

DECLASSIFIED
Authority NND 969000
By EW NARA Date 5-31-02

POL 33 Persian Gulf

XR POL 27 ARAB-ISRAEL

Department of State

TELEGRAM

XR DEF 1 IRAN



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~~SECRET~~ 976

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ACTION SS-45

INFO OCT-01 /046 W

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R 101320Z DEC 70
FM AMEMBASSY TEHRAN
TO SECSTATE WASHDC 2959

~~SECRET~~ SECTION 1 OF 2 TEHRAN 5335

~~EXD~~

SUBJECT: SHAH'S VIEWS ON MIDDLE EAST SITUATION AS IT RELATES TO IRAN'S SECURITY REQUIREMENTS

1. DURING HOUR AND HALF MEETING WITH SHAH DEC 9 HE SPENT MUCH TIME GOING OVER REASONS BEHIND IRAN'S MILITARY ACQUISITION REQUIREMENTS, STRESSING THESE WERE BARE MINIMUM GIVEN POTENTIAL DANGERS IN A VERY PERILOUS AREA.

2. HE OPENED BY STATING HE REMAINS CONVINCED THAT SOVIETS BASIC OBJECTIVES REMAIN (A) EXPELLING US AND WESTERN INFLUENCE FROM ARABIAN PENINSULA AND GULF AREA, AND (B) GAINING POSITION OF PRIMARY EXTERNAL INFLUENCE IN THESE AREAS AND THAT SOVIET TACTICS IN ATTAINING THESE OBJECTIVES IS TO USE RADICAL ARAB REGIMES TO DESTROY MODERATE ARAB STATES.

3. KEEPING BASIC SOVIET OBJECTIVES IN MIND, SHAH WENT ON, FUTURE WILL ALSO BE INFLUENCED MUCH BY (A) WHETHER THERE IS ARAB-ISRAEL SETTLEMENT; (B) WHETHER PROPOSED ARAB FEDERATION OF UAR, SUDAN AND LIBYA BECOMES A REALITY; AND (C) WHETHER IT IS EXPANDED TO INCLUDE FIRST SYRIA AND PERHAPS LATER IRAQ. SHAH DOES NOT BELIEVE SOVIETS WANT SETTLEMENT BECAUSE THIS WOULD REDUCE DEPENDENCY OF RADICAL ARAB STATES ON SOVIET UNION AND HENCE SOVIETS' CAPABILITY TO PENETRATE ARAB WORLD AND GAIN EVER INCREASING INFLUENCE IN THESE STATES.

4. RE ARAB FEDERATION, IF IT BECOMES REALITY IT SHOULD

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ELDOUT OF THESE ELECTIONS, BUT BHUTTO'S
ST PAKISTAN IS VERY DISTURBING BECAUSE
CAL MILITANCY AGAINST INDIA AND HIS
SOPHY WHICH MAY LEAD HIM INTO MUCH CLOSER



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RELATIONSHIPS WITH BOTH COMMUNIST CHINA AND SOVIETS.
WHILE VICTORY IN EAST PAKISTAN OF RAHMAN AND AWAMI
LEAGUE, WHICH WANT MODUS VIVENDI WITH INDIA, MAY TEND
TO COUNTERACT BHUTTO'S HOSTILITY TOWARD INDIA, WHO CAN
TELL WHETHER EAST AND WEST PAKISTAN WILL REMAIN UNITED
OVER NEXT FEW YEARS? AND IF THEY GO SEPARATE WAYS,
IRAN MUST TAKE ACCOUNT OF POSSIBILITY OF INSTALLATION
OF EXTREME RADICAL REGIME IN WEST PAKISTAN WITH VERY
CLOSE TIES WITH SOVIETS AND CHICOMS. AT PRESENT IRAN
HAS ONLY ONE DIVISION COVERING ITS WHOLE EASTERN BORDER
AND HAS NO NAVAL STRENGTH OUTSIDE GULF EVEN THOUGH IRAN

HAS COASTLINE ON GULF OF OMAN OF OVER 500 KILOMETERS.
THIS IS ANOTHER REASON WHY IT MORE ESSENTIAL THAN EVER
FOR IRAN TO PURCHASE THE TWO ADDITIONAL DESTROYERS FROM
US: IT HAS REQUESTED. SHAH MENTIONED THAT IRAN'S ORIGINAL
STRATEGIC NAVAL CONCEPT WAS CONFINED TO GULF. HOWEVER,
IT WAS ESSENTIAL TO INCLUDE A CAPABILITY IN GULF OF OMAN
TO COVER IMPORTANT SEA APPROACHES TO "IRAN'S LIFELINE,
THE GULF," AND ALSO BECAUSE OF POSSIBILITY ARAB SIDE OF
GULF OF OMAN MIGHT FALL INTO HANDS OF RADICAL REGIME
THAT MIGHT WISH TO INFILTRATE SUBVERSIVE TEAMS THROUGH
IRAN'S LONG AND TOTALLY EXPOSED COAST ON GULF OF
OMAN. TO ADD TO PROBLEM, IT POSSIBLE THAT A RADICAL

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S [REDACTED] SECTION 2 OF 2 TEHRAN 5335

GOVT COULD EVENTUALLY EMERGE IN WEST PAKISTAN, WHICH IF NOT ACTUALLY HOSTILE TO IRAN, MIGHT BE AT LEAST UNHELPFUL AND UNCOOPERATIVE.

