon: We will oppose Japanese troops—certainly, my God, we’ve
got to say that.

Kissinger: We won’t encourage the Formosan independence move-
ment. I think that all the five things we promised them is very easy

Nixon: Yeah. The communiqué language, I know this is a tough
one, because there we’ve got to get as much as we can. We’ve got the
connection, because we don’t want to give the Buckleys and frankly
some others, I don’t mean to jump on him, Bill Buckley and others, a
chance to go out and say “ah, we’ve went over and sold Formosa down
the river.” We haven’t sold Formosa down the river. We haven’t at all.
The one thing that did concern me about that, which I don’t know
whether we should change the others in order to make it conform, as
you realize, with regard to Korea and with regard to Japan, we indi-
cate that we will stand by our treaty commitments. We do not say that
in regards to Formosa. The point being that, I only note it, I don’t ob-
ject to it.

Kissinger: No, no. Have you, we say, we maintain our advisory
commitments.

4 Apparent reference to the memoranda of conversation.
Nixon: Friendship.
Kissinger: No, well, but there’s a separate section on Formosa.

Nixon: No, I know, I know. But we say, we do not say a treaty commitment, we use the word “treaty” on the other two. I just, you know what I mean. I just know that they’re trying to nitpick it from the standpoint of—but I am totally aware that Rogers, and certainly Rogers and John Connally, can’t expect you to uh... You know you have to realize that, first, that as far as Bill is concerned, if he’d done it himself it would be an entirely different game. And wouldn’t be nary as good as this. Now let’s face it, we know that. The second point, with regard to, and frankly let me [unclear]. The second point, with regard to Connally, I think Connally, in dealing with the Europeans, I don’t think he could possibly deal with the Chinese because—I don’t think so.

Kissinger: No. I don’t think he can even deal well with the Europeans. I think he’s the best man in your Cabinet, and I like him personally, but foreign relations is not, quite honestly, in my judgment—

Nixon: He picks it up as he goes along.

Kissinger: He’s very pugnacious. It, uh, the phrase we have in there is that the United States retains its abiding interest in a peaceful settlement.

Nixon: Yes, that’s fine.
Kissinger: Uh—

Nixon: Then, tell me—could I ask you one other thing? What have you done with regards to Rogers in terms of the communiqué?

Kissinger: I’ve just shown him the Formosa section.

Nixon: What’s he say he wants to do with it? Is he trying to re-write it?

Kissinger: Yeah.

Nixon: Has he offered you anything?

Kissinger: Yeah, but it’s totally, I mean, it’s ridiculous. They’ll never accept it. We can take part of it.

Nixon: What, I’m sorry you offered it to him. I was going to, I should have gotten it sooner. I would not have shown him the sections that you have. You’ve shown him the ones that Haig has worked on?

Kissinger: No, no, that I haven’t shown him. I’ve shown him the first draft of theirs [the PRC’s]. So, if they accept the Haig, the one we’ve sent through Haig [in his early January trip to the PRC] that will be a big improvement over what he’s seen. And he [Rogers] hasn’t seen that.

Nixon: Well, what’s he want to put in, has he said?

Kissinger: Well, what he wants to put in is to get a Chinese commitment that they will not use force in the settlement of the dispute, and that’s almost inconceivable. I mean it’s not that they—
Nixon: On the other hand, after it’s over, and after we get out of there, we could certainly agree to the effect that, well, if they do use force, then we have a treaty with Formosa.

Kissinger: Oh yes.

Nixon: I mean, we’re not giving up on our treaty.

Kissinger: Oh no, we have in the general language, we have a statement that we maintain our treaty commitment.

Nixon: We in the—

Kissinger: At the beginning.

Nixon: Oh, that’s something to point out. Oh, I see. I know how hard this thing is, but I, I’m not going to—what you’ve only shown him part? You haven’t shown him the other parts of the communiqué? Of course, there’s a perfectly good reason not to, because I told him back in October that Mao Tse-tung would make the deal.

Kissinger: And I’ve told him it doesn’t exist.

Nixon: That’s right. We don’t want him to find one of these books lying around.

Kissinger: I’ve just told him the—

Nixon: And how do we go about, for example, writing the communiqué on culture and so forth [unclear] the stock parts of [unclear]? Kissinger: Well, I’ve gotten them to give us some language on that.

Nixon: State?

Kissinger: Yeah. We can stick that in.

Nixon: Yeah, he’s going to give you language on that. Did you ask him for language on Korea or anything?

Kissinger: I don’t want it, because that we’ve already got set.

Nixon: I know we’ve got it all set, what I’m getting at is, when they play their little games.

Kissinger: I mean, but the Korean language is so perfect from our point of view.

Nixon: It’s brilliant. I mean, my point is, you might ask for something to look for. I don’t know, maybe not. I’m just to try to find ways to keep them out of the communiqué writing. I just wonder how physically you were going to do the communiqué, do you feel that—

Kissinger: Well, physically, I think the way to do it is—

Nixon: I’ll be meeting with Chou En-lai, and I’ll be meeting with Mao Tse-tung, and after that—

Kissinger: Well, what I should do, what I thought, Mr. President, is, if you agree, is that I send Chou a message that I’d like to see him before your first plenary session, so that we can work out the strategy. I could see Chou during some morning while they are free and technically work on the communiqué. Then, in your meeting with Chou,
you’d ratify it. I don’t think you want to get into a drafting session with Chou.

Nixon: Exactly.
Kissinger: You should put yourself on the level of Mao.
Nixon: How do you then explain to Rogers?
Kissinger: That we used some of these private sessions to work on a communiqué.
Nixon: Yeah, uh, but then—
Kissinger: Then he’ll start nitpicking it.
Nixon: That’s what I’m trying to get at. I’m trying to avoid that. How did we do that on the other summit communiqués?
Kissinger: We didn’t—no, we did it in Bermuda.
Nixon: Yeah.
Kissinger: Burke Trend and I did it.5
Nixon: You did?
Kissinger: Yeah.
Nixon: And then submitted it to Rogers?
Kissinger: Yeah, and he accepted it. And in France, we did it also in the meeting.
Nixon: And that’s the way we’ve established [unclear]?
Kissinger: For the Germans, I forget how it was done.
Nixon: Well, you weren’t there.
Kissinger: I wasn’t there.
Nixon: Then it’s established that we do them that way, isn’t it?
Kissinger: Yeah.
Nixon: I’m just not going to have any goddamn unpleasantness over there. The way it’s going to be is such a hard—
Kissinger: It only, Mr. President—
Nixon: We’re all going to sit down and get it. The trip must succeed. We’re not going to have any bullshit or unpleasantness, and—
Kissinger: This communiqué is so much more, I mean, if you read the news magazines, the news magazines expect a renunciation of forces, establishment of the common principles on the conduct of foreign policy, both countries say they do not want hegemony in the Pacific and will oppose hegemony. It’s—the danger is that some people can interpret it as a tacit Sino-U.S. alliance. And there’s a statement that both countries are opposed to hegemony in the Pacific and will oppose it.

5 Reference is to Sir Burke Trend, Secretary of the British Cabinet who participated in a private meeting with Nixon, Kissinger, and British Prime Minister Heath in December 1971.
Nixon: That’s directed against Russia, isn’t it? Or is it? And Japan.
Kissinger: Well, yes, and Japan and, and, but—so no one is going
to say that we didn’t have any understanding.
Nixon: Have you shown that to Rogers?
Kissinger: No.
Nixon: That’s good.
Kissinger: I figured, Mr. President, it’s much better for you.
Now—

[Approximately 1 minute 15 seconds omitted as White House
steward Manolo Sanchez enters the Oval Office and President Nixon
steps out.]

Kissinger: Well, I enjoyed it. I have a volume here, which has all
the changes that are in the communiqué.6
Nixon: Well, I want to, I’ll take a quick look at it. [Unclear] com-
muniqué [unclear] I’ll have a chance to read on [unclear]
Kissinger: Well, we have to change the Indian part a little bit.
Nixon: That’s obvious. I know that.
Kissinger: And, but if you, for example, we have got them to drop
from the draft the word “revolution.” They said, revolution is the law
of history and stuff like this.
Nixon: Go ahead.
Kissinger: And, I think the only contentious part of the commu-
niqué is Taiwan. We’ve told them we couldn’t accept their version,
and—
Nixon: They know that?
Kissinger: Yeah, now what I think should happen, Mr. President,
is that I have one session with Chou on the communiqué before you
meet Mao. Then you should just put it to Mao, you can say, we can do
a lot, but if you force us into a tremendous domestic debate on it, with
so many people in our bureaucracy—
Nixon: Put it on Rogers.
Kissinger: I would just put it to Mao. Mao is a big man. And
Chou. Time and again I’ve said, “I promise this to you, I keep all
my promises, I’m a man of principle.” Just treat him—“we’ve kept
every promise we’ve made to you, we’ve” . . . but we need some softer
language.

6 Nixon’s briefing books for the February 1972 trip include a section with these
drafts. See Document 193 and footnote 1 thereto.
[Nixon and Kissinger continue to discuss China, the communiqué, Vietnam and the possible timing of a Communist offensive in 1972, Kissinger’s trip to Paris, Mitchell’s resignation, and the impact of dispatching aircraft carriers to the Bay of Bengal.]^7

^7 Kissinger and Nixon discussed these topics further in a February 16 meeting. (National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, White House Tapes, Recording of conversation between Nixon and Kissinger, February 16, 1972, 4:15-5:36 p.m., Oval Office, Conversation No. 673-3)
The Litmus Test

Over the long term, the intangibles of your China visit will prove more important than the tangible results. We should be able to leave the People’s Republic of China with a creditable public outcome—because of the advance work, the careful scaling down of expectations, and the needs of both sides for various audiences. The crucial factor, however, will be the Chinese judgment of our seriousness and reliability: this litmus test will determine their future policy. If we fail it, the immediate results will be less satisfactory than we expect, but more importantly, they could turn sharply away from us in subsequent months.

In that case, they could easily resort to the tempting levers of public opinion. They could then deal with us like the North Vietnamese do—inviting in opposition politicians, dealing with unfriendly private groups, appealing to hostile journalists, lambasting us in the United Nations, and generally turning popular pressures on us while being tough on the state-to-state level. We can be certain that they would be especially skillful at this game; we would pay a double price at home and abroad for our alleged naivete at trying to deal with these people in the first place.

Thus, the Chinese will be concentrating on your strategic concepts as they discuss the various tactical issues. They will want to know if you understand their perspectives, how we chart the future, and whether we can be counted upon to move ahead surely and steadily. This does not mean that we shouldn’t be firm with them. On the contrary, they will only respect strength and resoluteness. Nor does it mean that we shouldn’t demand reciprocal treatment from them. On the contrary, they must be made fully aware of our own international and domestic imperatives.

Mao

When one refers to the Chinese one is in effect discussing Mao and Chou, they are the premier exhibits, the two clearly dominant figures on the Chinese scene today, and your only real interlocutors during your visit.

A convenient distinction between Mao and Chou—and one that is generally valid today—is to cite the Chairman as the philosopher and Chou as the practitioner. Thus we can think of Mao as the philosopher, the poet, the grand strategist, the inspirer, the romantic. He sets the direction and the framework and leaves the implementation to his trusted lieutenant. He can be counted on to speak in broad, philosophic, historic terms and leave the negotiations to Chou. He will want to talk about the long view, the basic tides running in the world, where China and the U.S. are heading, with each other and with others.
Chou is the tactician, the administrator, the negotiator, the master of details and thrust and parry. His emphasis will be on the concrete substantive issues, and he will invoke the Chairman’s authority and prescience with what seems total sincerity.

However, this distinction between the two men can be misleading. Chou is perfectly at home on the philosophic plane, and he couches his tactical arguments in historical and conceptual terms. No man could have endured and accomplished what he has without a strategic vision.

More importantly, Mao can be as ruthlessly pragmatic as he is ideologically fanatic. Now in his final years, he envisions himself as a man above practical details, but his writings and his actions have shown hard-nosed adaptability as well as philosophic insight. After all, in the past half-dozen years a whole string of his closest associates have been declared guilty of the most serious crimes and whisked out of sight—including two hand-picked heirs apparent and his personal secretary.

Mao’s style then, includes audacity and the activist impulse with a skillful sense of political tactics. He has repeatedly shown a unique capacity to judge when to press, when to retreat and adopt a humble posture, how to build a broad coalition of support, and also an unflinching willingness to attack his opposition when his own position is strong.

His pragmatism and tactical adaptability is reflected in what was clearly his decision to use one barbarian (the United States) to control another (the Soviet Union) and invite you to the Middle Kingdom. He is reported to have remarked:

“Bad things can change into good things, and bad persons can become good persons. I like a person such as Nixon, but I do not like Social Democrats or Revisionists. These kinds of people say one thing and do another. Although Nixon has his cunning side, he is not as bad as the others, for his policy is more open.”

Pointing out Mao’s tactical agility should not, however, obscure his basic philosophic trait. His stature as one of the 20th century’s outstanding political figures derives from his visionary side—a combination of personal assertiveness, charismatic self-confidence, and a creative native intelligence. This man knows where he wants China to go, and has been pushing his country’s social revolution for more than fifty years. He has torn China apart twice in a decade—in the Great Leap Forward and in the Cultural Revolution—to meet what he considered ideological requirements.

When he started his revolutionary road back in the 1920s there was absolutely no prospect of success. Since then, again and again, he has faced one towering crisis after another—the annihilation campaigns of Chiang, Long March, Japanese invasion, civil war with the Nationalists, Korean War, Great Leap Forward, split with Moscow,
Cultural Revolution, progressive Soviet encirclement. Surmounting such challenges requires vision as well as tactics.

Mao’s peasant background is evident in his direct and earthy humor, which he often used to ridicule or disarm opponents. At the same time, he has the sensitivity to write appealing poetry, displays a good working knowledge of Chinese history, and has a capacity for insight and abstract social analysis which has produced a number of philosophical writings and a clear (if not necessarily attainable) concept of his country’s future.

And he has made this vision real to others, like Marshal Yeh who told me in July of Mao’s romantic appeal to him. Yeh was a general in Chiang’s army in the 1920s when he heard of Mao in the mountains and what he was doing for the peasants and for China. The Marshal decided that his place was alongside this man, and he has been with him ever since. Countless others followed his example.

Chou

Chou is clearly running China. He is the dominant figure in both the party and government, and he steers both foreign and domestic policy. He refers to Mao for major issues of principle but clearly has great latitude in carrying out policies and decision-making.

He is charming, articulate and tough. You will enjoy the give-and-take with Chou on several planes, on all of which he is equally at home—historical discussion, philosophic dissertation, tactical jousting, hard bargaining, light repartee.

You can be sure that he had done his homework, not only on the issues but also on America and you personally. He has a good command of American politics and society, although his picture must be distorted.

His negotiating style is extremely effective and requires finesse to counter. If he states a position in absolute terms, he will stick by it at least for a while. He is not to be pressed if he is not ready to be pressed.

If, however, he is at all evasive or ambiguous—which is the usual case—this suggests room for exploration. In this case it is better to go at the issue circuitously rather than frontally. Either later in a meeting, or on an informal occasion, you could pick up the subject again and suggest another approach. He might then absorb this and come back subsequently with a new statement incorporating elements of what you said but presenting it as the Chinese view.

The indirect approach, the use of analogy, is typical of the Chinese in general and Chou in particular. Almost everything he says, no matter how far it seems to stray from the subject at hand, is making a relevant point. This oblique style is not at all inconsistent with candor. Indeed, frankness was one of the dominant elements in our talks with Chou, and frankness would serve you well in your conversations.
Chou can be extremely—and suddenly—tough. Both General Haig and I have been treated to withering blasts, although Chou has never been vituperative or harsh in personal terms. In dealing at your level, he may round a few edges, but you can assume that you will get some very hard speeches, spoken with a simple eloquence and perhaps just after some cordial small talk.

You should not let such statements stand but rather respond very firmly, though non-abusively. If you start pulling back he will stay on the offensive. If his thrust is philosophic, you should counter with your own viewpoint without attacking his. If he makes a frontal assault on a specific issue, however, you should retort directly.

Chou’s firmness, however, is not the kind of brutalizing toughness which we have come to expect from the Russians, but rather a hardness and consistency of purpose derived from fifty years of revolutionary experiences. To these people “struggle” is a way of life, without which they never would have gotten to where they are. Peace in the abstract is not a virtue; without justice it can serve to ratify oppression.

Thus if Chou (or Mao) makes hard statements, your response must be different than what you would use with the Russians. The latter can be met with tough language as well as tough substance. With the Chinese it is important to counter strongly with one’s own viewpoint, but in a way that reflects comprehension of their point of view. My own experience is that if you remain firm on principles but express yourself with restraint, they are likely to modify their rhetoric and address points of contention in a relatively realistic way. They may actually try to test you by firing some “empty cannon” of rhetoric at you, but a polite, though firm, rebuttal should get them to drop this tactic.

Conclusion

In sum, these people are both fanatic and pragmatic. They are tough ideologues who totally disagree with us on where the world is going, or should be going. At the same time, they are hard realists who calculate they need us because of a threatening Soviet Union, a resurgent Japan, and a potentially independent Taiwan.

The Chinese leaders are deadly serious people who will not be swayed from their convictions by anything that in their view smacks of opportunism or convenience. They take a very principled approach, but within that framework they are willing to be realistic. This reflects the tension between their sense of history and their imperative for movement.

On the one hand, they have been surmounting towering internal and external obstacles for some fifty years. They take a long view. They see history on their side.
On the other hand, these leaders are in their seventies, and they surely want to reach certain goals before they depart the scene. Assuring the security of their country and their system for their successors must preoccupy them. In addition, the mysterious events last fall and the alleged Lin Piao challenge underline the great gamble Mao and Chou have taken in dealing with us and inviting you. Thus they will need to show some immediate results for their domestic audience.

Our essential requirement is to demonstrate that we are serious enough to understand the basic forces at work in the world and reliable enough to deliver on the commitments we make. If in our formal and informal talks we can impress the Chinese with these intangibles, we will have truly made your visit an historic success. If we fail to do so, we can expect the Chinese to be an increasingly thorny adversary, and history could record your visit as a gallant but stillborn venture.

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194. Memorandum of Conversation

Beijing, February 21, 1972, 2:50–3:55 p.m.

PARTICIPANTS
Chairman Mao Tse-tung
Prime Minister Chou En-lai
Wang Hai-jung, Deputy Chief of Protocol of the Foreign Ministry
Tang Wen-sheng, Interpreter

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1 Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, White House Special Files, President’s Office Files, Box 87, Memoranda for the President. Top Secret; Sensitive; Exclusively Eyes Only. The meeting was held at Mao’s residence. A March 8 covering memorandum from Kissinger to Nixon reads: “Attached at Tab A is the transcript of your meeting with Chairman Mao. I thought you might be interested in looking it over before we put it in the files.” A notation on the memorandum indicates the President saw it. According to a March 28 memorandum from Holdridge and Lord to Kissinger, the NSC staff oversaw the “massive typing workload” needed to prepare these memoranda. (Ibid., NSC Files, Kissinger Office Files, Box 88, Country Files, Far East, Sensitive, China—President’s Trip, 15–29 Feb 72) The memorandum arranged by subject are ibid., NSC Files, Kissinger Office Files, Box 88, Country Files, Far East, Sensitive, China—President’s Trip, 15–29 Feb 72) The memorandum arranged by subject are ibid., NSC Files, President’s File—China Trip, Presidential Conversations in the PRC (Arranged by Subject) Copies of short, handwritten notes made by Kissinger and the President during their talks with Chou are in Library of Congress, Manuscript Division, Kissinger Papers, Geopolitical Files, Box CL115, China, Trips, February 1972, Richard Nixon. A complete collection of records of Kissinger’s talks in the PRC is in National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Kissinger Office Files, Box 92, President’s Trip, February 1972, HAK Conversations; and ibid., Box 92, Dr. Kissinger in the PRC During the President’s Visit, February 1972.
President Nixon
Henry A. Kissinger, Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs
Winston Lord, National Security Council Staff (Notetaker)

(There were opening greetings during which the Chairman welcomed President Nixon, and the President expressed his great pleasure at meeting the Chairman.)

President Nixon: You read a great deal. The Prime Minister said that you read more than he does.

Chairman Mao: Yesterday in the airplane you put forward a very difficult problem for us. You said that what it is required to talk about are philosophic problems.\(^2\)

President Nixon: I said that because I have read the Chairman’s poems and speeches, and I knew he was a professional philosopher. (Chinese laugh.)

Chairman Mao: (looking at Dr. Kissinger) He is a doctor of philosophy?

President Nixon: He is a doctor of brains.

Chairman Mao: What about asking him to be the main speaker today?

President Nixon: He is an expert in philosophy.

Dr. Kissinger: I used to assign the Chairman’s collective writings to my classes at Harvard.

Chairman Mao: Those writings of mine aren’t anything. There is nothing instructive in what I wrote.

(Looking toward photographers) Now they are trying to interrupt our meeting, our order here.

President Nixon: The Chairman’s writings moved a nation and have changed the world.

Chairman Mao: I haven’t been able to change it. I’ve only been able to change a few places in the vicinity of Peking.

Our common old friend, Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek, doesn’t approve of this. He calls us Communist bandits. He recently issued a speech. Have you seen it?

President Nixon: Chiang Kai-shek calls the Chairman a bandit. What does the Chairman call Chiang Kai-shek?

Prime Minister Chou: Generally speaking we call them Chiang Kai-shek’s clique. In the newspapers sometimes we call him a bandit; we are also called bandits in turn. Anyway, we abuse each other.

\(^2\) Apparent reference to Nixon’s airplane trip from Shanghai to Beijing on the morning of February 21. No record of this conversation has been found. Vice Minister of Foreign Affairs Ch’iao Kuan-hua and other PRC officials accompanied Nixon on the Spirit of ’76.
Chairman Mao: Actually, the history of our friendship with him is much longer than the history of your friendship with him.

President Nixon: Yes, I know.

Chairman Mao: We two must not monopolize the whole show. It won’t do if we don’t let Dr. Kissinger have a say. You have been famous about your trips to China.

Dr. Kissinger: It was the President who set the direction and worked out the plan.

President Nixon: He is a very wise assistant to say it that way. (Mao and Chou laugh.)

Chairman Mao: He is praising you, saying you are clever in doing so.

President Nixon: He doesn’t look like a secret agent. He is the only man in captivity who could go to Paris 12 times and Peking once and no one knew it, except possibly a couple of pretty girls. (Chou laughs.)

Dr. Kissinger: They didn’t know it; I used it as a cover.

Chairman Mao: In Paris?

President Nixon: Anyone who uses pretty girls as a cover must be the greatest diplomat of all time.

Chairman Mao: So your girls are very often made use of?

President Nixon: His girls, not mine. It would get me into great trouble if I used girls as a cover.

Prime Minister Chou: (laughs) Especially during elections. (Kissinger laughs.) Dr. Kissinger doesn’t run for President because he wasn’t born a citizen of the United States.

Dr. Kissinger: Miss Tang is eligible to be President of the United States.

President Nixon: She would be the first woman President. There’s our candidate.

Chairman Mao: It would be very dangerous if you have such a candidate. But let us speak the truth. As for the Democratic Party, if they come into office again, we cannot avoid contacting them.

President Nixon: We understand. We will hope that we don’t give you that problem.

Chairman Mao: Those questions are not questions to be discussed in my place. They should be discussed with the Premier. I discuss the philosophical questions. That is to say, I voted for you during your election. There is an American here called Mr. Frank Coe, and he wrote an article precisely at the time when your country was in havoc, during your last electoral campaign. He said you were going to be elected President. I appreciated that article very much. But now he is against the visit.
President Nixon: When the Chairman says he voted for me, he voted for the lesser of two evils.

Chairman Mao: I like rightists. People say you are rightists, that the Republican Party is to the right, that Prime Minister Heath is also to the right.

President Nixon: And General De Gaulle.

Chairman Mao: De Gaulle is a different question. They also say the Christian Democratic Party of West Germany is also to the right. I am comparatively happy when these people on the right come into power.

President Nixon: I think the important thing to note is that in America, at least at this time, those on the right can do what those on the left talk about.

Dr. Kissinger: There is another point, Mr. President. Those on the left are pro-Soviet and would not encourage a move toward the People’s Republic, and in fact criticize you on those grounds.

Chairman Mao: Exactly that. Some are opposing you. In our country also there is a reactionary group which is opposed to our contact with you. The result was that they got on an airplane and fled abroad.

Prime Minister Chou: Maybe you know this.

Chairman Mao: Throughout the whole world, the U.S. intelligence reports are comparatively accurate. The next was Japan. As for the Soviet Union, they finally went to dig out the corpses, but they didn’t say anything about it.

Prime Minister Chou: In Outer Mongolia.

President Nixon: We had similar problems recently in the crisis on India–Pakistan. The American left criticized me very heavily for failing to side with India. This was for two reasons: they were pro-Indian and they were pro-Soviet.

I thought it was important to look at the bigger issue. We could not let a country, no matter how big, gobble up its neighbor. It cost me—I don’t say this with sorrow because it was right—it cost me politically, but I think history will record that it was the right thing to do.

Chairman Mao: As a suggestion, may I suggest that you do a little less briefing? (The President points at Dr. Kissinger and Chou laughs.) Do you think it is good if you brief others on what we talk about, our philosophic discussions here?

President Nixon: The Chairman can be sure that whatever we discuss, or whatever I and the Prime Minister discuss, nothing goes beyond the room. That is the only way to have conversations at the highest level.

Chairman Mao: That’s good.

President Nixon: For example, I hope to talk with the Prime Minister and later with the Chairman about issues like Taiwan, Vietnam and Korea.
I also want to talk about—and this is very sensitive—the future of Japan, the future of the subcontinent, and what India’s role will be; and on the broader world scene, the future of U.S.–Soviet relations. Because only if we see the whole picture of the world and the great forces that move the world will we be able to make the right decisions about the immediate and urgent problems that always completely dominate our vision.

Chairman Mao: All those troublesome problems I don’t want to get into very much. I think your topic is better—philosophic questions.

President Nixon: For example, Mr. Chairman, it is interesting to note that most nations would approve of this meeting, but the Soviets disapprove, the Japanese have doubts which they express, and the Indians disapprove. So we must examine why, and determine how our policies should develop to deal with the whole world, as well as the immediate problems such as Korea, Vietnam, and of course, Taiwan.

Chairman Mao: Yes, I agree.

President Nixon: We, for example, must ask ourselves—again in the confines of this room—why the Soviets have more forces on the border facing you than on the border facing Western Europe. We must ask ourselves, what is the future of Japan? Is it better—here I know we have disagreements—is it better for Japan to be neutral, totally defenseless, or is it better for a time for Japan to have some relations with the United States? The point being—I am talking now in the realm of philosophy—in international relations there are no good choices. One thing is sure—we can leave no vacuums, because they can be filled. The Prime Minister, for example, has pointed out that the United States reaches out its hands and that the Soviet Union reaches out its hands. The question is which danger the People’s Republic faces, whether it is the danger of American aggression or Soviet aggression. These are hard questions, but we have to discuss them.

Chairman Mao: At the present time, the question of aggression from the United States or aggression from China is relatively small; that is, it could be said that this is not a major issue, because the present situation is one in which a state of war does not exist between our two countries. You want to withdraw some of your troops back on your soil; ours do not go abroad.

Therefore, the situation between our two countries is strange because during the past 22 years our ideas have never met in talks. Now the time is less than 10 months since we began playing table tennis; if one counts the time since you put forward your suggestion at Warsaw it is less than two years. Our side also is bureaucratic in dealing with matters. For example, you wanted some exchange of persons on a personal level, things like that; also trade. But rather than deciding that we stuck with our stand that without settling major issues there is nothing
to do with smaller issues. I myself persisted in that position. Later on I saw you were right, and we played table tennis. The Prime Minister said this was also after President Nixon came to office.

The former President of Pakistan introduced President Nixon to us. At that time, our Ambassador in Pakistan refused to agree on our having a contact with you. He said it should be compared whether President Johnson or President Nixon would be better. But President Yahya said the two men cannot be compared, that these two men are incomparable. He said that one was like a gangster—he meant President Johnson. I don’t know how he got that impression. We on our side were not very happy with that President either. We were not very happy with your former Presidents, beginning from Truman through Johnson. We were not very happy with these Presidents, Truman and Johnson.

In between there were eight years of a Republican President. During that period probably you hadn’t thought things out either.

Prime Minister Chou: The main thing was John Foster Dulles’ policy.

Chairman Mao: He (Chou) also discussed this with Dr. Kissinger before.

President Nixon: But they (gesturing towards Prime Minister Chou and Dr. Kissinger) shook hands. (Chou laughs.)

Chairman Mao: Do you have anything to say, Doctor?

Dr. Kissinger: Mr. Chairman, the world situation has also changed dramatically during that period. We’ve had to learn a great deal. We thought all socialist/communist states were the same phenomenon. We didn’t understand until the President came into office the different nature of revolution in China and the way revolution had developed in other socialist states.

President Nixon: Mr. Chairman, I am aware of the fact that over a period of years my position with regard to the People’s Republic was one that the Chairman and Prime Minister totally disagreed with. What brings us together is a recognition of a new situation in the world and a recognition on our part that what is important is not a nation’s internal political philosophy. What is important is its policy toward the rest of the world and toward us. That is why—this point I think can be said to be honest—we have differences. The Prime Minister and Dr. Kissinger discussed these differences.

It also should be said—looking at the two great powers, the United States and China—we know China doesn’t threaten the territory of the United States; I think you know the United States has no territorial designs on China. We know China doesn’t want to dominate the United States. We believe you too realize the United States doesn’t want to
dominate the world. Also—maybe you don’t believe this, but I do—
neither China nor the United States, both great nations, want to dom-
inate the world. Because our attitudes are the same on these two is-
sues, we don’t threaten each others’ territories.

Therefore, we can find common ground, despite our differences,
to build a world structure in which both can be safe to develop in our
own ways on our own roads. That cannot be said about some other
nations in the world.

Chairman Mao: Neither do we threaten Japan or South Korea.
President Nixon: Nor any country. Nor do we.
Chairman Mao: (Checking the time with Chou) Do you think we
have covered enough today?
President Nixon: Yes. I would like to say as we finish, Mr. Chair-
man, we know you and the Prime Minister have taken great risks in
inviting us here. For us also it was a difficult decision. But having read
some of the Chairman’s statements, I know he is one who sees when
an opportunity comes, that you must seize the hour and seize the day.

I would also like to say in a personal sense—and this to you Mr.
Prime Minister—you do not know me. Since you do not know me, you
shouldn’t trust me. You will find I never say something I cannot do.
And I always will do more than I can say. On this basis I want to have
frank talks with the Chairman and, of course, with the Prime Minister.

Chairman Mao: (Pointing to Dr. Kissinger) “Seize the hour and
seize the day.” I think that, generally speaking, people like me sound
a lot of big cannons. (Chou laughs.) That is, things like “the whole
world should unite and defeat imperialism, revisionism, and all reac-
tionaries, and establish socialism.”

President Nixon: Like me. And bandits.
Chairman Mao: But perhaps you as an individual may not be
among those to be overthrown. They say that he (Dr. Kissinger) is also
among those not to be overthrown personally. And if all of you are
overthrown we wouldn’t have any more friends left.

President Nixon: Mr. Chairman, the chairman’s life is well-known
to all of us. He came from a very poor family to the top of the most
populous nation in the world, a great nation.

My background is not so well known. I also came from a very poor
family, and to the top of a very great nation. History has brought us
together. The question is whether we, with different philosophies, but
both with feet on the ground, and having come from the people, can
make a breakthrough that will serve not just China and America, but
the whole world in the years ahead. And that is why we are here.

President Nixon: He (Mao) reads too much.
Chairman Mao: Too little. I don’t know much about the United States. I must ask you to send some teachers here, mainly teachers of history and geography.

President Nixon: That’s good, the best.

Chairman Mao: That’s what I said to Mr. Edgar Snow, the correspondent who passed away a few days ago.

President Nixon: That was very sad.

Chairman Mao: Yes, indeed.

It is alright to talk well and also alright if there are no agreements, because what use is there if we stand in deadlock? Why is it that we must be able to reach results? People will say ... if we fail the first time, then people will talk why are we not able to succeed the first time? The only reason would be that we have taken the wrong road. What will they say if we succeed the second time?

(There were then some closing pleasantries. The Chairman said he was not well. President Nixon responded that he looked good. The Chairman said that appearances were deceiving. After handshakes and more pictures, Prime Minister Chou then escorted the President out of the residence.)

195. Memorandum of Conversation

Beijing, February 21, 1972, 5:58–6:55 p.m.

PARTICIPANTS

The President
William P. Rogers, Secretary of State
Dr. Henry A. Kissinger, Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs
Ronald L. Ziegler, Press Secretary to the President
Marshall Green, Assistant Secretary of State for East Asian and Pacific Affairs
John A. Scali, Special Consultant to the President
Alfred le S. Jenkins, Director of Office of Asian Communist Affairs, State Department
John H. Holdridge, Senior Staff Member, NSC
Winston Lord, Senior Staff Member, NSC
Charles W. Freeman, Jr., State Department Interpreter

1 Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, White House Special Files, President’s Office Files, Box 87, Memoranda for the President. Top Secret; Sensitive; Exclusively Eyes Only. The meeting was held in the Great Hall of the People.
Prime Minister Chou En-lai
Yeh Chien-ying, Vice Chairman of the Military Commission
Li Hsien-nien, Vice Premier of the State Council
Chi Peng-fei, Minister of Foreign Affairs
Ch’iao Kuan-hua, Vice Minister of Foreign Affairs
Hsiung Hsiang-hui, Secretary to the Prime Minister
Chang Wen-chin, Director of Western Europe, North American, and Australasian Affairs, Ministry of Foreign Affairs
Han Hsu, Acting Chief of Protocol
Wang Hai-jung, Deputy Director of Protocol
Chai Chi-hua, Ministry of Foreign Affairs
Chi Chao-chu, Interpreter
Peng Hua, Chien Ta-yung, Shen Jo-yun, Li Chung-ying, Ting Yuan-hung, Chang I-chun, Ma Chieh-hsien and Lien Cheng-pao—Leading Members and Staff
Members of Departments Concerned

Prime Minister Chou: We have too many elderly people in our leadership. So on this point we should learn from you. I have found that you have many young men; Mr. Chapin is very young indeed, and Mr. Green is not very old either.

Mr. Green: Very old man.

Prime Minister Chou: You used to stay in Hong Kong, didn’t you?

Mr. Green: That’s right, 1961 to 1963.

Prime Minister Chou: Then you know something about China.

Mr. Green: No, I know very little.

Prime Minister Chou: And then you can hold discussions this time when you come to China with our Minister of Foreign Affairs, under the leadership of your Secretary of State. You can raise any question you like.

Secretary Rogers: You will raise the questions.

Prime Minister Chou: Those who are concerned with these affairs, we shall see to it that they are able to know what they want to. Don’t you think that’s right.

President Nixon: Absolutely, but I hope they find some answers too.

Prime Minister Chou: We shall reply to them (the press) not only what we have done wrong. Only in this way can we enable others to make comparisons and to look at things from the point of view of development.

It seems none of you are smoking. Then let us have some tea. We shall start out with some tea. So the meetings are prickly.

President Nixon: They have lots of questions too.

Prime Minister Chou: They wanted me to receive them, and I said it would be better after Mr. President leaves for me to receive them. It is not very easy for me to answer their questions in the middle. Nor am I very adept at briefing conferences like Mr. Kissinger. Because if I
were to hold such briefing conferences I might tell the truth about what went on and then I would not be abiding by good faith. It is indeed not easy to deal with correspondents. Before we obtained power throughout the country, then we were more free and easy and could speak on more easy terms with correspondents.

President Nixon: Having read the transcripts of conversations the Prime Minister had with Dr. Kissinger, I think the Prime Minister can handle himself with anyone in the world.

Prime Minister Chou: No, I don’t feel I am in a position to take such an exaggerated position. The knowledge of any one person is limited. As Chairman Mao just said, there is much we do not know about the United States; because we have been cut off for many years and tremendous changes have taken place in your country and that is also the case with China. China too has undergone many tremendous changes.

Having said so much, I should say that we express our welcome to President Nixon in bringing such a large party to visit the People’s Republic of China. And I believe the thinking of Mr. President is that we should engage in serious discussions on matters we consider important, and first of all, as to how to promote the normalization of relations between our two countries. And particularly, you came despite the great distance between our two countries of more than 16,000 kilometers, and we express to you our thanks for that. And, what is more, there is such a big time difference between our two countries, so our first meeting we will make as short as possible.

One addition, however, is that before talks have even begun, Mr. President has already met with Chairman Mao and discussed questions which are to be discussed and that is advantageous.

President Nixon: Mr. Prime Minister, I first express appreciation on behalf of our party for receiving us. You have mentioned the fact that you do not know our country, and we on our part do not know your country. And this is a great loss to both of us.

Prime Minister Chou: So now we should make amends to that.

President Nixon: Now we begin a process through which we will have a chance to know each other as peoples and also to communicate as governments.

Prime Minister Chou: That is right.

President Nixon: And as we meet we have the opportunity to discuss our past differences, which the Prime Minister has pointed up in his conversations with Dr. Kissinger, and as we discussed today with Chairman Mao. We also can discuss those areas where we have common interests. I believe that when this trip was announced that a very solid majority of the American people approved the idea of the visit.
Prime Minister Chou: And we can notice that spirit both from your press, as well as the resolution passed by your two Houses. And also it can be seen from the “Spirit of ’76” on your plane. (laughter) This “Spirit of ’76” includes a period of 200 years, a pioneer spirit. I discussed this question of the pioneer spirit with Dr. Kissinger.

President Nixon: One of the side benefits of this visit was one of the rare occasions that I was able to get from our Congress a unanimous resolution. (laughter) What that means is that our people and our Congress of both parties want to see a new relationship between the People’s Republic and the United States of America. They know, as the Prime Minister has pointed out in his statements, that the differences of the past and of the present are not going to be resolved by one visit.

Prime Minister Chou: That is right.

President Nixon: But they also know that if the world in which our children are to live is to be a more peaceful world, China and the United States must, when possible, work together rather than against each other.

Prime Minister Chou: Yes, we hope so.

President Nixon: And while we have, of course, been talking about differences, and in our private talks will discuss these differences both in our meetings with the Prime Minister and Chairman Mao and our Secretary of State’s meetings with the Foreign Minister, we must not overlook the fact that the People’s Republic of China has no territorial designs on the United States, and the United States has no territorial designs on China. Neither of our countries desires to dominate the other, and neither of our countries—I can say this and the Prime Minister and Chairman Mao have said it—wants to reach out and control the world. These things, then, we have in common.

