Preface

The Foreign Relations of the United States series presents the official documentary historical record of major foreign policy decisions and significant diplomatic activity of the United States Government. The Historian of the Department of State is charged with the responsibility for the preparation of the Foreign Relations series. The staff of the Office of the Historian, Bureau of Public Affairs, under the direction of the General Editor of the Foreign Relations series, plans, researches, compiles, and edits the volumes in the series. Secretary of State Frank B. Kellogg first promulgated official regulations codifying specific standards for the selection and editing of documents for the series on March 26, 1925. These regulations, with minor modifications, guided the series through 1991.


The statute requires that the Foreign Relations series be a thorough, accurate, and reliable record of major United States foreign policy decisions and significant United States diplomatic activity. The volumes of the series should include all records needed to provide comprehensive documentation of major foreign policy decisions and actions of the United States Government. The statute also confirms the editing principles established by Secretary Kellogg: the Foreign Relations series is guided by the principles of historical objectivity and accuracy; records should not be altered or deletions made without indicating in the published text that a deletion has been made; the published record should omit no facts that were of major importance in reaching a decision; and nothing should be omitted for the purposes of concealing a defect in policy. The statute also requires that the Foreign Relations series be published not more than 30 years after the events recorded. The editors are convinced that this volume meets all regulatory, statutory, and scholarly standards of selection and editing.

Structure and Scope of the Foreign Relations Series

This volume is part of a subseries of volumes of the Foreign Relations series that documents the most important issues in the foreign policy of Presidents Richard M. Nixon and Gerald R. Ford. The subseries presents in multiple volumes a comprehensive documentary record of major foreign policy decisions and actions of both administrations. This


This volume has three chapters: U.S. relations with Greece; the U.S. response to the Cyprus issue, which erupted into a crisis with the Turkish invasion of the eastern portion of the island in mid-1974; and U.S. relations with Turkey. The chapters on Greece and Turkey focus on bilateral relations and events in those countries. The chapter on Cyprus documents a multilateral relationship among Greek and Turkish Cypriots, Greece, Turkey, the United Nations, Great Britain, and the United States. Experts in Washington feared that Greece and Turkey, two NATO members already at odds over oil exploration in the Aegean Sea, might go to war over Cyprus and destroy NATO's southern flank. The Cyprus chapter, therefore, has a high component of contingency planning and intelligence assessments and is documented in greater detail than the other two chapters. Where Greece or Turkey had an interest in Cyprus, the documentation is placed in the Cyprus chapter, although it was sometimes impossible to separate bilateral issues from Cyprus.

What makes the Cyprus chapter particularly interesting is the fact that the Turkish invasion of Cyprus began at the height of the Watergate crisis. The documents on the U.S. response provide a unique window into how the Executive branch functioned during the time leading to Nixon’s resignation in early August 1974. President Nixon remained aloof from the policymaking process, consumed by his own political survival. Kissinger spoke periodically with Nixon, but the President’s presence was largely superficial during this tense time. During Nixon’s last month in office, which coincided with the onset and height of the Cyprus crisis, he remained mostly in San Clemente. Kissinger shuttled back and forth, and partly for this reason, his telephone transcripts provide valuable insight into policymaking. Nixon’s absence from the heart of discussions contributed to a relatively seamless transition to the Ford administration in early August.

Kissinger remained Secretary of State during the Ford administration. The Turkish invasion of Cyprus in 1974 became one of the problems he sought to resolve by acting as a facilitator between the two sides, much like his successful shuttle diplomacy in the Middle East. The documentary selection for Cyprus therefore presents a picture as seen very much through Kissinger’s eyes. Kissinger became increasingly frustrated with the Greek-American members of the U.S. Congress, whom he believed were sabotaging his negotiations with Greece and Turkey. Although Ford was a neophyte when it came to foreign policy and relied very much upon Kissinger, he was effective in dealing with Congress, and the documentation emphasizes his ability.
Nevertheless, a solution to the Cyprus crisis eluded Kissinger’s considerable diplomatic skills and he and Ford left office in January 1977 disappointed with virtually all the parties.

*Editorial Methodology*

The documents are presented chronologically according to Washington time. Memoranda of conversation are placed according to the date and time of the conversation, rather than the date a memorandum was drafted. Documents chosen for printing are authoritative or signed copies, unless otherwise noted.

Editorial treatment of the documents published in the *Foreign Relations* series follows Office style guidelines, supplemented by guidance from the General Editor. The documents are reproduced as exactly as possible, including marginalia or other notations, which are described in the footnotes. Texts are transcribed and printed according to accepted conventions for the publication of historical documents within the limitations of modern typography. A heading has been supplied by the editors for each document included in the volume. Spelling, capitalization, and punctuation are retained as found in the original text, except that obvious typographical errors are silently corrected. Other mistakes and omissions in the documents are corrected by bracketed insertions: a correction is set in italic type; an addition in roman type. Words or phrases underlined in the source text are printed in italics. Abbreviations and contractions are preserved as found in the original text, and a list of abbreviations is included in the front matter of each volume.

Bracketed insertions are also used to indicate omitted text that deals with an unrelated subject (in roman type) or that remains classified after declassification review (in italic type). The amount and, where possible, the nature of the material not declassified has been noted by indicating the number of lines or pages of text that were omitted. Entire documents withheld for declassification purposes have been accounted for and are listed with headings, source notes, and number of pages not declassified in their chronological place. All brackets that appear in the original text are so identified in footnotes. All ellipses are in the original documents.

The first footnote to each document indicates the document’s source, original classification, distribution, and drafting information. This note also provides the background of important documents and policies and indicates whether the President or his major policy advisers read the document.

Editorial notes and additional annotation summarize pertinent material not printed in the volume, indicate the location of additional documentary sources, provide references to important related documents printed in other volumes, describe key events, and provide summaries of and citations to public statements that supplement and
elucidate the printed documents. Information derived from memoirs and other first-hand accounts has been used when appropriate to supplement or explicate the official record.

The numbers in the index refer to document numbers rather than to page numbers.

Advisory Committee on Historical Diplomatic Documentation

The Advisory Committee on Historical Diplomatic Documentation, established under the Foreign Relations statute, reviews records, advises, and makes recommendations concerning the Foreign Relations series. The Advisory Committee monitors the overall compilation and editorial process of the series and advises on all aspects of the preparation and declassification of the series. The Advisory Committee does not necessarily review the contents of individual volumes in the series, but it makes recommendations on issues that come to its attention and reviews volumes, as it deems necessary to fulfill its advisory and statutory obligations.

Presidential Recordings and Materials Preservation Act Review

Under the terms of the Presidential Recordings and Materials Preservation Act (PRMPA) of 1974 (44 U.S.C. 2111 note), the National Archives and Records Administration (NARA) has custody of the Nixon Presidential historical materials. The requirements of the PRMPA and implementing regulations govern access to the Nixon Presidential historical materials. The PRMPA and implementing public access regulations require NARA to review for additional restrictions in order to ensure the protection of the privacy rights of former Nixon White House officials, since these officials were not given the opportunity to separate their personal materials from public papers. Thus, the PRMPA and implementing public access regulations require NARA formally to notify the Nixon Estate and former Nixon White House staff members that the agency is scheduling for public release Nixon White House historical materials. The Nixon Estate and former White House staff members have 30 days to contest the release of Nixon historical materials in which they were a participant or are mentioned. Further, the PRMPA and implementing regulations require NARA to segregate and return to the creator of files private and personal materials. All Foreign Relations volumes that include materials from NARA’s Nixon Presidential Materials Project Staff are processed and released in accordance with the PRMPA.

Declassification Review

The Office of Information Programs and Services, Bureau of Administration, conducted the declassification review for the Department of State of the documents published in this volume. The review was
conducted in accordance with the standards set forth in Executive Order 12958, as amended, on Classified National Security Information and other applicable laws.

The principle guiding declassification review is to release all information, subject only to the current requirements of national security, as embodied in law and regulation. Declassification decisions entailed concurrence of the appropriate geographic and functional bureaus in the Department of State, other concerned agencies of the U.S. Government, and the appropriate foreign governments regarding specific documents of those governments. The declassification review of this volume, which began in 2003 and was completed in 2007, resulted in the decision to withhold 3 documents in full, excise a paragraph or more in 12 documents, and make minor excisions of less than a paragraph in 56 documents.

The Office of the Historian is confident, on the basis of the research conducted in preparing this volume and as a result of the declassification review process described above, that notwithstanding the number of denied and excised documents, the record presented in this volume presented here provides an accurate and comprehensive account of U.S. foreign policy towards Greece, Cyprus and Turkey.

Acknowledgments

The editors wish to acknowledge the assistance of officials at the Nixon Presidential Materials Project of the National Archives and Records Administration (Archives II), at College Park, Maryland. The editors wish to acknowledge the Richard Nixon Estate for allowing access to the Nixon presidential recordings and the Richard Nixon Library & Birthplace for facilitating that access.

Laurie Van Hook collected the documentation, made the selections, and annotated the documents under the supervision of the General Editor, Edward C. Keefer. Chris Tudda compiled the Lists of Persons and Abbreviations. He also coordinated the declassification review under the supervision of Susan C. Weetman, Chief of the Declassification and Publishing Division. Florence Segura performed the copy and technical editing. Max Franke prepared the index.

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Marc J. Susser
The Historian
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Sources

Sources for the Foreign Relations Series

The presidential papers of the Nixon and Ford administrations are the best source for high-level decision making documentation on Greece, Cyprus, and Turkey, 1973-1976. At the Nixon Presidential Materials Project, located at the National Archives and Records Administration II, in College Park, MD, the National Security Files, Country Files, Middle East and South Asia, contain NSC staff files on Greece, Cyprus, and Turkey. They are valuable in assessing NSC staff recommendations and presidential policy towards these three countries. Another key source in the Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, is Backchannel, Middle East, which contain the direct communications to and from the White House and the ambassadors in the field. These backchannel messages did not go to any other agencies and were a mechanism by the President and Special Assistant for National Security Affairs to communicate directly and privately with ambassadors. The NSC Files, Saunders Chron. File, NSC Secretariat, Nixon Cables/Contingency Plans contain considerable valuable documents for Greece, Cyprus, and Turkey. A fair number of key documents are contained in the NSC Files, Unfiled Material, a chronological file of documents that was not filed when President Nixon left office in August 1974. High-level correspondence between President Nixon and the heads of state in Greece and Turkey are in the National Security Files, Presidential Correspondence Files, under those countries.

The Nixon Presidential tape recordings ended in July 1973, a year before the Cyprus Crisis erupted, and while the editor checked the log and selective tape recordings, she deemed that none were significant enough to print.

The Henry Kissinger Office Files of the NSC File of the Nixon Presidential Materials have little information on Greece, Cyprus, and Turkey, but the same cannot be said for the Kissinger Papers in the Library of Congress. The most important source in the Kissinger Papers by far is the Kissinger telephone conversations, especially since during the initial days of the Cyprus crisis when Kissinger and the President were out of Washington. Indeed, during the crisis period of July and August 1974, diplomacy was conducted hour by hour, and sometimes minute by minute, and the transcripts of Kissinger’s telephone conversations provide a unique window into crisis management. Although these files are cited in this volume as from the Library of Congress, Kissinger Papers, copies are available at the National Archives II as part of the Nixon Presidential Materials. Also of great value in the Kissinger papers are
the Memoranda of Conversations, with sub-files for the Chronological Files, Presidential Files, and Staff and Others. The third collection of note in the Kissinger Papers is the Geopolitical File, most importantly for Cyprus, but to a lesser extent for Greece and Turkey.