7. INsofar as AIR FORCE (IIAF) CONCERNED, IRAN MUST HAVE SOME CAPABILITY OF DEFENDING ITS VAST WEST AND SOUTHERN AIR FRONTIER STRETCHING FROM TURKEY TO PAKISTAN FRONTIER, A DISTANCE OF THOUSANDS OF KILOMETERS AS WELL AS SOME CAPABILITY ON ITS NORTHERN FRONTIER WITH SOVIET UNION TO GIVE CREDIBILITY TO IRAN'S WARNING THAT IF SOVIETS EVER INVADE IRAN THEY WILL HAVE TO SHOOT THEIR WAY IN. IRAN REALIZES IT CANNOT COVER ALL OF THIS VAST AREA AS FORCE NEEDED WOULD BE TOTALLY BEYOND IRAN'S FINANCIAL AND HUMAN RESOURCES. THEREFORE IT MUST TAKE CALCULATED RISKS AND ASSUME THAT IT WILL NOT HAVE TROUBLE ON ALL ITS FRONTIERS AT SAME TIME. THIS WAS WHY IIAF REQUIREMENTS HE HAS GIVEN US FOR EIGHT SQDNS OF F-46 ARE IN REALITY AUSTERE IN LIGHT OF VAST AREA TO BE COVERED AND ARE ABSOLUTE AND INDISPENSABLE MINIMUM. HE OBSERVED IRAN'S SITUATION IS QUITE DIFFERENT FROM OURS IN THAT WE HAVE ATLANTIC AND PACIFIC OCEAN CUSHIONS AND ALSO HAVE HIGHLY TRAINED AIR RESERVE UNITS WITH COMBAT-EXPERIENCED PILOTS WHICH, IN EVENT OF NEED, CAN BE ACTIVATED IN SHORT TIME, THUS EXPANDING OUR AIR CAPABILITY. IRAN HAS NO SUCH CUSHIONS AND NO SUCH REERVE. IT HAD TO COUNT ON ACTIVE UNITS ALONE WITH NO BACK-UP WHATSOEVER. THIS IS WHY IIAF REQUIREMENTS HE HAD DISCUSSED WITH PRESIDENT IN OCTOBER 1969 WERE

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AND OTHER SOURCES AS BEEN
EQUIPMENT OVER A FIVE YEAR
NEED ESSENTIAL AS IRAN WOULD OBVIOUSLY
BE ESTABLISHED IN KEEPING WITH
AND FINANCIAL AND MANPOWER CAPABILITIES.
THAT THIS WAS OF COURSE TRUE BUT SAID HE
WANTED TO EMPHASIZE THAT INOPMRT AS AIRCRAFT ARE

SHAH CONCERNED
WANTED TO EMPHASIZE THAT INOPMRT AS AIRCRAFT ARE

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CONCERNED, DECISION AS TO WHAT IS NEEDED HAS ALREADY BEEN TAKEN.

10. HE THEN ASKED ME POINT BLANK WHETHER IT TRUE WE HAD OBJECTIONS TO 7TH AND 8TH SQDNS OF F-4 AIRCRAFT. I REPLIED BY SAYING WE TRYING TO HELP IN ALL POSSIBLE WAYS, LISTING AS I HAD TO ALAM, WHAT WE HAD DONE TO TRY TO HELP IRAN MEET ITS MILITARY NEEDS: E.G., SHIFTING FROM FMS TO EX-IM, PICKING UP MISSING EIGHTH TRANCHE, OUR WILLINGNESS TO EXPAND PILOT TRAINING, ETC. OBVIOUSLY, THERE WERE PROBLEMS FOR GOI INCLUDING FINANCING. HOWEVER, I COULD ASSURE HIM HIS DESIRE TO ACQUIRE THESE AIRCRAFT WAS FULLY UNDERSTOOD IN WASHINGTON WHICH I ALSO KNEW WAS EXAMINING PROBLEM. I FELT SURE HE KNEW WE WOULD DO OUR LEVEL BEST TO HELP IRAN AS MUCH AS POSSIBLE TO MEET ITS SECURITY REQUIREMENTS. HE SAID HE WAS SURE HE COULD COUNT ON US.

11. COMMENT: AT BEGINNING OF OUR DISCUSSION OF F-4S AND IRAN'S MILITARY REQUIREMENTS, SHAH WAS IN SOMBER AND RATHER SUSPICIOUS MOOD, OBVIOUSLY IN PART CAUSED BY REPORTS (TEHRAN 5193) THAT ELEMENTS WITHIN USG OPPOSING HIS ACQUISITION OF 7TH AND 8TH F-4 SQDNS AS WELL AS OPPOSITION TO FLAME THROWERS. RE LATTER, HE SAID RATHER ACIDLY HE COULD OBTAIN ALL HE WANTED FROM ISRAEL. HOWEVER, BY END OF OUR CONVERSATION HE SEEMED IN MORE RELAXED MOOD, PARTICULARLY AS RESULT OF ASSURANCES IN VERY HELPFUL STATE 199179 AND SECDEF 7580 THAT I WAS ABLE TO GIVE HIM. HOWEVER, THERE IS NO QUESTION WHATSOEVER THAT SHAH HAS MADE FINAL DECISION ON ACQUISITION OF 7TH AND 8TH F-4 SQDNS AND EXPECTS OUR APPROVAL AND COOPERATION. I NEED NOT ADD THAT IF WE FAIL HIM ON THIS, IT WILL CHANGE HIS ENTIRE OUTLOOK.

12. DEPT PASS OTHER POSTS AS APPROPRIATE, INFORMING US WHICH ONES. GP-3.
MACARTHUR

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