As we look at the whole world, and the balance of power in the world, there is no reason for the People’s Republic of China and the United States of America to be enemies, and there are many reasons why the People’s Republic of China and the United States should work together for a peaceful Pacific and a peaceful world.

One of the refreshing things about the talks I have had already with Chairman Mao and with the Prime Minister is that they have talked directly, and honestly, and candidly. We cannot cover up with protocol and fine words the differences we may have. It does not serve the cause of better relations to put a cosmetic covering over fundamental differences of opinion.

Prime Minister Chou: That is right.

President Nixon: The conventional way to handle a meeting at the summit like this, while the whole world is watching, is to have meetings
for several days, which we will have, to have discussions and discover differences, which we will do, and then put out a weasel-worded communiqué covering up the problems.

Prime Minister Chou: If we were to act like that we would be not only deceiving the people, first of all, we would be deceiving ourselves.

President Nixon: That is adequate when meetings are between states that do not affect the future of the world, but we would not be meeting our responsibility for meetings which the whole world is watching, and which will affect our friends in the Pacific and all over the world for years to come.

As we begin these meetings we have no illusions that we will solve everything. But we can set in motion a process which will enable us to solve many of these problems in the future. And the way to do it at the beginning, as the Prime Minister did in his conversations with Dr. Kissinger, and as we have done today and will do the rest of the week, is to lay the problems on the table, talk about them frankly and with good temper, and find the areas where we can agree and where we cannot agree. The men in this room and women in this room have fought a long hard struggle for a revolution which has succeeded. We know you believe deeply in your principles, and we believe deeply in our principles. We do not ask you to compromise your principles, just as you would not ask us to compromise ours.

Prime Minister Chou: Yes, indeed. In spite of the fact that there exists now such great differences between us and in the future there will still be differences. But as Mr. President has said, we will invariably find common ground to promote the normalization of relations between us.

I am very sorry—I would like to apologize to Mr. Ziegler—for not telling you in advance about the meeting between President Nixon and Chairman Mao. It came awfully suddenly. But I have already promised Mr. President that the press release of the meeting, the photos as well as the release, will be issued by your side first.

President Nixon: That is unprecedented. No other nation we have ever dealt with has been so generous.

Prime Minister Chou: That is what we should do because this is an initiative of your side, so you should take the initiative.

President Nixon: One of the points it is important for all our colleagues here to understand is that the meetings we will have will be ones in which we can talk frankly, and there will be no disclosures to the press unless we agree—unless the Prime Minister or the Chairman and I agree, and the Foreign Minister and Secretary Rogers agree—because it is important that the talks we have be completely open, and they will not be completely open if we are talking to the press rather than to each other.
Prime Minister Chou: We can immediately reach agreement on that.

President Nixon: Right. I will see that even Dr. Kissinger gives no backgrounder. (laughter) Or Ziegler.

Prime Minister Chou: As you said to Chairman Mao this afternoon, today we shook hands, but John Foster Dulles didn’t want to do that.

President Nixon: But you said you didn’t want to shake hands with him.

Prime Minister Chou: Not necessarily. I would have.

President Nixon: We will shake hands. (Shakes hands with Chou.)

Prime Minister Chou: His assistant, Mr. Walter Bedell Smith, he wanted to do differently, but he did not break the discipline of John Foster Dulles, so he had to hold a cup of coffee in his right hand and, as generally one doesn’t shake hands with the left hand, so he used his left hand to shake my arm. (laughter)

But at that time we couldn’t blame you because the international viewpoint was that the socialist countries were a monolithic bloc, and the Western countries were a monolithic bloc. But that is not the case. Now we understand.

President Nixon: We have broken out of the old pattern. We look at each country in terms of its own conduct rather than lumping them all together, and saying because they have this kind of philosophy they are all in utter darkness. And I would say in honesty to the Prime Minister that my views, because I was in the Eisenhower Administration, were similar to those of Mr. Dulles at that time. But the world has changed since then, and the relationship between the People’s Republic and the United States must change too. As the Prime Minister has said in a meeting with Dr. Kissinger, the helmsman must ride with the waves or he will be submerged with the tide.

Prime Minister Chou: That is right. (he laughs) Dr. Kissinger introduced this to you very well, because that is indeed what I said.

President Nixon: He tells me some things. (laughter)

Prime Minister Chou: I suppose that our future discussions should be separated into groups. We can proceed faster that way. Don’t you suppose so? That is, for some assistants to have restricted meetings on basic major questions. And then for the Secretary and his assistant to discuss with the Foreign Minister and his assistants various specific matters to promote the normalization of relations between our two countries. As Chairman Mao said to Mr. President, this afternoon, we must first of all discuss major problems and should not discuss specific matters.

But then since Mr. President took office, this gate to our contacts has been opened, and to have these specific contacts between us would
be beneficial to the promotion of the normalization of relations between the two countries. And we should say on this matter, Mr. President took the initiative. But our Minister of Foreign Affairs was rather slow in responding. I don’t know about your State Department . . .

Secretary Rogers: We were fast.

Prime Minister Chou: So during the table tennis championship matches in Nagoya, Japan, the decision to invite the American table tennis team to China was made by Chairman Mao personally, and when it was issued, your State Department approved the visit. That shows that since the desire long existed, once the opportunity for that came it was taken.

And so, since that is the case, then for these bilateral specific matters, they can be discussed by your Secretary of State or his assistants and our Foreign Minister and his assistants. That will surely further relations. Of course, in discussing these specific matters of principle, I am sure Mr. Green will raise them, and we will reply, but our Foreign Minister and his assistants will also raise their questions. I believe that so long as both sides have this desire to promote normalization of relations then we can proceed rather easily on these specific matters.

But as for basic matters, we must depend on Mr. President and ourselves to solve. It goes without saying it involves all kinds of relationships as well as the question of the Taiwan situation. Shall we start this way tomorrow?

President Nixon: I think the Prime Minister has outlined a very satisfactory and workable process, and as our Foreign Ministers discuss the problems of normalization of contacts, or trade . . .

Prime Minister Chou: Culture . . .

President Nixon: Culture . . .

Prime Minister Chou: Scientific . . .

President Nixon: Right . . . technology. All of these matters they are prepared to discuss. In the meantime I know that the Prime Minister will want to discuss, and we will want to discuss with him, not only Taiwan but the problems of Southeast Asia, Korea, South Asia, and then related problems in the Pacific area—the problem of our relations with Japan and then world problems generally, the relations with the great superpowers.

While our emphasis will necessarily be on the bilateral matters, in order to discuss these matters in an intelligent and effective way, we must do so in the framework of the whole world because—as I said

\[2\] All ellipses are in the source text.

\[3\] See Document 198.
earlier—while neither of our countries wants to rule the whole world, each of us by destiny is a world power, and we therefore must discuss issues of the whole world, not just the issues which are problems at the moment.

For example, we cannot discuss a critical area like South Asia, and India, without evaluating the policy of the Soviet Union toward that area. And the same can be said of the whole problem of arms control.

Prime Minister Chou: Yes, Mr. President had already pointed out this principle in your talks with correspondents in Kansas City in July of last year.\(^4\) There may be some differences or you may have changed your view. You overestimate us. You said we are a potential power. Prime Minister Heath also overestimated us in his speech to the annual Conservative Party Conference. And that shows that there has been great turmoil and tremendous changes in the world since the Second World War.

So it is important for us to exchange views and seek some common ground.

President Nixon: The Prime Minister should not underestimate—and I am sure he does not—the reality of China. Not only is it a potential power, but so significant a power that the Soviet Union has more units on its border with China than it does on the border with Western Europe.

Prime Minister Chou: That is indeed the case. Our Vice-Chairman of the Military Commission is here, and he can testify to that.

President Nixon: We have very good intelligence on that.

Prime Minister Chou: I heard that Mr. President would want to deal with your domestic matters in the mornings, so the discussions will always be in the afternoon. Tomorrow, and maybe the day after, we can start in the afternoon. Maybe we should have a longer session in the afternoon, because I think two hours is not enough.

President Nixon: No, does the Prime Minister prefer to meet in the morning?

Prime Minister Chou: It is better for you to engage in your work in the morning.

President Nixon: But I can be available in the early afternoon.

Prime Minister Chou: Starting from 2:00?

President Nixon: Yes, that is good. I don’t know whether I can stay up as late as the Prime Minister, but I will try.

Prime Minister Chou: It will be 2:00 Peking time.

\(^4\) See footnote 14, Document 139.
President Nixon: That’s when I am supposed to be asleep. The Prime Minister takes advantage of me. (laughter)

Prime Minister Chou: Well, tomorrow after the performance, if you are still in a vigorous spirit, we can continue the discussions.

President Nixon: And as our discussions go along, if morning discussions seem to be useful I can turn my schedule around.

Prime Minister Chou: Well, as for tomorrow, let us set it at 2:00.

President Nixon: And then each day we can make a different plan.

Prime Minister Chou: As for the Secretary of State and the Foreign Minister, they can decide on their time. And the Foreign Minister works in mornings, afternoons, any time.

President Nixon: They are much younger than we are (laughter).

Prime Minister Chou: And then, as the visit is not so very long and there is the previous question of a communiqué to do, it would be wise for us on each side to designate someone to do some thinking on it.5

President Nixon: I think we should do that.

Prime Minister Chou: For our side, I will designate Mr. Ch’iao Kuan-hua. He will take part in our discussions as well.

President Nixon: And we will designate Dr. Kissinger for our side. He will, of course, work with the Secretary of State and me.

Prime Minister Chou: You know the Soviet Representative Malik is very dissatisfied with our Representative to the United Nations (Ch’iao Kuan-hua).

Secretary Rogers: We like him. (laughter)

Prime Minister Chou: He cooperated with Mr. Bush.

President Nixon: One of the more attractive aspects Dr. Kissinger told me of working with Chinese friends is they always publish the same text. That does not always happen (with the Soviet Union).

Prime Minister Chou: We must act like that. Otherwise one would not enjoy any confidence.

President Nixon: I think this is a helpful kind of meeting, because if we begin this way, knowing we can talk in confidence and our press people will say only what we tell them to . . . and second, we will have people work on the communiqué being honest, and if there are areas of disagreement stating them. I think that will be a very good procedure.

Prime Minister Chou: It is good to make clear our differences because then it will be easier for us to find a common point, because there will be a comparison.

5 The final text of the Shanghai Communiqué is printed as Document 203.
President Nixon: It is also important for us to know why we differ. We may find areas of disagreement not as wide as we thought, and sometimes it may be only a question of timing as to how long the difference will exist.

Prime Minister Chou: As Chairman Mao said, if we find there are differences between us and cannot solve them this time, we can try to solve them next time. We will find most by reason why we are not able to solve these differences. Maybe one side is wrong; maybe the other; and maybe both, and then... .

President Nixon: And maybe time will change it.

Prime Minister Chou: I won’t take any more of your time now. For our side, in many of our sessions, the Vice-Chairman of the Military Commission, and Mr. Li Hsien-nien may not take part in all the sessions.

President Nixon: Whatever you desire. And one question—there, of course, is very great interest in the fact that I did meet with the Chairman. When should we...

Prime Minister Chou: That has already been announced.

President Nixon: That’s the trouble, the President is the last to find out anything (laughter).

Prime Minister Chou: I abide by what I promised. I told the New China News Agency not to publish it until 8:30. That means we gave the priority to Mr. Ziegler.

Mr. Ziegler: We appreciate that.

Prime Minister Chou: Because even Mr. Yeh and Mr. Li Hsien-nien didn’t know about that. I didn’t have time to inform the two before.

President Nixon: The Prime Minister is spoiling Mr. Ziegler.

196. Memorandum of Conversation

Beijing, February 22, 1972, 2:10–6 p.m.

PARTICIPANTS
The President
Dr. Henry A. Kissinger, Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs

1 Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, White House Special Files, President’s Office Files, Box 87, Memoranda for the President. Top Secret; Sensitive; Exclusively Eyes Only. The meeting was held in the Great Hall of the People.
The meeting opened with an exchange of pleasantries between Prime Minister Chou and President Nixon. The Prime Minister remarked that none of those on the U.S. side smoked. He said that Madame Mao would attend the ballet that evening and noted that it was difficult to combine classical ballet with revolutionary themes. The President noted that the Prime Minister had been an actor in his youth, and that he himself had met Mrs. Nixon while acting in a play in which he did not get the girl. The Prime Minister commented that the play therefore did not match reality.

The Prime Minister confirmed that the room in which the meeting was being held—the Fukien Room—was the same one in which he had entertained Dr. Kissinger in 1971 and had the duck lunch. Dr. Kissinger related he had gained two pounds his first trip to Peking and five pounds his second.

President Nixon: I want to tell the Prime Minister that last night’s banquet was superb. All our party and the press are talking about it this morning, what a wonderful time they had. I talked to my daughter by telephone this morning, and she saw the banquet on television live, at 6:00 a.m. Boston time. She heard the Prime Minister’s toast, and was very impressed. She was very impressed, too that I could use chop sticks. My tipping glasses with the guests and going around the tables also made a very great impression. All this was on live television, from about 6:00 to 8:00 a.m.

Prime Minister Chou: It is a good thing to draw the attention of the people to this trip of the President. It shows you did not come in vain.

President Nixon: As I said, more people than at any time in the history of the world heard our two speeches live.

Prime Minister Chou: Your earth satellite played a role there, and we hope that other earth satellites will serve purposes like this.

President Nixon: That’s what we would prefer.

Prime Minister Chou: That is not an easy thing.

President Nixon: What is the Prime Minister’s preference as to how we should proceed? Whatever he would like—I would like to conform with his wishes.
Prime Minister Chou: I would also like to hear Mr. President’s views on this matter: whether we should start out with major world questions and then move on to the question of Taiwan and the normalization of relations, or start out with Taiwan and then move toward major world questions. I would like to hear Mr. President’s views.

President Nixon: I think a better way to proceed so the Prime Minister can get a better idea of my views—which he has not yet had except through my agent Dr. Kissinger—is if he would permit me to make a general statement. I would cover Taiwan briefly, then turn to the world scene and discuss it, and then go back to concrete issues such as Taiwan, Korea, Japan, and the subcontinent and other issues as they relate to the world scene. The reason is that I feel it is important that the Prime Minister understand how I relate specific issues to the world scene and why I have reached conclusions regarding certain questions. I want the Prime Minister to have my thoughts and to know why I think certain things are important. Afterwards we can talk about concrete items. He will want to probe my general feelings. If he will permit, that’s the way I would like to proceed.

Prime Minister Chou: Yes, I approve. Please.

President Nixon: I would like to begin by commenting upon the statement Chairman Mao made at the start of our meeting yesterday. He very properly raised the question of whether our talks would be in confidence or whether we were going to talk for publication. I assured him and have also assured the Prime Minister in our conversation in the car that they would be confidential.

Let me be more specific. When Dr. Kissinger returned from his trip in July and in October, the total number of pages in the transcript was over 500.

Prime Minister Chou: That must have been quite a tiring thing to read that.

President Nixon: It was very interesting. I think the Prime Minister will find this hard to believe, but except for General Haig and these gentlemen here, and Dr. Kissinger of course, I am the only one who has seen these 500 pages. I have read the whole 500. We provided a sanitized memorandum of conversation for others—I am talking here in great confidence—who are on the trip with us, like Secretary Rogers and Assistant Secretary Marshall Green. This is because they need to have some of this information in order to do their work.

This does not indicate any lack of confidence in either Secretary Rogers or Mr. Green, but our State Department leaks like a sieve. (Prime Minister Chou laughs) Also within our bureaucracy there is great opposition to some of the positions I have taken, for example, our positions with respect to India and Pakistan.
Prime Minister Chou: (laughs) The record of three of your meetings were made public because all sorts of people were there.

President Nixon: Now, I want to tell the Prime Minister that as far as the conversations I have with him and with Chairman Mao and any other conversations with the Chairman, this rule will apply. The only people who will get the transcript will be the people at this table and General Haig. General Haig must have it because he is Dr. Kissinger’s deputy. We will prepare for Secretary Rogers a memorandum only for those matters that can be generally discussed and regarding which the State Department must act. But the transcript of the conversations in this room will go no further than the people at this table and General Haig, who is totally reliable.

The Prime Minister may think we’re being too careful, but as you know, we had the Pentagon papers from the previous Administration, and we’ve had the Anderson papers from this Administration, and Dr. Kissinger and I have determined that this will never happen in the new relationship that we have established with his (the Prime Minister’s) government. Let me say to the Prime Minister in a lighter vein that the problem we have in keeping things in confidence in our country are greater than the ones which he has.

Prime Minister Chou: That I believe.

President Nixon: For example, I do not believe in making a public spectacle of a state gift. I wanted the musk oxen, which I think are a great idea, to be a surprise to the Prime Minister but the zoo keeper called in the press and said I was giving them the minute he heard of this idea. He wanted to get the credit. (Chinese laughter) That of course seems like a small matter, but I’m determined where the fate of our two countries, and possibly the fate of the world is involved, that we can talk in confidence.

Prime Minister Chou: Yes indeed, and since Dr. Kissinger made his first visit to Peking, we have abided by the principle of strict confidence. So we understand that is really quite difficult for you to do that.

President Nixon: In the eight years in which I was Vice President, in the three years I have been President, and in the six years I was a member of Congress, I have never seen a government more meticulous in keeping confidences and more meticulous in keeping agreements than his (the Prime Minister’s) government. It’s difficult, but we want to reciprocate in kind and that’s why we want to keep such iron control. I wish—as I know he will—I hope the Prime Minister would convey that to the Chairman, what I have told to him, because it is very important he (the Chairman) knows this. When I give my word—I don’t give it very often—I want him to know I will keep it.
Now, if I could turn and, as we have discussed, begin with the subject of Taiwan briefly at this point on things regarding which there is no disagreement. I thought we would return to it later, or I’m sure we will want to discuss the issue in more detail.

Dr. Kissinger when he was here stated our agreement to five principles. I completely endorse these principles, and the Prime Minister can count on that no matter what we say on other subjects.

Principle one. There is one China, and Taiwan is a part of China. There will be no more statements made—if I can control our bureaucracy—to the effect that the status of Taiwan is undetermined.

Second, we have not and will not support any Taiwan independence movement.

Third, we will, to the extent we are able, use our influence to discourage Japan from moving into Taiwan as our presence becomes less, and also discourage Japan from supporting a Taiwan independence movement. I will only say here I cannot say what Japan will do, but so long as the U.S. has influence with Japan—we have in this respect the same interests as the Prime Minister’s government—we do not want Japan moving in on Taiwan and will discourage Japan from doing so.

The fourth point is that we will support any peaceful resolution of the Taiwan issue that can be worked out. And related to that point, we will not support any military attempts by the Government on Taiwan to resort to a military return to the Mainland.

Finally, we seek the normalization of relations with the People’s Republic. We know that the issue of Taiwan is a barrier to complete normalization, but within the framework I have previously described we seek normalization and we will work toward that goal and will try to achieve it.

(Prime Minister Chou pauses and offers tea. When he asks Mr. Holdridge if he would like more, the latter replies that he hasn’t had time to start drinking it. President Nixon said he was being kept busy.)

President Nixon: Now, I would add to that, as Dr. Kissinger had pointed out, two-thirds of our present forces on Taiwan are related to the support of our forces in Southeast Asia. These forces, regardless of what we may do here, will be removed as the situation in Southeast Asia is resolved. I have made that decision. And the reduction of the remaining third of our military presence on Taiwan will go forward as progress is made on the peaceful resolution of the problem.

The problem here, Mr. Prime Minister, is not in what we are going to do, the problem is what we are going to say about it. As I said yesterday, my record shows I always do more than I can say, once I have made the decision as to the direction of our policy.
Now with regard to the technical matter of what we can say, I know that Dr. Kissinger and the Prime Minister had long discussions, and I know that Dr. Kissinger and the Deputy Foreign Minister had a discussion on it this morning. I don’t believe it would be useful here to go into the wording here at this point.

I know the Prime Minister also has a problem. This is an issue which basically is an irritant and has a high emotional content and therefore he needs to show progress on the issue. That’s his side, and I recognize this. I am taking that into consideration as to what we can say in the joint communiqué.

Let me in complete candor tell the Prime Minister what my problem is, from a political standpoint. What we say here may make it impossible for me to deliver on what I can do. Our people, from both the right and the left, for different reasons, are watching this particular issue. The left wants this trip to fail, not because of Taiwan but because of the Soviet Union. And the right, for deeply principled ideological reasons, believes that no concessions at all should be made regarding Taiwan. Then there is another group, the people in our country who are obsessed with pro-Indian sentiment, who don’t like the idea of a U.S.–China détente. All of these forces have lines into the various political candidates. And so, what we might find is that they might seize on the language we finally agree upon to attack the whole trip, and you would have the very unholy alliance of the far right, the pro-Soviet left, and pro-Indian left.

Mr. Kissinger: You forgot the pro-Japanese, like our friend, Professor Reischauer.2

President Nixon: I could add there is another strong group, those who are pro-Japan, like Reischauer; not because of Taiwan but because of Japan. He, too, was Dr. Kissinger’s student. (Chou laughs) They hope our movement toward relations with the People’s Republic of China will fail.

Now, the Prime Minister as a sophisticated observer of the American political scene, could very well interpret what I have said as being a self-serving statement, and solely devoted to assuring my political survival. I would simply respond by saying that there is something much more important than whether I am around after November this year or January next year, and that is the whole American–Chinese initiative. That is what is involved.

So what we need to do, and what we are trying to find is language which will meet the Prime Minister’s need, but language which will not give this strong coalition of opponents to the initiative we have

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2 See footnote 3, Document 143.
made, that we have talked about, the opportunity to gang up and say in effect that the American President went to Peking and sold Taiwan down the river.

The difficulty is that as you get into the political campaign, and as critics join in, not because they are for Taiwan but because they oppose the American–Chinese initiative, as they join together, the debate will force both candidates to assure the American public on this issue. This we must not let happen if we can avoid it.

Now I would like to come back to Taiwan with the Prime Minister’s permission, after I have had the opportunity to discuss world views. I know this will take some time. Since Dr. Kissinger and the Deputy Foreign Minister had an interesting conversation today, I want the Prime Minister to know why we seem to say, difficult on this issue. It is not because of a fatuous argument but because we see here a danger to the whole initiative. Our problem is to be clever enough to find language which will meet your need yet does not stir up the animals so much that they gang up on Taiwan and thereby torpedo our initiative. That is our goal.

I will simply sum up by saying I do not want to be forced when I return to the United States, in a press conference or by Congressional leaders, to make a strong basically pro-Taiwan statement because of what has been said here. This is because it will make it very difficult to deliver on the policy which I have already determined I shall follow.

If I could turn now, with the Prime Minister’s permission, to the world scene, this will enable me to put into context my feelings with respect to Japan, Korea, Vietnam and India. I apologize for talking so long.

Prime Minister Chou: No.

President Nixon: . . . but if Mr. Kissinger had 500 pages I must have equal time.3

Prime Minister Chou: Surely. This visit is mainly for the purpose of talks.

President Nixon: Right. I am anxious to hear the Prime Minister talk, but I know he hasn’t had a chance to hear me talk, except through Dr. Kissinger, whose views I support, of course.

The Prime Minister and Chairman Mao are both correct in what they have said in previous years about what my attitude has been on the whole issue of East-West relations. Before 1959, it did seem to us in the U.S. that the socialist world was monolithic, and that the Czar was in Moscow (Prime Minister Chou laughs). Now, during the period of 1960–1968 when I was out of office, I had the opportunity to travel

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3 All ellipses are in the source text.
a great deal in the world and to reach what seemed to me some very sound principles about how the world had changed—conclusions which I summarized in my Kansas City extemporaneous speech.4

Incidentally, that speech was better thought out than the grammar would indicate. I was once talking to Winston Churchill’s son Randolph, who was Churchill’s biographer and who recently died. I had heard Winston Churchill make a brilliant speech without notes and I asked Randolph Churchill with some amazement how in the world Winston Churchill could make such a magnificent speech just off the top of his head. Randolph Churchill answered, and said “Mr. Vice President”—I was Vice President then—”my father spends the best hours of his life writing out his extemporaneous speeches.”

Now, with regard to the situation we now face, what is it that brings China and the U.S. together? For example, we have differences on Taiwan, not in my opinion so significant over the long run but difficult in the short run. We have differences over Southeast Asia. We have different attitudes toward Japan. We have different attitudes toward Korea. Now we say, and most of our rather naive American press buys this line, that the new relationship between China and America is due to the fact we have a basic friendship between our peoples. But speaking here, the Prime Minister knows and I know that friendship—which I feel we do have on a personal basis—cannot be the basis on which an established relationship must rest, not friendship alone. I recall that a professor of law when I was a first-year student said that a contract was only as good as the will of the parties concerned to keep it. As friends, we could agree to some fine language, but unless our national interests would be served by carrying out agreements set forward in that language, it would mean very little.

Now, I come to a point where I find I am in disagreement with the Prime Minister’s analysis of what America’s role in the world should be. Let me say that in terms of pure ideology, if I were in the Prime Minister’s position, as one who deeply believed in the socialist revolution, I would take the same position he took with regard to the United States in his talks with Dr. Kissinger. And publicly I think that the Prime Minister and Chairman Mao have to take that position, that is the U.S. is a great capitalist imperialist power reaching out its hands and it should go home from Asia, home from Europe, and let the democratic forces and liberation forces develop in their own way.

There are some of my advisers who tell me I could win the next election in a landslide if I advocated such a policy, because the American people did not seek this position of a world power and they would

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4 See footnote 13, Document 139.
like to be relieved of maintaining forces in Europe and the burden of maintaining guarantees to various other nations in the world. And some would say why not cut the American defense budget from $80 billion to $40 billion and then we could use the money for domestic purposes to help the poor, rebuild the cities, and all that sort of thing.

I have resisted that—it is what we call the new isolationism for the U.S.—and have barely been able to get a majority on some key votes. I am in an ironic position because I am not a militarist. I don’t want the U.S. to be engaged in conquest around the world, but because as I analyze the situation around the world I see we would be in great danger if we didn’t maintain certain levels of defense, I have had to come down hard for those levels of defense.

Now let me come to the point. I believe the interests of China as well as the interests of the U.S. urgently require that the U.S. maintains its military establishment at approximately its present levels and that the U.S., with certain exceptions which we can discuss later, should maintain a military presence in Europe, in Japan, and of course our naval forces in the Pacific. I believe the interests of China are just as great as those of the U.S. on that point.

Let me make now what I trust will not be taken as an invidious comparison. By religion I am a Quaker, although not a very good one, and I believe in peace. All of my instincts are against a big military establishment and also against military adventures. As I indicated a moment ago, the Prime Minister is one of the world’s leading spokesmen for his philosophy and has to be opposed to powers such as the U.S. maintaining huge military establishments. But each of us had to put the survival of his nation first, and if the U.S. were to reduce its military strength, and if the U.S. were to withdraw from the areas I have described in the world, the dangers to the U.S. would be great—and the dangers to China would be greater.

I do not impugn any motives of the present leaders of the Soviet Union. I have to respect what they say, but I must make policy on the basis of what they do. And in terms of the nuclear power balance, the Soviet Union has been moving ahead at a very alarming rate over the past four years. I have determined that the U.S. must not fall behind, or our shield of protection for Europe, or for some of the nations of the Pacific with which we have treaties, would be worthless.

Then, as I look at the situation with respect to China, as we mentioned yesterday, the Soviet Union has more forces on the Sino–Soviet borders than it has arrayed against the Western Alliance. Now, I think that, as the Prime Minister knows, I have asked Dr. Kissinger to provide a briefing to whomever the Prime Minister designates on very sensitive material, what we know to be totally reliable on both the position of the Soviet forces versus China and also the general nuclear
balance. I suggest that if the Prime Minister could designate, in addition to people on the civilian side, someone such as the Vice Chairman for Military Affairs, (note: Yeh Chien-ying, Vice Chairman of the Military Affairs Mission of the CCP) I believe it would be extremely interesting for him. The meeting place should be highly secret, however, if this could be arranged.

Dr. Kissinger: We have.

President Nixon: O.K.

Now as I see China, and as I look at China’s neighbors, this is what would concern me. I believe Chairman Mao and the Prime Minister when they say that China does not seek to reach out its hands, and that while it will support forces of liberation, it does not seek territory around the world. However, turning to what others may do, and looking to the south, as far as India is concerned, China could probably handle India in a month in the event they went to war. India is no threat to China, but India supported by the Soviet Union is a very present threat to China because China’s ability to move, to deal with respect to India and to take military action would be seriously in question if the Soviet Union, its northern neighbor, was supporting India.

That was why in the recent crisis that was one of the reasons we felt it was very important to call the hand of India in moving against West Pakistan—and we had conclusive evidence that the Prime Minister of India was embarked on such a course—why we had to call their hand and prevent that from happening. In other words, when we took a hard line against India and for Pakistan, we were speaking not just to India or Pakistan but also—and we made them well aware of it—to the Soviet Union.

That brings us back again to my major premise: if the U.S. were in a position of weakness vis-à-vis the Soviet Union, whatever policy the U.S. followed would have much less credence with the Soviet Union. For the U.S. to be able to inhibit the Soviets in areas like the subcontinent, the U.S. must at least be in a position of equality with the Soviet Union.

We took a lot of heat on this policy because, again, we had an unholy alliance against us (Chou laughs)—the pro-Soviet group, and the pro-India group which has an enormous propaganda organization in the U.S., and also what you could call the anti-Pakistan group because they didn’t like the form of government in Pakistan. They charged we were sacrificing India, the second biggest country in the world, because of our desire to go forward with the China initiative. That’s to a certain extent true, because I believe Mr. Prime Minister, it is very important that our policies—and this is one area I think we can agree—that our policies in the subcontinent go together. I do not mean in collusion, but I mean we don’t want to make movement with respect to India and
Pakistan unless you are fully informed, because we believe your interest here is greater than ours. We face a problem here because the question of resuming aid to India, economic aid, will soon arise when I return. A case can be made against this on the grounds that they will be able to release funds from buying arms from the Soviet Union which can then be manufactured in India.

But a very critical question which we have to ask ourselves, the Prime Minister and I, is would it be better for the U.S. to have some relation with India, some influence in India or should we leave the field for the Soviet Union?

Let me use one other example to bear out my argument that a U.S. presence in Asia is in the interest of not just the U.S. but in the interest of China. I think that the Prime Minister in terms of his philosophy has taken exactly the correct position with respect to Japan, for example the U.S. should withdraw its troops, the Treaty between Japan and the U.S. should be abrogated, and Japan should be left to become a neutral country that is unarmed. I think that the Prime Minister has to continue to say that. But I want him to understand why I think strongly that our policy with respect to Japan is in the security interest of his country even though it is opposed to the philosophic doctrine which he espouses.

The U.S. can get out of Japanese waters, but others will fish there. And both China and the U.S. have had very difficult experiences with Japanese militarism. We hope that the situation is changed permanently away from the militarism that has characterized Japanese government in the past. On the other hand, we cannot guarantee it and consequently we feel that if the U.S. were to leave Japan naked, one of two things would happen, both of them bad for China. The Japanese, with their enormously productive economy, their great natural drive and their memories of the war they lost, could well turn toward building their own defenses in the event that the U.S. guarantee were removed. That’s why I say that where Taiwan is concerned, and I would add where Korea is concerned, the U.S. policy is opposed to Japan moving in as the U.S. moves out, but we cannot guarantee that. And if we had no defense arrangement with Japan, we would have no influence where that is concerned.

On the other hand, Japan has the option of moving toward China and it also has the option of moving toward the Soviet Union.

So the point I would summarize on is this. I can say, and I think the Prime Minister will believe me, that the U.S. has no designs on China, that the U.S. will use its influence with Japan and those other countries where we have a defense relationship or provide economic assistance, to discourage policies which would be detrimental to China. But if the U.S. is gone from Asia, gone from Japan, our protests, no
matter how loud, would be like—to use the Prime Minister’s phrase—firing an empty cannon; we would have no rallying effect because fifteen thousand miles away is just too far to be heard.

Now I realize that I have painted here a picture which makes me sound like an old cold warrior (Prime Minister Chou laughs). But it is the world as I see it, and when we analyze it, it is what brings us, China and America, together; not in terms of philosophy, not in terms of friendship—although I believe that is important—but because of national security I believe our interests are in common in the respects I have mentioned.

I will just close by saying that after this analysis I would not want to leave the impression that the U.S. is not going to try to go to the source of the trouble, the Soviet Union, and try to make any agreements that will reduce the common danger. Our policy will be completely open and frank with China. Since Dr. Kissinger’s visit, we have informed his (Prime Minister Chou’s) government completely with respect to the contacts we have had with the Soviets. When we have had my meeting in Moscow, if the Prime Minister agrees, I would like to have Dr. Kissinger come and report personally to the Prime Minister on what we have discussed and what agreements we reached in Moscow. We are going to try, for example, to get an arms limitation agreement and also make progress on the Middle East if that subject is still before us.

But the most important fact to bear in mind is that as far as China and the U.S. are concerned, if the U.S. were to follow a course of weakening its defense, of withdrawing totally or almost exclusively into the U.S., the world would be much more dangerous in my view. The U.S. has no aggressive intent against any other country; we have made our mistakes in the past. And I do not charge that the Soviet Union has any aggressive interests against any other country in the world, but in terms of the safety of these nations which are not superpowers in the world, they will be much safer if there are two superpowers, rather than just one.

I have taken too much of the Prime Minister’s time, but I wanted him to get the feel of my general philosophy on these points.

Prime Minister Chou: (in English): Thank you.

(Prime Minister Chou then suggested a ten minute recess and the President agreed this was a good idea. During the recess, from 3:50 to 4:00 p.m. there was light talk, including the difficulty of translating Chairman Mao’s poems.)

Prime Minister Chou: I would like to thank Mr. President for your rather comprehensive introduction to your views and your line of action.
Of course, some of that was already said by Mr. Kissinger before. But to hear it directly from Mr. President has enabled us to have a clearer understanding of your views and to know them more clearly.

Of course, the world outlooks of our two sides are different, basically different, which we do not cover up. But that should not hinder state relations between our two countries from moving toward normalcy, because owing to the interests of a state during a certain period of time one is able to find common ground.

As for the fact that peoples of various countries want progress, and to move forward, neither the Chinese Government nor the American Government can do anything about that. It is not a matter for us; it is a matter for posterity. As Mr. President has said, you wanted to strive for a generation of peace, but can only talk about the present generation.

President Nixon: But it would be longer than (the era of) Metternich.
Prime Minister Chou: But I didn’t agree with the view of Dr. Kissinger in his book, and we had a discussion on it.
President Nixon: It was very interesting.
Prime Minister Chou: The times are different.

Dr. Kissinger: I told the Prime Minister I had enough difficulty discussing American foreign policy without concerning myself with Austrian foreign policy.

President Nixon: It was a brilliant debate.
Prime Minister Chou: So this question arises, that is, in view of the current interests of our two countries, there is the possibility we may find common ground. But this common ground must be truly reliable. It should not be a structure built upon sand, because that structure will not be able to stand.

And so Mr. President just now has made a description of the world scene, and the situation of the world, as we have said on previous occasions, is a situation of upheaval in the twenty-six years or so since the Second World War and this situation is increasing, not decreasing. Of course, as we have said, a worldwide war did not break out during this interval, but local wars have never stopped. And so the question arises as the President put it, there can be no vacuum in the world. But here again arises a question of philosophy.

For example, with respect to China after the Second World War; according to the Yalta Agreements, the U.S. was the principal country having a sphere of influence in China, whereas the Soviet Union only had a partial sphere of influence, in some parts of China.

(There was a brief interruption as snacks were served and Prime Minister Chou reported that Wang Hai-jung had told him that TV pictures of the Nixon–Mao meeting had already been transcribed. There
was some blurring because the Chinese cameramen found the equipment too heavy and shook and thus the pictures were not very clear. Also since the meeting was on the spur of the moment, they were not at all prepared and thus were very tense.)

Prime Minister Chou: Shall we continue?

So the situation at that time, immediately after the Second World War, was clearly stipulated by those agreements. What is more Chiang Kai-shek had a treaty with the Soviet Union at that time, which also was called the Sino–Soviet Treaty of Friendship and Alliance. It was to last for twenty years. In addition, according to the agreements reached at Yalta, Chiang Kai-shek recognized the independence of Outer Mongolia, which is now called as the People’s Republic of Outer Mongolia. Now, however Chiang Kai-shek says he regrets very much the establishment of diplomatic relations between Japan and the People’s Republic of Mongolia. I would like to write a letter to Chiang Kai-shek to ask him who signed the agreements providing independence for Outer Mongolia.

At that time, Lady Cripps of Britain\(^4\) went to Yenan and met Chairman Mao. Chairman Mao asked her why you powers were interested in drawing up spheres of influence. She said she could do nothing about it, but Britain was on the downgrade. And so as I saw it at that time, the situation was fixed as it then was.

Then, as the President probably recalls, the U.S. sent Ambassador Hurley\(^5\) to China to mediate between the KMT and the Chinese Communist Party, who advocated the establishment of a coalition government. And later President Truman sent General Marshall as an envoy to mediate.\(^6\) At that time, Ambassador Hurley was quite enthusiastic. Besides he had the courage to draw up a provisional coalition government and sign those articles with me in Yenan. (Prime Minister Chou laughs.)

After that, Chairman Mao immediately sent me off to Chungking, because I was already the representative of the Chinese Communist

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\(^4\) Lady Isobel Cripps, wife of Sir Stafford Cripps, was a World War II-era British Labour politician and Minister of Aircraft Production. She visited Mao and Chou in Yenan in 1946.

\(^5\) Patrick J. Hurley was Presidential envoy to China (1944) and Ambassador to China (1944–1945).

\(^6\) President Truman sent General George C. Marshall to China in November 1946 as a special envoy to negotiate a cease-fire between Chiang Kai-shek’s Nationalist troops and the Chinese Communist forces. Cease-fire was declared in 1946 but political and military questions stalemated the peace negotiations. Marshall returned to the United States in early 1947 without reaching a solution.
Party in Chungking, to continue negotiations. But Chiang Kai-shek didn’t agree. President Truman’s reasons for having Ambassador Hurley act as he did was because Stalin had told him that you should advise the Chinese Communist Party to join in a coalition with the KMT. As for us, the Chinese Communist Party, the Soviet Union gave us no help at all. We had no contact with them at that time. We didn’t even know about the Yalta Agreement. We learned of the terms of the Yalta Agreement quite late. In fact, we learned them from the KMT side. Since Chiang Kai-shek opposed establishment, the coalition government couldn’t be established. Then General Marshall came, and the history of that is mostly published in Acheson’s White Paper. At that time, Mr. Chang Wen-chin was my interpreter, my assistant. We engaged in negotiations with them (the KMT) for one year and signed all sorts of things, but to no effect. What happened then was that Civil War broke out and still continues. The U.S. sided with Chiang Kai-shek because of your state relations with him, which we understand.

