

# Turkey

## 195. Letter From Acting Secretary of State Rush to Secretary of Defense Schlesinger<sup>1</sup>

Washington, July 16, 1973.

Dear Jim:

Our longstanding problem with Turkey over providing their armed forces with an electronic warfare capability has now come to a head. If it is not resolved there will probably be a direct impact on the operation of our important intelligence installations in Turkey. If allowed to fester, I am concerned that this problem could have a harmful effect on the overall climate of our complex security relationship, inevitably affecting other of our important assets such as the present relatively free access to Turkish air space. I know that the details of this problem are familiar to some members of your staff, but I believe the matter is urgent enough to warrant your personal attention.

In 1957 in connection with our obtaining Turkish acceptance of an Electronics and Communications agreement governing both intelligence activities and certain operational communications, we agreed to provide the Turkish armed forces with an electronic warfare capability. This was reaffirmed by a 1962 Memorandum of Understanding, and a 1963 protocol to that MOU provided that this assistance be made available outside of the regular Military Assistance Program.

In accordance with this commitment, the U.S. Department of Defense in the early and mid-1960's provided equipment, training, and logistical support to develop an EW commitment for the Turkish First and Third Armies. The equipment provided at that time is now obsolete and Turkish authorities have requested that we provide additional equipment to modernize the EW elements of those two armies and provide an EW capability to the Second Army. The Turks have also indicated interest in obtaining assistance in upgrading the EW capability of the Air Force and Navy, though the nature of our commitment to these services is more ambiguous than in the case of the ground forces.

One of the more troublesome aspects of our undertaking to the Turks has been its open-ended nature both as to time and dollar amounts. Ear-

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<sup>1</sup> Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970-73, DEF 12-5 TUR. Secret. Drafted by Nicholas Murphy (NEA/TUR) on July 13; cleared by Robert Dillon (NEA/TUR), Rodger Davies (NEA), Ray Cline (INR), and Thomas Pickering (PM). Rush's handwritten signature is at the bottom of the first page of the letter.

lier this year, in an attempt to close off this commitment, the Department of Defense put together a \$2 million equipment package which was offered to the Turks. It is now clear that that amount is far less than the Turks consider the minimum which would constitute fulfillment of our obligation, and through the Foreign Ministry they have told our Embassy in Ankara that they regard our offer as constituting unilateral abrogation of an agreement. Though the Turks have held off from making a formal *démarche* on the subject, they have told us quite clearly that our insistence that our EW commitment under the 1962 MOU has ended with the \$2 million equipment offer would have an unpredictable impact on [1 line not declassified] the operation of which is sanctioned by same 1962 MOU.

While we have not committed ourselves to modify our earlier offer, we have told the Turkish Foreign Ministry that the whole matter would be reviewed once again by the U.S. Government.

In indicating its intention firmly to reject our \$2 million offer, the Turks have shown understanding of the problems we have with an open-ended commitment and have proposed that military officials of our two governments get together to work out a new package which would be mutually acceptable. Until we actually enter into such discussions, it will be impossible to know the price of the minimum package that will satisfy the Turks. It is probably realistic to assume that, at a minimum, \$8 million in addition to the already offered \$2 million will be required.

We have requested [*less than 1 line not declassified*] an evaluation of the value of our intelligence facilities in Turkey including an assessment of the impact of their being curtailed or closed down. Without awaiting the results of such a study, however, I think it safe to say that our intelligence facilities in Turkey, as well as the other security-related privileges we enjoy there, are of such value that we should attempt to reach a satisfactory agreement with the Turks on this issue.

While I am fully aware of the Department of Defense's budgetary difficulties, I believe that given the military importance of certain of our facilities in Turkey and the importance of the intelligence derived from others, it would be appropriate if funds could be allocated to solving this problem both from Department of Defense resources and those of the intelligence community. I would appreciate your having this matter reviewed once more to see if we cannot find some way out of this troublesome situation.

I am sending a copy of this letter to the Director of Central Intelligence as this subject, while having broad policy implications, concerns in the first instance our intelligence activities in Turkey.

With warm regards,  
Sincerely,

Ken

**196. Research Study Prepared in the Bureau of Intelligence and Research<sup>1</sup>**

RNAS-16

Washington, July 19, 1973.

TURKEY'S PRESIDENTIAL ELECTION

Turkey has emerged from a prolonged constitutional crisis with a new president and prime minister. The dynamics of the changeover was a vindication and reinforcement of Turkey's parliamentary system. This paper discusses the role of the military establishment in the political structure, as reflected in the election crisis, and the significance of that role for the forthcoming general elections.

*Abstract*

On April 6 a constitutional crisis was resolved with the election by Parliament of a compromise candidate to the Presidency. In the three weeks of balloting that preceded Fahri Koruturk's election, former Chief of the General Staff Gen. Faruk Gurler consistently ran a poor second to a civilian candidate backed by the Justice Party (JP). Uncertainty existed as to how far the military would go on behalf of Gurler's candidacy.

Gurler had previously resigned from his top position in the armed forces and was appointed to the Senate, thus making him eligible for the Presidency. His election seemed assured but he ran into stiff opposition from the two largest political parties, the JP and the Republican People's Party (RPP).

Koruturk is not a member of any political party and as a political moderate he conforms to the model of an ideal Turkish President. Although he is not viewed by the military as one of their own, he commanded the Navy until the 1960 coup that overthrew the regime of Adnan Menderes, and the military can, therefore, take some satisfaction in his election.

As the leader of the fight against Gurler's candidacy, former Prime Minister Suleyman Demirel was the chief beneficiary of the crisis. His antipathy to a military-sponsored nominee in general, and to Gurler in particular, is understandable. Demirel's JP is the spiritual descendant of the Democrat Party which was ousted by the 1960 coup. More

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<sup>1</sup> Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970-73, POL 15 TUR. Secret; No Foreign Dissem; Controlled Dissem. Drafted by Rotklein, cleared by Curtis Jones, and released by George Denney. A note at the bottom of the first page reads: "Aside from normal substantive exchange with other agencies at the working level; it has not been coordinated elsewhere."

recently, Gurler was deeply involved in the March 1971 "coup by memorandum" which led to Demirel's resignation as Prime Minister. The memorandum demanded restoration of law and order, then under attack by leftist terrorists, and enactment of reforms long advocated by the military.

Demirel, however, might not have been so zealous in his opposition to Gurler's candidacy had he not perceived a lack of enthusiasm and unanimity among the generals in their support of Gurler. Demirel seized this opportunity to reassert parliamentary supremacy and to call a halt to the practice of reserving the Presidency for the Chief of the General Staff.

With one exception, all of Turkey's six Presidents have been generals. The founder of the Republic, Kemal Ataturk, bestowed on the military the twin roles of protector of the revolution he had launched and guardian of his reforms. The military was, consequently, disturbed when they perceived during the 1950s that Menderes was appealing to the "reactionary" sentiments of the peasant masses and undercutting Ataturk's vision of a modern Turkey.

In the short run, the military coup that toppled Menderes in 1960 benefitted the RPP. As Ataturk's party and as the purveyor of his reformist ideology, the RPP enjoyed a special relationship with the military. Over the past year or so, this relationship dissolved as Bulent Ecevit achieved leadership of the party. Ecevit headed a doctrinaire faction of the RPP that had pressed the party to adopt a "left of center" orientation. Moreover, he opposes continuation of martial law which was instituted following the "coup by memorandum" and he is regarded by the generals as being soft toward the radical left.

The new Prime Minister, Naim Talu, heads a caretaker coalition government charged with leading the nation through parliamentary elections in October 1973 and securing passage of a program of reforms deemed "essential" by the military. He could not count on much help from Koruturk to carry out his mandate since the new President, unlike his predecessors, is without a constituency.

With Demirel's energetic backing, Parliament in the last days of June passed with uncharacteristic speed several key reform bills. Demirel's new-found interest in reform legislation apparently is part of his strategy to forestall possible military interference with the JP's expected triumph at the polls in October, and it is questionable how effectively he might implement the reform measures if he is elected.

A Demirel victory in October following Gurler's defeat in April could be regarded as a fresh rebuff to the military. Even with the reform legislation on the books, the military would face the dilemma of allowing the man they brought down in 1971, because he had failed to secure reforms, to reassume the premiership, or to intervene once again

in the democratic process. However, with most of the activists involved in the “coup by memorandum” now in retirement, such intervention appears to be only a remote possibility.

[Omitted here is the body of the study.]

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**197. Information Memorandum From the Officer-in-Charge of Turkish Affairs in the Bureau of Near Eastern and South Asian Affairs (Dillon) to the Assistant Secretary of State for Near Eastern and South Asian Affairs (Sisco)<sup>1</sup>**

Washington, October 17, 1973.

SUBJECT

Turkish Election Upset Gives Plurality to Left-of-Center Party

In a stunning election upset the left-of-center Republican Peoples Party (RPP) has won a plurality of about 190 of the 450 National Assembly seats in Turkey’s October 14 general elections (official vote tally and distribution of parliamentary seats has yet to be announced). The Justice Party (JP), senior partner in the present coalition government which won majorities in the 1965 and 1969 elections, got about 100 seats less than it did the last time at the polls. Two smaller parties—the religiously oriented National Salvation Party (NSP) and the Democratic Party (DP), both well to the right of the JP, between them gained about 80 seats, largely carved out of the JP’s traditional constituency. Representation of the Republican Reliance Party (RRP), the junior coalition partner, was sharply reduced to about ten seats.

Factors in the election outcome included (a) the effective campaign waged by RPP leader Bulent Ecevit; (b) the lackluster campaigning of former Prime Minister and JP leader Demirel; (c) initial JP overconfidence resulting in a slow-starting campaign which never got up to speed; (d) serious voter concern over spiralling inflation for which the JP, as a government party, was forced to shoulder some blame.

*Coalition or Minority Government Necessary*

The results presage a minority or a coalition government, either likely to be quite unstable. In line with traditional practice RPP leader

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<sup>1</sup> Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970–73, POL 14 TUR. Confidential. Drafted by Nicholas Murphy and sent through Rodger Davies.

Ecevit will probably be asked to form a government. It will not be an easy task. The RPP would be ideologically uncomfortable with either of the two smaller right wing parties, and JP leader Demirel (whose leadership position may now be shaky), has announced his intention to take the party into opposition. If a minority RPP government were to come into power, it would remain there only at the suffrance of parties with which it has sharp policy differences.

*Significance for the US*

We expect that the USG will be able to continue close and friendly relations with whatever government comes to power. However, the possibility of instability and resultant loss of effectiveness in government might make these relations somewhat more difficult. Moreover, the RPP rank and file and particularly its left wing, has not always been as friendly towards the US as has the JP, and the RPP might therefore be inclined to give a hard look at some aspects of US-Turkish relations, especially in the security field.

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**198. Telegram From the Embassy in Turkey to the Department of State<sup>1</sup>**

Ankara, November 3, 1973, 0932Z.

8681. Subj: Continued Soviet Overflights of Turkey. Ref: A) Ankara 8619; B) State 216995.<sup>2</sup>

1. Summary: In meeting morning November 3, and after I raised points outlined reftels, Bayulken told me that in view of U.S. NATO-oriented concerns re overflights and in view of fact that numbers had exceeded figure he had given me, GOT would promptly re-examine situation and he would report back to me as soon as he could. End summary.

2. I met Saturday morning with Foreign Minister Bayulken pursuant to reftels. I said that I had sought appointment at Dept's request to reiterate USG concern over imbalance GOT treatment of USG and

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<sup>1</sup> Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 633, Country Files, Middle East, Turkey, Vol. III. Secret; Priority; Exdis.

<sup>2</sup> Telegrams 8619 from Ankara, November 2, and 216995 to Ankara, November 3, discussed the number of Soviet overflights, which were twice what Turkey had estimated, and sent instructions for Ambassador Macomber's next meeting with Turkish officials. (Ibid.)

Soviet Government during present Middle East crisis. I specifically contrasted GOT unwillingness for Incirlik to be used in connection with crisis while at same time permitting Soviet overflights. I added that USG was concerned by failure on part of allies fully to comprehend the danger to NATO itself of divisive shift in strategic balance in Middle East and that we were therefore surprised by Turkish actions in facilitating these Soviet shipments. I noted that the number of overflights had exceeded by over one hundred percent the figures he had conveyed to me in our last meeting. I also noted that Turk Ambassador in Washington, Esenbel, had told Dept that he understood flights had ended whereas our information was that they were continuing. I referred to Article 3 of the Chicago Convention and said that in the light of this and of past practices there was no way that USG could be convinced that GOT did not control who used its air space. I said that quite apart from concerns I had earlier noted we were troubled by precedent which GOT was establishing vis-à-vis Soviet overflights in the situation.

3. I then referred to USIS Wireless File 209 (date Nov 2)<sup>3</sup> and read to him background statement by senior unidentified Defense official re Turkey overflight situation, noting that in public we were in effect defending Turkey's actions because we did not believe that U.S.-Turkish relations would be served by speaking publicly with the same candor I was employing privately and directly with him.

4. I ended presentation by saying that, in view of foregoing concerns, USG would like to know what GOT's intentions were re continuing Soviet overflights.

5. Bayulken was clearly uncomfortable during the presentation. He first attempted to say that if Turkey had understood it was NATO problem they would have taken different attitude, but that they had considered matter simply domestic Middle East struggle in which Soviets were helping their friends and U.S. were helping their friends, and Turkey thought it best to stay out of dispute.

6. I pointed out that in beginning our discussions I had noted that problem was larger than simple Middle East dispute and that if power balance in this area changed as result of Soviet intervention this would clearly have adverse consequences elsewhere. (I reminded him that, in our earlier conversations, he had agreed with this point.) I also referred to the concerns Ambassador Rumsfeld had expressed in NATO councils. Finally, I said that, of all NATO partners, Turkey instinctively should be in best position to recognize threat to shift of power balance in its own back yard.

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<sup>3</sup> Not found.

7. Bayulken then inquired: "What about all those KC-135 flights at Incirlik." I reiterated that if there were any materials at Incirlik which we needed in connection with Middle East situation these were being moved from Incirlik to another country and deployed from there. I noted that this being done at very great inconvenience to USG in deference to GOT wishes, and this transfer of resources was what the C-135 flights were concerned with.

8. Bayulken said he was sure USG understood the delicate position that Turkey was in. He expressed the belief that we did not really want to see a Turkish crisis with the Soviets. If such a crisis took place, he noted, it would directly involve USG as well, for U.S. was Turkey's "NATO partner and closest friend". In response, I said that USG did not believe that way to get along with Soviets was to have appeasement policy toward their demands, that in the long run it was better to stand up to them right from the start.

9. Conversation then concluded with Bayulken making two points: first, he expressed great appreciation for the public posture that we were taking and which I had reported to him; second, that he was not aware of how many overflights there had been and that on the basis of my belief that they were over double what he had indicated to me, and in view of USG conviction that these flights were carrying war materials and were continuing, GOT would undertake, as a NATO partner, to look into the matter right away and that he would report back to me as soon as he could.

**Macomber**

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**199. Memorandum From Harold Saunders and Henry Applebaum of the National Security Council Staff to Secretary of State Kissinger<sup>1</sup>**

Washington, February 15, 1974.

SUBJECT

Turkish Opium

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<sup>1</sup> Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 634, Country Files, Middle East, Turkey, Vol. IV. Secret. Sent for information. Concurred in by Horan and Froebe of the NSC staff.



The purpose of this memo is to call your attention to the question of opium production in Turkey, an issue that may come to a head both within the USG and with the Turks during the next few weeks.

The new Turkish government has indicated to Ambassador Macomber its interest in joining with the USG to reexamine Turkey's ban on opium production. You will recall that the Turks imposed the ban in 1971 as a result of considerable USG pressure. The US agreed to grant Turkey \$35.7 million to compensate and assist the roughly 70,000 farmers who had been earning all or part of their livelihood from opium cultivation.

The ban has never been popular in Turkey, either among the farmers themselves or among Turkish nationalists who feel that the ban was imposed by the USG and that it serves US rather than Turkish interests. During Turkey's election campaign last fall all political parties expressed dissatisfaction with the ban.

It is not clear yet just what the new government—a coalition of moderate leftists and right-wing nationalists—is going to do with regard to the ban. There is a good chance that they will ask us for more financial support as a condition for the ban's continuation. If this happens, the issue for us will be whether we should (a) refuse either to give more financial assistance or to acquiesce in resumption of production, (b) agree to give more financial assistance, or (c) agree to the resumption of production but with comprehensive controls to prevent leakage into the illicit worldwide heroin trade. What the latter course of action could mean is cultivation of opium straw (as opposed to the less controllable opium gum) on carefully supervised state farms.

An additional factor which may help bring the issue to a head soon is this month's international narcotics conference in Geneva. The USG positions that have been developed for this conference include the view that a worldwide opium shortage may be developing which (1) would have to be met through expanded Indian production and (2) necessitates USG domestic research and testing of opium straw production, in the hope of finding methods that will bring higher yields while also being susceptible to better controls than those that are possible under present opium-growing practices. The Turks have already informed us that these US positions will inevitably stimulate increased pressure within Turkey for resumption of opium production there.

Of the three USG options mentioned above, the first one—a completely negative response to the Turks—would substantially strain our overall relations with the new Turkish government and could lead them simply to resume opium production unilaterally, with or without controls. The second option—agreeing to pay further compensation—could lead us into what the Turks would view as an open-ended commitment to keep paying them off indefinitely for maintaining the ban.

Moreover, it is not clear that they could put more aid money to good use. A substantial part of the \$35.7 million we granted them in 1971 still has not been used.

The third option—agreeing to their resuming production under carefully controlled conditions—has some pros and cons. We do not know yet whether they could in fact set up a well-controlled production system, although they believe they could. Moreover, this type of production, which presumably would have to be on state farms, would not really take care of the peasant farmers who before 1971 were earning money by growing opium on their own private plots along with their other crops. On the other hand, controlled state production would at least partially assuage the demands of nationalists who oppose the ban. Resuming Turkish production with controls would also be more consistent with our belief in a probable worldwide shortage than would a continued Turkish ban. Finally, resuming production with controls would free us from an endless chain of Turkish demands for financial compensation.

On the other hand, it might be advisable to start off with a tough stance that we could soften later on. Ambassador Macomber advocates such an approach.

This problem will probably be thrashed out in greater detail by various interested USG agencies in the weeks ahead. Related to the Turkish problem are (a) Ambassador (to Thailand) Kintner's belief that US domestic testing of opium straw production will cause us considerable difficulty with the Thais, and (b) Indian unhappiness over US advocacy at Geneva of a worldwide shift from opium gum to opium straw production; the Indians are skeptical about our contention that such a shift would in fact lead to higher yields and better controls. This memo has focused on the Turkish problem because that is the one that carries the greatest danger of seriously hurting our overall relations with an important ally. We do not seek any decisions from you at this point but simply want to call these developing issues to your attention.

200. **Telegram From the Embassy in Turkey to the Department of State**<sup>1</sup>

Ankara, March 15, 1974, 1441Z.

1964. Subject: Greek-Turkish Dispute over Aegean. Refs: a) Athens 1550;<sup>2</sup> b) [*document number not declassified*].<sup>3</sup>

*Begin summary:* Following are our views of the Turkish attitudes in the Greek-Turkish dispute over the Aegean. Although it is challenging the Greek position, Turkey's official position is ostensibly conciliatory; the Turks say they want a bilateral agreement to delineate the continental shelf (probably on principle of equidistance), thus disposing of related issues. At present it appears doubtful that active Turkish or Turk-contracted oil exploration or drilling activities will take place in the disputed areas in the near future, but other steps cannot be ruled out. An always present danger is that Turkish emotions could be ignited by irresponsible press play of the dispute, as well as by Greek sabre-rattling. *End summary.*

1. By septel<sup>4</sup> we are reporting results our latest discussions with Turk officials in the dispute between Greece and Turkey over the Aegean continental shelf demarcation issue as well as the oil exploration problem. Our info indicates that the Aegean issues have high level military and civilian attention, including that of Pres Koruturk himself, a former fleet commander.

2. An authoritative MFA official (Soylemez, head of International Organizations Dept) indicated to us that the Turks were well aware of what he described as longstanding Greek aspirations to extend their territorial sea limits to twelve miles; however, according to this official, the Turks at present doubt that the Greeks would take such action in near future.

3. The official Turkish posture, as disclosed to us by this MFA official, is that a bilateral agreement between the two govts should be negotiated ASAP on the division of the continental shelf, which would thus also dispose of the oil exploration issue. Turks would prefer a division taking into account so-called special circumstances (proximity

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<sup>1</sup> Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 634, Country Files, Middle East, Turkey, Vol. IV. Secret; Exdis. Repeated to Athens.

<sup>2</sup> Dated March 13. (*Ibid.*, Box 594, Country Files, Middle East, Greece, Vol. IV)

<sup>3</sup> Not found.

<sup>4</sup> Telegram 1974 from Ankara, March 18, reiterated the Turkish belief that a bilateral agreement regarding the division of the continental shelf and related issues should and could be negotiated as soon as possible. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy Files, 1974)

of Greek islands to Turk mainland) but would fall back to principle of equidistance (or median line).

4. Turk MFA official also claimed the Turkish position was one of moderation. Turks were prepared to compromise and did not object in principle to sharing resources of whole of Aegean. No polemical comments have yet been uttered to us directly, although General Sancar came close (Ankara 1472).<sup>5</sup> Still, there is no denying the fact that the Turkish action in opening up disputed areas to oil exploration was in effect a challenge to the Greek position.

5. A high official of the Turkish Ministry of Energy and Natural Resources has also confirmed to us that at present the GOT is not physically involved in any type of exploratory activity in the disputed areas nor is any Turkish-contracted firm engaged in such activity. It is a fact, however, regularly repeated to us, that the Turks want to interest American and foreign companies in exploration activities.

6. In a TV interview on March 13, FonMin Gunes took a fairly even-handed approach to problem but insisted there must not be a Greek wall stopping Turk access to the Aegean. He said Turkey claimed the continental shelf up to a depth of two hundred meters, in accord with the latest concepts in international law.

7. Our view is that the ostensibly moderate position of the GOT at present could easily change, depending on Greek moves and on the actions of the frequently irresponsible Turkish press. Among other factors contributing to historic Turkish suspicions and dislike of Greece is the fear that the Greeks want to make of the Aegean a Greek lake, to further the old "megali" idea.<sup>6</sup> In addition, many Turks who in other respects accept most of Atatürk's dictums still believe that Turkey got a raw deal in allowing Greece to obtain unimpeded sovereignty over a chain of islands nestling against the Turkish mainland. It also must be taken into account that although this govt, like all recent govts, appears committed to achieving a good relationship with Greece, it is probably the most nationalistic in spirit of any Turkish Govt since 1965.

8. Our interim judgment is that we are not likely to see in the near future some oil exploration or drilling activity in the disputed areas. The Turks first will want to determine whether the Greeks are willing to negotiate a bilateral agreement. (One Turk newspaper on March 14, citing news agency sources in Athens, claimed that Athens was prepared to negotiate a bilateral agreement.) If progress is not made, however, we would not be surprised to see the Turks step up the nature of their challenge to the Greek position by, for example, flying special mil-

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<sup>5</sup> Dated February 27. (Ibid.)

<sup>6</sup> A concept in Greek political thought for uniting with Greece proper all territories in which a large number of Greeks lived.

itary air sorties over the Aegean, as they did in the days leading up to the 1967 Cyprus crisis. (Department may want to review the records as regards that period, since the Emb files are no longer available.)

9. In our opinion, Turkish attitude so far does not warrant a formal *démarche* counseling moderation, although I am prepared to do so if our monitoring of the issue suggests that Turk tempers are rising.

**Macomber**

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## 201. Memorandum of Conversation<sup>1</sup>

New York, April 15, 1974, 5:30–6 p.m.

### PARTICIPANTS

#### *U.S.*

The Secretary  
Assistant Secretary-designate Atherton  
Assistant Secretary Hartman  
Mr. Dillon, Director, NEA/TUR (Notetaker)  
Mr. Katzen, French-English Interpreter

#### *Turkey*

Foreign Minister Turan Gunes  
Turkish Ambassador to the U.S. Melih Esenbel  
Mr. Ozceri, Chief Aide to Foreign Minister Gunes, Interpreter  
Mr. Gunden, Turkish Mission to the UN (Notetaker)

### SUBJECT

Turkey: Secretary's Meeting with Foreign Minister Gunes

The Secretary: You can speak French to me. I understand it but I don't like to use it with civilized people. (Laughter)

Your Prime Minister is an old student of mine. There'll be no need to talk to him. We can just tell him what we have decided. He was a very tractable student but slightly revolutionary.

Foreign Minister Gunes: He was also my student.

The Secretary: We Foreign Ministers must stick together. If we don't, our superiors will think we are fallible—we can't have that.

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<sup>1</sup> Source: Library of Congress, Manuscript Division, Kissinger Papers, Box CL 272, Memoranda of Conversations, Chronological File. Confidential; Nodis. Drafted by Robert Dillon on April 16 and concurred in by Atherton. The meeting was held in the Waldorf Towers. Kissinger was in New York for a special session of the UN General Assembly.

Have you met Mr. Hartman? You know that Turkey is moving to the European Bureau.

Foreign Minister Gunes: Yes. I have met both of these gentlemen (indicating Atherton and Hartman). One Assistant Secretary will be acting for Thrace and one for Anatolia.

The Secretary: You will have to talk to Hartman in Istanbul, not Ankara. (Laughter)

Foreign Minister Gunes: Yes.

I appreciate that the Secretary is busy preparing recommendations for the President, but I am a new Minister and also need to prepare recommendations for my Prime Minister. I know you have been visiting my neighbors and I am sorry you have not been able to stop in Turkey. I would like to hear more about your conversations with my neighbors.

The Secretary: You should still have your old possessions.

Foreign Minister Gunes: I would like to make you happy but we have no intention nor desire to take over those old countries. At the Islamic Summit Conference at Lahore many ministers said the same thing to me. I told them we had no territorial designs.

The Secretary: I would like to stop in Turkey on an early trip to Europe or the Middle East.

Foreign Minister Gunes: Thank you.

The Secretary: With great pleasure.

Foreign Minister Gunes: We have a good friendship with Mr. Macomber in Ankara. He is doing good things for your country there.

The Secretary: That's the impression we have gotten.

Foreign Minister Gunes: At the 25th Anniversary of NATO, we made many congratulatory statements but maybe we should have waited for more unity of views.<sup>2</sup>

The Secretary: We wanted to have a declaration not as the French thought for American hegemony in Europe but to prevent isolationism in America. Before the decade is out, our West European friends will regret having made so much trouble for the most pro-Atlantic administration you will see for a long time. If we don't symbolize our Atlantic relationship for the American people, you will see changes. We still think that at the NATO Ministerial meeting we should have a declaration. We are not so eager any more for one with the European Community.

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<sup>2</sup> NATO members marked the 25th anniversary of the organization at the June Ministerial Meeting in Ottawa.

Foreign Minister Gunes: As I have said before, we don't desire differences between America and Europe. We want divergencies removed as soon as possible. Our ties are such that dissolution will not benefit any of us. We have strong ties to Western Europe through NATO. Also, we will become members of the European Economic Community. We do not want to see developments separating Europe and America. We don't like artificial labels like "Nine". We want to see the western world as an entity. That's why I made the joke about waiting for more unity of views before making our statements praising NATO.

The Secretary: Yes, we agree. The western world should be looked at as a unit. We don't want to see it consumed in internal squabbles.

Foreign Minister Gunes: We have the same views.

The Secretary: Now on other problems. What are your views on Cyprus? I just want it to go away.

Foreign Minister Gunes: I have the same view. It is not just the Cyprus problem but it is a question of our ties with Greece. I don't want to go into detail on Cyprus. We are trying to have good relations with Greece but right now they are not at their best level. If something happens, don't be alarmed.

The Secretary: Who is alarmed? What is this?

Foreign Minister Gunes: There may be a big argument.

The Secretary: If I hear about Turkish troops in Salonika, I will be alarmed.

Foreign Minister Gunes: No, it won't be like that. There is going to be a bit of a brawl but there is no need for the Secretary to be alarmed.

The Secretary: I have plenty of courage but I am not going to get in between Turks and Greeks when they are fighting. I have a principle not to interfere in national sports. But where is this taking place?

Foreign Minister Gunes: Perhaps in the Aegean Sea. But don't worry, I have made clear to my Greek colleagues that our argument<sup>3</sup> must be at the conference table.

The Secretary to Hartman: Do you want the area or should we give it back to NEA?

The Secretary to Foreign Minister Gunes: Seriously, it would be unfortunate if there were a deterioration of relations between Greece and Turkey. There are many countries which would wish to take advantage of the situation.

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<sup>3</sup> The word being used in Turkish, "kavga," means fight, quarrel, disagreement. The Turkish interpreter used several English words, but in each case Gunes said "kavga." [Footnote is in the original.]

Foreign Minister Gunes: Let me say a few words about Cyprus. Our relations with Greece are based on a delicate political economic and military balance. This balance is necessary. We Turks are trying hard to maintain the balance. We want a solution for Cyprus and neighborly relations between Greece and Turkey. This delicate balance has an old history. When it is upset, there are problems between Greece and Turkey.

The Secretary: I don't know about this situation. I will get a report on the Aegean Sea.

Foreign Minister Gunes: The situation is that we think there is oil under the Aegean. There are Greek islands in the Sea very close to Turkey. The Greeks claim that the continental shelf belongs to them. We both want to explore for oil. The Greeks say that the Sea belongs to them and we say that we should negotiate this question.

The Secretary: Give me 48 hours to look into this problem and I will give you my views.<sup>4</sup>

The Secretary to Atherton: Did you know about this?

Mr. Atherton: Yes. But we didn't know it had gotten this serious.

Foreign Minister Gunes: Thank you, but we regard the problem as legal. There will be no clash of armies.

The Secretary: I will give you my views. Our concern is that nothing happen to break the unity of the western world.

Now don't tow those island out to sea. As a student of Turkish history I know you are given to drastic solutions.

Foreign Minister Gunes: No, no, do not worry. The right is on our side but we are acting with restraint.

The Secretary: On Cyprus, our view is that negotiations should go on.

Foreign Minister Gunes: When our government came to power we went ahead with the negotiations from the spot at which they had arrived.

The Secretary: We believe there should be no preconditions. There should be no preconceived ideas about a unitary or a federal state.

Foreign Minister Gunes: Perfect. We are in agreement.

The Secretary (Referring again to the Aegean Sea): My colleagues never tell me anything because they think I will screw it up.

Foreign Minister Gunes: I see similarities between your colleagues and mine.

The Secretary: Foreign Ministers must stick together.

Foreign Minister Gunes: That's right. Therefore, I would like to ask you to stop in Turkey.

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<sup>4</sup> No formal follow-up was found.



The Secretary: I will plan to stop soon on a trip to Europe or the Middle East.

Foreign Minister Gunes: President Nixon saw Prime Minister Ecevit in Paris at President Pompidou's funeral and expressed hope that he would be able to visit Turkey. Of course such a visit would be a great feather for American-Turkish relations but a visit by you would be an opportunity to talk business.

I want to mention an important problem. Affection between America and Turkey grows every day. But friendly relations are important not just between governments but between peoples. We as a government are trying to foster growth of this affection. Before 12 March 1971<sup>5</sup> in Turkey some sources said the USA was imperialist and was imposing its will on Turkey. They said that our military cooperation was to Turkey's disadvantage. Some people began to accept this view. Now we as a government don't want those things said and we are working against it. That is all I want to say.

The Secretary: The Indian Foreign Minister is waiting and I will have to leave in just a minute. I just want to say that we appreciate a government which defends its national interest because we know those governments have the support of their people. In that situation we have confidence that their basic policies will be in the right direction. The U.S. should have done more for Turkey in the military field but Congress has limited what we have been able to do.

Before you go, I want to say a word about opium. I don't want to go into detail, but in considering this problem you must look at it in terms of American public opinion. There must be a solution which is acceptable to both sides.

Foreign Minister Gunes: I fully appreciate what you have said. I am fully aware of the implications of the opium problem for American public opinion. We need a solution which will offend neither American nor Turkish public opinion.

The Secretary: Exactly.

Foreign Minister Gunes: I cannot say categorically that we are not going to grow opium poppies but I can say that we are not going to do anything to poison anybody. We are preparing plans which call for the fullest control possible.

The Secretary: I think we both want the same thing. I can tell you that in recent weeks I have learned more than I want to know about opium. I may go into the business myself.

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<sup>5</sup> On March 12, 1971, the Turkish military took over the government and forced the resignation of Suleyman Demirel.

202. Memorandum From Harold E. Horan and Henry R. Applebaum of the National Security Council Staff to the President's Deputy Assistant for National Security Affairs (Scowcroft)<sup>1</sup>

Washington, May 3, 1974.

SUBJECT

Turkish Opium Ban

In response to a State Department query on the subject, our Ambassador to Turkey, William Macomber, has recommended (Tab B)<sup>2</sup> that he be authorized to deliver an oral message from President Nixon to Turkish Prime Minister Ecevit expressing the President's concern about the possible lifting of the Turkish opium ban. Macomber has an appointment with Ecevit Monday, May 6 (at 11 a.m. Washington time), and he would like to have this authorization in time for that meeting.

The reason for the short notice on this is that Macomber had asked for an appointment with Ecevit sometime before May 15, expecting to be granted an appointment a day or two before that date. Instead, the Turks have just informed him that the appointment is to be May 6. He expects this to be his last opportunity to see Ecevit before his (Macomber's) May 15 departure for a CENTO meeting in Washington. Macomber believes that a Presidential message needs to be delivered to Ecevit before his departure if it is to have the best possible chance of being delivered before the Turks make their final decision to ease the ban.

You may want to approve this yourself, but we have set it up as a memo to the President (Tab A)<sup>3</sup> in case you want to handle it that way. The memo at Tab A outlines the reasons for having a Presidential message, and for doing it as an oral rather than a written message. An additional reason for not having a written message is that the Turks appear likely to resume opium production in any case. In light of this, Ken Cole's office<sup>4</sup> says it would prefer not to see the President identified in writing with what is likely to be an unsuccessful effort at dissuasion. Cole's office (Geoff Shepard) has no objection to a Presidential message to the Turks as long as it is oral and private.

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<sup>1</sup> Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 634, Country Files, Middle East, Turkey, Vol. IV. Secret. Sent for action.

<sup>2</sup> Tab B is telegram 3274 from Ankara, April 30; attached but not printed.

<sup>3</sup> Attached but not printed.

<sup>4</sup> Domestic Council, Drug Enforcement Agency, Department of Justice.

An advance copy of a State Department memo on this matter is at Tab C<sup>5</sup> for your information.

*Recommendation:* That you authorize Macomber to convey the oral Presidential message recommended in the memo at Tab A, in time for a cable to go out to Ankara no later than Sunday, May 5.<sup>6</sup>

*Alternate Recommendation:* That the memo at Tab A be forwarded to the President.

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<sup>5</sup> Tab C is a memorandum from Rush to Nixon, May 3; attached but not printed.

<sup>6</sup> Scowcroft circled the recommendation, wrote “OK,” and initialed. In telegram 92323 to Ankara, May 4, the Department instructed Macomber to tell Ecevit: “The President has asked me to communicate to you his serious concern, which is shared by the American Congress and public, over the possibility that the Turkish Government may rescind the opium ban. A resumption of opium production by Turkey would carry a very grave risk of resumed illicit traffic with serious adverse consequences for the international effort to end narcotics smuggling. Instead, the President hopes that our two governments, along with concerned international agencies, can pursue efforts to improve the economic condition of those individuals affected by the ban.” (National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 634, Country Files, Middle East, Turkey, Vol. IV)

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### 203. Editorial Note

An Interagency Intelligence Memorandum, June 21, 1974, entitled “The Likelihood of Conflict Between Greece and Turkey” examined the two nations’ conflicting claims to rights over possible oil reserves in the Aegean Sea and the resulting increased tensions. See Document 15.

## 204. Telegram From the Embassy in Turkey to the Department of State<sup>1</sup>

Ankara, July 2, 1974, 1235Z.

5213. Subject: Meeting With PriMin on Ending of Poppy Ban. Ref: Ankara 5210 (notal); Moscow 10340 (notal).<sup>2</sup>

1. I met for one hour, commencing at midnight July 1st, with PriMin Ecevit. Acting FonMin Isik and DCM Spain also present.

2. Ecevit confirmed that Council of Ministers earlier in evening had approved decree for resumption opium poppy production in six provinces and part of Konya. He said he would be explaining details to Parliament afternoon July 2nd. He added that he was going "to ask the United Nations to give advice and technical assistance, and that all the control measures advised would be taken, and that the Turkish nation will act with full consciousness of its responsibility to the world".

3. I said that I must ask, on behalf of my government, that he reconsider this decision. It carried the gravest risks of setting back our battle against heroin and of doing enormous damage to the US-Turkish security relationship. I then emphasized that as result of tonight's announcement we were already in crisis relationship, and that his government's proposed action would, in my judgement, bring the US-Turkish relationship to its lowest point since World War II. I also said that while I hoped very much I was wrong, the odds tonight were very strong that US military assistance to Turkey was finished. The US Executive branch, while deeply dismayed, would not, I thought, initiate such a cut off. The Congress, however, would take decision into its own hands.

4. Isik, supported by Prime Minister, said that reconsideration was politically out of question. "It would result in no government, and no relationship with U.S." Ecevit added that he "would have thought Turk-American relations ran deeper" than I had suggested. I expressed equal surprise that GOT would take such an action against a friend, and moreover that we should learn of it through a public broadcast. I then let it be known that active consideration was being given in Washington to my being immediately recalled for consultation, remarking

<sup>1</sup> Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 634, Country Files, Middle East, Turkey, Vol. IV. Confidential; Flash; Exdis. Sent also Niact Immediate to Moscow for Saunders and Hartman. Repeated Immediate to New Delhi, Bangkok, Islamabad, Kabul, Adana, Istanbul, Izmir, the U.S. Mission in Geneva, and USUN.

<sup>2</sup> Telegrams 5210 from Ankara, July 1, reported that Turkey had rescinded the poppy ban. In telegram 10340 from Moscow, July 1, the Secretary's party requested confirmation and consultation from the Embassy in Ankara. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy Files, 1974)

that my departure just before hosting 4th of July party would inevitably be widely noted.

5. Ecevit turned conversation back to sincerity of GOT re developing fool-proof surveillance system. I stressed that if poppies grown at all, Congress likely have little faith in effectiveness of any proposed controls. Ecevit said again that irrevocable government decision taken that poppies would be grown, but he would welcome all advice on controls and asked what I would suggest.

6. I reiterated that even smallest amount of poppy growing likely to have most serious consequences in US-Turk relationship. Obviously, however, if he were prepared to grow only a very small amount at start, surround it with massive surveillance, and expand only after soundness of controls had been proven to satisfaction of international community—this might possibly make Congressional problem slightly more manageable. I added that if the poppy growing area at start was so minute as to obviously present almost no danger of significant diversion into illicit channels, I personally would urge USG to continue subsidy for the much larger proportion of those former poppy farmers not being permitted to resume cultivation. I said that by growing even a small amount he would have made good on his election pledge. At same time severe limitation of the kind I was suggesting might make problem somewhat more manageable at our end. I then added that if GOT absolutely determined to resume cultivation, an even better alternative would be to wait the three years necessary to develop a bractiatum program, and maintain the ban until then.

7. Ecevit responded that my suggestions (especially the first one) merited serious consideration and he would take them to his government in the morning. He added that in both his explanation to Parliament and in a major television appearance on Eurovision evening July 2nd he would seek to reassure Congress by emphasizing his government's intention to limit and control production. I said I appreciated effort but doubtful of its success.

8. At conclusion of conversation Isik, supported by Prime Minister, expressed hope that official USG spokesman, while regretting GOT decision, would add expression of confidence that a proven ally would act responsibly re surveillance effort. I said latter would not be possible.

9. *Comment:* Decision comes as bitter disappointment, especially as we convinced that in past few weeks, for first time, US position was gaining adherents within Turkish Government.

10. During my recent Washington consultations<sup>3</sup> there was, I believe, general agreement that every effort should be made to

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<sup>3</sup> Macomber returned to Washington on May 15 for a CENTO meeting.

“stonewall” this decision as long as this offered any possibility of success. If in the end this failed, however, strategy was to shift to damage limiting operation, i.e., seeking to ensure minimum growing under maximum security. While we are not faced with final faits accomplis until President has actually signed decree, it is obvious that we must now turn our attention to strategy’s second phase.

Macomber

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**205. Memorandum From Harold E. Horan of the National Security Council Staff to the President’s Deputy Assistant for National Security Affairs (Scowcroft)<sup>1</sup>**

Washington, July 10, 1974.

SUBJECT

Turkish Opium

Bud McFarlane told me last night that according to Tom Korologos,<sup>2</sup> the Mondale Amendment cutting off aid to Turkey, which will be offered in connection with the authorization bill for the Drug Enforcement Agency budget (S. 3355), is now due to come up on the Senate Floor tomorrow, July 11.<sup>3</sup> I have confirmed this with Mr. Weiss, Chief of the Congressional Relations Section of DEA.

In Korologos’ view, and others agree, Secretary Kissinger needs to get involved in this one on an urgent basis. One suggestion is that the Secretary contact the Senate Foreign Relations and the Military Affairs

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<sup>1</sup> Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 634, Country Files, Middle East, Turkey, Vol. IV. Secret. Sent for urgent action. A notation in Scowcroft’s handwriting on the memorandum indicates that Kissinger saw it.

<sup>2</sup> Thomas Korologos was Deputy Assistant to the President for Legislative Affairs.

<sup>3</sup> According to the President’s Evening Report of July 11: “A wide range of efforts from several sources converged successfully on Senator Mondale this morning; the net result being that he revised his original amendment which would have cut off aid to Turkey immediately. The new amendment, co-sponsored by Senators Humphrey, Buckley and several others, passed the Senate 81 to 8. It would require suspension of aid after January 1975 unless the President can certify that the Turks have taken effective safeguard measures to prevent the diversion of opium into illicit markets.” (National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 61, President’s Daily Briefs, July 1–15, 1974)

Committees to urge against precipitate action in view of the damage such action could create not only for our bilateral relations, but in the NATO context. We might urge that on an issue as important as this, the Senate Committees should have an opportunity to hold hearings (I understand, by the way, that the House will hold hearings next week on the Wolff Resolution calling on the President to suspend aid to Turkey.) Also, cutting off aid now would weaken seriously our ability to cooperate with the Turks in preventing Turkish heroin from being smuggled into the US.

Attached at Tab A is a draft copy of an options paper<sup>4</sup> for Presidential decision which State is circulating to members of the European/IG and the Combined Committee on International Narcotics Control. The Secretary has been provided an advance copy as well. The recommended option involves working with the Turks on controls, but with a clear warning that Section 481 of the Foreign Assistance Act is being considered and would be invoked if we were not convinced their control system is adequate. The credibility of this threat would be increased by applying pressure at several points by “(a) denying a recent GOT request of transfer to Turkey of two excess US naval vessels,” and “(b) informing the GOT that we will not for the present grant Turkey any military assistance under our current continuing resolution authority and will not make any disbursements under FY 1975 Foreign Assistance until we are convinced that the GOT has an adequate plan to prevent smuggling.” An element of this scenario is that we must persuade Congress to withhold punitive action against Turkey.

*Recommendation*

That you urge Secretary Kissinger to contact the appropriate Committees to request delay on action of the type proposed by Mondale.<sup>5</sup>

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<sup>4</sup> Attached but not printed.

<sup>5</sup> No approval or disapproval is indicated.

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206. Paper Prepared by the National Security Council  
Interdepartmental Group for Europe<sup>1</sup>

Washington, July 16, 1974.

TURKISH OPIUM POPPY BAN

*The Problem:* Turkey has revoked its June 1971 opium ban. This threatens a resumption of smuggling of illicit opium from Turkey and a resultant worsening of the heroin problem in the U.S. There is also a danger of serious damage to our interests in Turkey as sentiment develops in the Congress to take punitive measures against Turkey.

*Background/Analysis*

Prime Minister Bulent Ecevit's government decided on July 1 to end the opium poppy ban. Despite numerous promises to notify us in advance, our Embassy in Ankara received the final news through the radio announcement that the ban had been lifted. Ambassador Macomber met with Prime Minister Ecevit at midnight to protest the Turkish action and warn him of the possible consequences for Turkish-American relations.<sup>2</sup> Ecevit confirmed that the decision was irreversible and reiterated his determination to impose a foolproof control system that would prevent smuggling and said he would welcome advice.

The government's decree indicates that the GOT plans to allow farmers in seven provinces to apply for planting licenses. Each farmer would be limited to 1¼ acres of poppies. Thus there is posed a serious problem in terms of control: the probability of many small plots planted by individual farmers spread across a six-and-a-half province area.

Section 481 of the Foreign Assistance Act requires the President to suspend all assistance when he determines that a country's government has failed to take adequate steps to prevent narcotic drugs produced in that country from entering the U.S. unlawfully. While this section does not require a production ban, the breach of the agreement does constitute a prima facie case for questioning the adequacy of Turkey's performance.

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<sup>1</sup> Source: Ford Library, NSC Institutional Files (H-Files), Box H-54, NSDM 267. Secret. Concurred in by John McDonald (IO/CMD), James Michel (L/PM), Mark Feldman (L), Cyrus Vance (S/NM), [name not declassified] (CIA), Kenneth Towery (USIA), and Robert Mantel and E. Johnson (OMB). Not concurred in by DOD/ISA, Treasury, AID, and JCS. Nonresponse by DEA. Transmitted by Jeanne Davis of the NSC staff to the Departments of State, Defense, and Treasury, CIA, JCS, USIA, AID, and DEA. (Ibid.)

<sup>2</sup> See Document 204.



Examination of possible courses of action is based on the following assumptions:

- a. The decision to lift the ban is irreversible barring an overthrow of the Ecevit government. We are not considering promoting an overthrow.
- b. There are many within and without the Turkish Government who are genuinely concerned at the possible impact of the poppy decision on Turkish-American relationships, and particularly its impact on the security relationship. (The opposite side of this coin is that there are some who welcome the decision as an opportunity to weaken or destroy that relationship.)

*Objectives:*

We are looking for ways to:

- a. Minimize the adverse impact of the Turkish decision on our increasingly successful battle against heroin addiction in the United States;
- b. Maintain our credibility with foreign governments, the Congress and the American people regarding our seriousness in combating international narcotics trafficking;
- c. Accomplish the above with the least damage to our important security relationship with Turkey.

*The Options*

1. *Enter into discussion with the GOT on ways to prevent opium smuggling (see Annex A)<sup>3</sup> while attempting to maintain business as usual on all other aspects of the Turkish-American relationship.*

*Pros:*

—As the Turkish decision to resume growing is irrevocable, the next best chance we have for avoiding a serious setback to our narcotics efforts is the establishment of an adequate control system in Turkey. This is technically feasible. The issue is whether the GOT is willing to bear the domestic political costs of a truly effective system. We have indications that the GOT is seriously concerned over the potential damage to its relations with the U.S. We should be able to translate this concern into a firm willingness to employ whatever methods are necessary to prevent smuggling. We will be able to enlist international support in this effort.

—By maintaining business as usual throughout the rest of the wide range of relationships, we would try to divorce the opium issue from our other interests, which are important to us, especially in the area of

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<sup>3</sup> Annexes A, B, and C were not attached and not found.

security, thereby minimizing the damage to these other interests from the heat which has developed on opium.

*Cons:*

—There is substantial Congressional pressure to take a tougher line.

—The Administration will be accused of being soft on narcotics.

—Internationally, we may weaken the credibility of our anti-narcotics efforts in a number of other countries, if we do not react to the Turkish setback.

*2. Enter into discussion with the GOT and the UN agencies concerned on ways to prevent opium smuggling (see Annex A), while applying pressure at several points, but attempting to maintain most other aspects of the Turkish-American relationship.*

*Pros:*

—By taking several actions on the military side, we can increase the pressure on the GOT to establish an effective control system. The Turkish military establishment is sympathetic to our position on opium as it has the most to lose from a rupture. These actions may well encourage the military to increase its pressure on the GOT to accommodate the U.S.

—By bringing the UN into the control issue at an early stage, we can multilateralize the discussions and pursue them regardless of any deterioration of our bilateral relations with Turkey.

—This will also partially assuage Congressional hardliners.

*Cons:*

—Applying pressure will add another irritant to U.S.-Turkish relations, already strained over the opium issue.

—More importantly, the mutually beneficial nature of our relationship with Turkey provides just as many points at which the GOT can retaliate by applying the same sort of pressure on us. (See Annex B.)

—Furthermore, we would have to move very carefully or we would risk totally alienating the Turkish military.

*3. Recommend to the President that he suspend economic and military assistance to Turkey. Apply pressure at all points. Refuse to discuss the subject of control with the GOT.*

*Pros:*

—This would demonstrate very clearly that the U.S. Government attaches the highest priority to its efforts against narcotics. Our credibility would be enhanced elsewhere in the world.

—The action would be popular with Congress and the press.

*Cons:*

—This would not succeed in persuading the GOT to reverse its decision.

—It would, moreover, remove whatever leverage we have by changing the threat into reality. We would be unable to persuade the Turks to impose better controls if our relations so deteriorate that we cannot carry on discussions.