After September 1973, Henry Kissinger became Secretary of State and the records of the Department of State take on a new prominence. In July of the same year, the Department began using the electronic State Archiving System (SAS). Records from that system have been transferred to the National Archives and are part of the on-line Access to Archival Database (AAD). Because the SAS system was in its initial stages in 1973, finding all relevant documents for the period can be a problem. The Embassy Files for Athens and Ankara, therefore, take on a special significance. In addition, some of the most tightly held telegrams are not on the electronic system, but on microfilm reels. In many cases the copies of these telegrams that are in the Nixon Presidential Materials and Ford Library, Countries Files for Greece, Cyprus, and Turkey were used. Three Department of State Lot files are of special value. The Records of Henry Kissinger (E5403), containing many of his tightly held memoranda of conversation, Transcripts of Henry Kissinger Staff Meetings (E5177), minutes of the Secretary’s meetings with his principal officers at the Department of State, and Records of Joseph Sisco (E5405), containing the personal files of this long-time Middle East expert, are especially valuable.

The records at the Ford Library are the primary source for the Ford administration’s foreign policy towards Greece, Cyprus, and Turkey. They are similar, but not exactly the same, as those in the Nixon Presidential Materials. A major collection at the Ford Library that spans both the Nixon and Ford administrations is the National Security Adviser, Memoranda of Conversation collection which includes accounts of Presidents Nixon’s and Ford’s meetings with foreign leaders and with their foreign policy advisers during the period from January 1973 to January 1977. The Ford Library’s National Security Adviser File, Presidential Country Files, Middle East and South Asia, have sections on Cyprus, Greece, and Turkey that are essential collections. There is also a Convenience Country file in the National Security Adviser’s files which contains the documents most used by the Ford NSC Staff, although in the Convenience Files, Cyprus, Greece and Turkey are under NSC staff Files for Europe, Canada, and Oceans Affairs. Also of special value in the National Security Adviser’s file are the Kissinger–Scowcroft West Wing Office Files and the Presidential Correspondence with Foreign Leaders.

The Ford Library also has separate NSC Institutional (H-Files), which are not part of the National Security Adviser collection. The same minutes and related documents system for NSC meetings, Senior Review Group meetings, and Washington Special Action Group Meetings (WSAG) exists as it does in the Nixon Presidential Materials. WSAG
Minutes are essential to following the Cyprus crisis period after July 1974 because of the many meetings of the Washington Special Actions Group (WSAG), during which Chairman of the group Henry Kissinger and other policymakers struggled unsuccessfully to resolve the Cyprus crisis. Also in the Institutional (H-Files) are the valuable Policy Papers Files containing National Security Study Memoranda (NSSMs), National Security Decision Memoranda (NSDMs) and related documents.

The final collections of special note in telling the story of the Eastern Mediterranean from 1973 to 1976 are the files of the Central Intelligence Agency and the Department of Defense. In the former, relevant material is available in the files of the Executive Registry, the National Intelligence Council, the Deputy Director for Intelligence, and the Office of Current Intelligence. In the latter, valuable nuggets about foreign policy are scattered amongst the files of Record Group 330, Records of the Office of the Secretary of Defense and his Assistants, described in the list below.

Unpublished Sources

Department of State

Central Files. See National Archives and Records Administration below.

Lot Files. For other lot files already transferred to the National Archives and Records Administration at College Park, Maryland, Record Group 59, see National Archives and Records Administration below.

INR/IL Historical Files

Files of the Office of Intelligence Coordination, containing records maintained by the Office of Intelligence Liaison, Bureau of Intelligence and Research

National Archives and Records Administration, College Park, Maryland

Record Group 59, Records of the Department of State

Central Files, 1970–1973

DEF 15 CYP–US, bases and installations, US-Cyprus
DEF GREECE, defense, Greece
DEF 15 GREECE–US, bases and installations, US-Greece
DEF US–TUR, defense relations, US-Turkey
DEF 9 TUR, military personnel, Turkey
DEF 12–5 TUR, armaments sales to Turkey
DEF 15–3 TUR–US, bases and installations, status of forces, US-Turkey
DEF 15–4 TUR–US, bases and installations, agreements and leases, US-Turkey
POL 1 CYP, political affairs, general policy, Cyprus
POL 7 CYP, High level visits, meetings, Cyprus
POL 14 CYP, political affairs, elections, Cyprus
POL 15–1 CYP, political affairs, head of state, Cyprus
POL 15–2 CYP, political affairs, legislature, Cyprus
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POL 17–4 CYP, diplomatic representation, ceremonial and social affairs, Cyprus
POL 23–10 CYP, internal security, travel control, Cyprus
POL 27 CYP, political affairs, military operations, Cyprus
POL 27–4 CYP/UN, political affairs, use of international forces, Cyprus-United Nations
POL CYP/UN, political affairs, Cyprus-United Nations
POL CYP/USSR, political affairs, Cyprus-Soviet Union
POL GREECE, political affairs, Greece
POL 1 GREECE, political affairs, general policy, Greece
POL 6 GREECE, political affairs, people, Greece
POL 12 GREECE, political affairs, political parties, Greece
POL 13–2 GREECE, political affairs, student groups, Greece
POL 14 GREECE, political affairs, elections, Greece
POL 15 GREECE, political affairs, government, Greece
POL 15–1 GREECE, political affairs, head of state, Greece
POL 23–9 GREECE, political affairs, coups, Greece
POL 29 GREECE, political affairs, political prisoners, Greece
POL 30 GREECE, political affairs, defectors and expellees, Greece
POL 30–1 GREECE, political affairs, asylum policy, Greece
POL 30–2 GREECE, political affairs, exile political activities, Greece
POL GREECE–TUR, political affairs, Greece-Turkey
POL GREECE–US, political affairs, Greece-US
POL 14 TUR, political affairs, elections, Turkey
POL 15 TUR, political affairs, government, Turkey
POL 23–8 TUR, political affairs, demonstrations, Turkey
POL 23–9 TUR, political affairs, coups, Turkey
POL 29 TUR, political affairs, political prisoners, Turkey

Central Foreign Policy Files, 1973–1976
Part of the on-line Access to Archival Databases (http://aad.archives.gov): Electronic Telegrams, P-Reel Index, P-Reel microfilm

Lot Files

EUR/SE Files: Lot 77 D 34, Lot 78 D 30, Lot 85 D 148
Files of the Office of Southeast European Affairs for Cyprus and Greece, 1974–1976

Records of Henry Kissinger, Entry E5403
Records of Secretary of State Kissinger, September 1973 to January 1977, primarily memoranda of conversation

Transcripts of Kissinger Staff Meetings, E5177
Minutes of Secretary of State Kissinger’s staff meetings, September 1973 to January 1977 (formerly Lot 78 D 443)

Records of Joseph Sisco, Entry E5405
Records of Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs Joseph Sisco, 1951–1976
(formerly Lot 74 D 131 and Lot 76 D 251)

S/S–I Files: Lot 80 D 212
National Security Council files pertaining to NSSMs and NSDMs and related documents as maintained by the Department of State, 1969–1980

S/S–Files: Lot 83 D 411
NSC Contingency plans for various countries as maintained by the Department of State, 1969–1974
Athens Embassy Files:
Lot 77 F 105, Political Files, 1973
Lot 78 F 134, Political Files, 1974
Lot 78 F 160, Political Files, 1975
Lot 96 F 335, Political Files, 1974–1993

Ankara Embassy Files:
Lot 76 F 21, Subject Files, 1974
Lot 78 F 165, Subject Files, 1975
Lot 80 F 215, Subject Files, 1973–1974

Nixon Presidential Materials Project
National Security Council Files
   Agency Files: CIA, NSC, State
   Backchannel: Europe, Middle East/Africa
   Country Files: Cyprus, Greece, Turkey
   President's Daily Briefing
   Presidential Correspondence: Greece, Turkey
   Presidential/HAK Memoranda of Conversations
   Saunders Chron File, NSC Secretariat - Richard M. Nixon
   Subject Files
   Unfiled Material

NSC Institutional Files (H-Files)
   National Security Council Minutes
   National Security Council Meetings
   Senior Review Group Minutes
   Senior Review Group Meetings
   Washington Special Actions Group Minutes
   Washington Special Actions Group Meetings
   Policy Papers: National Security Decision Memoranda (NSDMs), National Security
                Study Memoranda (NSSMs)

Gerald R. Ford Presidential Library, Ann Arbor, Michigan
National Security Adviser
   Backchannel Messages: Europe, Mideast/Africa, Hotline-Cabinet Office London
   Brent Scowcroft Daily Work Files
   Kissinger–Scowcroft West Wing Office File
   Memoranda of Conversations: Nixon Administration, Ford Administration
   National Security Council Meetings File
   NSC Institutional Files: IF/NS File for the President, NSC/NS File
   NSC Staff for Europe, Canada, and Ocean Affairs: Cyprus, Greece, Turkey
   NSC Staff for Information Liaison with Commissions and Committees: Cyprus
   Crisis, Status Report of Subpoenaed Documents on Greece, Cyprus, Turkey
   NSDMs and NSSMs
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Outside-the-System Chronological File
Presidential Agency Files: CIA, CENTO, NSC, NATO
Presidential Briefing Material for VIP Visits
Presidential Correspondence with Foreign Leaders
Presidential Country Files for Middle East and South Asia: Cyprus, Greece, Turkey
Presidential Name File
Trip Briefing Books and Cables for Henry Kissinger: Kissinger Trip File
Trip Briefing Books and Cables for President Ford: Presidential Trips File

NSC Institutional Files (H-Files)
National Security Council Minutes
National Security Council Meetings
Senior Review Group Minutes
Senior Review Group Meetings
Washington Special Actions Group Minutes
Washington Special Actions Group Meetings
Policy Papers: National Security Decision Memoranda (NSDMs), National Security Study Memoranda (NSSMs)

Library of Congress
Papers of Henry A. Kissinger
Cables
Chronological File
Geopolitical File: Cyprus, Greece, Turkey
Memoranda of Conversations
Memoranda to the President
National Security Council: 40 Committee, Intelligence Committee, Senior Review Group, Washington Special Actions Group, NSC Meetings, NSDM, NSSM
Department of State: EUR Bureau, NEA Bureau
Policy Planning—History Project
Telephone Conversations
Subject File: Congressional Hearings—Pike Committee/Cyprus

National Security Council
Nixon Intelligence Files
Ford Intelligence Files

Central Intelligence Agency
Deputy Director of Intelligence Files
Job 99T01488R

Executive Registry: Executive Files of the Director of Central Intelligence
Job 80M01066A
Job 80M00165A
Job 80M01048A
Job 86B00269R
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National Intelligence Council Files: National Intelligence Estimates and Special Intelligence Estimates
Job 79R01012A

Office of Current Intelligence, Intelligence memoranda and related documents
79T00861A

Washington National Records Center, Suitland, Maryland

Record Group 330, Records of the Office of the Secretary of Defense

OSD Files: 330-78-0010 and 330-78-0011
Decimal subject files of the Office of the Secretary of Defense, 1974

OSD Files: 330-78-0058
Decimal subject files of the Office of Secretary of Defense, 1975