But what were the results? The results were, as Mr. President said in one of his campaign statements, the Truman Administration lost a country of 600 million. Well, having lost China a new relationship could have been established. The fact, however, was that at the beginning the Truman Government admitted that they had no territorial ambitions against China, including Taiwan. But because of his suspicions and his belief that it might be possible for Chiang Kai-shek to make a comeback, he did put that into effect (establish a new relationship), and the result was that he sent the Seventh Fleet into the Taiwan Straits.

From that the policy of the Truman Administration developed to the point of Dulles’ signing a treaty with Taiwan at the end of 1954 which was ratified at the beginning of 1955.\(^7\)

There is still a question now which the State Department often have replied to (Prime Minister Chou laughs) that is to say, the Committee for a Free China organized by Walter Judd, the organizer of the Committee of One Million. Walter Judd’s Chinese name is Chou Yi-de, so my surname and Judd’s are the same.

The development of history shows that there was no vacuum in China. The U.S. forces left China, the Soviet forces, too, left China, and the Chinese people themselves filled up the vacuum. Therefore, if we really believe in the people, and believe people can liberate themselves, then there can be no real vacuum appearing. The biggest change after the Second World War was the liberation of China.

In your campaign speech, Mr. President, although you did complain about the dangers of the Truman policy, you also recognized the

realities of China, the success of the Chinese people. It was because of that we are meeting today. The situation in China today is like what it was almost two-hundred years ago—you talk of the Spirit of ’76—when the British Colonial forces were driven out of America, and the American people themselves filled up the vacuum. That is one way of looking at things.

I would like to ask Mr. President a question, because Mr. President pointed out possible dangers. We too have taken note of these dangers. But what is the best way out? Should we do it by expanding armaments mutually? There is an old Chinese saying that as the tide rises the boat also rises. You have made public your military expenditures. The Soviet Union does not make public its military expenditures. There is no question that the percentage of their budget for military expenditures is no less than yours. Otherwise how is it that the life of the Soviet people is so bad, and the agriculture situation is so bad. They can’t say it was only bad weather. (President Nixon laughs.) Agricultural production in Canada is not bad at all although the weather there is the same as the Soviet Union. So they cannot explain by the weather, but because the Soviets use the greater part of their budget on military expenditures.

As for disarmament conference, there have been many dozens but no result whatever. The Soviet proposal at the UN was only to deceive people, so Mr. Ch’iao Kuan-hua expressed our position on it and Czar Malik was thrown into a frenzy, with the result that this proposal was postponed. Nevertheless, the Soviets asked the UN General Assembly to vote to express appreciation for their proposal.

Now both of you keep on expanding armaments like this, what will be the result. It will only be war. Of course, it may not necessarily be a nuclear war, but could start as a small-scale conventional war which could develop into a larger scale conventional war. Of course, if you two big powers can get an agreement limiting armaments, that would be good. We don’t have the least opposition to the improvement of relations between the United States and Soviet Union.

Dr. Kissinger can bear testimony to that fact. We even suggested that Mr. President visit the Soviet Union first and then us. That is what Chairman Mao wanted me to tell Dr. Kissinger, that is to say that if you felt there was advantage in visiting the Soviet Union first, you could. When I say advantages to you, it doesn’t mean a unilateral advantage, but to both sides and to the world as a whole.

But now, Mr. President, you first came to China, and Moscow is carrying on like anything. But let them go on. We don’t care. They are mobilizing a whole mass of their people, their followers, to curse us. What we are concerned about is that you two big powers spend so much money on arms expansion. What does this mean for the future of the world, the far reaching results?
The worst possibility is what I told Dr. Kissinger in the record of our proceedings, that is to say the eventuality that you all would attack China—the Soviet Union comes from the north, Japanese and the U.S. from the east, and India into China’s Tibet. Under these circumstances, of course, our people would have to make terrific sacrifices. But it is also possible under these circumstances that the question could be solved. Of course, that’s talking only about the worst possible contingency. But just as Dr. Kissinger and Mr. President have said, there is no conflict between our two countries; there is no necessity for our interests to conflict or for the U.S. to occupy Chinese territory, even though on philosophy our two sides differ and we have the slogan, “Down with U.S. Imperialism.” Chairman Mao mentioned this yesterday that it is just “empty cannon.” Dr. Kissinger knows the phrase.

Dr. Kissinger: The Vice Minister knows it now too.

Prime Minister Chou: And Mr. Bush. But even despite that Malik and the Soviet Union are cursing us, saying that there is a synchronized duet between the U.S. and the PRC.

President Nixon: Let me interrupt to pay a compliment to the Vice Minister. The most effective thing he did was at one point when Malik talked, he just smiled at him. That drove him nuts. (Prime Minister Chou laughs)

Prime Minister Chou: You saw that on T.V.? So you have that advantage over us. We didn’t see it here. On these matters we are still backward and we admit our backwardness. We don’t have the idea we’re number one in the world. One thing Chairman Mao constantly teaches us is that once one thinks one is number one under heaven one is bound to suffer defeat. Because no matter what people or what nation, that people and that nation are bound to have shortcomings. Similarly, that people and that country are bound to have strong points. Dr. Kissinger has said that Vietnam, although a small country, has a great people. Only in this way can one have a sense of reality.

So proceeding from these considerations, if one country tries to gain superiority over another merely through expansion of armaments, there will be no end to it.

You’re in a very important position vis-à-vis that question. You have said you have no intention to dominate the world, nor have you any territorial designs. You want to see peace in the world and first of all see a relaxation of tensions. We believe that this indeed reflects a genuine desire of your people.

But as to whether the U.S. will completely revert to isolationism, I don’t think that is possible, because the times have changed and are no longer the times of the beginning of the twentieth century. Speaking quite candidly, so-called isolationism these days is not real isolationism but merely a desire to see that other countries don’t meddle in
the affairs of the Americas. Mr. President, you are quite right when you said that the Chinese people couldn’t understand either the Monroe Doctrine or the Open Door Policy.

The question is now of great importance not only to Sino–American relations but to the future of the world. Since neither China nor the U.S. has any territorial ambitions on the other and neither side wishes to dominate the other, and what is more, each wants to make some contribution to the relaxation of tensions in the world, then we should see to it first of all where there is a possibility for relaxation of tensions in the Far East. Because we are not in a position to look into the possibility of other parts of the world; they are too far away from us. If we were to do that, it would only give rise to new troubles. Our help to the African people is only a very small part of our efforts. So we will only talk about the situation around us, and the crucial question then is the question of Indochina.

On this question, only the Indochinese people themselves have the right to speak, to negotiate with you. But as the Indochinese area is of concern to us we should have the right to raise our voice on that matter. What’s more we have the obligation to give the Indochinese peoples assistance and support. I said this to Dr. Kissinger on a number of occasions.

Since the U.S. had decided to withdraw all of its forces from Vietnam and the whole of Indochina, and the U.S. would like to see the region more or less neutral, that is to say, non-aligned, with no particular force occupying that region, then if that is the President’s policy and that of your Government, I think it would be better to take more bold action. Otherwise, you would only facilitate the Soviets in furthering their influence there. As for us, we are not afraid of that eventuality because whatever our help to Vietnam, Laos, and Cambodia, we have never asked for special privileges, and we have never interfered in their internal affairs.

We have not even looked at their different ideology. For example, Prince Sihanouk’s ideology is Buddhist and we respect him. The ideology of Vietnam, too, may not necessarily be completely the same as ours, but we have never interfered in their ideology.

So in this sense the later you withdraw from Indochina, the more you’ll be in a passive position, and although your interest is to bring about an honorable conclusion of the war, the result would be to the contrary. You admitted that General DeGaulle acted wisely when he withdrew from Algeria. In fact, General DeGaulle even withdrew more than two million European inhabitants from Algeria, an action which we didn’t dare to envision, and to have withdrawn in such a short space of time. And General DeGaulle encountered great opposition at home. But maybe because he was a soldier his life might actually be
different from that of yours, Mr. President. I know Mr. President appreciated Mr. Patton. Of course, you didn’t appreciate his desire to attack Russia, but you appreciated him for his daring and for his doing what he thought was right.

Maybe these words of mine are superfluous in trying to persuade you, Mr. President, but I want to make my views clear. It is easier for us to discuss other matters. I appreciate that on this matter we don’t see eye to eye. As Dr. Kissinger told us, on this our attitude is even stronger than Vietnam.

Dr. Kissinger: Than the Soviet Union.

Prime Minister Chou: It’s clear what they say doesn’t count. I believe it is possible for you to take bolder action, and you would only gain a better feeling. Because if peace can be brought about in that region at an earlier date, then you’ll be able to maintain more influence there.

The French have something else in mind. The French are thinking to bring the U.S. and the Soviet Union together in some form of international conference for détente. But that would not do. You don’t approve either?

President Nixon: I think that is a moot question.

Prime Minister Chou: When I consider the form of the Geneva Agreements,8 my conclusion is that this was a mistake.

President Nixon: 1954?

Prime Minister Chou: Yes. At that time we were taken in by agreeing to sign. The result for you was that the U.S. was drawn into a quagmire. At that time, President Eisenhower brought about the end of the Korean War—quite a courageous action of President Eisenhower. But President Eisenhower didn’t expect that Dulles would lead him into the morass of Indochina, and have America sink in it.

How is it conceivable that a country could enter into an agreement and not sign? You said you would live up to the agreements, but actually disturbed them. The result was the elections that were supposed to take place two years afterwards were not realized, and if they had been held, even without international supervision it goes without saying that Ho Chi Minh would have been elected throughout the country. He was a very old friend of mine—I knew him in France in 1922. If Ho Chi Minh had led the whole of Vietnam, the relations between the whole of Vietnam and the U.S. could not have deteriorated, and may have been much better.

But history twists and turns, just like the history of our two countries, in which after twenty-two years we are meeting again. That’s history, and there are many examples of this. But if the U.S. Government would take a very bold move in Indochina you would gain very good feelings on the part of the Indochinese people. As to how to resolve this issue I can’t say, since we do not take part in the negotiations nor do we want to take part. Our position is that so long as you are continuing your Vietnamization, Laoization, and Cambodianization policy, and they continue fighting, we can do nothing but to continue to support them.

But I would like, Mr. President, to take note of the fact that our policies of assistance to the countries of Indochina, that is Vietnam and other peoples of Indochina, differ from that regarding Korea. Why did we send the Chinese peoples [as] volunteers during the Korean War? Because Truman compelled us. He sent the Seventh Fleet in to the Taiwan Straits so that it wasn’t possible for us to recover Taiwan. What was more, his troops pressed straight toward the boundary of the Yalu River, and we declared at that time that if the American forces pressed toward the Yalu River, although China was newly liberated, we could not stand idly by. So when Truman’s forces came to the Yalu River, we had to show that what even we say counts. We couldn’t be sure, though, that we would win, because the Soviets were not willing to send forces. You are quite clear about that.

The end result was that when President Eisenhower took office, he realized the war should be brought to an end. But the loss of lives and material losses you suffered in Korea is incomparably less than in Vietnam. No one expected that. Rather than spending so much effort in a war of contention in such a localized area, you should adopt a most courageous attitude and withdraw when you should.

The Taiwan question can be discussed rather easily. For example, the five point program you mentioned was told to us by General Haig on instructions from the President, and the President reiterated it just now. We have already waited over twenty years—I am very frank here—and can wait a few more years. I can go a step further. Even when Taiwan comes back to the Motherland, we will not establish any nuclear bases there. Mr. President knows more about it than I. What use is there to establish nuclear bases in a place like that? Only the Soviets continue to hold four islands north of Japan. They will either hang on or maybe sell. What’s more, their condition for a peace treaty with Japan is that Hokkaido cannot be defended. We can tell Mr. President in advance, and also Japan, that when Taiwan returns to the Motherland we will not establish bases there. What use are they? We have no desire to send one single soldier abroad. We have no design on the territory of others. So why establish bases there? Our purpose is merely self-defense.
The most pressing question now is Indochina, which the whole world is watching. So in making your present visit, the Democratic Party tried to put you on the spot on this question by alleging that you came to China to settle Vietnam. Of course this is not possible. We are not in a position to settle it in talks. Of course, we can have an exchange of views on the matter in which we can proceed from a relaxation of tensions in the Far East and proceed in the interest of relaxation of tensions throughout the world. As Mr. President didn’t say much on this, I would like to hear your views. Possibly Mr. President has different views on these questions. As for the other questions, we can discuss them tomorrow. I would like to hear your views (on this) now.

President Nixon: On Vietnam?

Prime Minister Chou: Indochina as a whole.

President Nixon: Mr. Prime Minister, the problem of Vietnam is one that no longer should divide us. The Prime Minister has suggested that if we could move more quickly this would be a wise, and as he points out, courageous thing to do. This is a possibility which we have considered, but is one on balance which we feel we must reject.

Let’s look in terms of how quickly we are moving. We now have less than 100,000 [troops]. We have already removed our forces to less than 100,000, and in mid-April I will make another announcement regarding reduction of forces. We therefore would be at a point where we are only talking about two or three more months before the American role, insofar as our presence in Vietnam is concerned, will be finished, unless, of course, the problem of our prisoners is still outstanding. The difficulty we now confront is not simply ending American involvement by the withdrawal of our forces, which is now a foregone conclusion and only a matter of a few months, but the difficulty now is the question of bringing peace to the whole of Indochina, including Laos and Cambodia. That is why we believe the offer I made in October and reiterated in January is one which should be given serious consideration by the North Vietnamese.

Let me cut away the eight points, five points, and thirteen points, etc. and come right down to what our offer really is. If I were sitting across the table from whoever is the leader of North Vietnam and we could negotiate a ceasefire and the return of our prisoners, all Americans would be withdrawn from Vietnam six months from that day. And let me also point out that while we’re willing to settle on that basis, when this was suggested to the North Vietnamese as far back as the middle of last year, they rejected it and always insisted there had to be a settlement in which we had to impose a political settlement as well as to resolve the military side.

I couldn’t agree more with the Prime Minister’s view, to let the political decision be made by the people of those countries themselves.
without outside interference. We have already offered that. We have offered to withdraw all Americans, with no “tail” behind—to use the Prime Minister’s expression—and to have a ceasefire throughout Indochina provided we get our prisoners back. Then we would let the decision be made by the people there. But the North Vietnamese insist that we not only make a military settlement, they want us to impose a political future and remove the existing government and impose a government which basically would be one of their choice. That we can’t do.

I greatly respect the Prime Minister’s views on this subject because this is simply an issue on which the only gainer in having the war continue is the Soviet Union. They want the U.S. tied down. They, of course, want to get more and more influence in North Vietnam as a result. From all the intelligence we get they—should we say—even be egging on the North Vietnamese to hold out and not settle.

I should also say that we realize we may not reach agreement on this, and who knows who’s right? We think we are right. As the Prime Minister knows, I have great respect for General DeGaulle’s resolution of the terribly difficult and wrenching Algerian experience. But what happened between France and Algeria only affected France and Algeria. France is a great country, but France at this time is no longer a world power.

If the U.S. were not only to get out of Vietnam—which we are going to do through the policy of Vietnamization in a few months in any event—but get out and at the same time join those who have been our enemies to overthrow those who have been our allies, the U.S. would in my view, perhaps be permanently destroyed insofar as being a country which any other nation could depend upon.

I realize there are views to the contrary, but when a nation is in a position the U.S. is in, where around the world, in Europe for instance, there are nations that depend on the U.S.A. for their defense, if the U.S. does not behave honorably—and I don’t believe dying for honor is enough—if the U.S. does not behave honorably, the U.S. would cease to be a nation to have as a friend and which the people of the world could depend upon as an ally.

The point that the Prime Minister has raised here is one which neither of us is going to convince the other, and I respect his point of view. I hope he can understand our policy is one which is truly designed to bring about an end of the war, not only for the people of Vietnam but for all of Southeast Asia as quickly as possible. I think it is very important for the Prime Minister to know this, because I don’t want to leave any false impressions: the negotiating track is open, and as I indicated, we are willing to negotiate a settlement on military issues alone, if they are willing, to negotiate a general political settlement in
which Thieu would resign and an impartial commission would run the elections. If, in answer to our proposals, North Vietnam chooses to step up the fighting, I have no choice and the action I take is apt to be very strong. This is my record, and that is what it’s going to be so that other nations in the world know that the U.S. will react strongly if tested.

There is also something else very important for North Vietnam to consider. When we talk about Vietnamization, that’s the longer road. It does envisage the withdrawal of U.S. forces over a period of time, months, but on the other hand, if we are talking about total withdrawal, no residual force, that is something they are going to have to negotiate about—we’re not just going to walk out of there without an agreement.

I should point out also that there are no American forces in Cambodia and no American forces in Laos. It’s true that in relation to our policy in Vietnam we’ve found it necessary to use U.S. air action against North Vietnamese forces in both countries. If North Vietnam would withdraw its forces from Cambodia and Laos at least the war would end for those two countries, and let the people determine their own future.

The U.S. is prepared, just in conclusion, to provide a very heavy economic assistance to Cambodia, Laos, and North Vietnam for rehabilitation, and to South Vietnam in the event a settlement is made. We don’t want to leave a tail behind. We don’t want bases. And we would accept the idea the Prime Minister referred to as a neutralized area. On the other hand, it takes two to make a deal.

We really feel if our offer were seriously studied, it would be seen that we have gone very far indeed to settle military issues only and let historical processes decide or settle military and political matters in which the issue would be taken to the South Vietnamese; we would hope there would be elections. Here the situation would be very different from 1954 because here we would guarantee the elections and they would be supervised by an impartial body set up and guaranteed by outside powers.

The Prime Minister is very perceptive to note that some of my political opponents have created the impression that I am coming to see the Prime Minister in order to settle the war in Vietnam. (Prime Minister Chou laughs.) Let me say I want him to know in all candor that we, of course, would welcome any moves, any influence to get negotiations. We don’t expect anything, however, and if we cannot get any assistance we understand. We shall proceed to deal with North Vietnam in the way I have suggested. This will be a longer and harder road for them, much harder than for us. There is the shorter road of negotiations if they prefer.

Prime Minister Chou: Probably it is not easy for us to make these things very clear quickly. I have discussed this matter with Dr.
Kissinger on many occasions. We can only remain in a position of supporting them and not speaking on their behalf. I understand the joint communiqué has been discussed?

President Nixon: Yes, I believe the communiqué draft is in very good order.

This (Vietnam) is one of the ironic situations where the U.S. will be equally damned by both the People’s Republic and the Soviet Union. (Prime Minister Chou laughs)

Dr. Kissinger: Except the People’s Republic wants the war to end and the Soviet Union wants the war to continue.

President Nixon: Yes.

Prime Minister Chou: Yes.

The President: We can be very honest in this conversation. I understand the Prime Minister’s position. We noted the Prime Minister’s comments before coming and know that this is an irritant in our relations. I want to assure the Prime Minister I am removing this irritant as fast as anyone in my position could. My predecessor sent in 500,000 men into Vietnam, and I’ve taken 500,000 out. I will end American involvement—it’s a matter of time. I can speak with certainty on this point. All we are really talking about is whether we can hasten the process, not by our moving out in a precipitate way, but by agreement.

We can—if I can put it quite directly—we will withdraw, we are withdrawing, but what we cannot do—and we believe this very strongly—we cannot remove the government of South Vietnam and in effect turn over the government to the North Vietnamese. That we cannot do. We believe they can have a fair chance to do it through what we regard as a fair election. But we are not going to withdraw and go one step further and remove the government of South Vietnam and turn it over to North Vietnam. That we cannot do. The U.S. then would be a nation which would, in my opinion, deserve nothing but contempt before the people and nations of the world, whatever their philosophies.

Prime Minister Chou: That is still your old saying—you don’t want to cast aside old friends. But you have already cast aside many old friends. Of these, some might be good friends and some might be bad friends, but you should choose your friends carefully. (PM Chou laughs.) That again is a question of philosophy. For example, Mr. President, you asked me yesterday if Chiang Kai-shek was an old friend, and I said he was even an older friend of ours than yours. I cooperated with Chiang Kai-shek once. I also quarreled with him and fought against him. Chiang Kai-shek still believes in one China. That’s a good point which we can make use of. That’s why we can say that this question can be settled comparatively easily.

As for Vietnam, you went there by accident. Why not give this up? Vietnam is different from Korea because Korea was indeed divided into
North and South by the results of the war. According to the terms the Soviet forces went north and you went south. I don’t recall whether this was a result of the Potsdam Agreement or what. It would be beneficial for the relaxation of tensions in the Far East to bring about a nonaligned Southeast Asia.

The President: I believe that will eventually happen. It is a question of . . .

Prime Minister Chou: You have this confidence? But if the Soviet Union goes in and you two big powers contend there, then there can be no talk of relaxation. The American government made public that reason when you increased your military expenditures. Now you have realized that we pose no threat to you, and as for us, you have no reason to believe that we have territorial designs in Southeast Asia.

The President: We have no designs on the territory of Southeast Asia either.

Prime Minister Chou: But you are tied down by the South Vietnamese regime. Actually that regime has nothing to do with your former treaties. You worked it out with Bao Dai. But according to the Dulles method you had Bao Dai represented by Diem.

The President: Bao Dai was out hunting lions.

Prime Minister Chou: Then you worked with Diem and his brother. He and his brother went to see God. These fellows are not reliable. If the U.S. really wants to create a good impression in the world, you don’t need these so-called friends. You may say that if you withdraw your influence from the area a vacuum is created and the Soviet Union will fill it up. The fact is, the later you move out, the more serious the contention there, and another Middle East will develop. Then that will be another extension of tension from the Mediterranean to the Middle East to the Indian Ocean to the Subcontinent to Southeast Asia to the South China Sea.

If the war in Indochina continues we will, of course, continue our aid to them because what we say counts, but we will not get involved unless, of course, you attack us. So tensions will continue there and, under those circumstances, how can you talk about a relaxation of tensions? When I first met Dr. Kissinger he said you wanted relaxation of tension. You must start somewhere.

The situation in Japan is different from Southeast Asia. That’s another matter.

The President: If I may interrupt. Before the Prime Minister goes on to that subject, I would only add that we have our proposal on the table now at Paris, and will continue to press it. We believe it is a fair proposition, and we think it would be in the interest of the relaxation of tension and very helpful if the North Vietnamese were to finally
negotiate. I don’t ask the Prime Minister to do anything about it, and certainly not do anything about it publicly. I would simply say we want a relaxation of tension. We don’t want bases.

This is quite different from what I am sure the Prime Minister is going to say about Japan.

Prime Minister Chou: Let us conclude our discussion today. We still have to have dinner before going to the performance tonight.

The President: I want to say to the Prime Minister that I very much appreciated his frankness on these issues. Of course, I have tried on my part to give him my feeling of my own views on these issues. I believe that this kind of discussion these next few days will show that where great issues are involved our interests will bring us together. That is why I believe we can find understandings which will be very important for the rest of the world.

Prime Minister Chou: At least on issues which are important for the Far East.

The President: Just as a historic note—who can be a prophet these days?—I think that looking ahead for the next twenty-five years, peace in the Pacific is going to be the key to peace in the world, there being a relative balance in Europe. The Middle East is a candidate (PM Chou laughs). But I believe the Pacific is the key, and that is why our meetings are so important for the whole world.

Prime Minister Chou: When you say a generation, does that mean twenty-five years maybe?

The President: I am using it in the sense that we are one generation since World War II and in that period we in the U.S. have had two wars, in Korea and Vietnam. I’m not so presumptuous as to look beyond twenty-five years—if I can see twenty-five years ahead, that is as far ahead as I can see. And also, Mr. Prime Minister, I have often referred to the fact that every generation of Americans in this century has experienced wars—World War I, for the first generation; World War II, for the second generation; Korea in the 1950s; and Vietnam in the 1960s. I think four wars in a century is enough. (PM Chou laughs).

Prime Minister Chou: It should be so. That’s why we also think there should be a way to solve armaments expansion.

The President: This is one subject I would like to take up at a later meeting. One reason we are pursuing the matter with the Soviet Union on limits to arms is that we believe a breakthrough in this area is essential if we are going to avoid an arms race.

Prime Minister Chou: Too much money has been spent on it. Our posterities will condemn us for such huge wastes.

President Nixon: Yes.
Prime Minister Chou: That is why we say we are only in the first stage. We don’t want to spend too much money. You probably took note of this.

President Nixon: Yes.

Prime Minister Chou: We say that in a very honest way. We don’t wish to expand.

The President: I understand. In terms of world peace, I would say that a strong China is in the interests of world peace at this point. I don’t mean to suggest that China should change its policy and become a superpower. But a strong China can help provide the balance of power in this key part of the world—that is desperately needed. Then, too, I have a selfish reason—if China could become a second superpower, the US could reduce its own armaments. (PM Chou laughs.)

Prime Minister Chou: You have too much confidence in us. We don’t want to.

We can meet again tomorrow at 2:00 p.m.

197. Memorandum of Conversation

Beijing, February 23, 1972, 2–6 p.m.

PARTICIPANTS

The President
Dr. Henry A. Kissinger, Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs
John H. Holdridge, NSC Staff
Winston Lord, NSC Staff
Prime Minister Chou En-lai
Ch’iao Kuan-hua, Vice Minister of Foreign Affairs
Chang Wen-chin, Director of Western Europe, North American, and Australasian Affairs, Ministry of Foreign Affairs
Wang Hai-jung, Deputy Director of Protocol
Chao Chi-hua, Ministry of Foreign Affairs
Chi Chao-chu, Interpreter
T’ang Wen-sheng, Interpreter
Two Notetakers

1 Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, White House Special Files, President’s Office Files, Box 87, Memoranda for the President. Top Secret; Sensitive; Exclusively Eyes Only. The meeting was held in the President’s Guest House.
(There were some opening pleasantries in which Prime Minister Chou asked about Mrs. Nixon and the President said she was fine. He added that she had been impressed with the acupuncture demonstrations she had seen. The President noted that there were forecasts of snow and asked if they would get to the Great Wall the next day. Chou responded yes.

Chou then referred to a mural hanging in the room painted in 1935 which depicted a battle in which the Chinese Communists won a big victory over Chiang Kai-shek, a very great turning point. The battle was near Tsunyi, in Kweichow province, after which the Communist forces marched west into Yunnan. In response to the President’s question of whether this was the battle in which the Communists crossed the river, Prime Minister Chou said this occurred later. Prime Minister Chou then proceeded to describes the battle and the various maneuvers used by the Communists to achieve victory. He gave a very detailed and precise rendition of the military maneuvers, describing the battle with great vigor and arm movements.)

President Nixon: Did Chairman Mao make all the strategic and tactical decisions or did he have a staff organization?

Prime Minister Chou: Yes. I could be considered one of the members of his staff at that time. But it was Chairman Mao who took the initiative on how far we should march every day and where we should stay at night. Chairman Mao made all the strategic decisions.

President Nixon: We hope we have no necessity of facing you in battle after hearing that description.

Prime Minister Chou: I don’t think that will happen. I hope it won’t.

President Nixon: It won’t.

Prime Minister Chou: You know our policy. We don’t disguise our policy. We of course support revolutions waged by the peoples of the world, but we don’t send a single soldier abroad. The revolution of any country must depend on the people of their country.

That was the case with George Washington, in your eight-year war of independence. Of course, at that time you had the assistance of the volunteers of Lafayette; they were not troops sent by the State of France. Also Abraham Lincoln in his Civil War had volunteers. He was defeated in many battles, but he was finally able to turn the tide of battle. He was able because he relied on the people. He had three phrases about the people. If something is really important, we then can really mobilize the people.

And although our philosophies differ, we think in managing our state relations we should act in accordance with the five principles of peaceful coexistence that I mentioned yesterday at the banquet.
Actually the five principles were put forward by us, and Nehru\(^2\) agreed. But later on he didn’t implement them. In my previous discussions with Dr. Kissinger, I mentioned a book by Neville Maxwell about the Indian war against us, which proves this.\(^3\)

President Nixon: I read the book.

Dr. Kissinger: I gave it to the President.

President Nixon: I committed a faux pas—Dr. Kissinger said it was—but I knew what I was doing. When Mrs. Gandhi was in my office before going back, just before the outbreak of the war, I referred to that book and said it was a very interesting account of the beginning of the war between India and China. She didn’t react very favorably when I said that (Chou laughs).

Prime Minister Chou: Yes, but you spoke the truth. It wasn’t a faux pas. Actually that event was instigated by Khrushchev.

President Nixon: You think it was? Khrushchev?

Prime Minister Chou: He encouraged them. Mr. Holdridge probably knows this. He has studied it.

Mr. Holdridge: I can remember the editorial that came out in the press.

Prime Minister Chou: In looking at 1962, the events actually began in 1959. Why did he go to Camp David? In June of that year, before he went to Camp David, he unilaterally tore up the nuclear agreements between China and the Soviet Union. And after that there were clashes between Chinese and Indian troops in the western part of Sinkiang, the Ak-sai Chin area. In that part of Sinkiang province there is a high plateau. The Indian-occupied territory was at the foot of the Karakorums, and the disputed territory was on the slope between.

Dr. Kissinger: It’s what they call Ladakh.

President Nixon: They attacked up the mountain.

Prime Minister Chou: We fought them and beat them back, with many wounded. But the TASS Agency said that China had committed aggression against India. After saying that, Khrushchev went to Camp David. And after he came back from Camp David he went to Peking, where he had a banquet in the Great Hall of the People. The day after the banquet he went to see Chairman Mao. Our two sides met in a meeting.

\(^2\) Pandit Jawaharlal Nehru, former Prime Minister of India.

At that time our Foreign Minister was Marshal Chen Yi, who has now passed away. Marshal Chen Yi asked him: “Why didn’t you ask us before releasing your news account? Why did you rely on the Indian press over the Chinese press? Wasn’t that a case of believing in India more than us, a fraternal country?”

And what did Khrushchev say? “You are a Marshal and I am only a Lieutenant General, so I will not debate with you.” He was also soured, and did not shake hands when he left. But he had no answer to that. He was slightly more polite to me.

President Nixon: To the Prime Minister?

Prime Minister Chou: Yes. He said: “The casualties on the Indian side were greater than yours, so that's why I believe they were victims of aggression.” If the side with the most casualties is to be considered the victim of aggression, what logic would that be? For example, at the end of the Second World War, Hitler’s troops were all casualties or taken prisoner, and that means that Hitler was the victim of aggression. They just don’t listen to reason.

So they had no way of passing this away, and anyway, the TASS Agency account had the effect of encouraging India. And also Neville Maxwell mentioned in the book that in 1962 the Indian Government believed what the Russians told them that we, China, would not retaliate against them. Of course we won’t send our troops outside our borders to fight against other people. We didn’t even try to expel Indian troops from the area south of the McMahon line, which China doesn’t recognize, by force. But if your (e.g. Indian) troops come up north of the McMahon line, and come even further into Chinese territory, how is it possible for us to refrain from retaliating? We sent three open telegrams to Nehru asking him to make a public reply, but he refused. He was so discourteous; he wouldn’t even do us the courtesy of replying, so we had no choice but to drive him out.

You know all the other events in the book, so I won’t describe them, but India was encouraged by the Soviet Union to attack.

Of course, Mr. President also comes from Camp David, but we have no interest in asking you not to have good relations with the Soviet Union. And we also hope that you will reach agreements with the Soviet Union on disarmament and other matters. We have even expressed the wish that you visit the Soviet Union first.

President Nixon: I would like to ask the Prime Minister a question with regard to Bangladesh recognition. I know his government must make a decision on recognition, and we must make our own. As I told you yesterday, we have delayed recognition, even though Britain and other countries have done so.

Prime Minister Chou: France has also recognized Bangladesh.
President Nixon: Before we make a decision on that, we have tried to find out the attitude of Bhutto. And Bhutto has indicated he does not object to recognition. In fact he could see that we would have some advantage in not leaving the field clear to the Soviet Union in that region. It is our understanding that India is supposed to withdraw all its forces from Bangladesh by the 24th of March. And based on that we have for consideration—the decision is not yet made—we have for consideration the possibility of recognizing Bangladesh about that time.

I wonder what the Prime Minister’s reaction is to that?

Prime Minister Chou: As for the first matter, we have always stressed that the General Assembly and Security Council Resolutions passed by the United Nations should be implemented, because these have won the support of both of our nations and of the people of the world.

President Nixon: Ten to one.

Prime Minister Chou: In the past, generally speaking there hasn’t been so large a majority vote. After vetoing the resolutions three times, the Soviet Union was embarrassed to veto further, and could only abstain. Of course, it was finally passed at a rather late date, but it still had some binding moral force. By that time India had already seized East Pakistan, but they stopped their advances toward West Pakistan.

President Nixon: That was the important thing.

Prime Minister Chou: Because of this we truly wish to see them truly withdraw their troops in East Pakistan, now called Bangladesh. We wish to see them truly do this and not just with words. Of course they can only do that superficially, because if they get some Bengali forces to remain and join with Mujibur Rahman, there would be no way to be sure because the Bengalis all look the same. But that would bring trouble to the future of India and Mrs. Gandhi herself.

Also, in the West both sides should also truly cease-fire and withdraw their troops, and they must come together to negotiate. The Indians said they had no territorial ambitions, but the development of events is that they have remained in their place and have refused to withdraw. Once again we can only cite the events of the Indian aggression in the 1962 war. At that time our troops pressed to the foothills quite close to Tezpur in Assam, and when they reached that place, Chairman Mao ordered that all troops should turn back. We turned back all the equipment to the Indians—this is in Maxwell’s book—and we withdrew all troops back north of the so-called McMahon line because one must show one can be trusted and must not wait for others to act. One must do one’s own account and show good faith.

And since she (India) has also agreed to the UN resolution that things should be settled in the eastern part of Bengal, why are they not willing to settle with West Pakistan? At least the issue of West Pakistan
should be settled, because if the question of West Pakistan is not resolved there is bound to be a return of trouble in the future. From our point of view, even if the subcontinent were under one country there would still be turmoil there, because they have nationality problems there even more complicated than yours which are now covered up. If India took over all of the subcontinent, there would be even more trouble. India is not able to exercise hegemony—this is our philosophy. But speaking from the question of state relations, this should not be done because, after all, after the partition Pakistan became an independent country in 1947. This was something left over from Britain.

President Nixon: 1949.
Prime Minister Chou: 1947.
President Nixon: 1947.

Prime Minister Chou: Since that is the case, then India should withdraw its troops from the areas it is occupying in West Pakistan, and Pakistan should also withdraw from the lesser areas it occupies in India. Bhutto agrees. These two things, at least, the Indian side should abide by. If the U.S. recognizes Bangladesh after this situation is brought about, then we believe this would raise the prestige of the U.S. in the United Nations. And you would be in a better position to speak on this issue.

After all, what you want is to bring about the withdrawal of all troops from Bangladesh and West Pakistan. Also, you will be able to encourage Mr. Bhutto and give him some assistance. That is what they need. You said your actions should be parallel with ours, and we don’t mind that. We said that both to Yahya, the former President, and to the present President. Both of us owe something to Yahya, although he didn’t show much statesmanship in leading his country, for bringing the link between our two countries.

President Nixon: He is a bridge.
Prime Minister Chou: We should not forget and we cannot forget, especially that Dr. Kissinger was able through him to come secretly for talks here. And when a man makes a contribution to the world, we should remember him.

Dr. Kissinger: Actually the President sent a message to Bhutto that he should treat Yahya well in retirement and we would not look favorably on any retribution. It was a personal message from the President.

Prime Minister Chou: He also told us that he was taking good care of him and protecting him, and that if he didn’t do so, some other generals would want to take care of him (Yahya) differently.

Of course we don’t want to interfere in others’ internal affairs, but Yahya really did not lead his troops in East Pakistan well. Even though
we assisted with armaments, we didn’t send a single military personnel, what the Soviet Union calls military adviser. We only sent some people to train in the use of the planes and guns we sent, and afterwards brought those people back. At the time of the ceasefire they (the Pakistanis) still had 80,000 troops in East Pakistan. It was not a situation in which they couldn’t keep fighting. We know the Pakistanis are good fighters, and the men wanted to keep on. The trouble was the Commanders were terrible—they really just scattered the troops. General Patton, whom you admire, would not have done that. Yahya should have concentrated his troops to win a victory, and once the Indian side had suffered a defeat they would have stopped because West Bengal was not very secure either. The Indians had eight divisions at first, but these were also scattered. They had three divisions in the west part of East Bengal; the northwest part had two divisions; in the eastern part they also had two divisions.

They also had two other divisions on the McMahon line, which they didn’t move. They only took one division from the McMahon line down to East Pakistan. Also, in Sikkim they originally had an army of three divisions, from which they took one division over to eight in East Pakistan and left two divisions facing us.

If at that time the Pakistanis had concentrated a force of 40,000 against one Indian division, they would have been able to win and that would have demoralized the Indians. So at that time even our Vice Foreign Minister still believed they could win the war. Bhutto too. They are both men of letters; not soldiers. But we didn’t believe this. We said that if they fought, they would sacrifice everything.

(To Dr. Kissinger) Can that be said here?

Dr. Kissinger: Absolutely.

Prime Minister Chou: You saw Huang Hua on December 10.

Dr. Kissinger: Yes, the 10th.4

Prime Minister Chou: That time was the best time, the first ten days of December. They lost within 20 days. That was from the 25th of November to the 15th of December, but at that time they still had plenty of time. President Yahya was probably a good man, a man of good intentions, but he didn’t know how to lead an army, how to fight. So there was some reason for the dissatisfaction of the younger generals in the Pakistani army with President Yahya, but there is also some reason to say good words about him. I agree with that spirit.

4 See Document 176.
President Nixon: As Dr. Kissinger said in his conversations with the Prime Minister, one doesn’t burn down a bridge which has proved useful.

Prime Minister Chou: Yes, there’s a Chinese saying that to tear down a bridge after having crossed it is not good.

President Nixon: With regard to Bangladesh, in view of what the Prime Minister said, we will have Dr. Kissinger inform you with regard to the timing of recognition. Our decision will be made depending on our information with regard to Indian withdrawals, but we will inform you about that decision. We are pressing the Indians to withdraw and we believe we have some leverage there.

Now with regard to the problem of West Pakistan. We want to help there because it is essential to carry out the Prime Minister’s philosophy which is also ours, that no nation should establish dominance in that part of the subcontinent. We have a problem with regard to military assistance, because our Congress, and as I informed the Prime Minister and as the Deputy Foreign Minister knows, American public opinion, oppose military assistance to Pakistan. Incidentally, in retrospect it is my belief that had we been able to provide more assistance to Pakistan it would have averted war, because India wouldn’t have been tempted to win what they thought was a cheap victory. But that is water over the dam.

Prime Minister Chou: And I would also like to add here that the Pakistani Government policy toward East Pakistan had many errors. But because this was their internal matter we could only give advice and nothing more.