—The Turkish Government would probably force us to remove the drug enforcement agents who are presently cooperating with the Turkish police in enforcement activities.

—The military establishment, which we rely on to exercise pressure on the GOT in our favor, would be alienated. The Turkish military tend to be nationalistic and suspicious of foreigners. They have until now, however, appreciated the value of American military assistance to Turkey. A complete suspension of this assistance (more than \$150 million per year) would cause a serious reaction in Turkey which could lead to a significant and probably rapid deterioration in our security relations.

*Recommendation:*

We recommend Option 2. We should approach the GOT with minimum criteria for the establishment of system to prevent smuggling. We should discuss with them the advantages of switching to papaver bracteatum, a virtually risk-free form of poppy. We should also insist, if opium poppies are grown, that incising be prohibited in Turkey and a straw process be used.

These discussions should be accompanied by a clear warning on our side that Section 481 is being considered and will be invoked if we are not convinced that their system is adequate. The credibility of this threat will be increased by applying pressure at several points, specifically by (a) denying a recent GOT request to transfer to Turkey two excess U.S. Naval vessels, (b) informing the GOT that the U.S. will not program any grant military assistance in FY 75 until we are convinced that the GOT has an adequate plan to prevent smuggling. We must expect counter pressure and be prepared to accept this in the interest of furthering the narcotics program. This involves a decision that it will be necessary to risk some of our security interests in Turkey in the interest of our narcotics program. On the other hand, a complete breach would serve neither objective. Concurrently, we should immediately consult with the international narcotics control organizations in Geneva to inspire and assist them to make a maximum contribution to improve controls in Turkey.

We must persuade Congress to withhold punitive action against Turkey pending these discussions. This will require the personal in-

tervention of the Secretary of State, who should advise the Congress that we will insist on effective Turkish controls and will not program grant military assistance in FY 75 until we are convinced that the GOT has an adequate plan.

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**207. Telegram From the Embassy in Turkey to the Department of State<sup>1</sup>**

Ankara, July 17, 1974, 1251Z.

5630. Subject: Future of Greek-Turkish Cooperation in NATO.

1. In course of Prime Minister's July 17 appraisal of current Cyprus situation and statement of Turkish requirements with respect to it (septel),<sup>2</sup> he raised question of future of Turkish-Greek cooperation in NATO. He said that this was a subject that they had been hoping for some weeks to find time to talk directly with Secretary Kissinger about.

2. Sometime before the current Cyprus situation developed, GOT had reached conclusion that Turk-Greek cooperation in NATO had lost its meaning. He said we sincerely want NATO to remain strong and effective in this area but GOT has to face facts. GOT relations with all its neighbors are good today, except with the one neighbor which is a NATO ally. We must, therefore, he said, think about new shape that has to be given to NATO in this region. It totally unacceptable for Greek officers in Izmir to be free to observe Turkish activities and this must end. PriMin said he recognized that if NATO were not to be badly damaged, something had to be developed in lieu of Greek-Turkish cooperation. He said he did not understand military matters as well as Dr. Kissinger and he did not specifically understand what Turkish military had in mind as compensatory measures but he believed these involved giving additional common defense installations to the US "along the coast."

3. I said that just the thought of a formal break-off of cooperation between these two key southeastern NATO countries was "chilling" and that I hoped very much he would not overreact as a result of the performance of most recent Greek Government. I said I thought it would be the height of folly to move precipitously in this direction and that it important to keep overall area-security interests in mind, despite

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<sup>1</sup> Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 634, Country Files, Middle East, Turkey, Vol. IV. Secret; Exdis. Repeated to Athens and USNATO.

<sup>2</sup> See Document 90. On July 15 the Cypriot National Guard led by Greek officers overthrew Makarios and Nicos Sampson assumed the Presidency.

anger over current Greek-Turkish problems. PriMin repeated that serious consideration being given to this problem but agreed that precipitous action would be unwise. He said an alternative solution, which would go in exactly the opposite direction, would be to find ways to restore Greek-Turkish cooperation and carry it to further degrees. For example, if increased Greek military activity on Dodecanese were intended to strengthen NATO, there should be Turkish cooperative presence on islands. He said he would prefer a solution which involved greater, not lesser, Greek-Turkish cooperation but that as of now, GOT would probably opt for formal break-off of cooperation.

**Macomber**

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**208. Memorandum From the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger) to President Ford<sup>1</sup>**

Washington, August 21, 1974.

SUBJECT

Turkish Opium

The announcement on July 1 by the Turkish Government that it is lifting its three-year-old ban on opium cultivation requires your decision as to the proper US Government response.

*Background*

Turkey's ban on opium cultivation was decreed in June 1971 at the strong urging of the United States Government and through President Nixon's personal efforts. Up to that time, Turkish opium had been the major source of heroin smuggled into the United States. Since the imposition of the Turkish ban there has been a dramatic decline in heroin addiction in the United States.

In the months preceding the July announcement, it was clear that there was strong popular sentiment in Turkey in favor of the repeal of

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<sup>1</sup> Source: Ford Library, NSC Institutional Files (H-Files), Box H-54, NSDM 267. Secret. Sent for action. An earlier draft was distributed on July 16 and summarized in an NSC memorandum for Kissinger on July 29. (Ibid.) Kissinger disagreed with the recommended option which included threatening sanctions against the Turks. Scowcroft submitted this revised paper, which reflected Kissinger's concerns, to Kissinger on August 17. (Library of Congress, Manuscript Division, Kissinger Papers, Box 315, National Security Council, NSDM 7/74-11/76)

the ban. Despite US grants of \$35.7 million to compensate and assist Turkish farmers in affected areas, the ban was highly unpopular among these farmers and others in Turkey; they insisted that the US assistance was inadequate and that the ban served US interests at Turkey's expense. US officials, aware in recent months that the Turkish Government was moving toward lifting the ban, strongly and repeatedly urged Turkish authorities at all levels not to take such a step. We emphasized to them that the ban had played a key role in combatting a major US problem, and that US public and Congressional reaction to a revocation of the ban could seriously harm US-Turkish relations.

Since the announcement repealing the ban, there has been considerable adverse US public and Congressional reaction. On July 11 the Senate passed an amendment requiring suspension of all US military and economic aid to Turkey after January 1975 unless Turkey has by then taken effective steps to control opium smuggling. The House on August 5 passed and sent to the Senate a somewhat different resolution which would require that we enter into talks with the Turks on establishing controls and that we suspend assistance under existing legislation if these talks prove unfruitful.

The existing legislation—Section 481 of the Foreign Assistance Act—requires that you suspend all US assistance to a country if you determine that its government has failed to take adequate steps to prevent narcotics produced there from illegally entering the US. US military assistance to Turkey has been running at \$150–200 million annually in recent years. Economic aid has been much smaller; our request to Congress for fiscal 1975 economic aid to Turkey is for \$23 million, and the final figure is expected to be much lower.

#### *The US Response*

The Turkish decision to lift the opium ban appears irreversible. That being the case, I believe that the US response should aim at achieving the following objectives:

—To minimize the adverse impact of the Turkish decision on our battle against domestic heroin addiction;

—To make clear to the Congress, the American people, and foreign governments your commitment to combatting international narcotics trafficking;

—To accomplish the above with the least possible damage to our important security relationship with Turkey.

Prime Minister Ecevit and his government have assured us that they would welcome the cooperation of the US, the UN, and others in developing an effective control system. US Government and UN agencies have already developed a number of ideas and plans as to how an effective control system might be established in Turkey.

I believe we have three broad types of response to Turkey's lifting of the ban:

1. *Soft-line approach:*

We could enter into discussion with Turkey on ways to establish an effective control system, while maintaining business as usual in all other aspects of US-Turkish relations.

2. *Middle-ground approach (recommended option):*

We could enter into discussions as in option #1, while pointing out to the Turks that the Foreign Assistance Act requires suspension of our military and economic assistance to them if they fail to take adequate steps to prevent smuggling into the US. This would underscore our concern and show responsiveness to the concerns of Congress and others.

3. *Harder-line approach:*

We could enter into discussions as in options #1 and #2, while also applying pressure on Turkey in several key areas at the outset of the negotiating process.

The first, soft-line approach, would please the Turks and minimize damage to US-Turkish cooperation. However, it would convey the implication that the Administration's previously expressed concerns about a lifting of the ban were overstated. Also, it would not satisfy the Congress and would weaken the credibility of our narcotics control efforts in other countries. Congress is likely to mandate an early aid cut-off if it is not satisfied that we are moving positively. No US Government agency advocates this soft-line approach.

The third, or harder-line approach, has been endorsed by several agencies. OMB, the Domestic Council, Treasury, and AID all favor applying sanctions against the Turks at the outset of the negotiations. They believe this is necessary to demonstrate that the US will not tolerate a renewal of illegal opium trafficking. They recommend that virtually the whole range of US assistance to Turkey—FY 1975 development assistance (\$23 million), FY 1975 military grant assistance and military sales credits (\$170–180 million), and deliveries from the current military assistance pipeline—be suspended, pending agreement on establishment of an adequate control system. These agencies believe that this tougher approach would be more convincing to the Turks and the Congress but would not irrevocably terminate any programs if the Turks respond satisfactorily.

This harder-line posture might be popular with Congress and the press and would make clear the firmness of our commitment against illicit narcotics traffic. But it could also jeopardize our mutual security relationship with Turkey, threatening such US security interests as our use of military bases and intelligence installations there, our Sixth Fleet's ability to operate in the Black Sea and use Turkish ports, and our extensive use of Turkish air space to fly from Europe into the Mid-

dle East and Asia. Turkey is, of course, an important NATO ally and its control over the Turkish Straits gives NATO an ability to cut off Soviet access to the Mediterranean if necessary. Most importantly, there is no assurance that these costs would be offset by any gains in the effort to control illegal drug traffic into the US; indeed, the hard-line approach, by seriously damaging our relations with Turkey, could greatly diminish our ability to limit that traffic.

Serious thought has been also given within the US Government to a modified version of this harder-line posture, in which we would suspend just one or two categories of our assistance at the outset of talks. No US agency now endorses this approach, however, and I believe—given Turkish pride and nationalism—that such an approach would probably do as much damage to US-Turkish relations and cooperation as would the broader suspension advocated by OMB and the other three agencies.

While we may eventually want to impose all or some of the sanctions envisaged in the harder-line approach if Turkey proves obdurate in the negotiations, I believe that to do so at the outset would produce a negative Turkish reaction that could defeat our efforts to get good controls. Under the more moderate approach we would retain the option to get tougher if the situation demands but leave the Turks some room to work out their own domestic problems while meeting our needs.

Therefore, I recommend the moderate approach of option 2. The Departments of State and Defense, CIA, and USIA all support this approach. I believe it offers the best chance of obtaining an adequate control system. Moreover, it would at least partially assuage Congressional and public demands for a firm US response to Turkey's action, while holding open the prospects for Turkish cooperation both on opium and mutual security matters.

The memorandum at Tab A<sup>2</sup> would establish option #2 as US policy. (State, Defense, CIA and USIA concur).

*Recommendation:* That you approve my signing the memorandum at Tab A.

Approve<sup>3</sup>

Disapprove (prefer option #3 harder line, suspending aid now pending agreement on establishment of an adequate control system. OMB, Domestic Council, Treasury, and AID favor).

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<sup>2</sup> Printed as Document 209.

<sup>3</sup> Ford initialed this option.



Disapprove (prefer modified version of harder line, suspending one or two categories of aid now. No agencies favor).

Disapprove (prefer very soft line described in option #1. No agencies favor).

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## 209. National Security Decision Memorandum 267<sup>1</sup>

Washington, August 23, 1974.

TO

The Secretary of The Treasury  
The Secretary of Defense  
The Attorney General  
The Deputy Secretary of State  
The Administrator, Agency for International Development

SUBJECT

Turkish Opium Production

The President has reviewed the Interdepartmental Group memorandum of July 13, 1974, as well as the agency views submitted separately.<sup>2</sup> He has instructed that the United States take the following steps in response to the recent decision by the Government of Turkey to lift its ban on opium production:

1. Enter into discussions with the Government of Turkey and relevant United Nations agencies on specific measures to prevent opium smuggling. Our major objectives in these discussions will be that the Turkish Government:

- severely restrict acreage in the first year and expand only as controls are proven to be effective;
- immediately experiment with, and ultimately shift to, more controllable agricultural and technological processes for the production of opium;
- design, install and implement a stringent control system.

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<sup>1</sup> Source: Library of Congress, Manuscript Division, Kissinger Papers, Box CL 315, National Security Council, NSDM 7/74–11/76. Secret. Copies were sent to the Director of the Office of Management and Budget, the Director of Central Intelligence, the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, the Director of the Domestic Council, and the Director of the United States Information Agency.

<sup>2</sup> Document 206. The separate agency views are summarized in Document 208.

2. Make clear to the Turkish Government that suspension of all US economic and military assistance to Turkey is required under Section 481 of the Foreign Assistance Act if it is determined that the Turkish Government has failed to take adequate steps to prevent narcotic drugs produced in Turkey from unlawfully entering the United States.

Henry A. Kissinger

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## 210. Memorandum of Conversation<sup>1</sup>

New York, September 24, 1974, noon.

### SUBJECT

The Secretary's Meeting with Turkish Minister Gunes

### PARTICIPANTS

#### *Turkish Participants:*

Foreign Minister Gunes  
Ambassador Olcay, Permanent Representative  
Ambassador Esenbel (to US)  
Mr. Omer Akbel, Chef de Cabinet to Foreign Minister

#### *U.S. Participants:*

The Secretary  
Under Secretary Joseph Sisco  
Assistant Secretary Arthur A. Hartman  
Mr. Denis Clift, NSC  
Mr. William Eagleton, EUR/SE (Notetaker)  
Mrs. Sophia Porson (Interpreter)

Prior to the meeting with the Secretary, Mr. Sisco and Foreign Minister Gunes exchanged some remarks. In answer to a question, Gunes said that elections in Turkey would probably not take place before June 1975 since the Republican People's Party's new partner in the coalition would want some time to build up its prestige. In any case, he said, the timing of the elections would not affect foreign policy.

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<sup>1</sup> Source: Library of Congress, Manuscript Division, Kissinger Papers, Box CL 272, Memoranda of Conversations, Chronological File. Confidential; Nodis. Drafted by Eagleton and cleared in S on September 30. The meeting was held in the Secretary's suite at the Waldorf Hotel.

The Secretary: Which problems should we discuss first? For my part it would be helpful if we had the immigration of one million Turks to the U.S. Until we have some Turkish manifestations, I am in trouble.

Gunes: Like their Minister, the Turks here don't want to demonstrate.

The Secretary: This is because of the gentle character of the Turks which has been manifested through the centuries.

Gunes: Yes, we are some times too gentle—until we are completely overcome then we must resist.

The Secretary: I used to be fascinated by the Turkish way of administration and expansion before the 19th Century, particularly their ability of getting occupied people to do the work for themselves.

Gunes: We want to continue with the administrative ability without occupying anyone.

The Secretary: Let's talk of the existing situation. I am in favor of the closest relations between Turkey and the U.S. Your Ambassador can confirm that I am under enormous pressure in Washington because of this.

How do we envisage the next stage in the relations of Greece, Turkey and Cyprus?

Gunes: As I have already expressed to you before I feel strongly the need for friendship between Turkey and the U.S. not because of passing events but because of the world situation. Domestic political problems can only be a passing phase.

Turkey wants friendship also between Greece and Turkey. This has been the platform of our government, to settle outstanding differences, but the Greek Junta did not have responsible leaders with whom to talk. After there was the Cyprus crisis; but our intention is to liquidate disputes with Greece as quickly as possible.

Before getting to concrete issues I want to mention the political situation in Greece. The policies of Greece seem disoriented. They don't seem to know what they want to do. The situation is fragile and dangerous. Greece has taken the decision to quit NATO. I would have understood if they wanted to change the basis of their foreign policy to have the sympathy of the Soviets or the nonaligned, but they seem not to have reflected seriously on the question. They want to stay in the political side of NATO, but the military organization is of great importance for their defense and for the defense of the west.

They support the Soviet position for the enlargement of the Cyprus conference. They have also adopted nuanced policies toward the Common Market. They seem to have a confused policy.

The Secretary: One has to recognize that the Greek Government took over in very difficult circumstances. It is never easy to handle a military question, but particularly so at the beginning of a government.

The Greek Government is being attacked from the left and right. They wish to steal enough anti-Americanism from the left and right to pursue a pro-American policy. They would like to get credit for leaving NATO and, at the same time, have the protection of NATO.

If I had been able to talk with your Prime Minister before you went into Cyprus I would have said that it was foreseeable that a non-Junta government would have these problems.

The situation in Greece is unstable. It is our intention to support the Karamanlis Government.

Recognizing the instability, the question is what can be done in the near future on a number of points. First, we have to show some movement to prevent Congressional action. You know we are stretching the law to the outer limits of its interpretation. You are a lawyer and if you analyze the situation you will find it very complex. We don't do this out of personal affection for my ex-student. We do it because we think the defense of Turkey is in our own interest. But we are now in a disintegrating state of U.S. domestic politics. We have to face realities.

The second problem is in Greece. I understand that it is probable that there will be elections in November. I think what is needed before elections is a sign of progress but not a conclusion because a conclusion would leave Greece in a less favorable situation than in July or August. But progress could leave them better off than today.

So, we have to begin thinking between us about (1) what could be the final outcome, and (2) what can be done between now and the Greek election to show some movement but not a final settlement.

I have talked with Mavros—he speaks well of you.<sup>2</sup>

Seriously, I thought he was calmer and more reasonable than I had expected—I know the Turks can keep secrets but I am not so sure of my colleagues. I have the impression certain principles can evolve. This would include a federal solution with geographic separation. I think on the whole the Greek attitude is more realistic than it was previously.

As I told your Prime Minister, I am not prepared to ask for Turkish concessions in a vacuum. I know it is difficult for you to restrain your natural impulse to make concessions. But, if you can restrain until you can get progress, I would recommend it that way. You have a choice of mediators—almost as many as for Vietnam. I think that during the month of October a gesture from you might be a good thing. I think it would be best that it be made through us though we do not insist on this. We should begin to think about what that gesture should be. I have no proposition now.

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<sup>2</sup> See Document 153.

I will tell you what I told Mavros this morning since it is useful that we be frank in these matters. I told him we can't be asked to produce miracles. On territory, he said it should be in proportion to the Turkish population. I told him that in my view this was unrealistic—that the territory would have to be more than the proportion of population but less than what is now occupied. This, of course, was my own view.

Gunes: It is mine too.

The Secretary: Before history, I don't want to be the one to dislodge the Turkish army since it usually takes three centuries to do that.

On refugees I told him the return of some would be possible but not all. This was my opinion.

Gunes: Mine too.

The Secretary: I said the central government should be federal in nature. If the Greeks were willing to accept some principles, then I or the USG would be prepared to talk to Turkey. (A colleague said I should in my speech announce that I would "talk turkey" about Cyprus.)

In that framework we are willing to be helpful. It is also in Turkey's interest that this not be isolated from other factors. If we are forced to cut aid to Turkey the Greeks will not have the basis for making concessions and we will be in a terrible stalemate.

The present situation is that Mavros said he would have to discuss my approach with Karamanlis. I have made another appointment with Mavros for Sunday. There is nothing for Turkey to do now, since we do not yet know if the Greeks are ready to collaborate.

Gunes: I am almost completely in accord with Dr. Kissinger.

I am here in New York to do something useful. I could have an exchange with Mavros but he should be realistic. We are ready to help Karamanlis with his public opinion. We could set up things to satisfy public opinion in both countries but I wonder if now we can have anything from Mavros. He has made things difficult at the UNGA. I could respond in the same way in my speech today.

The Secretary: But that would be against your nature.

I also said to Mavros (1) if they want a big conference we will do nothing. We do not want the USSR to be seen to have influence in reaching a settlement. Even if we eventually participated in a conference we would do nothing to help it along; (2) we do not want a violent debate on Cyprus in the UNGA. I think Mavros will settle for a resolution to ask the Security Council to look at the problem again. This is the direction in which we are moving but this does not change realities. We will see many unreasonable declarations from the Greek Government.

But I think one of the steps to take by October would be to give the communal talks more political substance. You should not give away concessions for nothing. It would be easier for Athens to agree to something that the Cypriots have first accepted.

Gunes: I don't have the intention to make concessions but I know that everyone is beginning to get mixed into the act. Our friends in the Common Market are beginning to get involved too much in political questions. We try to say no to their pressures nicely.

We have put together a collection of little gestures.

The Secretary: I understand. I do not need to know them now. We can talk about what they are later.

Gunes: I want you to understand our methods.

The Secretary: What about some progress before the Greek elections? At the right moment we could give the communal talks more political character. I also told Mavros that they should see to it that Makarios behaves himself in New York—we will see about that. What do you think about giving more political content to the communal talks?

Gunes: They have already begun to discuss political matters in private.

The Secretary: But it could be more visible—not right now.

Gunes: In private they seem to be exchanging maps showing two zones.

To give a résumé: I agree with you that, given the fact that we foresee finding a solution, we must find a way to reach that solution without shocking public opinion in the two countries.

We should not get the issue before too many international bodies.

The Secretary: That is why we must get control of the process. It is important that something real should happen in one of the forums.

Gunes: Yes.

The Secretary: But if there is nothing real the other forums will dominate.

Will you be here next week?

Gunes: I might have to go home to see about my job. I could come back.

The Secretary: I will see Mavros on Sunday.<sup>3</sup> It would be useful if I could see you Monday.

Gunes: I think I will still be in New York. Regarding the forum, if Mavros agrees on the major forum it is all right, but if he wants to use all forums it will not be useful. If the Greeks say they want the Soviet proposition and then make eyes at the French to get French support that will not make an important difference as long as they recognize the main forum.

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<sup>3</sup> September 29. They met on September 30; see footnote 4, Document 153.

The Secretary: Can I suggest breakfast on Monday? Do you observe Ramadan?

Gunes: No, in Islam it is not observed when one is at war.

The Secretary: King Faisal prays for me five times a day which is more than he prays for you.

Gunes: You are right.

The Secretary: Is 8 a.m. too early?

Gunes: That is fine. Dr. Kissinger knows that the French press says I am a peasant so I am an early riser.

The Secretary: You should see what the French press says about me!

Gunes: Another problem is the military aid question. The Senate has had a vote which is not binding. This should not influence relations between the U.S. and Turkey. These are too important to be influenced by passing things.

The Secretary: The problem is if we can get something moving we can control Congress. If not they will eventually pass something binding. Your Ambassador understands.

Esenbel: Yes.

The Secretary: I don't believe in this kind of pressure. It is not a good principle. We give military assistance in our own interest. We will meet with Congressional leaders on Friday<sup>4</sup> but it is to some extent out of my control. It is being used against me politically.

Gunes: We should have mutual assistance among politicians. I will do what I can.

The Secretary: I think it is in our common interest. If we can get control, you know how it will go because I have kept you informed of my thinking.

You might also give some thought to the possibility that if we get a big negotiation perhaps it would be best to have a package deal on all issues between Greece and Turkey.

Gunes: I mentioned the Common Market countries, our allies. The British usually see things in a realistic way, but they seem a little disoriented now.

The Secretary: We have had some influence with the British. They have refused to join common pressures on you.

Gunes: I wonder if the Common Market wishes to follow France.

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<sup>4</sup> See Document 211.

The Secretary: The British have been quite responsible and I believe they will follow our course. If you and we agree we can get the Federal Republic of Germany to support it.

Gunes: We can do something to help the Greek Government before November but we also have Turkish opinion. I am talking about the Turkish Cypriots who are unable to leave the British bases.

The Secretary: Can we talk about this on Monday?<sup>5</sup>

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<sup>5</sup> September 30. No record of this meeting has been found.

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## 211. Memorandum of Conversation<sup>1</sup>

Washington, September 26, 1974.

### PARTICIPANTS

The President  
 Secretary Henry A. Kissinger  
 Senator Mike Mansfield  
 Senator Hugh Scott  
 Senator William Fulbright  
 Senator George Aiken  
 Senator Hubert Humphrey  
 Congressman Thomas O'Neill  
 Congressman John Rhodes  
 Congressman Thomas Morgan  
 Congressman Peter Frelinghuysen  
 L/General Brent Scowcroft  
 Mr. William Timmons

### SUBJECT

Bipartisan Leadership Breakfast with the President

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<sup>1</sup> Source: Library of Congress, Manuscript Division, Kissinger Papers, Box CL 124, Geopolitical File, Cyprus, Chronological File. Secret. The meeting was held in the family dining room of the White House residence. According to the President's Daily Diary, the breakfast meeting was held 7:55–10:08 a.m. (Ford Library, President's Daily Diary) Ford and Kissinger previously met with a bipartisan congressional leadership delegation to talk about foreign aid, including aid for Turkey, on September 12. (Ibid., National Security Advisor, Memoranda of Conversations, Box 5) Kissinger discusses the aid cut-off in *Years of Renewal*, pp. 235–236.



The President: I appreciate Mike's holding the Foreign Assistance Bill so we could talk over Turkish aid, the Foreign Assistance Bill and the Trade Bill.

Doc, you approved the modified Turkish language.

Congressman Morgan: It passed by a vote of 19 to 11.

The President: I hope we can make it stick on the floor. Then, Mike helped get the same into the Senate aid bill. Henry, would you explain the situation we are in.

Secretary Kissinger: Let me do two things—explain the diplomacy and then the legal situation.

The Greek domestic situation is extremely complex. Karamanlis is caught between anti-US forces on the left and right. There is Papadopoulos on the left (who was strong enough in '67 to stimulate a coup); and on the right are the military types from the junta.

Karamanlis and Mavros are personally pro-US. They talk differently, however, for public consumption.

Congressman O'Neill: How did the junta judge so wrong on Cyprus?

Secretary Kissinger: We got no high-level warning of the coup. Neither did Makarios. We earlier had had some rumors which we passed to him.

The junta made a basic wrong judgment. They thought in terms of the 1964 situation. But in 1964 there was a strong Cyprus government and a popular Greek government. And as a result of '64, the Turks vowed never would they let it happen again. The junta was living in a dream world—in the early days after the coup it wouldn't give concessions to keep the Turks from invading.

Karamanlis is trying to steal support from the left and the right before the November elections. Take his actions with respect to NATO—Karamanlis is trying to steal the thunder from the left. He has really done a minimum. Mavros was upset because he was the only foreign minister called on in New York. He thought it wouldn't look good back home.

The Greeks know the outcome will be worse than on July 15. Any conceivable outcome before the elections would have to be of a character which would hurt them. They hope in a negotiation to wrap in other issues with Turkey. It was our judgment that there was nothing we could have done which would have stopped the second Turkish offensive.

Immediately after the second attack began, we invited both Prime Ministers here or offered to send Ambassador Bruce to meet with them. These were all rejected.

We told Karamanlis that we understood the need for some anti-US propaganda, but there was danger it would prevent us from helping

them. He quieted it down thereafter. Then Karamanlis asked for a private emissary. We sent Tyler.<sup>2</sup> Karamanlis told him that in direct negotiations, he would have to ask far too much. He gave us a list of what he would need in direct negotiations and then gave us a smaller list of demands which he said he could get by with in direct negotiations. Then he said he would rather not be involved at all—so he wouldn't have to accept the responsibility. He could accept a communal talks outcome which he couldn't accept if he were directly involved.

At the same time, we took the foreign assistance legal interpretation to the Turks and told them we would have to implement it if there were no progress in the negotiations and on poppies. (They have now agreed on the straw process.) The Turks have now agreed that when the Greeks give the signal, they will make some concessions. That would be used to elicit a statement of principles and would permit communal talks, plus some refugee returns. This would be in October. Then, after the November elections, the talks would be broadened.

The Greek problem is presentational. Mavros was very friendly with me and asked for economic and military aid—but publicly he has had to make some troublesome statements. He told me he would get Makarios under control. He asked privately that I go to Turkey to bring back a concession, but they are reluctant to ask me publicly. But all this is tactics. Both the Greeks and Turks substantially agree on this general process.

In Turkey, Ecevit has a government problem because his coalition wanted annexation in Cyprus. He is looking for a partner who would be willing to negotiate with Greece.

Greece is willing to give Turkey 20% of the island, and the Turks are willing to reduce their holding to 33%. Somewhere in between will work.

We are ready to use leverage on Turkey (whatever you think of our policy), but if we cut off aid ahead of time we will lose that leverage. If we are tough beforehand, the Greeks—who will be tough negotiators anyway—would have leverage over us. With an aid cutoff, the Greeks would expect concessions no one could get them. These restrictions would lose us the Turks without helping the Greeks and destroy this process I have been describing. It is going pretty well really—but it will move in fits and starts. Cutting off aid doesn't help the Greek moderates because it cuts their maneuvering room—they can't point to objective necessities for compromise.

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<sup>2</sup> Retired Ambassador William R. Tyler. See Documents 147, 149, and 150.

The legal provisions are such that we can and probably should cut off aid. We could avoid the cutoff by the following (read from talking paper):<sup>3</sup>

- Find the Turks not in substantial violation
- Self-defense
- Treaty of 1960 creates doubt
- Law applies to future, not past action

The President felt we should not make a strained legal interpretation without talking with you. Even if we cut off, does it apply to pipeline, and how about the \$50 million grant exception? A cutoff without the pipeline cutoff would infuriate the Turks without leaving any effect for a year.

The negotiations timetable can't be speeded. All of this represents the nature of our problem and why we don't want an automatic cutoff but rather to use the threat of it for leverage.

The President: This is why the amendment of yesterday is good.

Senator Fulbright: What is it?

Secretary Kissinger: The CR Amendment required "substantial progress." This gives the Greeks the opportunity to say at any time there isn't any. The language in yesterday's amendments call for "good faith efforts by the Turks."

Congressman Morgan: You saw the *Post* editorial?

Secretary Kissinger: Yes. It is not accurate. I haven't done anything about the legal opinions.

Senator Aiken: How do we respond to our Greek friends?

Secretary Kissinger: I spoke with AHEPA a while back<sup>4</sup> and while they were good in private, they went right out to lobby for a cutoff.

Congressman Frelinghuysen: The fight isn't over. Brademas will continue to fight. His argument is the amendment was designed to get some troops moved off Cyprus.

Secretary Kissinger: We could make a shyster interpretation—pull out 5,000 troops and declare substantial progress. We don't want to do it that way.

Congressman Frelinghuysen: The whole thing is a PR move to pacify feelings.

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<sup>3</sup> Memorandum from Kissinger to Ford, September 10; Library of Congress, Manuscript Division, Kissinger Papers, Box CL 124, Geopolitical File, Cyprus, Chronological File.

<sup>4</sup> Kissinger met with Greek-American AHEPA leaders on August 23. (Memorandum of conversation, August 23; *ibid.*, Box CL 272, Memoranda of Conversations, Chronological File)

Secretary Kissinger: Once the Turks know we are playing games like pulling out a few troops, we will lose our leverage with them.

Congressman Frelinghuysen: How do we get out of complying with the act?

Secretary Kissinger: The minimum compliance would be to cut off credit and all grants above \$50 million, and have the pipeline alone. But this would force the Turks to a nationalistic posture in which no Turk could give concessions—and the Greeks wouldn't want to make concessions in such a situation because they would want to wait to see what effect the cutoff was having.

Congressman Frelinghuysen: But we don't have an ideal solution and the House vote shows clearly what the sentiment is.

Congressman Rhodes: Brademas told me not to make him roll us again—because he can and will. What we need is a Senate action on CR first so we can bring something in conference.

Secretary Kissinger: Our lawyers say the House Committee action would override the language in the Foreign Assistance Act.

We should have some action going by the time the recess is over.

Congressman O'Neill: Could you talk with the Greek Congressmen?

Senator Mansfield: We have the amendment now and will try to hold it as is for conference.

Congressman Rhodes: That is what we need.

Secretary Kissinger: If we had the House language on the CRA there would be daily arguments about what was "substantial" progress and the Greeks would gain great leverage.

Congressman Rhodes: How about stressing the effect on NATO. We need both Greece and Turkey.

President Ford: Sure. Turkey could take the same NATO action as the Greeks.

Secretary Kissinger: The potential for the Turks getting out of NATO is greater than Greece. There is no sympathy with Americans in Turkey and there is always the possibility of a Qaddafi-type coup. If the Turks should throw in with the Arabs, we would be in trouble.

Senator Humphrey: We have a problem of cosmetics: There must be some action showing something is going on that we can point to. We can make a case if we have something to point to. Remember, there is a US election in November, too.

Secretary Kissinger: Our dilemma is that the Turks are willing to grant some concessions, but the Greeks have asked that we don't do it now because they want it close to their election and not so far in front they have to deliver something else by November.

Senator Humphrey: Can we say within 30 days?

Secretary Kissinger: If the Greeks think we are under pressure, they may back off.

Congressman Rhodes: But the Turks are mad now about the Congressional action. If they make concessions now, it looks like they are caving under pressure.

Senator Humphrey: We have already gone through a period in this country where we have ignored the law. It just won't work. We need something.

Senator Mansfield: I would be prepared to go with the Brooke Amendment.

Senator Fulbright: I prefer to put the amendment on the authorization rather than the CRA. Of course I am opposed to the whole bill. This Cyprus negotiation is a British problem. These amendments would get us into another dispute where we don't belong. Let the UN handle it. They can't do any worse than we.

Senator Humphrey: It's not a UN problem. It's a NATO problem.

Senator Fulbright: The problem is we are using foreign aid to get us involved in every dispute around the world.

Senator Mansfield: Our policy in Cyprus has been good. There are all sorts of dangerous possibilities in this situation. I oppose aid but I want to support our diplomacy.

Senator Fulbright: I oppose doing it through the CRA. After all, the bill has more money, but it does have a number of restrictive amendments.

Congressman Rhodes: Hubert has identified the immediate problem. Can we tell the Turks the law is such, and that we will have to comply by a certain time.

Congressman Frelinghuysen: I don't think the Brooke–Hamilton approach will be accepted unless we do something with the Turks.

Secretary Kissinger: Our dilemma is the Greeks don't want it now.

Senator Scott: It will be as much trouble after the election as now.

The President: There are two bills: the authorization tomorrow and the CRA Monday.

Senator Fulbright: Why not take it to the UN. Then we wouldn't have all of the responsibility.

The President: The Greeks and the Turks both trust us.

Secretary Kissinger: Giving it to the UN is a pro-Turk move because the UN can't do anything and the situation would freeze as it is. If we move away from the Turks, the Soviet Union will probably move toward them. Turkey is more important to the Soviet Union than Greece.

Senator Fulbright: Turkey has always been afraid of the Soviet Union. They wouldn't turn to them.

Senator Mansfield: No, you are wrong. They would turn to the Soviet Union and the Arabs.

The President: The Greek government won't publicly acknowledge to the US Greeks they don't want movement now. We both have elections and they must understand if they don't call off the US Greeks, it will hurt the Greek position.

Senator Mansfield: How about a token Turk reduction of 2,000–3,000 now and another nearer election?

Senator Humphrey: Maybe we could dump all the bad stuff on the Authorization to let people vent their spleen and then negotiate it out of the CRA.

Senator Mansfield: We will probably take up the Authorization Tuesday.<sup>5</sup>

Senator Humphrey: The House has a mild amendment on the Authorization and if the Senate puts a tough amendment on the Authorization, but not on the CRA, then we can negotiate a good CRA.

The President: Then, by the time the recess is over, there may be some progress and we could take care of it in the Authorization.

Senator Aiken: To summarize—all this maneuvering must be kept from the public.

Congressman Rhodes: How is the US Greek Community divided?

Secretary Kissinger: The responsible ones are for Karamanlis and the demonstrators are for Papadopoulos.

Congressman Rhodes: Suppose Iakovos<sup>6</sup> met with the President and then made a good statement.

Congressman O'Neill: Before the coup the Greek Congressmen were out of touch with the US-Greeks—who supported the junta. Now they want to get back in touch with their constituents by being tough.

The President: We will put tough language in the Senate Authorization and keep the Senate CRA with the Brooke Amendment. Then after the recess, progress would get us off the hook.

So it's crucial to get to Iakovos.

Congressman Rhodes: I think it would add to our problems to put a tough amendment on the Senate bill.

[Omitted here is unrelated discussion.]

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<sup>5</sup> October 1.

<sup>6</sup> Archbishop Iakovos, highest ranking Greek Orthodox official in the United States.

**212. Telegram From Secretary of State Kissinger to the President's Deputy Assistant for National Security Affairs (Scowcroft)<sup>1</sup>**

Moscow, October 24, 1974, 1621Z.

Hakto 2. 1. I would like you to show the President the letter from Prime Minister Ecevit<sup>2</sup> contained in Tosec 60 and give him the following message from me:

2. "As we feared, the reaction to the irresponsible actions of Congress are now beginning to set in. As was bound to happen, the Turkish Prime Minister is questioning whether or not the United States can be depended upon as an ally. All that we had hoped to achieve now is in jeopardy because the Turks do not wish to make concessions under pressure. We are faced with a hopeless situation unless we can reverse these irresponsible decisions.

3. Specifically, the Prime Minister has told us that, despite our efforts to obtain an improved resolution from the Congress, the final wording will 'cause serious difficulties' going far beyond the field of military assistance. He predicts that there will be a strong Turkish public reaction and that he will have great difficulty in controlling the situation. He states flatly that the resolution complicates rather than facilitates the solution of the Cyprus problem. Ecevit asks why our Congress was not equally concerned when American-supplied arms to Greece were used in the 1960's against the Turkish population of Cyprus. He feels that the congressional action calls into question the common understanding of our mutual security relationship. He thinks that Turkish opinion will conclude that the American Congress has a different approach and they will wonder whether they should continue to support such a one-sided alliance.

4. Despite the friendly but concerned tone of this letter, I fear that the whole basis for our approach and indeed the basis for my visit to Ankara, may have been undermined by the congressional action.

5. It is clear to me that our first priority after the congressional recess must be to reverse this action by the Congress. Not only will its continuance prevent us from achieving any solution to the Cyprus problem but it will most certainly have its effects on our ability to conduct an effective foreign policy."

6. Warm regards.

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<sup>1</sup> Source: Ford Library, National Security Adviser, Presidential Trip Files, Box 4, November 1974—Japan, Korea, and USSR, Hakto 1. Secret; Sensitive; Immediate. Kissinger was in Moscow to talk to Brezhnev about SALT and the Middle East.

<sup>2</sup> Dated October 22. (Ibid., Trip Briefing Books, Box 2, 10/20–11/9/74, HAK to President 1)

213. Memorandum From Director of Central Intelligence Colby to the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger)<sup>1</sup>

Washington, November 20, 1974.

SUBJECT

The Intelligence Stake in Turkey and the Eagleton Resolution

1. There are recent indications that the Turkish military have assessed the possible consequences of a cutoff of US military supplies and want badly to avoid any such cutoff. Nonetheless, the political stalemate makes decisions difficult for the Turkish government, and the chances of an adverse turn in US-Turkish relations cannot be discounted. Speaking for the Intelligence Community, I should note that, in addition to the obvious consequences for US and NATO political and military interests of such a development, it could jeopardize a number of intelligence facilities located in Turkey and [1 line not declassified] which would be difficult if not impossible to replace. We do not know that any of these would be terminated, but they might become involved if Turkish retaliation for a cutoff of US aid went far enough. Without being unduly alarmist, I wish to bring this to your attention as an additional reason which may be of use to you in dealing with the resolution.

2. I attach a list of the facilities in question for your personal information only.<sup>2</sup>

**Bill**

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<sup>1</sup> Source: National Security Council, Ford Intelligence Files, Subject M-Z, Turkey, 11/20/74-2/28/75. Secret.

<sup>2</sup> Attached but not printed.



**214. Backchannel Message From the President's Deputy Assistant for National Security Affairs (Scowcroft) to the Supreme Allied Commander in Europe (Haig) in Ankara<sup>1</sup>**

Washington, December 5, 1974, 1531Z.

WH43529. AmEmbassy Ankara: deliver immediately to Gen Haig. Henry sends the following for your consideration in connection with your talks with Turk military leaders.

1. You are aware of intensive efforts we made with Congress prior to its pre-election recess to prevent restrictive legislation on aid to Turkey. I had expected that during the period between mid-October and December 10 (when by presidential certification restrictive features of CRA were suspended) we would have been able to obtain unilateral Turkish gestures of sufficient importance to provide a visible sign of progress in negotiating process that would permit US to continue aid to Turkey. However, continuing Turkish Government crisis and reluctance of caretaker government to come forward with meaningful unilateral gestures has blocked hoped-for progress. We are now facing the real prospect that those in Congress who backed restrictions on CRA bill will now succeed in placing even more restrictive language in foreign aid authorization bill which will result in termination of military aid and sales to Turkey. While recognizing that your visit to Turkey will come at a time of uncertainty and sensitivity regarding status of caretaker Turkish Government, I would nevertheless appreciate your making following points to senior Turkish military leaders with whom you have discussions:

A. U.S. administration, including President, engaged its full efforts in October to resist congressional pressures to end military sales and assistance to Turkey and was successful in preventing totally restrictive legislation. The administration had been able to do this because we had reached an understanding with Turkish Government that, at time of my then projected visit to Ankara, Turkey would arrange a series of meaningful gestures which would constitute a visible sign of progress in negotiating process.

B. Because of continuing Turkish governmental crisis<sup>2</sup> this carefully arranged plan was aborted and although the administration deplores the prospect, there is now real danger that administration will

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<sup>1</sup> Source: Ford Library, National Security Adviser, Backchannel Messages, 1974–1977, Box 1, Europe, 12/74 Outgoing, Secret; Sensitive; Flash; Eyes Only.

<sup>2</sup> Ecevit had resigned in September and was replaced as Prime Minister by Demirel.

not be able to resist pressures in Congress for early restrictive action on military assistance to Turkey.

C. Recent contacts in Ankara indicate that Turkish Government has not yet been able to reach a decision on gestures of sufficient importance to represent sign of progress needed to help the administration resist congressional pressures.

D. We believe that it is important for Turkish military leaders to be aware of gravity of situation since it is in our common interest to prevent harm to the basic security relationship between the U.S. and Turkey. Turkey's military position on Cyprus and in the area is sufficiently strong for her to make significant gestures without sacrificing her basic security requirements or the interest of Turkish Cypriots.

Warm regards.

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## 215. Intelligence Note Prepared in the Bureau of Intelligence and Research<sup>1</sup>

INR IN-7

Washington, January 16, 1975.

### THE TURKISH POLITICAL SITUATION

President Koruturk and the party leaders are searching for a way out of the impasse that began five months ago when Prime Minister Ecevit resigned.

They have endeavored to put together another coalition government that could win a vote of confidence in Parliament or, failing that, to obtain agreement among party leaders on early elections. Neither effort has yet produced results.

*Attitude of the Armed Forces.* Koruturk and the military leadership have shown increasing impatience with the inability of the politicians to resolve their differences. Although reports are surfacing that junior officers are becoming impatient with the passiveness of the High

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<sup>1</sup> Source: Ford Library, National Security Adviser, NSC Staff for Europe, Canada, and Ocean Affairs: Convenience Files, 1974-1977, Box 26, Turkey 1975, NSC. Secret; No Foreign Dissem; Controlled Dissem. Prepared by Charles Hartley and Philip Stoddard. A note at the bottom of the first page reads: "Aside from normal substantive exchange with other agencies at the working level, it has not been coordinated elsewhere."

Command, the political situation probably will have to get worse before the military steps up the pressure on the civilians.

—The military establishment supports early elections to establish a more stable parliamentary base.

—The military favor Ecevit, who also wants early elections, as Prime Minister.

—Alternatively, the military probably would support a national coalition, or even a reconstituted Irmak, government in the pre-election period.

—On the other hand, the senior officers continue to dislike Justice Party Leader Suleyman Demirel and might seek to delay a move by Koruturk to ask Demirel to try to assemble a rightist coalition.

*What Are the Alternatives?* The conservative Democratic Party, with 41 of the 450 seats in the National Assembly, holds the key to either of the two parliamentary solutions under consideration: support for a Demirel-led “Nationalist Front” or a coalition with Ecevit’s Republican People’s Party.

—The “Nationalist Front”—the Justice Party and three smaller rightist parties, including the National Salvation Party—can muster 218 votes. Koruturk apparently is unwilling to ask the “Nationalist Front” to form a government until it is assured of an absolute majority in the National Assembly (226 votes).

—The Republican People’s Party (184 seats) and the Democratic Party (41 seats), despite the latter’s internal division, are continuing their efforts to form a majority coalition. (A few independents would probably lend their support.)

The Democratic Party has been unable to reach a decision, however, because one faction of it dislikes Demirel and the other refuses to work with Ecevit.

The Republican People’s Party also has proposed a meeting of party leaders to decide on an early election date. Demirel has expressed his opposition to such a meeting, insisting that the matter should be discussed in Parliament first. Meanwhile, the caretaker Irmak government continues as best it can to avoid controversial issues.

*Impact of the Political Crisis on the Cyprus Issue.* The Irmak government has hesitated to take any positive initiatives on Cyprus. Its inclination, under Foreign Minister Esenbel, is to adhere to a cautious line. As a result, it is drifting aimlessly toward the February 5 Congressional deadline on military assistance.

In our view, however, the Irmak government probably can make some concessionary gestures and probably can accept some limited agreement in the Clerides/Denktaş forum. Whether it does so, and the extent to which it does, depends in large part on the attitudes of the military leadership, which is increasingly apprehensive about the effect of a cutoff of US assistance on Turkish military capabilities.

—The threatened cutoff is likely to provide the catalyst for a more active military role in pressing the politicians to fix an early date for elections. A final settlement of the Cyprus problem may depend on the formation of a majority government after new elections, with Ecevit again prime minister. In any case, it may be several months—well after February 5—before this impasse is broken.

—The aid cutoff may also lead the armed forces to pressure the Irak government to announce certain concessions before February 5. Embassy Ankara believes that military pressure for Turkey to deal on Cyprus appears to be growing. Furthermore, reporting during the past three weeks suggests that over the longer term the military establishment is prepared for substantial concessions to achieve a Cyprus settlement, as long as these concessions lie within the framework of a reasonable negotiating process.

—Not to be ruled out is a move by the military leadership and the National Security Council (which has taken over from the cabinet the effective direction of Cyprus policy) to make various gestures, such as the withdrawal of units from Cyprus. We have no evidence, however, that the armed forces are as yet prepared to move in this fashion.

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## 216. Memorandum From A. Denis Clift of the National Security Council Staff to Secretary of State Kissinger<sup>1</sup>

Washington, January 20, 1975.

### SUBJECT

Military Assistance to Turkey

The White House and State Congressional liaison staffs are preparing a coordinated Administration approach to the Congress on the issue of military assistance to Turkey.

The Foreign Assistance Act of 1975 states that the President must determine and certify to the Congress that “substantial progress toward agreement has been made regarding military forces in Cyprus” if the normal flow of U.S. military assistance to Turkey is to continue after February 5.

If Turkey makes the necessary gestures before the cut-off date, the President can so certify. However, even without the necessary gestures,

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<sup>1</sup> Source: Ford Library, National Security Adviser, Presidential Country Files for Middle East and South Asia, Box 33, Turkey 2. Secret. Sent for information. Kissinger initialed the document indicating that he had seen it.

it remains of fundamental importance to U.S. interests to continue military assistance to Turkey, and the Administration's approach to the Congress should be tailored accordingly.

This issue between Executive and Legislative comes close on the heels of the adverse US-USSR trade developments, and the President's State of the Union warning to the Congress<sup>2</sup>—that if our foreign policy is to be successful we cannot rigidly restrict in legislation the ability of the President to act—takes on added significance.

The principal arguments in favor of continuing U.S. military assistance to Turkey can be summarized as follows:

1. The United States provides Turkey with military assistance because it is in the United States' and US/NATO security interests to do so. Turkey is a NATO ally, and a cut-off in military assistance would weaken NATO's Southern Flank.

2. Our efforts to assist in solving the Cyprus crisis reflect our interest in finding a solution that will permit Greece to preserve her prestige and dignity. A cut-off of assistance to Turkey will work against Greek and Greek-Cypriot interests:

—The United States will lose negotiating leverage with the Turks, leverage which will be retained if our military assistance continues.

—Turkish attitudes will harden and the Turks will seek—and probably find—military assistance elsewhere.

—If the United States "turns against" Turkey and toward Greece by cutting off assistance, the Turkish military may be increasingly tempted to again resort to force and take more territory on Cyprus.

—If such events were to unfold, the Cyprus crisis would deepen, Greece would be unable to act and her position would worsen.

3. Substantive political discussions have begun in earnest between the leaders of the two Cypriot communities. These discussions will collapse if the United States takes the step of cutting off assistance to Turkey.

4. Turkish domestic politics have left Turkey with a caretaker government for more than four months. This has restricted Turkish negotiating flexibility, and U.S. patience is required.

5. The negotiating issues are complex and involve coordination with several interested parties to the dispute—Turkey, Greece, and the two Cypriot communities. The process of achieving agreement among the various parties is slow and complex and cannot be constrained by arbitrary deadlines for results.

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<sup>2</sup> The January 15 address is published in *Public Papers: Ford, 1975*, pp. 36–46.