Published Sources


Abbreviations and Terms

AF, Air Force
AFB, Air Force Base
AFSOUTH, Armed Forces South
AHEPA, American-Hellenic Educational and Progressive Association
AID, Agency for International Development
AKEL, Anorthotikon Komma Ergazo Laou (Reform Party of the Working People) (Cyprus)
AMB, Ambassador
AMCITS, American citizens
AMCONGEN, American Consul General
AMCONSUL, American Consul
AMEMBASSY, American Embassy
ASW, antisubmarine warfare
A/SYG, Assistant Secretary General
C, Office of the Counselor, Department of State
CA, circular airgram
CCC, Commodity Credit Corporation
CDI, Common Defense Installations
CENTO, Central Treaty Organization
Cherokee, special telegram channel
CIA, Central Intelligence Agency
CINC, Commander in Chief
CINCEUR, Commander in Chief, U.S. Forces, Europe
CINCLANT, Commander in Chief, Atlantic Command
CINCSOUTH, Commander in Chief, U.S. Forces, Southern Europe
CINCUSAFE, Commander in Chief, U.S. Air Force, Europe
CINCUSAREUR, Commander in Chief, U.S. Army, Europe
CINCUSNAVEUR, Commander in Chief, U.S. Navy, Europe
CINCSTRIKE, Commander in Chief, Strike Command
Col, Colonel
COMSIXTHFLT, Commander, Sixth Fleet
CONGEN, Consul General
Controlled Dissem, controlled dissemination
CONUS, continental United States
CPA, Cypriot Provisional Authority
CR, Continuing Resolution
CSCE, Council on Security and Cooperation in Europe
CYPOL, Cypriot Police
CY, calendar year

D, Deputy Secretary of State
D/INR, Director, Bureau of Intelligence and Research, Department of State
DA, Department of the Army
DAO, Defense Affairs Officer
DATT, defense attaché
DCA, Defense Cooperation Agreement
DCI, Director of Central Intelligence
DCM, Deputy Chief of Mission

XIX
XX Abbreviations and Terms

DDC, Office of the Deputy Director for Coordination, Bureau of Intelligence and Research, Department of State
DDI, Deputy Director for Intelligence, Central Intelligence Agency
DDO, Deputy Director of Operations, Central Intelligence Agency
DDO/EUR, Division of European Affairs, Deputy Director of Operations, Central Intelligence Agency
DEA, Drug Enforcement Agency
DefMin, Minister of Defense
DefSec, Defense Secretary
Del, delegate, delegation
Depcirteil, circular telegram from the Department of State
DepFonMin, Deputy Foreign Minister
Dept, Department of State
Deptel, Department of State telegram
DIA, Defense Intelligence Agency
DirGen or DG, Director General
Dis or Dissem, dissemination
DOD, Department of Defense
DOD/ISA, Department of Defense, Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs
DPC, Defense Planning Committee
DPRC, Defense Program Review Committee
DPRG, Defense Program Review Group

E, Bureau of Economic Affairs, Department of State
EAN, Greek Anti-dictatorship Youth
EC, European Community
EDA, United Democratic Left (Greece)
EDE, National Democratic Union (Greece)
Emb, Embassy
Emboff, Embassy Officer
Embtel, Embassy telegram
EOKA-B, Ethniki Organosis Kyprion Agoniston (National Organization of Cypriot Fighters) (Greek Cypriots)
EPOK, National Cultural Movement (Greece)
ERE, National Radical Union (Greece)
ESA, Greek Military Police
EST, Eastern Standard Time
EUCOM, European Command
EUR, Bureau of European Affairs, Department of State
EUR/SE, Office of Southern European Affairs, Bureau of European Affairs, Department of State
EXDIS, exclusive distribution only
Ex-Im, Export-Import Bank

FBI, Federal Bureau of Investigation
FBIS, Foreign Broadcast Information Service
FCO, Foreign and Commonwealth Office
FIR, Far Infrared Radiation; also Finite Impulse Response
FM, foreign minister; also from
FMS, foreign military sales
FonMin, Foreign Minister
FonOff, Foreign Office
FonSec, Foreign Secretary
Abbreviations and Terms  XXI

FRG, Federal Republic of Germany
FY, fiscal year
FYI, for your information

GA, United Nations General Assembly
GOC, Government of Cyprus
GOG, Government of Greece
GOT, Government of Turkey
GNP, Gross National Product

H, Bureau of Congressional Relations, Department of State
HAF, Hellenic Air Force
HAK, Henry A. Kissinger
HE, Hellenic Forces
HICOMER, (British) High Commissioner
HMG, Her Majesty’s Government

IBRD, International Bank for Reconstruction and Development (World Bank)
ICJ, International Court of Justice
IMF, International Monetary Fund
INR, Bureau of Intelligence and Research, Department of State
INR/DDC, Office of the Deputy Director for Coordination, Bureau of Intelligence and Research, Department of State
INR/OD, Office of the Director, Bureau of Intelligence and Research, Department of State
IO, Bureau of International Organizations Affairs, Department of State
ISA, Office of International Security Affairs, Department of Defense

J, Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs
JCS, Joint Chiefs of Staff
JP, Justice Party (Turkey)
JCSM, Joint Chiefs of Staff memorandum
JUSMAGG, Joint U.S. Military Advisory Group

K, Kissinger
KKE, Greek Communist Party
KYP, Greek Central Intelligence Agency

L, Office of the Legal Adviser, Department of State
Limdis, limited distribution
LOS, law of the sea
LTDG, Lieutenant General

MAC, Military Assistance Command
MAP, Military Assistance/Aid Program
Memcon, memorandum of conversation
MFA, Ministry of Foreign Affairs
MIL, military
MILAD, military adviser
MIN, Minister
MP, member of parliament
MR, military region; also memorandum for the record

NAC, North Atlantic Council (NATO)
NARA, National Archives and Records Administration
NATO, North Atlantic Treaty Organization
XXII  Abbreviations and Terms

NDAC, Air Defense Committee, NATO
NE, northeast
NEA, Bureau of Near Eastern and South Asian Affairs, Department of State
NEA/CYP, Office of Cypriot Affairs, Bureau of Near Eastern and South Asian Affairs, Department of State
NEA/GRK, Office of Greek Affairs, Bureau of Near Eastern and South Asian Affairs, Department of State
NEA/RA, Office of Regional Affairs, Bureau of Near Eastern and South Asian Affairs, Department of State
NEA/TUR, Office of Turkish Affairs, Bureau of Near Eastern and South Asian Affairs, Department of State
NG, National Guard
NIACT, night action, telegram indicator requiring immediate action
NIC, National Intelligence Council
NIE, National Intelligence Estimate
NIO/WE, Division of Western Europe, National Intelligence Office, Central Intelligence Agency
NMCC, National Military Command Center
Nodis, no distribution (other than to persons indicated)
Noforn, no foreign distribution
NPG, Nuclear Planning Group
NPT, Nonproliferation Treaty
NSA, National Security Agency
NSAM, National Security Action Memorandum
NSC, National Security Council
NSDM, National Security Decision Memorandum
NSSM, National Security Study Memorandum

OASD, Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense
OASD/ISA, Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs
OBE, overtaken by events
OCI, Office of Current Intelligence, Central Intelligence Agency
OMB, Office of Management and Budget
ONE, Office of National Estimates, Central Intelligence Agency
OSD, Office of the Secretary of Defense
OSD/ISA, Office of the Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs
OSR, Office of Strategic Research, Central Intelligence Agency

P, Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs
PAO, Public Affairs Officer
PARAS, paragraphs
PASOK, Panellinio Sosialistiko Kinima (Pan-Hellenic Socialist Party) (Greece)
Permreps, permanent representatives
PM, Prime Minister; also Bureau of Politico-Military Affairs, Department of State
PM/ISO, International Security Operations, Bureau of Politico-Military Affairs, Department of State
POL, petroleum, oil, lubricants; Poland; political adviser
POLTO, telegram series indicator
POLAD, political adviser
POL/MIL, political and military adviser
PolOh, political officer
PR, public relations
PriMin, Prime Minister
Abbreviations and Terms  XXIII

Reftel, reference telegram
Rep, representative
Res, resolution
RG, Record Group; also review group
RMN or RN, Richard Nixon
RPP, Republican People’s Party (Turkey)
RPT, repeat

S, Office of the Secretary of State
SA, supporting assistance
SAC, Supreme Allied Command; also Strategic Air Command
SACEUR, Supreme Allied Commander, Europe
S/AL, Ambassador at Large, Office of the Secretary of State
SBA, Sovereign Base Area
SE, southeast
SEA, Southeast Asia
SecDef, Secretary of Defense
SecGen, Secretary General (UN)
SECASTATE, Secretary of State
SECTO, series indicator for telegram from the Secretary of State while on travel
SEPTEL, separate telegram
SHAFC, Supreme Headquarters, Allied Forces Command
SHAPE, Supreme Headquarters, Allied Powers, Europe
SOFAG, Status of Forces Agreement
SOV, Soviet
S/P, Policy Planning Staff, Department of State
S/PRES, Office of Press Relations, Office of the Secretary of State
SRG, Senior Review Group
SSBN, Ship Submarine, Ballistic Missile, Nuclear Power (Fleet Ballistic Nuclear Missile Submarine)
S/S, Executive Secretariat, Office of the Secretary of State
S/S–I, Executive Secretariat, Office of the Secretary of State
SYG, Secretary General (NATO)

T, Under Secretary of State for Security Assistance
Telcon, Telephone conversation
TMT, Turkish Cypriots
TOSEC, series indicator for telegram to the Secretary of State while on travel
TRU, Tactical Reserve Force (Cyprus)

UDI, Universal Declaration of Independence
UK, United Kingdom
UN, United Nations
UNFICYP, United Nations Force in Cyprus
UNGA, United National General Assembly
UNSC, United Nations Security Council
USAFAE, United States Air Force
USCINCEUR, United States Commander in Chief, Europe
USDEL MC, United States Delegation to NATO, Military Committee
USDOCOSOUTH, Documents Officer, Allied Forces, Southeastern Europe
USEUCOM, United States European Command
USG, United States Government
USIA, United States Information Agency
USIB, United States Intelligence Board
XXIV  Abbreviations and Terms

USIS, United States Information Service
USN, United States Navy
USNATO, United States Mission to NATO
USNMR, United States National Military Representative
USSR, Union of Soviet Socialist Republics
USUN, U.S. Mission to the United Nations

VOA, Voice of America

WG, Working Group
WH, White House
WHSR, White House Situation Room
WSAG, Washington Special Actions Group

Z, Zulu time (Greenwich Mean Time)
Persons

Agnew, Spiro T., Vice President until October 10, 1973
Albert, Carl, Democratic Congressman from Oklahoma; Speaker of the House
Alexandrakis, Menelaos, Greek Ambassador to the United States from August 1974
Anderson, Robert, Department of State spokesman
Androutsopoulos, Adamantios, Greek Prime Minister from November 1973 until July 1974
Angelis, Gen. Odysseus, Chief of Staff, Hellenic Armed Forces until 1973; Greek Vice President until July 1973
Annenberg, Walter H., Ambassador to United Kingdom until October 1974
Atherton, Alfred L., Jr., Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for Near Eastern and South Asian Affairs until April 1974
Averoff-Tositsas, Evangelos, Greek Minister of Defense from July 1974
Bayülken, Ümit Haluk, Turkish Minister of Foreign Affairs until 1974
Bitsios, Dimitrios, Greek Foreign Minister from October 1974
Boyatt, Thomas, Director of Cypriot Affairs, Bureau of Near Eastern and South Asian Affairs, Department of State until 1973
Brademas, John, Democratic Congressman from Indiana
Brandt, Willy, German Chancellor until 1974
Brown, Gen. George S., Chief of Staff of the U.S. Air Force from August 1973; Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff from July 1974
Buffum, William B., Assistant Secretary of State for International Organizations from 1973 until 1975
Bush, George H.W., Director of Central Intelligence from January 30, 1976 until January 20, 1977
Çaglayangil, Ihsan Sabri, Turkish Foreign Minister from March 1975
Callaghan, James, British Foreign Secretary from March 1974 until April 1976; Prime Minister from April 1976
Cargo, William I., Director of Policy Planning Staff, Department of State until July 1973
Christophides, John CL, Cypriot Foreign Minister until July 1974
Clements, William P. (Bill), Jr., Deputy Secretary of Defense from 1973 until 1976
Clerides, Glafkos, Speaker of Cypriot parliament under Makarios; acting President of Cyprus from July until December 1974; founder of Democratic Rally Party in 1976
Clift, A. Denis, Member of NSC Staff
Cline, Ray S., Director, Office of Intelligence and Research, Department of State, until 1973
Colby, William, Director of Central Intelligence until January 1976
Constantine II (Konstantinos), King of Greece until June 1973
Crawford, William R., Ambassador to Cyprus from August 1974
Cromer, Earl of (George Rowland Stanley Baring), British Ambassador to the United States until 1974
Crosland, Anthony, British Foreign Secretary from April 1976 until January 1977
Davies, Roger P., Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for Near Eastern and South Asian Affairs until February 1974; Ambassador to Greece from July 1974; assassinated in Nicosia, Cyprus, August 1974
Davis, Jeanne W., NSC Staff Secretary
XXVI  Persons