Dr. Kissinger: (Reading from a cable) Mr. President, you were speaking of military shipments. We have information that the Soviet Union has shipped since November 150 tanks from Poland and 100 armored personnel carriers from Czechoslovakia. They were shipped in two ships each month in November and December. In January a third ship was to bring military equipment to India.

President Nixon: To India?

Dr. Kissinger: To India.

President Nixon: The problem is to find some way that West Pakistan can find some military equipment and assistance. On our side, what we will do is to supply substantial amounts of economic assistance to West Pakistan. That would enable West Pakistan to—we would think in the interest of its defense—to acquire arms from other sources. As a matter of fact, that is the tragedy of our policy in India. We supplied almost 10 billion dollars in assistance to India in the last 20 years—very little

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5 This cable has not been identified.
was military assistance, it was economic—and that relieved India so that it could purchase very substantial amounts of arms from the Soviet Union, and also manufacture arms. That was not our intent, but that’s what happened.

With regard to our aid to India on this point—economic assistance—we are going to move in a very measured way. I am resisting considerable pressure from the public and the press to rush in and resume economic assistance at former levels. (Chou laughs) We are going to wait and see what India does with regard to the border problem and our relations generally.

Prime Minister Chou: And India actually is a bottomless hole. (President Nixon laughs)

President Nixon: When the Prime Minister referred to the problem India has with Bangladesh, as I look at India’s brief history, it has had enough trouble trying to digest West Bengal. If now it tries to digest East Bengal it may cause indigestion which would be massive.

Prime Minister Chou: That’s bound to be so. It is also a great pity that the daughter (Madame Gandhi) has also taken as her legacy the philosophy of her father embodied in the book *Discovery of India* (in English). Have you read it?

Dr. Kissinger: He was thinking of a great Indian empire?

Prime Minister Chou: Yes, he was thinking of a great Indian empire—Malaysia, Ceylon, etc. It would probably also include our Tibet. When he was writing that book he was in a British prison, but one reserved for gentlemen in Darjeeling. Nehru told me himself that the prison was in Sikkim, facing the Himalayan mountains. At the time I hadn’t read the book, but my colleague Chen Yi had, and called it to my attention. He said it was precisely the spirit of India which was embodied in the book. Later on when I read it I had the same thought.

President Nixon: When did Chen Yi die?

Prime Minister Chou: Just recently. Chairman Mao attended the funeral. He had cancer of the stomach. Do you have a way of curing cancer?

President Nixon: It is a serious problem. One of the programs we want to undertake this year is a massive research program on cancer. We hope to have such a program. Who knows when we will find the answer? Scientific genius is not natural any place in the world, and we don’t know where to find it—here, or there. But whatever money is required will now be provided for massive cancer research.

Prime Minister Chou: We can cooperate in that field.

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President Nixon: We would approve of that. I was going to suggest it in the counterpart meetings if the question of medical research comes up. We will make all our facilities available on cancer, because research should not be for one country but for all the countries of the world.

Prime Minister Chou: (Nods) Yes. There would be some beneficial cooperation in this field for the world.

President Nixon: With regard to the subcontinent, I should emphasize our policy is not anti-Indian any more than the Prime Minister’s policy is anti-Indian. It’s pro-peace. It is the right of every nation in the subcontinent to survive and develop. This right should be recognized and protected, and if one country should be allowed to gobble up another, it would be a very unsafe world. We apply that to every country, including ourselves.

Prime Minister Chou: It would be another question if the people of that country rise up themselves to change the government. It is quite another thing if foreign troops invade a country. That can’t be allowed. That’s a very important principle.

President Nixon: We shall set up procedures to inform you on recognition.

Dr. Kissinger: Exactly, through our channels.

President Nixon: Through the established channel, in Paris.

Prime Minister Chou: We will probably recognize Bangladesh later on. Perhaps we will be the last one. Our reasons for that have to do with two questions. The first is the withdrawal of Indian troops from both East Pakistan and West Pakistan. The second thing is it would not do for them (the Indians) to proclaim that the problem of Kashmir is already settled because the UN hasn’t agreed and we (sic) still have observers there. It is very complicated. It is also something that Great Britain deliberately left behind.

President Nixon: It’s so sad because Kashmir has poisoned relations between India and Pakistan since 1947.

Prime Minister Chou: But Britain purposely left that problem behind. Another question is that the Islamic countries haven’t recognized Bangladesh, and we must respect their views.

President Nixon: We must respect them too.

Dr. Kissinger: We had a letter from Bourghiba7 expressing approval of your stand on India/Pakistan. Prime Minister Chou: Even Bourghiba, who is considered to be a rightist, has supported Pakistan. As Chairman Mao mentioned yesterday, sometimes it is a good thing to be on the right.

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9 Habib Bourghiba, President of Tunisia.
President Nixon: Another is the Shah. He’s on the right, but he’s “right” in this instance. (Chou laughs before the translation)

Prime Minister Chou: And also your case. You dared to have contact with China. Mr. Mansfield has said that he wouldn’t have had the courage to come. But he supports you.

President Nixon: Yes.

Prime Minister Chou: Last night I received all the news reports from your country on your visit. I found that all views I saw were favorable, even Meany of the AFL–CIO supported you.

President Nixon: Meany? That’s really a surprise.

Prime Minister Chou: He said that you had done right.

President Nixon: The Prime Minister would like Mr. Meany. He’s a man of the people, very earthy and very honest, but he’s not always right. (Chinese laugh)

Prime Minister Chou: It is impossible for a person to be correct always. No one on earth can call himself infallible. (President Nixon laughs)

President Nixon: I was going to say—the Prime Minister mentioned Senator Mansfield—while he is, of course, of the other party and has disagreed with us on some policies, as he should, on our Chinese initiative he has been a strong supporter. He visited China many years ago, as did Senator Scott the Republican leader. Before we left I said that I would mention to the Prime Minister that I think it would be useful, and significant, if the Republican leader of the Senate and the Democratic leader could visit China. It would show bipartisan support. This would not be now, when Congress is still in session, but perhaps later on at the end of the session in July. And your government may want to consider this. I’m saying this because they asked me, but I did want to bring it up.

Prime Minister Chou: Congress will recess in July?

The President: Yes, around July.

Prime Minister Chou: We have abided by our promise to Dr. Kissinger, and even though we had considered allowing—we felt it would be difficult to refuse to let some people in the political field come after (last) July—even so we have still put off this matter until your present visit. I think it was more beneficial to have them come after your visit. We think your present proposal is a very good one, and it would be even better if they came together.

President Nixon: They are two very good friends, although they are a Republican and a Democrat. On this issue they agree. They would not embarrass your government if they come.

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8 Mohammad Reza Pahlavi, Shah of Iran.
Dr. Kissinger: It’s fair to tell the Prime Minister that Senator Scott sometimes has the same tendency of our Japanese friends—anything you say to him is likely to find its way into the press. (Prime Minister Chou laughs)

President Nixon: But Mansfield does not leak. Now to show how fair I am, I’ll say that the Democrat does not leak but the Republican does leak. (Chinese laughter) All the virtue is not just in one party in our country.

I do appreciate the Prime Minister’s actions in not having political personages before my visit. I wish to emphasize that this visit has bipartisan support, and for other visits now it would be perfectly proper. As I indicated to the Prime Minister it is important to have policy carried forward whoever sits in this chair next year. I may be here next year and I may not, under our system. I want to be sure of that whether a Democrat or Republican occupies the presidency—actually I expect to be here, but I may not. It is bigger than one party or one man. It involves the future for years to come. When I go back I’m going to enlist bipartisan support for what we agree to and for continuing that.

Prime Minister Chou: Yes, from what I read last night about the response of public opinion in your country, both to your actions and our speeches, we find that on that response you have done right and we believe this unprecedented event is a correct action. Although there are four forces that oppose you, pro-Soviet, pro-India, pro-Japanese and pro-Chiang Kai-shek, yet the strength combined of their voices is not very loud. George Ball9 also opposes you, doesn’t he? Is he pro-Indian?

President Nixon and Dr. Kissinger: He is pro-Japanese.

President Nixon: He represents some Japanese businesses. He thinks in different terms.

Prime Minister Chou: And Mr. Reischauer. And even if Walter Judd or McIntyre10 or George Ball or (to Dr. Kissinger) your former student, Reischauer, would like to come here, we wouldn’t oppose that.

President Nixon: Yes. We think it would be best if people came here—I would not dictate a decision of Chairman Mao and Prime Minister Chou—to have the two leaders of the Senate. This avoids having political candidates. A candidate does not act sometimes with the same responsibility as someone who is not a candidate.

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10 Senator Thomas J. McIntyre (D–New Hampshire).
Prime Minister Chou: Yes, they try to seize an opportunity. In your dining room upstairs we also have a poem by Chairman Mao in his calligraphy about Lushan mountain, the last sentence of which reads "the beauty lies at the top of the mountain." You have also risked something to come to China. There is another Chinese poem which reads: "On perilous peaks dwells beauty in its infinite variety."

President Nixon: We are at the top of the mountain now. (Chinese laughter)

Prime Minister Chou: That’s one poem. Another one which I would have liked to put up, but I couldn’t find an appropriate place, is “Ode to a Plum Blossom,” I had an original plan to take you to see the plum blossoms, in Hangchow, but I have heard that their time has already passed. They are ahead of season this year.

Dr. Kissinger: They have passed already?

Prime Minister Chou: I don’t know why. In other years they have not shed so early.

In that poem the Chairman meant that one who makes an initiative may not always be one who stretches out his or her hand. By the time the blossoms are full-blown, that is the time they are about to disappear. (Chou reads the whole poem) The Chinese at the same time have a different meaning for this. (Chou gestures at the end as he reads the poem)

President Nixon: That’s very beautiful.

Prime Minister Chou: Therefore we believe we are in accord with the idea you just now expressed. You are the one who made the initiative. You may not be there to see its success, but of course we would welcome your return. We would think that is a very scientific approach.

Dr. Kissinger: A very unlikely event, though.

Prime Minister Chou: Of course, that’s what you should say.

I was only trying to illustrate the Chinese way of thinking. It does not matter anyhow. Regardless of who is the next President, the spirit of ’76 still exists and will prevail. From the standpoint of policies, I hope that our counterpart will be the same so we can continue our efforts. We also hope not only that the President continues in office but that your adviser and assistants continue in office. Also various changes may be bound to come. For example, if I should suddenly die of a fatal heart attack, you would also have to find another counterpart. Therefore, we try to bring more people to meet you. At least perhaps the interpreters have the hope of living longer than the Prime Minister.

I hope you won’t complain that I am too lengthy in my words.

President Nixon: Not at all. I am very interested.

Prime Minister Chou: This belongs to the philosophic field, but also to the political point of view. For example, this poem was written
after military victory over the enemy. In the whole poem there is not 
one word about the enemy; it was very difficult to write the poem.

President Nixon: Of course, I believe it is very useful to think in 
philosophic terms. Too often we look at problems of the world from 
the point of view of tactics. We take the short view. If those who wrote 
that poem took the short view, you would not be here today. It is es-
sential to look at the world not just in terms of immediate diplomatic 
battles and decisions but the great forces that move the world. Maybe 
we have some disagreements, but we know there will be changes, and 
we know that there can be a better, and I trust safer, world for our two 
peoples regardless of differences if we can find common ground. As 
the Prime Minister and I both have emphasized in our public toasts 
and in our private meetings, the world can be a better and more peace-
ful place.

I think one thing which Dr. Kissinger has greatly contributed in 
his services to my administration is his philosophic view. He takes the 
long view, which is something I try to do also, except sometimes my 
schedule is so filled with practical matters and decisions on domestic 
and foreign policy that I don’t have as much time to take the long view 
as he does.

I think if we could . . . incidentally, I should mention to the Prime 
Minister he can be sure that if we survive the next political battle, as we 
hope and expect to do, I will still have Dr. Kissinger with me.11 He can’t 
afford to stay, but I can’t afford to have him leave, because the book he 
would write would tell too much. (Prime Minister Chou laughs)

Prime Minister Chou: Yes, indeed, I think it would be better if he 
remained (to Dr. Kissinger). Yes, if it is your wish to promote the nor-
malization of relations between China and the United States and if you 
left before fulfilling that mission, just to write a mere book, that would 
not be in accord with your philosophy.

Dr. Kissinger: I will not leave as long as the President thinks I can 
be of service and I will not write a book in any event.

President Nixon: I will amend that in one way. I will authorize 
him to write a book, but he must write poetry.

Prime Minister Chou: Write poetry; I like that. That would be good. 
Dr. Kissinger: Because of my Germanic origin it would be 400 
pages. (Prime Minister Chou laughs)

Prime Minister Chou: As for the question of Korea, we know of 
course your ideas, and of course you also know our ideas. First, the

11 All ellipses are in the source text.
official policy of the President is that he is prepared to finally withdraw troops from Korea in the future, and also to prevent the entry of Japanese forces into South Korea because this would not be beneficial to the cause of peace in the Far East. How does one promote contacts between North and South Korea? How does one promote peaceful reunification? That question will take a long time.

President Nixon: What is important here is that both of us exert influence to restrain our allies.

Let me give you an historical note. In 1953, in my first trip around the world as Vice President, President Eisenhower gave me a long oral message for Syngman Rhee. Syngman Rhee was thinking of going north and I had the unpleasant duty to tell him that he couldn’t go, and that if he did we wouldn’t support him. I remember Syngman Rhee cried when I told him. I was the one that kept Syngman Rhee from going north. Of course, I was the agent of President Eisenhower, his Vice President. This story has never been told before.

Prime Minister Chou: Yes, and the characteristics of Syngman Rhee as you just now described are also similar to what we have heard about him.

President Nixon: Similar to what?

Dr. Kissinger: What he had heard about him.

Prime Minister Chou: A few years after that he left the scene.

President Nixon: The Koreans, both the North and the South, are emotionally impulsive people. It is important that both of us exert influence to see that these impulses, and their belligerency, don’t create incidents which would embarrass our two countries. It would be silly, and unreasonable to have the Korean peninsula be the scene of a conflict between our two governments. It happened once, and it must never happen again. I think that with the Prime Minister and I working together we can prevent this.

Prime Minister Chou: The thing is also to promote their contacts.

President Nixon: Like the Red Cross and political contacts.

Prime Minister Chou: And we think also it will be good when the day comes that the United Nations Commission for Unification and Rehabilitation of Korea should be able to end its life. That would be a good thing.

Dr. Kissinger: We are examining this question, Mr. President.

President Nixon: You raised that with Dr. Kissinger, and we are looking into it.

With regard to Japan, I must emphasize what I said yesterday. It is our policy to discourage Japan from any military intervention in Korea, but the extent to which we are able to implement that policy will depend on the extent to which we maintain close relations with Japan.
I cannot guarantee it, but we believe we can very strongly influence Japan and our purpose will be to discourage any Japanese adventure against Korea or Taiwan.

Prime Minister Chou: I always try to cite the 1969 Joint Communiqué, but now the situation has changed. The situation on Okinawa has begun to change. And the question they face now is not Taiwan or South Korea, but the question of the four islands in the north.

President Nixon: I hope our Soviet friends will be as generous with Japan as we were on Okinawa. (Chinese laughter) I told Sato that when I saw him in San Clemente. The Okinawa decision was the right thing to do, after a period of time, for it belonged to Japan.

Prime Minister Chou: What caused the dissatisfaction of the Japanese people was that you still maintain nuclear bases. That still causes a problem.

President Nixon: That is a political issue created by the opposition to Sato. The point is really a false issue, because the problem of nuclear bases is covered by the statements we made at the time and later.

Dr. Kissinger: We have moved all nuclear weapons off Okinawa. They have already left.

President Nixon: There are none there.

Prime Minister Chou: Japan is now at the crossroads, as I had discussed with Dr. Kissinger. If Japan were to be able to make a friendly approach to both China and the United States, then the development of its economy could be in a more regular way, not such an abnormal way as it has been up to now. Its previous development is abnormal. That is very clear because they have no raw materials; their raw materials come from abroad and their markets also. Since their development has been at such a great rate the result is bound to be expansion abroad. Expanding in such a great way as they are toward foreign lands, the inevitable result will be military expansion.

You have now also said that your relationship with Japan is one of partnership, not the previous relationship between the victor and a defeated force. But when they reach a certain point they will cease listening to your words, and this development, if it goes in such a direction, will affect the security of the entire Pacific. Because of their tradition of militaristic thinking, this would be quite worrisome to some other people. Of course, only a very small section of their population are militaristic—old politicians and military men left over from the

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Second World War, who in recent years have been making a lot of propaganda. And as you mentioned in our previous meeting, neither you nor we will forget the historical past between us and Japan.

We hope that a new, independent, peaceful and democratic Japan will appear which will express a friendly attitude toward China and the United States.

President Nixon: I want the Prime Minister to know that we do have an alliance with Japan despite the great war we fought with Japan. We have developed a friendly relationship which you have described as a partnership, including the economic field. We believe that this relationship is actually in the interests of peace in the Pacific. Because the Japanese as a people have drive and a history of expansionism; if they are left alone as an economic giant and a military pygmy the inevitable result, I think, will be at this point to make them susceptible to the demands of the militarists.

If, on the other hand, we in the United States can continue a close relationship with them, providing their defense—because they cannot have a nuclear defense—we believe this can restrain Japan from following a course which the Prime Minister correctly pointed out could happen, of economic expansion being followed by military expansion. Our policy is, to the extent possible, to restrain the Japanese from going from economic expansion to military expansion. But we can only do that if we have a close relationship with them. If we don’t have that close relationship, they aren’t going to pay any attention to us.

The Prime Minister pointed out yesterday the danger, based on past history, that China might be carved up by its major neighbors, by the Soviet Union, India, by Japan, or possibly even by the United States. I, of course, can assure him unqualifiedly that not only will the U.S. never follow such a policy, but, to the extent we have influence, we will attempt to discourage Japan and others if they embark on such a policy.

One of the tragedies of history . . . Dr. Kissinger would tell you that I have read China’s history at night, on many nights; I didn’t know much about it, not adequately, and hadn’t known that China’s history has been one of so many foreign invasions. China is so strong it absorbs—as it has been said, China sifts all water that runs into it. On the other hand, as the leaders of their country, the Prime Minister and Chairman Mao rightly must be concerned by what happened in the past and must make every effort so that it does not happen in the future. The Prime Minister can be sure that the new relationship which we have established is one which will serve that purpose. We are not talking in terms of being philanthropic—it is in our own self-interest. It is in the interest of the United States that China be a strong independent country and that China’s neighbors not engage in carving it up.
I would like to give—before taking ten minute break—I would like to give the Prime Minister one other assurance. I am sure the Prime Minister, who follows our press very closely has noted that some rather cynical observers have implied that it would be in our interests to have the two great socialist superpowers—the USSR is one, and China could be one—be in conflict because this would make things safer for us. Some have written this. The Prime Minister probably didn’t notice this, but I was asked in one of my press conferences a year ago about this, and I categorically said that it was not in the interest of the United States to have war between the Soviet Union and China. War between major powers can never be contained, and the whole world would become involved.

Prime Minister Chou: Because everything is linked.

President Nixon: Now to the assurance that I give the Prime Minister.

Prime Minister Chou: Yes, I also read your press conference.

President Nixon: To the assurances I already gave the Prime Minister I add this. In December, when the situation was getting very sensitive in the subcontinent—I’m using understatement—I was prepared to warn the Soviet Union against undertaking an attack on China. A warning, of course, means nothing unless the individual being warned realizes you may have the will to carry it out. Insofar as Japan is concerned and India, there is no question about where our influence will be used. With regard to the Soviet Union, I can also give assurances that the U.S. would oppose any attempt by the Soviet Union to engage in an aggressive action against China. This we would do because we believe it is in our interest, and in the interest of preserving peace as well, world peace.

Prime Minister Chou: Perhaps they now feel calmer, more at ease, after reading the World Report, the first part. 13

Dr. Kissinger: They complained bitterly to us. (Chou laughs)

President Nixon: Shall we take a ten-minute break? Afterwards, perhaps, I would like to hear the Prime Minister’s views on this.

Prime Minister Chou: The World Report part on the Soviet Union was the thickest. After they read that they became quieter.

President Nixon: We had to devote the most attention to the nation which, as of now, seemed to pose the greatest threat to peace.

(At this time 4:00 p.m., the two sides took a ten-minute break.)

Dr. Kissinger: The Soviet Ambassador complained bitterly about the World Report, the Arms Control and South Asian sections.

President Nixon: Dobrynin.

Prime Minister Chou: Is that so? He probably thought that Dr. Kissinger drew up those sections for the President.

President Nixon: I don’t want to blame Dr. Kissinger for our Indian policy, since when he writes his book he will point out it was my policy.

The Indian decisions were mine. If anything, again speaking to the Prime Minister in the confidence we always use, we made two mistakes. The first of these I could do nothing about—not seeing that Pakistan had enough arms to discourage an Indian attack. Secondly, when I saw Mrs. Gandhi I made the mistake of listening to my advisers, who said to reassure her. So I spent the whole time reassuring her when I should have warned her. So I’m the hard-liner on India. I must say he (Dr. Kissinger) was a conspirator with me. We agreed on that policy. (Prime Minister Chou laughs)

I would like to get the Prime Minister’s views on a very fundamental question. As he knows, we are planning to have a meeting with the Soviet leaders, neither of whom I have met before. Our policy as the Prime Minister has also agreed, should be one of seeking arms limitation and a relaxation of tension if possible. We will of course make no, and have no, understandings with the Soviet Union that we will not only inform your government and the Prime Minister about, but also in any event would provide the option of having a similar understanding with China.

For example, we have already made some progress in this area, unilaterally without any understanding as to what comes from it. I have made a further adjustment with respect to trade just before this trip, to put China and the Soviet Union on an absolutely equal footing. We made that announcement just before we came here.

And now to my question. As the Prime Minister knows, I feel that it isn’t pieces of paper that you sign but the motives behind these pieces of paper that really matter. Why, in the Prime Minister’s view, is the Soviet Union so critical of the meeting we are now having? What is the reason behind its policy? China has not criticized the fact that we are meeting with the Soviets; in fact you suggested that we go there first. Why is the Soviet Union so critical? It would be helpful to get the Prime Minister’s view on that.

Prime Minister Chou: The policy of the Soviet Union, although they don’t admit it themselves, is actually a policy of expansion, but they don’t admit that. In the course of this expansion they, of course, meet with criticism and naturally our criticism is rather sharp. And our criticism also has its influence in the world. We have called them “social-imperialists.” They don’t like that name, but they have no way of defending themselves because this name we have given them was taken from Lenin.
Dr. Kissinger: (Looking toward Vice Minister Ch’iao): He’s particularly bad.

Prime Minister Chou: Lenin talked about people who were socialist in words but imperialist in deeds. We began to give them this name when they invaded Czechoslovakia. At that occasion, it happened just by coincidence that Romanian National Day occurred at that time. On that day I personally went to the Romanian Embassy and in front of the Soviet Ambassador I gave them that title. (President Nixon and Dr. Kissinger laugh.)

Since then they have hated us to the very core and since then they have been haggling with us. They have been doing various things to cause us great trouble. Because an overwhelming great number of countries of the world would have the same feeling about them, not to mention the peoples of the world.

The second point is that we also want to relax tensions between the Soviet Union and China to a certain extent. It was Kosygin, one of the troika, who came to do that.

President Nixon: In 1965?


Dr. Kissinger: In 1969 on his way back from attending the funeral of Ho Chi Minh in North Vietnam.

Prime Minister Chou: Even before that they created the Chen Pao Island incident in the Ussuri River in the northeastern part of China.

That occurred in March 1969. It happened exactly when we were preparing to convene the Ninth Congress of the Chinese Communist Party. And Mr. President, who is a great American lawyer and has a knowledge of the laws, will know that an international boundary running along a river should go along the centerline of the main channel. And that was also stipulated in the diplomatic dictionary that was compiled under the direct (sic) direction of Gromyko. In Russian, of course. But they don’t apply that rule to us. The two boundary rivers between China and the Soviet Union, the Ussuri and the Amur in Heilungkiang Province, were even stipulated in this way in the unequal treaties of the 19th century.

That was the time of the Czars. And we have already acknowledged that these treaties were concluded at a time when neither the Soviet nor the Chinese people had power in their hands.

President Nixon: So neither people had a representative. That was very generous.

Prime Minister Chou: And in Lenin’s time he had declared all in equal treaties between the Soviet Union and China should be abolished.
President Nixon: Because the present government is totally different from then.

Prime Minister Chou: Yes. At that time the Chinese government was a war-lord government and was not able to solve this problem. But now China has been liberated, and as a socialist country should take the initiative to conclude new treaties.

Of course, China would not take the opportunity to exert new territorial claims, but would only ask for adjustments along the border. We would take the present status quo along the border as the basis, because we have been living in such a status quo for over a hundred years. But the Soviet Union did not take such an initiative. On the contrary, it very often made demonstrations and provocations along the borderline between the USSR and China on the Ussurii River and also on the borderline between Chinese Sinkiang and the Soviet Union.

Then it was we who took the initiative to hold border negotiations. They began in 1964. We suggested that we should hold such negotiations and they agreed, but when negotiations began they took out the old maps of the Czar. They wanted to settle according to these maps instead of according to the present situation. But in those times they had no idea where the border lay. The borderline was just drawn as the pencils in the hands of the Czar’s surveyors went along the border, sometimes on the right bank, sometimes in the middle, and sometimes on the other bank. In a similar fashion the railroad between Moscow and Leningrad—Petrograd—was just drawn by a stroke of a pencil. Also in the same fashion, Britain’s McMahon drew the so-called borderline between China and India. That still exists today. This was also the way European countries carved up Africa.

President Nixon: That’s why so many African countries are really not countries. It was a terrible error.

Prime Minister Chou: Yes, and many countries are divided. But even so, we still have a desire to settle problems through negotiations. We have settled our border question with Burma. Part of the McMahon line runs along the Sino–Burmese borderline. But General Ne Win\textsuperscript{14} was a farsighted man, and we solved the question between China and Burma. But U Nu refused to do so. He was very difficult and raised many petty matters. However, the boundary settlement of this Sino–Burmese boundary line was one of mutual accommodation, but actually the result was that Burma gained a bit more, which was reasonable. Since they are a smaller country than us we gave them the benefit of the doubt.

\textsuperscript{14} General Ne Win, Burmese Prime Minister.
Also we settled the border question between China and Nepal. We have a treaty with Sikkim, and a non-disputed borderline with Bhutan and later with Pakistan. Of course, this raised a problem with India, because they said the borderline included part of their territory. In settling the boundary between China and Nepal, we resolved that the highest peak in the world, Mount Everest or Chomolungma, should belong to both China and Nepal, and we each took half. The second highest mountain is on the border between China and Pakistan, K-2, and we also shared it.

We also have a very tiny border between China and Afghanistan, where the silk road ran, and we solved that question.

As for Mongolia, there is the problem that the People’s Republic of Mongolia used to be part of China, but since Chiang Kai-shek put his signature on the Yalta Agreement we could only take his legacy. But now he refuses to recognize his own signature. If I met with him I would have to ask him about that. But we were able also to define the border between China and the People’s Republic of Mongolia at a time when the People’s Republic of Mongolia took a rather reasonable approach.

We also have a border between China and the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea. There is a lake on it, T’ien Ch’ih, on the peak of a very high mountain. In the past the Manchus said the lake belonged to them, and the Koreans said it belonged to them. We finally solved the question by dividing and sharing the lake.

It is very easy to solve questions if both sides are reasonable. We have generally settled the borders between China and Vietnam/Laos, and although there are still questions in some places, it is mostly settled. There are only two big countries, the Soviet Union and India, which haven’t settled. They’re cooperating in this.

President Nixon: Do they want to create incidents?

Prime Minister Chou: They want to leave a pretext so that they can take the opportunity to make provocations against us when they need it.

The border negotiations which began between China and the Soviet Union in 1964 lasted only one year, and we could only leave the table. So the time passed until 1969, in March, when they created the Chen Pao Island incident (they call the island Damanstey). It is actually on our side of the central line, but they had border guards on that island. We also had border guards there. They tried to attack us, but the first assault was not successful, and they had losses. We also had some losses.

On the second assault they used tanks, for the river is frozen in March. They maneuvered their tanks behind our island, and then tried
to cut the island off. But the tanks were rendered useless by our side and fell in the river, so they couldn’t go back. They used that as a pretext that we made the provocation against them. But their tanks were on our side of the river. How could they say that we made provocations against them?

A very interesting coincidence was that at the very same time the West German Presidential elections were being held in West Berlin. Because the Soviet Union had before that warned West Germany against holding elections in West Berlin, they (the Soviets) now took the Chen Pao Island incident as a pretext to tell East Germany it was not now possible for them to pay attention to that matter because they were occupied elsewhere. As a result the West German President was elected in West Berlin. They also used that incident as a pretext to shift the main body of their forces from Western border to the Far East.

But at that time Kosygin felt a bit uneasy. Before that we had a so-called hot line, between the Soviet Union and ourselves, but by that time it had already become cold because the Kremlin hadn’t called us. Their line existed, but they didn’t use it. At the time of the Chen Pao incident, Kosygin called us. He asked the operator to find Chairman Mao. (Prime Minister Chou laughs) Without orders, the operator, unauthorized, answered him, “You are a revisionist, therefore I will not connect you.” Then he (Kosygin) said, “If you will not try to reach the Chairman, will you please find the Prime Minister.” The telephone operator gave him the same unauthorized reply.

Afterwards, we learned about this. Of course, we criticized the telephone operator. That telephone operator shouldn’t have intruded in such matters without reporting them. Later on we found other means to communicate.

President Nixon: I imagine the telephone operator was like the heroine in the ballet last night. They took her pistol away and then gave it back to her. I think that happened to the telephone operator too. (Prime Minister Chou laughs) Both disobeyed for a good cause.

Prime Minister Chou: That’s right. So, the result was that at the funeral of Ho Chi Minh they told us through the Vietnamese that Kosygin would like to see us at the Peking Airport. We agreed to that and he came. That was on the 11th of September 1969. It was in the waiting room of the airport that you landed at that we talked for three hours. I also invited him to dinner. We reached agreement to relax tensions between our two countries. First and foremost was that the boundary question should be resolved.

By that time they had already increased the number of troops along the border in the six months that had passed between March and October. Of course, the number of Soviet troops along the Soviet border was not as great as at present.
Dr. Kissinger: Actually less than one-half, because they have nearly doubled it.

Prime Minister Chou: We said that we were willing to enter into border negotiations, but we said there would be one condition—they could not ask us to enter into them under the threat of force. The principles I would put forward then were as follows: one, maintain the status quo at the border; two, to enter into negotiations free from the threat of force so as to avoid armed conflict;—there is a method about the third point—disengage troops immediately facing each other. At that time we agreed to these principles. He (Kosygin) also said that we should write down those principles into a draft agreement and send it to him after he returned to the Soviet Union. The main idea then, the main idea of the agreement, could be summarized in those three points: one, maintain the status quo of the border; secondly, avoid armed clashes; and the third point, that both armed forces on the two sides should disengage.

At that time Mr. Kosygin considered those points reasonable. He asked me to give him a written draft of those principles, after we met. The second thing we discussed was that the two sides should send back ambassadors, and as a result both countries now have ambassadors to each other.

The largest embassy in Peking is the Soviet Embassy. What I mean by large is that it has the most members on the staff. They have over 200 cars alone, so that they can go everywhere. They engage in activities all over the place. Of course, there are certain places they are not allowed to enter.

The third point was the restoration of trade, because they had disputed previous long-term trade agreements. They disrupted these long-term agreements when Khrushchev passed through China in 1964. We discussed that last night. The thought was that when we discussed the problem of polemics and principle, though, we said that this could go on for 10,000 years. At that time there was still trade. They wanted Chinese tinned pork, and we also needed their timber. This agreement was on a very equal, mutually beneficial basis, but they disrupted it the next year. They suddenly declared that the Chinese pork was bad, and didn’t want any more. They finally had to make up the imbalance in money and other trade. We don’t owe them—they owe us.

President Nixon: I wonder if the telephone operator was working in a pork packing plant. (Chinese laughter)

Prime Minister Chou: That might not have been the case. Maybe that operator knew about the suspended trade agreement.

After discussing these three points, Kosygin went back to the Soviet Union. On the 20th of October those boundary negotiations finally
began between China and the Soviet Union. It was decided the negotiations would be held in Peking at the Ministerial level and the Vice Minister here headed our delegation. Mr. Ch’iao began these talks, and when the Vice Minister went to the United Nations we assigned another Vice Minister, Mr. Han Nien-lung. The Soviets had Mr. Kuznetsov, but it is said he is now ill in Moscow. *(Note: Ilichev is now the Soviet negotiator.)*

The negotiations have been going on from October 1969 up to the present date, a period of over two years and three months, but we still haven’t been able to reach agreement, even on the provisional agreement on the three principles. This is because whenever we approach them on one issue, they raise another. Perhaps you have also had the same experience. They draft something and insist that agreement be on the basis of their draft, but we will not agree. That is not equal. Why should we accept their draft? Edgar Snow’s article on his conversation with Chairman Mao mentioned that. “We are those who are not entirely in accord with the Soviet Union.” Perhaps Mr. Edgar Snow didn’t think it appropriate to appear in Life, and didn’t publish it.

Dr. Kissinger: He didn’t publish it. He was very discreet. He didn’t publish anything you didn’t authorize.

Prime Minister Chou: Of course, on the one hand we authorized and on the other hand he was discreet even when it was authorized.

President Nixon: He didn’t want to embarrass you. That’s very unusual for a journalist.

Dr. Kissinger: He didn’t tell us, for example, what Chairman Mao said about the President’s visit until after we met.

Prime Minister Chou: Yes, he was a very prudent man. Also an honest man. And therefore we commemorate him. He dared to come to visit us when it was difficult to do it. He dared to make public to the world our situation.

Therefore up to the present date the Sino–Soviet border negotiations are stagnated in the same place. So when they feel the necessity of relaxing tensions they come and have negotiations, and when they want to raise tensions they cease negotiations. Otherwise they try to bind us to their terms, which we have not agreed to. They always say that we have territorial claims. We have documents to show that we have no territorial claims. I believe Dr. Kissinger already has seen them; the Foreign Minister’s statements issued in 1969 on behalf of the Chinese government.

Dr. Kissinger: I don’t believe we have formally received a letter. I am unfamiliar with them. Last time, your Foreign Minister explained your position to me orally.

Prime Minister Chou: Those are all published documents. We have made our attitude very clear in them, that we want to settle the issue
because otherwise it would always be a source of tension. Anyhow, it is very difficult to talk with them. They are really very frightened that the U.S. and China are coming closer. They always think we are trying to put them on the spot. But actually we met them and entered negotiations with them first before negotiating with you. We met with Kosygin at the airport, and although Mr. President was already in office, we met the Soviet Premier first. In my opinion, Kosygin already had an interest in solving some of the questions, but after he went back to the Soviet Union and had a Politburo meeting, and after the troika had discussed the question among themselves, the problem became more difficult. Mr. Brezhnev is stronger, and has more ambition. He is the one who is most emotional.

President Nixon: Do you know him?

Prime Minister Chou: Probably we have met, but I am not familiar with him. I don’t know Podgorny. As for Mr. Kosygin, from time to time he is able to talk reason, but he has a very technical mind, and he is not very farsighted.

Perhaps now because of their increasing nuclear strength Brezhnev has larger ambitions than Khrushchev. Because he thinks he had success in Czechoslovakia, he now has ambitions in the Balkans.

President Nixon: Yugoslavia?

Prime Minister Chou: Romania. First Romania, then Yugoslavia.

President Nixon: Maybe Yugoslavia after Tito. The Yugoslavs are afraid of that.

Prime Minister Chou: Because they (the Soviets) are already engaged in subversion in Yugoslavia.

President Nixon: In Yugoslavia?

Prime Minister Chou: Yes.

President Nixon: That is what we’ve heard.

Dr. Kissinger: Very actively.

Prime Minister Chou: We would like to wait for them to relax tensions. We have quite a large enough country and have a lot of work on our hands already. The land left over from our ancestors is very large, and there are large tracts of land not yet cultivated. The land on which we grow grain only accounts for one-ninth of the area of our country. The greatest potential we have is our land. We also have not used enough fertilizer on our land, and once there is more fertilizer we will be able to gain even greater potential. In accordance with advanced methods used by other countries around the world we will have great potential to grow more grains such as wheat and rice.

And also, because we are trying to build socialism, how can we expand abroad? Wouldn’t that be against our principles? It is our be-
lie that ideology has no national boundary in the same way that religion has no borders. Newspapers of various countries are sold in other countries. News reports, books and magazines can flow across borders. But it is the people of a country who can control their own destinies.

It is through this concept that we have been able to formulate the five principles of peaceful co-existence. They (the Soviets) do not believe in those principles. Therefore these two ideologies (of ours) are diametrically opposed. Therefore, in this case not only is it difficult to maintain party relations, but it is also difficult to maintain state relations and diplomatic relations. But such things as diplomatic relations must be continued. But once they see more and more of your people going to China, they will be quite disturbed. But they have lots of people from your country and we say nothing about that.

President Nixon: Do they fear you for the future? Is that the problem? The border dispute has to be an excuse, not a reason. It can’t be that important to them.

Prime Minister Chou: Just because of that—they fear there will be a chain reaction. That is what they have told Japan. They said that if the four islands were returned to Japan, then there would be problems along the whole border, all the way to Finland, East to West. They have gained territory along their whole border; there is no country where this is not so. In the past we thought this was not the case with Afghanistan, but we found it was the case even with them. You know the border situation between the Soviet Union and Iran, Turkey, Romania, Czechoslovakia, Poland, and even Germany, East Prussia—. (Talking to Kissinger) You know about that. Konigsberg, a most beautiful city.

Dr. Kissinger: They took the northern half of East Prussia and Konigsberg, the biggest city in East Prussia, which they named Kalinograd.

Prime Minister Chou: They also took Karelia from Finland. We don’t want them to return all the territory they have taken from us, only a small readjustment, because there is no meaning to dispute in such a way over a border. But it won’t do if they don’t treat us equally and if they don’t abide by what they say. Something must be discussed about that.

President Nixon: Do they fear that you threaten their leadership of the so-called socialist camp?

Prime Minister Chou: We don’t even recognize them as belonging to the socialist camp.

President Nixon: That may worry them.

Prime Minister Chou: Of course.

President Nixon: Because the Russians don’t need territory.

Prime Minister Chou: The socialist camp no longer exists because there are many different ideas.
The second point is that there should always be one head of that camp, and that all others should listen to that head.

President Nixon: How long have they felt that way in their relations with you? Since 1965? 1966? When did you see the conflict developing?