217. Interagency Intelligence Memorandum<sup>1</sup>

DCI/NIO 386-75

Washington, February 21, 1975.

[Omitted here is a table of contents.]

## TURKEY AFTER THE US ARMS CUTOFF

*Note*

It is too early to predict with much confidence precisely how Turkey will behave in reaction to the cutoff of US military aid.<sup>2</sup> Indeed, it seems clear that the Turks themselves are just beginning to address the problem, largely because—until now—the prospect of such a cutoff has been for them unthinkable.

As Turkey searches for a way out of the dilemma, however, we can identify some of the factors that will weigh heavily in Turkish calculations. These factors may provide clues with respect to the options open to Ankara and to how these impinge on US interests. The degree of Turkish dependence on US arms aid, the likely outcome of the inevitable search for alternate sources of military equipment, and the durability of Turkey's present orientation toward the West are some of the issues this paper addresses.

For purposes of this paper, an indefinite cutoff of US military assistance is assumed. We try to look at least several months into the future.

## Principal Conclusions

The Turks have no satisfactory alternative to US supply of arms, at least over the near term. Hence, the effectiveness of the Turkish armed forces and their ability to perform their key role in NATO will steadily deteriorate. The strategic implications of a protracted US cutoff could be profound, particularly in view of Turkey's geographic position anchoring NATO's southern flank and controlling Soviet access to the Mediterranean.

Although the Turks are shocked and appalled at the termination of US arms aid, their reaction thus far has been measured and they will

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<sup>1</sup> Source: Central Intelligence Agency, NIC Files, Job 79-R01012A. Secret; No Foreign Dissem; Background Use Only; Controlled Dissem. A note on the first page reads: "This memorandum was prepared under the auspices of the Acting National Intelligence Officer for Western Europe. It was drafted by CIA and DIA and has been reviewed and endorsed by representatives of State/INR as well as CIA and DIA."

<sup>2</sup> The ban on Turkish military aid took effect on February 5, in accordance with the 1975 Foreign Assistance Act, which the Senate passed on December 4 and the House on December 11, 1974. (*Congress and the Nation*, Vol. IV, 1973-1976, pp. 858-860, 866) For the President's statement, see Document 173.

probably avoid any rash response. If the arms cutoff continues, it is highly likely that the Turks will retaliate against the US in stages, including steps to curtail US use of facilities in Turkey. This could seriously weaken the ability of US forces—primarily naval and air—to operate in the area as well as jeopardize key intelligence collection programs.

Turkey's ties with NATO will also be damaged, but probably not as seriously as Turkish relations with the US. For at least the short term, much will depend on whether Turkey is successful in obtaining military equipment from other NATO countries to help compensate for the loss of US supply. If those countries are able to help Ankara in this way, moderate forces in Turkey will be strengthened and the country's ties to Western Europe will probably remain strong.

If, on the other hand, the Turks conclude that their basic military needs cannot be met by their European allies, they are likely to read this as *de facto* isolation from NATO and will react much more strongly. In these circumstances, Turkey is likely to explore alternative sources of support abroad—from Arab states, for example—but will probably not be able to satisfy its needs in this way. The results might be an inward-turning isolation and a reversion to domestic conservatism which could spell trouble for Turkey's economic health and its role in southern Europe.

#### *I. Turkey's Dependence on US Military Equipment*

1. The degree of Turkish military dependence upon the US is difficult to overstate. All told, the US has supplied over 90 percent of Turkey's military equipment. Since 1950, over \$3 billion of military equipment has been provided through the US Military Assistance Program (MAP); an additional \$1 billion was programmed for the next five years. The US has supplied the Turkish Army with over 95 percent of its medium tank inventory, all of its personnel carriers, and all of its post-World War II field artillery. About 85 percent of Turkey's aircraft have come from the US. Almost all major naval combatants are former US vessels supplied through the MAP or built in Turkey under a cost-sharing program. More than 18,500 Turkish military personnel have been trained over the past 25 years with US assistance, nearly all in the US.

2. With this US assistance, Turkey has been able to maintain the second largest army and the third largest overall armed forces in NATO. The Turks have accepted an important mission—defense of NATO's southeastern flank and the Turkish Straits.

#### *Impact of US Aid Cutoff*

3. The termination of US military assistance will affect the Turkish armed forces in two key respects: first, the loss of new supplies of space parts will severely compound maintenance problems; and, second, the force modernization program will be stifled.

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*Spare Parts*

4. Nearly 30 percent of the undelivered balance of MAP assistance was intended for spare parts, overhaul, repair, and rehabilitation. The large amount of aid needed simply to keep existing equipment in working condition underscores Turkey's heavy dependence on the US.

5. Turkey's stocks of spare parts have been low for some time. A three-week cutoff of spare parts in December caused a drawdown of stocks, rescheduling of maintenance, and even some cannibalization. Making a virtue of necessity, the Turks have displayed unusual adeptness in keeping aging equipment operable. This kind of maintenance, however, can be only a temporary expedient, and eventually results in serious degrading of equipment and capabilities.

6. The cutoff of the flow of spare parts will be felt immediately. The pace of deterioration in the combat readiness of the Turkish armed forces, however, will vary from service to service. The Air Force is the most vulnerable to the US arms cutoff and will begin to feel a serious impact in about three months, if it cannot get spare parts elsewhere. It will take somewhat longer for the other services to be seriously hampered. (These projections assume normal peacetime conditions.)

7. The lack of spare parts will also have an immediate impact on training, which will probably now be cut to a bare minimum in all three services. This will adversely affect the proficiency of pilots and also of small unit commanders and troops.

8. The impact of the cutoff would be much more serious if the Turks came to blows with Greece over conflicting claims to rights to the Aegean seabed, or if serious fighting were to resume on Cyprus. According to one recent report, senior Turkish officers believe that, with the limited amount of spare parts on hand, Turkish forces would run short after only seven to ten days of fighting with Greece.

*Force Modernization Program*

9. The impact of the US arms cutoff on the modernization program will not be as quickly felt as in the case of spare parts, but it is likely to be as severe over the longer run. The ground forces will be particularly hard hit. The Army will probably not be able to proceed, for example, with plans to modernize some 800 tanks to make them a better match for the Soviet T-62. The Air Force too will be hurt badly; Turkey has received only 16 of the 40 F-4E fighter-bombers purchased through the foreign military sales program. Plans for improvements in the Navy will also be set back.

*II. Other Sources of Supply*

10. Until early this month, the Turks felt that some way would be found to avoid a cutoff of US arms. Hence, they have just begun to



make a serious effort to identify other sources of supply. Ankara is now weighing the prospects for:

- greater reliance on domestic production.
- purchasing arms from other NATO countries, especially West Germany and Italy.
- getting help from wealthy Middle Eastern states, such as Iran and Libya.

There seems to be a general consensus already among the Turks that there are no sources, or combinations of sources, that can be tapped in the near future to enable the Turkish armed forces to maintain their current capability.

11. Turkey has long spent a higher percentage of its GNP on defense than most other NATO members and is taking steps to increase its defense spending still more in the light of the US aid cutoff. The Turks would like to devote additional funds to domestic arms production and to buying weapons abroad. They are handicapped, however, by a high rate of inflation, a large trade deficit, and a sharp drop recently in foreign exchange reserves. These problems do not altogether prevent Ankara from attempting to use its own resources to help compensate for the loss of US aid, but the Turks realize that such efforts could hamper their economic development.

*Reliance on Domestic Production*

12. Turkey lacks the basic industrial capacity, investable funds, and skilled manpower needed to produce major military equipment. Hence, the Turks will not be able to satisfy their major military requirements in this way for many years, if ever.

13. [*less than 1 line not declassified*] a thorough study of Turkey's capability to produce military equipment. A detailed inventory of Turkish industry is being drawn up in order to determine what kinds of equipment can be produced in-country and to identify areas that should be the target of military R&D programs.

14. Turkey now produces small arms, ammunition, and some naval vessels. In addition, the Turks have the capability to modernize some of their more important military equipment. They would still be dependent, however, on outside suppliers for major subassemblies. The Turks are completely dependent on foreign sources for aircraft, tanks, submarines, and other more complex systems, and [*less than 1 line not declassified*] indicate an awareness that Turkey will remain so for a long time to come.

*Arms From Other NATO Members*

15. Prime Minister Irmak has said publicly that Turkey will begin shopping for arms "first from NATO countries, and, failing that, wherever it can buy them." The Defense Minister has spoken of attempts to

negotiate new arms deals in five NATO countries. In the past, other NATO members have provided most of the equipment that has not come from the US. Some of this equipment, however, such as the M-48 tanks supplied by West Germany, is US-built and requires US permission for transfer to Turkey.

16. US legal restrictions now appear to prevent the transfer of US-built equipment to Turkey, but the Turks can continue to obtain non-US equipment from Western Europe. West Germany, which has been Turkey's major non-US source, has its own program of military assistance and sales to Turkey and has provided aircraft, submarines, patrol boats, and other equipment. Italy has sold the Turks fighter aircraft, helicopters, and trucks. Sales and assistance from other NATO countries, however, cannot match in quantity, quality, or financial benefit, what Turkey expected from the US.

17. The Turks are afraid that they will be unable to obtain, from other NATO states or elsewhere, military equipment produced in third countries under licensing agreements with the US. Many of the spare parts Turkey badly needs are manufactured under such licensing agreements, as are the F-104/S aircraft which the Turks recently bought from Italy.

18. The rising cost of foreign sales is another factor that will weigh heavily in the Turks' calculations. They had to pay almost \$4 million for each of the F-104/S aircraft purchased from Italy.

#### *Help From Middle Eastern States*

19. Middle Eastern countries may assist the Turks, particularly in financing arms purchases. Relations between Turkey and Libya, for example, have improved considerably since the outbreak of fighting in Cyprus last year. The Libyans apparently provided spare parts or other material assistance for the Turkish forces at that time. Since then, ties between the two countries have continued to improve, with the Turks trying—with some success—to tap Libyan financial resources for military assistance. Tripoli apparently financed the purchase of Italian F-104s, for example, and a new Turkish-Libyan agreement provides for some unspecified form of cooperation in the production of military equipment.

20. The Turks will also seek to improve relations with other wealthy states in the Middle East. Iran, for example, shares with Turkey a historical hostility toward the mutual neighbors to the north, and the Shah is a possible source of support. The Turks know, however, that maintaining the strength of their forces is a question not only of money, but also of access to the proper kinds of weapons and equipment. Even if Middle Eastern countries were willing to spend as much as the US was spending for military assistance to Turkey, the Turks could not obtain all the spare parts needed to maintain their current inventory of US-built equipment. Nor are they likely to get sophisticated items like the F-4s and electronic warfare equipment which they were counting on to upgrade their forces.

21. Substantial financial assistance from wealthy benefactors would make it theoretically possible for the Turks eventually to re-equip their forces with non-US equipment, such as French Mirage aircraft, West German Leopard tanks, and British naval vessels, if the producer countries were willing to sell them to Ankara. (The French, West Germans, and British would have to weigh carefully, *inter alia*, the repercussions of such sales on their respective relations with Greece.) The Turks realize, however, that in the best of circumstances, a massive re-equipment program would take several years to complete. In the interim there would be no way to avoid a confused and cumbersome supply system which would weaken the preparedness of Turkey's armed forces.

22. One way of speeding a re-equipment program would be for friendly states to transfer equipment directly from their inventories to Turkey. This would be possible for Libya, which currently has more modern aircraft and tanks than its forces are capable of using efficiently. Libya and other Arab states, however, would probably be reluctant to part with any major weapons at a time when they believe another war with Israel is possible.

23. The Turks are doubtless aware that re-equipment of their forces with non-US weapons would carry risks and would substitute dependence on other foreign states for dependence on the US. Nevertheless, Ankara will probably take some steps in this direction, even if US aid is later resumed, since the danger of relying on a single source of supply has been made abundantly clear.

*From Russia?*

24. We do not believe that the Turks are now seriously considering turning to the Soviet Union or any other Warsaw Pact country for military supplies. Although the USSR has the capability to re-equip Turkish forces, the Turks would probably see little value in becoming dependent on the Soviets. Ankara nonetheless may try to use the specter of a turn to the USSR as leverage to induce Western states to provide military equipment.

*III. When the Turks React*

25. Turkey's reaction in the initial period following the cutoff of US arms aid has followed predictable lines. Believing, as the Turks did, that some way would be found to avoid the cutoff despite the lack of progress on Cyprus, they were surprised, dismayed, and angry. There is no sign that they drew up contingency plans in the event the aid was actually stopped. Even now, Turkish leaders continue to harbor hopes that the arms tap can soon be turned on again. In these circumstances, Ankara's relatively restrained response thus far is probably not a reliable gauge of what is to come.

26. Turkish confidence in the mutual security relationship with the US has already been seriously shaken. If US aid is not reinstated soon—the end of February has been cited as the outer limit of Turkish patience—retaliatory moves by the Turks against the US are inevitable. Ankara has already let it be known that all defense agreements with the US will be subject to re-examination unless military deliveries are resumed. In the paragraphs that follow we assume for purposes of analysis that the US arms cutoff continues indefinitely and we offer preliminary judgements as to how the Turks may respond.

*Impact on US-Turkish Relations*

27. The Turks' measured reaction thus far strongly suggests a determination not to let matters get out of hand either in the diplomatic arena or with respect to public opinion in Turkey. As the weeks go by, Ankara is likely first to restrict or eliminate privileges enjoyed by the US in Turkey under informal agreements. Next, the Turks will probably curtail US use of facilities in Turkey for military operations and intelligence collection. Those facilities most conspicuous to the public would probably be among those most vulnerable. Installations that do not directly contribute to the defense of Turkey but are extremely valuable to the US—for example, certain intelligence collection facilities—would also be fair game. We believe it likely that Turkey will eventually demand that some, if not all, of these installations be closed down. Turkey's leaders could demand a high price for continued use of facilities permitted to remain. They would probably not shrink from these steps even though they realize that such actions will do nothing to help them out of their present dilemma.

28. The venom injected into US-Turkish relations by the controversy over military aid is likely to poison other important bilateral dealings as well. It will be difficult, for example, to conduct fruitful discussions on sensitive issues like the opium problem.

*Domestic Repercussions*

29. There are some tentative signs that the halt in US military aid may create sufficient pressure to break the political stalemate in Ankara, now in its fifth month. The armed forces' disenchantment with squabbling politicians has become increasingly evident in recent weeks, and the military may now seize the occasion to apply more pressure on political leaders to resolve their differences. This could bring stronger efforts to form a coalition or a move toward elections. The Turkish press has recently carried reports that new elections will be held some time in June.

30. If an election is held, the aid cutoff will undoubtedly be one of the major issues, and extreme nationalists will find a much more receptive audience for anti-US rhetoric. An election will conceivably result in a government committed to ending all cooperation with the US,

but the possibility of intervention by the Turkish military would increase in this event.

*Turkey, Europe, and NATO*

31. Turkey has now been forced to re-examine its role in NATO since—until now—the Turks have looked on membership in the Alliance as synonymous with very close military ties to the US. Ankara's relationship with NATO has thus been shaken and it is too early to predict the eventual outcome. Over the short run at least, Turkish ties with the Alliance are not likely to suffer as much as bilateral relations with the US. Turkey's modern leaders have pointed the nation toward Europe and this direction will not change overnight.

32. Turkey is an associate of the EC, looking toward full membership by 1995, and a member of several other European regional organizations. NATO, however, is Turkey's most important tie to the West and the Turks have taken great pride in the active role they have played in the organization.

33. The Turks have already said that the cutoff of US military assistance will weaken their capability to meet their NATO commitments, and they are likely to reduce their military participation in NATO, at least temporarily. The Turkish government has stressed, however, that it has no present intention to withdraw from the Alliance. Indeed, Ankara is not likely to step out of NATO without an in-depth review of Turkey's entire foreign policy, and a basic decision to change it radically. The military especially—still the final arbiter of power in Turkey—would be most reluctant to sever all ties with the Western Alliance.

34. Turkey's eventual course will be greatly influenced by the results of its search for alternative sources of military equipment—and that search will take time. If other NATO countries are willing and able to step into and fill some of the breach, this will buy time and help strengthen forces for moderation in Ankara, especially those in the military who want to hold losses to a minimum. If, however, the Turks are cut off from these alternative sources, they are likely to read this as *de facto* isolation from NATO, and they will react much more strongly.

*Relations Between Turkey and Greece*

35. The Turks, of course, blame Greece for the US arms cutoff, and they are particularly incensed at continued US military deliveries to the Greeks. Moreover, tensions remain high over Cyprus. It is possible that the arms cutoff may add a constraint on Turkey to avoid provoking the Greeks in such a way as to risk getting drawn into a protracted military conflict. This consideration may have played some part in Ankara's recent decision to respond favorably to Athens' proposal to take the dispute over the Aegean seabed to the International Court of Justice.

36. On the other hand, if Turkey should feel seriously threatened by the Greeks, it would retain various options not yet foreclosed by the arms cutoff. If, for example, Ankara were to conclude that war with Greece is inevitable, the Turks might opt for a surprise attack aimed at inflicting serious damage on Greek forces before the Turks' supply problem becomes more acute.

*Turkey and Cyprus*

37. Turkey's recent actions with respect to Cyprus are meant to underscore Turkish determination to deal from a position of strength and to prove that Ankara is immune to outside pressure on the Cyprus issue. There is no chance that this tough stance will weaken any time soon. The Turks may retain, however, some flexibility with regard to the size of the Turkish Cypriot sector, the number of Greek Cypriots permitted to live there, and the powers granted to any central government eventually created on the island.

38. Recent Turkish reinforcement on Cyprus indicates that Ankara does not intend to pull out forces any time soon. In time, however, the drain on scarce military resources would argue for withdrawal of a significant portion of Turkish forces on the island. The Turks would have additional incentive to pull out military units if their efforts to obtain arms and spare parts are unsuccessful, and if they believe that such a withdrawal would bring a resumption of US arms deliveries.

*Looking Around for Friends . . .*

39. If the halt in arms aid continues, the Turks are likely to weigh more far-reaching steps, particularly if they find that their basic military needs cannot be met by their European allies. Closer relations with Middle Eastern states and an improvement in relations with the USSR and Eastern Europe are options that would probably be examined. All would have serious drawbacks for the Turks.

40. As mentioned above, the Turks have already made some attempts to improve relations with the Arabs, and Libya has been especially active in courting Turkey. A major shift toward Arab countries, however, would be a difficult one for the Turks who would not wish to depend on Arab governments, and particularly not one led by so mercurial a leader as Qadhafi. [7 lines not declassified]

41. A substantial shift toward the USSR would seem even less likely than one toward the Arabs. Shortly after the US aid cutoff, there were unconfirmed reports that the Turks would consider a nonaggression pact with the Soviet Union. There is no sign that a serious initiative of this kind is in the cards, but something like it may come to be seen as an alternative, if Turkey eventually concludes that it has been deserted by its allies and left relatively defenseless.

42. Since Turkey controls the Soviets' access to the Mediterranean through the Bosphorus and Dardanelles and their direct air routes to the Middle East, the Turks would have some strong bargaining chips if they decided to cultivate closer ties with the Soviet Union. The two nations have been rivals for centuries, however, and the Turks retain a deep-seated fear and suspicion of Russian intentions, despite the modest improvement in relations in recent years. There have been unconfirmed reports that Moscow has recently offered some limited arms assistance, but the Soviets probably have no illusions about their chances of replacing the US as Ankara's principal arms supplier.

*... or Turning Inward*

43. There is no sign yet of any fundamental reorientation of Turkish foreign policy. Indeed, it would seem equally likely that Turkey's current troubles could result in growing isolationist feeling and a return to domestic conservatism. This could spell trouble for Turkey's economic prospects and for its role in southern Europe.

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## 218. Memorandum From the President's Deputy Assistant for National Security Affairs (Scowcroft) to President Ford<sup>1</sup>

Washington, March 10, 1975.

Secretary Kissinger asked that the following message be passed to you:<sup>2</sup>

"I have just completed six hours of conversations with the principal Turkish leaders<sup>3</sup> including Foreign Minister Esenbel, Prime Minis-

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<sup>1</sup> Source: Library of Congress, Manuscript Division, Kissinger Papers, Box CL 273, Memoranda of Conversations, Chronological File, March 1975. Secret; Sensitive; Exclusively Eyes Only. Ford initialed the memorandum.

<sup>2</sup> This message was transmitted to Scowcroft in telegram HAKTO 22 from Ankara, March 10. (Ford Library, National Security Adviser, Trip Briefing Books and Cables for Henry Kissinger, 1974–1976, Box 6, 3/5–22/75, HAKTO 1) Kissinger was in Ankara as part of a Middle East trip.

<sup>3</sup> On March 10 Kissinger met with Esenbel (Memorandum of conversation, 5:20–6:30 p.m.; National Archives, RG 59, Records of Henry Kissinger, 1973–1977, Entry 5403, Box 10, Nodis Memcons, March 1975); Sancar (Memorandum of conversation, 6:40–7:40 p.m.; Library of Congress, Manuscript Division, Kissinger Papers, Box CL 273, Memoranda of Conversations, Chronological File); Irmak, Sancar, and Esenbel (Memorandum of conversations, 7:50–8:30 p.m.; National Archives, RG 59, Records of Henry Kissinger, 1973–1977, Entry 5403, Box 10, Nodis Memcons, March 1975); and Ecevit (Memorandum of conversation, 8:30–9:50 p.m.; Library of Congress, Manuscript Division, Kissinger Papers, Box CL 273, Memoranda of Conversations, Chronological File).

ter Irmak, Chief of the Turkish military, General Sancar and the key political leader, and former Prime Minister Ecevit. It is clear from the results of these discussions, which I will continue tomorrow morning, that the achievement of the beginning of serious substantive negotiations will be difficult as well as the negotiations themselves for two principal reasons: (a) there is strong feeling against the aid cutoff and the political leaders do not want to appear to be making concessions in the face of Congressional action; and (b) the political uncertainty in Ankara in which the present technocrat government while well disposed is unable to act in any decisive or conclusive way.

"I exposed all leaders to our assessment of the aid cutoff and said that there were three possible ways to deal with it: (a) a waiver; (b) the beginning of a serious negotiation which would allow us to report to the Congress that 'substantial progress' had been made; or (c) repeal of the law, which would likely require some substantive progress between the parties in order to convince at least the House members of our Congress to reverse themselves. I found no interest in the waiver option other than an outright repeal. It is clear from my talks that the posture that we have adopted in the Executive Branch has helped keep the lead on the situation here and has helped avert more serious decisions which would have a more critical effect on our overall relations with Turkey.

"I probed whether the Turkish Government would agree to reduce substantially the zone of its present occupation if we could get a commitment from the Greek Government for a bizonal federation. While all the Turk leaders obviously are interested in the bizonal arrangement, no one felt in a position to commit themselves to any kind of specificity as to how much of a reduction in the zone of occupation might prove feasible. Foreign Minister Esenbel, who is a competent and open-minded professional, has to touch many bases before any decision can be taken, and he told us this evening that while he can manage the military, the Prime Minister and the President, his greatest difficulty in getting decisions made is getting the acquiescence of the two principal political leaders Ecevit and Demirel, each of whom tends to view each issue from the point of view of what advantage can be derived from it.

"In this regard I was struck in particular by Ecevit's approach to my probes regarding a bizonal federation. All of us came away with the distinct impression that he was attached to the idea of a bizonal arrangement—as all the main Turkish leaders are—but he left the impression that he wants to reserve this kind of solution for himself rather than to have any technocrat government undertake it. The difficulty with Ecevit's approach is that it is likely to be months before a reasonably strong Turkish Government can be put together, and my concern is that there will be a progressive deterioration both in Greece and in Cyprus unless we can get a serious negotiating process started in the near future.



“On the whole, however, I believe this trip was very useful. We exposed the Turks to our analysis that all concerned would benefit from the bizonal solution, and all would be hurt by a prolonged impasse. We have talked to all political leaders in a way the Turkish Government finds it difficult to do. We were able to reflect to the Turks Karamanlis’ desire for an early solution, and by probing the bizonal solution, we have begun to sow some seeds for future evolution.”

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## 219. Memorandum From the President’s Deputy Assistant for National Security Affairs (Scowcroft) to President Ford<sup>1</sup>

Washington, March 11, 1975.

The Secretary asked that I pass you the following report on his talks with the Turkish leaders.<sup>2</sup>

“I have just completed another series of talks with Turkish leaders,<sup>3</sup> including President Koroturk as well as each leader of every principal political party in Turkey. I want to share with you in particular my conclusions regarding the impact of the aid cutoff.

“First, it is clear that the embargo has deeply hurt the national pride of the Turks. These words spoken by former Prime Minister Ecevit to me were repeated in different ways time and again by every leader that I spoke to. What has Turkey done to the United States? We are and have been a loyal ally. How can this cutoff possibly do any-

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<sup>1</sup> Source: Ford Library, National Security Adviser, Trip Briefing Books and Cables for Henry Kissinger, 1974–1976, Box 6, HAK for President. Secret; Sensitive. Sent for information. Ford initialed the memorandum.

<sup>2</sup> This message was transmitted to Scowcroft in telegram HAKTO 28 from Ankara, March 11. (Ibid., HAKTO 2)

<sup>3</sup> On March 11 Kissinger met with Koroturk and Esenbel (Memorandum of conversation; Library of Congress, Manuscript Division, Kissinger Papers, Box CL 126, Geopolitical File, Cyprus, Chronological File); Demirel and Caglayangil (Memorandum of conversation, 11:35 a.m.–12:40 p.m.; *ibid.*, Box CL 273, Memoranda of Conversations, Chronological File, March 1975); Oguzhan Asilturk, Secretary General of National Salvation Party, and other party leaders (Memorandum of conversation, 12:45–1:05 p.m.; National Archives, RG 59, Records of Henry Kissinger, 1973–1977, Entry 5403, Box 22, Classified External Memcons, 12/74–5/75); Ferruh Bozbeyli, Democratic Party leader (Memorandum of conversation, 1:07–1:30 p.m.; *ibid.*); and Turhan Feyzioglu, National Confidence Party leader, and Ferit Melen (Memorandum of conversation, 1:35–2 p.m.; *ibid.*, Box 10, Nodis Memcons, March 1975). He also attended a luncheon hosted by Irmak. (Memorandum for the Record; Library of Congress, Manuscript Division, Kissinger Papers, Box CL 273, Memoranda of Conversations, Chronological File, March 1975)

thing but be harmful to Turkish-American relations and in particular the common interests we share? What is the prospect for an early repeal?

"It is clear that the present government as well as the principal political leaders have been carefully avoiding unleashing strong anti-American feeling among the populace for all of them seem to be dedicated to the fundamental proposition that Turkey and America are friends whose mutual interests would be irrevocably damaged if things get out of hand. In this connection, the statements you have been making against the aid cutoff and the position that you have insisted upon that we cannot accept this as a matter of principle have helped decisively in keeping a lid on the situation here. At the same time, however, I am deeply concerned—even more so than before I arrived—that if the cutoff is maintained it will be only a matter of time before the constraints being maintained by all the political leaders will be put under unbearable pressure.

"A second factor in the situation, of course, is the weak technocrat government—which, while competent within the limited political parameters in which it can operate, is not in a position to take the kind of decisions which are required in order to move negotiations at a rapid pace. Nevertheless, I believe I made good headway with a number of political leaders in convincing them that Turkey must grasp the nettle soon, that this is a propitious opportunity which could be lost, and that a bizonal solution which the Greek Government seems prepared to accept now is not likely to be available two or three months from now. I painted the picture of the results from a continued impasse: a weakened Karamanlis; internationalization of the Cyprus problem; the Soviets being given an opportunity to become directly involved in an injurious way; Makarios in a better position to be even more troublesome than he is now; and, finally, a continued deterioration in Turkish-US relations, even though it is not the desire of either of us. The key to the Turk internal political situation seems to be Ecevit, and my concern is that he wants to reserve the Cyprus solution for when he comes to power some months from now. The trouble is that the situation will not hold—politically speaking—until he gets to power. I intend to continue to maintain contact with him in order to underscore the importance of his support for a prompt seizing of the opportunity by the Turks which exists today. If they are willing in time to consider how large a zone of occupation they would settle for in return for a bizonal federation, there is hope in the situation.

"Ecevit, in explaining the reasons why the outburst in Turkey has not been even stronger regarding the aid cutoff, not only attributed this to hurt national pride and a weak Turkish Government, but also to the fact that the leftist intellectuals would just as soon see the aid cutoff lead to a weakening of Turkey's ties to the United States and NATO.

“It is really tragic to see what this aid cutoff is doing to a very close and loyal ally of the United States. I feel even stronger than when I arrived that we have no alternative but to continue to make an all-out effort to get the cutoff repealed. The Turks have no real interest in a waiver on spare parts, and this is understandable since they want no link whatsoever between our relations, aid, and the Cyprus problem. Since we are now working on a package deal, it is unlikely that you will be able to make a determination that ‘substantial progress’ had been made. Therefore, the only realistic choice is an outright repeal, and I believe it is essential that we make every feasible effort to achieve this result. In the meantime, of course, we should continue our efforts to get a serious negotiating process started, but the repeal of the cutoff cannot await this negotiating process which at best will be slow and deliberate.

“In a separate message, I am planning on giving Brademas a very brief picture of the situation as I see it.<sup>4</sup> In the meantime, I believe we should continue to press for the adoption of the Senate resolution.”

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<sup>4</sup>No record of this message has been found, but Ford and Scowcroft met with Brademas, Sarbanes, and Rosenthal on March 21; see Document 221.

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## 220. Memorandum From the President's Deputy Assistant for National Security Affairs (Scowcroft) to President Ford<sup>1</sup>

Washington, March 12, 1975.

Secretary Kissinger asked that I pass you the following report . . .<sup>2</sup>

“I have sent you two detailed reports<sup>3</sup> of my 24 hours in Ankara, and I want to outline very briefly in this message the principal highlights and where matters stand.

My overall principal observation is clear: The congressional aid cut-off has had a shattering effect on the Turks, but the position taken

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<sup>1</sup> Source: Ford Library, National Security Adviser, Trip Briefing Books and Cables for Henry Kissinger, 1974–1976, Box 6, HAK for President. Secret; Sensitive. Sent for information. Ford initialed the memorandum.

<sup>2</sup> This message was transmitted to Scowcroft in telegram HAKTO 31 from Ankara, March 12. (Ibid., 3/75–12/75, HAKTO 2)

<sup>3</sup> Documents 218 and 219.

by you against the cut-off has kept the lid on the situation here in Turkey. All of the principal political leaders will try to continue to hold the line against anti-Americanism for at least a few weeks more.

Secondly, I believe we have made real headway with the present government and the outside political leaders in convincing them that a total settlement has to be achieved in the next two or three months or the situation could deteriorate significantly: Karamanlis would be weakened; Makarios would increase his troublemaking; the problem would be internationalized; and the Soviets would be able to exploit the situation.

Third, I believe we have also made headway with key leaders in getting them to examine seriously Greece's willingness to accept the principle of a bizonal federation if the Turks are willing to consider as a matter of principle the reduction of the size of its zone of occupation. This would be the starting negotiating framework.

Fourth, the problem can no longer be approached piecemeal looking for independent gestures on one side or the other. The negotiations, which would be conducted by Clerides and Denktash, would have to have as its objective a total settlement. Because the aim would be to get a total settlement, we are not able to point to certain interim evidences of progress as a way of convincing the Congress to lift the cut-off. In other words, either in a couple of months a total settlement will have been achieved, or there will be a sharp deterioration in the situation—no interim step-by-step progress can be expected.

In these circumstances, therefore, there is only one answer for us as it relates to the congressional problem; there must be a total repeal of the aid cut-off, nothing more or less. My hope is that if we can get the parties in the next few weeks to agree on the principles of bizonal federation and some reduction of territory, that this will be the real starter of the negotiations. I am aiming to achieve this with or without an aid cut-off, though obviously if we could achieve the actual or potential repeal of the aid cut-off it would not only be a stimulus in starting the process of the negotiation but it would help carry it through to a successful conclusion. But the reversal of the cut-off cannot wait for the negotiations. We have, at most, till the end of April to get it changed before reprisals will occur."

Warm Regards

**221. Memorandum of Conversation<sup>1</sup>**

Washington, March 21, 1975, 10 a.m.

PARTICIPANTS

Representative John Brademas (D–Ind)  
Representative Paul S. Sarbanes (D–MD)  
Representative Benjamin S. Rosenthal (D–NY)  
President Gerald Ford  
Lt. General Brent Scowcroft, Deputy Assistant to the President for National  
Security Affairs

SUBJECT

Turkish Aid Cutoff

President: I appreciate your suggestion for the meeting. No one is happy with the present situation. There is a stalemate, and unless something is done, there is no hope for progress.

Henry has met with you.<sup>2</sup>

Late action was the Turkish Cypriot declaration of an autonomous state.<sup>3</sup> The Greek Cypriot went to UN.

Henry saw Bitsios on March 7.<sup>4</sup> Then he went to Ankara on March 10.<sup>5</sup> He met there with all the Government people and the political leaders. You know about the Turkish political stalemate. All the key leaders are outside the Government. Everyone seems to want to negotiate, even Makarios's stalemate is sound, but we are on dead center. I am willing to listen, but we can't let this drift. It is very harmful. With the problem with Portugal we don't need any in the East Mediterranean, and in the Middle East.

Brademas: Thank you for seeing us, Mr. President. We all want a solution. I told the Greeks we want to support aid to Turkey. We have been restrained—we have made no statements since January. We only put the legislation in when the United States didn't condemn the occupation.

We think it is a fundamental principle that arms shouldn't be used against the purposes of the Act. We think Kissinger has focused more attention to turning Congress around than to turning Turkey around.

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<sup>1</sup> Source: Library of Congress, Manuscript Division, Kissinger Papers, Box CL 281, Memoranda of Conversations, Presidential File, January–May 1975. No classification marking. The meeting was held in the Oval Office.

<sup>2</sup> See Document 172.

<sup>3</sup> See Document 176.

<sup>4</sup> See Document 179.

<sup>5</sup> See Documents 218–220.

We would give 24 hour service if we got some Turkish concessions. We react at pressure on Congress to turn around without movement by Turkey. A self-fulfilling prophesy isn't intransigence. What concessions have they made? Look at the displaced persons; there are 200,000; their plight is terrible. We want to see free passage between Nicosia and Famagusta. We want to see refugees return to Famagusta. If there is an attempt to restore the aid without any progress, there would be bad results in your relations with Congress. Also with the Greeks.

The Secretary of Defense came up with the waiver approach.<sup>6</sup> We are not saying this is the right way, but it lets the Turks save face. If we knew in advance there was movement, we would agree to keep quiet and let you go ahead. We wouldn't agree to this as an ice-breaker, but there would be no public move after a pre-agreed agreement.

Sarbanes: The principle of not making arms available for aggressive purposes is fundamental. To scrap it would have very basic implications not only for Greece but for all the other countries. It would be a turning point. I am thinking especially of the second Turk move, although the first could be considered a provocation. We told Kissinger that if Turkey would make some substantial moves—to let 40–50% of the refugees return home—that would at least be a gesture to let things go forward. We have stayed very quiet and haven't demagogued, but the Turks couldn't get anything before 5 February, and what they proposed wouldn't have been enough. Schlesinger brought up the waiver bit; we don't know if this is the thing, but it shows constructive thought.

There are fundamental differences in conception between the State Department's view of the pressure we put on Turkey and ours. We looked at the cables; we talked to Macomber, etc., and Macomber has acted as an agent for Turkey. The United States has said the Congressional act wasn't wise—that is understandable, but to say we are trying to get it reversed is to encourage intransigence. We object to reversing the decision—it is a matter of principle.

We recognize the Turks hold the cards and they have to get much of what they want. They clearly hold more than they intend to keep—particularly in Famagusta.

If they had let 25,000 refugees go back before February, we could have lifted it for 4 to 6 weeks.

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<sup>6</sup> Section 614 of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961, as amended, would allow for the use of FY 1975 MAP funds to Turkey if the President determined it necessary to the security of the United States. The Department informed Kissinger of the amendment in telegram Tohak 39 to Athens, March 8. (Ford Library, National Security Adviser, Trip Briefing Books and Cables for Henry Kissinger, 1974–1976, Box 7, TOHAK 3, 3/5–22/75)

If we could get some agreed movement which we could then use for the waiver, then there would be movement and then we would lift it.

Rosenthal: Everyone wants a settlement. The Greeks do. The Turks do. They don't want to rupture NATO for Cyprus. They are closer than anyone realizes. They own 40 percent—I think they would go to 35 percent right away. The Greeks would go to 25 percent, so someone has to put it together at 29 percent. So how do we get a move? Kissinger says Turkey won't move under pressure. But if they could be brought together and agree to a first step, if we could lay out a scenario for a concession in two months, we could keep quiet for the 614 waiver. Then if there is more progress, then we would lift the cutoff.

President: I have tried to play square with the Congress. I couldn't say adequate progress has been made, because it wasn't right. There was a point where we were fairly certain on Famagusta, the airport, but with the cutoff close the Turks wouldn't do it. They have a tough problem. Anyone who makes a major agreement there just before an election would be facing that in an election. There is 614, but the cutoff supersedes it. A lawyer would argue it supersedes 614 and I would be on shaky ground.

Brademas: I am not sure of it. We have looked into it. Some say yes and some say no.

Sarbanes: I think it can be argued either way. What we feel is that if it were being done as part of a package to get a concession, we wouldn't challenge it and you can make a reasonable case.

President: Everyone is getting by on principle but me. You want explaining.

Sarbanes: But you have publicly asked for a reversal.

President: But we have abided by the law.

All: And we appreciate it.

President: But you are putting me in this weak position.

Sarbanes: Only for a week.

Rosenthal: Then we would propose lifting the act.

President: But it does put me in a bad situation. I discussed it with Kissinger. They have a bad situation. They can't form a government. They have high national pride. They will come off better than last July, but there must be a better way than for me to make a dubious legal decision. You know I had the leaders down to see if there was a way out. Scott and we came up with this waiver provision. They had hearings and have held it up—you talked with them.

Rosenthal: We want to cooperate with you and not embarrass you. Any other way is OK.

President: I just don't think I can go that legal route.

Sarbanes: [Gets out a map]<sup>7</sup> If the Turks lifted this red line, that would take care of 40 to 50 percent of the refugees. They clearly don't intend to hold it. That would be a gesture.

President: I don't think the settlement is the real problem. It is getting it started.

Here is the waiver. Is it completely unacceptable?

Rosenthal: It wipes out 8 votes in the House and 7 in the Senate.

Brademas: The basic one is this: Do you give priority to a Cyprus settlement or to your premise that Congress was wrong and should reverse itself? If it's the former, we will help; if it's the latter, we will fight. But all the pressure has been on the Congress. If a waiver isn't the right way, we will work with you.

President: Let me be frank. We have made tremendous pressure. But they have a domestic situation.

Rosenthal: Right, and they don't want to be blamed in an election.

Scowcroft: How about getting it through the Senate first and using that with the Turks? Would that be acceptable?

[Much discussion]

Sarbanes: This could put the Senate on the spot.

[More discussion]

President: Let me summarize. We do this as part of a package. As a consequence of the Senate acting, Turkey would have to make concessions, then the House would act.

Rosenthal: If there is some agreement with the Turks that this would happen.

Sarbanes: The bill would have to be modified; right now it is total reversal.

President: If they are moving to an agreement there is no sense not to. Both sides want a settlement and I don't think we need to worry.

Brademas: We would have to bring the Senate in.

Rosenthal: I think keeping the pressure on is a good idea.

President: I think you would have to have some faith in us. We will push—we don't want this problem to fester.

Sarbanes: I think we must know what concessions the Turks will be willing to make.

President: I think Brent's suggestion is a starting point. I will consult with Kissinger.

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<sup>7</sup> All brackets are in the original.



Rosenthal: You are going to have to lean on Macomber.

Brademas: Kissinger is a little impatient with us right now.

President: We will go to work on it and Brent will keep you informed.

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**222. Briefing Memorandum From the Director of the Bureau of Intelligence and Research (Hyland) to Secretary of State Kissinger<sup>1</sup>**

Washington, April 17, 1975.

PROSPECTS FOR THE DEMIREL GOVERNMENT

Demirel's winning of a narrow vote of confidence (without an absolute majority) has not ended his problems. He himself had previously judged that he needed an edge of about 50 deputies for effective government, and he got only four. It will be hard for Demirel to concert his narrow majority of disparate elements to pass contentious legislation, but it will also be even harder for the opposition soon to get the 226 votes needed for a vote of no-confidence.

Demirel's coalition partners are committed to (and may pass) an election law change that would benefit them at the expense of the Republican Peoples Party. In general, however, Demirel will probably be inclined to bypass Parliament and rule through executive decrees of the Cabinet as far as possible. Even this route depends on keeping his coalition in line and is not suited to longer-range actions. It is in fact that method that Demirel preferred when he headed the government before 1971.

The present coalition has little room for flexibility on the Cyprus issue. Deputy Prime Ministers Erbakan and Turkes have both advocated extreme policies toward the Greek Cypriots. Their presence in the government will not be reassuring to Athens or Nicosia but probably will not prevent the resumption of humanitarian talks between Clerides and Denktash later this month. Efforts at an overall solution, however, will be even more difficult.

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<sup>1</sup> Source: Library of Congress, Manuscript Division, Kissinger Papers, Box 239, Geopolitical File, Turkey. Confidential. Drafted by George Harris (INR/RNA).

Demirel's government will try to limit damage in relations with the US. He and Foreign Minister Caglayangil are personally well-disposed toward Washington and are convinced of Turkey's need to remain in the Western alliance. They may feel forced to retaliate against the US, however, by Turkes and perhaps others in the Cabinet who are less committed to cooperation. The government also is likely to be pressed more intensely by the opposition parties whose hopes of regaining power had moderated their criticism of the US over the aid cut. In a free-wheeling political debate in Turkey, the US can only come out the loser.

Demirel's most troublesome problem will be dealing with the aroused and frustrated opposition. Ecevit has played a powerful role in keeping the left wing in Turkey reasonably quiet to avoid disrupting his chances to return to office. These elements consider Turkes a fascist and, either in reaction to acts of his followers or on their own initiative, are likely to contribute to increasing student and labor unrest. Demirel will thus find it considerably more difficult to govern than Ecevit did last year.

Threats to law and order would greatly disturb important elements in the military. The generals ousted Demirel in 1971 on these grounds. They will be watching closely to see how well his government does this time. Should he be faced with continuing disturbances, sentiment within the military to intervene would grow, although given their strong non-political inclination, it would take very powerful impetus to set the leadership of the armed forces in motion.

Despite these many problems, Demirel does not consider his government a short-term expedient to prepare for elections. He would like to remain in office long enough to show that he can govern, thus removing the taint of his removal in 1971. His coalition partners also want the prestige of participating in the Cabinet to improve their standing in the next elections. Few of the members of the smaller parties want early elections—in which their chances of being returned to Parliament are questionable.

Thus, for all its difficulties, this coalition could stay in office for some time. If it did encounter continuing threats to law and order, however, Demirel might choose to proceed to elections in hopes of being able to form a more manageable and acceptable government.

223. Memorandum of Conversation<sup>1</sup>

Washington, May 16, 1975, 2 p.m.

PARTICIPANTS

President Gerald Ford  
Senator Mile Mansfield  
Senator John J. Sparkman  
Senator Clifford P. Case  
Dr. Henry A. Kissinger, Secretary of State and Assistant to the President for  
National Security Affairs  
Ambassador Donald Rumsfeld, Assistant to the President  
John Marsh, Counsellor to the President  
Lt. General Brent Scowcroft, Deputy Assistant to the President for National  
Security Affairs

All: Congratulations [on the *Mayaguez* incident!]<sup>2</sup>

The President: I think it created a good climate and provides protection against miscalculation. I thought we should meet to see what we can do about the Cyprus situation.

Secretary Kissinger is meeting in Ankara next week. I am meeting both the Greek and the Turkish Prime Ministers at NATO. I asked you to come here to see if some progress is possible in the Senate; then the Turks might move, and then we could move in the House shortly thereafter.

The choices, as I understand, are the Mansfield–Scott Bill,<sup>3</sup> a waiver, and to lift the ban on sales.

Kissinger: A lift on sales makes more sense than a waiver.

Mansfield: We did a head count. Scott has twenty-seven yeas. We will get some of the doubtfuls. It is coming up next Monday.<sup>4</sup> We think we can finish in one day.

Sparkman: Eagleton told me he had the votes—he would fight, but not viciously.

Mansfield: We have a time limit on the debate.

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<sup>1</sup> Source: Ford Library, National Security Adviser, Memoranda of Conversations, Box 11, 5/16/75. Confidential. The meeting was held in the Oval Office.

<sup>2</sup> All brackets are in the original.

<sup>3</sup> As reported in a May 13 memorandum from Springsteen to Scowcroft: “The Scott/Mansfield Bill (S–846) would restore grant assistance and credit and commercial sales to Turkey as long as the Turks observe the Cyprus ceasefire, and provided the President reported monthly to Congress on progress in the Cyprus negotiations.” (National Archives, RG 59, Records of Joseph Sisco, 1951–1976, Entry 5405, Box 21, Cyprus Negotiations)

<sup>4</sup> May 19.

Kissinger: If we could get your bill passed, maybe by June there would be progress that the House could see.

Sparkman: When will you be in Brussels?

President: May 28–30 I will be in Brussels. Then I will be in Spain a day, then two days in Salzburg with Sadat, then a day in Rome.

Kissinger: We should have Macomber telephone some key people. [General Scowcroft briefed on the map.]

Sparkman: Send your people up and ask if there are any questions.

Marsh: If we could have a list of the Committees we should hit.

President: The time is right.

Rumsfeld: I think the margin of the vote is important.

Case: I agree. If it is by one vote, it would be better not to have the vote.

President: Can we include in the fact sheet that Henry and I will be meeting with them?

Mansfield: I think last night's results will carry over.

## 224. Memorandum of Conversation<sup>1</sup>

Ankara, May 22, 1975, 3:35–5:12 p.m.

### PARTICIPANTS

Ihsan Sabri Caglayangil, Minister of Foreign Affairs of Turkey  
 Dr. Henry A. Kissinger, Secretary of State and Assistant to the President for  
 National Security Affairs  
 Ambassador William Macomber, U.S. Ambassador to Turkey  
 Joseph J. Sisco, Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs  
 Arthur A. Hartman, Assistant Secretary of State for European Affairs  
 Peter W. Rodman, NSC Staff

[The conversation began in the Minister's sitting room. Photographers were admitted.]<sup>2</sup>

Caglayangil: We are very pleased to have you here in our country, particularly at a time when we have taken the new initiative of

<sup>1</sup> Source: National Archives, RG 59, Records of Henry Kissinger, 1973–1977, Entry 5403, Box 23, Classified External Memcons, 5–12/75. Secret; Nodis. The meeting was held in the Foreign Minister's office. Kissinger was in Ankara to attend a CENTO meeting.

<sup>2</sup> All brackets are in the original.

meeting with my Greek colleague in Rome. During the negotiations I found him to be understanding, realistic, and of the intent to reach an agreement. We are a coalition of four parties and opposed by a powerful opposition. Before leaving for Rome I had not had an opportunity to meet with the four coalition partners and the opposition, to see what the possibilities were to make concessions. Therefore, we had not the means to record progress in Rome.

Kissinger: Because the coalition partners didn't agree?

Interpreter: He didn't have an opportunity to meet with them.

Kissinger: Oh, he didn't.

Caglayangil: To start with, we didn't know that the Greeks wanted. Part of the purpose of Rome was to find out what the Greeks wanted, to take to my coalition partners. I had difficulty explaining to my colleague, but he understood and agreed to bring a "picture" to that effect the next morning. However, the next morning he apologized for not having a detailed picture because he said it was a one-sided dialogue and we—the Turks—had nothing to offer. He demanded that since the line was negotiable, the two sides of the island should have economic viability, and since there was a humanitarian aspect, the refugee problem should be solved. Of course, what he said about economic viability and appropriation of enough land to each side would have no meaning since we didn't talk about the area.

Now I want to raise something which I don't want to expound on in the meeting room. One thing I don't understand is whether we are in fact partitioning the island or whether the Greeks have something in mind. We are ready to establish a federal state, with two zones, but the territory would in fact belong to the federal state. I think if I proposed now that the question of whether the line would pass in this area or that area was left to a later stage and we talked now about the powers of the federal state, I think we could progress, because the line is a secondary matter. Yes, indeed, there exists a distance between the two communities, but the problems we talk about would be no problem in two or three years time. If the military tension is lessened and the present problems overcome, there would not then even be a recognition of the line—the people wouldn't even be aware of the line between them.

Kissinger: Are you saying you think at any stage the people would be able to move freely between the two parts of the island?

Caglayangil: Naturally. If the political tension of today is removed, of course. They for centuries lived together, and the great majority wouldn't be drawing pistols against each other.

Kissinger: Are you suggesting that the Greeks who left could just return?

Caglayangil: Now there is a point of interesting concern to them, too. The Turks are not willing to live among the Greek majority because in the past they suffered. This requisite of the majority is being kept in mind. Of course, there would be exchange of visits, trade, etc.; of course there are grave sites in the two sides. All these could be talked about, negotiated, and solutions could be found. However, the Greek party isn't willing to talk and they want to find out where the line is.