Day, John, Office of Greek Affairs, Bureau of Near Eastern and South Asian Affairs, Department of State, from 1974 until 1976
Demirel, Süleyman, Turkish Prime Minister from March 1975
Denktash, Rauf, Vice President of the Republic of Cyprus from 1973 until 1975
Dillon, Robert S., Office of Turkish Affairs, Bureau of Near Eastern and South Asian Affairs, Department of State from September 1971 until June 1974
Dimitriou, Nicos G., Cypriot Ambassador to the United States from 1974
Dobrynin, Anatoly, Soviet Ambassador to the United States
Douglas-Home, Sir Alexander Frederick, British Foreign Secretary until March 4, 1974
Dountas, Michalis, Greek Ambassador to Cyprus
Eagleburger, Lawrence S., Member of NSC Staff from June 1973; Executive Assistant to the Secretary of State from October 1973
Eagleton, Thomas F., Democratic Senator from Missouri
Ecevit, Bülent, Turkish Prime Minister from January until November 1974
Ellsworth, Robert, Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs from June 1974 until December 1975; Deputy Secretary of Defense from December 1975
Erbakan, Necmettin, Chairman of the National Salvation Party (Turkey)
Esenbel, Melih, Turkish Ambassador to the U.S. until November 1974; Turkish Foreign Minister from November 1974 until March 1975; Turkish Ambassador to the United States from April 1975
Fascell, Dante B., Democratic Congressman from Florida
Ford, Gerald R., Republican Congressman from Michigan until 1973; House Minority Leader until 1973; Vice President of the United States from October 13, 1973 until August 8, 1974; President of the United States from August 8, 1974 until January 20, 1977
Frelinghuysen, Peter, Democratic Congressman from New Jersey
Fulbright, William, Democratic Senator from Arkansas until 1974; Chairman of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee until 1974
Genscher, Hans Dietrich, German Foreign Minister from May 1974
Giscard d’Estaing, Valery, French President from May 1974
Ghizikis, Phaidon, Greek President November 1973 until December 1974
Grivas, Col. George, leader of EOKA until January 1974; Commander of Cyprus National Guard from 1964 to 1967
Gromyko, Andrei A., Soviet Foreign Minister
Güneş, Turan, Turkish Minister of Foreign Affairs until 1974
Gürler, Gen. Faruk, Commander-in-Chief of Turkish Army until 1974; President of NATO Military Committee until 1973
Habib, Philip C., Assistant Secretary of State, Bureau of East Asian and Pacific Affairs from September 1974 until June 1976; Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs from June 1976
Haig, Gen. Alexander M., Jr., Deputy Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs until January 1973; Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs from November 1974 until January 1977; Army Vice Chief of Staff from January until August 1973; Assistant to the President and Chief of Staff from August 1973 until August 1974; Commander in Chief, European Command and Supreme Allied Commander from 1974
Hamilton, Lee, Democratic Congressman from Indiana
Hartman, Arthur A., Assistant Secretary of State for European Affairs from January 1974 until January 1977
Hays, Wayne, Democratic Congressman from Ohio until 1976
Heath, Edward, British Prime Minister from June 1970 until March 1974
Helms, Richard M., Director of Central Intelligence until February 1973
Humphrey, Hubert H., Democratic Senator from Minnesota
Hyland, William, Director, Bureau of Intelligence and Research, Department of State, from January 1974 until November 1975
Iliou, Ilias, Spokesman for EDA
Ingersoll, Robert, Deputy Secretary of State from July 1974 until March 1976
Ioannides, Brigadier Gen. Dimitrios, Chief of Greek Military Security 1974
Irakli, Mahmut Sadi, Turkish Prime Minister from November 1974 until March 1975
Irwin, John N., II, Deputy Secretary of State until February 1, 1973
Isik, Hasan, Turkish Minister of Defense from January until September 1974
Johnson, U. Alexis, Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs until February 1, 1973; Ambassador at Large from February 1973 until January 1977
Kannellopoulos, Panayiotis, ERE leader
Karamanlis, Constantine, Greek Prime Minister from July 1974
Karayanni, Denis, Greek Permanent Representative to the United Nations from 1974 until 1975
Kennedy, Col. Richard T., Deputy Assistant to the President for NSC Planning from 1973 until 1975
Killick, Sir John, Deputy Under Secretary of State, British Foreign and Commonwealth Office from 1973 until 1975; Ambassador and UK Permanent Representative to NATO from 1975
Kissinger, Henry A., President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs until November 3, 1975; Secretary of State from September 21, 1973 until January 20, 1977
Korutuk, Fahri, Turkish President from April 1973
Kosygin, Alexei N., Soviet Premier
Kubisch, Jack, Assistant Secretary for Inter-American Affairs, Department of State from May 1973 until September 1974; Ambassador to Greece from September 1974
Lodal, Jan, Member of NSC Staff
Lord, Winston, Member of NSC Staff until 1973; Director of Policy Planning Staff, Department of State from October 1973 until January 1977
Lowenstein, James G., Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for European Affairs from April 1974 until 1977
Luns, Joseph, NATO Secretary General
Lyssarides, Dr. Vassos, founder and President of Cyprus Socialist Party (EDEK); personal physician to Makarios
Macomber, William, U.S. Ambassador to Turkey
Makarios III, Archbishop of Cypriot Orthodox Church; President of Cyprus until July 15, 1974, and from July 23, 1974 until August 1977
Mansfield, Michael (Mike), Democratic Senator from Montana; thereafter Senate Majority Leader
Markezinis, Spyro, Greek Prime Minister from October until November 1973
Mavros, Georgios, Greek Deputy Prime Minister and Foreign Minister from July until November 1974
McCloskey, Robert, Ambassador to Cyprus from May 1973 until January 1974; Ambassador at Large from December 1973 until February 1975
McFarlane, Robert C., Military Assistant to National Security Advisers Kissinger and Scowcroft until 1977 (Special Assistant starting in 1976)
XXVIII  Persons

Morgan, Thomas E., Democratic Congressman from Pennsylvania; Chairman of the House Committee on Foreign Affairs

Moorer, Adm. Thomas H., USN, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff from July 1970 to June 1974

Niehuss, Rosemary, Member of NSC Staff

Nixon, Richard M., President of the United States until August 9, 1974

O'Neill, Thomas P. (Tip), Democratic Congressman from Massachusetts

Osorio-Taffal, Bibiano, UN Special Representative for UNFICYP until 1974

Papadopoulos, Col. George, Greek Prime Minister until November 1973

Papandreou, Andreas, Founder and Chairman of PASOK from 1974

Pauly, Gen. John W., Assistant to the Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff from July 1974 until September 1975; Deputy Chief of Staff for Plans and Operations, Headquarters U.S. Air Force from September 1975 until July 1976; Vice Commander in Chief, U.S. Air Force Europe from July 1976

Pickering, Thomas R., Special Assistant to the Secretary and Executive Secretary of the Department of State from 1973 until 1974

Pompidou, George, French President until 1974

Popper, David H., U.S. Ambassador to Cyprus until May 1973

Ramsbotham, Peter, British Ambassador to the United States from 1974

Rhodes, John J., Republican Congressman from Arizona; House Minority Leader from 1973 until 1975

Rockefeller, Nelson A., Vice President of the United States from December 19, 1974 until January 20, 1977

Rogers, William P., Secretary of State until September 3, 1973

Rosenthal, Benjamin S., Democratic Congressman from New Jersey

Rossides, Eugene T., General Counsel of AHEPA

Rumsfeld, Donald, Ambassador to NATO until 1974; Assistant to President Ford from August 1974 until October 1975; Secretary of Defense from October 1975

Rush, Kenneth, Deputy Secretary of State from February 1973 until May 1974

Sampson, Nikos, member of EOKA; President of Cyprus from July 15 to July 23, 1974

Sancar, Gen. Semih, Chief of Staff of Turkish General Staff from 1973

Sarbanes, Paul S., Democratic Congressman from Maryland until 1976

Saunders, Harold H., Member of NSC Staff until 1974; Assistant Secretary of State for Near Eastern and South Asian Affairs from 1975

Sauvagnargues, Jean, French Foreign Minister from 1974 until 1976

Scali, John, Representative to the United Nations from 1973 until 1975

Schlesinger, James R., Secretary of Defense from July 1973 until October 1975

Schmidt, Helmut, German Chancellor from 1974

Scott, Hugh, Republican Senator from Pennsylvania

Scowcroft, Gen. Brent, Military Assistant to the President until 1973; Deputy Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs from August 1973 until October 1975; President's Assistant for National Security Affairs from November 1975

Simon, William E., Secretary of the Treasury from May 1974

Sisco, Joseph J., Assistant Secretary of State for Near Eastern and South Asia Affairs until January 1974; Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs from February 1974 until June 1976

Sonnenfeldt, Helmut, Senior NSC Staff member until 1974; Counselor, Department of State from 1974
Springsteen, George S., Jr., Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for European Affairs from August 1973 until January 1974; Special Assistant to the Secretary of State and Executive Secretary of the Department from January 1974 until July 1976

Stabler, Wells, Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for European Affairs from 1973 until 1974

Sunay, Cevdet, Turkish President until 1973

Talu, Mehmet Naim, Turkish Prime Minister from April 1973 until January 1974

Tasca, Henry, U.S. Ambassador to Greece until September 1974

Tetenes, Spiridon, Greek Foreign Minister from November 1973 until July 1974

Theodorakis, Mikis, Greek composer

Thornton, Thomas P., Member of Policy Planning Staff, Department of State

Tsatsos, Constantine, Greek President under Karamanlis

Tyler, William R., Negotiator sent to Athens, September 1974

Tzounis, John A., Director General, Greek Ministry of Foreign Affairs from 1974

Van der Stoel, Max, Dutch Foreign Minister

Vance, Cyrus, Presidential mediator for Cyprus from November until December 1967

Vest, George, Director, Bureau of Politico-Military Affairs, Department of State from April 1974

Waldheim, Kurt, Secretary General of the United Nations

Walters, Lt. Gen. Vernon A., Deputy Director of Central Intelligence until July 31, 1976

Welch, Richard, CIA Station Chief in Athens assassinated on December 23, 1975

Whalen, Charles W., Republican Congressman from Ohio

Wilson, Harold, British Prime Minister until 1976

Xanthopoulos-Palamas, Christos, Greek Foreign Minister from January until November 1973

Zagorianakos, Gen. Dimitrios, Commander-in-Chief of the Hellenic Armed Forces Supreme Command until November 1973

Ziegler, Ronald, White House Press Secretary until 1974
Greece, Cyprus, Turkey, 1973–1976

Greece

1. Memorandum From the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger) to President Nixon


SUBJECT
Letter to Prime Minister Papadopoulos

As US assistance recipients improve their economic condition, it has been our practice to shift them gradually from grant military assistance to foreign military sales credits. You may recall that Iran took this step shortly after your visit in May last year. Several other countries were considered to make this transition in FY 1974. Greece was one of them. When the Greek government learned of this, they decided to do the same thing that Iran did last spring—take themselves off the grant list. They judged that the amount of money had become quite small and that their being on the recipient list subjected them to continued Congressional criticism. They preferred to initiate the termination of grant military assistance. Greece will receive $65 million in military sales credits in FY 1974.