Prime Minister Chou: We began to come apart in 1956, at the time they had the 20th Party Congress. We came apart then because of ideology, and because it was unfair at that time to write off all of Stalin’s achievements at one stroke. Chairman Mao made the remark that 30 percent of what Stalin did was wrong but 70 percent was right. We don’t say that it was all right. Anyway we must recognize that he (Stalin) made contributions in the Second World War. Even our American friends recognize this.

President Nixon: The Russians fought very well. They had heavy losses.

Prime Minister Chou: Even leaders of Western countries, such as Winston Churchill, who differed in their ideologies from Stalin, recognized Stalin’s contributions the most. And if it had not been Stalin in command at that time, but Khrushchev... It was utter nonsense for him to claim that it was not Stalin, but he, Khrushchev, who led the battle.

President Nixon: Khrushchev?
Dr. Kissinger: They rewrote history and said that Khrushchev had led the battle into the Ukraine.

Prime Minister Chou: Therefore they’re constantly rewriting Party history. Now Brezhnev must stand out, but they can’t do that because it’s against history.

Although at that time we had ideological differences with the Soviet Union, we still wanted to find a way to unite in order to maintain our relations. In 1957 Chairman Mao went to Moscow, and supported the issuance of the Moscow Declaration although we had some reservations about the Declaration which we also put forth at that conference. But in 1960 they withdrew all their experts from China and tore up all their contracts.

President Nixon: All the technicians—all their technical assistance in 1960—yes, I remember.

Prime Minister Chou: They withdrew. But after that we still went to Moscow for another conference of 81 nations, which also issued a statement at that time.

President Nixon: It is interesting to note that when Khrushchev met with Eisenhower this had already happened, but our people did not know about it.

Dr. Kissinger: They met in 1959. Tensions had already developed, but not that technician thing.
President Nixon: Your cooperation had stopped before Eisenhower had met Khrushchev but our people didn’t see the significance, what with other great events developing at the time. That is when that great meeting took place. The meeting President Eisenhower had with Khrushchev in 1959 was not a very comradely one. I think he was just warming up for when he got here. (Chou laughs)

Prime Minister Chou: In 1960 he quarreled with you in Paris, at the Elysee Palace.

President Nixon: He had a good reason, the U–2. We admit it was good reason.

Prime Minister Chou: It was a very good pretext.

President Nixon: I agree it may have been a pretext and not a reason. That was the analysis some of our experts made at that time—Khrushchev wanted the summit to blow.

Dr. Kissinger: I once asked a Swedish diplomat, who had served in Moscow, for his estimate of Khrushchev’s greatest quality. He said it was Khrushchev’s ability to extricate himself from difficulties he himself had created. In 1960, he started the Berlin crisis, and he didn’t know how to end it. The same thing in 1961 and 1962; he started a crisis every year and he didn’t know how to end them. He couldn’t go forward and he couldn’t go backward. Therefore I agree with you, Mr. President, he couldn’t have the meeting fail, without success.

Prime Minister Chou: It is possible, because we do not know very much about the issues and the situation at that meeting. I only know what he said publicly about the U–2 incident. And it was I who went to the Soviet Union in 1961 to take part in the 22nd Party Conference. At that time we had a semi-split.

President Nixon: 1961?

Prime Minister Chou: Yes. The Soviet Union itself unilaterally declared that they were going to expel Albania from the conference as not being a socialist country, and they wouldn’t let them attend. The ships they had sent to Albania were all called back, and all their exports were called back. This was an attempt to bully a small country.

President Nixon: It is ironic. Most people say Albania is more socialist than the Soviet Union. (PM Chou laughs)

Prime Minister Chou: That is right. The result was that we couldn’t refrain from sympathizing with a small country, because it was in the right. We withdrew from the meeting and criticized them, but not very strongly.

Perhaps, Mr. President did not take note of these developments because he was not in office at that time. In July 1963, when you were not in office, the Partial Test Ban Treaty was signed.
Dr. Kissinger: In 1962?
Prime Minister Chou: In 1963. At that very time they were, on the one hand, holding meetings with three countries about the partial test ban, and on the other hand, were holding meetings with other parties regarding the treaty. We knew beforehand that no good would come from this, because they were attempting to exert pressure on us at a time when we didn’t have nuclear weapons.

President Nixon: You had your first nuclear explosion in 1964?
Prime Minister Chou: Yes, and the day after Khrushchev fell from power.
Dr. Kissinger: Did you plan that?
Prime Minister Chou: No, it was not planned beforehand. It was a coincidence.

President Nixon: You can say that he went out with a big bang. (Chinese laughter)
Prime Minister Chou: He tried to use a meeting to exert pressure on us. Since that meeting there has been a split. We said that party relations were only suspended, and didn’t want to go to the extremity. But after the talks were suspended they immediately made public to the whole Soviet people and the other Communist parties that the Sino–Soviet party talks had ended in failure, and made public the whole proceedings of that meeting.

Miss Wang just now corrected me. The Soviet Union does not have 200 cars for the Embassy, but they can send cars out 200 times in one day. Two hundred times, that is the number their cars go out. Miss Wang is from Protocol, and it is not under her charge. It is under the charge of the place that takes care of cars.

In 1964 Khrushchev fell from power. Although we had already exploded a nuclear explosion, at that time we still placed some hope on the new leadership in the Soviet Union. So we went to Moscow to celebrate the anniversary of the October Revolution in 1964, and suggested to other parties that they also should go in an attempt to unite. But the result was it was impossible. The policies pursued by Brezhnev were the same as those of Khrushchev.

And in their cocktail parties they instructed people like Malinovsky to make provocations against us. This was something we could not accept. No matter how we talked with them, the talks were not successful. Since then I have also met them many times—since then, party relations have been severed. We could do nothing about it because we made every effort and were not successful.

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15 Marshal Rodion Yakovlevich Malinovsky, former Soviet Minister of Defense.
President Nixon: There is a point which I particularly want to make with the Prime Minister. In our relations with the Soviet Union, we do not want to do anything which would be against the interests of his country, China. For example, we do not want this meeting with Chairman Mao and the Prime Minister to become an embarrassment to China in its relations with the Soviet Union.

Prime Minister Chou: That won’t be the case.

President Nixon: Dr. Kissinger has told Mr. Dobrynin not to be concerned about this meeting, but Dobrynin doesn’t believe him.

Dr. Kissinger: They are a little bit hysterical on this subject.

Prime Minister Chou: If they have confidence in themselves, they would not be upset, because China doesn’t oppose them.

President Nixon: That was the point I was trying to get to in my question, and I am very glad to get the Prime Minister’s analysis of the problem. Certainly China is not a threat to the Soviet Union at this point because of the nuclear superiority of the Soviet Union over China. So what we think is that they are not so concerned about the border, which is a pretext, but about the leadership and doctrine of what they say is the socialist camp, which you don’t accept.

They also must be afraid of whether China could become powerful in the future, because the Soviet leaders in my experience tend to take a long view.

Certainly we will conduct ourselves with complete correctness in dealing with them and will make every effort to see that no pretext will be created by this meeting to indicate we are setting up a condominium against them.

Prime Minister Chou: Condominium?

President Nixon: Cabal. There are probably better Chinese words for this than we have. What concerns us about Soviet intentions was the recent experience of India, because certainly in the early stages of that conflict they were doing nothing to discourage India in its actions against Pakistan. It was only after we made a very strong stand—I personally intervened with Brezhnev, and Dr. Kissinger made a statement that was widely quoted in this respect—that they took a more reasonable attitude and a more moderate position in the United Nations, as you may recall.

I believe, in other words, the best policy towards the Soviets as far as the U.S. is concerned is one of firmness but not belligerency, and a willingness to negotiate. But we should make it very clear we would be willing to resist if incidents like Pakistan occur.

I think a fundamental fact which at present assures a possible period of peace without world conflict is that the Soviet Union certainly doesn’t want a conflict or confrontation with the U.S., and we don’t want it with them either. We both know it would be mutual suicide.
Prime Minister Chou: Yes, a world war especially a nuclear one. They are also in a dilemma on this. A nuclear war would be detrimental not only to the two big countries but also to the people of the whole world. But on the other hand, they refuse to cease the arms race. But the more nuclear weapons, the more difficult it is to engage in a nuclear war. Nuclear weapons cannot be eaten, not worn as clothing, nor can they be used as utensils. They can’t raise the standard of living. The only thing they can do is lie there waiting to be used. Mr. President probably knows much better than I what a great waste they are. The people in the next century will blame us for this waste.

President Nixon: We completely share the Prime Minister’s view that we should attempt to work out an arms limitation agreement with the Soviet Union. I think our meeting in Moscow will be the acid test. It will not prove everything if we do make an agreement because it will be a limited agreement, but if it doesn’t work out it will have a great effect on the U.S. because we will have to increase the nuclear arms burden so as not to fall behind. We can’t fall behind, but we don’t want this.

I completely agree with the Prime Minister about waste. When there are so many hungry people in the world and poor people in the world it would be a disaster to spend so much money. On the other hand, if the Russian level is going up, we would have no choice.

Prime Minister Chou: Yes, you are in that position.

Dr. Kissinger: In this connection, it is interesting to point out to Mr. President and Mr. Prime Minister that we have not deployed land-based missiles for six years.

President Nixon: No new land-based missiles in six years and no new submarine-based missiles in four years. In all that time the Soviet Union has been building very heavily. They only agreed to talk to us about a limitation of arms and only began to show a willingness to discuss submarine weapons when we began to increase ours. So only when we started a new program were they willing to talk. So this is very curious, a paradoxical situation. When we stop unilaterally they raise their levels, and when we raise ours they talk about stopping.

Prime Minister Chou: I have taken note of certain incidents—I don’t know whether we are correct in this. We found that when your navy ships were moving toward the Indian Ocean they also very quickly sent nuclear subs down from Vladivostok to the Indian Ocean.

President Nixon: Your intelligence is very good.

Prime Minister Chou: Once they decide to take action they move very speedily. They even passed through the Suvarov Straits, which should be considered internal waters of Japan between Hokkaido and Honshu. This was the first time, and Japan was very tense.
President Nixon: We didn’t know that, did we? It must have been known.

Prime Minister Chou: It was the first time the ships went into the Straits, and the Japanese were upset.

President Nixon: Mr. Prime Minister, I want to assure you that the arms race is not our choice. It was only with great reluctance that I approved the ABM, but it is either that or fall behind. And I felt it would be very dangerous for ourselves and for our allies, because we would be subjected to very great pressures.

I should point out that this is a limited agreement. It does not, for example, cover intermediate range missiles.

Dr. Kissinger: I informed the Vice Prime Minister this morning.

President Nixon: The information Dr. Kissinger gave you is totally reliable.

Dr. Kissinger: Right now there is a recess in the talks, and they will not resume until March 28. No matter what the press says, it is not reliable. When they resume, and there is any development, I will inform you through our regular channels. With the President’s approval, I will inform you of our position so that there will be reliable information.

Prime Minister Chou: Thank you for your information. You, of course, know that we do not want to have too much money spent on this. Since your two big countries have already had that experience, we don’t want to follow that. We have no wish to waste so much money. You are now on the peak of two very high piles, and it is very hard to come down. It is very unfortunate. We hope you will be able to succeed in your negotiations with the Soviet Union.

We must also say this has two sides. On the one hand, we hope you will succeed in your discussions, but on the other hand, that will not be easy.

President Nixon: I want to say, in bringing this afternoon session to a close, that I recall what the Prime Minister said about the battle in which the Chinese troops were on the top and the Indian troops suffered more casualties, and how Khrushchev misinterpreted this. I just want to say, in conclusion, that I don’t want the situation with evidence that they are on top of the peak and that we are way down below. (Chinese laughter.)

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16 Kissinger met with Yeh Chien-ying, Vice Chairman of the Military Commission, from 9:35 a.m. to 12:34 p.m. on February 23. The memorandum of conversation is in the National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Kissinger Office Files, Box 92, China, President’s Trip, February 1972, HAK Conversations. See footnote 2, Document 202 for a complete list of Kissinger’s private meetings while in the PRC.
Prime Minister Chou: I understand. But we still hope you will succeed.

President Nixon: I was going to say that I think we may, but the Prime Minister is absolutely right that these will be hard, tough negotiations.

Prime Minister Chou: I believe the SALT talks have lasted already more than two years, the same as the border negotiations. Our easy negotiations haven’t succeeded, nor have your difficult negotiations succeeded yet.

There is something else I would like to ask you, one other question. We have heard that Mr. Rogers told us—our Foreign Minister—that the Secretary of State would like to take part in the discussions about the communiqué. And our Foreign Minister replied, in the first day plenary meeting, that Mr. Prime Minister assigned Mr. Ch’iao Kuan-hua, and Mr. President assigned Dr. Kissinger, and that was all that he had on the subject since there had been no further understanding.

President Nixon: I think there is a misunderstanding. Secretary Rogers may have some ideas which he can discuss with the Foreign Minister. I have delegated Dr. Kissinger to be our representative, as the Prime Minister has designated the Deputy Foreign Minister. That is the way we would like to have it done.

I would like to say in this connection that I have talked to Dr. Kissinger at length about the communiqué. And after these talks I feel much more strongly than ever that we should have a communiqué that rises above the usual nit-picking pettiness that usually characterizes a communiqué.

Naturally, there will be statements of disagreements made, but I hope that Dr. Kissinger and Mr. Ch’iao can give us language that is worthy of the occasion because this is a historical occasion on which we have the opportunity to say something of significance. I am glad they have to do that because I don’t want to do the work. (PM Chou laughs)

Prime Minister Chou: So far, we have held two meetings, and I am thinking that tomorrow afternoon we should have another meeting in which on our side we can give you our overall assessment of the situation in which we link together all issues so that Mr. President can have a better understanding of us. It will not take a long time. As for the communiqué, I understand they have already agreed to meet. They should start working and will have to skip the Great Wall.

President Nixon: I think he (Dr. Kissinger) is too lazy and does not want to climb the Wall again.

Dr. Kissinger: I will have a stomach ache.

President Nixon: If he has a stomach ache, there will be a story in the press.
198. Memorandum of Conversation\footnote{Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970–73, POL 7 US/NIXON. Secret; Nodis; Homer. The meeting was held in Villa 5 of the Guest House Complex. Drafted by Platt and approved by Rogers on February 28. A complete set of the Rogers–Chi P’eng-fei memoranda of conversation is also ibid., Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Kissinger Office Files, Box 91, Country Files–Near East, Memoranda of Conversation between Secretary Rogers and PRC Officials, February 1972. Rogers met with Chi February 22–25 and 28. He had a brief meeting with Chou on February 27. He also attended the February 26 meeting with Nixon and Chou; see Document 201. See also Foreign Relations, 1969–1976, vol. E–13, Documents 91, 94, 101, 105, 107.}  

Beijing, February 23, 1972, 3 p.m.

SUBJECT
Counterpart Meetings Between the Secretary of State and the Foreign Minister of the People’s Republic of China—II

PARTICIPANTS
Chi P’eng-fei—Foreign Minister  
Hsiung Hsiang-hui—Secretary to the Premier (Foreign Affairs)  
Wang Chen—Deputy Director, Information Department  
Ch’ien Ta-yung—Deputy Director, West European, American and Australasian Affairs  
Li Tsung-ying—Leading Member, Research Group  
Ting Yuan-hung—Member, Delegation to the UNGA  
Shen Jo-yun—Interpreter  
Hu Chuan-chung—Interpreter  
Hu Fang Hsien—Stenographer  
William P. Rogers—Secretary of State  
Marshall Green—Assistant Secretary of State–EA  
Ron Ziegler—Press Secretary to the President  
John Scali—Special Consultant to the President  
Alfred le S. Jenkins—Director for Asian Communist Affairs–EA  
Nicholas Platt—Assistant to the Secretary  
Commander John Howe—National Security Council Staff  
Charles W. Freeman, Jr.—Interpreter

MFN Impact on Trade

The Secretary opened the meeting by speaking to the point on MFN Treatment raised by the Foreign Minister the day before. He said that in order to answer the question fully, the US would need to know the particular exports involved. For some exports, for example, like tea, rice, tung oil and turpentine, no tariff is imposed at all and MFN status makes no difference. For other items, like hog bristles, a differential exists, but it is very small. As matters now stand, MFN Treatment has little effect on the limited number of items the PRC may be interested in exporting to the US. As trade broadens and the list expands,
however, the impact of non-MFN status would widen. The Secretary concluded by reiterating the US position on trade.

Taiwan

The Foreign Minister thanked the Secretary for the information, and suggested that the discussions proceed to cover general questions. As the problem most central to the relationship between the PRC and the US was Taiwan, he would like to begin by discussing that. Ten years of talks on the subject at Warsaw had proved fruitless, but the President had taken the initiative to come to China, and the topic was an important one to discuss.

The Secretary agreed and asked the Foreign Minister to present his views first.

The Foreign Minister began by reiterating the sentiments expressed in the President’s and the Prime Minister’s toasts at the welcoming banquet and the Secretary’s statement the day before; that the Americans and Chinese were great peoples, that establishment of normal relations under the five principles would be in the interests of the world; and that the history of the past two decades had been an aberration.

History

Reading from a prepared text, the Foreign Minister then proceeded to review the history of Sino–American relations. The Chinese and American peoples had been close in the past, he began. Large numbers of Chinese workers had come to America and participated in her construction and development. The US for its part had introduced modern techniques to China. Americans appreciate Chinese culture and the Chinese admire the American pioneering spirit, both knowing and respecting the names of Washington and Lincoln.

However, relations between the governments of the two countries have not been good, the Foreign Minister continued. He proceeded to cite US participation in the Opium War (1840), the Cushing Treaty (1844), the Boxer Rebellion (1901), US support for Chiang Kai-shek after World War II, US intrusion into Chinese territorial waters and airspace (against which 497 serious warnings had been issued since 1958), the trade blockade, deprivation of the PRC’s legitimate rights in the UN, and travel restrictions.

Most of the problems between the two governments, the Foreign Minister continued, stemmed from the policies of Secretary Rogers’ predecessors. Nevertheless, he felt the need to cite the record in order to prove that it was the United States which was responsible for the abnormal relationship of recent years. For its part, the PRC had expressed upon its founding willingness to negotiate its differences and establish a normal relationship with the United States. In 1955, Premier
Chou had declared that the Chinese did not want a war with the United States, and initiated discussions on the means to ease tensions in the Far East and the Taiwan Strait. More than 100 talks ensued, without result.

The attempts of American policy makers to isolate and contain the Chinese people were foolish, the Foreign Minister went on. China was neither isolated nor contained. On the contrary, the Chinese people were aroused to high resolve and determination to rely on themselves. As Chairman Mao has put it, the United States has played the role of teacher by negative example, and the Chinese are grateful for this.

The PRC has noted, the Foreign Minister continued, that President Nixon has expressed the desire several times for a new start. The Chinese government would like to regard such expressions as being earnest and has made its response. There is an old saying that it is difficult to turn around when weighed down by burdens. Nevertheless, we cannot stand still, still less move backward. The policies of the past were not formulated by President Nixon or the Secretary of State, so why keep these heavy burdens? The key to normalization is the Taiwan question.

**PRC Position**

The Foreign Minister went on to outline the PRC position on Taiwan. Taiwan has been Chinese territory since the Sui and Tang Dynasties, long before Columbus set foot on North America. The Taiwanese are blood brothers. The Foreign Minister cited the State Department White Paper in 1949, the Cairo Declaration in 1943, the Potsdam Declaration in 1945, the Chinese government acceptance of Japanese surrender in 1945, and President Truman’s January 5, 1950 statement as evidence supporting the PRC claim to Taiwan and US recognition of it. He cited President Truman’s June 27, 1950 statement and the signing of the 1954 Mutual Defense Treaty with the Chiang government as evidence that the US had gone back on its word.

Again, the Foreign Minister apologized for telling the Secretary things he already knew, but felt he had to establish that the blame for blocking normal PRC–US relations lay with the US.

To normalize relations, he continued, the US must recognize the PRC as the sole legal government of China. The Chiang “government” is an illegal insurgent. During the American civil war were there two Americas? Was there one United States and two governments? Certainly not. The Secretary’s statement of August 2, 1971 that the US government still wants to maintain its commitments and friendship with the “Republic of China” shows that the US still clings to the errors of the past and is incompatible with the desire for better relations.²

Taiwan is part of China, the Foreign Minister continued, and there can be no interference in Chinese domestic affairs. Any attempt to create a “one China, two governments” formula, or to continue to maintain that “the status of Taiwan is undetermined” is untenable and utterly wrong. The Chinese government is firmly against the Taiwan Independence Movement instigated behind our backs by foreign forces. The US government must withdraw all its armed forces from Taiwan and the Strait area, dismantle its military installations on Taiwan and abrogate the “defense treaty.”

Insofar as the means for liberating Taiwan are concerned, the Foreign Minister continued, that is the PRC’s affair. He could say to the Secretary, however, that the Chinese people are willing to liberate Taiwan by peaceful means as far as this is possible. In the past, the Chinese people had liberated Chinese territory by force of arms, but there was no lack of precedent for liberation by peaceful means. Furthermore, the PRC had always treated with leniency those whom they had liberated that desired to live in peace.

In closing, the Foreign Minister reiterated his belief that the Chinese and American people are friends. China had never menaced the United States or invaded it. He welcomed the visit of the President and the Secretary, hoped that they would show courage and foresight, and that the visit would prove to be a turning point.

The US Search for Peace

The Secretary thanked the Foreign Minister for his views, and said that since the President discussed the same question the day before, he would not repeat what had been said. He would, however, like to clarify the US position further. Thanks to the discussions today, the US does in part understand the PRC position as it sees it in history. China is an old culture. The United States is a young country which has been through the difficulties of two World Wars and has different perspectives. As both sides proceed to improve relations, the US will take these historical views into account.

The predominant impression in the United States, the Secretary continued, is of friendship toward the Chinese people. What his own generation remembers is that we fought on the same side in World War II, and that pilots downed inside China were treated with friendship.

President Nixon had made three points, the Secretary went on. The US has no territorial ambitions. Neither the US nor the PRC have any intention of controlling the world. Neither the US nor the PRC fear each other. US policy under the Nixon Administration is to maintain its strength so that it will never be second best and to further the cause of peace through discussions. Twice the US has become involved in world wars and twice it has been ill prepared. This will never happen again.
The US feels it is important for the cause of peace that the world’s strongest and most populous nations have better relations. Mankind has developed the ability to destroy itself in the event of a nuclear war. The President’s visit to China and the talks today are part of an effort to reduce tensions in the world and in the long run make it possible to have a generation of peace.

The US believes, the Secretary continued, that the fundamental issue is peace, and how both sides can work together to promote it. Improvement in our relations is one way. In that spirit it is important to consider the past and keep it in mind. However, we want to concentrate on the present and the future, and not let preoccupation with the past, or even past injustices, hurt the prospects for the future. The Secretary said he would not attempt to comment on some of the PRC’s historical statements. Rather, he hoped that the US and the PRC could change their relationship on the basis of experience; the experience which Chairman Mao has valued so highly in his writings.

The Secretary said he was not clear what the Foreign Minister had in mind when he said it might be difficult for the US to turn around while carrying heavy burdens. The President’s policy is not based on burdens, but rather by his belief that we should work for peace.

The Secretary said that he could think of no time since he had first become involved in government in 1941 when the US was stronger or more prosperous than now under the leadership of President Nixon. People can get the wrong idea from reading the news, and the idea that the US was changing its policy through weakness or any burdens it carried was a fallacy.

Assistant Secretary Green had commented, the Secretary continued, that the US had welcomed contacts with the PRC rather than restricting them. The US favors contacts and wants as many Chinese to visit the US as possible, and vice versa.

The Secretary welcomed the Foreign Minister’s statement that President Nixon’s initiatives had been treated in earnest by the PRC. At the same time, the US has been very careful to avoid hostile comments toward China. Those of us in this room understand why the US is called names in the PRC press, but the American people don’t understand. The Secretary hoped that one result of the visit would be an end to name calling on both sides.

Before discussing Taiwan, the Secretary wished to point out that an improvement in relations between the PRC and the US was in the interest of all mankind. Both of us recognize that there are predatory forces in the world which could bring us to the brink of a world war. These are the fundamentals.

As far as Taiwan is concerned, the Foreign Minister was correct in pointing out that the US has no predatory designs, the Secretary
continued. No useful purpose would be served by going into the statements made by Truman and Acheson except to say that their positions had been affected by the events of the Korean War.

The Secretary outlined the US position on the Taiwan question as follows:

Chinese on both sides of the Taiwan Straits agree that Taiwan is a part of China and that there is only one China. We take note of that position on the part of both parties.

The US will accept and abide by any solution the parties can arrive at as long as it is peaceful. We are prepared to take note of the PRC position that Taiwan is an inalienable part of China.

The United States is not trying to promote “two Chinas and one Taiwan,” or “one China, two governments.” We want to proceed from where we are to see how we can improve our relations.

The US is not providing encouragement or assistance to any Taiwan independence movement or group.

The Secretary noted in the Foreign Minister’s comments that the PRC would be willing to pursue a peaceful resolution of the Taiwan question, and underscored the US hope that it would occur.

Because of the history of the problem, the US presumes it will take some time to solve, both socially and economically.

Insofar as US troops on Taiwan are concerned, as tensions in the area lessen, and we think they will, the US is prepared to reduce its military forces there. A reduction is already in train and further reductions are contemplated. Any expression by the PRC of a determination to follow a peaceful solution would facilitate further reductions.

The Foreign Minister has referred to US efforts to contain and isolate China, the Secretary continued. Surely, the PRC had taken note that President Nixon’s policy was quite the contrary. We have reduced troop levels in the Pacific by 450,000 men during the past two years. This is not containment. We have no desire to isolate China. On the contrary, the US welcomes the PRC’s new policy of diplomacy, welcomes increase in contacts, and welcomes its membership in the UN.

Clarifications and Arguments

The Foreign Minister said that he had a few points to clarify. As far as his statements on heavy burdens were concerned, he was referring to the great differences between the two countries in the past and not to US domestic difficulties or weakness. When citing the policy of containment and isolation, the Foreign Minister had been referring to the actions of the previous administrations and not the Nixon Administration.

The PRC would try to liberate Taiwan peacefully insofar as this was possible but this should not be taken as a precondition. The Secre-
tary had mentioned that as long as a statement of intention to solve the problem peacefully was made, the US would reduce its troop levels. The PRC does not share this view and cannot make such a statement.

The Secretary said that he understood that the PRC could not make such a statement as a precondition, and did not have a precondition in mind. We do not have to make one statement in exchange for the other. These are parallel policies. The United States has no predatory interest in Taiwan and we have already reduced our troop levels. The PRC is prepared to attempt to solve the problem by peaceful means separately from that.

The Foreign Minister responded that Taiwan is China’s internal affair.

The Secretary said that he was not sure that he had made our position clear. No precondition is involved. The PRC’s position is that Taiwan is an internal problem which the PRC will try to solve peacefully. The PRC need not say anything that will show that actions it takes will be affected by anything the US does. The PRC policy is to try to solve this internal problem by peaceful means. At the same time, the US has no predatory aims toward Taiwan and will reduce its forces there as tensions lessen. These are parallel policies; or policies which coincide and on which no agreement is necessary. There must be some formulation that we can make, the Secretary continued, to avoid any appearance of a precondition or a bargain.

The Foreign Minister responded that it was quite clear that there could be no precondition or bargain, that the liberation of Taiwan is an internal question and that the American withdrawal is separate.

The Secretary agreed that the two policies should be stated separately. The Foreign Minister said that the United States must first make up its mind to withdraw the troops. The US had put them there in the first place.

The Secretary said he understood that time was necessary to solve the problem. However, the US and the PRC were working on parallel courses, each seeking a peaceful solution by the Chinese themselves.

The Foreign Minister replied that when he had referred to heavy burdens, he had meant that the Taiwan problem would take time to solve. The PRC does not expect the US to withdraw its troops tomorrow. However, it should at least promise that they will be withdrawn. Unless US troops are withdrawn, it will be difficult to liberate Taiwan peacefully.

The Secretary then quoted Assistant Secretary Green as saying that time is a cure for muddy waters. The Secretary said that time was indeed a very important factor in the solution of the problem. He thought that the two sides could formulate a statement at the end of the meeting which would outline both positions. Because President Nixon has
already reduced troops, the Secretary felt sure that the Foreign Minister was reassured about US policy.

The Foreign Minister replied that President Nixon and Premier Chou at the plenary session had appointed Dr. Kissinger and Chiao Kuan-hua to work out a communiqué. He suggested that he and the Secretary leave it to them.

The Secretary replied that the point had been made at the plenary that the communiqué would be worked out under the supervision of the Foreign Ministers and that, therefore, both should be clear in stating our position.

The Secretary then asked the Foreign Minister to contrast US troop withdrawal policy with Asia and Europe. The US had started to withdraw troops in the Pacific but by contrast NATO forces would remain in place because the US felt them necessary for the stability of Europe. He repeated that the PRC should be reassured by the trend in US policy.

The Foreign Minister replied that the US should remove its troops in the Asian area as soon as possible.

As tensions are reduced, the Secretary responded.

The Foreign Minister said that the PRC understood the US was reducing its troop levels.

*The United Nations*

The Foreign Minister stated that the legitimate rights of the PRC in the UN had been restored. The Secretary’s use of the word “admission” or “entry” into the UN implied that the US still clings to the idea of “one China, two governments.”

The Secretary replied that it was an academic question. The US had avoided the legalities and taken the position that the United Nations’ function and the trend toward universality made it important to have as many people represented as possible. The US voted for representation for the Taiwanese people as a practical matter. The vote went against us.

The United Nations General Assembly rejected your position, the Foreign Minister replied.

The Secretary asked whether the Foreign Minister was trying to win all over again. The PRC was successful, the Secretary continued; we don’t have to debate this question again.

The Foreign Minister said the Chinese people felt strongly about this question. We are trying to have exchanges between our peoples; however, this is impossible if you are trying to create two Chinas.

We don’t accept the idea that we are trying to create two Chinas, the Secretary replied. We have acknowledged publicly that Chinese on
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the mainland and in Taiwan believe that there is one China. We recognize that fact, but there are two entities no matter what you call them. The Secretary then asked the Foreign Minister what it was about the UN situation that troubled him now. In view of the General Assembly vote, he should be satisfied.

Not necessarily, the Foreign Minister replied, but that is a long story and we can discuss it later. The US has its stand and its views. That is why it is difficult for you to turn around.

The Secretary replied that the discussions were helpful. It had been particularly useful for the Foreign Minister to point out that time was required to solve the problems between the two countries.

The Foreign Minister said he was grateful to the Secretary for the frank exchange they had had. The opportunity to make each other’s positions known would promote mutual understanding. He knew that there was considerable disagreement between them, but that both sides should try their best to find those points on which they could agree.

The Secretary closed the meeting by paying tribute to his colleagues on both sides of the table for having listened so long and patiently. He hoped that it would be the beginning of many such exchanges.

199. Memorandum of Conversation¹

Beijing, February 24, 1972, 5:15–8:05 p.m.

PARTICIPANTS

The President
Dr. Henry A. Kissinger, Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs
John H. Holdridge, NSC Staff
Winston Lord, NSC Staff
Prime Minister Chou En-lai
Ch’iao Kuan-hua, Vice Minister of Foreign Affairs
Chang Wen-chin, Director of Western Europe, North American, and Australasian Affairs, Ministry of Foreign Affairs
Wang Hai-jung, Deputy Director of Protocol
Chao Chi-hua, Ministry of Foreign Affairs

¹Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, White House Special Files, President’s Office Files, Box 87, Memoranda for the President. Top Secret; Sensitive; Exclusively Eyes Only. The meeting was held in the Great Hall of the People.
Prime Minister Chou: You took a rather tiring trip to the Great Wall this morning.
President Nixon: Nothing is tiring that is interesting.
Prime Minister Chou: How about Mrs. Nixon?
President Nixon: She loved it.
Prime Minister Chou: Was it cold?
President Nixon: No, it was a beautiful day. We didn’t need the big coats.
Prime Minister Chou: Dr. Kissinger didn’t go to the Wall today.
Mr. Lord neither.
Dr. Kissinger: The Vice Minister was very difficult. (Prime Minister Chou laughs.)
President Nixon: I’m sure Dr. Kissinger was too.
Prime Minister Chou: That’s right.
Vice Minister Ch’iao: That’s fair.
President Nixon: On things of very great importance it is necessary to be frank. One must discuss matters good-humoredly but directly. It was very different with Mr. Khrushchev. He took his shoe off and hit the table. That was before the Vice Minister was there.
Prime Minister Chou: As I said yesterday to Mr. President, today I would like to say something about our general position and point of view. Because we plan to talk in the joint communiqué about the five principles of peaceful coexistence and that both sides are prepared to make efforts for realizing these principles in our relations. As Mr. President has said, neither side has any territorial designs on the other. Neither side wants to dominate the other nor impose its will. But, of course, to realize this a process is required. On our side there is less difficulty with that. But as for you, Mr. President, it is not only a matter of a political step by you, yourself, it is a matter of things left over from the previous administration. These are things you must clear up.
President Nixon: That’s true.
Prime Minister Chou: In this sense, after publishing the joint communiqué, we consider it good for the leaders of the two parties to come
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...exploring the communiqué frankly and in an aboveboard manner. Of course, we will say nothing about the private discussions. We would then hope that both parties in your country would support that approach and that attitude, since it is not a question of the President’s election, but for the benefit of the long-term interests of the two people.

And so those four points of principle that we would declare we will have in common, in the latter part of the communiqué, that is something we should work to put into effect. That is to say, to normalize relations between our two countries is not only in the interest of the two peoples but also in the interest of the peoples of the world. We are not xenophobes. And our attitude toward US-Soviet negotiations can bear testimony to that. They claim that our two sides are discussing how to oppose the Soviet Union, to conclude an anti-Soviet alliance. In Moscow they are making that proposition. So our attitude in this matter is very clear.

And then on the second principle which is common, both wish to reduce the danger of international military conflict. I have indicated our opinion that the US and Soviet Union reach an agreement on limiting nuclear armaments; wouldn’t that be good? If an agreement to that effect is not reached, that is their fault.

President Nixon: The Soviets?
Prime Minister Chou: Yes.
President Nixon: We are ready.
Prime Minister Chou: Yes.

The third principle is that neither of us should seek hegemony in the Asia-Pacific region. And that would imply not only our two countries should not seek hegemony in this region, but that Japan should not either.

President Nixon: And the Soviet Union.
Prime Minister Chou: That’s right. Nor the Soviet Union.
President Nixon: Nor India.
Prime Minister Chou: That’s right. Here it implies that both will try to do good things, not do bad things.

President Nixon: Let me clarify. It implies that neither of our two sides should seek hegemony. It also implies, to the extent that each of us can, that we will resist efforts of others to seek hegemony. Is that what it means?

Prime Minister Chou: Yes, that is we oppose any efforts by another country.

(Dr. Kissinger reads the sentence from the joint communiqué on hegemony.)
Prime Minister Chou: And the fourth principle agreed upon is that neither is prepared to negotiate on behalf of third countries or enter into agreements or understandings directed at other states.

So, it’s very clear that what we are engaged in is bilateral negotiations, and we do not negotiate on behalf of any third countries. The matters of third countries are their matters.

So these four principles between us will be able to keep any misunderstanding from arising.

President Nixon: He has to explain to the press because most of the press don’t even know what “hegemony” is. (Prime Minister Chou laughs.)

Dr. Kissinger: But as I told the Vice Minister, the President has instructed me to work out a line either with the Vice Minister or you, if you agree.

President Nixon: What you want to say.

Dr. Kissinger: What we will say we will decide ahead of time and not go beyond it. I will tell you ahead of time exactly how I explain the communiqué subjects.

Prime Minister Chou: Since we are going to reach agreement, then we should see to it that the interpretations of the two sides should be identical or approximate to each other. We should not have misunderstandings arise over the communiqué. You face more trouble than we. You have to report to the Secretary of State. The Vice Minister, of course, reports to his Minister. The problem is easier for him to report to his Minister than for you to report to the Secretary of State. Because, as Mr. President is aware, we absolutely will not leak anything out of what is discussed.

Now, I will go on to some concrete issues.

First, the question of Taiwan. That memorandum that Secretary Rogers submitted to Mr. President is already known to the Japanese.2

Dr. Kissinger: I gave the Vice Minister yesterday a draft of the State language in order to show that we really had gone very far. It is possible that they showed it to them.

Prime Minister Chou: We learned of this last night. And I saw this news in bed early this morning, a dispatch from a German news agency from Tokyo that Foreign Minister Fukuda leaked it out. And the content that Fukuda revealed to the press was similar to what the Secretary of State gave you on Taiwan.

President Nixon: Taiwan, not Japan.

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2 Apparent reference to the memorandum summarized in Document 208.
Prime Minister Chou: Taiwan.

Dr. Kissinger: The only section I showed was the Taiwan section.

Prime Minister Chou: I told Mr. President yesterday the Secretary of State told my assistant Chi Peng-fei that he wants to take part in the discussions on the Taiwan portions, and that shows that this Taiwan question is the crucial question for you as well as for us. Because if in the communiqué the U.S. is not to point out all the direction in the future toward solution of the question, if this is not pointed out, it would not be possible to give an account to our people, or neighboring countries or other countries concerned with us.

And in the draft Dr. Kissinger handed over this afternoon, it was mentioned at the end that question about the withdrawal, the final withdrawal, and there is no question about the date for such withdrawal. But you had it linked up with certain conditions.

That, of course, is a matter for Dr. Kissinger and the Vice Foreign Minister to rack their brains as to what should be the proposed formulation. That is to say to have it so both sides understand some obligation but not make it so that people know exactly. It should not be so rigid.

President Nixon: That’s what we want. We have not found it yet.

Prime Minister Chou: At the same time you want a peaceful liberation. Dr. Kissinger mentioned in his private talks on the last day and in reply to Dr. Kissinger we said that we will strive for peaceful liberation. It is a matter for both sides. We want this. What will we do if they don’t want it? While your armed forces are there our armed forces will not engage in military confrontation with your armed forces. That I mentioned in the toast at the banquet. I also said that 15 years before. Therefore, our position in this matter is very clear. When the President first took office one of the first signs of the good will of your Administration was that the Seventh Fleet no longer patrolled the Taiwan Straits, but just passed by now and then. So both our sides had by implication envisaged how this Taiwan question would be solved.

I already told Mr. President yesterday that even after Taiwan is returned to the mainland, there is no necessity for us to engage in such construction on Taiwan as building nuclear bases. That is to say, we will not use Taiwan against Japan. Japan may feel at ease about that.

And so in this sense it is our hope, it would be good if the liberation of Taiwan could be realized in your next term of office. That, of course, is only a hope. Of course that’s our internal affair. We cannot express the hope that you should not interfere in this internal affair.

