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FROM HENRY A. KISSINGER
TO WILLIAM HOOD
CITE SW0005

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MAIL ROOM

DECEMBER 13, 1972

TO: WILLIAM HOOD
FROM: HENRY A. KISSINGER

PLEASE DELIVER THE FOLLOWING MESSAGE TO YOUR CUSTOMER:

BEGIN TEXT: THE U.S. SIDE WISHES TO INFORM THE CHINESE SIDE THAT IT REMAINS PREPARED TO SIGN AN AGREEMENT ON VIETNAM WHICH WOULD MEET THE ASPIRATIONS OF THE WORLD'S PEOPLES. TO THIS END, IT HAS SENT A MESSAGE TO THE DRV SIDE, THE TEXT OF WHICH IS ATTACHED.

THE U.S. SIDE WISHES TO POINT OUT THAT REPETITION OF UNJUST CHARGES CAN ONLY COMPLICATE THE SITUATION. AN ANALYSIS OF THE U.S. MESSAGE CAN LEAVE NO DOUBT THAT ITS PROPOSALS DO NOT CONSTITUTE SUBSTANTIAL REVISIONS BUT RATHER THE MINIMUM CLARIFICATIONS REQUIRED. THESE POSITIONS HAVE ALREADY BEEN ACCEPTED BY THE DRV SIDE IN THE NEGOTIATIONS. SPECIFICALLY, WITH RESPECT TO THE DMZ QUESTION, THE DRV SIDE AGREED TO LANGUAGE ON NOVEMBER 23, 1972, WHICH IS ACCEPTABLE TO THE U.S. WITH RESPECT TO THE SIGNING PROCEDURE, THE DRV SIDE'S OWN PROPOSAL, AS DESCRIBED IN THE U.S. MESSAGE, WOULD PROVIDE AN ACCEPTABLE SOLUTION.

ON THE BASIS OF THE U.S. MESSAGE, THERE CAN BE A RAPID CONCLUSION OF THE NEGOTIATIONS AND RESTORATION OF PEACE. END TEXT.

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AFTER CAREFUL REVIEW OF THE RECORD OF THE RECENT NEGOTIATING SESSIONS, THE U.S. SIDE HAS COME TO THE CONCLUSION THAT THE DRV SIDE WAS DELIBERATELY AND FRIVOLOUSLY DELAYING THE TALKS. THE U.S. SIDE WAS DETERMINED TO CONCLUDE THE NEGOTIATIONS RAPIDLY AND THIS CERTAINLY COULD HAVE BEEN ACCOMPLISHED IF THERE WERE RECIPROCAL GOOD WILL AND SERIOUS INTENT.

IN ORDER TO BRING THE NEGOTIATIONS TO A RAPID CONCLUSION, THE U.S. SIDE MAKES THE FOLLOWING PROPOSAL. WITH RESPECT TO THE SUBSTANCE OF THE AGREEMENT, THE TWO SIDES SHOULD RETURN TO THE TEXT AS IT EXISTED AT THE CONCLUSION OF THE SESSION OF NOVEMBER 23, 1972, EXCEPT FOR THE DELETION OF THE PHRASE "ADMINISTRATIVE STRUCTURE" IN ARTICLE 12(A) AND THE MAINTENANCE OF THE STRICTLY TECHNICAL CHANGES IN THE TEXT MUTUALLY AGREED IN THE EXPERTS' MEETINGS IN DECEMBER. WITH RESPECT TO THE PROCEDURE FOR SIGNATURE, THIS SHOULD BE ON THE BASIS OF THE DRV PROPOSAL OF MONDAY, DECEMBER 11, 1972. ACCORDINGLY, THE UNITED STATES AND THE DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC OF VIETNAM SHOULD JOINTLY SIGN THE AGREEMENT, WHILE THE GOVERNMENT OF THE REPUBLIC OF VIETNAM AND THE PROVISIONAL REVOLUTIONARY GOVERNMENT OF THE REPUBLIC OF SOUTH VIETNAM SHOULD SIGN SEPARATE DOCUMENTS WHICH WOULD BE IDENTICAL TO THE AGREEMENT, MINUS THE PREAMBLE, AND THUS CONTAIN ALL ITS OBLIGATIONS.

IN THE MEANTIME THERE SHOULD BE RAPID PROGRESS ON THE PROTOCOLS DESIGNED TO IMPLEMENT THE AGREEMENT. THE U.S. SIDE WISHES TO REEMPHASIZE THAT IT IS UNACCEPTABLE TO REINTRODUCE INTO THESE PROTOCOLS SUBSTANTIVE ISSUES WHICH CONFLICT WITH THE AGREEMENT ITSELF OR ATTEMPT TO REOPEN QUESTIONS ALREADY DECIDED.

ON THIS BASIS, DR. KISSINGER IS PREPARED TO MEET SPECIAL ADVISOR LE DUC THO ON ANY DATE AFTER DECEMBER 26, 1972, TO BE CHOSEN BY THE DRV SIDE. IT MUST BE POINTED OUT THAT BECAUSE OF HIS OTHER RESPONSIBILITIES IT IS IMPOSSIBLE FOR DR. KISSINGER TO REMAIN IN PARIS FOR EXTENDED PERIODS OF TIME IN THE FUTURE. THE U.S. SIDE ALSO WANTS TO EMPHASIZE THAT THE PRESENT FRAMEWORK FOR A NEGOTIATED SETTLEMENT CANNOT BE MAINTAINED INDEFINITELY.

THE U.S. SIDE REITERATES ITS STRONG PREFERENCE FOR AN EARLY AND STABLE PEACE AND BELIEVES THAT A POSITIVE RESPONSE TO THIS MESSAGE WOULD CONSTITUTE A MAJOR BREAKTHROUGH TOWARD THAT GOAL.

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