



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September 5, 1972



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MRS. MULLETTEE

Attention **Keep this study together.**

COPIES TO:

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

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Subject: MOROCCO: King Hassan's Difficult Position

In the wake of the unsuccessful attempt by the Moroccan Air Force to assassinate King Hassan August 16, the King is in a weak and difficult position. He has taken personal command of the army but cannot be sure of its loyalty. His overtures to the opposition parties to join the government and participate in parliamentary elections have thus far been rebuffed. The King recognizes his vulnerable situation and is working hard to reestablish his authority and control. He may succeed. On the other hand, given the fragile nature of the situation, another coup or assassination attempt could come at any time and create a dangerously unstable and unpredictable situation in Morocco.

U.S. Actions to Date. Your message of congratulations to the King was delivered on the day following the attack and received headlines in the Moroccan press. We have also asked Ambassador Rockwell to convey our deep and sympathetic concern to King Hassan regarding the current situation and to obtain the King's own assessment of his position. Meanwhile, our present policies and programs in Morocco are continuing without change for the time being. Our present posture is to continue to give the King all possible indications of our continuing support.

We have, in addition, requested the intelligence community to prepare by mid-September a Special National Intelligence Estimate on Morocco and the King's prospects. We have asked CIA to check its resources in Morocco for possible clues to future dissidence, particularly within the armed forces. The Navy is

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reviewing its plans for a possible transfer or evacuation of the Kenitra communications facilities on short notice. USIA is reviewing its plans with regard to the Voice of America Relay Station at Tangier. Contingency plans to evacuate the more than 5,000 Americans in Morocco are being reviewed and updated where necessary. We are also continuing to consult with the French and other interested governments on Morocco.

U.S. Options. Broadly speaking, we have three basic options with regard to the King:

(1) On the grounds that Hassan's continuance offers the best protection to US interests in Morocco, we can support him strongly and try to shore up the Throne; or

(2) we can offer a more modest level of general support for the regime while maintaining a certain distance from the King and keeping lines of communication open to opposition leaders; or

(3) we can disengage more convincingly from the monarchy and focus on building relationships with possible successor governments.

In view of the important U.S. strategic and defense interests in Morocco, I recommend that you authorize preparation of a National Security Study Memorandum to examine options for U.S. policy with regard to King Hassan and Morocco. A draft NSSM is attached for your consideration.


William P. Rogers

Attachment:

Draft NSSM.

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