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3 See Document 198.
You should not impose anything on us nor should we impose anything on Chiang Kai-shek. But also, Mr. President, you should be aware that there are not too many days left to Chiang Kai-shek.

President Nixon: Age?
Prime Minister Chou: Yes.
President Nixon: Yes.
Prime Minister Chou: But his idea is that there is only one China. So we appreciate this point of his. In 1958, then Secretary Dulles wanted Chiang Kai-shek to give up the islands of Quemoy and Matsu so as to completely sever Taiwan and the mainland and draw a line there. Chiang Kai-shek was not willing to do this. We also advised him not to withdraw from Quemoy and Matsu. We advised him not to withdraw by firing artillery shells at them—that is, on odd days we would shell them, and not shell them on even days, and on holidays we would not shell them. So they understood our intentions and didn’t withdraw. No other means or messages were required; just by this method of shelling they understood.

As Chairman Mao told you the other day, he has known Chiang Kai-shek since 1924, that is, he is an acquaintance of almost 50 years. So we have fought with him and cooperated with him at different times. So we are quite clear about both sides. Since it is your principle, Mr. President to have no territorial designs on China and approve of only one China, then we should make efforts to try to apply those principles while you are still in office. Because that would be beneficial to our two countries, while at the same time posing no threat. I should say very frankly that when Dr. Kissinger said that it would take ten years, that would be too long. This was at a briefing conference, you said that maybe it would take ten years, but that would be too long. It is better not to mention any date. I can’t wait ten years. You have ten years. You can wait for ten years. Mr. President may be reelected to a third term.

Dr. Kissinger: That’s against the Constitution.
Prime Minister Chou: After four years then you can run again because your age permits you to do that. But in view of the age of the present leaders of China, it is not possible. They’re too old.

President Nixon: Mr. Prime Minister, former presidents of the United States are like British Kings; they have great responsibility, but no power. I mean one who is out of office.

Prime Minister Chou: But your career is quite rare in history. You have been Vice President for two terms, then lost and then won an election again. It’s quite rare in history.

President Nixon: One can still have influence if one is out of office.
Prime Minister Chou: As Chairman Mao said the other day, he will give you one vote.

President Nixon: That would be a big vote.

Prime Minister Chou: So we hope to solve this question in a friendly way, since already more than 20 years have passed. According to the solution to the question put forward by John Foster Dulles at the Warsaw Talks the time limit has already been passed. Dulles put forward the proposal through the American Ambassador that so long as China did not use force for a period of 10, 15 or 20 years he would be satisfied. If we had concluded such an agreement then the 15 years would have long passed by now. You can look at the archives in the State Department.

Dr. Kissinger: You have never been wrong on a factual matter yet.

Prime Minister Chou: I have grounds for what I am saying. But if we accepted such a principle, it would be equivalent to accepting interference in our internal affairs. So we cannot accept that.

In our present efforts at formulation it is shown that the two sides approach each other in views, but there is no question of interfering in internal affairs, and that would be good. We are not asking you to remove Chiang Kai-shek. We will take care of that ourselves.

President Nixon: Peacefully.

Prime Minister Chou: Yes, we have self-confidence. How would we do that if we didn’t have self-confidence? As we solve ourselves this question, your forces, of course, may leave and that would be quite natural.

So the Taiwan question is the crucial question between our two countries, and here I cannot but add that it was the result of a mistake by former President Truman. We needn’t put that in the communiqué. I want to say it here.

That is to say, it is indeed not an easy thing for two countries which have been hostile toward each other for so long to adopt such methods to solve problems. This was made possible only because we have the great spirit of Chairman Mao. He has the courage to write such things down and realize them in such a way. Because in the formulation of the Taiwan question we are going to work out, each side states its own position, but if one has profound understanding one can see that there is common ground between our two countries toward this question. But if one looks at it in a general or superficial way one may not see that common ground.

So on this question it is only the great spirit expressed by Chairman Mao that makes us dare to do so. Only because of the great trust placed in Chairman Mao by our 700 million people that we are able to put forward such a document.
So Mr. President should realize that we do have our difficulties, but we have the courage to take on such difficulties, to overcome them.

So we must arrive at an agreement on this one matter. Once agreement is reached on that, all others can be solved easily. That is, the Taiwan question is the crucial question. I believe you will surely be able to find some formulation to at least approximate our view.

President Nixon: Does the Prime Minister want me to comment now or wait for the other issues?

Prime Minister Chou: Please.

President Nixon: As I said in my opening statements, we have first the problem of what I will do. And I have indicated already that my goal—the Prime Minister has already referred to it directly—my goal is normalization with the People’s Republic. I realize that solving the Taiwan problem is indispensable to achieving that goal. Now, the problem of direction, therefore, between the Prime Minister and myself, and Chairman Mao and myself, is decided. This direction is normalization. I started down this road in 1967 in an article in Foreign Affairs, with some rhetoric. And now we are trying to follow it with action. The goal of normalization is the one which I alone at the outset initiated and it’s my intent to realize this goal.

Now the problem of what we say about achieving that goal will directly affect whether I can achieve it. And if our communiqué, after our two experts work on it, is one that gives opponents a chance to seize upon the communiqué and say that the President of the United States came 16,000 miles in order to repudiate a commitment to the government on Taiwan, this could poison our relationship in the months ahead.

To give an example, when I ordered action with regard to the Seventh Fleet, there was opposition in our bureaucracy, but I did it. And as Vietnam is concluded, as it will be concluded one way or another, the removal of the two-thirds of our forces (on Taiwan) will be done. There will be opposition, but it will be done.

And I can also move to reduce our other forces, the remaining one-third, I can do that as our relationship develops.

One thing that is very important—and I know the Prime Minister with his understanding of our press and Congress will realize this—I must be able to go back to Washington and say that no secret deals have been made between the Prime Minister and myself on Taiwan. So what I must do is to have what we would call “running room” which the communiqué language I hope will provide, which will not make Taiwan a big issue in the next two or three months and next two, three, or four years. So I can do the things to move us toward achieving our goal.
Prime Minister Chou: On this our Foreign Minister has similarities with the Secretary of State—he has his limitations. We were just discussing this a few minutes ago because I said we should leave some running room, and no time limit. That is, you have your difficulties, and we have our difficulties. On this point our Foreign Minister represents the feelings of the people. But it is possible for us to persuade our people because of the prestige of the leadership of Chairman Mao.

President Nixon: Chairman Mao takes the long view, as I do. I don’t mean 1,000 years, nor do I mean ten years on this issue. But I think the Prime Minister should have in mind, and Chairman Mao should have in mind, that I have stated my goal is normalization. If I should win the election, I have five years to achieve it. I cannot, for the reasons just mentioned, now make a secret deal and shake hands and say that within the second term it will be done. If I did that, I would be at the mercy of the press if they asked the question. I don’t want to say that.

Let me use a comparison with Japan. For example, I know the Prime Minister’s position is that we should withdraw our forces from Japan. I do not agree with that position, as shown in the communiqué, and I will not withdraw our forces from Japan, because I believe that our interest in peace in the Pacific is to restrain Japan. All the things that we have talked about require our forces staying.

With regard to Taiwan I do not believe a permanent American presence—whatever happens in our meetings—is necessary to American security. And for that reason my goal—we can now use this term in this meeting—my goal is the withdrawal of our remaining forces, not just two-thirds, but all forces, including the remaining one-third. That is a goal which I can achieve.

Now, if the Prime Minister could also understand how I may have to present that in order to sell it to our Congress. That is, it must be consistent with the doctrine—which I know the Prime Minister does not approve of—the so-called Nixon Doctrine. Under the Doctrine we are cutting our forces in Korea. Of course, Korea is a different case because in some ways it is tied to Japan and is different from Taiwan. I think how I do this, Mr. Prime Minister, is something I have to handle with my public opinion. Two-thirds will go, hopefully as soon as we can finish our Vietnam involvement. My plan also is one which reduces the one-third and withdraws it during the period I have the power to act. But I cannot do it before January of next year. It has to be over a period of four years.

Now if someone asks me when I return, do you have a deal with the Prime Minister that you are going to withdraw all American forces from Taiwan, I will say “no.” But I am telling the Prime Minister that it is my plan, and as step-by-step I withdraw I can develop
the support that I will need to get the approval from our Congress for that action.

And I would put it on a basis for our public opinion—I think it would not be harmful to your public opinion either—that the presence of American forces on Taiwan is no longer needed.

Now I said to Chairman Mao that he didn’t know me and therefore he shouldn’t trust me. But I only said that because I feel it is important that we develop complete candor and recognize that neither of us would do anything unless we considered it was in our interests. And what I am saying to the Prime Minister is this: I am not asking him to trust me. This policy—I am not asking for a piece of paper on it—I have determined, looking at American self-interest, looking at the desire to have normalization with the People’s Republic, I have determined that we should proceed with the withdrawal of American forces according to the timetable I have just described.

I would simply close by saying that I can do this without question in my mind because I know the political situation very well, if I can do it gradually but inevitably. But if I were to announce it now, it would make it very difficult to do it, because it would raise the issue at the wrong time.

That is all.

Prime Minister Chou: Our request is not to have any time limit. We didn’t raise the question of a time limit. As for the question of one China, that is already mentioned in the five principles. I have attached importance to these points put forward by Mr. President.

Firstly, you hope for and will not hinder a peaceful liberation. Secondly, it was that you would discourage and not allow Japanese armed forces to come to Taiwan while your forces are still there. You will try to avoid in any event—but need forces in Japan to do that.

President Nixon: That’s right, while we still have forces in Japan. But you meant while our forces are still on Taiwan?

Prime Minister Chou: Yes, while your forces are still on Taiwan. You will discourage the Japanese from coming in while they are there?

President Nixon: I will go further. We will try to keep Japanese forces from coming into Taiwan after our forces leave.

Prime Minister Chou: That is to say, while you still have forces in Japan?

President Nixon: Precisely that. Unless we have forces in Japan, they won’t pay any attention to us.

Prime Minister Chou: And the third point you mentioned was that you would not support or allow a Taiwan Independence Movement, nor encourage it, either in the U.S. or Taiwan.

Dr. Kissinger: Encourage. “Allow” is beyond our capability.
Prime Minister Chou: Discourage?
President Nixon: Discourage.
Prime Minister Chou: But you should say that you would not allow a Taiwan Independence Movement on Taiwan while American forces are still on Taiwan. That is important.
President Nixon: While they are still there.
Prime Minister Chou: Because you know even Chiang Kai-shek said that you let Peng Meng-min out. 4
Dr. Kissinger: That is not true. I mention this simply because the Prime Minister and I have talked about it before. Mr. President, as you will recall from the transcripts I told the Prime Minister that no American personnel, directly or indirectly, nor any American agency, directly or indirectly, will give any encouragement or support in any way to the Taiwan Independence Movement. If he has information, give it to us through our channel, and we will take action to stop it.
President Nixon: I endorse that commitment at this meeting today.
Prime Minister Chou: I have received material to effect that Peng Meng-min was able to escape with help from the Americans. He was Dr. Kissinger’s student, like Mr. Reischauer.
President Nixon: Mr. Prime Minister, Chiang Kai-shek did not like it. You did not like it either. Neither did we like it. We had nothing to do with it.
Dr. Kissinger: To the best of my knowledge that professor was probably able to leave because of help from American anti Chiang Kai-shek left wing groups.
President Nixon: Chiang Kai-shek objected to us.
Dr. Kissinger: It was politically difficult for us to stop because we were not then in contact with each other. We tried to discourage it. If it happens again we can probably stop it. He had gone to Sweden. He was not on Taiwan. He was in Sweden, from which it was very hard not to let him come to America.
I also told the Prime Minister, Mr. President, that we would not support directly or indirectly as a government, or any other form, the Taiwan Independence Movement within the United States. And if he has any other information to the contrary we would try to stop it. 5
President Nixon: And I endorse that commitment.
Dr. Kissinger: What we cannot do is to use our forces to suppress the movement on Taiwan if it develops without our support.

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4 See Documents 65, 91, and 178.
5 See Document 212.
Prime Minister Chou: That is true. Chiang Kai-shek will do that. That he has the strength to do.

President Nixon: That is what we have heard.

Prime Minister Chou: As to what kind of proper formulation to find on the Taiwan case, you two will work that out. Only after that is solved, can we very well agree to hold a plenary meeting to discuss the matter.

President Nixon: Absolutely.

Prime Minister Chou: After we solve the question.

President Nixon: This is a matter we should solve between ourselves and not put in a big meeting.

Prime Minister Chou: That is true.

President Nixon: We have to sell our people, Rogers and Green. That is our problem. That is Dr. Kissinger’s job. (Prime Minister Chou laughs.) But not in a plenary session.

Prime Minister Chou: I would like to discuss another matter. Of course, we are only having an exchange of views. The second question then is Indochina. As for Indochina, you know about the proposal of the Indochinese. We support this proposal.

President Nixon: The seven points.

Prime Minister Chou: We support the seven points of the Provisional Revolutionary Government, and also the two point elaboration, and also the Joint Declaration of the Summit Conference of the Indochinese Peoples. That is quite clear.

And if the war there continues, whether after the withdrawal of American forces or whether there are still some American forces left and the war goes on, we will continue our support, not only to Vietnam but to all three Indochinese countries. That is inevitable.

Thirdly, if the U.S. completely disinvolved itself and it becomes primarily a civil war, we would still support the sides which we are supporting, whether in Vietnam, Laos or Cambodia. That has been our position all along and we will not change it. Of course, we hope the war will stop. But your two sides have not yet found a way out, and we cannot meddle in this. We can only wait. And we have repeatedly made clear that we only have the duty to support them, not the duty to negotiate on their behalf. This has already been made clear in the four points.

But I would like to say something which was not put into the communiqué. Nor is it a view that we want to impose on you; it is only our view. And that is, Mr. President, for a leader like you, who is known for your farsightedness, it would not be beneficial for you or for the honor of the United States to leave behind a “tail,” although you are still determined to carry out the withdrawal of 500,000 troops. Because
there are people in Saigon and Phnom Penh who are not reliable friends, in the end the people will cast them aside. The war there might be dragged out.

President Nixon: What does the Prime Minister mean by a “tail?”

President Nixon: I appreciate the Prime Minister’s frankness. He knows we have a difficult position, in the sense that the Prime Minister mentioned, that we came here with many saying that we were going to get help from the Prime Minister’s government in ending the Vietnam war. Of course, what the Prime Minister is telling us is that he cannot help us in Vietnam.

President Nixon: I want the Prime Minister to know that naturally we have to do what is necessary to defend our interests, to protect our forces and get back our prisoners. I realize that the Prime Minister’s government may have to react to what we do. We will do nothing that we do not consider necessary to accomplish our goal. And our goal is an eventual withdrawal after the return of our prisoners. But if we cannot get negotiations, it is not we, but the North Vietnamese who have forced us to continue to use military action.

But the settlement of Vietnam, Mr. Prime Minister, is inevitable because I have made a decision. But it must be done in the right way. It won’t be with us very much longer.
President Nixon: Yes. Completion of American withdrawal.

But as I have said, I emphasize that it must be done in the right way. We are not going to engage in unilateral withdrawal without accomplishing the objectives of our policy there.

Prime Minister Chou: But that makes things rather complicated. Because your policy is not something started by your government, but by your predecessors. In the first place, there was no need to send American forces in. When you did send them in more and more were sent in, and you got yourself bogged down. And so your present government was compelled to want to bring about withdrawal, and you found this unfortunate problem on your hands.

As for the release of the prisoners of war, they are bound to be released. That is the natural thing. But there are also some exceptions, like India. They have captured so many prisoners of war from Pakistan and want to keep them for bargaining.

President Nixon: That is what North Vietnam is doing to us.

Prime Minister Chou: In talking about prisoners of war, I want to mention something. It happened while you were Vice President and you may not be clear about that. We exercised great control over ourselves. It is a good thing, after all that President Eisenhower brought an end to the war in Korea. But your prisoners of war and the prisoners of war of other countries on your side were all released by the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea. But as for our prisoners of war, quite a large number of them, Chiang Kai-shek sent people to work with them who engaged in all kinds of special activities in the prisoner of war camps in South Korea. The formal repatriation of prisoners was done under the supervision of an international commission with India as chairman. And there was a so-called screening process set up—a small cubicle—and they let prisoners come in one door, asked them if they wanted to go back to Taiwan and then let them out the other door. Under those circumstances, under armed threat to their person, it was not really possible for these prisoners to say what they wanted to say. Many of those prisoners were sent to Taiwan; some fled and then came back to the mainland.

We could have made a big issue, and say: “What right does Chiang Kai-shek have to meddle in this matter of repatriating prisoners?” Because both sides wanted to terminate the conflict, and we sent only volunteers there, we thought it was not good to insist that the war continue over the question of prisoners. The number of our prisoners who were coerced to go to Taiwan was not in thousands, but up to ten thousand or more. But we tolerated that.

So whenever there is war things cannot be the same. For us at that time although it was a matter of principle, as far as we were concerned we thought the best thing was to end the war. I just say that much. It is a matter of history, but something very much in our hearts. But when
prisoners of ours went to Taiwan, it was still Chinese territory. Maybe some of them went into the Chiang Kai-shek army. Most of them now are quite old, and some have fled back to the mainland.

President Nixon: With regard to Vietnam, if I may just add one point. We understand the Prime Minister’s position. However, we would hope, while he cannot say he can interfere in this situation, that he would at least not do what the Soviets appear to be doing, that he would not encourage the North Vietnamese to refuse to negotiate.

The problem is the Soviet Union wants the U.S. to be tied down in Vietnam. It doesn’t want our involvement to end. It appears to be discouraging the North Vietnamese from negotiating. I do not ask the Prime Minister to respond, but if they are discouraged from negotiating by both the Soviet Union and the People’s Republic, this poses a problem.

Prime Minister Chou: When the Johnson Administration, at the beginning, announced the bombing halt in 1968, at that time we were not very much for the Paris negotiations. At that time we felt it was not very opportune, but after 1969 our position changed to supporting the negotiations. In fact, in order to help the Paris negotiations bear fruit, we stopped the Warsaw Talks. And then, it was only later because of what happened in a fashion show in the Yugoslav Embassy in Warsaw that these talks again started. And they told us something about what was going on in negotiations. From that time onwards we were for negotiations because in fighting there is also bound to be negotiations, such as in the Korean War.

Mr. Ch’iao Kuan-hua also took part in the Korean negotiations which went on for over two years. Finally an armistice agreement was achieved in 1953.

The channel of negotiations should not be closed. We can only go so far. We cannot meddle into their affairs.

I will tell you a story. That is with regard to Cambodia, as I see it, Prince Sihanouk is quite an intelligent man.

President Nixon: I knew him.

Prime Minister Chou: And a patriot. And I believe that he is quite different from Lon Nol or Sirik Matak or Son Ngoc Thanh. Of course, as they are in a state of war it is quite inevitable, natural for Prince Sihanouk to ally himself with leftist forces in Cambodia. But they have their own independent policies. Although some members of Prince Sihanouk’s government are in Peking we have never meddled in their affairs. He has already written over 30 messages and published these for his people. And we offer him free access to the People’s Daily for publishing.

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6 Son Ngoc Thanh, Cambodian First Minister under Lon Nol in 1972.
He writes his messages entirely according to his own thinking. His ideology is completely different from ours. Dr. Kissinger knows that and so will the President. On this point our freedom of speech is greater than any other country. He has now been in China almost two years. The articles that he has published in the People’s Daily could be compiled into thick books. The number of articles and statements issued by any of us could not exceed his. Why? Because he is a patriot. So we support him. He is neither a communist nor a socialist nor a Marxist, but a patriot.

So as we continue to have a mutual understanding with each other I like to tell you that this is our position.

President Nixon: We . . .

Prime Minister Chou: You know, Senator Mansfield is a close friend of Sihanouk.

President Nixon: I met Sihanouk twice in 1953.

Prime Minister Chou: In Phnom Penh?

President Nixon: In Phnom Penh, and also when he came to Washington in early 1953. No one believes this, but it was not our policy that deposed him in Cambodia.

Prime Minister Chou: (Laughs) We had a dispute about that with Dr. Kissinger.

President Nixon: I think that if he had a closeness to China, this would not hurt Sihanouk, but his closeness to the North Vietnamese hurt him because the Cambodians hate the North Vietnamese. That is my analysis; I realize it is not the same as the Prime Minister’s. But I think that is what happened.

If the North Vietnamese would get out of Cambodia, then the Cambodians could determine whether they might want Sihanouk back. But as long as they are in Cambodia, I think there is very little chance of his returning to power. That’s just my view, but we have no way to control that event.

Prime Minister Chou: As our method of analysis differs, so we cannot come to the same conclusion. Because as we see it, the Johnson Administration sent American forces to suppress patriots in South Vietnam, and under these circumstances how can you refuse their compatriots in the north coming south to assist their brothers in the south?

President Nixon: I think I can understand this although I oppose it. I can understand North Vietnamese going into the south; it’s all Vietnam. But North Vietnam has no business going into Cambodia. The Cambodians always fought the North Vietnamese, all Vietnamese.

\(^7\) All ellipses are in the source text.
There is no justification to their going into Cambodia. That’s my way of thinking. But I am afraid what we say here will not affect it.

Prime Minister Chou: It is a question of historical perspective, because the French colonialists linked together the three Indochina countries and linked their interests together. The very word “Indochina” was given by the French. Before there was no such name. There was no such name before. They are three separate countries in history. China’s relations with Vietnam were very close; second, we had ties with Cambodia by sea; there was not so much relations with Laos.

It was French colonialism which linked their interests. Then there was the question of redrawing boundary lines by the French, which enhanced the contradictions between the three countries, like the British in Africa.

President Nixon: The McMahon Line (Prime Minister Chou laughs).

Prime Minister Chou: And then after Japanese were defeated, the French returned and again occupied the three countries of Indochina, and that again linked the three peoples together to fight French colonialism. After the 1954 agreements, the three countries were again separated. Only then did we come to know the situation in the three countries; before we knew little about them, only Vietnam. President Ho Chi Minh was on very close terms with us.

And after the Geneva Conference, if the then American Government had not sabotaged the Geneva Agreements, the situation would have been different. Vietnam would have been unified. Cambodia probably would have remained under Prince Sihanouk. As for Laos, that situation is different, but would have been solved by the 1962 Geneva Accords on Laos.

But then during the Johnson Administration, Johnson sent so many forces into South Vietnam—if you look merely at the numbers, the physical strength, they exceed the South Vietnamese armed forces and also the North Vietnamese armed forces. These were circumstances that were well known throughout the world. Even the American people talked about them, as did the Chinese people.

And because of that, the Vietnamese forces made use of Cambodia as a place for troop movements and cover but we only came to know about that in 1969. The fact was that Prince Sihanouk sympathized with the Vietnamese troops and allowed them to pass through Cambodia because in the days of resistance against French colonialism they were together. So that sympathy expressed by Prince Sihanouk for North Vietnam should be understandable.

So if the war comes to an end, the Vietnamese forces will surely withdraw from Cambodia, and Cambodia will be Cambodian.
President Nixon: The Prime Minister stated that the principle of the People’s Republic is not to intervene militarily with armed forces in neighboring states. Does the Prime Minister then oppose North Vietnamese domination of Cambodia and Laos by military forces? That is our position.

Prime Minister Chou: It is only because the war had already broken out, the war was given rise to by the U.S., that they are conducting their operations there.

President Nixon: When the war is over, does the Prime Minister believe that North Vietnam should get out of Cambodia and get out of Laos?

Prime Minister Chou: If the war is completely stopped, that is to say a reversion of Cambodia to Prince Sihanouk, then the North Vietnamese will surely withdraw. If there is still Lon Nol in Cambodia, that is not possible. Because even the majority of the Cambodians themselves do not support Lon Nol. He is someone imposed from the outside.

I still maintain on the Indochina question you made a mistake. Of course, that is not the responsibility of your government. Because at that time that region could have become a region of peace and neutrality, or at least two-thirds of the region could have become that. But because of John Foster Dulles’ policy of drawing lines here and there and sabotaging the Geneva Agreements, the whole thing turned into a mess. That was borne out by Anthony Eden in his memoirs. The agreements arrived at in Geneva explicitly stipulated a plebiscite after two years, but Dulles said that was just for domestic consumption.

So if we are to bring about an area of peace and neutrality, not only for the three countries of Indochina but for Southeast Asia as a whole and friendly to the area as a whole, I think the time is not too late to do that. Otherwise there will be no tranquility. I mean not just Indochina, but Southeast Asia—Thailand, Malaysia, Singapore, the Philippines. There is that tendency now in those countries. We should help them in that direction, to gain independence in that way.

But in that case, Mr. President, you might say that another power vacuum would be built up, and it would complicate the situation. Anyway, you know that we would not go in those places. You admit that. Our conviction is that if trouble arises the people will fill up the vacuum. In the first meeting I discussed that; but, of course, the timing may not be so quick. It depends on the political consciousness of the people in each country.

So indeed there is a possibility that in a particular country if the people have not yet risen up, a certain big power will go there and set up a sphere of influence. We have that in our communiqué (reading from the communiqué).
President Nixon: We have a different view. As I told the Prime Minister we respect his views. Regarding Vietnam, the North Vietnamese have rejected our eight-point proposal. It is a good one which could bring about the very goal the Prime Minister is describing of a neutral Indochina, as far as the neutrality of Cambodia, Laos and Vietnam is concerned. I will say that this is our problem now, and I will solve it in the right way.

I am glad that the Prime Minister’s government will not try to discourage the North Vietnamese from negotiating. That is the best way to solve it rather than by solving it militarily.

Prime Minister Chou: Then here is a concrete question, just an isolated problem. They said they wanted to continue negotiations. You said no on the 17th of this month and then agreed to the 24th. The reason you refused was because of the Peoples’ Conference in Versailles.

Dr. Kissinger: We felt it was not appropriate for negotiations. They are meeting today.

President Nixon: Right. We will be very forthcoming in trying to negotiate, but we cannot be dictated to on this issue by North Vietnam. We are not trying to dictate to them. They are not trying to negotiate. They say here it is, take it or leave it and that we cannot accept. If they talk reasonably, as the Prime Minister and I are talking, though we disagree we could find common ground. This could have been settled two years ago when secret talks started, but they won’t talk that way. Right, Henry?

Prime Minister Chou: You have held 12 secret meetings?

Dr. Kissinger: Right, but once there were two meetings in one day so we counted them as one. (Chou laughs.)

Prime Minister Chou: Another question is Korea.

President Nixon: Korea?

Prime Minister Chou: Korea. We of course appreciate the gradual reduction of your forces in Korea.

President Nixon: We are down by one third already.

Prime Minister Chou: But if Japanese armed forces are allowed to invade South Korea that would create tension. Dr. Kissinger admitted that Japan had made some attempts, and they had already sent personnel. Of course, these are not in the form of troops, but some military men. We are watching closely such activity of theirs, and we believe you are, too.

President Nixon: That is one place that where neither the interest of the People’s Republic or the United States would be served by the Japanese intervention in Korea. We cannot guarantee we can keep out Japanese intervention, but to the extent we can do so, we will use our influence to discourage it.
Prime Minister Chou: As for the question of Japan, I suppose you are aware that a state of war actually still exists between China and Japan because the so-called peace treaty with Chiang Kai-shek cannot count; even Chiang Kai-shek admits that. So they are bound to want to find a way out.

The present Sato government’s words do not count. The Sato government may say one thing one day, and on another day they say another. Even their own Diet no longer believes them.

So we are placing our hope on the next Japanese government, because if China and Japan are able to restore diplomatic relations, Chinese-Japanese friendship should not hurt the relations between Japan and the United States.

We even said that if we are able to establish diplomatic relations with Japan and conclude a peace treaty with Japan, then we will even consider a mutual non-aggression pact with Japan. They are worried about our nuclear armament, but we can guarantee that we will not be the first to use them. So we don’t pose any threat to them. But such a treaty would not exclude Japan from having relations with other countries.

At the present moment the Soviet Union is probably more strongly opposed to Japan’s having diplomatic relations with us than you. In Gromyko’s recent visit to Japan he openly told Fukuda, that is Gromyko told Fukuda, that within five years you will see a conflict between China and the Soviet Union that would be even bigger than that which occurred in the Chen Pao Island incident.

The second thing Gromyko told Fukuda is that the Soviet Union might consider the question of the four Northern Islands in the peace treaty but that those four islands cannot be returned now. Why? Because the Sino-Soviet boundary negotiations are going on, and if the Soviet Union returned them now it would be favorable to China versus the Soviet Union.

President Nixon: A chain reaction. They will never get them back. The Soviet Union has never returned anything to anybody.

Prime Minister Chou: They always regret the Czar’s selling Alaska. How much was it, $5 million?

Dr. Kissinger: $10 million.

President Nixon: It was the best purchase ever made. Now it has oil.

Prime Minister Chou: They didn’t know about that at that time.

President Nixon: There is a very big oil field there.

Prime Minister Chou: You received the Japanese Emperor there last year. And you are going back this time. . . .

President Nixon: We will stay overnight.
Prime Minister Chou: It won’t be as warm as Guam or Hawaii.

President Nixon: There is no daytime; it is all night. Maybe two to three hours of sunlight. The “midnight sun,” they call it.

Prime Minister Chou: On this question of Japan, if either of our sides learns anything it would be good if they would inform the other side. Because we also hope that in the Pacific region it would be good if Japan were to become a peaceful, independent, and neutral country.

President Nixon: The important thing there is if we can do it in total confidence.

Prime Minister Chou: That is true. We shouldn’t let Japan think we are imposing on her, because we really are not doing so. In China’s history we have never invaded Japan although Japan did invade China, in the end we drove them out. Now we pose no threat to Japan.

Dr. Kissinger: I think, Mr. President, that one matter might be mentioned, given the tendency of the Japanese Government to speak to the press and the unreliability of the Japanese press. We should have an understanding that if we say something to one another, we should say it to each other directly and not indirectly through Japan. I had a bad experience with the Japanese political leader of the Democratic Socialist Party, Kosaka, to whom I gave an interim assessment on the Taiwan question, among other things. He treated it as if it were a formal pronouncement on Taiwan; but this was totally incorrect.

President Nixon: This should be in total confidence.

Prime Minister Chou: Japan is engaging in economic development and she should engage in economic development, but she develops too rapidly, and that excessive rapidity has something to do with your former policies on Japan. You didn’t pay enough attention to that. You helped Japan fatten herself, and now she is a very heavy burden on you.

President Nixon: It is interesting to note, however, that both the defeated countries in World War II, Germany and Japan, received U.S. aid. Also many other countries did, and I think if we analyze why Germany and Japan have done so well, it is because they have qualities of drive and are willing to work hard, whereas some other countries we have helped do not have this quality. This brings me to the point: it is not the help that is provided a country that counts, it is whether the people of that country have the will to use this help. If they don’t have that, the money just goes down a rathole.

A pretty good example is aid to India. (Prime Minister Chou laughs.) We don’t regret having given it, apart from the fact that the more aid we have given, the less influence we have. The point is that India is not able to do much with aid because as compared with Japan, it does not have the drive, or the spirit of determination that the Japanese people have.
Prime Minister Chou: Well, the quality of people is something, but people throughout the world have common qualities. The most important thing is that both Japan and Germany were defeated powers who wanted to restore their vitality. You could also say Italy, but it lacks spirit. You could find that example.

President Nixon: Japan and Germany have great drive, and the Chinese people also. They have common qualities. But some people on the subcontinent, maybe because of the environment, never had these qualities. I would only respectfully advise the Prime Minister that if his government provides aid to India, don’t expect anything in return. (Chinese laughter.) Except a slap in the face. (Chinese laughter.) Dr. Kissinger was a great supporter of aid for India, but I have made a convert out of him now. Now you can speak for yourself.

Dr. Kissinger: The President meant the American Indians. (Prime Minister Chou laughs.)

Prime Minister Chou: As for the subcontinent, our first sympathy is with Pakistan for being dismembered. We should give her help. Mr. President said that he was only in the position to give her economic aid. I have noted that. As for recognizing Bangladesh, when a decision is made to recognize, please tell us beforehand. It has already been agreed that you would tell us you would do that.

As for us, our recognition of Bangladesh certainly will be later than yours, and we may be the last. But that does not mean we will refuse to have any contact whatsoever with an area with so huge a population. That is not in our interest. We don’t want to place Pakistan in a predicament, make her think that she has no friends. Also we must take account of the feeling of Islamic countries.

Even before the India–Pakistan conflict, we were contemplating returning our ambassador to India. We wanted to improve our relations with India. The Indian government expressed a desire for that, too. Madame Gandhi published this.

President Nixon: She told me that when I saw her in New Delhi and in Washington. But she also told me some other things, too. (Prime Minister Chou laughs.) She said she would not oppose my meetings with the Prime Minister and the Chinese government, just don’t harm her.

Prime Minister Chou: But . . .

President Nixon: But . . .

Prime Minister Chou: Don’t harm her—who wants to harm her?

Dr. Kissinger: Mr. President, we should point out again, with regard to recognizing Bangladesh, the decision you have made to gear our recognition to the withdrawal of Indian troops at the end of March. It is an issue on which the Prime Minister no doubt will read endless
speculation of the American press because this is one issue on which
the bureaucracy disagrees with us. They wanted us to move faster. Bangladesh has asked us for recognition, too.

President Nixon: They wanted us to move before the trip, and I refused.

Dr. Kissinger: So we will inform you when we do. Do not believe
what you hear before then.

President Nixon: Only believe it when you hear it from us, from
me. Don’t believe the press.

Prime Minister Chou: That’s right. I would like to ask another
question. How do you envisage a solution the Middle East question?
(Prime Minister Chou laughs.) France wanted us to take part in the
Middle East question, and we refused to meddle because we are not
involved there.

President Nixon: We are working on a possible interim settlement
of the Suez problem alone, and trying to get talks going indirectly be-
tween the Israeli government and the government of the United Arab
Republic. But I would have to say that I see no prospect of a settlement
in the foreseeable future. It may be that one of the keys to a settlement
in the Middle East will be the attitude of the Soviets on this.

I would like to be more precise, being perfectly honest with the
Prime Minister. We will try to keep the ceasefire. We will try to get both
sides engaged in talks and use our influence with the Israelis. But the
parties are very far apart as far as a settlement is concerned. I would
say that this problem is so complicated and difficult that maybe when
the Deputy Foreign Minister goes to the UN he could bring some Chi-
nese wisdom and that would solve the problem. (Prime Minister Chou
laughs.)

Prime Minister Chou: That is not possible.

President Nixon: You have to work it out with Mr. Malik. (Prime
Minister Chou laughs.)

Prime Minister Chou: Even Dr. Kissinger doesn’t want to discuss
this problem because being Jewish he is afraid that they suspect him,
so Dr. Kissinger does not want to talk about the Middle East question
with me.

What do you think of the Soviet practice of on the one hand ex-
pressing support for the Arab states while on the other hand sending
so many Jewish people to Israel. Wouldn’t that make things more com-
plcated? I hear that up to 500,000 may go to Israel. Can’t they feed the
people in their own country?

Dr. Kissinger: I don’t think, Mr. Prime Minister, that they are send-
ing that many.

President Nixon: They want to go.
Dr. Kissinger: Yes, they want to go. So far they are sending mostly old people, non-productive, who are a terrific drain on the State of Israel. They are not very productive.

President Nixon: It is not a rich country. There is no oil.

Dr. Kissinger: I must confess that the Soviet behavior is puzzling. I think it is much less than 500,000. I think 5 or 10,000 per year. I can get the exact figures. I’ll get the figures.

President Nixon: One reason we took a strong stand on the India-Pakistan matter was to discourage Soviet adventuristic policy in a place like the Middle East. India–Pakistan, that struggle was one really that involved stakes much higher than the future of Pakistan, and that was high enough. It involved the principle whether big nations supported by the Soviet Union would be allowed to dismember one of their small neighbors. Once that principle is allowed, the world would be unsafe. That is why the vote in the United Nations was 10–1 against it. It didn’t get much play though; you would think the UN hadn’t said anything about it.

Prime Minister Chou: Never before in UN history was there such an overwhelming majority. The vote was 104 to 11 and of those 11 actually they only represented two countries, the Soviet Union and India.

President Nixon: I think the Prime Minister would be interested in my view on the Middle East. The Soviet Union doesn’t see Israel itself as a problem. I know the attitude of the Prime Minister’s government towards Israel. The Soviet Union is playing for much bigger stakes. It is playing for a dominant role in the Mediterranean. It is playing for the gateway to Africa, as well as playing for total influence in the Middle East area. That’s what I think is involved, and Israel is only a pawn, a pretext as far as the Soviets are concerned.

And our concern, Mr. Prime Minister, in the Middle East, at least my concern—incidentally it is his (Dr. Kissinger’s) too, he says he is Jewish, but he is an American first—our concern is much bigger than Israel. We believe the Soviet Union is moving to reach its hands out in that area. It must be resisted. That is why we have taken a position in the Jordanian crisis, for example, a position warning the Soviets that if they move aggressively in that area, we will consider our own interests involved.

Prime Minister Chou: Time is already up. I will say two more words. We can have more talks tomorrow. In fact I have more than two words. Let us continue tomorrow, because Mrs. Nixon is coming. It is better to stop because Mrs. Nixon is coming right away. We can go on tomorrow.

President Nixon: Or 3 o’clock tonight. (Prime Minister Chou laughs.)

Dr. Kissinger: He will accept—he kept me working the whole night once.
Prime Minister Chou: You can have night work with the Vice Minister after the duck dinner. Mr. President wants to see the former Imperial Palace tomorrow.

(As the parties left the table, there was discussion on future plenary and private sessions.)

200. Memorandum of Conversation

Beijing, February 25, 1972, 5:45–6:45 p.m.

PARTICIPANTS
The President
Dr. Henry A. Kissinger, Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs
John H. Holdridge, NSC Staff
Winston Lord, NSC Staff
Prime Minister Chou En-lai
Ch’iao Kuan-hua, Vice Minister of Foreign Affairs
Chang Wen-chin, Director of Western Europe, North American, and Australasian Affairs, Ministry of Foreign Affairs
Cha Chi-hua, Ministry of Foreign Affairs
Chi Chao-chu, Interpreter
T’ang Wen-sheng, Interpreter
Two Notetakers

(The conversation began with a brief exchange of pleasantries between Prime Minister Chou and the President concerning the President’s trip to the Great Wall and weather conditions in Peking.)

Prime Minister Chou: I understand that the weather will be clear between here and Hangchow tomorrow, and there will be no trouble in your flight there.

We don’t have too much time left tonight, so if we don’t finish we can go on in Hangchow and Shanghai. We can also let the two negotiators (Dr. Kissinger and Ch’iao Kuan-hua) work later on tonight after the banquet.

The President: We should tell them to get finished!