Prime Minister Papadopoulos wrote you a letter [Tab B] explaining Greece’s step. There was some misunderstanding at the Greek end of what was involved, so there has had to be continuing technical discussion over the practical elements of terminating grant assistance so that the Greeks would not do themselves out of some aid that was in the pipeline. However, those discussions need not affect your reply.

At Tab A is a suggested reply to the Prime Minister treating this transition in a low key way and expressing appreciation for Greece’s contribution to NATO.

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2 Dated January 11; attached but not printed. All brackets are in the original.
Recommendation: That you sign the letter to Prime Minister Papadopoulos at Tab A. [Text cleared with Mr. Gergen].

3 Nixon signed the letter on April 26; attached but not printed.

2. Telegram From the Embassy in Greece to the Department of State

Athens, April 21, 1973, 1115Z.

2400. Subj: Greek Prime Minister Confronts Serious Problems.

Summary: Greek regime in recent months has been unable to deal decisively and in timely fashion with variety serious problems, e.g., universities and student unrest, detention of seven lawyers without charges, arrest of Professor Tsatsos of Bonn University, etc. At same time while Admiral Norton, Chief of British Defense Staff’s visit was exploited for needed positive publicity, escalation of violence in Cyprus and squabbling within Greek Orthodox Church have cast additional doubts on competence of GOG leadership. Rising level of internal public criticism of GOG coupled with heightened complaints from Greek military rounds out dreary picture for Prime Minister Papadopoulos. Question arises as to viability of Prime Minister vis-a-vis his colleagues within regime. Remains to be seen whether PM can or will exert strong leadership based on full implementation of 1968 Constitution. End summary.

1. Prime Minister must be increasingly aware he faces problem of developing sufficient forward progress on the political side to eliminate charges of stagnation and lack of direction. Early concrete steps to implement the 1968 Constitution could get him off the hook. For example, such concrete steps would involve the establishment of constitutional court and putting into effect draft electoral law allowing for organization of political parties, as well as fixing of a date for elections, at some distance in the future, however. Recent developments in internal situation are putting him under greater pressure for action.

2. Events in recent months have not improved image of GOG. Number of unresolved problems has increased, causing embarrass-
ment and highlighting regime inability to take decisions in timely fashion. For example, despite fact it has been clear for some time that archaic university administration and growing student dissatisfaction were likely to present problem, regime failed to come to grips with issues posed. When recent student difficulties erupted into confrontation that required resort to drastic measures to bring situation under control GOG reacted rashly, particularly in its resort to draft and in means police used in restoring order. Criticism produced by this affair in Greece and abroad added new element of uneasiness and tension in political environment.

3. Difficulties arising from GOG fumbling on student problem were compounded by untimely arrest of seven lawyers who were publicly identified as legitimate defense counselors for detained students, even though there is little doubt they engaged in other activities considered subversive. GOG refusal to receive representatives of International Commission of Jurists and American Bar Association, while it may have been justified on narrow legal basis considered from internal standpoint, was poor public relations abroad since it lost GOG opportunity to put its version of facts on record.

4. Similarly inept move was GOG arrest of Greek Professor Tsatsos of Bonn University. His arrest, for which no reason yet given publicly but Embassy understands involves his extensive contacts with opposition elements here and abroad, came just at time that GOG discussing and arranging date for visit of German Foreign Minister Scheel to Athens, as well as shortly before SPD Party Congress at which GOG must have been aware FRG Chancellor Brandt would face hostile critics of regime. As result product of SPD Congress was perhaps sharper in its anti-regime focus than might otherwise have been the case, and a considerable cloud has been cast upon prospective Scheel visit this calendar year.

5. On other hand Prime Minister was able to extract maximum publicity value from visit of Admiral Norton, Chief of British Defense Staff by insuring Norton received red carpet treatment and providing full press and TV coverage, including prominent front page pictures of Norton, British Ambassador and himself. To some extent, however, question in House of Commons on desirability of such visits inasmuch as they implied support for GOG, undercut PM, particularly after HMG response made plain visit was military in character and not intended to have political implications.

6. To add to PM’s woes, public image of Greek Orthodox Church under GOG-chosen head Archbishop Ieronymos is in deplorable state. Continuing ecclesiastical problems, including proffered resignation of Archbishop, must have produced considerable uneasiness among Greek public generally.
7. Escalating violence in Cyprus, most of which turns upon differences between pro-Makarios and pro-Grivas Greek Cypriots, also casts unfavorable light upon GOG leadership. Here again image of regime and govt have seriously depreciated. Greek inability to unify Greek Cypriot elements, given its announced claim to lead the Hellenistic world, could adversely affect overriding objective of maintaining strong and friendly Greek-Turkish relationship. Athens regime seems to realize critical character of problem it faces in Cyprus but has so far demonstrated inability to master developments on island rather than be mastered by them.

8. While grounds of revival of Vice President Agnew’s Drake University statement over past weekend remains somewhat obscure, it seems clear that it was surfaced for government’s purposes. It balanced critical resolutions of SPD Congress, and it also served to remind Greek public that GOG has important friends in U.S., irrespective of hostility shown by certain European political leaders.

9. On economic side, GOG has also demonstrated considerable ineptitude in face of inflation, meat shortage problem, pressure for increased wages, and inability to initiate key economic development projects involving foreign investments.

10. Government has either deliberately or by inadvertence permitted development of considerably higher level of direct criticisms within country as evidenced by such publications as “political themata” and regular Greek press which have taxed GOG for its failure to cope with wide variety of current problems. Coupled with publicity regarding seven detained lawyers and university problems, these criticisms take on added psychological significance since they contribute to creation of atmosphere in which opposition groups within Greek society are feeling somewhat freer about revealing their own opinion about current situation. Rising level of such critical comment could compel PM to face choice between new and genuine clamp-down and present “shadow of martial law” posture that permits “tolerable” level of dissent, reviving this area of intra-regime friction.

11. The problems above have not been lost on the military who individually have increased their complaint level. This apparently has allowed Chief of Military Police, Col. Dimitrios Ioannidis, who often opts for a much harder line, an increased voice in governmental matters through adroit exploitation of officer complaints. It is difficult to come to grips with the existence or exact size of dissident conspiratorial groups in the Army who may have plans to seize upon this opportunity to move against the Prime Minister. Such a move if carried out by the military with a view toward extricating the Army from government would probably receive a large majority of support both in the military and the population. However, prospects for such a move
to succeed would have to be evaluated in context of PM’s demonstrated ability to ferret out and neutralize Army dissidence. Any new group would also have to take into account the views of those junior revolutionary officers who control the key military units in Athens and appear to command the loyalty of Ioannidis.

12. Foregoing adds up to dreary picture for Papadopoulos and his government. It seems to bear out analysis that weakened position of PM vis-à-vis his colleagues within regime may be coming close to point where he has only slim chance to lead government constructively. Various aspects of these developments have been reported on separately [less than 1 line not declassified]. Added together, I believe evidence is mounting that the Prime Minister’s problems are substantial and that he must move decisively and constructively if he is to retain the balance in his favor within the military establishment necessary for survival. It remains to be seen whether Prime Minister will in light of above circumstances ultimately grasp point that only by a strong demonstration of leadership based upon the full implementation of the 1968 Constitution does he continue to have real chance to save himself as leader of the government and prevent disgrace and disintegration of his “revolution.”

Tasca

3. Memorandum From Acting Secretary of State Rush to President Nixon


SUBJECT
Reappraisal of our Greek Policy

Events over the past two weeks have presented us with a changed situation in Greece which will affect our interests in ways that cannot yet be fully assessed.

a. The Navy mutiny on May 22–23 brought an aftermath of arrests of royalist officers in all services. This development has raised a

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2 Tasca sent an analysis of the mutiny to the Department in telegram 3206, May 24. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970–73, POL 23–9 GREECE)
question as to whether the Greek armed forces can now be considered fully effective as a NATO force.

b. King Constantine appealed to you on May 30\(^3\) to forestall an impending move against the monarchy and to press the Papadopoulos government for evolution toward parliamentary rule. Our reply to Constantine, and the way we handle the monarchy issue, will have an impact on other monarchs in the area, especially the Shah of Iran, who has already expressed his concern, and King Hussein of Jordan.

c. Papadopoulos announced on June 1 that the monarchy was abolished and that a prompt plebiscite on constitutional changes would be held with general elections to follow before the end of 1974.\(^4\) In a shrewd move, Papadopoulos has destroyed an institution that offered continuity and an option for evolution back to democracy while at the same time pledging that he will promptly return the country to representative rule within a republican form of government. Our reaction to this development should reflect our assessment of Papadopoulos’ actual intentions and capabilities. Papadopoulos’ announcement also faces us with an immediate question of recognition, since Ambassador Tasca is accredited to King Constantine.

Our approach to the various issues that have been raised over the past two weeks should be carefully coordinated, in the context of a review of all our policy options on Greece. While our preliminary assessment indicates that the Papadopoulos regime may not be viable over the long run and may indeed not be able to meet other challenges in the short term, we may also have to face the possibility that there is little we can effectively do to move events in the direction we wish. I recommend that you issue a NSSM along the lines of the attached draft as soon as possible,\(^5\) looking toward an early meeting of the Senior Review Group on the Greek issue. I will be sending you our views on the situation in the aftermath of the regime’s momentous decision.

Attached is a very preliminary tentative analysis.

Kenneth Rush

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\(^3\) King Constantine had requested a meeting with Ambassador Volpe in Rome to discuss his concerns about the political situation in Greece. (Memorandum from Eliot to Kissinger, May 29; ibid., POL 30 GREECE) The Department decided that it would be better for a subordinate Embassy officer to meet with the King. (Telegram 103077, May 30; ibid.) Consequently, the DCM met with Constantine on May 30. (Telegram 4621, May 30; ibid., POL GREECE–US)

\(^4\) The Embassy in Athens reported the announcement in telegram 3496, June 1. (Ibid., Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 594, Country Files, Middle East, Greece, Vol. IV)

\(^5\) Attached but not printed. The NSSM was finally issued on January 16, 1975, as NSSM 215. See Document 33.
Prime Minister Papadopoulos has abolished the monarchy and established a “presidential parliamentary democracy.” He announced on June 1 that he would assume the duties of Provisional President, that revisions of the constitution would be prepared within two months, and that general elections would be held before the end of 1974. This is a substantial change which will undoubtedly affect our interests in Greece in ways that are not yet entirely clear.

Background

In recent months it has become evident that Prime Minister Papadopoulos’ control over Greek internal events has become increasingly tenuous. The stalemate in Greek political life, combined with inflation, student riots, and charges of corruption in high places have raised the level of dissent particularly within the armed forces which represent the key to power. We have been concerned for some time about the possibility of an abrupt change of leadership, most likely in the form of a “palace coup.”