The biggest difficulty regarding the drawing of the line is from the opposition parties. After assuming the powers of Government, I asked Mr. Ecevit what he meant by his saying "the line is negotiable." Now that we're in Government. He said that on the existing line there are certain extensions, and those could be rectified. I don't think such a solution would satisfy the Greek party as a final solution. I don't think that's what they want.

Kissinger: Nor is it what Mr. Ecevit had in mind when he said it. [Laughter] Because I was in correspondence with him when he said it.

Caglayangil: Nevertheless, I had the impression the dialogue I had could lead us somewhere. For 5-6 years, I negotiated with them; I can tell when there is a possibility. My impression is they are bent on giving thought to finding a solution. I don't think there is freedom of action on our part in light of the domestic situation and the governmental situation. We'll meet in Brussels again [at the NATO Summit May 28-29]. There is the possibility the two Prime Ministers may meet. Maybe a more auspicious situation might arise.

Kissinger: For the Prime Ministers?

Caglayangil: I don't think the Prime Ministers would take up this situation because the situation isn't ripe if they try to take up the method. If they met, it could be unsettled. The Prime Ministers could discuss general principles; the Foreign Ministers should deal with detailed methods.

Kissinger: The Union of Foreign Ministers should keep the heads of government out of foreign policy. [Laughter] Let me ask one concrete question. First procedurally, you had in mind that first the Prime Ministers meet and then the Foreign Ministers meet again?

Caglayangil: In Rome when I talked with Bitsios, he told me it was a very good start and we should continue the dialogue and proceed in these lines. I don't know how they evaluate the Rome meeting in Athens. If they evaluate it as good, we should continue to meet again on the Foreign Minister level. If they evaluate it as negative, a meeting of the two Prime Ministers would be only a courtesy. No time and place have been set yet for the two Prime Ministers to meet. Either in Brussels I'll talk to Mr. Bitsios to set the time and place, or he will take the initiative.

Kissinger: If neither of you takes the initiative, should I propose it to the two of you?

Caglayangil: I asked him at Rome. He said, "Naturally our Prime Ministers should meet but I don't want to speak for my Prime Minister."

Hartman: Could I ask just one question? You said governmental and domestic problems. By "domestic" I assume you mean the opposition. Is that more serious than the coalition problem?

Caglayangil: Regarding the situation with the opposition as well as the coalition, that's where the dilemma lies. We are not in a position to go to either the coalition or the opposition to ask what concession we should make to the Greeks. This is the way we can present the situation to the opposition as well as to the coalition: "We have talked to the Greeks; they are agreed to a bizonal solution; in return they want this and that. In this way we can find a solution. We as the main proponent of the coalition find this to be in the high interest of the state. Are you willing?" They might say they are ready and willing and want a little retouching here and there, and they might say no, it's non-negotiable.

Kissinger: One thing they won't say is yes!

Caglayangil: It depends on the proposal!

Kissinger: For all of Cyprus, they'll say yes.

Caglayangil: I'm not in complete agreement with Dr. Kissinger, because in private talks they say they're prepared for a settlement but can't do a big thing.

Kissinger: Should we now join your colleagues?

Caglayangil: All right.

Kissinger: Why should I be the only one at a disadvantage?  
[Laughter]

[At 4:04, the group moved to the Cabinet room. Caglayangil was joined by Ambassador Esenbel, Tezel, Yavuzalp and four others. More photographs were taken.]

Caglayangil: Your Excellency, I'm very happy to see you here in Turkey again. I have just summed up to you our dialogue in Rome. The general lines of the Rome talks are this: I have found out that my Greek colleague is a realist who wants to get some results. I have not learned clearly what his conditions are. "In general, the economic viability of both sides must improve; the question of the refugees must be settled. We have to find a durable solution; a modus vivendi isn't good enough." This is what they said. I've told him I can't discuss conditions or concessions but if he has an offer that would be acceptable to Turkish public opinion, I'd consider it. They said, "You're placing us in a position where it's impossible for us to say."

We are meeting again in Brussels. While I was discussing this with my Greek colleague, experts on both sides were also discussing all the problems on the two sides, and they have decided they should meet again at the experts level. The question of the continental shelf, the question of the Aegean,<sup>3</sup> Cyprus, air space over the Aegean, and minority questions were subjects of the experts meeting. Working committees were created and these will continue. The door has been opened toward a solution. If the parties can move, results can be achieved.

About the questions of continental shelf, we've told them this is a rather complicated issue, bearing in mind the 3,000 or so Greek isles, so we proposed a joint exploration of minerals. We will discuss with them.

A subject just as important for us is Turkish-U.S. relations. If I could hear Mr. Secretary's comment about this, I'd be much obliged.

Kissinger: Mr. Foreign Minister, first I'd like to thank you for your courtesy, and at the risk of offending your Ambassador in Washington, I'd like to congratulate you on assuming your new responsibilities. [Laughter]

On the American domestic situation, and I'm sure your excellent Ambassador, whom we all admire, can give you a good account—first, on the positive side, I think the narrow vote in the Senate<sup>4</sup> is somewhat deceptive. According to our estimate, we could have had a margin of between 10 and 15. On the other hand, the Greek community in America is so well organized and so vindictive towards those who vote against their wishes, that many Senators decided that, as long as it was going to pass anyway, why should they risk alienating the community needlessly? So we didn't press for all of them. Just one example: Senator Kennedy voted for restoration, then switched when he saw it wasn't necessary. He would have voted for restoration if it had been necessary.

Now, in the House, there is no question, and your Ambassador can confirm: in the House the situation is more difficult. Because the election results last November produced an almost uncontrollable group of young Congressmen. Nevertheless, we will make a major effort when the Congress reconvenes starting the 1st of June. But I have to tell you honestly, nothing would help so much as to show the negotiations were moving forward. I am not asking for unilateral Turkish concessions, but if we could make a plausible case that, based on my discussions here and the President's conversations with Demirel, the negotiations were moving forward, then I believe we'd have a good chance.

<sup>3</sup> For a DIA intelligence appraisal of the Aegean seabed dispute, see Document 34.

<sup>4</sup> On May 19 the Senate passed S.846, which permitted resumption of most military aid, by a 41-40 vote. (*Congress and the Nation*, Vol. IV, 1973-1976, p. 866)



What the House people say is that they're willing to do a waiver for the grant aid. I discussed it with your Ambassador. Now there is a new Foreign Minister, may I ask whether you're interested in our exercising that authority? Then I'll get into the substance. But first I wanted to ask about the procedural.

Caglayangil: Mr. Secretary, may I be allowed to listen to your comments about the substance before I give an answer to your question about a waiver?

But a waiver by itself isn't sufficient.

Kissinger: While you're thinking about it, my impression is the Greek Congressmen will insist on conditions on the waiver. They won't just let us put a waiver unconditionally.

Caglayangil: Yes, Mr. Secretary, we are all ready to hear your comments.

Kissinger: On the substance, on the subject of your conversations with the Greeks, there are two aspects: one is procedure; one is substance. As I understand it, you feel you can't go to your Cabinet and ask for concessions without being able to tell them what the Greeks are going to do.

Caglayangil: Yes.

Kissinger: On the other hand, from my conversation with Bitsios,<sup>5</sup> my impression is that he has exactly the same problem. He can't go before his Cabinet and utter the words "bizonal federation" without knowing what you will do.

Caglayangil: That's the dilemma.

Kissinger: I have an idea on this, but let me say first on the substance. As your Ambassador knows, I have from the beginning said the solution had to be some kind of bizonal solution, and I said so publicly, and I also very early said it should be a federal solution.

Caglayangil: Yes.

Kissinger: That's why I'm so popular in Greece today. [Laughter] My name is a household word, but not a word people can use in polite society.

I have the impression that Greece is prepared to accept a bizonal solution, and that Greece is prepared to accept a federal solution in which both zones have a considerable degree of authority, and that Greece is prepared not to let Makarios stand in the way of a solution. And it's my impression that Greek Government finds it very difficult to make these concessions and have them rejected by Turkey. That way they would lose twice—once domestically in making the concession

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<sup>5</sup> Not further identified.

and once internationally when it's rejected. This is the impression, based on my conversation with Bitsios and Karamanlis.

Why is Karamanlis ready to make this sort of agreement? I'm just giving my assessment, not speaking for him.

Caglayangil: I know.

Kissinger: He's ready for this because he knows that any solution you'll accept is much worse than the situation before July. That's axiomatic. Therefore he'd like to get it behind him as quickly as possible. He's afraid if negotiations get too protracted, you could see events like in Portugal: where the military, disaffected with the United States, could combine with Papandreu and the left-oriented military. And they'd have a chance of getting much more Soviet support. And that's my worry, too.

So my view is this: If Karamanlis can get a quick agreement he'll pay a considerable price for it, but if he can't get a quick agreement he's better off being a demagogue about it and acting more like Makarios. He'll fight Makarios if he can get a quick agreement. But why have the army, Makarios and Papandreu against him if he can't get an agreement anyway?

Therefore, I totally disagree with your opposition, who want you to let them do it, or wait a year to get something better than what you can get now. In fact, it may well be that in a year you can't possibly get the terms you can get now.

Caglayangil: Mr. Secretary, in order to clarify the situation, when you say you disagree with the opposition, can you state it again so I can put it more clearly to them?

Kissinger: I'll say it to Ecevit tomorrow. When I was here last time, Ecevit said there is no hurry; he could do it in a year, or after elections, or anyway you don't need a quick settlement. My view is what you have going for you now is Karamanlis's desire to get it behind him. Then a year from now when Karamanlis goes for another election, he'll have other issues. Otherwise he has no reason not to take a radical position. In any case, I regard Karamanlis as a transitional figure in Greece. By age alone, he's not of the new generation.

And I will say exactly this to Mr. Ecevit tomorrow morning, so it's not something I'm doing behind his back.

All I'm saying is, as a friend, in my judgment this is the best time for a settlement for Turkey, and I'll explain my views on the substance in a minute.

What are the Turkish interests as I understand them in Cyprus?

One, to get autonomy for the Turkish population.

Second, to get an amount of territory for the Turkish people to live.

And third, to get a Constitution in which the central government can't turn against the Turkish people again or get a foreign policy that could turn against Turkey.

Those are the positive goals. The negative goals should be to prevent Cyprus from being an international issue on which Turkey will be constantly embarrassed and constantly threatened, and your position will depend on military force alone. What you need is international acceptance of your legitimate position.

I believe Turkey has already practically achieved all its objectives, if it can only make them legitimate. I believe Greece is ready to accept a bizonal solution, a federal solution, and powers for the central government that will give the Turkish part adequate protection. And my instinct is they even won't let Makarios stand in the way.

This is my instinct; I have not discussed with them.

What will Turkey have to pay for it? Some territory you've occupied and some return of refugees. Some refugees will go with the territory. But others can come. So I believe if you let some refugees go back into the Turkish area, just so the principle is maintained . . . Right now you're in the best position.

Another element: Right now the Soviet Union is quiet. In a year, Karamanlis or whoever else will be there, will be closer to the Soviets, and the Soviets will be more active.

So if you go for a quick solution, you'll be better off. I believe you can get it.

I really believe you can get a solution that is 95% of the Turkey position. And what you get by waiting longer is whatever you get domestically, which I can't judge, but internationally, maybe 2–3%, which is peripheral.

Procedurally, to break this deadlock where each side waits for the other, to be able to put something before the Cabinet—and this is just an idea, and not a proposal: If you and Bitsios continue to meet and if the communal talks continue, and if you feel you're fairly close, and if you want, we could put forward something as an American proposal, if neither side wants to put something forward as your own proposal. We don't want to put something forward alone; it would be agreed to ahead of time. If domestically you didn't want to put something forward without knowing what the other side would do. But the talks with Bitsios would have to go forward to narrow the gap more than it is now. We would not put forward a proposal unless we know you would accept it. We will not inject ourselves into the negotiations.

Whatever the procedural formula, my strong impression is the immediate future, leaving aside all the domestic considerations, is the best time to make a settlement.

Caglayangil: I thank you, Mr. Secretary. I've clearly understood, and I'm much obliged for those thoughts. I'd like to give my view. The domestic political situation in the United States has become rather complicated . . .

Kissinger: In the United States.

Caglayangil: Yes. To what extent it's explicable, this situation in the United States is not clear to me, but I'm sure Dr. Kissinger can analyze the situation in Turkey. Mr. Ecevit is saying, "I intervened in Cyprus; I have the upper hand in Cyprus. Why should I come with formulas? Let the Greeks do that. Instead of going after formulas, the thing to be done is to improve the economic lot of the Turkish part in Cyprus. And sooner or later the Greeks will come to us." Inside our own government, there are those whose appetite was whetted by the 40% and who calculate, "How can I improve my gains in Cyprus?" Under these circumstances, Mr. Secretary, I find myself rather limited in my movement. How can I ask these people to make a concession? That is why I've conducted my negotiations with my Greek colleague alone and in person. No minutes were kept. I asked him if he could make a proposal I could bring to my government, and I said, "Afterward, if you want to deny it, you can." I told him, "Both you and I are trying to serve our national interests. Give me a picture I can show my countrymen, to say 'this is what the Greeks will do.'"

Mr. Secretary, I've just told you exactly what Mr. Bitsios said: "Let's improve the territorial adjustments." Mr. Secretary, what I've been told is, "Make some territorial adjustments, make some territorial concessions. You're holding now 38% of Cyprus territory. Tell me, 'give me 35%.' This is a figure I can take back. On the refugees there is the figure of 200,000. The UN estimate is 185,000, our estimate is 150,000. We also know the Turkish Cypriots have emigrated to the north and left their homes and their fields and their gardens. We also know that 60,000 left. So the number of displaced persons isn't 185,000 or 200,000 but 25-30,000. Give me this figure."

Kissinger: No, but I understand his problem. When he gives you a figure, he's locked in. He's accepted a bizonal federation.

I have experienced at home a complicated domestic situation, and I have experienced that in those situations appeals to the national interest aren't always convincing. Because there is ambition.

But I don't think it is such a Turkish concession. First, I don't think you intended to keep that territory. In fact, that's what Ecevit told us when he was Prime Minister. He said you didn't need it at all. You could keep it by force, but then you're totally dependent on the accident of Greek domestic politics. If you get a Portugal-type government, the Soviet Union will be on your back, the non-aligned will be on your back, and for what? For more than you need.

Caglayangil: You, yourself, with your experience of the Middle East, a complicated situation, know that conquering land is easier than surrendering land. [Laughter] This is the case in the Middle East where you're trying so hard. I keep telling them, "Give me a picture I can take back to my own government." I will never be in a position to go to the Greeks and tell them "For this we are prepared to do this and that." I tell you frankly, I'm not the man to go there and tell them that.

Kissinger: For domestic reasons.

Caglayangil: For domestic reasons, many reasons.

Kissinger: Maybe it would be better to start with a discussion of the powers of the federal government, as I suggested.

Caglayangil: But they ask me, what are they going to give us?

Kissinger: We went through much of this—if you hadn't mentioned the Middle East—I think Israel made the wrong choice, too. Instead of giving up 8 kilometers, they'll be under great international pressure. I told them the exact location doesn't make all that difference; the key is international recognition of the line.

Speaking as a professor, I think the hardest thing is to make peace when you don't have to. The key is to be moderate before it's under pressure.

Caglayangil: Mr. Secretary, I'd like to show you—although I know your view of this—the position of Turkey was interpreted in the United States and blamed for using American arms against Greeks. Here are photos of American arms in the hands of Greek Cypriot nationalist forces—and no embargo was imposed. [He passes to the Secretary a book of glossy photos.]

Yavuzalp: These are all Americans arms used by Greek Cypriots.

Kissinger: Of course, our Congressmen would say it's not the same thing. They'd say the Turkish army has no right to be there, but the Greek Cypriots do have the right to be there. This is what they'd say; you know I oppose what they are trying to do.

Caglayangil: Mr. Secretary, the gist of the Congressional objection wasn't that the Turkish army was in Cyprus, but that American arms were used—and those arms were supplied by the Greek government.

Kissinger: That's different. But I oppose the embargo because it's against our interest. You can't conduct foreign policy as charity. You give us facilities. I think it's a tragedy.

Caglayangil: Turkey intervened in Cyprus when Cyprus became a Cuba for Turkey. Mr. Secretary, is Turkey going to stand to all threats because Turkey has NATO arms? The same game is being played today on the Aegean Isles. The Islands are being armed to the teeth, Mr. Secretary, and in violation of signed treaties. Can you tolerate an island near your coastline to be an ammunition dump?

Kissinger: There is no question the treaties of Lausanne and Paris prohibit arming of the islands.

Caglayangil: They say we're violating.

I believe we have laid the foundation for the discussion Mr. Secretary will be having tomorrow with the Prime Minister.

Kissinger: All right.

When you discuss among yourselves: Many of your arguments have great merit, and the injustice of our position I totally agree with you. I'm looking for practical ways for a solution because I believe the best conditions for a solution are in the next six months, whoever is in power. I know from my experience—before it happens it's impossible to convince people; after it happens, it's too late.

Caglayangil: The structure of my mentality is such that you can't find a person more situated than myself to implement such a solution.

Kissinger: I agree. That's our problem.

Caglayangil: There is a Turkish proverb: You can't clap with one hand only.

Kissinger: We will speak with the same energy to the Greek side.  
[The meeting ended.]

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## 225. Memorandum From the President's Deputy Assistant for National Security Affairs (Scowcroft) to President Ford<sup>1</sup>

Washington, May 22, 1975.

Secretary Kissinger asked that I pass you the following report<sup>2</sup> on the opening session of CENTO.

"I spoke today at the opening session of CENTO along with the Ministers of Iran, Turkey, Pakistan and the United Kingdom. My principal theme was to reaffirm that we will stand by our friends and allies; this was welcomed by the participants as timely. As you know, this area has become even more important to us strategically than

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<sup>1</sup> Source: Ford Library, National Security Adviser, Trip Briefing Books and Cables for Henry Kissinger, 1974–1976, Box 8, 5/18–23/75, HAK to President. Secret; Sensitive; Eyes Only. Sent for information. Ford initialed the memorandum indicating that he had seen it.

<sup>2</sup> This report was transmitted to Scowcroft in telegram HAKto 26 from Ankara, May 22. (Ibid.)

in the past. The session was opened by a message from the Turkish President followed by a short speech by Prime Minister Demirel in which he underscored the importance of CENTO in this part of the world.

“The US is not a formal member of CENTO but as an ‘observer’ we participate fully in its activities. Our link is based on individual bilateral agreements we have with the principal regional partners—Iran, Turkey and Pakistan. We are committed ‘to consult’ our CENTO partners in the event of a Communist aggression against them. As détente has supplanted cold war, the work of the organization has shifted to economic activities, although this past year an important joint military exercise was successfully undertaken. CENTO’s principal utility is that it provides us with an instrumentality for close consultations with Iran and Turkey. For several years Pakistan’s participation was minimal, but in the aftermath of the Indo-Pak war, Bhutto has made his country a more active participant. Your decision to lift the arms embargo against Pakistan has been an added stimulus to the Paks.

“The most important part of the day centered on my bilateral discussions with the Turks. I had a rather full discussion with Prime Minister Demirel at lunch and a two-hour session with Foreign Minister Caglayangil. It is clear that the Demirel Government would like to find a Cyprus solution; it is equally clear that he is in a most difficult position domestically to take an initiative which could break the impasse with Greece on this issue. The Turkish and Greek Foreign Ministers met just a few days ago to explore possibilities, but made no substantial progress on this key problem. They have, however, agreed to continue the dialogue on this as well as differences over the Aegean.

“The curious situation is that Demirel would like to move ahead on a solution but he is stymied because Ecevit, the former Prime Minister, is not willing to agree to any settlement at this time. Ecevit is stalling because he knows the settlement would be good for Turkey and thus to Ecevit’s electoral advantage. The continuance of the aid cutoff continues to complicate matters for the Turk Government and our bilateral relations. There was disappointment here with the one-vote margin by which the Senate took action,<sup>3</sup> and the Turks are pessimistic regarding the possibilities in the House. I assured them that we would continue our efforts to get the House to take action similar to the Senate; they are going to send a delegation to bring their case to the Congress.

“The Greek and Turkish Foreign Ministers will meet again in Brussels prior to your meeting with Caramanlis and Demirel, but we must not expect any breakthrough on the Cyprus issue at that meeting. The

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<sup>3</sup> See footnote 4, Document 224.

Turks fully agree with our analysis that a quick solution would serve their interest, but the political environment is against a weak Demirel Government taking the requisite decisions. Since the gap will still be wide, I believe it will be important for you to restate to Caramanlis and to Demirel our general views on the need for early progress on the Cyprus question, but it would not be desirable, in my judgment, for us to get into a mediating posture. I believe the most we can hope to achieve in the discussions with Caramanlis and Demirel is some added momentum for them to continue their own efforts to close the gap.

"It was also clear from my discussions here that regardless of the arms embargo, there is tremendous good will for us and that the Turks would like to try to find a way to avoid taking any retaliatory action which would be contrary to our mutual interests. However, the government is under increasing pressure to take some countermeasures.

"I also had a talk with Minister of State Aziz Ahmed of Pakistan whose principal concern is that within two years India may again attack Pakistan. Since the decision to lift the embargo, the Paks have not made any specific request for sales of arms from us. They are carefully trying to determine their priorities since they do not have the money to purchase the sophisticated weapons they want within the next two-year timeframe. Aziz asked that we talk to both the Iranians and the Saudis to encourage them to help the Pakistanis financially. I told them we had already talked to the Shah, and we would continue to encourage both Iran and Saudi Arabia to be helpful."

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## **226. Memorandum From the President's Deputy Assistant for National Security Affairs (Scowcroft) to President Ford<sup>1</sup>**

Washington, May 23, 1975.

Secretary Kissinger has asked that I pass you the following report on the completion of the CENTO proceedings and further discussions with Prime Minister Demirel and former Prime Minister Ecevit.<sup>2</sup>

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<sup>1</sup> Source: Ford Library, National Security Adviser, Trip Briefing Books and Cables for Henry Kissinger, 1974-1976, Box 8, 5/18-23/75, HAK to President. Secret; Sensitive; Eyes Only. Sent for information. Ford initialed the memorandum indicating that he had seen it.

<sup>2</sup> This report was transmitted to Scowcroft in telegram HAKto 28 from Ankara, May 23. (Ibid.)



“I have just completed the CENTO proceedings and a further round of talks with Prime Minister Demirel and Former Foreign Minister Ecevit.<sup>3</sup>

“As to CENTO, we spent the morning with each Minister giving his assessment of the principal developments that have occurred in this area over the past year. The main theme was that the efforts of *détente* should be continued; at the same time CENTO members should maintain their vigilance since the threat of Soviet expansionism, in their judgment, remains, though in a less direct form. In my comments before the Council, I reviewed our current relations with the Soviets and the Peoples Republic of China, assured them of our unwillingness to accept stagnation in the Middle East, explained our approach to oil and commodity questions, and stressed the need for all Alliance members to do what is required in defense of their freedom. In this regard, I spent considerable time in assuring each member of our resolve to remain engaged in a constructive way on the key problems of the world and to stand by our commitments and friends.

“A more important part of the day was spent on talks with Ecevit and Demirel. As I reported to you yesterday,<sup>4</sup> the internal political situation here in Turkey is very complicated, with Ecevit as the Former Prime Minister out of power, being reluctant to commit himself to support the government in any meaningful initiative to break the present impasse on Cyprus, because he does not want to strengthen their position. While Foreign Minister Caglayangil seems willing to try to get agreement within the government coalition on a Cyprus proposal based on a bizonal arrangement, Demirel gave no such indication. Demirel did speak feelingly and with a good deal of understanding and support for America as he reviewed the difficult situation he is in as a result of the continued embargo. He wants to give us a little more time. He expressed the strong hope that we will do everything possible to get the House to take the same action as the Senate and I assured him of our determination in this regard. Demirel is continuing to keep a lid on anti-Americanism, but he left me with a distinct impression that the time is running out. He may very well give you some indication of the kind of retaliatory measures he will feel impelled to take if the embargo is not lifted.

“However, on the Cyprus issue he is reluctant to move. He is fearful that any initiative he might take will be exploited by Ecevit. It is

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<sup>3</sup> A memorandum of Kissinger’s conversation with Ecevit is in Library of Congress, Manuscript Division, Kissinger Papers, Box CL 273, Memoranda of Conversations, Chronological File, May 1975. No record of the conversation with Demirel has been found.

<sup>4</sup> See Document 225.

only problematical as to whether he will chance speaking to you in concrete terms on the Cyprus issue. We are trying to get across to him and the Foreign Minister that Turkish views expressed to you will be measured against the background of a Caramanlis stated desire to achieve a quick settlement. I pointed out frequently to the Prime Minister and the Foreign Minister that by making a concrete proposal now they can in effect get 95 percent of what they want; that they can get international approval of a permanent settlement favorable to them; and above all, what is available today is unlikely to be available a year from now.

"I believe my talks here have set a useful background for your discussions with Demirel and Caramanlis, but my assessment remains the same as that I conveyed to you yesterday—that we must not expect early dramatic results and that your talk should be helpful in getting us a little more time to work on our Congressional problem, but nothing new or decisive is likely to emanate on the Cyprus issue."

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## 227. Memorandum of Conversation<sup>1</sup>

Brussels, May 29, 1975, 11:30 a.m.

### PARTICIPANTS

*Turkey:*

Prime Minister Demirel  
Foreign Minister Caglayangil  
Ambassador Esenbel  
Ambassador Yavuzalp

*U.S.:*

The President  
Secretary Kissinger  
Lieutenant General Scowcroft  
Assistant Secretary Hartman

President: We certainly have beautiful weather here.

Demirel: Yes, we have had a lovely spring in Turkey too, fortunately with lots of rain.

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<sup>1</sup> Source: National Archives, RG 59, Records of Henry Kissinger, 1973–1977, Entry 5403, Box 11, Nodis Memcons, May 1975. Secret; Nodis. The meeting was held at Ambassador Firestone's residence. Kissinger and Ford were in Brussels for a North Atlantic Council meeting. They had met with Caramanlis and Bitsios earlier; see Document 50.

Secretary: I have the impression that the climate in Turkey is better since your reforestation program.

Demirel: Yes and, of course, we already had a lot of forests. I know your country fairly well in particularly Colorado.

President: Yes, I know Colorado too. You seem to speak English very well.

Secretary: Yes, I am getting a little disturbed when I find that foreign statesmen have less of an accent than the Secretary of State.

President: It is a great pleasure for me to meet you personally. The Secretary has had many good things to say about his conversations in Turkey. I know that you are dedicated to NATO and to the West. What I will be saying this afternoon is that the United States has complete dedication to the Alliance. We have had difficulties, particularly in the attitude of Congress, and we have had a difficult time in Vietnam but we are determined to strengthen NATO and solve the problems like the one that I know concerns you. I would be very grateful for your observations and particularly any thoughts you have on how we can be helpful in solving the Cyprus problem. I want to stress, however, how unwise I consider the action of our Congress in cutting off aid to Turkey. We totally opposed this action and, as you can see, we got the Senate to change its vote by working with a group of bipartisan leaders. The vote was disappointing to us but there were only 81 votes cast. If all the Senators had been there, we might have had a margin of 7 or 8 instead of one. We have taken a step and when I return I will do my utmost to get the House of Representatives to act. In the House there is more vocal opposition but maybe out of our conversations in Brussels I will be able to go back with something to convince the House to change its mind. I wish to assure you that I am personally dedicated to eliminating the embargo.

Demirel: Thank you very much for your words of welcome. I too have been very pleased to see you and to have this opportunity for a frank talk. I have discussed these problems with the Secretary of State. But I would like to add a couple of things talking as friend to friend. As far as Turkey is concerned we appreciate your efforts. We have been a friend of the United States for thirty years and we believe that this mutual friendship is based on great understanding and on the basis that there are mutual benefits in our relations. Turkey has chosen the democratic way in the Free World. Turkey is also trying to show that development is possible in a democracy. There are two systems struggling in this world—the Free Democracies against Communism. Communism has made lots of progress over the years and we feel we are in the front line in opposing Communism. We are a loyal friend of the United States. Many of our people died for freedom in Korea.

Secretary: Yes, Turkey sent a Brigade to Korea and their prisoners never broke under the strains of captivity—just like their negotiators never break.

Demirel: We believe in defending freedom. In the meantime we have a direct neighbor to the north—the Soviet Union. We cut our relations with them by taking certain actions which made us the target for the Soviets. We have never hesitated in this policy. I was six years as Prime Minister and I always defended the value of the U.S.-Turkish relationship. If there were a conflict between Turkey and the United States I would be better able to explain to my people what the problem is but we have no conflict. Cyprus is not our conflict. U.S.-Turkish relations would be easier to handle if we could talk about a specific problem between us.

Secretary: We have been impressed by your understanding. You know, Mr. President, that the Prime Minister has come under violent attack for being pro-American.

Demirel: I also have strongly opposed Communism. What I am trying to say is that Turkish-American relations are in a fix. Is it fair? We appreciate what the Administration has done. But the arms embargo puts us in a difficult position. It puts U.S.-Turkish relations in a difficult position. What harm have we done to the United States? My countrymen will ask this question. Did we violate some understanding or commitment? No. I can't complain about the United States Congress because that is not a body of my government. The United States sells arms to 90 countries but not to Turkey—loyal friend. We took risks. We became a prime target of Soviet arms because we made available missile bases for your Atlas missile. We also allowed intelligence facilities and thus continue to be a prime target. How can I explain to my people what harm we have done to the United States? Even Yugoslavia receives arms from the United States but not Turkey. We are anti-Communist, we believe in NATO and we are a democracy. How can we be treated this way?

I know how you feel. I am just pointing out the difficulties we are in. I wish we had a conflict because then we could find a solution but we don't have a conflict. We bought 40 F-4's. Sixteen have been delivered and the rest were due to be delivered by August 1975 but they have not been. We are paying installments, we are paying interest and we are asked to pay storage fees. But these have not been delivered. We have 100,000 tons of military materiel in New York and Houston. We are asked to pay warehouse charges for these goods that have not been shipped. How can I explain these things? They are small matters but they could easily spoil our friendship. Once spoiled it will be hard to rebuild.

President: I agree with you about the harmful results for both of our countries. There is absolutely no excuse for this action taken by

our Congress. It is counterproductive. There are some in Congress who forget which Party was responsible for overthrowing Makarios, installing Sampson and sending military materiel into the National Guard. Many Congressional friends forget this. But I can assure you that I will use my maximum effort to eliminate this injustice. There has been some progress and we will work on the House. Should there be a change this will give discretion to the President. But I don't want to mislead you. There are still potential problems because of the emotion of our Greeks. They have an abnormal impact. But I don't dispute your statements.

Demirel: I wish you did. Then I could explain our policy. Let me add a couple of more things. We have some C-130 planes that need repair. We have a contract with Lockheed to repair these planes in the United States but if we send them there they will not send them back because of the embargo. If we don't send them we have to pay a penalty to Lockheed.

Secretary: That is an absurd application of the law. It is bad enough already without our lawyers making it worse. There could have been no intention on the part of Congress to confiscate material already in the hands of Turkey.

President: We will straighten this out.

Demirel: That is but one example of what damage is being done. If you confiscate our planes, hostility will certainly grow. Turn to Cyprus, and ask why that should be a source of trouble in the U.S.-Turkish relationship. The United States was not party to the agreements that established Cyprus. Therefore, why do you penalize us? We have had troubles with the Greeks for many years and these issues have a long historical background. They are complex and they cause a malaise in our relations. But why inject these complex matters into the Turkish-U.S. relationship? Already the Greek-Turkish relationship is complicated enough. Cyprus as a problem is hard, sensational, and a national issue in Turkey. We see you lined up with Greece because of the Congressional action.

Secretary: Caramanlis says we are lined up with Turkey.

Demirel: We have had 25 years of history with this problem. Between 1950 and 1960 we struggled to reach an agreement on Cyprus. With great difficulty Menderes and Caramanlis solved the problem—we thought. But then from these agreements there emerged Makarios. If it had not been for the London and Zurich agreements he would not have become President of a Cyprus. There would not have been a Cyprus. The Turkish invasion was not a violation. We told Makarios—don't do it. We told him constantly. But he armed his people and they killed Turkish women and children. We are a nation of 40 million just 40 miles from Cyprus. Is this a just situation? The welfare of these peo-

ple had been guaranteed by Turkey. And yet unarmed Turks were killed. President Inonu in 1964 and I in 1967 were faced with this problem. All of our people wanted intervention but we were patient. In 1967 the Greeks brought 15,000 men on to the island. In one village they killed and then burned the bodies of 49 people. It was inhuman. We made up our minds to intervene. But the next morning through the persuasion of our friends we got what we wanted. The Greeks sent those people out. If we do not live up to the guarantees we give in treaties, how can people take us seriously in other important matters? We got out the 15,000 and Grivas and we got out the arms they secretly had brought in. In 1974 the Greeks had an illegal National Guard of 20,000 plus arms. None should have been there. In July Sampson declared a "Hellenic Republic of Cyprus" and was prepared to commit genocide. Then there are the islands in the Aegean. They all became Greek in 1924 and 1947. Some of them were not theirs. All of them had been part of the Ottoman Empire before 1914. Cyprus is the last island and they wanted that one too. They wanted enosis. All of these things were done against treaties signed and approved. The Greeks never stopped trying to get Cyprus. The Turks have never started anything. It was the Greeks who overthrew Makarios, who committed genocide. We were forced to act. We had no choice. What should we have done? The intervention was caused by Greece. Why did the Greeks put 1,000 Greek officers in charge of 20,000 men in the National Guard? Cyprus today is a consequence of all these actions—it is not a beginning. We have been pushed. Why should we be penalized?

President: I agree with much of the substance of what you say. But we need to undo the damage. This is a personal opportunity for me to hear your point of view and it will fortify me in my vigor to change our Congressional action. It is incomprehensible to me why Congress does not see this. The consequences of their action will not be to make a solution to Cyprus easier. That can only come when the aid cut-off is removed. We must re-establish good U.S.-Turk relations. Nothing will have a higher priority with me than to remove the embargo.

Secretary: May I add one thing—if you, Mr. President, succeed in lifting the embargo and then there is no progress on Cyprus (even though we shouldn't be involved—any more than Ecevit or Erbakan should be involved), there will be severe damage to the President. This is something I can say more easily than he can. If we win this struggle with the Congress and nothing happens, they will really hate us. This is the time for real progress in the negotiations. The situation has not been internationalized by the Soviets. The Europeans are not involved. If we succeed without conditions and a stalemate develops, it will be a very difficult situation.

Demirel: I am trying to explain our difficulties and then state our position. Let me add a couple of more things. Our people have developed

a great trust in the people of the United States. The embargo is shaking that trust. It is creating suspicion about the credibility of your commitment. Our arms supply is only a hundred million dollars and that is not the real question—we could pay for our own weapons. It is not a question of aid. The embargo represents hostility. You give arms to Tito but not to Turkey. You penalize loyalty. To get a change will take time. But I can tell you that pressure will not help to settle this problem. It will only lead to further difficulties. We have domestic problems among our 40 million people. I want to deal with these problems. Our population is increasing by one million a year. There are 400,000 each year looking for new jobs. I must educate 6 million kids. We have 2 million unemployed. I don't need additional problems. I want to show that democracy works. From the Adriatic to Japan there are only two countries defending the Free World—Turkey and Japan. We have rising expectations and we must give something. If we are pressured I can definitely tell you it will not work. We will try to settle these matters peacefully but we have waited 11 years. We said don't do it to Makarios. We have problems with Greece and with Syria too. How can our friend tell us that either you settle this problem or we will not be your friend any longer? I cannot explain this to my people. Now let me add a couple of more things. We have common defense cooperation. But the embargo continues and we must take measures of our own. People ask for what do we continue defense cooperation if the United States sends us no planes, no spare parts and asks us to pay charges? Why should we cooperate in the common defense? I would like to say for my Government that we attach great importance to our common defense.

Secretary: You have certainly proved this, Mr. Prime Minister.

Demirel: Twenty-five years ago my party helped Turkey enter NATO in 1952. I have always defended NATO but in 1975 I am penalized. I was the first Turkish engineer to be sent to the United States by ECA. The Truman Doctrine sent me to the United States in 1949. In 1954 I was the first Eisenhower Fellow. I went to study Federal-State relations in Washington and how to handle the problem of natural resources. I visited Chicago, Knoxville, San Francisco, and Boston. I attach great value to the ties between Turkey and the United States. I defend these from heavy attacks by the Left. I cannot say now to my opponents that you are right. Anti-Americanism is an arm of the Communists. They use this as a source of their strength. I don't want them to succeed.

President: We are most fortunate, Mr. Prime Minister, to have someone who has lived in the United States and understands our system and particularly the Constitution that gives some equality to the Branches of our Government. Too many people do not understand. Unfortunately, the system sometimes creates problems (although it gives

us benefits as well). It is impossible to explain why this disturbed Congress impedes the Executive in the foreign policy area. Our Constitution was not intended to give this kind of power to the Congress. Congress was anxious to cooperate in the post-war period but serious doubts arose during the Vietnam war. They wanted to make themselves partners but they went beyond the Constitution. In the process they eliminated restrictions and now we must fight further encroachments. We are now living within the War Powers Act. During the Cambodian boat affair the Act called for us to consult before using the Armed Forces but we chose to interpret that Act as merely requiring notification. I voted against the Act when I was in Congress but I am an optimist and I have not lost my faith that if Congress makes a mistake in foreign policy it will not correct it. Nothing will have a higher priority than getting aid restored to Turkey but I have to be realistic. Congress has made a mistake. I am always an optimist and I believe people will see the contribution that Turkey is making. Too few remember in the Congress the contribution you made in Korea. I know what Turkey did. I remember and it fortifies my feelings. But Congress is wrong. I will do all I can to change that situation. If we are successful and it means that I have to put my personal reputation on the line, I hope that there will be movement to solve the problem. There should be no conflict between these two objectives.

Secretary: The trouble with the Turks is that they don't know how to accept victory. The Greeks—and we now have confirmation of this from Caramanlis—are prepared to accept a bizonal federal system. I told the British to tell the Greeks to put forward the idea of alternating the Presidency between the two communities. With this the Turks will have achieved substantially all your objectives and all you have to do in return is to give up some territory—how much we do not know. We know the difficulty you have. You do not have an absolute majority. If you wait a year the Greeks will become more intransigent, the Soviets will demand an international conference and you will not be able to achieve in a year what you can get today. Leave aside the question of aid, a settlement is worthwhile now. I told your Minister some time ago that I thought a bizonal federal system was the correct solution. From a strictly technical negotiating view, now is the time to settle. If nothing happens now our problems will become impossible. Caramanlis will not be able to accept what he can today one year from now. The Soviets will be doing all kinds of things after the CSCE is finished. They will re-enter the situation. You should seek a solution now. If I can help with Ecevit, you should tell us. We could put him in a difficult position if he changes his position. We have in writing what he told us. We want to help. This is a serious problem. Every time I see Gromyko he says that the United States and the Soviet Union should jointly settle this problem but I stop him and in the pre-CSCE atmosphere this is easy to do



but after the conference is over I am not so sure. I know Ecevit's game. He wants to break up your coalition. But this is an extremely dangerous game. A year from now what more will you have achieved for a few percentage points more of territory? You have 40 percent now. We are talking only about territory—the refugees can return there. The alternating Presidency should also help and we have asked the British to put it forward. If territory is the only question left, it must be solvable.

Demirel: The case is very complicated. The complexity comes from history.

Secretary: Greeks and Turks have great difficulty with their history.

Demirel: We are not willing to have the aid suspended indefinitely. If it is restored we will do our utmost and in good will to get a settlement but there can be no pre-conditions. There must be a negotiation. All I can say is that we are willing to do our utmost to find a solution.

Secretary: The Turks are very negative. I don't get the impression that there is danger of the Turks being too flexible—least I will not go sleepless for that flexibility.

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## 228. Memorandum of Conversation<sup>1</sup>

Washington, June 19, 1975, 8:50–10:22 a.m.

### PARTICIPANTS

President Ford  
Dr. Henry A. Kissinger, Secretary of State and Assistant to the President for  
National Security Affairs  
Congressman Benjamin S. Rosenthal (D–N.Y.)  
Congressman Lee H. Hamilton (R–Indiana)  
Congressman Charles W. Whalen, Jr. (R–Ohio)  
Congressman Dante B. Fascell (D–Florida)  
Congressman John Brademas (D–Indiana)  
Congressman Paul S. Sarbanes (D–Maryland)  
Lt. General Brent Scowcroft, Deputy Assistant to the President for National  
Security Affairs

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<sup>1</sup> Source: Library of Congress, Manuscript Division, Kissinger Papers, Box CL 282, Memoranda of Conversations, Presidential File, June 1975. Confidential. The meeting was held in the Oval Office.

President: This meeting is even more appropriate than when we spoke last week, Ben.<sup>2</sup> There have been some developments since then. There is a glimmer of hope—the Clerides/Denktaş talks have gone on, even though there has been no progress yet.

I met with Karamanlis and Demirel at Brussels.<sup>3</sup> Both of them talked tough and they both realize something needs to be done. They had a good meeting together.

The Senate vote was close but it was good.<sup>4</sup> Something needs to be done. But before we get into a discussion, I would like Secretary Kissinger to bring you up to date on the discussions and on the internal situation in Turkey.

I see Karamanlis nominated Zatsos as President.

Kissinger: Let me explain where the situation is and what the Turkish domestic situation is. Let me start in February, whatever our views about what happened before.

I met Bitsios in February.<sup>5</sup> He said he would accept a bizonal solution if we could work out the territorial arrangements. Karamanlis wanted a quick solution, to minimize the impact on the Greek domestic situation. I then went on to Turkey, which had a caretaker government. They said they had no power to do anything. But I met with every Turkish leader,<sup>6</sup> urging them to put forth specific proposals to resolve the situation and prevent the development of complex international situation making it more difficult to resolve. They all agreed that they wouldn't discuss it while the embargo was on. They didn't promise to move afterwards, but they certainly would not move before; it would look like they were yielding to pressure. The Greek side has been very conciliatory—we couldn't ask for a better position than they are now willing to take.

Demirel then came in, which complicated the situation. Demirel couldn't accept the deal we had been working on, for domestic reasons. If Ecevit were in office, I am convinced we would now have a solution. I went to the CENTO meeting in May—not for CENTO but to talk to the Turkish leaders.<sup>7</sup> Ecevit won't take a position until the coalition does. He basically wants new elections which he feels certain—as do most of the Parliament—that he would win. He took Cyprus and

<sup>2</sup> Possibly a reference to their March 21 meeting; see Document 221.

<sup>3</sup> For records of the meetings with Karamanlis and Demirel, see Documents 50 and 227, respectively.

<sup>4</sup> See footnote 4, Document 224.

<sup>5</sup> Kissinger met with Bitsios on March 9; see Document 179.

<sup>6</sup> See Documents 218–220.

<sup>7</sup> See Documents 224–226.

he can blame the coalition for giving it away. Demirel was Prime Minister when Turkey *didn't* move in '67.

The President had good talks with Demirel. But Demirel is looking for some way to manage it so he doesn't get beaten to death domestically.

[He read from the message from Demirel of June 9, at Tab A]<sup>8</sup>

This was followed by an intelligence report we received that our NATO bases would be closed Monday. It is the non-NATO ones that we are most concerned about. They are of major importance to us. We called in the Ambassador and we got a 30-day extension.

Demirel wants to be able to show he stood up to the U.S., or to get the embargo lifted so he can show he got something back Ecevit had lost.

We expect Turkey to make progress in the Cyprus negotiation regardless of the embargo. I think the negotiation is now mostly a matter of Greek and Turkish domestic politics. The range of the issues is reasonably clear. It is not clear whether either side can make the required movement.

The Turks spent the first 20 minutes with the President talking about the arms embargo.<sup>9</sup> I know there is a difference of opinion about our strategy. But I assure you we had no other motive than to bring Turkish concessions. Even if the embargo is lifted, progress on Cyprus would be tough. But if the embargo is lifted, they would know the President's prestige is involved and they couldn't sit. There is still a gap, but it is not unbridgeable. There are only two issues: the nature of the central government and the territorial division. There is also the issue of refugees. [He describes refugee issues.] If they can break the logjam, the issues aren't too difficult. But getting started is the problem. If Greece made a move and it was turned down by Turkey, it would be disastrous for them. If Demirel moves in a way which looks weak, the coalition will break up.

Brent, will you discuss our installations.

General Scowcroft: [Described the bilateral installations.]

Fascell: If we move, won't we have Greek riots, etc.?

Kissinger: The Greeks asked the President in Brussels to warn against military action, especially in connection with the Aegean. We did so. We are preparing military assistance to Greece but we shouldn't link them.

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<sup>8</sup> At Tab A, attached but not printed, is telegram 4487 from Ankara, June 9, which reported Demirel's view that the domestic reaction to the arms embargo limited his ability to not only make progress on the Cyprus territorial issue but also prevent counteraction that might hurt U.S.-Turkish relations. All brackets are in the original.

<sup>9</sup> See Document 227.

Fascell: But you think there would be no eruption?

Kissinger: Papandreou and Mavros would complain bitterly. But we are convinced Karamanlis wants to get this behind him. If the embargo was lifted and there was no progress, there would be trouble.

Whalen: Let's get right down to cases. We are concerned and want to do something. Our way is the Hamilton Amendment which passed the Senate 41-40. Let's face it. You have won some victories which have made the freshmen bitter. We need to resolve it in a way to try to avoid a bitter confrontation. Maybe you have some ideas.

The President: What do you all think?

Brademas: I want to thank you for inviting us, Mr. President. One idea I would like to put forth—we have mentioned it earlier, but maybe we could modify it some. This idea is to employ the waiver authority. We have checked the legality with the GAO. We would want some private assurance that some action was forthcoming acceptable to both sides; then the President could waive the \$50 million without Turkey publicly having to say anything. To be sure that there is no renegeing on the agreement, you could assure them there would be another \$50 million coming—using both FY 75 and 76—that is more than the grant we are now giving.

If you announced a reassessment of US-Turkish relations at the same time, it would be a gentle reminder that we don't like ultimatums thrown at us. Another idea is to get NATO more involved to soften the US-Turkish aspects of it. As you know, we here are NATO supporters. We voted against NATO cuts. And I tell the Turks I want aid to Turkey. I have 450 voting Greeks. I don't need it politically.

We know there will be no settlement as good as the Greeks had before the crisis.

President: We discussed the waiver policy before. The lawyers can argue whether the waiver is legal. I think the GAO argument is questionable and I as a lawyer think it is probably not right. Suppose I waive and we either don't get a settlement or it isn't satisfactory. Then I am out on a limb. I don't think that is a satisfactory situation. I talked with Demirel for an hour. He pointed out that there are arms paid for that he can't get shipped and is even having to pay for storage. They just don't understand this and the waiver won't answer it.

Brademas: We are trying to find a way out. I agree, let's forget last August. But it is virtually impossible for Congress to turn around without something happening. We must save face and I think it is fundamentally wrong. Sure it causes you some problems. But we have the national interest to consider. I am offended by the Turkish ultimatums. I disagree with your waiver interpretation. I agree with Kissinger that the sides aren't that far apart. If we could get them \$50 million, get some movement, another \$50 million, more movement and we can end

the whole thing in 8–12 weeks. In the face of the Turkish ultimatum, even if we tried to just lift the embargo, we would be hung in effigy.

President: I have spoken with some of the leaders—Tip,<sup>10</sup> for example. Kissinger has talked to Burton. You know the Democratic freshmen better than I. I have gotten to know some of them, including Hubbard—he seems to want to help. It might be worth a try for Kissinger and me to talk to them. I am not sure they understand the nature of the problem.

Whalen: I understand what you both are saying. I see you out on a limb where you could have a problem. What if we applauded your use of the waiver. That might help.

Sarbanes: I think a starting premise has to be an understanding of some accommodation by the Turks. If we can get that, we can orchestrate to save their face. I don't think we can approach the problem from the view of just getting the decision changed. I think it was correct. If we just change, we would be in the position of sustaining aggression. If we know certain things will be done, there are arrangements which can be made—commercial sales, military sales, grants, etc.

President: Let me follow up on that point. There are differences in the kinds of military deliveries and they can be legally treated differently—especially when they have bought and paid for things.

Let me throw this out. Is there a possibility of exempting sales?

Sarbanes: There is a fundamental premise though, and that is movement by us without moves by them.

Kissinger: What bugs the Turks is not grant aid—that is within our sovereign rights. It is the sales, where they can't get things they have bought. So the waiver gets at what bothers them most.

On the negotiations, there isn't any minor movement on which we could report. It will be done all together, or not at all. If the Turks decide to move, it will be done in six weeks—but I can't say when they will decide to move.

If Ecevit were in office, we could get a settlement quickly.

Brademas: That is not Clerides' view. He thinks turning the arms on loses us all our leverage. He thinks that sticking fast will put such a bite on Turkish military that they will force a movement.

There is another group in the House which feels more strongly from a different view—Rangel.