Prime Minister Chou: Then we can meet for about 15 minutes to hold a plenary at the airport tomorrow before your departure (for Hangchow).

1 Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, White House Special Files, President’s Office Files, Box 87, Memoranda for the President. Top Secret; Sensitive; Exclusively Eyes Only. The meeting was held at the President’s Guest House.
The President: I think that a half-hour would be better. It would make some of our people who have not had a chance to sit in on the private sessions feel that they have had a part to play, too. We could also have some photos taken.

Prime Minister Chou: Yes, photos would be all right with me. And, if we go for a half-hour, you can say more.

The President: No. I’m through talking. We will let the negotiators have a chance to speak. They haven’t talked enough.

Prime Minister Chou: We can also ask Secretary of State Rogers and Foreign Minister Chi P’eng-fei to say more. They can talk about what went on in their meetings.

The President: That’s a good idea. They haven’t had a chance to talk to us, and we should hear them.

Prime Minister Chou: Now I have two questions which I haven’t discussed yesterday.

One is the question of Sino–Soviet relations. I have spoken very clearly about that question in the meeting of the 23rd in this very room. That was a recall of history. Now, we face a situation of great tension between China and the Soviet Union, but it won’t be difficult to solve if there is truly an intention to solve it. There is only a further question, and therefore we are willing to solve the boundary question if it is not done under the threat of force. Then, we have always striven (sic) to reach a provisional agreement. That’s what the question is all about. We have neither territorial claims against the Soviet Union nor the wish to impose our will on them.

As for other disputes on principle between the two centers, they are bound to continue. As Mr. President said, ideological disputes are of a long-term nature. But this should not prevent countries and states from improving their relations—their good neighborly relations—and reaching a state of harmony. That is what Chairman Mao told the deputy head of their negotiating delegation on May Day 1970. This was at a period when the head of the Soviet delegation, Kuznetsov, was back in the Soviet Union ill. We heard he was ill. Since 1964 and 1965, we have conveyed our opinions to the Soviet Union through the former Pakistan Head of State Ayub Khan. This was, first, we would not make provocations. At that time we conveyed this message to two heads of state, the Soviet head of state and President Lyndon B. Johnson, that we would not make provocations. The second point was that if you did attack us and came into our country, we would defend ourselves.

Prime Minister Chou: Just as the President mentioned yesterday, the Great Wall was for the purpose of defending, not dividing people.

President Nixon: That’s right.

Prime Minister Chou: And our digging underground air raid shelters is becoming known. Every family is digging underground shelters
and linking them together. I believe soon that Americans will find out
about that.

President Nixon: Dr. Kissinger didn’t know about it?
Dr. Kissinger: I didn’t know this.
Prime Minister Chou: I don’t think he mentioned it. He knows
about it.

President Nixon: President Yahya told me.
Prime Minister Chou: Our Soviet friends also know because some
also tried to see them.

A third point we made was that what we say counts.
The fourth point was that if your country from the air launches
attacks against us, we would also consider that war; you should not
think that you could get away with that.

Our attitude toward the Soviet Union at the present time still con-
sists of these four points.

As for relations between our two countries, since Mr. President ini-
tiated contacts between our two countries, some changes have occurred
in the tension that existed between our two countries. And Chairman
Mao also mentioned to Mr. President when they met on the first day
that the question of aggression by the United States against China or
the question of aggression by China against the United States was not
a major problem.

But another question exists, that is the question of the Soviet Union
which has not yet been solved. But we are still maintaining a position
of defense. We also maintain our position of willingness to improve
state relations with the Soviet Union.

But it is absolutely impossible for us to enter into negotiations un-
der the threat of force. Our request to the Soviet Union is not for them
to withdraw troops, because we do not interfere in their internal af-
fairs. Our request is only to disengage in areas that are disputed and
this is a most fair position. That is what we mentioned the day before
yesterday. Three points I mentioned on that day were: one, to main-
tain the status quo on the border; two, to refrain from military threats;
and third, to disengage from disputed areas.

Yet from reports which we have received from various quarters,
the Soviet Union is engaged in major military maneuvers in this part
of the world or in others, and from what Gromyko told Fukuda, within
the next five years there will be greater conflict between China and the
Soviet Union than there was at Chen Pao. Perhaps they want to do as
they did in Bangladesh, and maybe they will try to create a Republic
of Turkestan, or something.

President Nixon: We won’t recognize it.
Prime Minister Chou: But such words can not intimidate persons. We will resist. It is not so easy for them to enter the Sinkiang Province, and even if they come in it will be hard for them to get out. No matter what, we will not make provocations. At the same time our attitude toward contacts and negotiations between the United States and the Soviet Union is not one of opposition, but rather an attitude of viewing these things as a normal phenomenon. And therefore we wish that the negotiations you are going to hold in May will be able to make progress and also be successful. We also have to admit that that will not be easy.

And we can’t understand why we, who are much weaker than they, have greater confidence; while they, who are much stronger than we, show such great fear. This is something we cannot understand. Mr. President, you will understand their mentality.

President Nixon: They are pathological on the subject. The only major nation attacking this trip is the Soviet Union. I am sure the Prime Minister has noted that European nations, Latin American nations, all favor this trip. The press is very good in Europe.

Dr. Kissinger: Japan and India are not ecstatic.

President Nixon: Yes, but they can’t do anything about it.

Prime Minister Chou: They’ll have to wait and see.

Our attitude toward Japan is also one of willingness to promote good relations. And in the Communiqué we wish to issue, it may be written that neither of our sides seeks hegemony in the Pacific Ocean region and doesn’t want other powers to do so, and that also includes them. And this is also our attitude towards the Soviet Union. If the Soviet Union asks the President about our attitude toward them, you may tell them that. Otherwise it may appear that we two here are colluding against them and are up to some tricks; for example, they may think that we’re trying to subvert them.

The question for their own country is their business to solve. We don’t meddle in their affairs.

President Nixon: And I’m glad to get this information from the Prime Minister, because when I go to the Soviet Union, under no circumstances will I negotiate about or discuss our relations with the People’s Republic of China without his approval or knowledge. We are not going there for that purpose. And it will be our purpose as I indicated . . .

Prime Minister Chou: I said that because they might ask you about that subject.

President Nixon: Would you prefer that I not raise it?

Prime Minister Chou: There is no need for you to raise it, but they will probably ask about that. This should be your response.

\[2\] All ellipses are in the source text.
President Nixon: (to Kissinger) That is something we will do. We will meet seven days and we will need topics in order to meet every day; we will also have to find the topics. They have already asked Dr. Kissinger three times about what was discussed when he was here in the People’s Republic.

Dr. Kissinger: I expect a phone call from the Soviet Ambassador 9:00 o’clock Tuesday morning, February 28.

Prime Minister Chou: I also heard that Dr. Kissinger told the President to use the name People’s Republic of China in a toast to Ceausescu, and the Soviet Ambassador immediately called attention to that, and when you also mentioned the title properly in the World Report.

President Nixon: Rather than “Communist China.”

Prime Minister Chou: That is a very strange thing. Since they have been calling us by the People’s Republic of China for so many years, why should they be unhappy when you call us the same thing? We find it very difficult to understand them. It is truly a kind of pathology.

President Nixon: Rather than “Communist China.”

Prime Minister Chou: That is a very strange thing. Since they have been calling us by the People’s Republic of China for so many years, why should they be unhappy when you call us the same thing? We find it very difficult to understand them. It is truly a kind of pathology.

President Nixon: I think they apparently welcomed an antagonistic relationship between the United States and the People’s Republic of China. That is why they react when we showed we had changed our attitude. They did not want us to have more normal relations.

I would not try to judge motives, but based on their conduct they apparently want the People’s Republic and the United States to be at odds. However, our policy is not, as I said to the Prime Minister, to have the People’s Republic and the Soviet Union at odds. As I told the Prime Minister, I reject the proposition that it is in the interest of the United States to have the Soviet Union and China in a state of belligerency.

In a sentence, we want good relations with the People’s Republic and we want good relations with the Soviet Union. And we would welcome better relations between the Soviet Union and People’s Republic of China. That, however, is something the Soviet Union and the People’s Republic will have to work out.

As I said when I was in Romania and Yugoslavia, my principle is any nation can be a friend of the United States without being someone else’s enemy. That is my view.

I realize that is sometimes very difficult to achieve, because there is a tendency for some nations to gang up against other nations. But in the very delicate power balances in the world we in the United States would not gain in the long run by trying to stir up trouble between other nations. We, the United States, would not gain by trying to stimulate conflict between the Soviet Union and the People’s Republic. The People’s Republic would not gain, the Soviet Union would not gain, and we would not gain by trying to stimulate conflict between the others.
That is the idea, but in practicality we realize that the real world is very different than the ideal, and that is what we are concerned about, the real world.

Prime Minister Chou: Because we are speaking about practical questions, I would like to mention the question of the Middle East. Why is it not possible for Israel to return to the Arab nations the lands that it occupies? Wouldn’t that be beneficial to the relaxing of tensions?

President Nixon: The return of territory is, of course, the key to the problem. But Israel feels that it cannot return territory unless there is a better balance—so that it is better able to defend itself against an attack should one occur. But the subject of returning territory is one we are constantly discussing in these very intricate negotiations.

May I say to the Prime Minister that while this subject is not on our agenda, I can understand the Prime Minister’s interest in it and his interest in some of the other countries on Israel’s borders. I would like to authorize Dr. Kissinger when he comes in June to discuss this with the Prime Minister. It must be kept totally confidential, however, because otherwise it will blow. We may not get a settlement anyway, but Dr. Kissinger can inform the Prime Minister as it occurs. What is happening in this arena is like the tip of the iceberg.

No confidential talks have yet begun but we are considering, just the two of us, the possibilities here. That is why I am referring to. One of the problems is that I don’t think I can sneak Dr. Kissinger into Cairo, as I did into Peking.

Prime Minister Chou: That would be rather difficult. But actually it originally was possible for you to have contacts with the Arab countries.

President Nixon: Our policy, as Dr. Kissinger can tell you, since the day I took office has been to develop better contacts with the Arab countries. I haven’t visited most of the countries. I knew Nasser and, of course, several other leaders in the area, so that is a goal, but the Israeli problem, I confess, makes more difficult the attainment of that goal. But we are working toward it.

They in effect say, for example, that they cannot resume relations with us in a formal sense until they settle the problems of the Israeli–Arab dispute. But we have a number of informal contacts, and we are expanding those. It makes no sense, looking at the Middle East situation in terms of Israel, which as I pointed out is not the real problem in the Middle East, but in terms of the geopolitical forces there, to leave the Soviet Union as the only major power to whom the Arab countries can turn to for assistance.

Prime Minister Chou: After you have withdrawn from Libya, do you still help the Libyans exploit their oil?

Dr. Kissinger: Yes, we still have oil companies in Libya. The percentage being paid to Libya is being increased compared to what it was
previously. Actually, the Libyans are becoming a foreign policy power because they have an enormous amount of dollars and a very small population. They have offered a subsidy to Malta, for example. (PM Chou laughs.)

Prime Minister Chou: That is also an abnormal development since the Second World War.

Dr. Kissinger: It’s an indirect program of American aid. American economic aid goes through Libya to other countries. (PM Chou laughs.)

Prime Minister Chou: They also say that you have taken away their natural resources, and therefore you should give them a percentage of the profits.

President Nixon: They have a good deal, a better percentage than any other nations are given by other companies.

Prime Minister Chou: Therefore they’re not only opposing your colonialism, but also Soviet colonialism. That is one of their advantages. You probably already know they do not have relations with us.

President Nixon: I did not know that.

Prime Minister Chou: You withdrew your largest airbase from Libya.

President Nixon: Yes, Wheelus.

Prime Minister Chou: You made it impossible for the British naval base to stay on there. The Soviet Union cast eyes on that base, but Libya resisted that. So there are some good things in your oil profits.

President Nixon: Libya is one of the artificial countries the Prime Minister referred to, primarily in Central Africa; this is northern Africa. And I am not referring to boundary problems.

Prime Minister Chou: It is the only country in north Africa that I have not been to.

President Nixon: It is an artificial country which should never have been created. It has never been a country; that is my view. I don’t tell the Libyans that, however. Morocco, Tunisia, Algeria, the UAR—all have a certain identity but Libya just has oil.

Prime Minister Chou: I believe in the past it had closer relations with Egypt than with the Maghreb countries.

President Nixon: Oil.

Prime Minister Chou: It is one of the few places where Chiang Kai-shek maintains one of his Ambassadors. That is a very particular place. You, of course, also understand our policy towards that. We understand their policy and don’t want to impose anything on them.

I would like to go on to another question, that of the Portuguese colonies in Africa. I’m just putting forward this question for discussion in an informal way. Why is it you don’t persuade Portugal to give up its two big colonies in Africa, because those are places where the black people are subjected to the most oppressive policies.
President Nixon: The influence I think we can assert on Portugal would be very minimal. The Portugal Government has a totally negative reaction towards providing independence for these countries.

Dr. Kissinger: They consider them technically part of Portugal. They are not treated as colonies, but they are treated as part of Portugal.

President Nixon: Just as France used to treat some of its colonies, like Algeria, as part of France.

Prime Minister Chou: France could say that, but Portugal is so tiny and yet has such great colonies abroad. It even has a very small piece of our territory, a very small place called Macau, and call it part of Portugal. It was acquired 400 years ago. Many of our comrades say that with a brush of one’s finger we could get that territory back, but we have always maintained a very restrained attitude and want to wait awhile.

India showed her courage and reconvened [recovered] Goa, which is as small as Macau. Mr. Menon\(^3\) once boasted to me about that, and asked why didn’t we take back Macau? I said we were not in such a hurry because the major question was the national independence of Angola, Mozambique, and Portuguese Guinea in the south. Besides them, what is Macau in comparison?

We believe that this is the question most unequal toward Europe, and also toward Africa and Asia. There are two things. First, the Portuguese colonies. Second, there is the white rule in South Africa, also in Southern Rhodesia and South West Africa. This is something too unequal, too unjust. Recently in the U.N. our Vice Foreign Minister spoke about that, and also mentioned that in the Security Council meeting held in Addis Ababa, Ethiopia. And on these matters even the Emperor of Ethiopia, Haile Selassie II, and also the very conservative President of Kenya, were the most indignant ones when the issue was brought up.

And so, entirely based on the coming-closer relations (sic) which are happening between our two countries, I want to say that this is a question worth saying something about, because the U.S. could say something in this regard. Because the policy adopted by the governments of South Africa, Portugal and Rhodesia they impose on other countries to accept.

President Nixon: We have, of course, stated our position in the U.N. on many occasions on these points. The question is not really one of goals, or of ideals. We believe in majority rule; we don’t believe in racism. We said that and we mean that. On the other hand, the

\(^3\) V. I. Krishna Menon, former Indian Minister of Defense.
military resolution of the problem in South Africa and Rhodesia would be a great tragedy, not so much for the whites as the blacks. That’s our view. While other nations like the People’s Republic may take a strong position, and may take a more immediate approach while we have a more restrained position, I think our goals are the same.

Prime Minister Chou: But the Portuguese Government is adopting an attitude of even greater military repression and suppression of those places according to what we have learned. And the white rule in Southern Rhodesia also is supported by the British, who support Smith. Of course, this is a very informal exchange of opinions. There is no major difference in our stands.

President Nixon: I hope the Prime Minister understands that we are not always going to vote the same way on resolutions in the United Nations. But he also understands that each of us must make the best judgment as to our best approach. We are, of course, vitally interested in the problems of the black people of Africa. There we are also allies of the British and of Portugal, and it is very difficult for us to take a position which goes as far as the Prime Minister goes on this. I think we can perhaps influence more effectively by more of a restrained course of action so that we can have some influence with our allies.

(PM Chou checks the time.)

I wonder if the Prime Minister and I would have a chance to talk informally on the plane.

There is one personal matter which I would like to submit for the Prime Minister’s consideration. That is the problem of Downey that Dr. Kissinger discussed with him in October.

Prime Minister Chou: Downey?

President Nixon: The American prisoner. We know that Downey was guilty. We know also the Prime Minister’s government has shown compassion in commuting his sentence to five years.

Prime Minister Chou: Mr. Fecteau has already been returned.

President Nixon: Fecteau’s and Harbort’s release had a very good impact on our country.

Incidentally, we know, too, that there are two flyers involved in Vietnam about whom no action can be taken until the Vietnam problem is solved. Naturally we would appreciate that those two be treated as well as possible until we are able to work out the prisoner of war matter with North Vietnam.

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4 Ian Douglas Smith, Prime Minister of Rhodesia.
5 See footnote 16, Document 164.
What I now present to the Prime Minister for consideration is not a request—there is no legal basis—and he has no obligation to act, but Downey’s mother wrote me before I came. She is now 76 years old. She is not well. After five years she will be 81 and the possibility that she will not be alive when her son returns is quite obvious. I told her I would raise the subject with the Prime Minister. You must make this judgment. It would be a very compassionate act, especially since the mother is old and not well. It would have an enormously good impression in the United States, as you know when you were there (looking at Ch’iao) the story Harbort and Fecteau did.

Prime Minister Chou: Last year we already commuted his sentence to five years. And it seems he has behaved rather well recently. And therefore it is possible for us to take further measures when we have the opportunity. Of course, that will take some time. It is a complicated process for us because there are no relations between our two countries and there exists no legal precedent.

President Nixon: Exactly.
I must get to the banquet before the Prime Minister.

201. Memorandum of Conversation

Beijing, February 26, 1972, 9:20–10:05 a.m.

PARTICIPANTS
The President
William P. Rogers, Secretary of State
Dr. Henry A. Kissinger, Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs
Ronald L. Ziegler, Press Secretary to the President
Marshall Green, Assistant Secretary of State for East Asian and Pacific Affairs
John A. Scali, Special Consultant to the President
Alfred le S. Jenkins, Director of Office of Asian Communist Affairs, State Department
John H. Holdridge, Senior Staff Member, NSC
Winston Lord, Senior Staff Member, NSC
Charles W. Freeman, Jr., State Department Interpreter

Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, White House Special Files, President’s Office Files, Box 87, Memoranda for the President. Top Secret; Sensitive; Exclusively Eyes Only. This meeting was held at the Beijing Airport. A memorandum of this conversation prepared by the Department of State is ibid., NSC Files, Kissinger Office Files, Country Files—Far East, Box 91, Memoranda of Conversation between Secretary Rogers and PRC Officials, February 1972.
Prime Minister Chou En-lai
Yeh Chien-ying, Vice Chairman of the Military Commission
Li Hsien-nien, Vice Premier of the State Council
Chi-Peng-fei, Minister of Foreign Affairs
Ch’iao Kuan-hua, Vice Minister of Foreign Affairs
Hsiung Hsiang-hui, Secretary to the Prime Minister
Chang Wen-chin, Director of Western Europe, North American, and Australasian Affairs, Ministry of Foreign Affairs
Han Hsu, Acting Chief of Protocol
Wang Hai-jung, Deputy Director of Protocol
Chi Chao-chu, Interpreter
T’ang Wen-Sheng, Interpreter
Peng Hua, Shen Jo-yun—Leading Members of Departments Concerned

Prime Minister Chou: Would Mr. President like to begin?

President Nixon: Mr. Prime Minister, we have had very extensive talks, perhaps the most extensive talks that have been conducted, at least since I have been in office, between two heads of government. The Secretary of State and Foreign Minister have had talks at the same time. As a result we have covered our bilateral relations and have had an opportunity also to discuss in a less formal way the problems of mutual interest to the world.

Prime Minister Chou: Yes.

President Nixon: This was necessary because we had to find some common ground. I think what is important is that as we conclude our talks, as we issue our statement at the end it will reflect honestly what the talks were, rather than the usual kind of communiqué in which you have diplomatic double-talk to cover up what may be serious differences of opinion. Honesty and goodwill and direct talk has characterized our relationship up to this point. On this basis we will have a solid foundation to build for the future. And I think the Prime Minister perhaps has some views on this point you may want to express.

Prime Minister Chou: Thank you very much. Indeed, as Mr. President has just now said, our meetings and discussions in the past five days have truly been going along the direction that you have just now pointed out. We have both put forward our differences of principles in various fields and, but also in this process we have also been able to find common ground. And I also agree with Mr. President when you said just now we should both declare to the world, and first of all to the people of our two countries, our differences while at the same time we should also declare to them our common ground so as to reflect the real situation of our talks, and in this way we will be able to break through some diplomatic conventions. And, Mr. President, both you and Chairman Mao have this characteristic, that is to do away with superfluous coverings and also to do away with all the diplomatic language and various other coverings.
President Nixon: And in our talks we came to the point very quickly.

Prime Minister Chou: And this was also showing a new face to the world. Why should we cover up our differences in front of them with diplomatic language? In this way we can at the same time show to the people of our two countries the true situation of our talks and also show to the world a new style of work. Perhaps at the first—at the beginning—they may not be able to accept this new style, but I believe through a gradual process they will finally come to say that this is a good way of doing things. Just as Mr. President mentioned in the first meeting on the first day that we had that we would be able to do more than we will say.

President Nixon: Right.

Prime Minister Chou: I believe that will be better. On the contrary, it would not be good and it would be disappointing to the peoples of the world and our two countries to feed them illusions. And if we present them, on the contrary, with the true situation of our talks, and do not engage in something behind their backs that we cover up, that will be a new style of frank, honest and serious discussions.

President Nixon: I think it can also be said that we do have differences, and you can’t build a bridge covering 16,000 miles over 22 years in one week. But on our part, and I think the Secretary of State will agree, on our side there is more common ground as a result of these frank discussions than we anticipated and hoped. We want to emphasize not just the negative but the positive. The world wants to hear that these two great countries who have had this gulf between them do find that there is common ground between us.

Prime Minister Chou: That will be a very good point—that you can’t build a bridge over 16,000 miles over 22 years in one week.

President Nixon: I am a fast learner. After hearing Chairman Mao and also the Prime Minister has the ability as a poet . . .

Prime Minister Chou: That’s your talent—your original talent. And how are we going to begin? How can we start? This is the first step in the long march over hundreds of thousands of miles, so once we have begun the first step the next one will come easily.

President Nixon: But not 10,000 years.

Prime Minister Chou: That will be too long. As you mentioned at that point, 10,000 years is too long. “Seize the day, seize the hour,” as you quoted in your speech and your toast.

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2 All ellipses are in the source text.
So we shall also listen with pleasure to anything supplementary Mr. Secretary of State and our Foreign Minister would like to say in this regard. Would you agree?

Secretary Rogers: Thank you, Mr. Prime Minister and Mr. President, I am sure the Foreign Minister agrees with me when I say our discussions were conducted in the same spirit as the discussions the President and Prime Minister were conducted. They were frank, but never at any time unfriendly, and we agreed that in order to build the bridge we were speaking about, or to make the long march we were talking about, it was necessary to have communications and contacts. And for our side I pointed out we were prepared to engage in activities involving communications and frequent contacts in a way that best suited your government.

Prime Minister Chou: Both sides.

Secretary Rogers: Also, it was clear from these discussions that the talks and communications helped clear up misunderstandings. For example, the Foreign Minister was under the impression that our visas required fingerprints of Chinese who visited the U.S., and he said that was unacceptable from his standpoint. I said I didn’t think that was the case, but to make certain we went out into the adjacent room, picked up the phone, called Washington and in ten minutes notified the Foreign Minister that fingerprints were not required on visas.

President Nixon: I think the practice, Mr. Prime Minister, was stopped when Secretary Rogers was Attorney General under Eisenhower.

Secretary Rogers: To make certain we made the phone call.

Prime Minister Chou: That’s a very serious and earnest attitude.

Secretary Rogers: But it does indicate how misunderstandings can be cleared up when we have fast communications and contacts. I just want to close by thanking the Foreign Minister and his associates for the very generous hospitality at every step of the way, and in every way possible, that has made our trip here a most pleasant and enjoyable one.

Prime Minister Chou: That’s what we should do. But I would believe that there are some places in which we have not done enough. I have found, for instance, a shortcoming that your press pointed out to us. For instance, for your visit to the Great Wall we did some preparation which we believe was necessary, and it was earnestly, honest. But it was quite unnecessary to put up a show in the Ming Tombs, because it was quite cold that day. Some people got some young children there to prettify the Tombs, and it was putting up a false appearance. Your press correspondents have pointed this out to us, and we admit that this was wrong. We do not want to cover up the mistake on this, of course, and we have criticized those who have done this.
I did not go myself to the Ming Tombs, and I admit that I did not know about it previously that they would do that. I came to know that only through your press last night, and when I investigated the matter I found out that that had truly been the case, and I must thank that correspondent. I may have a chance to do that when we arrive in Hangchow and Shanghai. This is Chairman Mao's spirit—that is, we should not cover up our errors and you will understand it is not easy indeed to implement a policy. Although that is a very simple thing, it is bad. And therefore we would like to express this before Mr. President and Mr. Secretary of State and Dr. Kissinger. And to our guests we believe we should admit what we have done wrongly, but, of course, we cannot admit anything we have not done wrongly. Only by doing this can we improve our work. And only in this way will it be made possible to decrease our bureaucracy. It is not easy, indeed, to do away with bureaucracy even when you have a large state apparatus and so many requirements in that apparatus.

I have been saying too much. Let our Foreign Minister say something.

Foreign Minister: As for the recent days of talks between our side and the Secretary of State's side, I am in full agreement with the opinion expressed just now by Mr. Secretary of State. The general atmosphere of our talks has been characterized by friendliness. Both of our sides have been adopting the attitude of looking forward in a positive spirit to seek common ground, to improve the relations between our two countries and in this manner I believe that both sides have been working together. And in order to seek common ground we have at certain points reviewed history and touched upon differences in opinions and differences of principles that we have had in the past. However, in order to make a good start in the beginning of the normalization of relations between our two countries and to move forward in this field, we have both discussed some concrete issues and also some general principles. And with regard to how we can move forward in specific areas, we have discussed questions of people-to-people visits and exchanges in the sports and scientific areas, and also exchange of medical personnel.

Prime Minister Chou: And cultural exchanges, also.

President Nixon: And teachers.

Foreign Minister: And in these fields we have agreed with each other. We have also considered that the matter of trade between our two countries would also be helpful to the promotion of the normalization of relations between our two countries. And this would also have political significance and therefore we have reached an agreement—a meeting of the minds—with regard to the initial beginning of trade.

But also we have reached the common view that before the relations between our two countries have been normalized we believe that
it would be better for these above matters to be conducted through people-to-people channels, with the assistance of our respective governments, and they should also facilitate this. We have also reached the common view that these matters should be developed gradually and progressively. At the beginning our quantity may not be very large, but that will be developed very progressively.

Chou: 10,000 years is too long. Yet to finish the long march in one year probably will not be enough time, so that the time perhaps will have to be longer than that. But we must start—we must first seize the day and seize the hour, and in fact the President agreed with Chairman Mao on that. So we will have to ask Mr. Secretary of State and Mr. Foreign Minister to share the major part in seeing that it is done.

Rogers: I would like to remind the Foreign Minister that under our system President Nixon only has five years.

Chou: Five years is quite enough to do that.

President: Maybe only eight months.

Chou: But you see that your Secretary of State still supports you so why be so pessimistic?

Foreign Minister: And I also would like to express my appreciation and thanks to the Secretary of State in our talks.

President: I would like to add one point that is very important in terms of our future relations. The Prime Minister has been very forthright in talking about a press story that he saw with regard to our visit to the Ming Tombs. I would only say that I would not reprimand whoever set that up because I liked the little girls. I enjoyed seeing them. But the incident poses a problem that could poison our relations in the future that I think we must avoid. I think that the Secretary of State and Dr. Kissinger and all our party could agree that in the U.S. this new relationship with the People’s Republic of China is the big story of the century. We have 1,000 newspaper columnists who consider themselves experts. We have 1,000 politicians, Congressmen and Senators who also will want to comment on this. And they have a right under our system to make statements. They do not consult with us before they make these statements. For example, the story that came out yesterday was that the President had made a decision to recognize Bangladesh at a certain time. We are considering it, but I have not made a decision. The columnist made it up because it was what he wanted.

Now there will be stories written by columnists. There will be statements made by politicians that many people abroad will consider to be authoritative and representing the policy of our government. And it seems to me that at this early stage of our relationship we must develop between ourselves at the highest level what I would call mutual trust. Ayub Khan once told me that trust is like a thin thread—once it breaks it is very hard to put it together again. And I think it is important
for us all to recognize that when statements are made, as they will be made, about this great historic event in the future, the Prime Minister and his government should realize that until the President speaks or the Secretary of State speaks, or someone authorized by the President to speak speaks, it is not the policy of our government. And we cannot control what others say, but we will be absolutely scrupulous and trustworthy and honest in the discussions that we have and the communications that we have. I would like the Secretary of State to say whether he agrees.

Rogers: I think what the President said is of tremendous importance. I mentioned to the Foreign Minister the other day that I would appeal to him when a misunderstanding appears to be developing if he would get in touch with me.

Chou: Directly?

Rogers: Yes.

President: And then we will clear it up.

Rogers: I mentioned to the Foreign Minister that I have an arrangement with any Foreign Minister that they just pick up the phone. If we have a problem with Home of the United Kingdom or Schuman of France they call me. If we have a way to communicate together we will be very happy to clear it up. I think if we stay in touch we will be able to clear it up.

President: I would like to say to the Prime Minister and to his colleagues that never in my term, and I am sure the Secretary of State and Dr. Kissinger will agree, have we dealt with a government in which that government has been more meticulously and absolutely trustworthy in our communications. There have been no leaks and it is on that basis that we should try to develop for the future.

I noticed, for example, that we were criticized by one of the TV correspondents because we on our side have not informed the press about what we were talking about to each other. We have done that because that is the understanding we have had with the Prime Minister, and we have tried to keep that understanding. And that is the role that I want all of our people to understand and that the Secretary of State and I will convey when we get back. Our interest with regard to this great step forward in our dealings with the People’s Republic should never be the headline that we make today but the history we make for tomorrow.

Chou: Right. I agree with this idea, that is, that in order to make communications more accurate, the relations between our two governments should be done directly and the communications should be done directly; that is, between Mr. President, Mr. Secretary of State or anyone who is authorized by the President to talk directly with our government, only to make things more accurate. As for the general public opinion we should accept what is correct because there are
always those correct in public opinion, but we should not believe that which is wrong. And in that way we can avoid misunderstandings.

And we would also like them to know that the Chinese can also stand up to criticism, and if we are in the wrong we will change that, and if we are mistaken we will correct our mistakes; and there is always good from that.

We still have two days in which we can finalize our communiqué, and I hope that our task in this field will be fulfilled. Do you agree with that Mr. President?

President: Yes. And I think that will answer the understandable questions that the press raise as to what we have been talking about. I can only say now that we have not been talking about the weather.

Rogers: Mr. Prime Minister, if I could just add one other word. We have had people in our party who have had experience in China before, and they have been impressed with the progress that you have made in conditions for your people. We wish you well in that program and hope that you have great success in that program for your people.

Chou: I thank Mr. Secretary of State for your good wishes, but we have done not enough and we still have quite more efforts to make.

In view of this final plenary session meeting we are holding in Peking, I would like to suggest, Mr. President, that if you would like Mr. Ziegler to say something to the press about this meeting, you could just say that we have held this meeting, and we can also say this to our own news agency. Would you agree to that?

President: Yes.

202. Memorandum of Conversation

Shanghai, February 27–28, 1972, 11:05 p.m.–12:30 a.m.

PARTICIPANTS

Dr. Henry A. Kissinger, Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs
John H. Holdridge, NSC Staff
Winston Lord, NSC Staff
Jonathan T. Howe, NSC Staff

1 Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Kissinger Office Files, Country Files–Near East, Box 92, China, President’s Trip, February 1972, HAK Conversations, Dr. Kissinger’s Meetings in the People’s Republic of China during the Presidential Visit. Top Secret; Sensitive; Exclusively Eyes Only. The meeting was held at Kissinger’s guest house in Shanghai.
Kissinger: I thought we would do two things—give you the supplementary information which I did not have the other day.\(^2\) I gave you numbers on motorized rifle divisions and tank divisions. Motorized rifle divisions have the following major items of equipment. You remember I mentioned that there are 186 medium tanks; 200 armored personnel carriers; 4 frog launchers; 144 artillery pieces. They are broken down into 54 mortars; 54 122mm howitzers; 18 152mm howitzers; 18 multiple rocket launchers; 28 anti-aircraft weapons; 45 anti-tank artillery; 1,178 trucks and tender purpose vehicles (fuel tankers). I will review some of these figures that seem low to me. The tank division has 310 medium tanks; 80 armored personnel carriers; 4 frog launchers; 18 mortars; 60 122mm howitzers; 18 multiple rocket launchers; 68 anti-aircraft weapons; 9 anti-tank artillery; and 1,108 general transportation that includes cargo trucks, vans, and tankers. On Soviet surface-to-air missile sites. I gave you the number of sites last time. Each SA–2 site has four double launchers. Or, eight missiles—two together like this (HAK shows with fingers). Each SA–5 site has six launchers.

I told you I would let you know about Soviet tactical aircraft in western Russia and Europe. The total number in eastern Europe and western Russia is 2,230 of which 1,000 are in western Russia and 1,230 in eastern Europe. We estimated that about 1,000 could be shifted to these. Of course, in practice they can all be shifted. We think in a realistic scenario that the ones in western Russia could be shifted.

You asked about lend lease aid to the Soviet Union in World War II. It amounted in total to $10.8 billion. We have asked for reimbursement only for $1.3 billion which involves civilian-type vehicles. We did not ask for repayment on military equipment. The Soviets offered $170 million and they have now raised it to $300 million. For us at this point it is the principle. It has nothing to do with the money. Those are the figures. I think those were the questions you asked last time.

\(^2\) Kissinger’s reference is not clear. Memoranda of conversation for his private meetings are ibid. Kissinger met with Chou En-lai twice on February 21, and once on February 25; with Ch’iao Kuan-hua on February 22, twice on February 24, five times on February 25, once February 26, and twice on February 27; and with Ch’iao Kuan-hua and Yeh Chien-ying on February 23. See Foreign Relations, 1969–1976, vol. E-13, Documents 88–106.
China, October 1971–February 1972 803

Ch’iao: Thank you. We will report these figures to the Prime Minister.

Kissinger: One question. We will not volunteer information constantly but if we should learn of anything we think is of a special interest to you—this will happen most rarely. Should we give it to Ambassador Huang Hua? I am talking about military target type.

Ch’iao:3 In this connection I will reply to what I said I would reply to you when we met. Our secret channel will be through Ambassador Huang Hua and the open channel will be through Paris. And if we obtain any material through the open channel and if there is anything of substance, we will give the reply via the secret channel. And so that is fixed. We will not mention it again.

Kissinger: Can we mention that publicly?

Ch’iao: At a certain time when it is appropriate and when it is asked as you said in a very low-key way mention Paris.

Kissinger: Okay. I understand the Foreign Minister is seeing the Secretary of State tomorrow.4 He will no doubt be asked about the open channel—they don’t know about the secret channel. I think it would be best if you said it is still being considered.

Ch’iao: On the question of the open channel?

Kissinger: Just say it is still being considered and just let us know because then we can control the announcement in a very low-key way and do it in about a week or so. Otherwise it will become big fan-fare. I talked to the President about it and he thinks this is the best solution. Otherwise it will be on television and people will get in touch with your Embassy in Paris to see when they can get a visa. I think we should let things quiet down for a week, if you agree.

Ch’iao: We approve—a week or even longer.

Kissinger: Tell us when.

Ch’iao: I fully agree to these views, Dr. Kissinger. If the Secretary of State asks our Foreign Minister about this the Foreign Minister will tell him this is still under consideration. And we also approve that this

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3 A sanitized version of this conversation is in National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Kissinger Office Files, Country Files–Near East, Box 92, China, President’s Trip, February 1972, HAK Conversations, Dr. Kissinger’s Talks in the PRC during the President’s Visit, February 1972.

4 Chi Peng-fei and Rogers met on the morning of February 28 in Shanghai. The memorandum of conversation is ibid., RG 59, Central Files 1970–73, POL 7 US/NIXON. See footnote 1, Document 198 for a list of Rogers’ meetings while in the PRC.
news be revealed in one or two weeks time. And before you make that public we hope you will tell us through the secret channel.

Kissinger: Exactly.

Ch’iao: Because our Embassy in Paris must have a certain degree of preparation beforehand. Because people would ask it how are these contacts being made.

Kissinger: At what level should the contacts be made in your judgment?

Ch’iao: What is your view?

Kissinger: Why don’t the two ambassadors get together and work it out.

Ch’iao: That’s a good idea.

Kissinger: So what we will announce in about two weeks and we will let you know ahead of time is that Ambassador Watson and Ambassador Huang Chen in Paris will meet periodically to discuss these changes and other matters of common interest. Meet at irregular intervals—meet from time to time. How much advance notice do you want? Three days?

Ch’iao: It would be better if you can make it five days.

Kissinger: We will let you know at the end of the coming week what day we propose and it will probably be the end of the following week—Thursday or Friday.

Ch’iao: Alright. And when you tell us five days in advance you also will tell us the wording you are planning to use in this announcement.

Kissinger: We may not even make a formal announcement. We may just have Ziegler say it.

Ch’iao: It is not necessary to make a formal announcement.

Kissinger: It is a daily press briefing by Ziegler and he will say it at that time. So I will send you the approximate date. But it will not be necessarily word for word the same thing. We won’t say it is a joint announcement. We will just say we want to inform you that this has been worked out with the PRC. Is that all right?

Ch’iao: That is all right.

Kissinger: I will miss seeing your Ambassador in Paris. He is a very nice man.

Ch’iao: You will still have a chance to meet him.

Kissinger: I am sure. I also like Ambassador Huang Hua. I will see more of him. When you come we will have a dinner with Kraft.\footnote{Reference is to journalist Joseph Kraft.}
Ch’iao: So that is resolved. And we will tell our Foreign Minister when your Secretary of State mentions that, we will say it is under consideration.

Kissinger: And you will let us know as quickly as you can through the usual channel. He hasn’t even a vague idea. Now shall we have a few words about Vietnam. We understand your position on Vietnam and we don’t want to embarrass you with respect to it. From your point of view it should be desirable that the war ends because any realistic analysis makes it clear that we are obviously on the way out of Vietnam and that we don’t need Vietnam as a military base. It is our analysis that the reason the war continues is because the Soviet Union encourages its continuation. We are speaking here frankly and not officially and we will not treat your discussion as an official discussion so I will tell you what we think.

Ch’iao: We are doing this as a general exchange of views on the matter of common interest and that is the spirit in which we will carry out these discussions, and so we certainly are not going to say anything on behalf of Vietnam nor are we conveying anything to them. Nor do you have that intention.

