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**CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY**

WASHINGTON, D.C. 20505

**OFFICE OF THE DIRECTOR**

29 March 1972

MEMORANDUM FOR: The Assistant to the President  
for National Security Affairs  
The Secretary of State  
The Secretary of Defense

SUBJECT: Kurdish Efforts to Recruit International  
Support for Kurdish Position in Their Drive  
To Combat Closer Soviet-Iraqi Relations and  
Resulting Pressure on the Kurds

SUMMARY: Kurdish leader Mulla Mustafa al-Barzani sent an emissary during March 1972 to approach Jordanian [redacted] and United States Governments for aid, and to invite former Iraqi Prime Minister General 'Abd al-Razzaq al-Nayif to participate in an Arab-Kurdish Government in the North. The emissary said that al-Barzani believes that the West will not wish to overlook recent signs of strengthening Soviet-Iraqi relations. During his talks in the West, the emissary hopes to receive a favorable response to some or all of the following requirements:

- A. Political discussions on a continuing basis;
- B. Provision of financial assistance;
- C. Provision of a power radio station and training for its operator;
- D. Cooperation with Kurdish intelligence which is the responsibility of Mas'ud Barzani; and
- E. The award of some scholarships for Kurds to study at western universities. END OF SUMMARY.

1. During March 1972 Mulla Mustafa al-Barzani sent [redacted] as his special representative, to have discussions

with [REDACTED] representatives of the [REDACTED] and United States Governments.

2. During meetings with [REDACTED] explained recent developments in Iraq, including the forthcoming signature of a Soviet-Iraqi treaty of friendship agreed upon in principle during the visit of Saddam Husayn al-Tikriti, Vice-President of the Iraqi Revolutionary Command Council (RCC) and Assistant Secretary-General of the Ba'th Party of Iraq, to Moscow in February; Soviet pressure on the Kurds to sign the national charter with the Iraqi Ba'th Party and the Iraqi Communist Party; and the implications for the area as a whole of these developments.

3. [REDACTED] said that these developments placed the Kurds in a corner. If they agreed to join the national charter with the Iraqi Communist Party and the Ba'th, it would be impossible to escape at a later date, especially with the degree of support currently being pressed by the Soviet Union on the Ba'thi Government in Baghdad. If the Kurds refuse to join they must face the prospect of a renewal of hostilities. While the Soviet Union was pressing the Kurds to join, the Iranians were making every effort to persuade them not to. The Iranians had asked Idris Barzani, the son of Mulla Mustafa, to send them a list of requirements of their current military and material needs. This had been done and accepted in principle by the Iranians. The Kurds, however, did not trust the Iranians to implement their promises of help.

4. [REDACTED] continued by saying that the Kurds were no longer thinking in purely Kurdish terms but had discussed recent developments as a national problem for Iraq. In addition, the coming signature of a Soviet-Iraqi treaty had strategic implications for the whole area. In an effort to deal with the problem in its national context, the Kurds had had contact with Arab exile groups living in Cairo, but they did not trust them. [REDACTED] suggested that if [REDACTED] believed that the right moment had come, he personally should participate in the formation of a joint Arab-Kurdish committee located in Kurdistan, which would adopt the slogan of the Iraqi revolution in the north. The committee should establish international contacts throughout the world and then form a national government

in the north after preparing the constitutional basis of a new regime. It should then seek the cooperation of the Iraqi Army and expel the Ba'th from Baghdad. The Arab-Kurdish committee should make it clear to Iran that, while accepting their military and other material assistance, they would not welcome direct control or intervention by Iran in Iraqi internal affairs. Long Kurdish experience in working with Iran left no doubt that Iranian policy was to establish a weak government in Baghdad under unsuitable leaders such as 'Abd al-Ghany al-Rawi.

5. [REDACTED] said that if anything was to be done, a start would have to be made during the next three months. He proposed to visit [REDACTED] who had earlier promised to intercede with the Shah of Iran to provide necessary military aid without insisting on direct Iranian intervention and control of events. In addition, [REDACTED] said he was hoping to have discussions with officials at a senior level in [REDACTED] Washington to explain to them the strategic implications of recent Soviet moves in Iraq and to ask for some modest measures of help for the Kurds to be given in conditions of complete secrecy.

6. While realizing that Western policy toward the Kurds had traditionally been one of non-intervention, [REDACTED] said that the Kurds could not believe that the Western powers would remain indifferent once they were alerted to what was happening in Iraq. He hoped that he might receive a favorable response in the West to some or all of the following requirements:

- A. Political discussions on a continuing basis;
- B. Provision of financial assistance;
- C. Provision of a powerful radio station and training for its operator;
- D. Intelligence cooperation with Kurdish intelligence which was the responsibility of Mas'ud Barzani, a son of Mulla Mustafa al-Barzani; and

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E. The award of some scholarships for Kurds to study at western universities.



Richard Helms  
Director

CC: Assistant Secretary of State for  
Near East and South Asian Affairs

Director, Intelligence and Research

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