Hamilton: I think there is a trend in the House that the ban should come off. Many who voted for the ban are looking for reasons to change and the trick is to come up with something to help them to change.

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<sup>10</sup> Representative Thomas P. "Tip" O'Neill (D-Massachusetts).

Can't we explore something other than full restoral? One quirk of the law is that cutoffs are in perpetuity. Maybe we could put on a time limit. Maybe we could permit enough aid to let Turkey fulfill its NATO commitment. I don't think right now you would get the votes to left the ban.

President: Have you got some language?

Hamilton: We have been working on some ideas.

President: Why don't we have our people work with you. I can see the need for a parliamentary maneuver to avoid a head-on collision. The situation is bound to deteriorate otherwise—and it is not only Cyprus. Demirel did mention the Aegean and the Greek buildup on the islands. They are just off the Turkish coast. He didn't threaten, but it obviously is a concern. If this continues to unravel, with the Middle East situation nearby, we could have a holocaust. I can't sit here and do nothing.

Brademas: But we can't just turn the arms back on without some actions by the Turks. That leaves us in an indefensible legal and moral situation. That would put the aid bill in jeopardy if we turned any part of it on without any progress from Turkey. We would in that case have to modify our position on the aid bill.

President: We have to be realistic about the situation in Greece and Turkey. For either to take a public position would create an impossible situation.

Brademas: We agree. That is why we want to do it privately—to let them save face.

Sarbanes: I would like to broaden the discussion to the nature of U.S. foreign policy and providing arms and for what purpose. Aggression has been committed and we can't back off that principle. People may differ on that principle, and the Secretary and I part company on it. But just as we can divide categories of aid, we can divide categories of Turkish response.

The other concern is Greece. Kissinger seems to assume Greece will always be there.

Kissinger: No.

Sarbanes: I don't think so and if we move without any justification, I think there would be an explosion. I know it could even be involved with Yugoslavia, with Tito's departure and a possible crisis involving Greece. So I think we must move in a way which does not antagonize Greece.

President: Can you differentiate between sales and grants?

Sarbanes: Yes, but I can't turn around on any part of it without anything on which to rest it. Because of the critical nature of our relationship to Greece. We want to restore relations with both Greece and

Turkey. I think Turkey has more than it needs. I think it is in Turkey's interests to resolve this.

Kissinger: I think most of them want a resolution—maybe even Makarios. We can't get Turkish progress by 15 July. We also can't get it if there is a linkage with aid. But the President told Demirel that if the President sticks his neck out and they don't act, they are then up against the President also.

Brademas: Then what?

Hamilton: There is another aid bill.

Brademas: We have kept quiet. But it hasn't helped getting Turkish movement when the Executive keeps making statements trying to get Congress to turn around.

Whalen: The language is "substantial progress." I think there has been some.

Kissinger: We can't in good conscience say there has been.

Whalen: Would you rule out John's suggestion on the waiver?

President: It is such a marginal question legally. It puts me out on a limb. I am not saying you would cut it off, but let's be realistic. Statements by you on the floor would be helpful.

Taking Lee's idea of making it affirmative action in support of NATO and sales versus grants, let's see what we can do.

Rosenthal: Findley has a proposal to give NATO \$100 million and let them do it. But the bases problems aren't NATO, but a bilateral problem.

Brademas: Would this proposal . . . you are discussing be something different from a waiver?

President: Right.

Brademas: But the key part of a waiver was a private assurance from Turkey. If that would be included, I would look at it with an open mind.

President: I haven't explored this with Caramanlis and Demirel.

Brademas: I think that would be crucial.

Sarbanes: Could we keep a couple of tracks open—the waiver for example? We could also phase down what progress there is in line with what kinds of arms are released. We have intended to look at all this in total packages. Maybe we need to separate things out.

Whalen: I have concerns of time. It will take time. Second, what would we do about private assurances? If we start to debate on the floor . . .

Sarbanes: There have been peripheral ones—to Waldheim—for example. Straightening out some lines, maybe. Can we put together enough peripheral items to justify sales? Maybe. If we can work to-

gether . . . Congress is helping Greece as against the Turks and the Executive is helping Turkey as against Greece.

President: I will reexamine the waiver, although I have grave reservations. If you could look at Lee's ideas . . .

Kissinger: I don't exclude that we could put something together like Paul says. The best place to do it is at the Greek-Turkish talks at the end of July.

Rosenthal: We also can't appear to give in to Turkish threats. That would be a sign to others like Portugal.

Sarbanes: Rather than crumble, maybe we should say we should reevaluate our policy.

President: But if I use a waiver, doesn't that look like buckling?

Whalen: That is right. We would have to help the President.

Rosenthal: We are all in this together. Let's explore it again.

Sarbanes: The other should be looked at, too. That puts us in the same boat.

President: We have not only the deadline of the Karamanlis-Demirel talks. There is also the August recess, the end of the fiscal year, etc. There are lots of deadlines.

Brademas: If we would put this together I can't think of anything better for the country right now.

Fascell: I want to table something here about delivering the material already paid for. There is nothing more basic than the sanctity of a contract. We have got to consider resolving that.

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## 229. Memorandum of Conversation<sup>1</sup>

Washington, June 23, 1975, 9:28–10:43 a.m.

### PARTICIPANTS

President Ford

Dr. Henry A. Kissinger, Secretary of State and Assistant to the President for  
National Security Affairs

Congressman Lee H. Hamilton (D-Indiana)

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<sup>1</sup> Source: Library of Congress, Manuscript Division, Kissinger Papers, Box CL 282, Memoranda of Conversations, Presidential File, June 1975. Secret; Nodis. The meeting was held in the Cabinet Room at the White House.



Congressman Charles W. Whalen, Jr. (R–Ohio)  
Congressman Paul S. Sarbanes (D–Maryland)  
Amb. Donald Rumsfeld, Assistant to the President  
John O. Marsh, Jr., Counsellor to the President  
Max Friedersdorf, Deputy Assistant to the President for Legislative Affairs  
Lt. General Brent Scowcroft, Deputy Assistant to the President for National  
Security Affairs

SUBJECT

Restoration of Aid to Turkey

President: I am sorry that Ben [Rosenthal] and Dante [Fascell]<sup>2</sup> couldn't be here but I thought we had to keep the momentum. Since our last meeting,<sup>3</sup> I have been looking over the alternatives. It is clear to us that the situation in Turkey has deteriorated. Ecevit was assaulted over the weekend. It is indicative of the growing political unrest in Turkey.

We discussed the last time using Section 614, granting a waiver before the end of the fiscal year and initiating again in the new fiscal year. That would be followed by expressions of support from you. There is \$16 million in funds available this fiscal year and of course \$50 million in new funds. The other alternative we discussed was complete removal as the Senate did, but it appears to me it would be very difficult in the House now, even if we agreed, and some of you indicated you couldn't support that. One other idea was the lifting of the embargo on cash and credit.

I want to be forthcoming. I could indicate my willingness by saying I would exercise my waiver, either in FY '75 and '76, or hold it as an incentive for the Turks when Clerides and Denktash get together on 24 July. That is a question of tactics. But to show my willingness to compromise—but I think it is then fair to ask you—not to go the Senate route, but to lift the embargo on sales and credits. It seems to me that this is give on the part of both and achieves what we want. I have to add that we can't guarantee there will be an immediate settlement. We would then be in a position to put the kind of pressure on the Turks to get action. If under those circumstances they don't perform, it is then their problem, not ours. Henry, do you want to add anything?

Kissinger: We could understand among ourselves the nature of this agreement, but publishing it would destroy it.

Brademas: We are talking just in this room. There are three factors: Arms to Turkey; a resolution of the situation in Cyprus; and preserving the fundamental principle that US arms not be used for aggressive

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<sup>2</sup> Brackets are in the original.

<sup>3</sup> See Document 228.

purposes. Restoring arms to Turkey is not the only objective. Your proposal appears to respond to only one objective. When we mentioned your use of 614, there would have to be a prior assurance from Turkey. We could not accept a quid without a quo. You are now asking for Congress to remove the ban on credits or sales and you use the waiver, with nothing coming back from the Turks. There must be some response from Turkey on the ground in Cyprus or an assurance of that. What you have put forth is something for Turkey but with nothing on the other two points—the other thing and the principle that arms not be used for aggressive purposes.

President: On Cyprus: We can't be the negotiator on Cyprus. We have to create the climate for progress. Without this climate, nothing will happen and in the meantime we will be losing. [2 lines not declassified]

It seems to me if there is a settlement, whatever U.S. arms are there will be principally withdrawn. That is a matter for negotiations between the two.

Brademas: I think we are back to square one. I am very disappointed.

President: I candidly feel the same about your position.

Sarbanes: I think there must be something that justifies a legislative change of position. Absent that, I am hard put to have some rationale for changing. The waiver was to get around the legislative situation. To give Turkey something publicly while they gave us private assurances and then publicly make waves.

Hamilton: Is there some hope that Turkey would respond to your waiver with some gesture?

Kissinger: No chance. The ban on grants bothers them least because they think we have a right to do it. Morally they object to the sales cutoff. They also refuse to link the embargo with Cyprus.

The President told Demirel that even though we would not insist on written assurances, if we moved we would expect a reciprocal gesture. I think in July they might give the things that were possible in January, but that is my own feeling, not their assurances.

Hamilton: So the waiver is not a real inducement.

Kissinger: No. We have been trying all along.

I hope we are showing by our efforts and our good faith.

Brademas: It looks to me like we are faced with a complete unilateral gesture. No assurance at all—just a one-way street.

President: The other side of the street is that we stand to lose some vitally important installations. Further, we stand to lose any chance to get a Cyprus agreement.

Brademas: So we would be telling the world if we are pressured we will yield to blackmail.

President: No. What would you have us do, use force?

Brademas: No. This is water over the dam. We would have used pressure on Turkey earlier. I do not think we should yield to blackmail.

President: We must remember that the Turks didn't start this.

Brademas: For years I fought the Greek junta while the Administration supported it.

Sarbanes: I think we must distinguish between the moves of 20 July and the moves of 14 August. I concede you this right of the Turks in July, but not August. But I do not think we can concede on this matter of principle. To get out of this, we proposed this face-saving formula. To move without this, would be to sacrifice principle.

Hamilton: On the partial lifting, you wouldn't object if we inserted language that equipment would be used to further NATO objectives and not in Cyprus.

President: Can't you put it positively on the NATO thing?

Brademas: I would be in favor of action provided we know that some action would be forthcoming. That I don't understand.

Kissinger: I think the President was saying that if we don't move, we would lose bases and forego any chance to get a solution on Cyprus and the Aegean—where Greece is in violation of treaties—with U.S. arms.

Brademas: I would have no objection to invoking the law against Greece.

Kissinger: It is not aggression, just treaty violation. But our proposition is not just that we open the spigot and nothing happens. Demirel is under no misapprehension that the President expects movement if he acts.

Brademas: That was the situation for seven months until February.

President: I can cut these things off at any time. I would be obligated to insist that the parties get together and resolve the Cyprus dispute. I would feel personally obligated to the Congress. And I think both the Greeks and Turks are anxious to get the problem solved.

Sarbanes: Given the last observation, I am not sure why the scenario where you do the waiver, the Turks make some moves, and the Congress then takes action, won't work.

Brademas: At no point have we suggested the waiver be used to get the Turks to be forthcoming. It has always been conditioned on prior Turkish assurances. The point of the waiver was to help the Turks save face.

Sarbanes: It was to break the chicken and egg problem with respect to the Turks—not to get around the Executive-Congressional problem.

Whalen: What did you have in mind on simultaneous timing?

President: My scenario is to get results and show we could work together. Congress would pass before the August recess the sales lifting and either in this fiscal year or later, whichever is preferable, I would exercise the waiver. This would show we can work together and open the door to movement.

Supposing there is no action and you think I am negligent about moving. There are legislative devices to cut it off.

Sarbanes: They are also subject to waiver.

Brademas: We are aware of our weakness in this regard. If we could work something out, it would be good for the country. I hope we don't move at total loggerheads.

I have another thought, which the Secretary may not like. At no point until recently did the Executive use the tools available—an aid ban—to make the Turks move. Even now the Turks are being told that Congress is being pressured to rescind. Why should the Turks move? I wouldn't. Why not tell them there is no chance for the Congress to move and they better move. Why not put the pressure on Turkey?

President: We have been firm but we don't hold all the cards. Our bases aren't bases for their security but for ours. We don't hold all the chips.

Whalen: Do we hold any?

President: I told Demirel that if we got a lifting, they had to understand we expected action. We believe they will act, but they *won't* move under pressure. They will act on the bases and I don't want that responsibility.

Hamilton: The question is how you get them to move. We have a carrot and a stick. I disagree with Brademas and Sarbanes. I think we are more likely to get movement by a carrot than by a stick.

Kissinger: We have been trying to pressurize the Turks. We can argue forever whether the tactics are right.

Congressman Whalen: What does Turkey lose if we do nothing?

Secretary Kissinger: The Turks will lose spare parts and their Army will run down. They may try to move before that happens—in the Aegean and maybe Cyprus. They may not move to the Soviet Union but they will move toward the radical Arabs to get the funds for arms. Turkey will lose their tie to the United States. They don't want to. Maybe if we hang tough, the Turkish army will veer off. But I know no one who believes that. We all think they will pay the price and everyone will lose.

Congressman Whalen: If you exercise the waiver while Congress is going through the legislative process, is there any chance of action on Cyprus?

Secretary Kissinger: My instinct is that action would bring some concessions—token ones—in July. Then we can make a massive effort. We can get, after Turkish Senate elections—a settlement that is tolerable to Greece.

Congressman Brademas: You have been fair in describing in restrained terms what could be expected. We have not discussed the impact of this in Greece. In 1971, when I opposed sending arms to Greece because of the dictatorship, Sisco said Greece was vital to NATO. Can we now write off Greece?

The President: Not at all. We have completed two steps toward bases and aid. The new government is a big asset to us and NATO. We want to help. We haven't finalized it but we are making good progress.

Secretary Kissinger: We have to balance the dangers you describe—which are real, stimulated by the Papandreou forces—and the consequences of a prolonged stalemate with the prospect of confrontation and conflict in the Aegean. Karamanlis wants to get this behind him so he can focus on his other problems.

Congressman Sarbanes: The carrot and stick ignores the principle from which I don't think we can recede without violating. To recede without some basis that Turkey has receded is really bad.

Congressman Brademas: There is much cynicism in the United States over the last few months. If the Congress were to roll over, the people would say laws and principles mean nothing. Our action would then appear just a "get Kissinger" action, which it wasn't. We took it based on principle and we would have to recede the same way.

The President: I will give you all the benefits of doubt on that principle you express. But we also have a broad responsibility that in the process we don't undercut something which involves our national security.

After the last meeting I tried to find a way to compromise. Despite my feelings on the waiver—which you know—I told Secretary Kissinger I would have to show my willingness to work with you. I had language prepared—I have it right here. I respect your views, but it is an understatement to say I am disappointed.

Congressman Brademas: At no point did we suggest using the waiver without private assurances. A simple invocation of a waiver without assurances was never put forward. The waiver was prepared not by us but by Schlesinger.

The President: Maybe, but it was proposed by Congress, not Schlesinger.

Congressman Sarbanes: The waiver was not to make you cave but as a device to get the Turks to move.

Congressman Whalen: I would agree with John that the waiver was contingent on private assurances. But the assurances would in any

case have to remain private, so the cynicism would still remain. The other problem is that the Turks have already rejected a waiver.

Secretary Kissinger: The things we give the Turks free they think we have a right to cut off—while they don't like it. It is the sales embargo which gets them.

Congressman Brademas: I would hope you wouldn't press this to a vote. First, I think we can defeat you, and in any case, it would infuriate the Greeks and, if we win, it would infuriate the Turks.

Mr. Rumsfeld: The Turkish army has behaved very responsibly—not like a banana republic. They are proud of their Army and won't like it running down. When they start closing bases, they are on their way to unravelling a basic relationship. The stakes are very high.

Congressman Sarbanes: True. But it is also basic to ask what are the purposes of our alliances. If members use force to violate the very thing the alliance was designed to prevent, this too is basic. My scenario is to use the waiver, get Turkish concessions in July, and then we see what we can do.

The President: I think we unfortunately have reached an impasse. I think the consequences will be tragic.

Congressman Whalen: To summarize, I think some of us think some action must be taken. It would be facilitated if all the parties could agree. That can't happen, it appears. So Lee [Hamilton], Dante [Fas-cell]<sup>4</sup> and I will have to go back to see what we can do.

The President: We want to work with all of you. We will keep our rhetoric down and hope for movement which can prevent disastrous results.

Congressman Brademas: On the last point, we have been quiet for months. I did say that Executive statements about pressuring Congress are not helpful. I agree about keeping the rhetoric down. We will do our part.

The President: We can't be oblivious of the deadlines facing us.

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<sup>4</sup> Brackets are in the original.

**230. Memorandum of Conversation<sup>1</sup>**

Washington, June 26, 1975, 11:33 a.m.–12:50 p.m.

PARTICIPANTS

The President  
Speaker Carl Albert (D.–Oklahoma)  
Congressman Thomas P. O'Neill, Jr. (D.–Massachusetts)  
Congressman Thomas E. Morgan (D.–Pennsylvania)  
Congressman John J. Rhodes (R.–Arizona)  
Congressman William S. Broomfield (R.–Michigan)  
Congressman Lee H. Hamilton (D.–Indiana)  
Congressman Wayne L. Hays (D.–Ohio)  
Congressman Clement J. Zablocki (D.–Wisconsin)  
Congressman Dante B. Fascell (D.–Florida)  
Congressman John B. Anderson (R.–Illinois)  
Congressman Robert H. Michel (R.–Illinois)  
Congressman John J. McFall (D.–California)  
Dr. Henry A. Kissinger, Secretary of State and Assistant to the President for  
National Security Affairs  
Amb. Donald Rumsfeld, Assistant to the President  
John O. Marsh, Jr., Counselor to the President  
Max Friedersdorf, Assistant to the President for Legislative Affairs  
Lt. Gen. Brent Scowcroft, Deputy Assistant to the President for National Security  
Affairs  
Amb. Robert McCloskey, Assistant Secretary of State for Congressional Relations  
Robert Wolthuis, Deputy Assistant to the President

SUBJECT

Turkish Aid

The President: I asked you to come here to discuss a very important issue.

[Wayne Hays comes in. Also O'Neill.]<sup>2</sup>

We have had the Cyprus problem with us for almost a year. It is coming to a head now. The situation is more serious now, since Turkey has indicated its desire to renegotiate its base arrangements with us within 30 days. I met with Demirel and Karamanlis in Brussels and I urged them to cooperate.<sup>3</sup>

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<sup>1</sup> Source: Ford Library, National Security Adviser, Memoranda of Conversations, Box 13, 6/26/75. Confidential. The meeting was held in the Cabinet Room at the White House.

<sup>2</sup> All brackets are in the original.

<sup>3</sup> See Documents 50 and 227.

The Senate has passed the Mansfield–Scott Bill. I have talked to Brademas, Sarbanes, Lee [Hamilton] and some others<sup>4</sup> to see what could be done. I am not optimistic.

I have been urged to use my waiver authority, to provide up to \$50 million in grant aid. That could provide \$50 million this year, though we have only \$16 million, and \$50 million next year.

I have always been leery of Section 614, despite what some lawyers say. But I have said I would use it if there is no way to get some movement. I realize it is not possible to get a straight lifting of the embargo. Another alternative would be to lift the embargo on credit and sales. What really burns the Turks is that they can't even get the equipment that they bought and paid for, and they even have to pay warehouse charges. Another alternative, which I understand Bill Broomfield has proposed, would provide sales and grant for Greece and Turkey plus economic aid for Greece. I understand Lee has been working on some other ideas I haven't heard about.

These installations in Turkey are extremely important intelligence installations.

We have a tough problem. I am willing to use the waiver even though I am against it and it is not what they want. Henry?

Kissinger: Lifting the embargo won't guarantee a settlement, but without it there won't be a settlement.

Morgan: It will be enough but there is some softening. I did get a letter with 24 signatures from the minority side saying they will change their position. If we can make this known, Brademas and Sarbanes will compromise if they see their support eroding. I think Rosenthal is looking for a way out.

The President: I think so too. I see his problem. He was an original author.

I am willing to get people down here, 40 to 50 a day, if it would be helpful.

Albert: That may be helpful. I have a letter from Brademas saying what the U.S. will and won't do. [Reads from letter] He says he wants good relations with both countries, but we must have concessions from Turkey to lift the bans. He says a majority of the House would reject anything else. If the aid is voted—and I don't think the votes are there—it would offend the Greeks and endanger the new democracy there. We are willing to work something out with the Administration on a quid pro quo basis. The Administration has encouraged Turkey not to make concessions, by attacking the Congress.

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<sup>4</sup> See Document 229.



On your question, this letter comes to me flatly, the breaking of a vow, a deal, or whatever, which puts a strong moral issue before us, with the consequences of these essential bases in Turkey. If you could get some movement of some kind, it might help.

Hays: The only thing which would satisfy Brademas would be caving by the Turks. Brademas doesn't say the Greeks first broke the law by putting weapons on Greece. Brademas' position is totally inflexible.

I had some of the new members lined up, but these vetoes have undermined that. They almost undermined me. If you worked as hard on this as you did on strip mining, you might get it.

Albert: I agree. If we let the domestic controversy impact on this . . .

Kissinger: It is not true that we didn't observe the law. We did. It's true the Congress extended the ban two times. The first time there was no Greek Government. The second time we had no negotiating forum until 14 January. Then Greece rejected the Turkish proposals because it might have prevented the arms ban. Our statements have kept the Turkish bases open this far. Without our statements, they would have closed them by now.

Brademas wants concessions, then he will judge their adequacy and give something. The Turks cannot concede on that basis. It is a basic matter for the Turks not to concede under pressure.

Albert: How useful was Turkey in the October war?

The President: We used the Azores but we may not be able to next year.

Kissinger: They also refused to grant overflight rights and forced Soviet flights to go through Hungary and Yugoslavia; which is about three times as long.

Rhodes: How about freeing the stuff that is frozen now, but nothing goes in the future without further movement?

Zablocki: What if we extended the date to January 26, during which period the sales would be released, and other military assistance to Greece and Turkey and economic aid to Greece? We can't get any concession from Turkey under the pressure they now are under.

The President: Let me put a variation of it. Supposing I exercised the waiver, with an expression of support for that, you lift the ban on sales and with no specific cutoff. They don't want the sword of Damocles hanging over them.

Hays: The Greek lobby won't rest until the Turks have evacuated Cyprus. The Greek dictatorship would have exterminated the Turks on Cyprus if the Turks hadn't invaded.

I think you should consider the Broomfield proposal and I think if the leaders in this room are behind it we can get it through.

Hamilton: The vote was as high as 3 to 1 against. I think we have the votes in the Committee but not yet on the floor. But the momentum is going our way.

Rhodes: We have 100 votes for lifting it on our side.

Hamilton: The Greek Congressmen won't go for any lifting. I think the Rhodes route is the best. Slice it as close as you can and get the lobbying effort going. If you require Congress to move first, I don't think you can get the Greek group off it.

The thought that is prevalent in the House is that the Turks did violate the law, though as Secretary Kissinger said, the U.S. did observe it.

O'Neill: The majority of the House feels we are protecting Turkey but Turkey is not protecting us. They broke the law. What if others do the same thing?

Hamilton: The law is in perpetuity. There is no provision for relief.

Kissinger: It is more obscure than that. Turkey is a guarantor power under the London–Zurich Agreements. Even Brademas and Sarbanes probably agree that the first Turkish invasion was legal, but not the second one. On precedent, this is unique. Further, Greece is fortifying the islands in violation of its treaties with us. Brademas said a lifting of the ban would hurt Karamanlis. What will hurt him more than anything is to get no agreement at all.

One of Brademas and Sarbanes problems is that they have promised the Greek community more than the Greeks are willing to settle for. But the Greeks won't put anything forward unless they think it will produce an agreement. The Greek community here is more radical than the Greek Government.

Anderson: Why don't we do what we threaten in the Middle East—propose a U.S. settlement, then provide aid.

Kissinger: The problem is that for Greece it will be a lousy settlement, and if we put it forward they will blame us and use it for anti-American propaganda. I think there is no substantial disagreement between us and the Greeks. The problem is the Turkish domestic situation. Ecevit can claim he took Cyprus and Demirel gave it away—which is especially bad since Demirel didn't intervene in '67.

The President: The Turkish population is 18–19%. The Turks now occupy about 40%. The Greeks want them to go back to 18%. But there is now a gap of only about 5% if you can get them to the negotiating table.

Kissinger: There are only two issues, but they are big ones. It is agreed now that there will be only two regions. The issues are the amount of territory that each will hold, the refugees, and the powers

of the central government. The latter is pretty well settled, it is just the other two. This isn't as complicated as our domestic debate.

Fascell: I am not as sanguine about turning votes around. I think you have got to have some way to let people get off the hook. If you lifted the whole thing you are talking about \$300 million. Maybe we should do it in two bites. It is hard to argue that 12 F-4s can be used on Cyprus. They are a pain in the neck to us. Why not release them, start hearings and hope the Turks will move?

Anderson: The Turks have to do something. Your speech was directed at that, wasn't it? [The Secretary's speech at Atlanta, June 23, which stated that: "No country should imagine that it is doing us a favor by remaining in an alliance with us."] <sup>5</sup>

Kissinger: Yes. But without a significant step on the embargo, I don't think the Turks will move.

Fascell: AHEPA has already geared up for a fight. The only question is to go on a frontal assault or give a little to let people off the hook.

President: Suppose we go for lifting the sales ban, and either go or don't go for the waiver as you wish. Then I would participate after the recess in meetings with Congressional groups.

Albert: I think it is important to work out if we can. We need those installations but we can't do the impossible.

Hays: Lots of people are rethinking. I have been talking to people and so far only got one flat turndown. But the new members, if you get them down, will want a quid pro quo on domestic affairs. They don't give a damn about foreign affairs. I think if we lose Turkey we have had it in the Mediterranean.

The President: I agree. You work with Henry. I will give whatever time is needed.

Kissinger: We need to understand the clock is moving. We had an intelligence report two or three weeks ago that they would close the bases. We talked to them and got a month, but if we don't show something soon, we are in trouble.

Hays: I think movement in the Committee by July 15 would hold things. So the Turkish legislators tell me.

Morgan: Aren't the Israelis worried?

Kissinger: The Israeli Ambassador says he is working on it.

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<sup>5</sup> Kissinger addressed the Southern Council on International and Public Affairs and the Atlantic Chamber of Commerce. See Department of State *Bulletin*, Vol. LXXIII, No. 1881, July 14, 1975, pp. 49–56.

McFall: I am worried about the Senate if we put through something different.

President: We really had a 6 to 7 vote margin, if we need it.

If we could work with you to work out a bill, I will go to work down here on the members.

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### 231. National Security Study Memorandum 227<sup>1</sup>

Washington, July 16, 1975.

TO

The Secretary of Defense  
The Deputy Secretary of State  
The Director of Central Intelligence

SUBJECT

U.S. Security Policy Toward Turkey

The President has directed that a comprehensive review of U.S. security policy toward Turkey be undertaken on a priority basis. The study should identify U.S. interests, including those interests as they relate to NATO, and offer recommendations for U.S. policy aimed at their protection, particularly in the context of bilateral negotiations that may be requested by Turkey on the status of U.S. installations in that country. The study should take into account such factors as:

- The nature of the U.S. military presence in Turkey, and its relationship to specific U.S. security interests;
- The relative priority of U.S. bases and facilities in terms of their contribution to U.S. and NATO security;
- Turkish objectives regarding the U.S. presence in the country and specific US-Turkish bilateral agreements;
- The presence of nuclear weapons in Turkey;
- Turkey's needs for economic and military assistance and possible U.S. initiatives to satisfy those needs;
- The impact of restoration of U.S. military aid to Turkey and a resolution of the Cyprus crisis on U.S.-Turkish relations;
- The impact of U.S.-Turkish bases and facilities negotiations on overall Turkish-NATO defense arrangements.

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<sup>1</sup> Source: Library of Congress, Manuscript Division, Kissinger Papers, Box 316, National Security Council, NSSM. Secret. Copies were sent to the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and the Director of the National Security Agency.

The President has directed that the study be undertaken by an NSC interagency group comprising representatives of the addressees of this memorandum and a representative of the NSC staff and under the chairmanship of the Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs. The study should be forwarded no later than August 1, 1975 for consideration.

**Brent Scowcroft<sup>2</sup>**

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<sup>2</sup> Scowcroft signed for Kissinger above Kissinger's typed name.

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### 232. Memorandum of Conversation<sup>1</sup>

Washington, July 21, 1975, 8–9:45 a.m.

#### PRESIDENT'S MEETING WITH REPUBLICAN LEADERSHIP

##### PARTICIPANTS

President Ford

Dr. Henry A. Kissinger, Secretary of State and Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs

Dr. James R. Schlesinger, Secretary of Defense

Lt. General Brent Scowcroft, Deputy Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs

[The meeting began with a discussion of oil decontrol strategy.]<sup>2</sup>

President: The next item is the House item—the Turkish aid vote on Wednesday. The need for a victory on this is more evident than ever. I have had two breakfasts here for about 260.<sup>3</sup>

Congressman Michel: We don't have a count yet, but the breakfasts have been tremendously effective.

Kissinger: Let me just comment on a few of the arguments that are being made. The Administration did carry out the law, in the sense that we did stop new commitments. We didn't announce it because we

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<sup>1</sup> Source: Library of Congress, Manuscript Division, Kissinger Papers, Box CL 282, Memoranda of Conversations, Presidential File, July 1975. Confidential. The meeting was held in the Cabinet Room at the White House. The List of Participants does not include the names of the congressmen who attended the meeting.

<sup>2</sup> Brackets are in the original.

<sup>3</sup> The first meeting with the Republican leadership took place on July 10 at 8 a.m. (Memorandum of conversation; Ford Library, National Security Adviser, Memoranda of Conversations, Box 13, 7/10/75) The second meeting with the joint Congressional leadership was held on July 14 at 8 a.m. (Memorandum of conversation; *ibid.*)

didn't want to prevent a negotiation. Second, this is not a matter of choosing between Greece and Turkey. Having no progress is more harmful to Greece, because it will prevent a Cyprus settlement, which Karamanlis needs. Then why doesn't Greece support our action? The fact is that no Greek can publicly support restoring aid to Turkey. Makarios is the chief villain in this respect and his interest is in continued turmoil.

Congressman Cederberg: You keep saying "restoring aid." This doesn't restore aid. There are many who never vote for any aid. This lets them get material they paid for.

President: Yes. Plus it allows them to buy things. There is no aid.

Congressman Rhodes: What role does the Greek Church play in all this?

Kissinger: I am not clear on the motives here, but Iakavos has been no help at all. The Greek-American Community is very stirred up without any understanding of the real issues.

President: Jim, how about the military side?

Schlesinger: These installations, Mr. President, are irreplaceable. *[2½ lines not declassified]*

This is our last chance. Turkey has been willing to wait until the House votes. But if it doesn't pass, Turkey will go down the irrevocable path of closing us out.

Congressman Rhodes: Kennedy fanned the flames on refugees. Is there anything that can be done there to defuse it?

Kissinger: There is money in the bill for refugees, but agreement really depends on a settlement. We would certainly welcome any refugee relief Congress would vote, but a long-term solution is only possible if there is a settlement. In January, Turkey agreed that 8–12,000 could be resettled in no man's land. The Greeks stopped that because they were afraid we would claim that substantial progress was made. We might be able to resurrect that.

President: Relief is just a handout. The only way we can solve it is to get a settlement so they can be resettled. Only with a settlement can we be helpful.

Congressman Devine: Aid to Turkey is as helpful to Israel as anyone else. Over the weekend, the Jewish Community has raised more hell over arms to Jordan than Turkey.

Kissinger: The Israeli Embassy swears they are pressuring Rosenthal, but I don't see the results. The danger of pushing the anchor of the Eastern Mediterranean away from us is obvious—it should be to Israel. Hussein came to us a year ago saying the Syrians had offered him Soviet air defense. We, after a year of talks, agreed to sell them Hawks, with only a few now and the rest spread over several years. It

was a tough choice, but we believed it was better for us to do it than for Syria and Iraq with the result that they would be tied into the Syrian-Iraqi air defense net. The Jewish Community doesn't realize it is not just a matter of us giving it or them not getting it—it is us or the Soviet Union.

President: This equipment is purely defensive. Since the October war, we have delivered to Israel \$800 million of equipment—much of it offensive. And over the two years we've given over \$2 billion to Israel.

Congressman Broomfield: The ploy behind this is to put pressure for more arms for Israel.

President: Israel has in its budget \$2.6 billion in aid from the United States. That they put right in their budget.

Congressman Cederberg: What is the difference between your bill and the Senate bill? Fraser<sup>4</sup> said he would support the bill but he was worried about what would come from the conference.

President: The Senate voted complete removal. The House bill forbids grant aid.

Kissinger: The Fraser Amendment prevents foreign military sales.

Congressman Broomfield: The House conferees will have to hang tough on Fraser. Fraser wants some assurance we will not yield in conference.

President: We would hope the House bill could be improved more toward the Senate bill.

Congressman Broomfield: This is a real problem. Fraser wants assurances.

Schlesinger: Our companies have charged Turkey even for contract violation when they couldn't take delivery. Some remittance of that would help.

Congressman Rhodes: We could do that maybe in conference or on the aid bill. We shouldn't do it on the House bill.

Senator Case: Wouldn't it be harder for the Senate to take a softer line?

President: I would hope you would hang fast.

Congressman Edwards: I changed my position and I think we need to talk to some of these people on the fence. Now that I have converted, I want to win.

[Omitted here is discussion of other items.]

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<sup>4</sup> Representative Donald Fraser (D-Minnesota).

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**233. Memorandum of Conversation<sup>1</sup>**

Helsinki, July 31, 1975, 8–9:15 a.m.

## PARTICIPANTS

*Turkey*

Prime Minister Demirel

Foreign Minister Caglayangil

Secretary General Elekdag (Foreign Office)

Mr. Guvendiren, Deputy Director, Cyprus Department, Foreign Office

*U.S.*

The President

The Secretary of State

Lt. General Scowcroft

Mr. Arthur Hartman, Assistant Secretary for European Affairs

The Secretary: That was certainly a strange seating arrangement at dinner last night. Mr. Prime Minister, I want to know what you had said to Brezhnev that made him leave after the first course.

Demirel: It wasn't anything I said. He was apparently very tired but you are right, it was a strange seating arrangement. I noticed that you, Mr. President, were next to Makarios.

The Secretary: Yes, we had actually refused to talk to him because of some personal remarks he had made about the President before leaving Nicosia, but I am sure he must have asked to sit next to the President.

Demirel: He is now the "former" President.

The President: What does that mean?

The Secretary: What the Prime Minister is saying is that he is not considered to be President by Turkey.

Demirel: That is right. We don't think that there is any longer the old state of Cyprus. That is just on paper now.

The President: Is Costa Gomes coming?

The Secretary: Yes, I understand he arrives tonight and will speak tomorrow instead of today. We had some report from Spanish sources that there is some fighting in northern Portugal near the city of Oporto. We have not yet seen a report from our sources.

The President: I think the quality of the speeches here has been quite good.

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<sup>1</sup> Source: Ford Library, National Security Adviser, Memoranda of Conversations, Box 14, Ford Administration. Secret; Nodis. The meeting was held at the Ambassador's residence. President Ford and Secretary Kissinger were in Helsinki for CSCE talks.



Caglayangil: Yes.

Elekdag: We had prepared a speech with the full intention of not raising difficult issues in keeping with the spirit of this meeting but we understand that both Caramanlis and Makarios have different ideas. You heard Caramanlis yesterday and today Makarios will do the same thing.

Demirel: We did not intend to start a debate here.

Elekdag: That was the understanding of your staff.

Demirel: We don't want to have any fight here.

Elekdag: Mr. Secretary, when the two Prime Ministers (Greek and Turkish) met in Brussels they agreed to moderate their public statements, and we are trying to live up to that. The Prime Minister was not even going to touch on the Cyprus situation.

The Secretary: It is interesting to me that Makarios is now expressing a great deal more flexibility. When he talked to the President last night he said that he could accept a bizonal federation and even told the President that the territory to be left to the Turks could be as high as 25 percent. Perhaps that is not high enough but it is more than I have heard him say before.

The President: I told him that unless there was more give in the situation I would walk away from the problem. I said that 25 percent was not enough.

Demirel: Makarios is a very shrewd man. He always comes along with a photographer. He did that to me once and then your photograph appears with him in the newspaper with a statement "Mr. Makarios had very warm talks with \_\_\_\_\_<sup>2</sup>."

The Secretary: He must have asked the Finns to sit next to the President.

The President: You have a great friend in Wayne Hays.

Demirel: He is not only a great friend of mine but of Turkish-American relations. He is an able man.

The President: He was very helpful and he spoke bluntly in the meetings I had with Congressmen in support of lifting the embargo. He had no hesitancy in speaking but, unfortunately, we did not get enough votes. The Secretary and I have been talking about trying to get some action this week. As you may know, the day after the House vote<sup>3</sup> Senators Mansfield and Scott condemned the action of the House as ill

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<sup>2</sup> Omission is in the original.

<sup>3</sup> After the Senate passed S.846, 41–40, on May 19, which permitted resumption of most military aid to Turkey, the House Foreign Affairs Committee reported a substantially revised S.846 to the House on July 16. The amended version sought to answer the concerns of Turkish aid opponents. It still prohibited direct military aid grants but

advised. The Speaker told me the next day that it was the worst vote in the 28 years he has been in the House.

The Secretary: Where does this leave us?

Demirel: I told the President on May 29<sup>4</sup> what would happen. It has been very difficult for me to keep public pressure down. As a matter of fact, it has been extremely difficult to explain to Turkish public opinion why Congress did what it did. I have expressed great appreciation for what you, Mr. President, have done but it did not change the result. Our friendly relations have been spoiled. Since February fifth there has been an embargo. What can we do? I have tried not to create any provocations. Such provocations could easily be created. If we had a direct conflict between us it would be easy to define what actions we should take and where we should stop but we have no such conflict. Turk/Greek relations are sensitive. If there had been trouble over the last 30 years between us (US/Turkey) it would be easier to explain. I have always told my people that the U.S. is a friend. Our foreign policy has been based on friendship with the United States. We have no direct conflict. But if there are no spare parts and our armed forces are affected while Greece stays as it is, one day there will be a serious problem in Turk/Greek relations. For years you have supplied arms to the Greeks but not for use against Turks. In this situation the Greeks could become more powerful and they might push us to do "this or that." We all wish that something could be done.

The President: You have been very helpful in maintaining a moderate and cooperative attitude.

Demirel: This was not easy.

The President: If there is to be blame I would put it on the intransigence of a very vocal group of Greek-American citizens who are extremely ill advised. I can't seem to get through to them that this embargo is of no help to Cyprus, nor to Greece, nor to Greek-Turkish relations, and it weakens NATO and our own national security. There is nothing good that flows from the embargo.

Elektdag: If I may, Mr. Prime Minister, I would like to repeat what you said that our relations with the U.S. are like an unrequited love affair.

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allowed for "1) the shipment of arms contracted for with the United States before the embargo went into effect, 2) cash sales of arms on the commercial market, and 3) future U.S. government sales and credits for NATO-related items." On July 24 the House voted 206-223 to reject the amended version of S.846 despite intensive lobbying by the White House. The following day Turkey ordered the cessation of operations at the 27 U.S. bases on its territory, including 4 intelligence-gathering facilities. (*Congress and the Nation, 1973-1976*, Vol. IV, pp. 866-867)

<sup>4</sup> See Document 227.

The Secretary: We have been accused of having too much love for Turkey.

Demirel: What is the purpose?

The Secretary: This is the single most senseless act I have seen in my years in Washington.

The President: That is true of the 28 years I have been in Washington.

Demirel: If this somehow would save Greece but it won't. If it could help Cyprus, but it won't. If the U.S. wants to see Turks and Greeks live together peacefully, it is not helping by this action. Our policy has never been hostile to Greece. We want friendly relations. We both need to do other things and spend our resources elsewhere. I want to devote my attention to the development of my country. Turkey is the only country in this area that is stable and a democracy. In Iran you have a monarchy. In the Soviet Union and Bulgaria you have Communists. In Syria and Iraq you have Baathists. In Greece until "we brought Caramanlis to power" . . .

The Secretary: That is what Wayne Hays said in our meeting.

Demirel: We are trying to bring democracy to our people. From Japan to Turkey there was only India but it no longer looks very democratic.

The President: What do you think will happen to Papadopoulos?

Demirel: I don't know why Caramanlis decided to bring them to Court.

The President: Do you think he will send them into exile?

Demirel: Caramanlis probably cannot let them go free but he will neutralize them.

The Secretary: On some island?

Demirel: They have 3,000 islands and they want Cyprus too.

The President: I have a report in this morning that the Senate will try to attach a lifting of the embargo to another bill. If this happens we might be able to get the same bill over to the House tomorrow. We are working on this very hard today and we are trying to make sure that we have the additional necessary votes. Henry, why don't you explain the problem with Rangel?

The Secretary: Charlie Rangel is a black Congressman who is very interested in seeing that progress is made on the opium problem. We understand that you might be thinking of setting up a unit to coordinate your drug control problem. If we could write a letter that sets out what you intend to do it would help us with Rangel and he says that he could probably get another ten votes for us. I want you to understand, however, that we appreciate very much what you have already done on this problem.

Demirel: Yes. This year we took very strict measures which I think will be effective. Last year we decided to allow the growing of poppies in seven provinces on about 100,000 hectares. Only about 80,000 were actually planted. We have very heavy control by police in the area. Every field has been checked. If more was planted than we had licensed them, we destroyed that part of the field and withdrew the license. Actually in Anatolia they do not measure their land in hectares but in a local measure which is the equivalent of a thousand square meters and, therefore, we had to measure every field and there were many complaints. We have also checked every poppy head to be sure that no incisions were made before the plant was harvested. The Government buys all the plants and we paid 20 Lira which is a very attractive price. It amounts to about 1,000 Lira per hectare to the farmer and we think the program will be very successful. We don't like to be charged with poisoning your youth like many people have been saying. We only produce 200 tons while India produces a thousand tons. We will take the harvest of the whole plants and ship them abroad because we have no factory yet to extract the opium. Next year we hope to have such a factory.

The Secretary: We could write a letter saying this and that you promise to continue your efforts. What about this coordinating unit?

Demirel: There is a unit already in the Government.

The President: Could we say something positive about it?

Demirel: I have taken this matter up three or four times in my Cabinet to make sure that the Ministers understood the policy. This is something very important for us.

The President: We could say that your Cabinet Committee has been working on this problem and that it has been very helpful.

Demirel: All of the plants used to be bought by the Department of Commerce but I have now put all of this problem in the hands of the Minister of Agriculture and this has been announced. He controls and purchases all of the harvest and I can assure you that we will do everything that is necessary—just the best we can—as we had promised.

The Secretary: We could say that we talked about this problem and are sending a letter to Rangel about it.

Demirel: I feel that this is a very strong duty that I have.

The President: Isn't there a UN group that has approved his plan? We could say that to Rangel and, in fact, I could call him on the telephone today. I could also tell him that you have put this in the hands of your Minister of Agriculture.

Demirel: We have been advised by the UN and helped by them to pay a good price to the farmers. Many people suggested ten years ago that it was not a good idea to pressure one country but that we should use international controls.

The President: After all, India is allowed to grow poppies.

Demirel: The area where poppies are grown is in the central part of our country. It used to include 20 provinces, four of them are around one place. We do not want to poison your youth and I can tell you that the action I took lost votes for me. I felt that prohibition is wrong because it cannot be controlled and it will not work but I think our system will work.

The President: I think you are right about control rather than prohibition.

The Secretary: We actually need more opiates for medicinal purposes.

Demirel: We have more than a thousand people who are controlling this system.

The Secretary: We should put that effort in our letter. They have now shifted to the process which involves cutting the whole plant and shipping it off to be processed rather than allowing the farmers to draw the opium gum out of the poppy head in the field. It was that opium gum that used to find its way into illicit traffic that went through Marseilles on its way to New York and other centers in the States. We think this new process should control that traffic.

Demirel: The farmers used to cut a line around the poppy heads while it was still green and they allowed the milk to run and they would collect it. Now we allow no cutting by the farmers but the farmers are permitted to keep the poppy seeds while we take the rest of the plant which contains raw opium. This must be processed in a factory and then made into medicine. Next year we will keep it because we will have a factory but this year we will probably sell the straw to Holland where the only plant exists in Europe.

The President: You will be building a plant over the next year.

The Secretary: You could call Rangel at lunch time.

Independent of that problem, can we discuss the Cyprus negotiations? After we had a talk with Caramanlis<sup>5</sup> and I probably should not tell this to you but I definitely had the feeling that they want to settle this problem. The President was very tough—he said that we wanted their support to get aid to Turkey. Caramanlis said that he could control Makarios and that maybe the U.S. should put forward a proposal but we said we would not do that. But what kind of settlement can we obtain? Makarios and Caramanlis now accept a bizonal federation. Makarios is saying 25 percent for territory which is more than he has ever said to us before. Now for your own private information Cara-

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<sup>5</sup> See Document 51.

manlis commented to us on the three problems—first on refugees which depends on the eventual territorial settlement. On the second, on the power of the central government, he said that he would accept anything that Turkey proposed. Third, on percentage of territory, he didn't give us any specific figure but he did say that if it is made too high, it would not be possible for him to live with it in Greece but he didn't give a figure. I think a negotiation could be attempted. It is in the security interests of everyone. You can achieve everything you want, as we told you in March, if you can show some flexibility now.

Demirel: We will continue to do what we can and do our best to find a solution. I told that to Waldheim yesterday. What is to happen now is that the dialogue between the communities should be maintained—if it is broken we will lose the chance for a settlement. There are three ways to settle the problem of Cyprus. First, the island could be divided with Greeks here and Turks there. Second, the island could be divided and each part could be annexed, one by Greece and one by Turkey . . .

The Secretary: Then you would get a left wing government in Greece.

Demirel: I am not discussing the merits of these proposals—or, the two states on the island could be independent and run their own affairs. The third possibility is a federation composed of two states. We didn't want the second alternative but if it is to be the third alternative, it cannot be as it was in the 1960's. There must be two separate self-governing states plus a federal government.

The Secretary: I think that the Greeks will accept this.

Demirel: You could start from the federal level and agree on the functions and organization of that government. That would be a good step. Then the two states could discuss other questions such as territory.

The Secretary: Yes, but the Greeks argue that if they agree to the bizonal and the central government without reaching agreement on territory at the same time they are giving up an important point and that is not unreasonable. I am very impressed with the eagerness of Caramanlis to settle this issue. The President told Makarios that 25 percent is not enough. Our Greeks in the U.S. are talking of much less, like 14 percent (*sic*) [I think the Secretary meant 18 percent].<sup>6</sup> As I said, I think you can get by negotiation all that you want now.

Demirel: I talked to Caramanlis in May and we agreed to set up committees to study the problem.

The Secretary: Suppose Congress should reverse its action this week and then suppose that no progress is made. The President and I

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<sup>6</sup> Brackets in the original.

talked to more than 325 Congressmen and he would be in a really difficult position if no progress were made. Then in the fall we will be driven by the Congress to take some action. This is a moral obligation.

The President: My whole credibility is at stake. I have said that I spoke to you in Brussels and pledged to make a major effort to lift the embargo. I said that you had promised to make your best effort to achieve a settlement. They asked what the terms would be. I told them it was not for us to state the terms but that I had faith that you, Mr. Prime Minister, would make a good effort.

The Secretary: Caramanlis thinks there ought to be a Demirel/Ecevit government.

Demirel: I can tell you that that will not happen. But this is not a matter of different opinions among parties. It is a very complicated case with a long 25-year history. The Congressional action handicaps a solution to the Cyprus problems and harms Turkish-American relations.

The President: That is vitally important. We need good American-Turkish relations.

Demirel: I think we can solve this problem but there are really three problems: there is Cyprus; there is the embargo; and US-Turkish relations. We could have some movement but we can't start with Cyprus. If nothing happens there will be many other problems.

The President: The suggestion has been made that I exercise on my own a waiver which would permit me to grant \$50 million's worth of aid to Turkey. Frankly, I have resisted this proposition because I wanted the Congress to act. I can also tell you that there are technical legal arguments that I should not use the waiver. The waiver was put into the law four years ago and the embargo was passed subsequently. Therefore, some say that I am precluded from using the waiver but others say that it is all right. If I were to use the waiver would it be helpful?

Demirel: We are not after getting something. This is not what we want.

The President: But wouldn't this be an affirmative action and indicate that we want to have good American-Turkish relations which might undercut those who do not wish us to have them.

Demirel: I am not saying whether you should use it or not. But I can say that we are not after grant aid. Our pride is hurt and we do not want to be given aid. We want friendship. We know of your great efforts but the Congress is in doubt and it represents the people. If they are not friendly, my people will ask why.

The President: I am just trying to find a solution.

Demirel: The embargo means that you are hostile toward Turkey. We cannot even receive the planes we have paid for.

Caglayangil: We are the only country in the world subject to an embargo.