Against this backdrop, the Government of Greece announced on May 23 that it had thwarted a Navy insurrection and had arrested a number of active officers and two retired Admirals. Two days later, the Captain of the destroyer “Velos” took his vessel out of NATO maneuvers, declared himself and his crew against the regime, and sailed for Italy. In its public statement the Greek regime tied in the mutiny with “self-exiled” Greeks, and in subsequent remarks various Greek officials took the position that King Constantine was involved in the plot. They took the King’s failure to issue a public statement denouncing the mutiny as evidence of his complicity. The King has categorically denied his involvement. We have no hard evidence either way.

The wave of arrests in the wake of the Navy mutiny appears to have involved 60 or more Navy officers and the round-up of royalists is spilling over into the Air Force and Army. Therefore, the mutiny, while not successful, is not as limited as the Greek Government maintains.
On June 1, Papadopoulos announced that the monarchy was abolished by a constituent act voted by the Cabinet. He assumed the duties of Provisional President. He said that revisions to the 1968 Constitution will be prepared within one month and put to a plebiscite within two months. According to the announcement, general elections will be held before the end of 1974.

Preliminary Assessment

Papadopoulos has used the Navy mutiny as a pretext to free his regime from the structure of the 1968 Constitution and the monarchy. We assume Papadopoulos’ action is designed to buy time for his regime while throwing the opposition off balance, and that he hoped his solemn pledge of a firm timetable for general elections would forestall objections from abroad. In view of Papadopoulos’ failure to carry out his past categoric commitment to President Nixon regarding elections, and the fact that conditions for free elections do not and are not likely to prevail, we are skeptical regarding this shrewd, tactical announcement.

There is a mutual U.S.-Greek interest in maintaining Greek effectiveness in NATO. The latest move by Papadopoulos, in view of the fact that it involves military elements, raises questions as to future Greek effectiveness in NATO. It introduces a divisive issue in NATO, after a period when the “Greek question” has eased off.

While we have no direct stake in the monarchy as such, this institution represented continuity and one option for a peaceful re-establishment of parliamentary rule which has been a second objective of our policy. Our view of the impact of this development on our national interests must depend on an assessment as to whether Papadopoulos intends to, and is able to, honor his pledge to hold elections in 1974. As indicated above, we doubt this.

The conduct of the plebiscite, and of the general elections if they do occur, will have a bearing on Greece’s political future and the fate of our interests there. Papadopoulos did not say specifically in his announcement that the “old political world” will be excluded from elections, but one of the strongest policies of the regime from its inception has been to bar this group from political activity. Whether former politicians and royalists will be permitted political activity remains to be seen. The handling of the referendum and actual moves toward bringing into force those articles of the constitution providing for organization of political parties and elections may provide a reasonably satisfactory solution to Greece’s political problem with hope of future improvement, or alternatively might prove so distasteful to important segments of the Greek people that the situation would deteriorate even further. We will not have a clear picture of the way this move will affect our interests until this particular scenario is worked out through the election period.
4. Memorandum From the Chief of the Near East and South Asia Division, Central Intelligence Agency (Waller) to Director of Central Intelligence Schlesinger


[Source: Central Intelligence Agency, Executive Registry, Job 80–M01066A, Box 12, Folder 21. Secret. 2 pages not declassified.]

5. National Intelligence Estimate


[Omitted here is a table of contents.]

SHORT-TERM PROSPECTS IN GREECE

Note

This Estimate assesses the present state of the Greek regime, the issues facing it, its longevity, and the likely nature of a successor. It also addresses Greek relations with the US and Western Europe, either under a continuation of the Papadopoulos regime or under a successor. The focus is on the next year or so.

Précis

A. The present regime in Greece is showing signs of wear and tear after six years in office, but it still commands the essential elements of power. The odds favor Papadopoulos’ survival over the next year or so, but this is by no means assured. If he should go, the replacement would most likely be another member of the junta, and neither governmental policies nor attitudes toward the US would greatly change.

B. It is even possible that Papadopoulos might be ousted before the 29 July plebiscite or that other junta members, resentful of his

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1 Source: Central Intelligence Agency, NIC Files, Job 79–R01012A. Secret; Controlled Dissem. The Central Intelligence Agency and the intelligence organizations of the Departments of State and Defense, the National Security Agency, and the Department of the Treasury participated in the preparation of this estimate. The Director of Central Intelligence submitted this estimate with the concurrence of all members of the United States Intelligence Board with the exception of the representatives of the Federal Bureau of Investigation who abstained on the grounds that it was outside his jurisdiction.
efforts to institutionalize his control, might seek to delay the vote. We believe, however, that the voting will take place as scheduled and that Greece will become a republic headed by Papadopoulos with an extensive range of authority.

C. Once past this vote, Papadopoulos’ position will be strengthened. Yet the odds on his continued rule will diminish with the passage of time, the accumulation of grievances against him in various quarters, and Greek weariness with any regime too long in power. Three categories of opposition will remain sources of concern to him:

1. Papadopoulos’ senior colleagues within the regime have the potential to oust him, but probably will not unless and until he makes serious blunders—mishandling major issues or alienating key military elements.

2. Army officers who feel the regime has failed to carry out the goals of the “Revolution,” has grown corrupt, and is insufficiently nationalist. Some zealots of this type exist, but the regime, through its security services, keeps close tabs on such persons; a successful move by them is very unlikely in the near term at least.

3. Traditional political forces which want a return to elective government, but are virtually without power to force change on the junta so long as it remains cohesive.

D. The attitudes of the Greek people, in favor of ties with Europe and the US, will continue largely independent of whatever government rules in Athens. Most Greeks credit the US with great potential influence over Greek affairs and believe it backs the junta. But the regime is highly resistant to suggestions from outside on what it regards as domestic Greek affairs.

1. Papadopoulos would be annoyed by public US disapproval of his political plans. Such US action probably would not result either in modification of those plans or in drastic changes of policy toward the US. However, he probably would somewhat reduce cooperation on those bilateral arrangements which serve primarily US interests.

2. Whatever Washington’s policy on Greek domestic politics, the junta will be less easy to deal with than in earlier years, when it felt a more urgent need for strong US support.

E. The regime will continue to be an irritant in Greek-European relations. Athens will not enjoy smooth political relations within NATO; continued criticism of the junta, especially by smaller states, could lead to Greece’s pulling out of some NATO committees, but not from NATO itself.

F. The Papadopoulos regime has, on balance, helped to keep the Cyprus situation from breaking into flame, even though some of Papadopoulos’ colleagues incline toward drastic initiatives. No Greek government is likely to be more moderate over Cyprus than the present one.
The Estimate

I. The Regime and Its Current Position

1. Six years ago a junta led by Greek army officers seized power with the declared goals of halting a leftist takeover, purifying Greek society, and giving it honest and efficient government. The junta was convinced that democratic government had proved unworkable in Greece and that a strong administration was needed. It proclaimed a revolution, but it had no clear notion as to how to achieve its goals. The principal change that has occurred since the coup has been the gradual emergence of Papadopoulos as the dominant leader. However, the collegiate character of the regime, though weakened, has continued to be a restraint on his activities. The regime has ruled with the acceptance of the populace, partly because the people were weary of the political tumult of the early 1960s and partly because of favorable economic developments; per capita gross national product grew 40 percent in real terms in the 1967–1971 period. Unemployment is low thanks to modest industrial expansion and migration of workers to Western Europe.

2. The regime is beginning to experience wear and tear after six years in power; some corruption has come to light; Greece is no better administered than under the old system; and many Greeks feel the regime has lost its sense of purpose. Inflation has cropped up in the past year and is a source of concern to Greeks. There have been several developments which indicate a growth in political stirrings after several years of passivity. Papadopoulos discovered and circumvented a plot directed against him within the army in September 1972. The regime has had to contend with student strikes, demonstrations, and boycotts over a two-month period in the spring of 1973. And in late May 1973 there was an abortive challenge to the regime from within the navy.

3. The regime seized on this episode to buttress its position. The government accused the mutineers of being in collaboration with the exiled King Constantine; since the Greek Navy has been generally royalist in its loyalty, this provided a pretext to abolish the monarchy. A plebiscite is scheduled for 29 July to approve changes in the Constitution which will make Greece a republic for the second time in 50 years. Greeks will vote on 34 changes in the 1968 Constitution which eliminate all vestiges of the monarchy and give wide powers to the presidency. A yes vote will also put Papadopoulos in office as President for a term which expires on 1 June 1981. [Footnote is in the original.]

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2 Greeks will vote on 34 changes in the 1968 Constitution which eliminate all vestiges of the monarchy and give wide powers to the presidency. A yes vote will also put Papadopoulos in office as President for a term which expires on 1 June 1981. [Footnote is in the original.]
Greece recently. The government has arrested about 60 naval officers, including a substantial number of those qualified to command ships. This purge also served as a warning to officers in other services who might entertain similar ideas.

4. The ambitious Papadopoulos saw the plebiscite as a way to put himself in office for the rest of the 1970s. Abolition of the monarchy has appeal for many in the regime, especially those of second rank. Indeed, only a minority in Greece supports Constantine and the monarchy today. (At some future time, it may serve the purpose of some factions to work for reinstituting it.) But the plebiscite offers no real choice since there is no alternative to the constitutional changes or to the candidacies of Papadopoulos and Armed Forces Chief Angelis for President and Vice President.

5. There are few tools available with which to measure public opinion in Greece or the extent of popular support for the Papadopoulos regime; the press is controlled, public opinion polls do not exist, and observers’ reports by and large reflect specific topics rather than the overall situation. Such information as is available indicates that the acceptance the regime had enjoyed has lately begun to erode, even in rural areas. Large business interests have made their peace with the Papadopoulos government. As for labor, some factions have been restive, others have courted the regime’s favor; no clear pattern has emerged. The urban professional classes, with hopes of playing political roles again, are a source of antagonism. So is a sizeable portion of the university student body, with student complaints over academic issues beginning to take on a political flavor.

6. Within the regime itself, the strengths of various factions and persons is far from clear. Some members are apprehensive over the way Papadopoulos is using the monarchy/plebiscite issue to strengthen his position. He is planning to reduce selectively the military component of the government later this year, and this would affect a number of former officers who were members of the original coup group. (He evidently intends to retain officers who have strong military backing.) Other members of the regime are concerned that even a carefully rigged vote will open the door for a return to parliamentary elective government, which few in the regime want. Still others believe that the plebiscite cannot be successfully managed, despite the regime’s control of the administration, the police and security services and its domination of the news media. They fear that the regime’s claim to legitimacy could be damaged by a too transparent rigging of the vote.

II. Near-Term Prospects

7. The next few weeks could produce a challenge to Papadopoulos. There is an outside chance of a move against Papadopoulos and
the regime by former junta member Stamatelopoulos; he would need
the active support of a key figure such as military security chief Ioan-
nides to have any hope of success. Another possibility is that junta
members who want to stop Papadopoulos from getting more power
might decide to move before he is publicly chosen as President for
eight years. Such persons might seek ways of postponing or cancelling
the plebiscite. Regime leaders probably wish to avoid this, fearing it
would weaken their claim to govern. All things considered, we esti-
mate that the plebiscite will take place on schedule, that there will be
a certain amount of rigging to ensure that Papadopoulos gets the sub-
stantial majority he thinks he needs, and that Greece will become a
republic.