Kissinger: Nor with anybody else in our Government except the President. So that as General Haig already told the Prime Minister, we believe one purpose of the continuation from the Soviet point of view is to complete the encirclement of the PRC. In this respect, simply for your information, you may be interested to know the sequence of events about this eight-point proposal. I know you have said it is a fraud but it may be interesting that when Foreign Minister Gromyko was in Washington at the end of September after I had been in Peking the first time but before he knew I was going to Peking the second time, he asked whether they could transmit a message to Hanoi for us. Podgorny was then going to Hanoi. We then gave them a general outline of our thinking similar to what we gave to the Prime Minister when I was here at the end of October. They then told us that Hanoi wanted to discuss this so at least then they did not consider it a fraud. We then turned it into a formal proposal and sent it directly to Hanoi and not to Moscow. Hanoi then accepted a date for a meeting, which at least indicates they must have thought it was a serious proposal because otherwise they would have rejected it right away.

Then we announced our visit to Peking—the interim visit—and then afterwards things happened which you are familiar with. They accepted the meeting when we were here. I think the Soviets influenced them to turn in the other direction. I am just trying to give you our reasons for our analysis.

You asked me what do we want in Vietnam. It really is more interesting than it seems. It doesn’t make any sense for us to start the
exchanges we have with the People's Republic and at the same time try to maintain a permanent base in South Vietnam. And thus, any realistic assessment must come to that conclusion. On the other hand, we have never had a really serious negotiation with Hanoi. When we talk to Hanoi they do two things. They either repeat at great length their various struggles for independence which is interesting but not useful, or they read the list of demands we must do and then treat us as if we were students taking an examination.

I told the Prime Minister that certainly if Hanoi had discussed this with us in the spirit we have discussed Taiwan, we would have settled this very quickly. They have to understand that we cannot respond to an ultimatum—that is impossible. We can agree to a historical process and we have no interest in tricking them. They had a bad experience in 1954 but John Foster Dulles was a different person from what we are. At that time we were going into Asia, while now we are reducing our engagement.

So I must say Hanoi has wasted the opportunity of talking to me. As you know I have authority to make rapid decisions. It is a waste of time for them to have me hear the formal speeches that they are already making in the plenary sessions. Nor can I be interested in tricking them, because if they are tricked we have learned they will fight again and they will be 300 miles from South Vietnam and we will be 12,000.

It is a phony procedure to make a secret nine-point proposal and ten days later make a public seven-point proposal. We wanted to discuss the nine-point proposal and then they attacked us publicly for not responding to the seven-point proposal. Even you are in an odd position. You are publicly supporting the seven-point proposal which—I have a transcript of a meeting—which they have said that they don’t want to discuss, but they want to discuss the nine-point proposal to which we have replied.

I don’t want to waste time. I just want to use it to illustrate the difficulty. The longer the war continues the more they are forced to make demands we cannot meet, because the stronger the Government in Saigon becomes. So now on the one hand they want us out but on the other hand they want us to overthrow the government for them. We are prepared to withdraw and on the basis of what the Prime Minister said without leaving a "tail" behind. And then we are prepared to see what the evolution brings. We are prepared to limit our economic assistance if Hanoi limits the assistance it receives. We are prepared to have a serious, sincere and frank discussion in which we could look at their point of view and if they could have stated it in a way that is something other than a series of absolute demands. This is our general attitude but I would be glad to answer any questions you might have.
Ch’iao: In raising this question it was not that I wanted to learn about your detailed process of your negotiations with them, because we have said on many occasions this is a matter for solution between you and Vietnam. The reason that I raised this question at that time was because there were many exchanges of views between the President and Prime Minister on this matter and because of our discussions and so that is why I wanted to know something about the fact why the war does not stop. And if you continue with your present way, most frankly speaking, we don’t think there can be an end to the war. And so under these circumstances we think it is not to your interest.

Kissinger: What is not to our interest?

Ch’iao: What I mean if you continue with your present line of action, then the war there cannot be brought to a conclusion. As you have repeatedly told us, you have no intention of maintaining any base in South Vietnam, but if you continue with your present line of action it would result in the continuation of the war. It would not be beneficial to you while the Soviet Union will take the opportunity of using that. . . .6 We always said that so long as the war continues we will continue to give support to them.

Kissinger: We will not ask you to stop giving support to them.

Ch’iao: That we know.

Kissinger: But what is it about our actions that you think makes the war continue?

Ch’iao: On this matter it is purely our view, which you surely don’t agree with, and maybe after some time we may have an opportunity to have a further exchange of views on this matter. We will be in a better position to settle our views in this situation. As we see it, for you to maintain the Thieu regime for South Vietnam is not a way out. In that way it can only make the war continue. Of course you have now already withdrawn one-half of your troops but you are not being able to cut off your tail.

Kissinger: Like what?

Ch’iao: You don’t find it possible to withdraw your air force. Nor is it possible for you to withdraw in toto your combat forces. And should a turn take place in the war unfavorable to Thieu and his regime, then again you may have to return. That has been the history for more than twenty years and that has also been your experience in Vietnam. In the beginning you really did not have any wish to have military involvement. You got involved really without your being aware of it.

As for how you conduct your negotiations with the North Vietnamese, that is your business. You sometimes tell us what is happening—
we on our side never made this request. And the reason we are hav- 
ing another exchange of views on this matter is because we want to 
know more about your views as to what is to be done because, as we 
see it, according to your present plan of action although you think you 
will be bringing about an end to the war by your present action we see 
it will not bring an end.

Even though we would admit the Soviet Union has her motives 
here we do not think that is the crucial question involved. As for the 
question of the Soviet Union wanting to encircle China, we do not at-

tach importance to that. The war has already been going on for so long. 
As for us we continue to carry out our present line. And after your ex-

change of views between our Premier and your President you have 
made it very clear. This is just an exchange of views.

Kissinger: I think you understand our views. In our judgment what 
you said is not absolutely correct because we have offered the total 
withdrawal of our forces and they have not accepted it. And we have 
offered it either with political settlement or without political settlement.

Ch’iao: Well speaking rather frankly, our view is that your pres-

tent line of action cannot bring an end to the war. The Soviet Union 
does have her motives here, but in our view what you are doing pre-

cisely offers an opportunity for the Soviet Union to promote the real-

ization of her motives.

Kissinger: I think we have probably covered the subject sufficiently.

Ch’iao: Yes, because this does not involve only a localized matter 
but it involves a difference in our fundamental outlook. And so maybe 
a period will still be required before these matters will become more 
clear. This is just within the framework of an exchange of views.

Kissinger: Exactly. And then I would like to say something more 
in relation to the Communiqué which I mentioned this morning.7 First 
of all it is perfectly obvious that there is no question about victory or 
defeat in our talks we held in the past week because the truth of the 
fact is after the discussions we did arrive at an agreement in some mat-

ters and in others we did not. The President said that at the banquet. 
We could not make absolute assessments for who was the victor and 
who was defeated.

Ch’iao: But that would not be in the spirit and we won’t say that. 
And then further on in the Communiqué itself, it cannot be regarded 
only as a policy on Taiwan because it does cover certain other things 
although the Taiwan question is the crucial one in our bilateral rela-

tions. But we also discussed many international matters, which was re-

flected in the Communiqué, and in discussing these matters on certain

7 The final text of the Shanghai Communiqué is printed as Document 203.
points there was indicated a common direction or a common hope which did not involve Taiwan. So, here, too, it is obvious that as far as our side is concerned we will not say it only involves Taiwan because if that is what is said it won’t reflect it realistically.

This morning you did express the hope—not as a request—that our side will not make interpretations or shift the Communiqué in a way that would embarrass you. And then you further said you also hoped that China’s friends would not do that either. That’s rather vague. I can tell Dr. Kissinger very frankly that what some of our friends like Korea and Vietnam in their view think of our Joint Communiqué will be certainly not the same as what other ones think, and our policy with regard to them on that is we would not impose our will on them. That is for their own views.

So I must make this clear in advance otherwise it may give way to misunderstandings. Because we are only beginning our contacts and are probably not so very clear on our situation. And when I say our situation, I mean the situation of our relations with these friends of ours. It is really the truth, it is indeed, that on certain questions our views and their views differ, and that is quite natural. And as I said also before—we don’t only say it, we really do respect their views, although on certain matters our views differ with theirs. This is quite natural. So in view of what you said this morning that you hoped that we would say nothing about the Communiqué which would embarrass you, we have to make this understanding.

Of course, your situation is different from that of ours and we know that your Administration is even more complicated than ours. We have discussed that many times. And then from our side we will like to express the hope that the principal departments of your Government—that does not include the Congress and of course not the press—but the principal departments of your Government, White House, State, Pentagon, that they will adopt the same attitude as that openly advocated by your President, particularly towards the Communiqué, because we know the complexity of your government system.

Kissinger: Mr. Minister, we have called my deputy, General Haig and we have told him to tell all departments to keep quiet until I come back and to say nothing other than what I said in my press conference. After that I will do my very best to exercise discipline, but we don’t have our bureaucracy under the same control as you have. I think you will have noticed since my trip in July we have on the whole maintained rather good control.

Ch’iao: I agree to this estimate.

Kissinger: And we will continue to do our best. If you objected to something and there is time to let me know privately before you do something publicly it may be desirable. But we understand that sometimes you have to react publicly.
Ch’iao: And we will not lightly make any public reaction. Dr. Kissinger said we have a number of questions about what was said by your Department of State—but of course which we did not make public.

Kissinger: Can you give me an example.

Ch’iao: For instance, the statement that status of Taiwan remained undetermined and those matters that I first wanted to tell you in private. I am just talking about the direction.

Kissinger: I agree with the direction and we will carry it out scrupulously.

Ch’iao: This was a hope and no request.

Kissinger: We will on our part and in the spirit of the Communiqué unilaterally carry it out.

Ch’iao: In addition to this question about our friends, your question with respect to various speculations by the press where you do not refute them, this article—that comes under a broad heading. Here I should tell you very frankly that there are some of our friends of our war years who are opposed to the policy of improving relations between China and the U.S.

Kissinger: Some of your friends or ours?

Ch’iao: They may be both your friends and our friends. Just to be forward, that country I am referring to is the Soviet Union. Just look at how many articles they have written since you started the initiative in July. But up to now we did not refute any article and we should emphasize this. In fact you could say there will be accusations and slander and the main spearhead of that attack will be against us and possibly against the U.S. and under those circumstances it is possible that we will find it necessary that we must reply.

Kissinger: I was thinking more of comments to our press than comments to the foreign press.

Ch’iao: Yes, I know what you meant but in relation to the question which you raised, I raised this question to let you be prepared for any such possibility. So far that has not yet happened. But now that we have the Joint Communiqué that might become the object of their attack. And it is quite possible that circumstances will arise that we will have to reply to them. In our reply to them only we will mention their fundamental positions. But as for our comments on the Communiqué itself we will not say anything inappropriate and I think you should understand this attitude of ours for the whole course of our discussions, because the entire spirit that we have presented it in carrying out these discussions has been a positive one; that is, to progressively improve our relations.

Kissinger: We can’t lay down exact rules here. We have to do it on the basis of mutual trust. You have to understand that our enemies in
America will portray this as surrender on our part and your enemies
will try to put it that it is surrender on your part. It was a stalemate.
We will say both tried to make progress at the same time.

Ch’iao: Just an exchange of views. Because even though we have
started our contacts they are still in the preliminary stages and so it is
beneficial if we are able to tell each other in advance our views of things
we are thinking of doing. For instance, your informing us of your pos-
sible trip to Japan, and we are grateful to you and we understand it is
something which you really could not avoid. But in telling us in adv-
ance it helps us to know about the situation beforehand.

Kissinger: It won’t happen before the end of March.

Ch’iao: That doesn’t matter.

Kissinger: No, no. I am just informing you.

Ch’iao: We have been quite prudent in doing this. Of course, we
are also aware that there are matters of principle which are of great dif-
ference between us and we are not covering it up.

Kissinger: Mr. Minister, it has been a pleasure to work with you
and I think the spirit in which we have dealt with each other is a good
basis to build our future relationship. You have your principles which
we won’t ask you to give up, but on the basis of frankness and mutual
trust we can move towards closer cooperation. That is our policy and
we will very carefully follow it. And look forward to seeing you in
June.

Ch’iao: And I will be very happy to have an opportunity to offer
our hospitality again. From my side there is nothing more to say.

Kissinger: Nor from my side.

Ch’iao: These discussions of ours on the Communiqué have been
a very good beginning. Maybe you will rest some tonight. And then
starting from tomorrow you will be unemployed and so will I.

Kissinger: My life will be ended. But I shall miss you and also his
Grace.

Ch’iao: And then you must be the Pope because Cardinals are nom-
inated by the Pope.
203. Joint Statement Following Discussions With Leaders of the People's Republic of China

Shanghai, February 27, 1972.

President Richard Nixon of the United States of America visited the People's Republic of China at the invitation of Premier Chou En-lai of the People's Republic of China from February 21 to February 28, 1972. Accompanying the President were Mrs. Nixon, U.S. Secretary of State William Rogers, Assistant to the President Dr. Henry Kissinger, and other American officials.

President Nixon met with Chairman Mao Tse-tung of the Communist Party of China on February 21. The two leaders had a serious and frank exchange of views on Sino-U.S. relations and world affairs.

During the visit, extensive, earnest, and frank discussions were held between President Nixon and Premier Chou En-lai on the normalization of relations between the United States of America and the People's Republic of China, as well as on other matters of interest to both sides. In addition, Secretary of State William Rogers and Foreign Minister Chi P'eng-fei held talks in the same spirit.

President Nixon and his party visited Peking and viewed cultural, industrial and agricultural sites, and they also toured Hangchow and Shanghai where, continuing discussions with Chinese leaders, they viewed similar places of interest.

The leaders of the People's Republic of China and the United States of America found it beneficial to have this opportunity, after so many years without contact, to present candidly to one another their views on a variety of issues. They reviewed the international situation in which important changes and great upheavals are taking place and expounded their respective positions and attitudes.

The U.S. side stated: Peace in Asia and peace in the world requires efforts both to reduce immediate tensions and to eliminate the basic causes of conflict. The United States will work for a just and secure peace: just, because it fulfills the aspirations of peoples and nations for freedom and progress; secure, because it removes the danger of foreign aggression. The United States supports individual freedom and social progress for all the peoples of the world, free of outside pressure or intervention. The United States believes that the effort to

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reduce tensions is served by improving communication between countries that have different ideologies so as to lessen the risks of confrontation through accident, miscalculation or misunderstanding. Countries should treat each other with mutual respect and be willing to compete peacefully, letting performance be the ultimate judge. No country should claim infallibility and each country should be prepared to re-examine its own attitudes for the common good. The United States stressed that the peoples of Indochina should be allowed to determine their destiny without outside intervention; its constant primary objective has been a negotiated solution; the eight-point proposal put forward by the Republic of Vietnam and the United States on January 27, 1972 represents a basis for the attainment of that objective; in the absence of a negotiated settlement the United States envisages the ultimate withdrawal of all U.S. forces from the region consistent with the aim of self-determination for each country of Indochina. The United States will maintain its close ties with and support for the Republic of Korea; the United States will support efforts of the Republic of Korea to seek a relaxation of tension and increased communication in the Korean peninsula. The United States places the highest value on its friendly relations with Japan; it will continue to develop the existing close bonds. Consistent with the United Nations Security Council Resolution of December 21, 1971, the United States favors the continuation of the ceasefire between India and Pakistan and the withdrawal of all military forces to within their own territories and to their own sides of the ceasefire line in Jammu and Kashmir; the United States supports the right of the peoples of South Asia to shape their own future in peace, free of military threat, and without having the area become the subject of great power rivalry.

The Chinese side stated: Wherever there is oppression, there is resistance. Countries want independence, nations want liberation and the people want revolution—this has become the irresistible trend of history. All nations, big or small, should be equal; big nations should not bully the small and strong nations should not bully the weak. China will never be a superpower and it opposes hegemony and power politics of any kind. The Chinese side stated that it firmly supports the struggles of all the oppressed people and nations for freedom and liberation and that the people of all countries have the right to choose their social systems according to their own wishes and the right to safeguard the independence, sovereignty and territorial integrity of their own countries and oppose foreign aggression, interference, control and subversion. All foreign troops should be withdrawn to their own countries.

The Chinese side expressed its firm support to the peoples of Vietnam, Laos, and Cambodia in their efforts for the attainment of their
goal and its firm support to the seven-point proposal of the Provisional Revolutionary Government of the Republic of South Vietnam and the elaboration of February this year on the two key problems in the proposal, and to the Joint Declaration of the Summit Conference of the Indochinese Peoples. It firmly supports the eight-point program for the peaceful unification of Korea put forward by the Government of the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea on April 12, 1971, and the stand for the abolition of the “U.N. Commission for the Unification and Rehabilitation of Korea.” It firmly opposes the revival and outward expansion of Japanese militarism and firmly supports the Japanese people’s desire to build an independent, democratic, peaceful and neutral Japan. It firmly maintains that India and Pakistan should, in accordance with the United Nations resolutions on the India-Pakistan question, immediately withdraw all their forces to their respective territories and to their own sides of the ceasefire line in Jammu and Kashmir and firmly supports the Pakistan Government and people in their struggle to preserve their independence and sovereignty and the people of Jammu and Kashmir in their struggle for the right of self-determination.

There are essential differences between China and the United States in their social systems and foreign policies. However, the two sides agreed that countries, regardless of their social systems, should conduct their relations on the principles of respect for the sovereignty and territorial integrity of all states, nonaggression against other states, noninterference in the internal affairs of other states, equality and mutual benefit, and peaceful coexistence. International disputes should be settled on this basis, without resorting to the use or threat of force. The United States and the People’s Republic of China are prepared to apply these principles to their mutual relations.

With these principles of international relations in mind the two sides stated that:

—progress toward the normalization of relations between China and the United States is in the interests of all countries;
—both wish to reduce the danger of international military conflict;
—neither should seek hegemony in the Asia–Pacific region and each is opposed to efforts by any other country or group of countries to establish such hegemony; and
—neither is prepared to negotiate on behalf of any third party or to enter into agreements or understandings with the other directed at other states.

Both sides are of the view that it would be against the interests of the peoples of the world for any major country to collude with another against other countries, or for major countries to divide up the world into spheres of interest.
The two sides reviewed the long-standing serious disputes between China and the United States. The Chinese side reaffirmed its position: The Taiwan question is the crucial question obstructing the normalization of relations between China and the United States; the Government of the People’s Republic of China is the sole legal government of China; Taiwan is a province of China which has long been returned to the motherland; the liberation of Taiwan is China’s internal affair in which no other country has the right to interfere; and all U.S. forces and military installations must be withdrawn from Taiwan. The Chinese Government firmly opposes any activities which aim at the creation of “one China, one Taiwan,” “one China, two governments,” “two Chinas,” and “independent Taiwan” or advocate that “the status of Taiwan remains to be determined.”

The U.S. side declared: The United States acknowledges that all Chinese on either side of the Taiwan Strait maintain there is but one China and that Taiwan is a part of China. The United States Government does not challenge that position. It reaffirms its interest in a peaceful settlement of the Taiwan question by the Chinese themselves. With this prospect in mind, it affirms the ultimate objective of the withdrawal of all U.S. forces and military installations from Taiwan. In the meantime, it will progressively reduce its forces and military installations on Taiwan as the tension in the area diminishes.

The two sides agreed that it is desirable to broaden the understanding between the two peoples. To this end, they discussed specific areas in such fields as science, technology, culture, sports and journalism, in which people-to-people contacts and exchanges would be mutually beneficial. Each side undertakes to facilitate the further development of such contacts and exchanges.

Both sides view bilateral trade as another area from which mutual benefit can be derived, and agreed that economic relations based on equality and mutual benefit are in the interest of the people of the two countries. They agree to facilitate the progressive development of trade between their two countries.

The two sides agreed that they will stay in contact through various channels, including the sending of a senior U.S. representative to Peking from time to time for concrete consultations to further the normalization of relations between the two countries and continue to exchange views on issues of common interest.

The two sides expressed the hope that the gains achieved during this visit would open up new prospects for the relations between the two countries. They believe that the normalization of relations between the two countries is not only in the interest of the Chinese and American peoples but also contributes to the relaxation of tension in Asia and the world.
President Nixon, Mrs. Nixon and the American party expressed their appreciation for the gracious hospitality shown them by the Government and people of the People’s Republic of China.

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2 A Note following the text of the communique reads: “The joint statement was released at Shanghai, People’s Republic of China. On the same day, the White House released a statement by Press Secretary Ronald L. Ziegler and the transcript of a news briefing on the joint statement. Participants in the news briefing were Henry A. Kissinger, Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs, and Marshall Green, Assistant Secretary of State for East Asian and Pacific Affairs. The statement and the transcript are printed in the Weekly Compilation of Presidential Documents (vol. 8, pp. 480 and 476). On February 14, the White House released a statement by Ziegler on further relaxation of trade with the People’s Republic of China. The statement is printed in the Weekly Compilation of Presidential Documents (vol. 8, p. 438). On February 21 the White House released a statement and transcript of a news briefing by Ziegler on the President’s meeting with Chairman Mao Tse-tung. The statement is ibid., p. 466.

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204. Memorandum of Conversation

Shanghai, February 28, 1972, 8:30–9:30 a.m.

PARTICIPANTS

President Nixon
Dr. Henry A. Kissinger, Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs
Winston Lord, NSC Staff
Prime Minister Chou En-lai
Ch’iao Kuan-hua, Vice Minister of Foreign Affairs
Chi Chao-chu, Interpreter
T’ang Wen-sheng, Interpreter

(There was some opening pleasantries on the activities of the previous night and observations on the city of Shanghai. Prime Minister Chou commented that Dr. Kissinger and Vice Minister Ch’iao had met again the previous night. President Nixon remarked that they had had an interesting talk and that Dr. Kissinger had said he was with the Vice Minister; however, maybe he was out on the town. Dr. Kissinger then told the Vice Minister that he had to protect him. Prime Minister Chou

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1 Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, White House Special Files, President’s Office Files, Box 87, Memoranda for the President. Top Secret; Sensitive; Exclusively Eyes Only. The meeting was held in the President’s sitting room at Ching Kiang Guest House.
remarked that when he tried to call the Vice Minister and ask how the talks had gone, he found that he had already gone to bed and probably Dr. Kissinger had gone to bed also.

President Nixon then remarked that his room was very nice. Prime Minister Chou responded that this was the highest floor, although of course there was another dining room above it. President Nixon commented that he had woken up at 6:00 a.m. that morning and walked on his balcony and looked at the city. He remarked on the skyscrapers which he had not realized were in the city. Prime Minister Chou commented that the houses, streets and bridges in the city included old ones which went back to the eighteenth and nineteenth century, new ones in the twentieth century, and even some built after liberation. Before the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, Shanghai was only a small community and there weren’t many buildings at that time.)

President Nixon: I appreciate the opportunity to impose on the Premier’s time before taking off for Washington. There are a couple of points that I would like to make in confidence to him.

First, I would greatly appreciate it if he would extend my thanks to Chairman Mao for the talks we had and also for the great hospitality we have received. Particularly one of the things I would like the Prime Minister to tell Chairman Mao was that I will always take away memories of the Guest House in Hangchow where he has stayed.

Prime Minister Chou: Thank you very much for your kindness. I will certainly convey that.

President Nixon: I would like to send a letter to the Prime Minister. I would like to write a letter to Chairman Mao. How should we get them there?

Dr. Kissinger: We could give them to Huang Hua in New York, the secret channel.

President Nixon: I want to write a personal letter.²

Dr. Kissinger: That’s the secret channel, Mr. President. We have agreed not to tell anyone about the existence of this channel. We will keep Paris visible. No one knows about the secret channel except these people here.

Prime Minister Chou: Indeed.

President Nixon: I want the Prime Minister to know what my plans are when I return.

² Nixon wrote short letters to Mao and Chou dated March 14. In each, he offered his thanks for “the gracious consideration with which we were received in the People’s Republic of China.” He also expressed his hope for continued improvement in relations. (Ibid., NSC Files, Box 525, Country Files, Far East, PRC, Vol. III) See Foreign Relations, 1969–1976, vol. E–13, Document 111.
First it is obvious, of course, to the Prime Minister that what we have done this week is a very important beginning. But what we do from now on is even more important; otherwise, all progress we have made will be destroyed. I want to be sure that we handle matters on our side with the discretion that the Prime Minister has handled matters on his side. I assured the Prime Minister and assured Chairman Mao that the talks we have had would be kept confidential. I want to reassure him on that point. We will not put the record of these meetings in any channel except our own office, what we call the Top Secret file. It will not go into the Pentagon papers file. (PM Chou nods.)

When I return I will make a brief statement at the airport. The next day I will have to meet with Legislative leaders, up to ten people. Then I will meet with the Cabinet. The meetings with the Legislative leaders and the Cabinet will be private, but whenever I meet with groups that large, I assume they leak, so I will be very discreet with them.

As a major example, the Prime Minister and I have talked with a great sense of confidence and discussed our relations which each of us has with the Soviet Union, India, and Japan. I want to assure the Prime Minister that under no circumstances will we embarrass him or his government, by implication or otherwise, that those subjects were discussed. I know the Prime Minister and I want to say that in the spirit of the communiqué we discussed relations between China and the United States, not at expense of third parties. We know what we discussed on these issues. The Prime Minister can be assured that while I will be pressed by the leaders and the newsmen on those subjects I will see that nothing comes out which will be embarrassing because I consider that part of our confidential agreement.

As the Prime Minister knows, I cannot control what the press may speculate with regard to our meetings, but we will take every precaution to knock down any stories that are inaccurate and that are in violation of our understanding.

Dr. Kissinger: I told the Vice Minister last evening, Mr. President, on your behalf in answer to a question, that we would do our best to maintain discipline in the principal departments, especially the State and Defense Departments, so that they do not put anything out that is wrong. We cannot avoid some reference to Japan and India, since they are in the communiqué.

But we will keep in the bounds of the communiqué and force the Departments to clear everything at the White House, as we have in the period since my visits. I think our Chinese friends will understand if occasionally discipline isn’t total, but we will maintain it.

You (the President) told me to say that with the Vice Minister.

President Nixon: I was going to cover that point with the Prime Minister if you hadn’t. And we, of course, must realize that we have
some nations abroad and there are some political factions at home which take the line of some of the nations abroad, who will try to seize on any statement made by us or made here to demonstrate that the new relationship between China and the United States has broken. It is very important that we do all we can not to give them any ammunition for their guns which they have pointed at us.

On the other hand I am totally aware of the fact that on some issues like Vietnam and the African problems we discussed, the Prime Minister and his government, because its principles are different from ours, will take a different position from us, and we naturally expect that. The only wish that I would express would be that on both sides when we differ we could avoid personal references. If when the Government of People’s Republic differs from the policy of the U.S., we can avoid personal references I believe that it would take care of the situation, don’t you think, Henry?

Dr. Kissinger: Also the adjectives.

President Nixon: And keep the rhetoric cool. You have a position, in your country and in the whole socialist movement and the world, a position of principle which we, of course, expect you to maintain. We have a position on our side which is a different one. We will avoid giving any indication that either of us changed our principles. The only indication we will give is that we tried to find here common ground, and as time goes on, we will try to find more common ground. We recognize that between two major countries that have different systems there can never be all common ground.

And we will recognize—and this is the last point and perhaps the most important point—the enormous importance of not giving the Soviet Union any grounds to launch attacks of rhetoric against the People’s Republic due to the fact that this meeting has occurred. I have noted very carefully the Prime Minister’s remarks concerning how we should respond if the Soviet leaders do raise points, as we think they may on our relations with the People’s Republic. The Prime Minister

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3 On March 3 Rodman delivered a message to Shih Yen-hua of the PRC’s United Nations Mission in New York that reads in part: “The Soviet Ambassador called on Dr. Kissinger on March 1, 1972, to obtain an account of the President’s trip to the People’s Republic of China. Dr. Kissinger talked in a most general way, repeating what he said in his press conference in Shanghai about discussions on world affairs. In reply to a question, Dr. Kissinger said that the People’s Republic of China expressed no objection to the relaxation of tensions between the Soviet Union and the United States. When asked whether the People’s Republic of China felt threatened by the Soviet Union, Dr. Kissinger said that the matter did not arise. The Soviet Ambassador inquired whether the U.S. was prepared to make a joint appeal to the People’s Republic to participate in talks on nuclear disarmament. Dr. Kissinger replied in the negative.” (National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 849, President’s File—China Trip, China Exchanges) See also Foreign Relations, 1969–1976, vol. E–13, Document 108.
can be sure I will be meticulous and also will not violate any confidence and will do nothing to cause embarrassment to China as a result of our meetings. I would have to say, based on past performance, that we will probably have to expect a few verbal blasts from Moscow. We will not react, but most importantly we will not give any ammunition that will make the blasts get bigger if we can avoid it.

Prime Minister Chou: Thank you. I am very happy we had this opportunity just before you are leaving to frankly discuss some issues.

First of all, with regard to some things we have discussed secretly and in our secret meetings, that is not only regarding the questions of the Soviet Union, Japan and India but also things we have decided to do but not to say, we believe that we will maintain that secrecy and that what happened after the two visits Dr. Kissinger paid to China can serve as proof to that. And we believe it can continue in that way.

As for what we mean by secrecy, that does not mean that we have something unspeakable or that we are engaged in schemes or plots against third countries. On the contrary that cannot be done, and it is better not to speak about that. Because we wish to achieve better possibilities but at the same time we prepare against the worst possibilities. This is only a precaution against the worst possibility, while naturally the better possibility is the one which we are striving for.

History proves that it is better to adopt a serious policy toward the direction we are working for; that is better than talking lightly about these matters. It is not as foreign propaganda describes, secret agreements behind countries’ backs.

President Nixon: What we have to do is hope for the best and prepare for the worst.

Prime Minister Chou: That’s right.

The second point is that after the issuance of the joint communiqué both sides shall, of course, do our best not to harm the other side. But you have your difficulties and we have ours.

President Nixon: I know.

Prime Minister Chou: For instance, and as you have just now mentioned, you on your side will do your best to maintain agreements not only with the White House but also with the State Department and the Pentagon. But sometimes they may misfire, and this will give rise to speculation in the world. We can’t refrain from refuting these. Of course, we will not direct these at the President personally but we will direct our comments at the one who misfired. You on your side must first take measures to deal with the misfiring; and, of course, that’s better.

As for debate in Congress and news reports, we will deal with them in a different way. And also I have already agreed to Mr. President’s proposal that leaders of both parties should come together, for that is better.
President Nixon: Mansfield and Scott.  
Prime Minister Chou: Yes. Because that makes it easier then to combine them. 

President Nixon: Remember what I said, that Mansfield of the other party keeps secrets better than Scott of my own party. 
Dr. Kissinger: May the President say tomorrow that you have agreed in principle to their visit? 
President Nixon: But we would not announce anything. 
Prime Minister Chou: Yes. 
President Nixon: Could they say it? If I mention it, Scott will say it. 
Dr. Kissinger: We have to expect that they will then say this will happen. 
President Nixon: Will that be alright? 
Prime Minister Chou: Yes. Also, in view of fairness we welcome that proposal that they come at the same time because this matter will affect relations between our two countries. 

Dr. Kissinger: Again—because they will ask practical questions—we can tell them that when we have an operating channel set up they can deal with your Ambassador in Paris. We won’t tell them yet that Paris in [is] the channel. That gives us two or three weeks time. 
Prime Minister Chou: Alright. Of course, as for the disputes in Congress and various public opinion and misunderstandings directed against us, we will, of course, rebuke them. That will also have to do with our public opinion. 
President Nixon: Using Peking radio and newspaper. 
Prime Minister Chou: Yes. And also regarding countries close to us, they have their own stands and view. First of all Vietnam . . .  
President Nixon: And Albania on the left. (PM Chou laughs.) 
Prime Minister Chou: . . . have their own points of view and positions. We cannot account for or dominate their points of view.

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4 The March 3 message to the PRC reads in part: “The President appreciates the invitation extended to Senators Mansfield and Scott to visit the People’s Republic of China. At the same time, he has found an equally intense interest on the part of the leaders of the House of Representatives—a co-equal branch of the Legislature. The President would therefore be extremely grateful if the Prime Minister would also entertain a request for Congressmen Hale Boggs, Majority Leader of the House of Representatives, and Gerald Ford, Minority Leader, to visit the People’s Republic of China in the near future, but subsequent to the visit of Senators Mansfield and Scott.” See Document 223. This message also suggested that both sides announce on March 10 that Paris would be the public contact point between their governments. “The U.S. side believes it would be beneficial if the actual contact could begin soon in order to show some concrete results to the American public.” For the PRC response, see footnote 2, Document 207.

5 All ellipses are in the source text.
You understand and know that Albania opposed both Kosygin’s visit and yours. They wish us to be isolated, but, on the other hand, they also believe we have great power. It is not their subjective wish, but they want objectively our isolation. Of course, this is only for your ears and we say this merely to explain the situation we are in. We have always held that all countries no matter what their size are equal, and we respect their view. We will not interfere publicly and definitely will not act as the Soviet Union is doing, in attempting to dominate the opinion of so-called fraternal countries. I have said a lot to you about this.

On the third side there will be slander from the Soviet Union and this will not only be occurring in the future. Since our July 15 announcement last year up to the present day their stand has never ceased. I believe in the future they will be even more virulent. I think your side also will reply, not just ours.

President Nixon: Oh yes.

Prime Minister Chou: You must also be prepared for that. We told you our position. You can tell them about our position.

Another important matter is that we still maintain the view, that I have repeated on many occasions, that if the war in Vietnam and the other two countries of Indochina does not stop, no matter what form it continues in, it will be impossible to relax tensions in the Far East. And we will be forced to continue aid to their just struggles. We have only an obligation to sympathize with them and support them. We do not have the right to interfere in their position nor put forward various stands. We have no right to negotiate for them. This I have said repeatedly. This is our very serious stand.

Our hope is that in dealing with this question in the future you will see farther to the future. It can be said with certainty that if peace is really brought to that area then that area will become an area that is non-aligned. That also will be beneficial not only for easing tensions in the Far East but also in the world. Only in this way will it be possible for the U.S. to realize some common points that we have realized together.

President Nixon: It would also help the direction on Taiwan.

Prime Minister Chou: But Mr. President also understands that we would rather let the question of Taiwan wait a little while, while we would rather have the war in Vietnam and the whole of Indochina come to a stop because we feel this is a more urgent issue.

President Nixon: I was referring only to the level of forces in Taiwan.

Prime Minister Chou: Because Taiwan is our internal affair, and also we have our own efforts which we have to make. We cannot place too much hope on the U.S. and Mr. President to achieve this. We can’t hope that you will do everything. Of course, what you guarantee is only final withdrawal, and no support of the so-called Taiwan independence movement, and not allowing Japanese military forces to en-
ter Taiwan while you are still there, and so on. As for the final settlement, that is our internal affair and that is something we must do.

And then there is another point that Mr. President appreciates, and Dr. Kissinger has mentioned. Everything must be concretely analyzed and concretely solved in accordance with a concrete situation. One must not take a simple principle and use it dogmatically. One must not apply it everywhere. That would not be good.

President Nixon: What, for example?

Prime Minister Chou: That is, we being so big, have already let the Taiwan issue remain for 22 years, and can still afford to let it wait there for a time. Although the issue of Taiwan is an obstacle to the normalization of our relations, yet we are not rushing to make use of the opponents of your present visit and attempt to solve all the questions and place you in an embarrassing position.

But as for Vietnam and the rest of Indochina, during the 26 years since the Second World War, war has never ceased in that area. People there have been bleeding. Therefore we have extreme sympathy for the people of that area. We believe they are closely linked with us. We thought of using wording in the communiqué but then we thought maybe there would be other implications and so we did not do so. You must understand this feeling. Because during the struggles against others, whether Korea or Vietnam, our three countries have participated in each other’s country struggle. Historically, old China has committed aggression against these two countries. Of course this was during the times of the expansion of the old feudal empire.

Our assistance towards these countries, toward Korea and Vietnam, can be said to have been unconditional. But there is one thing we scrupulously abide by, that is our respect for their sovereignty and independence, the five peaceful principles of peaceful coexistence.

As Chairman Mao has pointed out, we who have been victorious have only an obligation to assist them, but not the right to interfere in their sovereignty. The debt we owe them was incurred by our ancestors. We have since liberation no responsibility because we overthrew the old system. Yet we still feel a deep and full sympathy for them.

I believe that it is the hope that Mr. President and Dr. Kissinger have conveyed, that you hope tensions in the Far East will be progressively reduced. In this easing of tensions the question of Vietnam and the other countries of Indochina is the key point. I believe Mr. President said in the toast at the reciprocal banquet in Peking that your relations with China were the key to world peace. And we believe that the question of Vietnam and other Indochinese countries is the key to the relaxation of tensions in the Far East. We are extremely sad that North Vietnam has been bombed in the period just before and during your visit here. To speak frankly, I would like to say the U.S. would suffer no losses if it had not bombed in that area. But now you have given
the Soviet Union a chance to say that the music played in Peking to welcome President Nixon has been together with the sounds of the bombs exploding in North Vietnam.

I would like to say in conclusion, to express our feelings, and you know that we have exerted great restraint. Dr. Kissinger can bear witness . . .

President Nixon: Yes.

Prime Minister Chou: . . . that we have exerted extreme restraint since July of last year. Yet the key to easing tensions in the world does not lie there and Mr. President and I and Chairman Mao all understand that.

At the time of departing for home, these final words will have a deep impression on Mr. President and our other friends. Of course, there are great negotiations for Dr. Kissinger to deal with.

President Nixon: The two buddies.

Prime Minister Chou: And it is very clear that it is due precisely to these reasons that negotiations between China and the United States are comparatively easier than negotiations between Vietnam and the United States.

Dr. Kissinger: Simply a point of honor . . . I don’t believe that we have bombed in North Vietnam while we are here.

Prime Minister Chou: In the DMZ, the line along the DMZ, on both sides.

Dr. Kissinger: Not while we are here.

Prime Minister Chou: Yes.

Dr. Kissinger: We will check it.

Prime Minister Chou: It has already reached Quang Nhin.

Dr. Kissinger: We will check. There was an order not to do it.

Prime Minister Chou: You can find out upon your return to the U.S.

President Nixon: On a less serious note. The press has reported a statement by Mrs. Gandhi on our visit.

Prime Minister Chou: I don’t think that is very serious, and we won’t take it very seriously.

Dr. Kissinger: Yes, but . . .

President Nixon: I don’t take it seriously.

Prime Minister Chou: Although she is so big a state. I think that this maneuver is very petty.

(The meeting then ended. Prime Minister Chou escorted the President and Mrs. Nixon downstairs to say farewell to the Chairman of the Shanghai Revolutionary Committee. They then proceeded to the airport to depart for the United States.)