The Secretary: You are making all the President's arguments that he used in three breakfasts with several hundred Congressmen and in 50 odd telephone calls. We have achieved some improvement in the situation because we have moved from two thirds against us to only 17 votes.

The President: I have put my arm around more political enemies in the last couple of weeks.

Demirel: We all do that. I know of your great efforts, Mr. President, but the problem is beyond us. My people have a high honor. They are sensitive and they feel that if the love of a friend is lost, it can hurt and it could develop into hatred. We want your friendship not your aid. We cannot take aid from a hostile country.

The President: But you have a friendly President.

Demirel: We shouldn't be put in this position. We are not trying to get something. We are only asking the question—are we friends? If yes, then let's behave that way. How can I explain that friends have put an embargo on us? First we have the embargo, then we have the closing of the bases, and who knows what will come next.

The President: I think we have had a very good discussion and I want to assure you that I will continue to do all that is possible and I will make a maximum effort to get this situation changed.

Demirel: I am sure you have done your best to save our relationship.

The Secretary: When you leave there will be newsmen outside. I think we ought to agree on what each of us is going to say. You, Mr. Prime Minister, ought to make the point you have just made about friendship and also say that Turkey wants a solution. Then the President can say that he opposed the House action and will continue to try to get it reversed.

Demirel: We can say that we reviewed relations and that we are willing to make every effort to keep our relationship.

The President: Why don't you start and then I can say that our relationship has been seriously jeopardized but that I will continue my efforts to remedy the problem.

The Secretary: It would be helpful if you could say that you are trying to solve all these problems including Cyprus.

Demirel: I don't want to give the impression that there is any link between our relations with you and Cyprus. I will say that we have reviewed relations and that I have always believed that it was necessary to do everything to solve outstanding problems. We can mention that we discussed Cyprus.



The President: I want to thank you for being such a good friend of the United States.

(Finished at 9:15 a.m.)

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**234. Paper Prepared in Response to National Security Study Memorandum 227<sup>1</sup>**

Washington, August 20, 1975.

U.S. SECURITY POLICY TOWARD TURKEY

[Omitted here is a table of contents.]

Summary

Bilateral security ties which have developed between the United States and Turkey over the past generation have been mutually beneficial. The US has, largely through grant assistance and some recent credit sales aid, provided Turkey more than \$3 billion in military equipment. Since Turkish troops are almost entirely equipped with weapons of US origin, Turkish dependence on the US as a source of war material has been almost total. The Turks are currently implementing a long-range armed forces re-organization and modernization program for which they had expected US assistance.

Under a series of agreements negotiated with the Turks during the 1950's and 1960's, the US obtained the right to maintain roughly two dozen facilities throughout Turkey. The major air installation which we jointly maintain with the Turks at Incirlik in southern Turkey has a NATO-assigned role, [2 lines not declassified]. Other US facilities fall under bilateral US-Turkish defense agreements, (the relevant umbrella agreement is the Defense Cooperation Agreement of 1969), although they, too, contribute to the overall defense of the western alliance. Among these are [1 line not declassified] a LORAN-C station, and communications facilities linking all US installations.

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<sup>1</sup> Source: National Archives, RG 59, S/S-I Files: Lot 80 D 212, Box 503, NSSM 227. Secret; FRD. An August 20 memorandum from Jeanne Davis transmitted the paper to the Secretary of Defense, the Deputy Secretary of State, and the Directors of Central Intelligence and the National Security Agency, stating that it had been prepared by an NSC interagency group chaired by the Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs in response to NSSM 27. A copy was also sent to the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. NSSM 27 is printed as Document 231.

Bilateral security cooperation between Turkey and the US was dealt a severe blow by the Turkish military intervention on Cyprus in July–August, 1974, and the subsequent imposition by the US Congress of a total embargo on US arms shipments to Turkey effective February 5, 1975. When the embargo went into effect, Turkey informed the US and NATO that it considered the US to be in violation of Article III of the NATO Treaty and Article XXI of the Defense Cooperation Agreement (the “mutual assistance” provisions of these two documents), and implied that the DCA and companion agreements governing the American presence in Turkey would have to be re-examined.

Amid steadily mounting domestic pressure to retaliate against the US, the Turkish Government informed us on June 17 that in its view the DCA and several related agreements were no longer valid, and requested that negotiations begin within 30 days on the future of US facilities in Turkey.<sup>2</sup> The note also indicated that at some subsequent date Turkey would place US facilities in a “provisional status” pending the outcome of negotiations.

At the opening of negotiations July 17—the only session held to date—both sides stated their respective legal positions: Turkey said the DCA was dead and that a new agreement would have to be negotiated;<sup>3</sup> the US side stated that the US considers the DCA still valid, but that we are willing, nonetheless, to negotiate with the Turks on the future of our facilities.<sup>4</sup> On July 27, the US gave the Turkish Government a note which again stated our legal position that the DCA is still valid.<sup>5</sup> Since the US legal position has thus been registered with Turkey, we have not considered it necessary to address the question of the DCA’s legal validity further in this NSSM.

The Turkish Government, which has not yet asked for a second negotiating session, stated, following the July 24 vote of the House of Representatives turning down a partial lifting of the embargo, that constructive negotiations will be possible only after the arms ban is rescinded. Within 24 hours of the House vote the Turks invoked the “provisional status” for US facilities, to which they had previously alluded.<sup>6</sup> They suspended operations at the [*less than 1 line not declassified*] LORAN-C station, placed all US facilities under Turkish control, and began cutting back the privileges of US armed forces

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<sup>2</sup> Telegram 4702 from Ankara, June 17. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy Files, 1975)

<sup>3</sup> Telegram 5544 from Ankara, July 17. (Ibid.)

<sup>4</sup> Telegram 5545 from Ankara, July 17. (Ibid.)

<sup>5</sup> Not found.

<sup>6</sup> Telegram 5768 from Ankara, July 25. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy Files, 1975)

personnel in order to bring those privileges into strict conformity with the NATO Status of Forces Agreement. They have not interfered with primary activities at Incirlik air base, which Turkey considers a NATO installation.

Not wishing to strike at the heart of Turkey's relationship with the United States, the Demirel Government has moved fairly cautiously in its retaliatory steps to date. To the extent that it is politically possible, Demirel may still search for measures against the US which will seem more severe than they actually are. On the other hand, the Turkish leadership probably will be unable to resist pressure to take conclusive action if the embargo is not rescinded or substantially modified. The Turkish military establishment, whose views carry heavy weight in Ankara, has also, on the whole, been generally committed to retaining ties with the US, although elements within the military were in the forefront of those demanding strong action against the US.

Turkey attaches great importance to its NATO role, both in terms of Turkey's defense and of its political identity as a western European country. The Turkish military has a strong interest in continuing full participation in NATO's military activities. We think Turkey will not want to call its basic alliance role into question, but will push other allies hard to fill the gap in its arms and equipment inventories. It may also insist on urgent NATO action on such items on its list of "urgent requirements" as communications and air defense.

In the longer term, Turkish disillusionment with the US could intensify Turkey's basic re-appraisal of all its security relationships and of its general foreign policy orientation. Decisions based on such a re-appraisal are not likely to be hasty, as Turkey judges whether NATO can meet what Turkey perceives to be its needs in the absence of a special US-Turkish relationship.

US objectives in the forthcoming negotiations with the Turks are to retain our basic facilities and preserve the fundamentals of the multilateral security relationship. These aims are intrinsically conservative. We want to preserve those things we now have which we consider desirable, and relinquish only what we must. Within these goals, opportunities may arise to realign the US presence in ways which could make it more efficient while decreasing its size, visibility, and overall cost.

One of the basic assumptions underlying what we consider to be the optional approaches to negotiations available to the US is that the US-Turkish relationship is undergoing some permanent change. Turkey will no longer trust the US to the same extent as heretofore, no matter what is done to lift the embargo in the weeks and months ahead. On the other hand, Turkish leaders will be reluctant to see US-Turkish bilateral security ties disappear entirely.

Four negotiating options, or approaches, deserve examination. They range from trying to accept and accommodate Turkish desires in devising a new security relationship, to abandoning our facilities in Turkey altogether. The options developed here are not mutually exclusive; each option contains a number of elements, some of which can be extracted and used in other options.

The four approaches are as follows:

Option 1—US acquiescence in Turkish demands for a new Defense Cooperation Agreement. We would negotiate a new agreement within parameters established by the Turks, and consult Congress on the result, even though many features of the new agreement would be unpalatable on Capitol Hill.

Option 2—The US would take the initiative in putting together a package which might satisfy the Turks sufficiently to enable us to retain our minimum facilities. Under this option we might utilize the negotiating leverage we have [*1 line not declassified*], seek to enlist our NATO allies in providing alternative sources of arms, and try to cloak some of our current bilateral facilities with a NATO mantle.

Option 3—Drag our feet on negotiations and play for time in the hope that developments this fall and winter with respect to Cyprus, or Congressional action to lift the arms embargo, would enhance our negotiating position.

Option 4—Reduce US installations in Turkey by deciding internally what facilities we can do without, and then negotiating a new agreement to provide for a much-reduced US presence.

Given present uncertainties regarding Turkish intentions on both the substance and timing of negotiations as the Turks await the outcome of the US effort to rescind the arms embargo, we think the US should for now retain maximum negotiating flexibility by keeping its options completely open. Thus, rather than recommend a specific approach to negotiations at this time, we recommend that the US government study the options presented in this paper, but adopt no specific one during the next few weeks of watchful waiting as the Congressional situation and Turkish intentions clarify.

[Omitted here is the body of the 45-page paper with annexes.]

**235. Memorandum From Acting Director of Central Intelligence Walters to the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger)<sup>1</sup>**

Washington, August 27, 1975.

SUBJECT

NSSM 227 (US Security Policy Toward Turkey)

1. We have reviewed the NSSM paper and have mixed feelings about it. In its description of the security relationship between the US and Turkey and how that relationship got where it is today, the study provides useful background material.

2. The section on US options is one-dimensional; it is based on the premise that the embargo on US arms to Turkey will not be lifted when Congress reconvenes after Labor Day. While we would be remiss were we not to plan for the worst, it is quite another thing to assume, as this paper does, that the worst is inevitable. The NSSM study does not examine policy options over the next few weeks, which are described as a period of "watchful waiting." In this important respect we find the paper passive and fatalistic.

3. Specifically, we think the following key assumption (on page 36) warrants closer scrutiny:

"Despite continued U.S. requests and pressure on Turkey, there will probably be neither definitive early progress toward a Cyprus solution nor sufficiently visible Turkish flexibility or concessions on Cyprus to persuade those in Congress who have taken the lead in imposing the arms embargo to change their minds."

Few would argue that it would be possible to change the attitudes of "those in Congress *who have taken the lead* in imposing the arms embargo." It seems less far-fetched, however, to suggest that some of the waverers in the House who may have decided at the last minute to vote against the last bill might be persuaded to reverse their votes. (Nine crossovers of this kind could assure a different outcome.)

4. A breakthrough in the negotiations on Cyprus might suffice to change enough minds, and in those talks the ball is now in Turkey's court. Significant progress will require Turkish territorial concessions in return for the concessions the Greek Cypriots said they were will-

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<sup>1</sup> Source: Ford Library, NSC Institutional Files (H-Files), Box H-37, NSSM 227. Secret; No Foreign Dissem. Sent to the attention of Jeanne Davis.

ing to make at the last session between Clerides and Denktash early this month.

5. We endorse Ambassador Macomber's recommendation that the US government actively urge the Turks to facilitate real progress during the next meeting between Clerides and Denktash on September 8-9 in New York. Certainly at this stage it would be very painful for the Turks to bite this bullet. But we would not rule out the possibility that they can be brought to the conclusion that their interests would be best served by giving a timely boost to the administration's efforts to change attitudes in Congress.

6. As for the longer term, the NSSM paper's discussion of US options seems a useful first cut at the general problem. It seems particularly important, in view of the damage already done, to dismiss any notion that it will be possible to return to the status quo ante. Hence, we should certainly continue to try to come up with imaginative alternatives for restructuring the US presence in Turkey in ways that would allow us to derive the maximum possible benefit from a reduced presence.

7. In sum, we concur in the paper's recommendation that for now the US should avoid adopting any one of the options presented in the response to NSSM 227.<sup>2</sup> In our view, primary attention over the next few weeks should be given to the talks on Cyprus. Ambassador Crawford commented recently that from the Cypriot perspective (both Greek and Turkish) there has never been a more opportune time for a breakthrough, if Turkey is willing to seize the opportunity.

**Vernon A. Walters**

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<sup>2</sup> In memoranda dated August 28 and September 11, respectively, the National Security Agency and the Department of Defense also concurred, with the latter suggesting minor modifications. (Both *ibid.*)

**236. Memorandum of Conversation<sup>1</sup>**

New York, September 23, 1975, 4:30 p.m.

SUBJECT

Secretary's Meeting with Turkish Foreign Minister Caglayangil

PARTICIPANTS

*Turkey*

Foreign Minister Caglayangil  
Ambassador to the UN Turkmen  
Ambassador to the US Esenbel  
DirGen for Political Affairs Tezel  
Mr. Batibay, Interpreter

*United States*

The Secretary  
Helmut Sonnenfeldt, Counselor  
Arthur A. Hartman, Assistant Secretary for European Affairs  
William L. Eagleton, Notetaker

(While photographs are being taken)

The Secretary: Are we going to settle everything this afternoon?

(Photographers leave)

Caglayangil: Although our efforts to lift the embargo have been futile, we can now say that it has been lifted. Our Prime Minister has ten security guards and we obtained weapons for them in the United States. I told them they could not take them back because of the embargo, but we were informed that they could be taken to Turkey. So, we have lifted the embargo.

(Laughter)

The Secretary: We believe if your ambassador continues his work on the embargo, he will be elected to Congress. He will even get Brademmas' support.

Caglayangil: We have been following with appreciation the efforts of the President and yourself with regard to the embargo. The Turkish people understand this. But this has created other problems.

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<sup>1</sup> Source: Library of Congress, Manuscript Division, Kissinger Papers, Box CL 274, Memoranda of Conversations, Chronological File. Secret; Nodis. Drafted by Eagleton on September 27 and approved in S on October 11. The meeting was held in the Turkish Foreign Minister's suite at the Waldorf Astoria. Kissinger was in New York to attend the UN General Assembly. Kissinger met with Greek Foreign Minister Bitsios the next day; see Document 185.

The Secretary: The Congress does not reflect the view of the American people on this issue. We are expecting to have a vote next Tuesday or Wednesday.<sup>2</sup>

Caglayangil: The continuation of the embargo has become a domestic issue in the United States. I hope the vote will be positive, and I think it will be. There will then be greater room for maneuver. I discussed this with the Council on Foreign Relations last night. They asked what would happen if the embargo was not lifted. I told them that the embargo directly affects the US defense installations. If it is lifted, our relations with the United States would go on in a friendly way. I told them that if the embargo is not lifted, the closing of installations will cause a danger to the US, to ourselves, and to NATO.

The Secretary: Let us see what happens. I think we will win. Don't you? (To Esenbel)

Esenbel: Yes.

The Secretary: But if it is lifted, what will happen then?

Caglayangil: We will find ways to promote Turkish-American relations by undertaking negotiations. No matter what the outcome is, Turkish-US cooperation will not be based on aid because aid is based on the decisions of Congress, and the US Government cannot act without the approval of Congress. I believe there could be agreement on a different basis for our relations.

The Secretary: What basis?

Caglayangil: Turkey and the US would base their defensive relationship on a new concept of defense cooperation.

The Secretary: What would that concept be?

Caglayangil: It could involve paying compensation to Turkey for the installations or something else beyond the control of Congress.

Esenbel: A new bilateral relationship would not be subject to aid projects which are subject to Congressional approval. We want to rid Congress of this relationship.

Caglayangil: We want to lift this way from Congress for the sake of your government as well as for ours.

The Secretary: That is for the future, not for the first weeks after lifting the embargo. We can talk about this later—after the Cyprus settlement.

Hartman tells me that you have agreed to 25 percent of the island. (Laughter)

Caglayangil: If we are to decide on territory—

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<sup>2</sup>September 30 or October 1.



The Secretary: You will then keep 40 percent. (Laughter)

Caglayangil: A new line which will take into consideration the economic viability of both communities will be considered. It is not very rational to ask for territory as a precondition for negotiations, and particularly when there is a problem for Turkey domestically before the elections.

The Secretary: This I understand. I did not think you would be able to make a move now.

Caglayangil: We have withdrawn a commando unit which participated in the invasion. This is not a political move but a military one.

The Secretary: That is what is driving me crazy.

Caglayangil: Why?

The Secretary: You have not gotten credit for all the troops you have withdrawn. In my judgment, you have withdrawn 10,000.

Tezel: 11,000!

The Secretary: If you had announced it, we could have gone to Congress with it and gotten the vote.

Caglayangil: Do it now.

The Secretary: It is too late.

Caglayangil: Denktash spoke of a declaration of independence for the Turkish-Cypriots, but our Prime Minister made it clear this was not on our government's program.

The Secretary: In our vote, it would help if you spoke of the economic viability of both communities.

Caglayangil: Because of the Senate elections, I cannot say anything about that.

The Secretary: I understand.

Caglayangil: If we can agree on other aspects, we will then take on the territorial issue.

The Secretary: Simultaneously?

Tezel: He says no.

The Secretary: That is not new, then.

Caglayangil: This is not a package deal. Neither the Greeks nor the Greek-Cypriots have said publicly that they accept a bizonal solution with a weak central government in which the communities would be on an equal basis. Makarios is still talking about cantonal arrangements.

The Secretary: You were the one who insisted on his return.

(Caglayangil makes a gesture of astonishment)

The Secretary: It was Ecevit in London.

Caglayangil: My name is Caglayangil. I never asked for it. (Laughter)

Turkmen: That was before our intervention on Cyprus.

The Secretary: If the embargo is lifted and nothing happens, we will have an impossible mess in this country.

Caglayangil: If it lifted and elections are over, we will have a large area to maneuver on Cyprus. None of us can act alone. Caramanlis has control in Greece, and he could settle it if he wanted to.

The Secretary: I believe he does want it settled.

Caglayangil: He never stops supporting the Greek lobby in the US.

The Secretary: He can't appear not to support them, because they would go to Papandreou.

Caglayangil: Every country has its Papandreou. I have an Erbakan. (Laughter)

The Secretary: After the embargo is lifted and after the elections, can you make progress on Cyprus?

Caglayangil: It depends on the result of the election. If we win more votes than the RPP, a lot will change.

The Secretary: Do you think you will?

Esenbel: Much would change in that case.

The Secretary: What if they win more votes? Would you have to resign?

Caglayangil: In fact, there are two parties—Demirel's and Erbakan's but Erbakan has only 20 seats. But both the RPP or Erbakan's party would need Erbakan's votes to come to power. If the Justice Party wins enough votes, we might go to a general election. I don't see a possibility of military intervention. They did nothing during 6 months of government crisis.

The Secretary: When will elections be?

Caglayangil: If the vote is in our favor, there could be elections in May or June. If Justice wins, we will ask for elections. If the RPP wins, they will press for elections.

The Secretary: Can you get a vote in Parliament for holding elections?

Caglayangil: We could even have a coalition with the RPP.

The Secretary: Would Ecevit agree?

Caglayangil: He would be for early elections.

The Secretary: Who would be the Prime Minister? You?

Caglayangil: Why?

The Secretary: I always like to prove that foreign ministers can take over governments. (Laughter)

Caglayangil: I was talking above of a coalition with the RPP *after general elections*, not after the Senatorial elections. There are several factions in the RPP. We can't unite with all of them.

The Secretary: Would Ecevit find a position in your coalition? I like to see foreign ministers succeed, but I also like to see former students do well.

Then after the embargo and elections, can you enter into serious negotiations?

Caglayangil: Yes.

The Secretary: What does that mean? That the Greeks agree on a bizonal solution?

Caglayangil: We have conditions. One is bizonal.

The Secretary: They will agree.

Caglayangil: Next is limited power to the central government. Further, we cannot give up an equal status for the two communities. There is one further condition, which we have not been saying anything about. That it must be a secular state.

The Secretary: You mean, no priest could be president? (Laughter) Makarios is one of the most secular people I have met.

At what stage would you be prepared to discuss the territorial issue?

Caglayangil: We have said to the Greeks and to Denktash: Let's sit down and talk about the future structure of the government. If there are good results, we can take up the territorial issue. But the Greeks want to make territory a precondition.

The Secretary: Why don't you discuss them simultaneously?

Caglayangil: We are ready to put the whole thing on the table. If we can agree on non-territorial aspects, then the territorial arrangements will be easier.

The Secretary: The Greeks say the same thing about their position and they have some good points.

Caglayangil: It is a matter of approach. Denktash asked Clerides: If I agreed to what you ask on territory—New Famagusta and part of Morphou area—would you sign an agreement on bizonal issue and weakened power of the central government?

The Secretary: What did he say?

Caglayangil: He said: If you agree on territory, we will start negotiating.

The Secretary: I think it is important for them to do it in parallel.

Caglayangil: If the Greeks are forthcoming on other issues, the Turkish-Cypriots would be willing to give up more land. That is the only bargaining point they have.

The Secretary: Except for the 30,000 Turkish troops.

Caglayangil: The Army can't stay there permanently.

The Secretary: What is your idea regarding the posture after the embargo has been lifted? Will Clerides and Denktash renew their discussions?

Caglayangil: Denktash will sit at the table and say: To the extent that you satisfy other aspects, we will try to satisfy your territorial needs. The Turkish Government will keep silent; but if this were said now, we would have to oppose it.

The Secretary: You mean, you would do that in the framework of the negotiations being conducted under Waldheim?

Caglayangil: Yes. If he is not a mediator but merely lends his good offices.

The Secretary: That is clear enough. If we can be of any help, let us know.

Caglayangil: After your speech at the General Assembly,<sup>3</sup> I was asked by several foreign ministers if there was not a change of style towards Cyprus in it. I want to ask you why? And why you said the present line cannot be maintained.

The Secretary: I was talking of the final settlement. I said it must not become permanent. You have said that, too. This is no change, and it is not different from your position.

Caglayangil: I can see a change. You have told us privately, but this time you spoke from the podium of the United Nations.

The Secretary: In effect, we have come out for a bizonal federation.

Caglayangil: No.

The Secretary: I didn't use the word.

Caglayangil: I want to interpret this as you do. It is in my interest. But I was told by several ministers that they saw a change of style.

The Secretary: Our position is the same as yours. I can't say bizonal, but this comes very close.

Caglayangil: The Turkish correspondents in New York have asked for my reaction. I told them I would not express a view until after I saw you.

The Secretary: You can tell them there is no change in US policy.

Caglayangil: Can I say it myself?

The Secretary: You can say I told you there is no change in US policy.

We are for a bizonal federation. We are for reducing the Turkish zone. But we have always said that. We are for the two communities

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<sup>3</sup> For the text of the speech, see Department of State *Bulletin*, Vol. LXXIII, No. 1894, October 13, 1975, pp. 545-553.

having a large voice, which means that the central government would not be dominant. Basically, we agree with you politically and with the Greeks on some of their territorial proposals.

Caglayangil: I am grateful for your explanation. On the 29th of this month there will be a meeting of the Turkish National Security Council, composed of high political leaders. What you have told us now will be of help.

The Secretary: What I have given you is the correct interpretation.

Caglayangil: The lifting of the embargo will permit us to heal the damage in our relations with our united efforts. Perhaps you can be helpful to me. There are various factions in Turkey who want to decrease US-Turkish relations. There are those who want to move closer to the non-aligned. We feel it would be helpful to make joint efforts on this matter.

The Secretary: What can we do?

Caglayangil: We should consult on what to do and what not to do.

The Secretary: What specifically?

Caglayangil: We must reach an understanding as to the new form of cooperation after the embargo is lifted. The military on both sides will exaggerate.

The Secretary: You know, Mr. Foreign Minister, the friendship of Turkey and the US is one of the key elements in our foreign policy.

Caglayangil: We need each other.

The Secretary: All action of the Administration has proven this. We will work closely with you, but frankly, we must move quickly to get Cyprus out of the way.

Caglayangil: This we will try to do, but you and President Ford should visit Turkey to honor Turkey.

The Secretary: I can visit Turkey, and I will discuss this with the President. We can look to many ways to symbolize our relationship. It is a thing of the heart for me. Your Ambassador knows this.

Esenbel: Nixon at one time promised to visit Turkey.

The Secretary: We can discuss this, but he would also have to go to Greece.

Caglayangil: Our President came to the United States.

The Secretary: I will have to stay in Ankara if the President goes to Greece. (Laughter) When I come to Ankara there is no problem because the Greeks don't want me.

Caglayangil: We have to act together.

The Secretary: After the embargo is lifted and if there is progress on Cyprus, we should both work to heal what has happened and create better US-Turkish relations. We have learned the importance of our relationship.

Caglayangil: There is a second request. Ten years ago it was Greek troops who were on the island and the Turks were refugees. There was no world-wide outcry at that time. We ask that you speak to the Greeks with the same frankness as with us.

The Secretary: We will do this, but the Greeks feel I am pro-Turkish. Do you think I am not?

Caglayangil: I think you are a friend of Turkey.

The Secretary: I unfortunately must leave because I have another meeting.

Caglayangil: Can we agree on what to say to the press?

The Secretary: What do you propose?

Caglayangil: We can say that we discussed all aspects of our bilateral relations and Cyprus. I can say that the Secretary told us there is no change in the American position, and I expressed the hope that there will be new developments that will lead to lifting . . .

The Secretary: That is too dangerous. It will be misunderstood.

Esenbel: Yes.

The Secretary: You can say that he (the Secretary) expressed hope for lifting the embargo.

(Caglayangil and Turkish delegation discussed possible language in Turkish.)

Esenbel: We will stick with the last suggestion that he can say you hope the embargo will be lifted.

The Secretary: We can say that we will remain in close contact.

237. Memorandum of Conversation<sup>1</sup>

Washington, September 25, 1975, 8–9:15 a.m.

PARTICIPANTS

President Ford  
Vice President Rockefeller  
Dr. Henry A. Kissinger, Secretary of State and Assistant to the President for  
National Security Affairs  
Rogers Morton, Secretary of Commerce  
Bipartisan Congressional Leadership (list attached)  
Leslie A. Janka (note taker)

SUBJECT

Energy, Turkey and the Middle East Agreement

The first 45 minutes of the meeting were taken up with a discussion of the status of energy legislation on the Hill. Discussion centered on the unlikely possibility that acceptable legislation would emerge from the House–Senate Conference. The President committed himself to meeting with the conferees to discuss potential areas for compromise.

*Turkey*

The President: I appreciate very much the vote yesterday granting the rule for Turkey.<sup>2</sup> I understand the vote is programmed for next Wednesday.<sup>3</sup> We feel that lifting the embargo is critically important, and I want to assure you that the Administration will maximize its efforts in achieving an affirmative vote.

Representative Anderson: We are hearing arguments that the United States would be meddling in the Turkish elections by voting on the embargo now. Some are calling for a delay of 30 days in the vote.

Speaker Albert: I have been presented with a scroll of the names of 150,000 Cypriot refugees. This is just an indication of how active the Greeks are calling on members to press their case. Of course the sad

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<sup>1</sup> Source: Ford Library, National Security Adviser, Memoranda of Conversations, Box 15, Ford Administration. Administratively Confidential. The meeting was held in the Cabinet Room of the White House. Attached is a list of additional participants and those who were not able to attend. Ford, Rockefeller, and Morton had met the previous morning with Republican Congressional leaders. (Memorandum of conversation, September 24, 8:05–9:50 a.m.; *ibid.*)

<sup>2</sup> S.2230 was referred to the House Foreign Affairs Committee, which reported it out on September 22. (*Congress and the Nation*, Vol. IV, 1973–76, p. 867)

<sup>3</sup> On October 2 the House reversed its stand and voted 237–176 to partially lift the embargo, with an amendment requesting the President to open talks with Turkey on ways to counter the illicit diversion of opium. The Senate concurred with the amendment on October 3. Ford signed S.2230 on October 6. (*Ibid.*)

part of the story is that the Turks indeed did force the removal of these refugees.

Representative Anderson: But we can counter that argument by saying that the United States is for a settlement which will permit the refugees to return and that we want to help them recover their homes.

Senator Mansfield: My daughter returned home after hearing John Brademas speak and asked me why I voted to lift the embargo. I told her I did so because I was pro-Greek and I wanted to help the Greek Cypriots.

The President: One of the worrisome indications we have seen is the potential action of the Turkish Cypriots to declare an independent Turkish-Cypriot state. This is especially discouraging since the parties have already agreed to a bizonal federal arrangement. I would think that an independent Turkish Cypriot would be the last thing the Greeks want. They have to recognize that the Turks have 30 to 40,000 troops on the island. Who can stop the Turks if they decided to go independent? The United States certainly won't go in to prevent that. Therefore, the only way to get the parties together to settle the refugee problem, and even more importantly, to protect our own security interests, is to lift the arms embargo.

Representative O'Neill: Mr. President, you've got to think about what happens if you should lose the vote. What would that do to the Turkish election?

The President: I think it is clear that we must take our action based on our own security interests and on the realities we face now. Another defeat of this legislation would deteriorate the situation to an absolutely irretrievable level.

The Vice President: The Turkish election is between the man who put the troops on Cyprus in the first place and the moderate who's seeking a reasonable solution. If the Congress fails to vote to lift the embargo, they will in fact be helping the radicals in Turkey.

Representative Anderson: NATO Secretary General Luns spoke to several of us on the Hill last week and expressed the concern of our European allies over the situation regarding Turkey. I don't see a stronger argument than the impact on NATO of the U.S. embargo.

The President: If the Congress takes off the embargo, the negotiations can get started on a Cyprus settlement. We have made it very clear to the Turks that if the embargo is lifted, they have got to make substantial movement. What assurances does the pro-Greek lobby have that a continuing embargo will solve the problem? There are all sorts of vehicles available to Congress to reimpose the embargo if there is no progress on Cyprus. There will be many opportunities to change course if the Turks do not perform but it is absolutely critical that we act now.



The Vice President: Mr. Dean Alfange, the former President of AHEPA, has been talking to a large number of his Greek friends and supporters on the Hill. He supports the Administration's view and is saying that the only way to get the refugees back to their homes is to achieve a negotiated settlement, which can occur if the embargo is lifted.

General Scowcroft: Mr. President, I think it is important to point out that the U.S. embargo is going to be a factor in the Turkish election whatever we do. Prime Minister Demirel is under great pressure from the former Prime Minister Ecevit, the man who invaded Cyprus in the first place. Demirel can only go two ways. He can try to be as tough as Ecevit on the United States, or he can point to the fact that he got the embargo lifted.

The President: I want to assure you that we will do all that we can. Every element of the Administration will be going all out to achieve an affirmative vote. Our national security is very much involved in this issue.

[Omitted here is discussion unrelated to Turkey.]

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### 238. **Telegram From the Embassy in Turkey to the Department of State**<sup>1</sup>

Ankara, November 5, 1975, 1223Z.

8214. Subj: Current Situation in Turkey.

1. Those who have followed recent Embassy reporting are aware current situation here is a discouraging one. This telegram summarizes where matters now stand in the key areas of USG interests.

2. With respect to Cyprus, it is increasingly clear that the GOT's capacity for maneuver is severely circumscribed. Demirel and Caglayangil have found a way to get Turks to the table and in a stance which incorporates willingness to discuss territory adjustments. But it is by a tortured back-door process that this has been achieved. And what must seem to objective observers elsewhere as a notably limited and tentative initiative on the Turkish part is, in effect, presented to us

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<sup>1</sup> Source: Ford Library, National Security Adviser, Presidential Country Files for Middle East and South Asia, Box 34, Turkey, Exdis to Secretary of State 2. Confidential; Immediate; Exdis. Repeated to Athens, Nicosia, Istanbul, Adana, and Izmir.

here by Turk officials as a precarious, high-risk effort in view of the difficult domestic political situation the Demirel–Caglayangil team is facing. In effect, the Turks have said they will discuss territory if it is raised at the resumed talks, but Ankara’s political exigencies require that any initiative on this subject come from the other side. When one sees how difficult it has been for the GOT to achieve even this position, a serious question arises as to whether, once a negotiation begins, there is any real possibility that the Turks can show even a minimum of flexibility or spirit of compromise. Demirel and Caglayangil are adroit maneuverers and they may therefore find a way to do so (especially if the military supports them behind the scenes)—but our present assessment is that the odds of the PriMin–FonMin team accomplishing this are very long against.

3. Unpromising as these odds are, however, I think we have for the present made all the approaches we should to the GOT on this subject. We should now reserve our next round of effort for the period when the talks are actually about to start. Then, through both diplomatic and military channels, we should do all we can to get the Turks to display at least the necessary minimum of flexibility, on territory and other issues, as the talks get underway.

4. With respect to a revised US-Turkish defense cooperation relationship, the situation is equally discouraging. The Turkish opening position is a source of serious concern. There is a one-sidedness to the Turk position which radically undercuts the kind of mutuality of sacrifice and commitment that is essential for a viable relationship. If I thought this Turk document was simply an extreme opening position in a tough bargaining situation, I would not be as concerned as I am. Unfortunately, however, while the Turks obviously have some “give” in their initial position, I doubt that there is very much. Moreover, what little there is, is not likely to be forthcoming very quickly.

5. Here again, therefore, an objective look at the situation brings disturbing conclusions. We must recognize that the shortsighted requirements of Turkish nationalism and the weakness of the current government are likely to override a realistic sense of Turkey’s security needs. This could well mean that either (A) we will not be able to negotiate an acceptable basis for a security partnership on anything like the scale we have known here before, or that in any event (B) this process will take so long that through an inevitable interim attrition our security position here will have largely disappeared long before a new *modus vivendi* is achieved.

6. Things do not have to turn out this badly, of course. I have scant hope that the Turks will respond affirmatively (they have not yet given us an answer) to the Secretary’s request for a partial reactivation of closed Common Defense Installations (CDI’s) as our revised security

relationship negotiations get underway. I think there is some possibility, however, that as the negotiations proceed, we will be able to bridge the gap in some areas of difference in a way that will permit, at some point in the weeks ahead, a resumption of some CDI activities here. I do not think the prospects are particularly good for this, but on the other hand the possibility cannot be ruled out. In the meantime, I urge that Washington adopt the Embassy's recommendation that we eschew arguments over principle and instead go back to the Elekdag negotiators with a specific counter-proposal as soon as possible. Concerned as I am by a number of the unacceptable principles which underlie the Turk draft, it is a losing game to take these principles on frontally. The Turks, with their weak government, in their current super nationalist phase, and in their post embargo period, will be largely unyielding. We must seek instead to find a practicable and acceptable *modus vivendi* out of the grey areas lying between the Turkish and American drafts. We should support the basic points of our counter-draft by references to the essential partnership principles which underlie them, but if we are to make any progress we must keep the basic negotiations away from arguments over principles and instead on *modus vivendi* specifics.

7. Serious as should be the state of our concern over the current US-Turkish relationship, we must carefully avoid for the present escalating this concern in a dramatic or confrontation-type way. The embargo-embroiled US-Turkish relationship is far more bruised than sometimes is realized—and is badly in need of a respite. After eight months of embargo, the October 2 vote has supplied this in part, but whatever respite we now have, it needs to last somewhat longer before we can afford to get into anything like the early rounds of a show-down over the new defense cooperation relationship.

8. To avoid this latter (and also not to undermine whatever influence we have on the Cyprus situation), our counter-position respecting our future relationship on security should be pursued primarily in the ongoing Elekdag level negotiations and should not be escalated in any major way to higher levels of the GOT at this point. If in these negotiations the gap subsequently proves to be as unbridgeable as I fear, then that will be the time to escalate our efforts.

9. This does not mean we should not mention our concerns (as I have done and will do again) in a general way to the FonMin and high government officials here. But the basic point is that despite the very serious nature of the problem we are facing *vis-à-vis* our future security relationship, we should continue for the present to focus on negotiations (A) in the Elekdag–Macomber channel and (B) while eschewing arguments over principle seek to narrow the gap in very specific areas between the two competing draft agreements.

10. The foregoing are my two major areas of concern, and I will not lengthen this message further by detailing still others of considerable importance which have to do—the above problems aside—with the question of whether Turkey is going to remain capable of being an effective and useful ally. The weak government situation here is not only a liability with respect to Cyprus and US security relationships. The Turkish economy is in a deteriorating condition and no Turkish Government has taken effective measures to deal with it for a dangerously long period. Reserves are declining; inflation is rampant; unemployment is staggering. Student violence continues to paralyze major sections of the university community. And under such circumstances of a deteriorating Turkish internal and international position, the question that always lurks in the background is just how much more will the Turk military take before intervening.

11. Despite the foregoing catalog of problems, however, Turkish society remains relatively stable and resilient. The Turks remain as one of the most courageous and patriotic people of any of our Western allies. Turkish geography has not lost its value for the defense of the West, nor have the Turkish people lost any of their zeal and determination to protect it from incursions from the North. The game is therefore still very much worth the candle. At the same time, it is obvious that the nature of the relationship which has existed between Turkey and the U.S. for 30 years is undergoing a serious sea change. Down the road we should be able to reconstruct a new and viable relationship, but in today's circumstances it seems almost inevitable that it will be a relationship based on less mutual sacrifice, and less mutual confidence and commitment, than that which existed prior to February 5, 1975.

**Macomber**

**239. Report Prepared in the Bureau of Intelligence and Research<sup>1</sup>**

No. 281

Washington, January 14, 1976.

KOSYGIN'S VISIT TO TURKEY AND FUTURE  
ANKARA–MOSCOW RELATIONS

Soviet Premier Kosygin, responding to a Turkish suggestion that he head the delegation to inaugurate a major USSR-financed steel plant, visited Turkey from December 26 to 29. While the visit was short on substance, one statement in the joint communiqué stood out. The two sides “agreed on the preparation of a political document on the subject of friendly relations and cooperation to be signed at a high-level meeting to take place in the near future.”

Turkish Foreign Minister Caglayangil explained to Ambassador Macomber on December 31 that, at Kosygin's request, Ankara would consider signing a declaration “during a later visit.” The Turks and Soviets had agreed, according to Caglayangil, that they could “perhaps improve” on the “declaration of principles of good neighborly relations” announced during President Podgorny's 1972 visit to Turkey “by adding to it things inspired by the final act of CSCE.” While noting that such a declaration would focus on CSCE, Caglayangil was vague on the actual language that might be incorporated, the nature of the document, and when and at what level it would be signed. He even left some doubt that he would ever agree to such a declaration.

*Putting the US on Notice.* By stating Turkey's intention to negotiate a political document with the USSR, while holding back any details, Caglayangil probably is using the threat of a joint declaration as a pressure tactic on the US. According to a [*less than 1 line not declassified*] report, Prime Minister Demirel told [*less than 1 line not declassified*] that future American and Western behavior in areas of interest to Ankara will determine the temperature of Turkey's relations with the USSR. American military assistance, US-Turkish base negotiations, and support on the Cyprus issue are the key determinants in Ankara's thinking.

*Ankara Prefers Ties to the West.* For historical and practical reasons, Ankara would much prefer to retain close ties to the West and the US. The Turks continue to fear Soviet expansionism and realize that nei-

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<sup>1</sup> Source: Ford Library, National Security Adviser, NSC Staff for Europe, Canada, and Ocean Affairs, Convenience Files, 1974–77, Box 27, Turkey 1976 1, NSC. Secret; Exdis. Prepared by Charles Hartley and approved by Peter Tarnoff.

ther the USSR nor their Moslem neighbors, including Iran, are dependable security allies. Provided that relations with the West remain good—and especially if US military assistance continues at roughly present levels—Ankara is likely to restrict its medium-term cooperation with the Soviets to:

- the signature of an innocuous declaration pledging friendship and exchanges between the two countries within the framework of the final act of CSCE;

- credit arrangements that will further Turkey's industrialization plans and relieve its balance-of-payments problems;

- an effort to negotiate bilateral agreements covering consular relations, civil aviation (if a mutually acceptable hijacking provision can be worked out), and an accord on political asylum; and

- the possible purchase of small amounts of unsophisticated Soviet military support equipment.

*Cuts in Aid May Change Turkey's NATO Stance.* If the US reduces or terminates its military assistance, the Turks would still be relatively cautious in their dealings with the Soviets as long as they believed such adverse developments to be temporary. In these circumstances, Turkey probably would not undertake to negotiate a political understanding with Moscow that could foreclose the possibility of future Western assistance or permanently damage relations with its NATO allies.

But if the Turks conclude that ties to the US and NATO (which they tend to equate) are permanently damaged, Ankara might well both reconsider its formal NATO membership and seriously contemplate negotiating a political accord with the Soviets. The Turks and Soviets might then look to the 1972 declaration and the 1925 Treaty of Friendship and Neutrality (see Annex)<sup>2</sup> in drafting an accord designed to significantly improve relations between the two countries.

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<sup>2</sup> Attached but not printed.

## 240. Memorandum of Conversation<sup>1</sup>

Washington, March 24, 1976, 2:30 p.m.

### SUBJECT

Secretary's Meeting with Foreign Minister Caglayangil; Defense Agreement Negotiations

### PARTICIPANTS

#### *Turkish*

Foreign Minister Ihsan Sabri Caglayangil

Ambassador Melih Esenbel

Ambassador Sukru Elekdag, Secretary General, Ministry of Foreign Affairs  
(MFA)

Ambassador Ercument Yavuzalp, Director General, Division of International Security Affairs, MFA

Major General Cemil Cuha, Turkish General Staff

Dr. Mustafa Asula, Deputy Director, Division of International Security Affairs,  
MFA

Mr. Nurver Nures, Counselor, Turkish Embassy (Interpreter)

Mr. Tugay Ulcevik, Chef de Cabinet to the Foreign Minister (Notetaker)

#### *U.S.*

The Secretary

Mr. William Clements, Deputy Secretary of Defense

Mr. Joseph J. Sisco, Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs

Ambassador William Macomber, U.S. Ambassador to Turkey

Mr. Arthur A. Hartman, Assistant Secretary for European Affairs

Mr. Monroe Leigh, Legal Adviser

Mr. William L. Eagleton, Director, EUR/SE

Mr. Harmon E. Kirby, EUR/SE (Notetaker)

Secretary: It is a great personal pleasure to be able to welcome here my old friend, the Turkish Foreign Minister. I am very much looking forward to our discussions. We are not meeting as adversaries or to win points against each other. We are meeting as old friends with a good deal of common ground. We all want to try to solve our current problems in as constructive a manner as we can, with the intention of restoring our countries' relations to what we would wish them to be. This is the spirit in which I welcome you here, Mr. Minister.

Caglayangil: Mr. Secretary, I want to thank you most sincerely for inviting me here. On every occasion that we have met our personal friendship has grown. Mr. Secretary, I wish that our strong personal

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<sup>1</sup> Source: Library of Congress, Manuscript Division, Kissinger Papers, Box CL 275, Memoranda of Conversations, Chronological File. Secret; Nodis. Drafted by Harmon Kirby and cleared in S on July 14. The meeting was held in the Secretary's conference room.

relationship had not developed during an unfortunate period which has beclouded US-Turkish relations. It is my sincere intention to work with you to try to find ways and means of overcoming the impasse. I would like to express my heartfelt thanks for your warm hospitality and for the courtesy you have always shown us. Since our time together will be very limited—we will have only a few hours during the next two days here to discuss several matters—if the Secretary agrees, let's arrange a work program for our delegations.

Secretary: I agree. We'll finish all the outstanding issues in the negotiations in our first fifteen minutes together. Then, tomorrow, we will turn to the Cyprus problem and settle it.

Caglayangil: If you want to settle the Cyprus problem, it looks like I will be staying in the US forever.

Secretary: Well, I agree with your approach. As I see it, there are about six issues relating to the Defense Agreement which we need to discuss. They are:

1. The amount of assistance,
2. The additional things the US can do to assist Turkey to meet its defense obligations,
3. The duration of the Agreement and its relationship to the duration of the assistance obligation,
4. The problem of the relationship of the Agreement to American laws,
5. How we define our bilateral defense relationship in the context of our broader relationship in NATO, and
6. The unilateral use by Turkey of joint facilities in the event of a national emergency.

Those are the issues we shall have to address with respect to the Agreement. While you are here I would also welcome the opportunity to discuss the Cyprus problem. We recognize your sensitivity about any suggestion of a relationship between the Defense Agreement and Cyprus, but Cyprus does affect the general atmosphere and, moreover, the relations between two of our close allies. Thus we would like to be able to understand your current thinking on the Cyprus problem, and then perhaps we could exchange a few words about the Aegean problem as well. It seems to me these are the topics we could discuss.

Caglayangil: I am in full agreement, Mr. Secretary. There are other issues we want to dwell on as well. If you allow, I will take each of the subjects you mentioned and state our views.

Secretary: Which issues first?

Caglayangil: The bilateral issues to be negotiated. Mr. Secretary, before I came here to undertake these discussions, I sought authorization from my Government on each of the issues. You are aware of the complex situation in Turkey. We have a four-party coalition government. Since these subjects we are discussing here are of such great



importance for Turkey, it was necessary to have thorough consultation in the Government. Naturally, I also felt the need to consult the Opposition parties. We have a National Security Council on which is represented the Turkish General Staff, the service chiefs, the Prime Minister and other relevant Ministers. The NSC discussed these issues and made certain recommendations to the Turkish Government on each of them. The Government considered those recommendations and, after a thorough discussion, made some decisions and authorized my approach to these issues. Of course, as I said, I had to contact the main Opposition leader, who is a former student of yours.

Secretary: When he was my student, he was a poet.

Caglayangil: The Opposition leader listened very carefully and said that while he did not wish to raise any great controversy, he did disagree over my Government's approach. He disagreed with the fundamental basis on which we have been addressing these negotiations.

Secretary: What does he want, Turkish bases in the US?

Caglayangil: He had his own views about Turkish defense policies.

Secretary: What are they?

Caglayangil: He explained them at length—over about an hour's time. I don't think it would be appropriate to repeat those views here. In thinking about this Agreement we are discussing, there may be those who would say that there must be an ideal solution for every dispute. I am not trying to find an ideal solution, but rather what is possible. (Caglayangil's interpreter first said "reasonable" but the Minister intervened to replace that word by "possible".)

Secretary: I know that asking you to be "reasonable" would be asking too much. The Deputy Secretary of Defense doesn't understand my making these jokes all the time. My Ambassador is about to have a heart attack. He will certainly goad me after this meeting.

Caglayangil: There may well be differing views on how to approach the question of restoring Turkish-American bilateral relations. I think we should both take a considered look at the circumstances in which Turkey finds itself. Naturally the US side will want to explain frankly the problems it sees as well.

Secretary: I agree. I think I understand the problems you refer to—the problems facing you in the coalition government and the general approach of the former student of mine to whom you referred. I think we agree on how to proceed in these talks. You have to recognize, however, that regardless of whether these negotiations fail or succeed, you will be blamed at home (laughter). In our country also there are pressures, pressures on us that we cannot always control. But I think that if each side tries to understand the difficulties of the other, we can surely resolve together the problems that face us.

Caglayangil: In a sense it would be useful if there were a way in which I could expose you to, or bring to you here, the many different views that Turkish circles express on how to restore our bilateral relationship, particularly given the fact that we are also bound together in the broader fifteen-member NATO context. Most Turks note that of all the NATO allies, Turkey has the longest land and sea frontiers with the Soviet Union. Because of our geographic position, we have been given a special mission. Thus, the responsibilities that Turkey undertakes as a result of these special responsibilities are all the greater. Consequently, the support others give to Turkey in enabling it to fulfill its responsibilities should also be considered special and should be commensurate with those Turkish responsibilities. People (i.e. in Turkey) note that normally in the US there is an all too easy and ready comparison made between Turkey and Greece. Turks point out that Turkey, with a population of 40 million, has a very different mission in the common defense than Greece, with 8 million (*sic*). In spite of the latter fact (i.e. disparity), the US Government traditionally equates the two countries. In devising assistance programs, you do not exactly equate them, but the aid to Greece is normally about 3/4 that of Turkey. The treatment you give to Turkey often causes public opinion in Turkey to say that the Government of the day is far less successful than the Government of Greece in obtaining support from the US. In these negotiations over past months, we have certainly tried to expose to you our special problems and to bring to your attention the special burdens we have undertaken. It has been brought to my attention that at the technical level in the negotiations you have offered \$200 million annual assistance. It seems to me it would be difficult for Turkey to renew its defense cooperation with the United States with defense support set at the \$200 million level. But on the other hand, I recognize that this is a complex issue, and I certainly would not consider it a matter for bargaining or haggling.

Esenbel: In short, Mr. Secretary, the Minister has indicated that any Turkish Government is always under criticism when the comparison is made between US aid for Greece and US aid for Turkey. In the past you have given Greece about 3/4 of what you have provided Turkey. Our role is so much heavier that we think this ratio to be unfair.

Caglayangil: I don't say that I necessarily agree with this complaint, I was just saying that this is the popular belief in Turkey. In approaching this problem, I think we should try to see whether there is any possibility of narrowing our differences. If it appears possible, then we should continue our discussions. If, on the other hand, we conclude that it is impossible to bridge our differences on defense support, we might decide there is no useful purpose in continuing the negotiations.