8. Although the name will change, the system will not. The polit-
ical attitudes of the regime leaders vary on certain issues, but they are
united by the imperatives of survival and by the belief that a continu-
ation of their government is best for Greece. Although the regime cou-
pled its announcement abolishing the monarchy and proclaiming the
plebiscite with indications that some freeing up of the political process
was in prospect, the evidence since then indicates that moves in the di-
rection of elective politics are not likely. After first implying that elec-
tions would be held in 1974, Papadopoulos has backtracked and now
promises only that a date for elections to the Parliament will be an-
nounced during 1974.

III. Once Past the Plebiscite

9. If Papadopoulos secures the expected majority in the 29 July
voting, he will have achieved a certain legitimacy and his position will
be strengthened at least for a time. Yet there will continue to be three
broad categories of opposition forces about which he must remain
concerned.

10. Traditional Political Forces. Certain of the pre-junta political lead-
ers are showing signs of activity, but neither individually or collectively
are they very strong. Many are in exile; those representing the extremes
of right and left are fairly well discredited within Greece. Karamanlis
and other centrist leaders have begun to cooperate, but they can do lit-
tle to affect the junta’s control as long as it remains cohesive and as
long as there is no crying domestic issue around which Greeks can rally
in opposition to the regime. Hence they are not likely to force change
on the regime in the near term.

11. There is also the possibility of a coup against the junta from within
the Greek armed forces. There are some officers, mostly under the rank
of lieutenant colonel, who feel that the regime has failed to carry
out the goals of the “Revolution,” has grown corrupt, and is insuffi-
ciently nationalist. These officers display signs of zealotry and hyper-
nationalism. Such elements reportedly participated in abortive coups
of 1970 and 1972, but we have no indications that a coup by such elements is now in the works. In general, our information on political factions within the Greek Army is spotty. The regime itself is aware of such attitudes. It takes pains to keep officers who hold them under surveillance and away from sensitive command positions. We think it capable of detecting a move and neutralizing it.

12. A falling-out within the regime is the most likely way in which Papadopoulos would be replaced. His senior colleagues—Pattakos, Makarezos, Angelis, and Ioannides—or a faction of them, acting in association with the second rank members, have the potential to oust Papadopoulos. They and their subordinates control the armed forces in Greece. Ioannides is a key figure, since he controls the domestic military intelligence apparatus and has the personal loyalty of some of the second rank officers. Most of the regime’s leaders still prefer to have Papadopoulos in office, if only because he is reasonably adroit and is bearing the brunt of criticism. Yet all of them know that Papadopoulos is personally ambitious and would like to cut some of them down to size if not remove them from power entirely.

13. On the whole, however, unless Papadopoulos gets into grave trouble by clearly mishandling major issues or alienates key military elements, the other junta members would probably not move against him. Although the troubles of the past 12 months have been significantly larger than in previous years, they have not reached critical proportions. But as time passes, the odds on Papadopoulos’ continued rule will go down; growing public demand for participation in rule will require moves on his part which will increase the chances of a misstep. And the desire for a new face in charge will grow; many Greeks are tired of the present one. Other members of the junta could seek his removal as the way to preserve their own position.

IV. Implications for the United States and Europe of Greek Developments

14. The attitudes of the Greek people toward Europe and the US are largely independent of whatever government rules in Athens. Greece considers itself part of Europe and its orientation is westward—culturally, economically, and politically. Moreover, Greek military leaders, in particular, are of a conservative bent, dislike communism, and look to the West for arms. Hence, the broad framework of Greek policies would be similar, whether under Papadopoulos or under the junta if it ousted him. On any given issue, the personal convictions of those in charge of Greece would make the government easier or more difficult to deal with. But differences would be largely of degree. The observations below apply to a situation in which the regime persists in office, with or without Papadopoulos at its head. (Paragraphs 26 and 27 address contingencies which would involve a sharp break with the policies of recent years.)
The United States

15. Of all Greece’s Western associates, the US is the most important. Bilateral ties are strong, and there is a very substantial interaction between the US and Greece. The US is a factor in the political process in Greece, since Greek public opinion credits the US with the power to shape developments within the country. Most Greeks think that Washington is thoroughly behind Papadopoulos and his regime, and he exploits this belief to strengthen his personal position. Papadopoulos, for his part, is committed to cooperation with the US on matters of mutual benefit, but he is not responsive to the US in matters which he considers touch the durability of his control. He, and the regime, have been highly resistant over the years to suggestions from any outsiders on such matters as restoration of elective government.

16. Papadopoulos has told the US that he will brook no interference in his current plans to reshape the Greek Government. He would be annoyed by any public expression of US disapproval of his plans. But he probably would not go so far as to either modify his political plans or make drastic changes in Greek policy toward the US. Rather, Papadopoulos probably would complain aloud of interference in Greek politics and somewhat reduce cooperation on those bilateral arrangements which primarily serve US interests.

17. Whatever Washington’s policy on Greek domestic policies in the months ahead, the US has probably already experienced the best years of its relationship with the Greek junta. In this regime’s early years in power, the appearance of US support was more important to Papadopoulos than it is today. The regime no longer sees such a compelling need to accommodate US desires. There will be frictions arising from the proposed major expansion of US military facilities in Greece. A carrier task force is due to be homeported near Athens beginning in February 1974. Consideration is being given to building a large pier to berth the carrier. This would bring the American naval contingent in that area to some 7,500 service men and 4,000 dependents. (There are also some 2,500 air force personnel and dependents.) The US presence will be a very visible one in the Athens area.

18. This is not to say that the second phase of the homeporting program will not go through on schedule, nor that the Greeks necessarily will want to halt or cut down on other US military facilities or programs under way. Most of these are related to the NATO alliance and, in addition, are of benefit to Greece. But the regime is likely to be fussier on details, less willing to agree to some project on short notice, and more disposed to exercise supervision to see that the facilities are not used in a way the Greeks regard as derogating from their sovereignty. (When a Greek opposition figure left Greece illegally from a US military installation in 1972, the government was affronted and moved
to restore a measure of Greek control over it.) In addition, the junta will probably, in certain circumstances, seek domestic political advantage through criticism of the US presence.

Western Europe and NATO

19. The junta’s relations in this theatre are likely to be more troubled than they are with the US. Many Europeans labor under the impression that only the ambitions of a few colonels prevent Greece from being a classic democracy. The regime resents the actions and words of some European states as intervention in Greek domestic affairs. Greece withdrew from the Council of Europe when it seemed about to be expelled for its lack of democracy.

20. Although Greece is a conscientious member of NATO, Athens will not enjoy smooth political relations within that organization. Various West European governments will keep calling attention to the incompatibility of the non-democratic character of the regime with the preamble to the treaty establishing NATO. Domestic political parties that would like to make Greece’s position in NATO intolerable are especially strong in Belgium, Holland, Denmark, and Norway. But no West European government wants a major quarrel with Washington over Greece, regardless of the character of Athens’ regime, and all recognize Greece’s strategic importance to NATO. Nonetheless, the possibility that a damaging confrontation within NATO might take place is real. Greece could, say, respond to continued criticism by ceasing to participate in one or more NATO committees. But even if gestures of this sort were made, Greece is not likely to diminish its military cooperation with NATO, and a complete Greek withdrawal from that organization is highly unlikely.

21. In other aspects of European, or indeed Atlantic, relationships, Greece is a factor of limited importance. Although trade and international finance are major concerns to Greece, Greece is of little consequence in either regard. Its total trade in 1972 amounted to some $3 billion, less than one percent of total European trade. Its reserves are similarly small in relation to all Europe’s. Greece simply is not in a position to influence European financial or trade matters to any great extent.

22. Greece signed an association agreement with the Common Market in 1961, which calls for the establishment, over a period of years, of a full customs union and the harmonizing of Greek social and economic policies with the Market. Currently half of Greece’s international trade is with the Nine. Over the long term, relations between Greece and the European Community will be difficult, since acceptance of full Greek membership, scheduled for the early 1980s, will ultimately be decided more on political than on economic grounds. Barring unexpectedly rapid movement toward liberalization, Greece will remain outside the Community.
23. In other European groups, Greece stands to play a small role. Greek representatives will probably be active in various committees of the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe working on declarations of purpose. But in this as in many other European matters, they will be chiefly concerned to defend Greece from others' meddling and are unlikely to take the lead in any serious way.

Cyprus

24. The Papadopoulos regime has, on balance, helped to keep the Cyprus situation from breaking into flame. Under the rigidly controlled political conditions in Athens, political figures cannot make headlines by inflammatory declarations on Cyprus. Papadopoulos has made it perfectly clear that Greek-Turkish hostilities over Cyprus would be in the interests of neither country. Both Athens and Ankara have in recent months urged their respective clients on the island to try to compose their deep differences sufficiently so as to restore some normalcy after a dozen years of tension and division. Some members of the junta are more inclined than Papadopoulos toward drastic initiatives on the Cyprus problem. But these tendencies are likely to be restrained by the collegiate character of the junta. It would be unlikely, however, that any Greek government would be more moderate than the present one.

25. But it must also be noted that the ability of the junta—or of any Greek regime—to be conciliatory on this issue is closely related to its own sense of security and self-confidence. Should the government feel weakened politically in coming months, it might yield to demagogic and nationalistic urges on the Cyprus issue.

A Totally New Military Junta

26. Speculating on the probable policies of an unknown group of military officers is seldom fruitful. In this case the question is addressed, since, although not likely, a radical new military junta is probably the only realistic contingency which would entail a sharp break with Greek policies of the past half-dozen years. It is possible that a new, more nationalistic leadership would decide that Greece had become too closely associated with the US and while maintaining its NATO ties, would reduce the bilateral relationship with the US. But even in this case, there are distinct limits on how far any such government could go. We would be quite confident in ruling out the takeover by an ultranationalist, anti-Western leader on the Nasser pattern. Such an orientation would be contradictory to deeply-held values in Greek society and hardly feasible for Greece’s material or security interests.

A Further Contingency

27. If Papadopoulos were replaced or the junta itself ousted, a principal effect would be to call into question the legitimacy of government
in Athens. That is to say, the 1967 military coup which aimed at “purifying” Greece had a certain amount of justification, since many in Greece felt that Greek society could stand a little purifying. A second military move would look more like a power-grab by self-seeking military officers. If one colonel felt called upon to seize power, then a second could feel equally justified. And if the regime in Athens were to change frequently through the agency of military force, the resulting loss of legitimacy would provide a target against which conventional forces could rally. At such a future time, the civilian side of the Greek political scene would heat up fairly quickly, throwing open the whole future of Greek politics.

6. Intelligence Note Prepared in the Bureau of Intelligence and Research


GREEK PLEBISCITE: THE REPUBLIC’S INAUSPICIOUS BEGINNING

The Greek Government has announced an overwhelming victory in the July 29 plebiscite. According to the Ministry of Interior, virtually complete results as of July 31 show a “yes” vote of 78.4 per cent, thus confirming the constitutional changes decreed by President-elect George Papadopoulos following his abolition of the monarchy and proclamation of the Republic on June 1.

In the days following his dramatic move, Papadopoulos hurriedly rewrote the 1968 constitution, which was never fully implemented, to give Greece a presidency that would control all the levers of power, and promised elections for a constricted parliament in 1974. The electorate was asked to vote “yes” or “no” on July 29 on these changes and on the unopposed candidacies of Papadopoulos as President and armed forces commander General Angelis as Vice President. Their term is to run through June 1, 1981.