Secretary: Despite our deep personal friendship, the Foreign Minister has been relaying an ultimatum to me for the past twenty minutes

(laughter). I would like to make the opposite suggestion. Let's settle all the other issues first and then get down to the assistance figures. I think you will find that we are making so many concessions on the other issues that you will be ready to make some on assistance.

Caglayangil: I am at your disposal.

Secretary: The first issue is the extent of defense cooperation on which you proposed the language "limited to NATO purposes". We have proposed the language "consistent with NATO purposes". There is also a sentence providing for "No purposes other than those authorized by the Republic of Turkey." We would be prepared to accept "limited to" plus that other sentence along with the assurance from you that the Turkish Government would be willing on a case-by-case basis to entertain requests for other uses.

Caglayangil: I understand the idea you have expressed. Provided we agree on other issues, this will not be an impediment. I can agree to make such a statement.

Secretary: (Speaks aside to Mr. Clements) I am up against negotiating with the Deputy Secretary of Defense. That issue is substantially settled. Let me have an easy one now.

Caglayangil: How can I ensure a better impression than what I have done?

Secretary: A second issue is the emergency use of facilities. Here we have the problem that this was in the 1969 Agreement, but it was a secret provision. Our problem is not in the provision, but in a public clause which will produce debate in Congress which will be very serious. I wonder whether we can handle this as in the previous issue on the basis of an understanding and assurance rather than on a formal text.

Caglayangil: I accept that, Mr. Secretary.

Secretary: Good. Now there is a more complicated issue. This is the reference to US legislation.

Caglayangil: What is your proposal?

Secretary: We understand that you do not want something that might include discriminatory legislation against Turkey. But if we have nothing referring to legislation we are inviting the Congress to attack the agreement. In this the Greek lobby would have influence. We propose a sentence which makes it clear that there is no discriminatory legislation: "The provision of defense support hereunder shall not be governed by restrictions of US law other than those generally applicable to recipients of such defense support." This makes it clear that there are no restrictions that apply only to Turkey.

Caglayangil: I regret that I am not in a position to give you satisfaction on this. I shall explain this. I do not agree that my own coun-

try should be subject to US legislation. I do not understand the reason for it. I could possibly discuss certain conditions in the case of grants, but in the case of cash purchases I cannot.

Secretary: This is a problem. I can understand your refusal to accept restrictions that apply only to Turkey. Under those conditions your answer would be decisive. But the United States Administration is authorized by Congress to sell arms to any country, including the British or others, under certain laws. This applies to the Executive. They say: "You are authorized only under these conditions." This applies to everyone, NATO and others.

Esenbel: He (Caglayangil) says that on grant aid it is okay but cash purchases are different.

Secretary: You, Mr. Ambassador, are active on the Hill where you control more votes than I do. In principle, you may be right. You may say: "Why should we attach conditions to what we sell?" The fact is that Congress has always attached conditions and this has been accepted by the Turkish Government. The FRG and Israel are subject to the same restrictions. To remove them we would have to go to Congress and change the law. This is not possible. We must one way or another tell Congress that the conditions apply to this Agreement. We do not, however, insist on using the word "restrictions". Is this right, Monroe?

Leigh: We could say "requirement".

Secretary: Yes, "requirement" or "regulation".

Leigh: "Provisions of US law."

Secretary: Yes, if you want to avoid the term "US law" you could say "those legal provisions other than those applicable to other recipients of US defense support."

Caglayangil: (After consultation with his colleagues) I appreciate your difficulty, Mr. Secretary. I have a formulation which I hope would not disturb certain circles in Turkey: "Defense support provided to Turkey shall be effectuated in accordance with the general practice applicable to all other recipient countries."

Secretary: Could you substitute "provision" for "practice"?

Caglayangil: You don't mention American law?

Secretary: Yes, that is right. In paragraph 1 of Article XX, after "paragraphs of this Article" you have "and within the framework of related agreements between the parties". Can we substitute "provision"? You want "defense support provided to Turkey should be effectuated in accordance with the practice applicable to all other recipient countries." We can accept that if you can keep the phrase in paragraph 1 of Article XX: "And within the framework of related agreements between the two parties."

Caglayangil: Both no! We can use our phrase instead. It covers your preoccupation.

Secretary: I am not worried about the difference between “practice” and “provision”. There are many practices, however, and this might be broader than you want. If we reference our agreements, we will have a framework and this would avoid intrusion of the Cyprus problem. If we keep the other phrase we can accept “general practice.”

Elekdag: (After consultation with Caglayangil) He says that if we keep “within the framework, etc.” why add this other phrase.

Secretary: The advantage to you is that it prohibits us from passing discriminatory legislation against Turkey. The kind of legislation passed a year ago would have been contrary to this agreement. That sentence actually adds to your advantage.

Yavuzalp: (After consultation) How about “in accordance with contractual obligations and with the general practices, etc.” and a period after “this article”? “In accordance with contractual obligations and with the general practices applicable to all other recipient countries.”

Secretary: Is this all right? I can go to jail.

Monroe Leigh: Yes. If you prefer “existing agreement” instead it is okay. “Contractual obligations” is rather vague.

Esenbel: Our understanding is “contractual obligations applicable to all other recipients.”

Secretary: One concern that Monroe Leigh raises is that he says: If you say “contractual obligations” without saying “between the parties” someone may find another agreement that would apply.

Caglayangil: We cannot mention “between us.” They will ask in Turkey if there is a secret agreement.

Secretary: We can live with this.

The next problem we have is the duration of the Agreement and of the assistance commitment. Our first idea was to make the duration of the Agreement conform with the duration of our NATO obligations. You proposed that the duration of the Agreement and of the assistance obligation be coequal in length. As for length, I recall that you proposed three years and we, five. Three years is a little short. It throws into a nervous state all of these people who fear they will soon have to be negotiating with you again.

Caglayangil: The duration of the Agreement and of the assistance provision also relates to the amount of assistance to be provided. I am unable to discuss duration at this stage, independently of the amount of assistance.

Secretary: Okay.

Caglayangil: I don’t think we can put an article into the Agreement stipulating that the duration of the Agreement will be the same

as the North Atlantic Treaty, but we could possibly state in the preamble that it is the parties' express conviction that their security relationship will last as long as they both adhere to the North Atlantic Treaty.

Secretary: I think we can live with that. We can agree later on actual duration. There remains the problem of how mention of extending the Treaty should be drafted. We would prefer language indicating that the Treaty will be automatically extended unless one party gives notice of an intention to terminate. This is stating the problem somewhat negatively.

Caglayangil: There is already in the Agreement a clause which says the Treaty will continue unless either party gives a year's notice of intention to terminate. I don't see any purpose in further elaborating that point.

Secretary: Yes, but we would like to have it read that the Treaty will be extended unless there is a notice of intention to terminate.

Caglayangil: I agree.

Secretary: Then we understand that the Treaty continues unless one party gives one year's notice of intention to terminate prior to the expiration period. There is one more technical point to be taken up before turning again to the assistance question. In the current text of the Agreement it is stated that the annexes will be an integral part of the Agreement. We see some difficulty with this. If we do it, Congress will say that it cannot approve the Agreement until it sees the annexes. Since the annexes are highly technical in nature and may take some time to produce, what I would prefer to do, in order to avoid delay in submitting and getting the Agreement through Congress, is to eliminate all references to annexes in the text. Let's simply agree that within six months, or three months if you prefer, or whatever is reasonable, we will negotiate the annexes. I am suggesting this in order not to delay moving the Agreement through Congress. If we retain the present language, it will unquestionably hold the Agreement up. If we agree on this point among ourselves, we can go ahead and get the Agreement approved by Congress while we are negotiating the annexes.

Yavuzalp: Could we reflect our understanding on this point in an exchange of notes?

Secretary: If we gave a note and Congress got wind of it, we would have to give the note to Congress, and that would arouse their concerns and occasion unnecessary delay.

Caglayangil: We have had an unfortunate experience in the past with the negotiation of implementing agreements. It took us two and a half years to negotiate and sign the 1969 Defense Cooperation Agreement. That Agreement noted that there were special circumstances surrounding certain aspects of our cooperation and that we would

conclude the necessary implementing agreements to handle those questions within six months. That was in 1969. When our Government resigned in 1971 no implementing agreements had been concluded. When we came back to power in 1974 we found that only one agreement had been signed. If these annexes are not concluded in three months, we shall have problems. Perhaps we should insert a clause in the Agreement saying that if the annexes are not concluded, we shall suspend all U.S. activities at the facilities (*sic*).

Secretary: All I am trying to do is to avoid giving Congress any opportunity to delay approval of the Agreement. This is a purely technical detail that we are addressing.

Caglayanil: I appreciate your point . . .

Secretary: Monroe? (To Mr. Leigh)

Leigh: Maybe we should look at the Minister's proposal about a clause specifying that if the annexes are not concluded in three months, there would be a suspension of operations.

Secretary: Can we simply say in the Agreement that the necessary implementing agreements or administrative agreements shall be concluded in three months?

Elekdag: The Minister agrees that we don't necessarily have to mention annexes in the Agreement as such . . .

Secretary: If we had a clause saying that any necessary implementing agreements shall be negotiated in three months, wouldn't that be all right? That is not the same thing as saying in the Agreement or to Congress that there definitely will be annexes or implementing agreements. It would only say that any *necessary* annexes will be negotiated in three months.

Macomber: Particularly if we tell Congress the subject matter, which is fairly technical.

Secretary: The Deputy Secretary of Defense says that he will bring pressure on his people to insure that these annexes are negotiated within three months. I think we could live with a phrase like the one I suggested. Then if Congress asks what the additional agreements are about, we could say that they relate to lists of heavy equipment, etc. I would rather do it that way than through a secret exchange of notes. Once Congress got wind of an exchange of notes, they would really get suspicious, but a clause buried here in the Agreement should not cause us any trouble.

Mr. Foreign Minister, my Legal Adviser has another suggestion. We could put a clause in the Agreement saying that you would not allow us to reopen our facilities until there had been an exchange of acceptances of the Agreement. Actually, as I think about this suggestion, though, I don't really like it. Frankly, if we agree to this, it will give

you total control of the situation. The problem that bothers me, frankly, is that we can't wait forever to get these facilities opened. You see what would happen if Congress approved the Agreement within a month, but you then said you could not let us resume operations until all the annexes were negotiated. You see the problem that would create for us. Maybe we should go back to my suggestion of a clause saying that any implementing agreements which may be necessary shall be negotiated in three months. If you don't like the term "implementing agreements," we could use "technical arrangements."

Caglayangil: I don't think there should be any great problem about concluding the annexes quickly. In effect, the armed forces of our two countries have already agreed on the language of the Agreement we have before us, which outlines the principles of their cooperation. All the principles and purposes of that cooperation appear in the Agreement. We should not have much difficulty on the annexes.

Secretary: Do you think we should refer to annexes or technical arrangements in the Agreement, or should we say nothing?

Caglayangil: It should be stated in the Agreement that the annexes will be completed in three months. It is not foreseen that we could permit reactivation until the annexes are completed.

Secretary: But you will understand that it would be impossible for us to implement our side of the Agreement so long as the installations stay closed. Theoretically, at least, we would have to start implementing our side of the Agreement as soon as we obtained Congressional approval of the Agreement, while you waited for the annex for each installation to be completed before permitting resumption of activities at that facility.

(Lengthy discussion among the Turkish delegation at the table.)

Caglayangil: Mr. Secretary, I would like to have clarified exactly what it is we are addressing. I want to try to understand your point. Do you mean to say that the sequence of events will be like this: We will sign an Agreement, then you will submit it to Congress, where it will be ratified. On our side we will ratify at the same time, but what then happens to the installations if at that point the implementing agreements are not concluded? What do we do about resuming U.S. activities? Is that what you are asking? If you are discussing that, I must say that it would not be possible. (i.e. resumption of activities prior to conclusion of the annexes.)

Secretary: No. Let me clarify. There is a Greek lobby in Congress which knows that this Defense Cooperation Agreement will lift all remaining restrictions on arms to Turkey. They will use every device to delay Congressional approval of the Agreement. The more things we put into the Agreement about additional annexes, understandings, etc., the more opportunities we give them to delay. If we put in a clause



saying there are a number of annexes that will be concluded in three months, Ambassador Esenbel's good friend Mr. Brademas, who is invited to the Turkish Embassy all the time, will simply say "Let's wait three months to see what is in the annexes. It looks like another secret Agreement by Kissinger. Let the Congress see what the annexes are before we vote our approval." Actually, I am changing my mind. I think it might be best to go back to Monroe Leigh's suggestion. We could agree in effect to exchange letters of acceptance. We could put the Agreement to Congress and let it begin looking at the Agreement. If, in the meantime, the annexes have not been concluded, simply don't send us your letter of acceptance, and you will not be considered to be breaking the Agreement. If the annexes are completed, then send your letter. If we put anything else in the Agreement implying that there are arrangements or agreements still to be concluded, that will give Congress an excuse to await the whole package. Then the thing will be pushed aside because of the Presidential campaign, and Congress will never act. Let us put in language talking about an exchange of acceptances. No one will know exactly what that means.

Caglayangil: What you have said about references to annexes appears in Article XXII. In fact, there are several references to annexes in the Agreement.

Secretary: Then we will have the Working Group take them out.

Caglayangil: I agree.

Secretary: We should have the Working Group organized so as to get to work right away when we finish. Is there anything left to discuss?

(Laughter)

The only question left has to do with assistance levels. We ought to be able to discuss that and also settle the Cyprus problem before going to see the President. Am I wrong? Should we leave the Cyprus problem to settle tomorrow?

Caglayangil: Tomorrow. We have made progress this afternoon in a way conforming to all the requests of the Secretary. Then I take it that tomorrow will be my day and that you will accept whatever I say?

Secretary: Shall we discuss the assistance level today, or do you want to leave that until tomorrow?

Caglayangil: No, today.

Secretary: I want to explain candidly how we have approached the assistance problem. We needed a figure that would have some chance of passing Congress, a figure that would relate in some manner to our historic assistance figures for Turkey. It would, of course, be possible to write any figure one chooses into the Agreement, but it would not get through Congress. That would be a humiliation for both of us. Our approach has been to try to see what the best is that we can do and

then give it to you frankly, rather than make it a matter of long negotiation. That is how we approach the matter now. First, before turning to the basic assistance figure, we have discussed some additional things we might do to help Turkey meet its defense responsibilities. As regards military equipment, we have already proposed to make available T-38's, F-100's and one intelligence facility.

Yavuzalp: Karamursel.

Secretary: Yes. There are some other things we could do that we have not previously mentioned. We could provide 36 helicopters, a submarine rescue ship, two destroyers, the LORAN Navigation Station at Kargaburum, and give you access to the U.S. satellite communications system.

Macomber: We have advanced the date on access to the communications satellite.

Secretary: Yes, that is right. We are advancing that date by two years. In addition, I think we can get the ExIm Bank to do something for Turkey—about \$50 million per year over five years.

Esenbel: For what purpose will the ExIm loans be? Defense?

Macomber: They will be oriented toward projects designed to help you with your own balance of payments.

Secretary: That's right, they will be oriented toward projects of that kind rather than toward defense. We can offer you a combination package of grant and FMS of \$250 million. That is the best we can do.

Esenbel: Does that include the ExIm figure?

Secretary: No, without ExIm. That is the highest we can go. We have really made a major effort. I think that your Ambassador, who knows conditions here, will agree that we have made a major effort. He won't say it here, but he can tell you privately. Most of my advisers felt that I should make this offer to you somewhat more slowly, but I have given it to you directly as the best we can do. Do we already have a clause in the Agreement establishing annual defense consultations?

Hartman: No.

Caglayangil: I am not a technician. I understand Ambassador Macomber indicated to Mr. Elekdag earlier that the U.S. Government is prepared to provide F-100's to replace some of our old F-100's.

Secretary: Yes, that is right. That is not new, we have mentioned it before.

Caglayangil: This offer created anxiety and a strong negative reaction in the Turkish armed forces. They told me the age of the F-100 airplanes, and I was surprised to find they are nearly as old as I.

Secretary: Yes, but these aircraft were on the list the Turkish Air Force provided us.

Sisco: Yes, it was our understanding that the Turkish Air Force intends to use them for spare parts. These items are from your list. That is why we have offered them.

Caglayangil: Of course, everyone tends to compare his military forces with those of neighboring countries. It is well known to you what aircraft are now in the pipeline for Greece. If you could arrange with us an aircraft swap of some sort to permit us to modernize our aircraft, we might be able to make progress.

Secretary: What are you suggesting? That you give us old F-4's for new F-4's?

Esenbel: No, he is suggesting that we give you F-100's for F-4's. You have something like this with Spain.

Secretary: That is different. F-4's were supposed to be exchanged for F-4's. We don't have any need for F-100's.

Esenbel: Frankly, why not consider doing something with F-4's? F-100's have little life left.

Caglayangil: We really can't discuss F-100's, because we can't modernize our Air Force with F-100's.

Secretary: When you get \$250 million FMS you can buy F-4's.

Caglayangil: To modernize our Air Force, we would have to allocate all that money for F-4's.

Elekdag: We have an obsolete Air Force. All the NATO countries are phasing out their old aircraft and replacing it with new. We propose to give back to you F-100's and F-84's in return for Phantoms.

Secretary: The problem is that we have no use for F-100's and F-84's. Hence it does not do us any good to get them. Is there any way we could use them?

Clements: No.

Elekdag: Even if the Phantoms were not completely new, they would be acceptable to us.

Caglayangil: This issue has very important implications for us because it will be taken in Turkey as an indication of the degree of importance the U.S. attaches to Turkey.

Secretary: Wait a minute. The purpose of providing you the F-100's would be to allow you to use them for spare parts so that you could make operable the F-100 squadrons you now have. If you had \$250 million in FMS you could then purchase the newer aircraft, the F-4's. The Deputy Secretary of Defense tells me that he would see to it that the delivery priorities on the F-4 were shuffled in such a way that you would get early delivery. Isn't that right, Bill?

Clements: Yes, we could see that at least a symbolic number of F-4's are delivered at an early date.

Secretary: Now on the T-38's . . .

Elekdag: The Turkish Air Force says it doesn't want T-38's.

Secretary: You asked for them.

Elekdag: Well, they say they don't want them.

Macomber: They were on the Turkish Air Force list of requirements.

Caglayangil: Frankly, when we spoke to the Turkish Air Force about T-38's and F-100's, they were disillusioned, dismayed and disconcerted. We want to modernize our Air Force. We can't do it that way. We cannot modernize our Air Force by spending \$250 million.

Secretary: You can't buy modern planes with \$250 million?

Elekdag: What the Minister means is that \$250 million is not enough for modernizing our Air Force. This is not the solution we expected.

Secretary: But you will have \$250 million every year of the Agreement. That is double the assistance being given to you now. You will have the money. In addition you could get two destroyers (*sic*), 36 helicopters and \$50 million from ExIm. We can't do better than that.

Esenbel: Mr. Secretary, can't you make an effort to replace our F-100's? They would not have to be new planes. They could be planes your Air Force is using now.

Secretary: I think we just don't have them. Isn't that the problem?

Clements: Yes. But what F-4 program does Turkey want? I have never understood it.

Esenbel: We want used planes, not new ones, to replace our older aircraft.

Clements: Yes, but in any case you would be paying for them under FMS.

Esenbel: We want a trade like the one you have worked out with Spain.

Secretary: But in the Spanish case, it was a swap of aircraft that they had for ours.

Hartman: Yes, we would have been able to use the F-4C's.

Clements: How many aircraft do you think you need?

Elekdag: I told Ambassador Macomber that we need four squadrons of F-4's.

Clements: How many aircraft are in your squadrons?

Elekdag: Twenty planes per squadron, a total of eighty.

Clements: You wish to make this change over what period of time?

Elekdag: Four years.

Secretary: You could use the FMS funds. How much is actually involved?

Clements: We would have to calculate. You don't want eighty used F-4's, do you?

Esenbel: Yes, used, as in the Spanish case.

Hartman: What the Spanish were prepared to return to us we needed.

Esenbel: The Spanish are shifting to the F-16. Our objective for now is to phase our Air Force into the F-4. We would be able to explain to Turkish public opinion that the U.S. had given us the additional assistance of used aircraft to modernize our Air Force.

Secretary: We have to go to the President now.

Clements: Let me work on the problem. I will see what can be done and report early tomorrow morning.

Secretary: The Deputy Secretary of Defense proposes to work on the problem. We will have an answer first thing in the morning.<sup>2</sup> In the meantime, shouldn't the working group get started now? I must get the Foreign Minister over to the President.

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<sup>2</sup> At the follow-up meeting on March 25 at the Turkish Embassy, Kissinger offered 14 planes over the next 4 months: 6 within 90–120 days of signing the agreement, 4 in the subsequent 120 days, and 4 in another subsequent 120 days. (Memorandum of conversation; *ibid.*)

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## 241. Memorandum of Conversation<sup>1</sup>

Washington, March 24, 1976, 5:03–5:50 p.m.

### PARTICIPANTS

*Turkey:*

Ihsan Sabri Caglayangil, Minister of Foreign Affairs

Amb. Melih Esenbel, Turkish Ambassador

Sukru Elekdag, Secretary General, Ministry of Foreign Affairs

Amb. Ercumet Yavuzalp, Director General for International Security Affairs

*U.S.:*

President Ford

Dr. Henry A. Kissinger, Secretary of State

Amb. William Macomber, U.S. Ambassador to Turkey

Brent Scowcroft, Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs

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<sup>1</sup> Source: Ford Library, National Security Adviser, Memoranda of Conversations, Box 15, Ford Administration. Secret; Nodis. The meeting was held in the Oval Office.

President: I wish to welcome you here, Mr. Foreign Minister. You have been here a number of times.

Caglayangil: Please excuse my English. It is very poor.

President: I am very pleased to have you here. I know that Secretary Kissinger has discussed matters in detail with you.<sup>2</sup> I hope that you will convey to the Prime Minister my best regards.

Since I haven't had a chance to discuss your talks with Secretary Kissinger, Henry, will you review them for us?

Kissinger: We discussed six issues. We resolved five of them and there is no reason to go into detail on them. The remaining issue is the level of assistance and the type of equipment we could make available. The level of aid we proposed is \$250 million a year and perhaps \$50 million of Export-Import credits. We can't frankly do any better, because we couldn't get it through Congress. We discussed selling equipment at reasonable prices—like F-100's and ships. They don't need F-100's, though, and Clements is looking for ways to loan them more modern ones or something else.

Caglayangil: As Secretary Kissinger says, we have resolved five out of six issues. We have not agreed on the level and scope of assistance to be provided to Turkey. I am sure you know that from the Adriatic to the Sea of Japan, Turkey is the only democratic regime in a sea of authoritarian regimes. Our per capita income now is about \$600. We have to maintain a defense budget of about \$259 per capita, and improve our economy, and do it while maintaining human freedom. The people at times abuse these freedoms and make it difficult for the government.

Turkish-American relations are going through a crisis and there are those who would take advantage of this crisis. Support for our defense forces is an integral part of our difficulties. The antagonists of NATO or of Turkish-American relations always bring forth the aid that you provide to Greece or places like Egypt or Iran. Dr. Kissinger says you can't increase aid past \$250 million and I am afraid this will not be satisfactory to the Turkish public. I told Secretary Kissinger today that if he had difficulty with the American Congress, we could modernize the Turkish armed forces through a swap deal.

Kissinger: The problem is it won't work—like trading F-100's for F-4's. The problem is we don't have any F-100's left in the US Air Force.

President: We would have a terrible logistics problem, since we don't have any.

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<sup>2</sup> See Document 240.

Caglayangil: I appreciate that. We are just trying to find a way out. Let me assure you that whether we come to an agreement or not, we still have great esteem for our relations with the United States. We have not forgotten the assistance from across the Atlantic when the Soviet Union made its demands on the three provinces and the Straits. That is why I do not see any serious implications in the discussions we are having. We will certainly try to develop our alliance relationship.

I bring you very warm greetings from my President and my Prime Minister—who cherishes pleasant memories of meeting with you. When previously I was Foreign Minister, we came to this country and paid a visit to the American President. To greet the American President in Turkey would be a great honor and give us much pleasure. If I could receive acceptance, it would be the greatest gift I could bring back.

President: I greatly appreciate the invitation. It would be a great honor for me to go there. I unfortunately have never been there and I will maximize my efforts to visit. We unfortunately now have some elections coming up, but I assure you that after November 2nd, if things go as I expect, I will certainly make every effort to visit Turkey. I would like very much to have the Prime Minister visit this country. I really enjoyed my meetings and discussions with him and I hope you will convey the invitation to him.

Caglayangil: I will do so.

President: I will leave the negotiating details to you two, but since I have been President, I have made every effort to show how important are our relations with you. I have discussed point six with Dr. Kissinger. We have gone really as high as we can possibly go, and I hope that you will discuss it further with Secretary Kissinger and make every effort to reach agreement. It would greatly facilitate all our proceedings.

Caglayangil: We have followed how consistently you have defended U.S.-Turkish relations, especially with the Congress. We have no complaints whatsoever. If the American Government and Congress don't see eye to eye, that is an internal American problem. Obviously we can't explain that to our public. This problem is not peculiar to the American scene. We also have that same problem. The Turkish Constitution grants the right of amnesty only to the Grand National Assembly, but nevertheless, it has been granted by various of our governments to terrorists, etc.

The whole American picture has been evaluated in Turkey as if what has been done has been the act of the government. This is in fact where we find ourselves.

President: We hope that in this election we would get strong support from our people and get some changes in the Congress. Cooper-

ation has gotten somewhat better in the past several months, but the real turn will come in January.

I just want to reiterate that we want to commit ourselves as deeply as possible to improving our relations and we have extended to the utmost our efforts to reach a satisfactory agreement. I wish you well in your discussions with Secretary Kissinger.

Caglayangil: I wish you well in the election. I don't pretend prophecy, but only wishes. If the Congress can be improved, that is in the best interests of both our countries.

President: What is the status of your discussions with Greece over Cyprus?

Caglayangil: It is like a wound which needs medical attention. It can't be left the way it is. The important thing is to break the connection of American aid to the solution of that problem. While I accepted most of the Secretary's proposals on the five issues, my objective was this point.

Turkey and Greece historically must know how to live together. The only way to do that is to sit down and talk. We think we have a good chance with the Karamanlis Government. Cyprus is the key to our relations. Here there are two obstacles—Makarios is one, and this linkage is the other. Makarios is a complicated element—so much that we can't solve the problem with him or without him. It is hard to get a proposal accepted by the Greek Cypriots which Makarios opposes.

Kissinger: The problem is which side will put forward the territorial proposal. Neither side wants to do it first, for good reasons. Any proposal either one puts forward is likely to become a domestic issue. I will talk to the Foreign Minister about some procedural ways we might attack it.

Caglayangil: The Greek Cypriot negotiator promised his views on territory within six weeks and the Turkish negotiator promised to respond within 10 days. They will meet again in May. Then they will form two subcommittees: one for territory, and one for constitutional questions. I think this is a hopeful procedure.

President: I hope this would move as you indicate. It raises serious questions here when there is no movement, so this would be helpful.

Caglayangil: I have done my best to encourage Denktash and have told him he can say yes, but to tell me only when he plans to say no.



**242. Memorandum of Conversation<sup>1</sup>**

Washington, March 26, 1976, 1 p.m.

SUBJECT

The Secretary's Meeting with Turkish Foreign Minister Caglayangil

PARTICIPANTS

*Turkey*

Foreign Minister Caglayangil

Ambassador Esenbel

*U.S.*

Secretary of State Kissinger

Ambassador Macomber

Assistant Secretary Hartman

The Secretary: I just wanted to cover in a smaller group<sup>2</sup> two important issues. I wanted you to know that we are going to have a major domestic problem on the Cyprus question in the absence of anything concrete happening. Obviously if there was a prospect of progress that would be best. I was wondering if I should ask David Bruce to visit Ankara, Athens and Nicosia to speak with the parties and see if he could help to bridge the territorial issue.

Foreign Minister: I have a very great problem of presentation. If Ambassador Bruce as a retired NATO Ambassador pays calls in a number of NATO countries this would make it easier for me.

The Secretary: No, he would have to be either a representative of the Secretary of State or the President specifically on this issue to do us any good here domestically.

Foreign Minister: That would certainly cause a reaction in Turkish opinion. If it could be done privately, I think that would be all right.

The Secretary: It must be official or it won't help us. We need this for our public.

Foreign Minister: Let me see what I can do when I get back to Ankara. I will certainly try.

The Secretary: I can't tell you how much it would help us. As you know, David Bruce is a good friend.

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<sup>1</sup> Source: Library of Congress, Manuscript Division, Kissinger Papers, Box CL 275, Memoranda of Conversations, Chronological File. Secret; Nodis. Drafted by Hartman and approved in S on April 30. The meeting was held in the Secretary's office.

<sup>2</sup> Kissinger and Caglayangil had met with a larger group in the Secretary's conference room at noon. (Memorandum of conversation, March 26; *ibid.*) Kissinger and Caglayangil signed the U.S.-Turkish Defense Cooperation Agreement on March 26. (Department of State *Bulletin*, April 19, 1976, pp. 503–504)

Foreign Minister: Yes, I know he is a good friend and I know that you need something like this for your own public relations so that you can show you are active on this issue.

The Secretary: This will be especially important while Congress is considering our new agreement.

Foreign Minister: I will let you know but it would certainly be better if Cyprus is not the only problem he discusses. If he could be sent out to talk about restoring US-Turkish relations.

The Secretary: Maybe I could make him my adviser for conditions in the Eastern Mediterranean.

Esenbel: Maybe you could even send him to Beirut.

The Secretary: Now let me mention the second point. On the Aegean it is of the utmost importance that you show the greatest restraint so that there are no provocations. I do not wish to get into the middle of the debate on the substantive issues.

Foreign Minister: This is a very delicate matter and I hope you will use your influence with the Greeks as well.

The Secretary: I certainly will.

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### 243. Memorandum of Conversation<sup>1</sup>

Washington, July 29, 1976, 10:40–11:37 a.m.

#### PARTICIPANTS

President Ford

Dr. Henry A. Kissinger, Secretary of State

Brent Scowcroft, Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs

Bulent Ecevit, Former Turkish Prime Minister, Leader of Republican People's Party

Amb. Melih Esenbel, Turkish Ambassador to the United States

Amb. Hasan Esat Isik, Republican People's Party Foreign Affairs Advisor

[The press came in for photos. There was small talk about Ecevit's being Secretary Kissinger's student, and the fact that the President had spoken before the Kissinger seminar, too. The press then left].<sup>2</sup>

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<sup>1</sup> Source: Library of Congress, Manuscript Division, Kissinger Papers, Box CL 283, Memoranda of Conversations, Presidential File. Secret; Nodis. The meeting was held in the Oval Office.

<sup>2</sup> All brackets are in the original.

The President: When did you enter parliament?

Ecevit: 1957. I had to leave here to campaign.

The President: First let me apologize for the incident in New York [the assassination attempt by a Greek Cypriot]. I assure we will do our best to ensure it will not happen again.

Ecevit: Thank you, Mr. President. These things can happen anywhere. The security has been fine and they risked their lives for me—otherwise I might have been killed.

The President: We are delighted to have you here. I would be interested in your comments on our mutual interests, and I'd like to hear your suggestions for how we can improve things.

Ecevit: I would like to thank you for receiving me and for what you and Dr. Kissinger have done to maintain the ties with Turkey against domestic pressure. That has been the major influence in calming the Turkish people over the situation. The Republican People's Party is doing its best not to inflame the situation.

My general observation is that the Turkish people have always been independent, so they are very proud, and any government which appears too pliant is opposed.

For that reason, when I was in power in 1974, I am sure Dr. Kissinger would tell you we were not an easy ally. But in 1974, the Turkish people developed friendly attitudes toward the United States and NATO. There were no slogans and no anti-American demonstrations.

Kissinger: That is why the tragedy is that we couldn't move decisively in 1974 soon after the Cyprus crisis.

Ecevit: We had problems which developed within my coalition and I had to leave office in November and cancel Dr. Kissinger's trip because I couldn't deliver on my promise.

The President: Tragically, it has been more than two years now. We have irrational elements in this country on Cyprus. But I have done my best to maintain friendly relations without regard to domestic concerns. I just hope we can find a way out.

Ecevit: Yes. I asked to form a minority government because I thought if the problem wasn't solved right away it would be more difficult. The new Government inherited my coalition so they weren't able to make many moves. I had been critical of the Government and urged them to make some conciliatory moves. Then, of course, Makarios returned to Cyprus. I have the feeling the Greek Government is losing its interest in a solution to Cyprus, and they can't influence Makarios. So all of these things conspire to make movement difficult, and the longer it goes the more difficult it becomes. I had a plan in 1974, but it no longer applies. If we win in 1977, we will put forth a plan. Of course, the Greeks are intransigent because they think they can get American and Western support.

The West appears to be aware of only the Cyprus problem between Greece and Turkey, whereas the major problem is the Aegean. Greece is laying claim to the whole of the Aegean—she has used NATO missions to reinforce that claim. They have been making seismic exploration in the Aegean without opposition. When I came in, we asked for discussions to solve the problem. The junta said there were no problems because the Aegean is theirs. So we sent a seismic ship out. Greece objected and we said, “So, let’s talk.” They refused. The Greeks have used their public relations skills on the issue to make it appear one-sided in favor of Greece.

The President: Haven’t both sides agreed to submit it to the ICJ?

Ecevit: The Greeks proposed it. My Government thinks it is important to have talks first.

This is a big issue between us. What the West should do is to induce Greece and Turkey to negotiate all our problems simultaneously, but separately. In that way, things could get going. I mentioned it to Waldheim who thought it had merit.

The President: Under the UN, or bilaterally?

Ecevit: Bilaterally. The UN has no role now in the Aegean except to give friendly support for talks. The other point is the West shouldn’t appear as if they support the Greeks against Turkey. Particularly the U.S. should keep equidistant between Greece and Turkey.

If I could, I would like to mention our difficult problems. I spoke yesterday with Congressional Armed Services Committees.

The President: How did it go?

Ecevit: I am not filled with optimism. I didn’t have the impression they were sure the treaty would pass.

The President: We are forthrightly in favor of it.

Kissinger: Did you tell them what the consequences would be?

Ecevit: Yes. But we must be careful. We aren’t volatile like the Greeks, but when we act responsibly we don’t get the publicity.

Demirel makes sour statements which may sound a little dangerous—like leaving NATO or warning of the consequences. I never say anything like that. I say that whatever happens, that is no reason to leave NATO because it is important for many reasons. I have kept my party in line on this issue. I don’t think the Eastern Europeans would be happy if we left NATO. They can’t say it, but we feel it.

The President: Romania or Yugoslavia?

Ecevit: Yes, and even further.

But if the treaty fails we would have to develop a new NATO relationship. We couldn’t go on as in the past. Turkey would crack under it. Our defense expenditures are the highest in NATO. I have given

this explanation to the Congress and told them they have been proven wrong on their predictions about Turkey. On the poppies, for example. The UN has investigated and said there is no opium leakage.

The President: I am dedicated to pushing the Turkish Treaty.

Kissinger: Frankly, I think the Greeks are trying to delay to prevent the Turkish Treaty from passing. I think we must separate them and push the Turkish Treaty.

The President: We will do whatever is needed.

[The Turkish press comes in for photos. Secretary Kissinger leaves. The Turkish press leaves.]

The President: Why don't you tell me a bit about the Turkish domestic situation?

Ecevit: There is a terrorist campaign from the extreme right, which is protected by some of the Government parties. By one party directly and by the Justice Party indirectly. There is a danger of militant counteraction from the left. We are trying to calm our party, but we have no influence on the extreme left. There have been 50 or so students killed and the terrorists are protected. Now they are penetrating the labor unions. I think all of this is being done because the conservative parties in power are different than those of the West. In the West, all of them are dedicated to the rules of the game. In developing countries, the conservatives fear democracy.

Nevertheless, I am confident of the future of the democracy in Turkey. We have a good constitution, an independent judiciary, a free press, a free labor movement, and a strong opposition party. Our Army has a tradition of intervening—right or wrongly—when it sees the country in trouble, but it has never wanted to rule. Now it is, thankfully, very reluctant to intervene in any way.

May I say frankly that in Turkey, many people suspect indirect CIA involvement in covert actions in Turkey.

The President: They must be approved by me and it is not and will not be done.

Ecevit: I believe whatever you say. As you know, such operations sometimes have a life of their own. I hesitate to mention it, but I thought you should know.

The President: I am glad you mentioned it to give me a chance to go on the record. There is absolutely no truth to the stories.

May I reemphasize the importance we ascribe to good bilateral relations with NATO. This Administration will maximize its efforts to maintain good relations and to contribute to a strong NATO. We must do our share—especially with Congress, with the Treaty and to keep them from taking ill-advised action as they have done in the past. On the other hand, it is important that Turkey do its best to resolve the

Cyprus problem. We understand Makarios' game. Cyprus is a cancer which is harmful to this Administration or to any U.S. administration. To the degree you can help in opposition, I hope you will work for progress. October, 1977 is a long way away. I hope to win in November.

Ecevit: I hope so.

The President: I plan to, but I have reason to believe Carter might be pro-Greece.

Ecevit: I know. I have seen his statements. I wish you well this fall. We know who our friends are.

The President: Can you have elections earlier than October 1977?

Ecevit: Only by an absolute majority of the Parliament.

#### 244. Memorandum of Conversation<sup>1</sup>

Washington, July 29, 1976, 2:20 p.m.

##### SUBJECT

Meeting with Former Prime Minister of Turkey, Bulent Ecevit

##### PARTICIPANTS

###### *US*

The Secretary

Mr. Hartman

William L. Eagleton, EUR/SE (notetaker)

###### *Turkish*

Bulent Ecevit

Ambassador Esenbel, Turkish Ambassador to the US

Hasan Isik, Republican People's Party Advisor (RPP)

Alev Coskun, RPP Advisor

Orhan Kologlu, RPP Advisor

Secretary: Hartman told me about his conversation with you yesterday when you thought we had given Greece a guarantee on the Aegean. This is not our understanding. We are opposed to provocation from either side. We told the Greeks this is not a guarantee.

<sup>1</sup> Source: Library of Congress, Manuscript Division, Kissinger Papers, Box CL 276, Memoranda of Conversations, Chronological File. Secret; Nodis. Drafted by Eagleton and cleared in S on August 27. The meeting was held in the Secretary's office. This meeting followed a luncheon that took place in the Secretary's dining room at 1 p.m. (Memorandum of conversation; *ibid.*)

Ecevit: The statement seems to have created an impact on Greece. The United States wants Turkey to make conciliatory moves. Turkey wants to do research on the Aegean seabed and they hope to find something there. Greece considers this provocative.

Secretary: We would have to take a decision whether or not this is a provocation.

Ecevit: Yes, but the Greeks will interpret it as such.

Secretary: We told the Greeks that the proclamation of a twelve-mile limit would be provocative. I would not want this to be known in public.

Isik: We were puzzled by the exchange of letters with Bitsios.<sup>2</sup>

Secretary: But we would be prepared to exchange letters with Turkey. Right, Art?

Hartman: Yes, but the law is unclear.

Esenbel: When Caglayangil was here, we did not talk about the Aegean.<sup>3</sup>

Ecevit: Would it not be useful if the United States stated that a solution can only be reached through negotiation?

Hartman: There remains the problem of the Court.

Ecevit: The mention of the Court indicates the futility of negotiation.

Secretary: It is natural for your two countries, if negotiations fail, to go to war. I have been reading a book about the Greek struggle for independence.

Ecevit: If we could convince Greece to negotiate, we could get somewhere, but if the Greeks think they have the backing of the West, there will be problems. The two states should come together at a higher political level and then experts could work out details. The first thing is to accept the principle of negotiation. If you could make such a remark . . .

Secretary: I think I could do it, but not say *only* negotiations.

Esenbel: You should not refer to the Court. You can say it should be solved between the two sides but that negotiation does not preclude going to the Court if they fail.

Ecevit: There is a question of timing. The small Turkish ship is about to go out. If in the next few days you could make such a statement, it would help.

Esenbel: When I was in office, the Greek Ambassador said there was nothing to negotiate about because they had all the islands.

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<sup>2</sup> See footnote 2, Document 64.

<sup>3</sup> See Documents 240–242.

Hartman: The Court could be a cover for beginning of negotiations.

Ecevit: No, it would indicate no interest in negotiations.

Isik: If after taking the islands Greece demands the seabeds, it is too much.

Ecevit: After the war Turkey made no claim on the former Italian islands. Now the Greeks are using the islands to demand the whole airspace and seabed.

Secretary: Are they willing to put the airspace to the Court?

Hartman: They are settling that through other channels.

Isik: The twelve islands belonged to us. Now they belong to them. When the Soviets acted in Cuba, you reacted to it. We are in the same position.

Hartman: The Greeks realize there must be some kind of negotiations.

Ecevit: But they accept negotiations only to prepare for the Court.

Hartman: They could use that to cover negotiations, to seek a solution.

Esenbel: I got the Greek commitment to talk about it, but Caglayangil saw them and got nowhere.

Ecevit: I don't think you have to mention the Court. Negotiations are going on all over the world to settle disputes.

Secretary: But there are not so many islands there. It is different when it has to do with the seabed.

Isik: I was impressed by what President Ford said about keeping good relations with all countries. During World War I we tried to find good relations, but the Greeks felt they had the support of the West and that Turkey should be Greek. We don't mind losing the twelve islands because there was no conflict between us. It is now a political question not a legal one. If we can settle the Aegean questions, relations between Greece and Turkey will be clarified.

Ecevit: Geological and economic zone principles would support our claim.

Secretary: Are the Greeks not interested in negotiations on Cyprus now?

Ecevit: They could be forced to negotiate if they had the right atmosphere. If negotiations on Cyprus and the Aegean were simultaneous, one move would bring another.

Secretary: Never have I seen so many negotiations begun with talk about the right atmosphere and then fail.

Ecevit: You cannot expect much with Makarios back and Clerides out. You cannot expect much between the two communities, but if the two mainland states negotiate, it would lead to a settlement.



Secretary: It is not going to be simple.

Ecevit: Not with the present Government in Turkey. The central thing is to begin a dialogue.

Secretary: If the Turkish elections came now, who would win?

Ecevit: Probably we would. At least we would be the strongest party.

Secretary: Do you think this can be maintained until October?

Ecevit: The present Government has subjected us to provocations from the extreme right. The economy is going bankrupt. Inflation is in two digits. We will certainly have a great change in the future.

Secretary: I am sorry, I must go to the White House and talk to the Republican ladies.

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## 245. Memorandum of Conversation<sup>1</sup>

New York, August 14, 1976, 10 a.m.

### PARTICIPANTS

*US:*

The Secretary  
Under Secretary Habib  
Ambassador Bennett  
Deputy Assistant Secretary Laingen, notetaker

*Turkey:*

Foreign Minister Caglayangil  
Ambassador Esenbel  
Under Secretary Tezel  
Ambassador Turkmen, Turkish notetaker

### SUBJECT

The Aegean Crisis

Kissinger: It is good to see you again Mr. Minister. The last time I saw you you had the flu. I hate to think what you would have gotten out of us at the time on the base negotiations if you hadn't had the flu.

Caglayangil: Thank you very much. I'm feeling fine now. We are watching your Presidential campaign with a great deal of interest. We

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<sup>1</sup> Source: Library of Congress, Manuscript Division, Kissinger Papers, Box CL 276, Memoranda of Conversations, Chronological File. Confidential; Nodis. The meeting was held at the Waldorf Towers, where Kissinger stayed while attending a UN Security Council session. He met with Greek Foreign Minister Bitsios earlier that morning; see Document 67.

have a Turkish proverb that reads: "when you cross a river, don't change horses."

Kissinger: That's a good proverb and very true. The situation has changed a good deal since around April when the President was clearly running ahead on all accounts. But it was at that time that the internal differences within his party began and that clearly affected the atmosphere.

Caglayangil: It's always a gamble to change the known for the unknown.

Kissinger: The present problems facing the President, an incumbent President, have happened only once before in this century; that was in 1932. Such a situation normally would not develop. But the combination of circumstances where Ford himself is not an elected President plus the bitter fight taking place within his party have contributed to a situation where he has been unnecessarily weakened.

I believe, except for these circumstances, he would have won the reelection easily. Even as it is, I believe he stands a much better chance than the press suggests. After all, Carter's primary victories were not that decisive when you analyze them one by one. So that an aggressive campaign could be successful on the President's part.

Caglayangil: Has there ever been a candidate from the South in US history?

Kissinger: Not really since the Civil War. That of course is an asset for Carter since it means that he has the South pretty much on his side.

Esenbel: What about Lyndon Johnson?

Kissinger: He was not a candidate from the deep South in the usual sense of the word. Johnson was also not a normal situation in the sense that he got his accession to the Presidency by succession as Vice President. Carter clearly has strength in the South, and in the North he has created the impression of being a liberal. This is probably true. I personally believe he is more liberal than Mondale. I don't consider that a compliment necessarily. But we may never find out what the facts are.

Well, Mr. Minister, we're here for one of our usual bouts. Couldn't you have kept the situation quiet for at least a year and saved our nerves a bit? Either that or send us 3 million Turks!

Caglayangil: Your assessment is right but you should have the point that the only reason we are here is because of the Greeks.

Kissinger: I have said substantially the same thing to the Greeks.

Caglayangil: To speak frankly, I am not disturbed at being here in New York. From the outset the Greeks have approached this problem from a different angle. It is a domestic problem for them. Public opinion is exercised because they have exaggerated the case and spoken in a threatening way about Turkey. Under the circumstances, I think that

instead of firing guns in the Aegean it is better that we fight our wars here.

This is due to the wisdom of Caramanlis. The Greeks had to do something; that is, their government did and this is the best way to proceed. I understand this. I understand it but I believe all the members of the Council recognize that the Greek case has no legal basis.

Bitsios came here and told the Council that he did not intend to discuss the juridical aspects of the case. But rather was approaching it on a political basis. But then he proceeded to base his comments on alleged juridical grounds. Now this is the area, this narrow strip of sea along our coast, that the Greeks tell us that they will kindly allow us to have. All the rest of the continental shelf is Greek! And the Foreign Minister tells us that justice and equity is on their side!

Tezel: So you see that if we follow the Greek thesis, this is how the narrow Turkish continental shelf would look like.

Kissinger: We have two problems, at least. The first is to determine the right dividing line of the continental shelf. The second is to establish the best procedure for determining that line.

Turkmen: The Minister would like to speak to those points.

Kissinger: But I'm afraid he will make so many concessions, as always, in the process of doing so that I won't get any credit!

Caglayangil: Yes, as usual.

Kissinger: It's a good thing our Ambassador in Ankara is not here!

Caglayangil: The Greeks say this is our continental shelf. We are quite prepared to say that they have rights in the Aegean but we do too. But our claims do not extend to the whole of the Aegean. We have a much more limited claim than that. But the point is that until now, neither Greece nor Turkey has come to agreement on a delimitation of exactly where the shelf is and to whom it belongs to. Clearly some areas are free of controversy and some of the areas are not. But what the Greeks have done is to say that you are free to conduct research but not in the areas that belong to Greece nor are you allowed to conduct research, you Turks, in areas that are controversial. When we asked why, they Greeks say that the answer lies in a 1958 Convention.<sup>2</sup> We must ask their permission before we undertake any research. Our answer is that we didn't sign that Convention.

But even the 1958 Convention states that areas of the continental shelf must be agreed to by delimitation and rights to use them established.

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<sup>2</sup> Reference is to the 1958 Continental Shelf Convention, which established the exclusive right of the coastal country to exercise sovereignty over its continental shelf for the purpose of exploration and exploitation of natural resources.

(Insistent ringing of a telephone in the suite interrupts conversation.)

Kissinger: In case that's someone calling to offer me the Vice Presidential nomination, I want to be sure I'm available! You know every President hates to have a Vice President around basically because all a Vice President is interested in is succeeding to the Presidency and probably wants nothing more than to see the President drop dead! I would be an excellent candidate, you know, as Vice President because the Constitution provides that a foreign-born citizen may not become the President. The Constitution does not prohibit a foreign-born citizen from being Vice President. So if I were Vice President, that would be ideal because I could not succeed and the President therefore would have no reason to be nervous about me. An ideal situation!

Caglayangil: Through the Greek Ambassador in Ankara I gave the following information to the Greek Government. I said the research that we will conduct will have no prejudicial impact on the legal rights of either country in the Aegean. Therefore, this should not bother Greece. It is clear that under the sea, we have rights to some of the continental shelf; you, the Greeks, do too. But for the present we don't know where those rights are and there should be no reason why either cannot therefore conduct research. We will not make any drillings from the surface. We shall only sail on the surface and make no physical contact with the shelf. As far as the surface is concerned, there is no Greek/Turkish difference as to the high seas.

You Greeks, I said, have some basis for your arguments that Turkey should not conduct research while we are negotiating. That in itself is a good argument. But we point out that there are 3,054 islands in the Aegean and if we accept the Greek thesis as to these islands each having a continental shelf of its own, then there will be only this narrow strip that I showed you on this map where Turkey would have rights. Turkey cannot accept this. I pointed out too that in the 1958 Convention, the concept of natural elongation out into the sea from the mainland is accepted. If we were to proceed from that thesis, then all of the Greek islands would belong to us.

Clearly, therefore, it is not possible to reach a settlement on purely legal grounds. This is a political matter and a settlement must be found in that context.

So we said that either we explore all of the continental shelf together or we make some kind of political bargain and come to a conclusion as to a delimitation of the shelf. There is no other way. We are prepared therefore to sit around a table for political bargaining. We say to the Greeks that you know the resources of the Aegean already. You have completed your research. But Turkey did not yet conduct its research and is only now doing this.

Kissinger: When did the Greeks do this?

Esenbel: They did it beginning in 1963. Even now they are doing drilling in the Thassos area. They have done nine drillings in that area.

Caglayangil: If the Greeks continue to be apprehensive about the research we are doing and this being a basis for a legal claim, I'm ready to make another announcement that our research will not prejudice anyone's legal claims or rights.

Esenbel: In other words, our research is not a claim to sovereignty.

Caglayangil: I explained all of this to the Greek Ambassador in Ankara. He replied that this explanation made sense to him and made him feel more comfortable and he would pass it to his government. So I said to the Ambassador, please do so. You can say to your government that the Turkish government gave you these assurances; therefore what Turkey is doing does not harm the claims of either government. If you will let me know if this is acceptable, I will not need to send any escort by the Turkish Navy with the *Sismik*. The Ambassador replied to me: don't worry; I will be your advocate.

Kissinger: He behaves like an American Ambassador!

Caglayangil: The next day he came back and said my government agrees to your approach providing two conditions are met. The first is that the full program of research by the *Sismik* should be conveyed to us in advance in detail, complete with coordinates etc. The second is that you will communicate to us the results of your research. Moreover your statement will indicate publicly what you have conveyed to the Greeks.

The Ambassador went on to say that in response, Greece would not escort or approach our ship but would only shadow it in various places.

I said to him these are not good answers. I said you are mad! I didn't ask you to get permission from your government.

Kissinger: Greek Ambassadors in Turkey have been killed for far less than that!

Caglayangil: I'm not afraid of Greek reaction and I don't intend to ask permission to do what we are doing. The Greek government made an important psychological error. I told him we cannot agree on anything with this kind of precondition attached. The Ambassador replied that I misunderstood. He said that he was not putting preconditions on this. He said let me talk to your experts concerning the assurances we seek from you and see if we can agree on them. I said while we would not accept preconditions, we would be prepared to talk about a statement that would be made about the *Sismik* sailing. So I sent him to see the Under Secretary and they worked six hours on a statement. During this time he was in permanent contact with Athens. But Athens insisted on a number of points that we could not accept. And we told them so.

The Greek Ambassador asked me whether we should consider this as a rupture in the discussions. I said no, that we were always ready to talk. But not with preconditions.

It was therefore clear that there was no possibility of an understanding on a statement regarding the *Sismik* and so we started our research.

The point is that the Greek claims have no legal basis. The *New York Times* says so. The State Department's legal experts say so. The British Government says so. So everyone agrees.

Kissinger: But of course you know the *New York Times* is always wrong!

Caglayangil: Of course officially you will say that you do not want to get into the middle of this.

Kissinger: That's because you and the Greeks have such a splendid record of settling problems between the two of you.

Caglayangil: We don't ask anyone to side with us. We ask only that our case be examined. This case is after all not so different from that between Iceland and the UK. They came here, to the Council, and the result was no resolution adopted by the Council but simply advice by the Council to the parties to try to resolve their problems.

I have seen the draft resolution<sup>3</sup> and I am told that the US agrees with it. When you look at the draft it seems innocent enough.

Kissinger: We have seen it but the point is that we have not taken any formal position on it.

Caglayangil: Yes, so we are told. As I say if you look at the resolution with a magnifying glass you will see the face of Caramanlis and the face of Bitsios. It is not a good idea for a resolution like this. This is the first time that any European question has been discussed in this fashion in the Security Council. I don't think we Europeans should confront each other in this manner over such a simple matter that should be resolved between the two of us.

Turkey simply cannot accept any resolution.

Kissinger: Any resolution?

How would it be if we simply endorsed your claim? Would you accept that?

Caglayangil: You know me; I'm always giving so many concessions in your office! We did not reject the idea of the Court. We spoke about this and are prepared to consider the Court. Caramanlis said let's come to some agreement on this. And he went on to say that even if

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<sup>3</sup> See footnote 2, Document 67.

we can't agree among ourselves, let's get a blessing from the Court that we would use with our public opinion.

We Turks, being nice people, didn't see this as another Byzantine scheme but now the Greeks claim that we have changed our minds. We have not done so. We are prepared to follow the agreement between us and Brussels of 1975; that is to try to agree among ourselves and then to go to the Court for its blessing. It may well be that we don't come to a complete agreement on the issue among ourselves. Okay, we will go the Court with those differences that remain. But not with the whole issue.

Now they have come up with another Byzantine scheme. They say let's go to the Court. We have a problem of public opinion. The Court's deliberation will take two or three years probably. Meanwhile we will negotiate bilaterally and see what we can do.

Each country regrettably has its Papandreou and its Makarios. We have our Ecevit! You know what he thinks after his visit here probably better than we do.<sup>4</sup>

Kissinger: No, that shouldn't be the case. Your Ambassador Esenbel was present during all our conversations.

Caglayangil: I have said something very important. Turkish public opinion believes that we have a very just case. If in such a just case our allies side with the Greeks and help them and the result is a resolution adopted against Turkey, this will be a great blow to Turkish/US relations and also to Turkish-Western European relations.

Kissinger: Let us first see whether this resolution is against Turkey. On first reading it didn't strike me that way although I have not studied it since I got it this morning.

Caglayangil: Will you allow me to explain our problems with the resolution.

Turkmen: In the first place it recommends a recourse to the ICJ. There is also reference to Greece's unilateral approach to the ICJ. We think any reference to the ICJ in view of Greece's unilateral approach is baseless and irrelevant.

Moreover, in the fifth preambular paragraph it qualifies bilateral negotiations in a way partial to Greece. This is not the kind of negotiations we are conducting. We prefer direct negotiations to settle the problem.

Kissinger: These are your major objections to the resolution?

Turkmen: We also have problems with operative paragraph one. This could be interpreted as supporting the Greek view regarding the

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<sup>4</sup> See Documents 243 and 244.

*Sismik*. There is also operative paragraph three where there is a general and sweeping statement about issues being referred to the Court, when in fact this is really a more general, political and even a security problem.

Caglayangil: We don't want a resolution. We want to proceed as was done in the Iceland/UK case. We have gone into detail on the resolution simply to describe how unilateral it is to us.

Kissinger: We didn't draft it. Nor did we clear it. Is it clear that we have not endorsed it?

Bennett: We have not endorsed it.

Kissinger: I was told that the Europeans had prepared it and had sent it to certain members. I discussed it with Bitsios and in general he is willing to go along with it.<sup>5</sup>

Caglayangil: Of course!

Kissinger: Let's put the resolution aside. If we can find a way out of this in some other way maybe we don't need a resolution. I talked to Bitsios alone. I told him our legal experts did not share the Greek view. But I don't want to get into a legal argument. We favor a settlement by political negotiations.

So Bitsios said to me alone that he had a private message from Caramanlis to me. You know what that means. It means that only about 5,000 people will know of it.

Caglayangil: Yes, at a minimum.

Kissinger: He says they are prepared to engage in political negotiations. They do not insist on going to the Court, they are ready to negotiate now.

Turkmen: Are they prepared to withdraw their request to the Council and to the Court?

Kissinger: No, they did not say that. I said I would be talking with you.

What they want is that neither side engage in research in disputed areas while you and they are engaged in political negotiations.

Caglayangil: If they had accepted my original proposal, we would have worked this out and we would have not sent the ship into disputed areas. But I could not say this publicly. And because they behaved so negatively in our discussions, our military people hardened their position and insisted on sending the ship. Now they are harassing our ship. They have harassed it by air within 140 meters and they have harassed it by sea within 20 meters of the ship. However, we have

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<sup>5</sup> See Document 67.



given strict orders to the ship and to our Naval vessels that there be no reaction at all to this. Yet they still continue provoking us.

Kissinger: Let us think now how we deal with this problem. Supposing we wrote a letter urging both sides to begin negotiations on the subject of delimitation of the continental shelf. I don't know if the Greeks would accept. I wanted first to find out if you would. The letter could also urge both sides not to engage in activities in disputed areas that would in any way disturb negotiations. If you were prepared to do this on this basis, you would be in effect not yielding to Greece but yielding to our suggestion. It would be keeping the ship out of disputed waters which after all is what you wanted to do at the outset.

Caglayangil: It is not possible for the Turkish government to accept any clause to stop or precondition this research. We have to continue research activity. But no one knows very well where the disputed areas are, so the Greeks perhaps could give us a map showing where the disputed areas are. I could take it to my government and say look we won't enter these areas. But another problem is the Greek unilateral approach to the ICJ. So during my conversation with the Greek Ambassador I asked him where are the disputed areas? He declined to do so or to reply.

Kissinger: They won't give you such a map because it would tend to question their own claim. But they may give us a map on their claims.

Caglayangil: We can't accept that and I can't give them a map from the Turkish side. If I do so that means I tend to accept some of their claims.

Kissinger: Can we give you a map showing you where we think the disputed areas are?

Caglayangil: (shrugs his shoulders)

Kissinger: I'm trying to find a solution to this problem.

Caglayangil: I can agree on this much. You go ahead and urge the parties to resume bilateral negotiations. But there can be no resolution from the Council. Meanwhile you indicate to me some disputed areas. Don't do it in your letter. Put it unofficially to us. I'll take this to my government and note that these areas are very sensitive.

Kissinger: You mean like the sea of Marmara!

Look we are friends and you know no matter how confidentially we treat this kind of thing, the Greeks will make it public in one way or another. I could agree it shouldn't be done as a part of the letter. It could be done separately and confidentially. But in practical terms it would still get out. Nonetheless it will get out as something that is not your decision. The point is I have to tell the Greeks something as to how we go about resolving this.

Caglayangil: In that case maybe it's best to not get involved at all. Our relations are already bad and it is not good to do anything to worsen them.

Kissinger: We cannot have another war in the Aegean. We would get involved anyway then but the point is we cannot have another Turkish/Greek conflict.

Caglayangil: We have no intention of going to war. If the Greeks want war, that is another matter. They are the ones that are militarizing all of the islands. No one says anything in response to this. All we are doing is sending a small research ship into the area.

Kissinger: You can take the question of militarization of these islands to the Security Council if you want.

Caglayangil: We are not going to play games with the Security Council for any purpose.

Kissinger: Let me understand where we are before we get too far into this. If the Greeks are ready to start negotiation with provision for ultimate reference to the Court and if we give you some idea of those sensitive disputed areas separately in some fashion then would you be prepared to take this into account in future voyages of the *Sismik*.

Caglayangil: Well, Mr. Secretary, my military people remind me that the Greek Ambassador on the 9th of August when he delivered the second Greek note said that the Greeks were ready to resume high level political negotiations if the Turks were prepared to stop the sailing of the *Sismik*. So your proposal has already been communicated to Turkey. Now we find ourselves talking about the same thing. I said to the Greeks then under instructions from my government that we would be prepared for talks even tomorrow but we would not be prepared on the basis of preconditions. We cannot deviate from the research we have underway.

Kissinger: But then what were you saying earlier to me when you said that if we gave you some idea of particularly sensitive areas for the Greeks that you would be prepared to take this into consideration?

Caglayangil: I said I would try to get my government not to include these areas in their research program.

Kissinger: Fine, I'm not saying you should stop the ship.

(There then ensued intensive discussion in Turkish between Caglayangil and his advisors.)

Kissinger: Let's not fight among ourselves!

Esenbel: Here's our reply.

Kissinger: First I suppose he says to go to hell!

Esenbel: First they should withdraw their request to the ICJ. Secondly, you could write a letter saying that the only solution is through political negotiations and that both sides should take this route. Thirdly,

you could indicate to us in some very informal fashion, perhaps as a piece of paper that was found on the street, those areas particularly sensitive as far as future sailing by the *Sismik* is concerned. We would then take this into consideration in the future course of the *Sismik*.

The Minister is not committing his Government. You said the Greeks might leak this. If they do that then we would go directly into the areas that were indicated as sensitive. But if they don't leak it, then I might be able to prevail on my government.

Kissinger: Let me make a point. I'm afraid enough of calm Turks! But angry ones I cannot take! We cannot say there can be only political negotiations. After all you too agreed on the ICJ approach at one time. So if we write a letter we would have to say something about the ICJ. We would have to say that the talks are intended to delimit the area and to find some formulation to have recourse to the ICJ on those points where there is no agreement. You don't want to bring in the Court at the outset but I can't send a letter or take a position that focuses only on negotiations.

Caglayangil: We should be prepared to go in good time jointly to the Court.

Kissinger: I don't know whether this approach would be possible. I will have to talk to Bitsios. I understand your point.

Caglayangil: In essence what we need to do is to save Karamanlis from the impasse he's gotten into. We are all entering into a big gamble which could have a bad effect on the whole Western relationship.

Kissinger: I understand.

Caglayangil: The situation could result in that that followed an earlier LBJ letter.<sup>6</sup> The Council should simply urge Greece and Turkey to resume negotiations. Then we could go off to Switzerland or to some such place. Perhaps we can agree on a meeting somewhere in Europe.

Kissinger: As a practical matter, I doubt we can have a situation where there is no resolution and no progress of any kind of the Council. It is possible to have progress and no resolution. But I don't think we can have nothing happen here. Do you agree Tap?

Bennett: Yes I agree.

Kissinger: Nor am I anxious to get in the business of a US letter. It will not in any event be a threatening letter. That's what the LBJ letter was and that's why we had trouble with it. If you can meet here with Bitsios and work this out between you that's fine too.

Caglayangil: Why do we need a resolution?

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<sup>6</sup> Reference is to President Johnson's letter of June 5, 1964; see *Foreign Relations*, 1964–1968, vol. XVI, Document 54.

Kissinger: Well, we can have a discussion if you want about what should be in the resolution. My view is that you have established the principle of your right to do research in the Aegean in the disputed areas. You have already been in there twice and the principle is well established. Secondly, if the Greeks now would also agree not to go into disputed areas then the definition is already practically established. Thirdly, if you can get negotiations started then you get what you have wanted. It would seem to me that Turkey has not lost under those circumstances.

My concern with the resolution is that even if we get one agreeable to everyone then the problem still remains. We would still have the problem of getting negotiations. So I want to go straight to the issue of talks. I'm not wild about a resolution.

Esenbel: The Minister says there was a similar case between Iceland and the UK. Why does the West have to go out of its way to please the Greeks with some face-saving resolution?

Kissinger: Look, it may be possible for the Council to wrap this up successfully. All I say is that it is not possible to have neither a resolution nor progress. I have not myself had spectacular success in getting Greece and Turkey to agree on anything previously!

(There then ensued a further discussion among the Turks.)

Kissinger: Could I hear what you are talking about?

Esenbel: The problem is that this is a very hard political question for Turkey. The Minister didn't come here to negotiate with the Greeks or to bargain.

Kissinger: Look, if you can't say you're willing to negotiate . . .

There are only two possible approaches it seems to me. In the first place, if there is no political prospect for talks or for a consensus approach, then there will be a resolution. We will have to take that into account. But remember that you are not the only ones with political problems. We have them too. The President faces a convention next week in Kansas City. He can't take on all the Greeks in the United States next week. So you should know that we cannot veto a resolution. Some reality has to be put into this.

Caglayangil: I came to this post from a political career. You see I had no training as a diplomat.

Kissinger: Well I came in as a professor!

Caglayangil: I would like to explain my position very clearly. If I had said in Ankara okay, we will stop the sailings in the disputed areas, then there would have been no need to come to New York. But the Aegean sea doesn't belong to Greece. Turkey cannot accept directives from Greece. We can't accept anything that appears to suggest that we are being authorized by Greece to do what we need to do.

Kissinger: I'm saying that both sides should agree not to engage in research . . .

Caglayangil: But the point is that they have already done their research.

Kissinger: You've done it too. If they now agree that they will not engage in such research doesn't that strengthen your case? Doesn't that strengthen your argument that it is a disputed zone?

Caglayangil: But we need to know what the natural resources of the area are.

Kissinger: You said yourself you could get this from satellites.

(To Habib) This isn't getting us anywhere.

Caglayangil: I have another idea. Why don't Greeks give us their results from their research and say that we can have it. Then maybe we can accept the situation.

Kissinger: As far as the US is concerned, we can go on playing the game in the Council until we have a situation where no one knows who proposed what. Then there will be some sort of resolution and that is a situation perfectly possible for us. I should think a resolution wouldn't be all that favorable to Turkey. I can't say what we would do then; it depends in part on our political situation. I can say we won't veto. But then where are we? Nowhere. We won't get into a middle of a war. You have your political problems, but we have ours. We're going for negotiations one way or another. How we get there doesn't matter. It seems to me we have an agreement already on the general principles; i.e. there are political negotiations necessary and that there are sensitive areas.

We are not going to be driven by the Europeans on behalf of Greece or indeed by the Turks into a totally passive situation. (A further long discussion ensued among the Turks.)

Caglayangil: I thank you for your frankness. I want to make things clear from the Turkish viewpoint. First we believe we are right in our research activity. So if it leads to an armed clash so be it. But it also relates to the relationship between big and small powers. You must take your position from your point of view.

Esenbel: We will not be the cause for any escalation.

Kissinger: Let me understand correctly. A half hour ago I understood you to say that you would agree to take into consideration that there are sensitive areas, provided the Greeks would say that they are ready for political negotiations.

Esenbel: That's right. And he will suggest this to Ankara.

The solution is for the President of the Council to make a statement. It could say that the members have listened to the statements of both sides. He understood they were prepared to resume negotiations

and would be prepared to refrain from any action that might aggravate the situation. The President would say that in this way the Council believes that the problem could be solved. The result would be that the Council would have acted similarly to what it did in the Iceland/UK case.

Caglayangil: Then I will try without committing myself after this appeal from the Security Council to get my government to agree to resume negotiations. I would also seek to get them to agree not to conduct research in areas that might cause difficulties. These would be areas that you would find some way informally to indicate to us. Perhaps your dog could be the emissary!

Now I cannot take this kind of idea to the full Cabinet or to the National Security Council. I will need to arrange it more privately with the Prime Minister and with the Chief of the General Staff.

Kissinger: I understand. Let me have a private talk with Bitsios and we will ourselves work on a consensus statement. But we will not discuss this with any other foreign government for the present.

Caglayangil: It is vitally important that the Greeks neither directly or indirectly disclose any of this.

Kissinger: If they do we will understand the actions that you may feel you then have to take. This assumes of course that you yourselves will not leak any of this.

Caglayangil: Of course.

Kissinger: I know you are a man of honor and we have no reason to think that you will do this.

Turkmen: It must be clear also that the appeal by the Greeks to the ICJ is withdrawn.

Kissinger: The way to do that is that you will say that you will negotiate to develop a joint approach to the ICJ.

I will talk to Bitsios alone to reduce the risk of leaks. We don't want to do anything that would embarrass Turkey. We will also speak to the French about their going ahead with their resolution drafting without sufficient consultation with us. This is an intolerable situation.

I agree that a resolution alone is no real solution. No matter what language we agree on the problem would remain.

Turkmen: Can we sum up. You will talk to Bitsios about what we have talked about. There will be agreement that the Council would wind the session up with a statement by the President.

(Mrs. Kissinger enters the room and there is a five minute interruption.)

Turkmen: It will be implicitly understood that the President of the Council would exhort both parties to resume negotiations and to

refrain from any unilateral activities that would aggravate the situation. Meanwhile you will make available, sort of like dropping it on the street, a suggestion to us as to areas particularly sensitive as far as the *Sismik* is concerned.

There needs also to be an understanding that would encompass the point that Greece would drop its approach to the ICJ.

Kissinger: All right. That's my understanding too. I will now go to Bitsios and see him alone. I'll come back to see you then and then I will see my psychiatrist!

You guys have so complicated the Cyprus problem that no one can understand it and now you're doing it to the Aegean.

What shall I say to the press? I propose I say that we have welcomed efforts on the part of the parties to seek a peaceful solution. I will say we had a good review of the situation and that we favor a peaceful solution and that I expect to get in touch with the Greek side to see what might develop.

Caglayangil: But don't use words that suggest that you are being too much of a mediator.

Kissinger: I will say simply that I am trying to help but that we are not putting forth proposals of our own. Now tell me, why shouldn't I be seen as a mediator. Am I that unpopular in Turkey?

Caglayangil: Not at all, you are very popular in Turkey.

We need also to know what happened to the Defense Cooperation Agreement.

Kissinger: Hearings will start in the Senate in early September, within a week or two after the Congress returns from the Convention recess.

Caglayangil: But are you intending to seek its approval before the elections?

Kissinger: We will fight for it. Certainly we will get it through the Committees. That's the most important thing. It depends really on how long the Congress sits.

Esenbel: Well the difficulty is that they come back on the 23rd of August and then there is another recess from September 2 to 7 so probably not much will begin until after the 7th.

Kissinger: I'll give you an answer after Monday.<sup>7</sup> Certainly there will be congressional action on the Senate side before October 2.

Esenbel: The problem is on the House side.

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<sup>7</sup> August 16.

Kissinger: Let me check on Monday. I will give you an answer next week.

Caglayangil: The most important thing is US/Turkish relations. If another problem is to develop now it would be bad.

Kissinger: You know my friendship for Turkey. If we had been left alone in 1974 we could have settled the Cyprus problem then.

Caglayangil: Well, we never doubted your good will. Even after the elections I believe you will be my partner.

Kissinger: Don't say that to my friends here in the room from my side. Their morale will go down!

Caglayangil: The election is not unlike the Truman situation.

Kissinger: The analogy is good. And after the elections, the President will be in a stronger position to deal with issues such as these.

I will call you on Tuesday or Wednesday about the DCA after talking with McCloskey.

(The Foreign Minister and the Secretary then went into the hall and met with the Press. The foregoing conversation resumed at approximately at 1:40 pm, again in the Foreign Minister's suite.)

Kissinger: I have now talked to Bitsios alone. I have shown him a consensus statement along the lines you indicated might be acceptable. He understood completely the matter concerning the designation of certain sensitive areas regarding the *Sismik* and he understands that this must be kept secret. If not, Turkey would be forced and expected to resume the activity of the *Sismik*.

As far as the consensus statement is concerned, he said he did not have the authority to accept it but would get in touch with Karamanlis and be back in touch with us tomorrow. He asked whether we were supporting the European draft of the resolution. I said that if it goes that way we would want a chance to discuss it and to see what we could support.

This is our position. We will see what views can be taken into account. If we are forced to a resolution we will probably have to support it. I didn't tell him that; but I am telling you.

I said that this would have to be a matter of discussion. We would have to take into account the views of other parties whom we have not yet consulted.

Caglayangil: What are your views about the resolution and about the situation? Is the situation such that I call Demirel now?

Kissinger: I would wait until we have an answer from Bitsios. The third point that they want is that they need to have some kind of reference to the ICJ, as a minimum. They say they can't have a consensus statement that doesn't even mention that.



Turkmen: Will they withdraw their unilateral approach to the ICJ? The way it would have to be formulated is that negotiations are designed to lead to a joint approach to the Court. It would also have to be understood that negotiations have to be substantive, meaningful, and political.

Kissinger: He said of course it was quite possible that negotiations will leave an area that will have to go to the Court. Of course if you settle everything it wouldn't be necessary. But he certainly did not exclude the Court.

Caglayangil: So the President would include all of this in his consensus statement?

Kissinger: I told him, that is Bitsios, that I would discuss this with you. He has to discuss it with Karamanlis. He knows Karamanlis cannot accept it without some reference to the ICJ.

Caglayangil: By what formula?

Kissinger: That surely can be negotiated if the Greeks buy the principle. We shouldn't now try to negotiate the formula. Perhaps the way to do it would be to say that the Greek appeal to the ICJ has been put into abeyance or some such thing.

Caglayangil: I thank you very much.

Kissinger: I will call him again on this.

Turkmen: I am not a lawyer but my understanding is that once such a thing is put to the ICJ a process begins to run.

Kissinger: I'm sure we can clear this matter up as soon as I leave here, which I fear will be in about four hours! (The Secretary to Habib: They don't seem to appreciate my sense of humor!) I will call Bitsios on this point.

Caglayangil: I thank you so much.

Kissinger: I do think it dangerous to go to Demirel yet. We don't yet have a clear answer. Ambassador Bennett will report to me tomorrow as soon as the Greeks reply.

(There then ensued some discussion between the Turks and the Secretary concerning telephone numbers where he could be reached on Sunday.)

246. Memorandum of Conversation<sup>1</sup>

New York, September 29, 1976, 9:30 a.m.

## SUBJECT

Secretary's Meeting with Turkish Foreign Minister Caglayangil

## PARTICIPANTS

*Turkey*

Foreign Minister Caglayangil  
 Ambassador to the United States Esenbel  
 Permanent Representative Ilter Turkmen  
 Mr. Ecmel Baratu  
 Mr. Daryal Batibay (Interpreter)

*US*

The Secretary  
 Under Secretary Habib  
 Assistant Secretary Hartman  
 Nelson Ledsky (Notetaker)

The Secretary greets Caglayangil and photographs are taken.

The Secretary: How are you, Mr. Minister?

Foreign Minister Caglayangil: You seem in a terribly happy mood this morning.

The Secretary: I always smile when I see my friends.

Foreign Minister Caglayangil: How are you? I know you have just completed a very difficult trip to Africa.

The Secretary: I am fine. But you have already given yourself away. You will have to admit before the press that you speak good English.

What are we going to do for the rest of the UN session now that I understand you and the Greeks are about to settle all your differences?

Foreign Minister Caglayangil: Without you, we can't settle anything.

The Secretary: You want me to settle your problems? Why not? Everyone likes to yell at us. So why not the Greeks and Turks?

Foreign Minister Caglayangil: I am glad to see you for two reasons . . .

The Secretary (to Habib): Don't you think our Turkish friends deserve a cup of coffee?

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<sup>1</sup> Source: Library of Congress, Manuscript Division, Kissinger Papers, Box CL 277, Memoranda of Conversations, Chronological File. Secret. Drafted by Ledsky and cleared in S on October 3. The meeting was held in the Secretary's suite at the Waldorf Astoria. Kissinger was in New York to attend the UN General Assembly session.

Habib: Yes, I think we can arrange it.

Foreign Minister Caglayangil: I wanted to thank you for your assistance in connection with the recent Security Council action on the Aegean. You also deserve to be congratulated for your impressive record in Africa. You have done much to liberate those still under colonial rule.

The Secretary: If I am not mistaken, you have liberated quite a few nations in your time yourself.

Foreign Minister Caglayangil: Since our time is short, I would like to give you a summary of where we stand on the Aegean.

The Secretary: Before you tell me what concessions you are prepared to make, let's have some coffee. As you know, my schedule this morning is such that after you leave, I have to see a delegation from SWAPO, then I see Bitsios.<sup>2</sup> After that, a psychiatrist will have to wheel me away. Now for your capitulation.

Esenbel: Why have you scheduled the Africans in between the Greeks and the Turks?

Foreign Minister Caglayangil: Let me recapitulate. After the Security Council resolution in late August,<sup>3</sup> we agreed to cut back the *Sismik's* sailing program. We hoped this would enable negotiations to begin immediately, and certainly before the General Assembly convened in New York. The Greeks said they could not begin discussions until the *Sismik* had returned to port. We had no alternative but to accept their view.

We also asked the Greeks to withdraw their request for interim measures before the International Court of Justice. They did not accept our recommendation. Now, after the initial decision of the ICJ,<sup>4</sup> we have asked the Greeks again to withdraw or suspend their case. If you recall, you had told us in New York that it was possible to suspend a case before the ICJ. Our lawyers had informed us to the contrary. Now the Greeks agree with us, namely, that suspension is impossible.

The Secretary: You were right. I was wrong.

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<sup>2</sup> See Document 69.

<sup>3</sup> On August 25 UN Security Council Resolution 395 passed by consensus. It appealed to Greece and Turkey to exercise restraint, urged a reduction in tensions, called for direct negotiations, and prompted appropriate judicial means, particularly the ICJ. (*Yearbook of the United Nations*, 1976, p. 321)

<sup>4</sup> On August 10 Greece filed an application in the ICJ against Turkey requesting, among other things, that specified Greek islands be entitled to the part of the continental shelf appertained to them. On September 11 the Court, voting 12–1, did not find the breach of Greece's rights such to cause irreparable prejudice to the rights at issue. Therefore, interim measures by the Court to protect Greece's right were not required. (*Yearbook of the United Nations*, 1976, pp. 813–814)

Foreign Minister Caglayangil: Now we say the Greeks should withdraw their unilateral case before the ICJ and begin to negotiate in good faith.

The Secretary: My understanding is they simply want to delay the Court's consideration of the matter and that this would be similar to a suspension.

Foreign Minister Caglayangil: This is not a serious Greek position.

The Secretary: The Greeks are apparently willing to take up to nine months to submit their memorandum which the Court will request. Then, if you take an additional nine months to submit your reply, there will be some eighteen months between now and the time the Court takes up the jurisdiction question.

Foreign Minister Caglayangil: Since the Greeks can make an application any time they wish—any time the negotiations falter or break down—I don't see why they cannot withdraw their case now. The gimmick of delay is not to be taken seriously. The Greeks should not joke with Court procedures in this way.

The Secretary: I believe it is Greek domestic politics. Of course, I know this is hard for you to understand since you have no domestic political problems.

Foreign Minister Caglayangil: Every country has its domestic problems. Every state has problems with its domestic opposition.

The Secretary: Not every state has an Erbakan inside its government.

Foreign Minister Caglayangil: Other countries have problems with coalition partners.

The Secretary: I am in a different position. In our country the only support I have is outside the Government.

Foreign Minister Caglayangil: As you know, Mr. Secretary, I had a talk earlier this week with Foreign Minister Bitsios<sup>5</sup> at his request. Our discussion concerned the Aegean. He made it clear that he could not accept our appeal that Greece withdraw its case before the ICJ. He said we could negotiate during the delay between now and the time the Court considers the case. He said we should first take up bilateral questions, the continental shelf and air space issues. If we made progress in these areas, then we could move on to other questions.

The Secretary: What questions would be left?

Foreign Minister Caglayangil: Cyprus.

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<sup>5</sup> Bitsios summarized this meeting during his later conversation with Kissinger; see Document 69.

The Secretary: Do they want to settle Cyprus now? I didn't think they have shown much interest in being involved recently.

Foreign Minister Caglayangil: They speak for the record, so as to make clear that Cyprus is not pushed aside. At the same time, they made clear that at this stage they do not want to take up the Cyprus issue. Bitsios then proceeded to ask me a series of questions about our sincerity and our willingness to negotiate a solution to Aegean problems.

The Secretary: What did you say?

Foreign Minister Caglayangil: I recalled to Bitsios that I had been seeing him off and on for two years. Each time we met, he always asked the same questions and set the same Greek preconditions. I suggested to him that the time had come for the two of us to talk in detail without notes or advisors for two or three days and see if we cannot come up with a set of agreements.

The Secretary: I suppose then the survivor could publish the results. (Laughter.) I know that if Ambassador Macomber were here, he would have had a heart attack by now. He claims you have no sense of humor, and that I drive you crazy with my jokes. As a matter of fact, I don't joke with the Greeks.

Foreign Minister Caglayangil: You treat me the way you do because you know how thick my back is.

Turkmen: That is an old Turkish expression.

The Secretary: Leaving aside for the moment the question of where the negotiations are to be conducted, what can be negotiated on the Aegean?

Foreign Minister Caglayangil: This is the question I put to Bitsios. I asked him whether he expected to settle our Aegean problems through bilateral negotiations. He said no. In the view of Athens the positions of the two sides are so far apart that only the Court can decide. But the Court is not a technical agency which is capable of delimiting a continental shelf. So, in my view, we must open a debate between us as to how the Aegean should be delimited.

The Secretary: How do you think the Court would rule on the substance of the Aegean dispute? Don't the Greeks want to go to the Court because they believe they would win the case?

Hartman: I think it is clear that the Greeks believe that the law is more on their side, but there is some understanding that there is equity in the Turkish position as well. Our guess is that the Court will cite the law and ask the two parties to negotiate the equities.

The Secretary: Well, why not let the Court come to this conclusion? What would either side have to lose?

Hartman: Of course, no one can be sure exactly what the Court would decide.

Foreign Minister Caglayangil: I am ready to let the Court make its ruling. I am not afraid of the Court. Indeed, I am beginning to think that the Greeks are proposing delays because they may fear what the Court will decide. In my own view, we should move on to have joint exploration of the Aegean and then delimit after we know what is present in its waters. We could send out a joint boat to explore.

The Secretary: That will be a happy ship!

Foreign Minister Caglayangil: After the exploration, there would be a common understanding of where we are—what is important and what is unimportant.

The Secretary: The Greeks have not rejected this, have they? I had the impression from my conversation with Tzounis in Souda Bay last week<sup>6</sup> that they might be prepared to undertake some joint exploration if one could decide in advance what the disputed area was. Isn't that your impression, Art?

Hartman: No. I believe the Greeks want to settle the boundary question first before any kind of joint exploration is considered.

Foreign Minister Caglayangil: My position is clear. I want negotiations to get started. But the important question is what are we to negotiate and to what purpose? They only want to begin negotiations in order to have them fail, so they can cite the failure in going back to the Court. I want to settle the issues. As you know, the Aegean air space question is all but settled. One or two more meetings may be required. They do not want to meet on this question now unless there are also parallel talks on the continental shelf at the technical level. I don't want technical level talks at all. I want the talks to begin on all subjects at the political level. This is the only way anything can be accomplished. Two days ago, I met with Bitsios. He did most of the talking and I did almost nothing but listen. I told him then that I would respond to his proposals on Friday.<sup>7</sup> What I have just told you now, I will tell him when I meet him on Friday.

The Secretary: What should I tell him when I see him later this morning?

Foreign Minister Caglayangil: I would be happy if you could tell the Greeks to put aside their formalistic concerns, to set out with us to find a settlement. They must be told to sit down to negotiate seriously with us, to look at the security and political aspects and adopt an open mind in questions related to equity.

The Secretary: Can the two sides agree on where the disputed area is?

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<sup>6</sup> See footnote 5, Document 69.

<sup>7</sup> October 1.

Hartman: Yes. One of the problems, however, is that the Greeks seem to know where the resources are and the Turks do not.

Turkmen: That is not the point. What we want to do is to delimit and provide for the utilization of the entire Aegean. We are not talking here about a small area.

The Secretary: Your idea then, as I understand it, is to divide the Aegean in half down the median line and then make some special arrangements for the islands.

Turkmen: Yes, in a crude way, that is our position.

The Secretary: My understanding from my discussion with Tzounis last week was that the Greeks would accept joint exploration in the disputed zone, but it has never been clear to me where that disputed zone is.

Foreign Minister Caglayangil: In some parts of the Aegean, we favor joint exploration. In others, there ought to be separate arrangements whereby each side can exploit his own resources. In other words, our position is that either the whole Aegean should be divided in a manner satisfactory to both sides, or the whole Aegean should be jointly explored.

The Secretary: But excluding the territorial waters of the islands.

Foreign Minister Caglayangil: Yes, except for the islands.

Esenbel: The Greek position is totally different. They want the continental shelf fixed starting from the Greek islands, that is, that the islands are the base point from which the continental shelf with Turkey is calculated. That is what we cannot accept. About resources in the Aegean, I am no longer sure that the Greeks know more than we do. We both applied to the same institution in New York in the hope of obtaining maps showing resources in the Aegean, so I would say we are about even in this regard.

The Secretary: I don't believe the Greeks will ever agree to joint exploration and exploitation of the whole Aegean. As far as I am concerned, having heard the position of the Greeks, such a notion would be out of the question. At the same time, however, I have learned in dealing with our friends in the eastern Mediterranean to let things cook a little. Several weeks ago, for example, I could have sworn we had developed a better result in New York than was eventually worked out ten days later in the Security Council. I would have thought the Greeks would have been far better off had they accepted the proposal we talked about then. But, they seem happy with the Security Council resolution, and so my judgment on these matters must somehow be faulty.

Foreign Minister Caglayangil: No, you are right. The Greeks would have been better off to have accepted the earlier compromise you discussed. Moreover, look at Cyprus. As you know, we had proposed a

cantonal system in Geneva. They would have been feasting in Athens today if they had accepted our proposal then.

The Secretary: You are right. That is one negotiation I permitted to get away from me. I never did understand completely what occurred. One thing is clear—we underestimated British incompetence. Of course, you, too, would have had a heart attack if the Greeks had accepted your proposal. You made your offer knowing the Greeks could not accept, since they would then have voluntarily given up the northern third of the island.

Esenbel: We had indicated a five-cantonal arrangement.

Foreign Minister Caglayangil: This is all beside the point now. Perhaps I could ask a few questions. You will recall that last time we discussed the American elections, I told you I thought Ford had a greater chance of winning than most Americans thought.

The Secretary: I told you then I agreed.

Foreign Minister Caglayangil: I still believe he will win the election.

The Secretary: That is my conclusion also. We have polls which have not yet been published which show Ford ahead by one or two percentage points in the country as a whole. If one figures in the fact that Carter is some 10 percent ahead in the South, the President is clearly ahead everywhere else in the country. I personally now think Ford is going to win. I perceive no big event coming along that could possibly help Carter. Once you begin sliding, unless there is some big event to turn it around . . .

Foreign Minister Caglayangil: If there is a big event, I would think it would work to the detriment of Carter.

Hartman: We would not want you to produce such an event.

Foreign Minister Caglayangil: Another question. In his speech yesterday before the General Assembly, Soviet Foreign Minister Gromyko spoke of the situation concerning arms build-up south of the Soviet Union. What specifically was he referring to?

The Secretary: I have not read his speech. Did he talk about demilitarizing and disarming the areas in the southern Mediterranean?

Turkmen: He didn't go quite that far.

The Secretary: Can someone get me that portion of the Gromyko speech?

Foreign Minister Caglayangil: My problem was that I didn't quite understand what Gromyko said. His speech was in English, but it was so poorly translated that I am not completely sure what he was talking about. My impression is, however, that it contained a threat and a warning to the Soviet Union's southern neighbors.



The Secretary: I will just have to read it before commenting.

Foreign Minister Caglayangil: Another point. Is a Turkish-US Defense Cooperation Agreement stalled? At one point this month, I thought there was some movement, but it is now your view that we can obtain nothing until after the elections.

The Secretary: Yes, that is correct.

Foreign Minister Caglayangil: How soon after the elections?

The Secretary: Immediately after Congress returns we will put great pressure on the legislature to get the agreement through. It is now my turn. I have one question for you. Early in our conversation, you said that without our assistance there could be no settlement. What did you have in mind?

Foreign Minister Caglayangil: What I have said many times before, that Greece will not be flexible on the open issues between us until Congress acts to approve the US-Turkish Defense Cooperation Agreement.

The Secretary: Well, I am sorry to say this will not be possible until Congress returns.

Esenbel: Couldn't the President call back the Congress before January 7?

The Secretary: He could, but I think that would be most unlikely.

Esenbel: Then not until after January 7.

The Secretary: I would have to say so.

Foreign Minister Caglayangil: There was one further small issue. It is saddening to me how the recent discussions in the General Committee of the United Nations turned out on the issue of the Cyprus agenda item. All we wanted was to enable the Turkish Cypriots to have an equal voice with the Greek Cypriots in the debate. Unfortunately, you decided to be silent in this matter and in the end abstained on the final vote. Right after the vote, the issue of South Africa and apartheid came up, and your delegate urged that the matter be referred to the Special Political Committee so that all the parties to the dispute could be heard. This is exactly the position we wanted for the Turkish Cypriots. So we do not understand why you take one position on an African matter and another on Cyprus.

The Secretary: I didn't know we were taking this position with respect to apartheid. It was probably the missionary band in the State Department—the retired clergy in the African Bureau. On substance, we agreed with your position, but could find no one else to vote with us. I issued instructions that if the Western Europeans would join us, we would vote with you. Unfortunately, I was told that they all dropped out.

Turkmen: The Germans and the Japanese would have voted with us if you had.

The Secretary: My perception is that we were the last one to give in—that all others gave in before we did.

Hartman: That is correct. The EC-9 decided to vote together and abstain. Once that decision was taken, there was no hope. Germany gave up, as far as we knew, before the UK, who were the last to wither.

Turkmen: The problem was you waited too long. If you had decided two days previously to vote no, we could have gotten eight or nine votes with you. But that is water over the dam now.

Foreign Minister Caglayangil: What should we say to the press when we leave this morning?

The Secretary: We cannot announce a settlement until after I have seen Bitsios. I suppose that we should say that we discussed the Aegean, Cyprus, and bilateral questions, that we had a friendly and useful exchange, that the United States is prepared to do what it can to assist the parties in making progress on their open issues.

Foreign Minister Caglayangil: That is fine with me.

The Secretary: Let me walk you to the elevator.

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#### 247. Telegram From the Embassy in Turkey to the Department of State<sup>1</sup>

Ankara, November 8, 1976, 1225Z.

8462. For Eagleburger and Hartman. Subj: Future Course of US/Turkish Security Relationship.

1. The failure of the 94th Congress to approve the new US/Turkish Defense Cooperation Agreement (DCA) prior to its early Oct adjournment<sup>2</sup> may turn out to have more significant consequences than as yet sensed either by the Congress or by many Turks.

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<sup>1</sup> Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy Files, 1976. Confidential. Repeated to Istanbul, Izmir, Adana, Athens, Nicosia, USNATO, USNMR SHAPE, USDOCOSOUTH INTAF Naples, EUCOM, and the Department of Defense.

<sup>2</sup> The Senate Foreign Relations Committee considered S.J. Res. 204, which implemented the DCA, in September at the request of the Ford administration in order to show Turkey that the process to restore bilateral relations had begun. No action was taken on the resolution prior to adjournment. (*Congress and the Nation, 1973-1976*, Vol. IV, p. 888)

2. If the Congress had endorsed the DCA before adjournment the Turkish Parliament would almost certainly have soon followed suit, thereby again placing the presently threatened US/Turk military partnership on a stable foundation. Some months from now we may find ourselves looking back on last summer as a lost opportunity which may not come back to us again. This is not inevitable; matters may not take such an unfortunate turn. But it is a sufficiently real possibility as to require that we take clear note of it at this time—and make a major effort to avoid it.

3. A key to the problem is timing. Even if the next Congress endorses the DCA, the effort to restore our relationships here can still fail. It can fail because of the congressional action's not coming soon enough to avoid the pre-election campaign which we will soon be headed into here in Turkey.

4. The Turkish general elections have to be held not later than next October, and they may come as early as this coming spring. As in the United States, the Turkish political campaigns begin many months before election day and once this period is under way, the Parliament's tendency is to put off controversial legislative actions until after the election. Acting at least in part on this same principle, the Congress has delayed action on the DCA until mid-winter at the earliest.

5. Even if President Ford had been re-elected, it would appear from our vantage point here that it would at best have been problematic as to whether completion of congressional action on the DCA could have been achieved by a mid-winter time period. With the arrival of a new administration, it would appear that this would be even more problematic. Presumably, any new administration would wish to re-examine the DCA before deciding the stance it would take respecting it. After weighing current circumstances—and our basic interests—in the Eastern Mediterranean, however, I would very much hope that the new administration will decide to endorse this agreement as it is presently written and seek early congressional approval. But even if it should decide to do this, there is still the danger that in competition with the many other problems the new administration must face, this decision will be delayed to a point where mid-winter congressional action becomes an impossibility.

6. An additional factor is the timing of USG–GOG agreement on a new US/Greek DCA.<sup>3</sup> It is possible that the conclusion of this agreement may be delayed until some time after the new administration takes office. If, as we assume, the new administration will wish, if it is

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<sup>3</sup> See Document 64 and footnote 3 thereto.

at all possible, to go to the Congress with both agreements at the same time, this could cause further delay in seeking congressional action on the US-Turkish DCA.

7. While deadline predictions are especially risky, it would appear to me now that if the Congress has not completed action on the DCA by mid-March, it will then be too late for the Turkish Parliament to act on it prior to their own election campaigns. If I am correct in my assumption that the elections will be next fall rather than next spring, this means that Turkish parliamentary action will be delayed for the better part of an additional year. Moreover, it is likely to mean that the agreement itself will become an important and controversial issue in the campaign. For the longer the Congress delays action on the DCA the more likely it is that the political opposition to the Demirel government (and increasing segments of the Turkish public) will become committed to the defeat or renegotiation of the DCA, and/or that the Demirel government itself may collapse or be defeated, thus leaving the DCA with no sponsor. All this in turn means that by November 1977, when the election is over and the Turkish Parliament has reconvened, there can be no assurances that the agreement can still be passed by the Parliament, even though today it would be passed without very much difficulty—and once passed would cease to be either a major or current issue here.

8. In addition, the longer we delay in putting back on a solid basis the US/Turk relationship, the longer we add to the risk of serious Greek/Turk confrontations—confrontations which could eventually be of a character to threaten prospects for restoring military partnerships with either Turkey or Greece.

9. We have considered what the situation would be here if Congress did not complete action on the DCA before the Turkish political campaign started but did give its endorsement sometime after the campaign was underway. This would perhaps have a marginally beneficial effect in reducing the political contentiousness of this issue in the campaign, but only a marginal one. It would also give us the opportunity to argue that all the shut down installations should immediately be reopened. (Turk negotiators in Washington last March said that these installations would be reopened immediately after favorable congressional action, but that was before the GOT decided that the agreement also had to be put through its own Parliament.) Unfortunately, however, I believe that the GOT could not agree to do this prior to its own Parliament having acted, particularly in the midst of a hard-fought political campaign.

10. Possibly the consequences of delayed congressional action could turn out to be less serious than the foregoing suggests. If Congress should continue to vote significant military assistance levels to

Turkey in the interim, both governments could end up muddling through an extended additional period of uncertainty. It is also possible, although I think unlikely, that in the intervening period, international and/or Turkish domestic developments would not rule out congressional and parliamentary approval roughly 13 to 15 months from now. To count on this, however, is a high-risk course indeed.

11. It is also possible that having found that we can get through one additional year or somewhat more without an agreement (but with continuing military assistance appropriations), we could then continue to get along in the years thereafter, still without either side having acted formally on the DCA. Again this would be a high-risk course, but it is a possibility that cannot be ruled out altogether. Should we end up following this latter route, we would have to insist on the opening of most of our closed down installations. We might not need to insist on all being reopened but certainly most of them must be allowed to function if the flow of our assistance is to continue. Even if our relationship could limp along in this way, however, it would be seriously plagued by the absence of all the key administrative and other vital arrangements which have been so carefully battled over in the DCA. Eventually we would have to work out, formally or informally, substitute arrangements which are not likely to be as desirable or workable as those embodied in the present DCA.

12. Another course that the new administration may examine is the negotiating of a new DCA, or at least the entering into of new negotiations designed to amend the present DCA—while insuring that at least the present level of military assistance continues to flow while this process is under way. The serious danger here, however, is that such an action would continue to invite all the basic risks of delay noted earlier. It also risks our ending up with either no agreement or an agreement less advantageous to us than the present one.

13. Still another approach would be to adopt the position of a number of congressional critics, i.e., that the DCA should be pressed with the Congress only when there is substantial progress in the Cyprus situation. Any public attempt to use this kind of open leverage on the Turks will be as unwise and unsuccessful in the future as it has been in the past. It will not produce progress on Cyprus. It will only hasten the deterioration of the US-Turk security partnership. On the other hand, the Turks have an even greater security stake in restoring the US-Turk partnership than does the US. If they can, without a display of public duress, be pushed into a more flexible and constructive stance on the Cyprus problem, this could help immeasurably with the Congress and thus help also Turkey's own security position. For the basic reasons repeatedly spelled out in the Embassy's earlier reporting, this will not be easy to accomplish. In a separate message, however, we will

be commenting on how a new effort in this regard might most effectively be mounted.<sup>4</sup>

14. Regardless of whether such an effort can succeed, however, the basic point of this message remains: namely, that failure to get early congressional endorsement of the new DCA risks the continued deterioration and disintegration of the US-Turk security partnership. Given the importance of this partnership to the world strategic balance and to US security interests, it therefore seems to me that it is essential that the present administration make a major effort to convince the new administration of the need to move the DCA through the Congress in the early weeks of the next congressional session.

15. Otherwise we may find that inadvertently, but quite possibly irrevocably, we have lost a military partnership which, in our own security interest, we simply cannot afford to lose. This is not to suggest that if the partnership does disintegrate the Turks will switch sides in the Cold War. Initially they will probably not leave NATO. What will take place, however, (along with a probable increase in Greek-Turkish tensions) is (1) a disintegration of strength on the eastern flank of NATO; (2) the creation of a power vacuum in this area with all the obvious dangers this entails; and (3) a serious diminution of the US presence in the Eastern Mediterranean, along with all that this in turn entails not only for our NATO interests, but also for our interests with respect to Israel and the rest of the Middle East.

**Macomber**

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<sup>4</sup> Not found.