Victory Guaranteed. The outcome of the voting was never in doubt. By employing the usual techniques of authoritarian regimes, the junta

1 Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970–73, POL 14 GREECE. Confidential; No Foreign Dissem. Drafted by Bernard Rotklein and cleared by David Mark and Philip Stoddard (INR/Near East and South Asia).
fostered an atmosphere of fear and intimidation in the weeks prior to the referendum and variously conjured up the spectre of chaos, on the one hand, and fascist repression, on the other, as direct consequences of a majority “no” vote. Voting procedures also were rigged to insure the right outcome. Moreover, by making clear that he would not step down irrespective of the plebiscite’s result, Papadopoulos encouraged an attitude of apathy and resignation that was already feeding on the widespread belief that the vote count would be falsified by the junta to record a predetermined total. In fact, extensive upward doctoring of the tally by authorities in Athens appears to have been unnecessary. On the contrary, the “yes” vote may have been so overwhelming, thanks to the efforts of overzealous local officials who seem to have reported near or total unanimity in their villages, that the regime was embarrassed. This in turn, may even have led to efforts to reduce the “yes” vote to more credible proportions.

Opposition Unites. The heavily handicapped effort of many pre-coup political leaders to mount an opposition campaign was unable to cope with the resources of the state arrayed against it. Although the former politicians may have indirectly enhanced Papadopoulos’ victory by urging a “no” vote and thereby recognizing and legitimizing the referendum, their success in closing ranks, from the communist left to the monarchist right, in opposing the plebiscite was especially noteworthy.

Papadopoulos’ Position Improved. In the short term, at least, Papadopoulos has bolstered his position by his success in staging the plebiscite. His victory at the polls will temporarily check the disaffection among the military that had surfaced in the abortive naval coup in May. Many officers who are distrustful of Papadopoulos’ steady consolidation of personal power, including a large number who are disillusioned by his “betrayal of the revolution,” will now bide their time, hoping for some future opportunity either to remove him or to cut him down to size.

The apparent smoothness of the referendum probably will disarm the hardliners in the junta who opposed the plebiscite. Despite their apprehension over indications that Papadopoulos intends to “politicize” the regime following the plebiscite by replacing military officers with civilians, they felt unable to risk a break with him in the weeks before the plebiscite. As has happened before in the six-year history of the regime, Papadopoulos’ would-be rivals in the junta have been out-maneuvered by the new President and are now in no position to dictate to him.

General Angelis’ refusal to follow custom and resign as armed forces commander prior to the referendum can be viewed against this background. He probably fears overdependence as Vice President on
Papadopoulos and wishes to maintain his position at the top in the military hierarchy before irretrievably tying his fortunes to a master of intrigue who has successfully neutralized all rivals in what began in 1967 as a collegium.

**Uncertain Prospects.** Over the long run, however, Papadopoulos is not likely to preserve his current dominance. He will confront serious problems in coping with skyrocketing inflation, discontented students, and, perhaps most important, growing disaffection within the military which was badly shaken by the demoralizing consequences of the abortive naval coup last May.

Papadopoulos may have deluded himself by the results of his “plebiscite,” but his partners in the junta will not be fooled by the charade. They know that he is not popular among the people and that their own support of him owes much more to the imperatives of survival than to any sentiments of loyalty. This is probably a key factor behind Papadopoulos’ apparent intention to replace an undetermined number of the junta members in the impending government reorganization. Those who remain will be watching for some misstep by Papadopoulos in his handling of a major issue to weaken, at least, his hold on the government.

In any event, proclaiming the Republic and holding the plebiscite may have sown the seeds of still further regime troubles. The mere exercise of voting has probably whetted the appetite for elections of the Greek people, who pride themselves on their political awareness. Although for five years Papadopoulos refused to implement the parliamentary provisions of the 1968 constitution, he will find it more difficult to welsh on his promise of elections in 1974. In this connection, the ability of almost all shades of the hitherto disparate political opposition to unite on a common course of action in urging a “no” vote may yet represent the most significant outcome of the plebiscite.

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7. **Telegram From the Embassy in Greece to the Department of State**

Athens, November 18, 1973, 1155Z.

8046. Subject: Views of PM Markezinis.

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1 Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 594, Country Files, Middle East, Greece, Vol. IV. Secret; Immediate; Exdis.
1. I talked briefly to PM Markezinis today regarding recent developments, expressing favorable impression which President Papadopoulos and his reference to the importance of elections and political normalization had made. I said I personally regretted that it had been considered necessary to declare martial law throughout the country, adding the hope it would be of brief duration.

2. Markezinis said martial law had been required because subversive plot had clearly developed. He hoped need for martial law would be very brief and that progress on political front would be resumed. He thought that decisive intervention of army would make clear to the country and the politicians that the path to democracy could and would be restored through the efforts of the present government. I repeated the point that prompt removal of martial law could give the impression of strength.

3. Markezinis confirmed he was to have made important political announcement at his November 17 press conference. He said he very much appreciated my words and expressed hope to have more extended conversation with me this coming week.

4. Thrust of my exchange with Markezinis was to get message to him and Papadopoulos that we appreciated continued emphasis on political progress, understood efforts of subversive elements, as Papadopoulos stated, to seek to cause political program to fail, and to encourage them to lift martial law and get on with the political program. Markezinis said he will pass thoughts to Papadopoulos.

5. Incidentally I should stress that available intelligence just prior to the demonstrations gave a clear indication that prospects of full participation of old political world were quite promising, a fact which could not fail to disturb Andreas Papandreou (and his stooge in Washington, Demetracopoulos), as well as other extremist elements.

Tasca

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2 In airgram A–322 from Athens, November 9, the Embassy reported that the resumption of university classes for the fall-winter term also brought the return of student “dissidence sparked by academic and intra-professional woes as well as political unhappiness with the Papadopoulos/Markezinis era.” (Ibid., RG 59, Central Files 1970–73, POL 13–2 GREECE)

3 In the early hours of November 17, the Greek armed forces cracked down on increased protests. In telegram 8037 from Athens, November 17, the Embassy called the move a “setback to ongoing GOG efforts to return Greece to more normal pattern of political life.” (Ibid., RG 84, Athens Embassy Files: Lot 77 F 105, Embassy/Athens Political Files, 1973, Box 9, POL 23–8)
8. **Telegram From the Embassy in Greece to the Department of State**

Athens, November 26, 1973, 1730Z.

8297. Subject: Greece’s Apparent New Master: Demetrios Ioannides; Some Fears.

1. As the reporting has indicated, Brigadier General Ioannides not only has masterminded the entire new coup but remains without question the dominant figure. Our intelligence reveals that the new President has had an undistinguished career, is not considered to have been a strong military commander, and in general is likely to be completely subject to General Ioannides’ objectives and desires. As for the new Prime Minister, Androutsopoulos, I have known him quite well over the years I have been here. I consider him honest and incorruptible but on the timid side. Here again, I believe he will knuckle down to whatever General Ioannides tells him to do.

2. General Ioannides’ record has been that of a persistent tough critic of Papadopoulos, a hardliner, and the Chief of the Military Police, which is reputed to have been largely responsible for maltreatment of political prisoners. He is a puritan at heart and in action. His behavior as recently recounted by Isouderos and Palamas would tend to indicate clearly that it is only matter of time before he may decide to push himself to the fore to become the outward expressed symbol of Greek political power. I would not be surprised if he were to replace Ghizikis as President. There is no reason to think he believes in democracy. Perhaps he does but the declaration of the armed forces yesterday morning tends to make clear that if he does believe in democracy, it will probably be of a type unacceptable to public opinion of Western Europe and the United States.

3. Because of the background of its principal members, this regime can be characterized as likely to be pro-American. However, I think we should accept this conclusion with at least one grain of salt since their puritanism on internal matters may become of such overriding importance to them as to affect adversely their external interests. This could affect our security relations. This does not mean they would not

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1 Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 594, Country Files, Middle East, Greece, Vol. IV. Secret; Exdis.

2 As reported in telegrams 8232 and 8233, November 25, and telegram 8473, December 3, all from Athens, and telegram 236011 to Athens, December 1, the Greek army ousted Papadopoulos in a bloodless coup on November 25. (Ibid.)

3 Phaidon Gizikis.
seek accommodation with the U.S., but they are likely to be tough in their bargaining and on some points even intractable.

4. Even more significant, in my view, will be the danger that a leader like Ioannides will polarize divisively the country’s political forces. The proponents of a united front from Karamanlis over to the left, including the EDA and even the Communist left, both internal dissidents and external, will be greatly encouraged. The possibility of organized violence on the part of such a group, already strongly promoted by Andreas Papandreou, will become greatly increased. Further repression will increase polarization and could easily lead to a serious division in the armed forces which might lead eventually to conflict and great political instability. I do not believe that U.S. interests would gain in this process. This process would be greatly facilitated by the likely inability of the new regime to deal successfully with the many problems facing them and which, if not properly tended to, will increase political tension and polarization. What the country needs is not more repression and more control, but more freedom and more self expression, politically organized. The problems facing Greece, such as inflation, Cyprus, students, bureaucratic modernization, etc. will need broad popular support if these are to be dealt with not only effectively but with a minimum of reaction to some of the tough measures required.

4. It is of course possible that none of this will happen. Some in Athens even believe that rapprochement may be in course between Karamanlis and the new regime. But based purely on the record I am not optimistic on this point. I find the manner in which Ioannides was able to cut across command channels and have discharged or released from service a number of officers senior to himself without commitment to any political program highly disquieting for the future. I also believe that even those Greeks who are presently in somewhat of a state of euphoria because of their glee with the disappearance of Papadopoulos, may find the gray “morning after” grim, dismal and depressing. There is some real indication that some of the military may already be concerned about where they are going. The Greek military are now engaged in what could be a disastrous operation of political intervention. This inevitably involves them in the divisiveness of internal Greek politics. Thus, instead of restoring their function as an independent defense force dedicated only to serving the country’s defense and security needs, they are becoming entrenched as masters of the people.

5. It is within the foregoing context that I think the U.S. should consider what its posture should be toward General Ioannides and his efforts at this time.

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9. Telegram From the Embassy in Greece to the Department of State

Athens, February 8, 1974, 1040Z.


1. Summary. The Embassy has previously reported on the Greek political mood and prospects for the future. In this message we look beyond the exterior appearances of government, to focus on the basic power structure in Greece, the Hellenic Armed Forces, for, while the entire government, except for the President, is composed of civilians, decisive power lies behind the scene with the military. Events of the last nine months have had a traumatic effect on the military’s effectiveness both as an organization and as basis for political stability. A sense of continuity and many of the benefits of experience have been lost as the upper ranks have been decimated by too frequent change. Discipline has been seriously impaired as the middle ranks have been politicized. The Armed Forces now constitute the single greatest barrier to stable political life. End Summary.

2. The Military on the Evening of the Coup. Dissatisfaction with the state of affairs in Greece had been growing markedly within the Armed Forces, particularly the Army, in the six months or so preceding the coup of Nov. 25. During the period preliminary to the November coup, however, the senior command positions in the military remained in the hands of the figures who, on the surface at least, remained loyal to Papadopoulos. They were put there, many only recently, precisely because of their presumed commitment to the President. Ironically, when the test did come, most went along with the coup, even if they had not been involved in the plotting from the beginning. A number, more deeply compromised by their association with Papadopoulos over a longer period of time, were themselves targets of the coup. They were unable to offer any effective resistance and were immediately neutralized.

3. While the majority of the officer corps may have been neutral on the question of military intervention, or at least were not inclined to agitate for it, a fairly well-defined group of middle-grade and jun-

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1 Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 594, Country Files, Middle East, Greece, Vol. IV. Secret; Priority; Exdis.

2 In telegram 512 from Athens, January 24, Tasca described the euphoria over Papadopoulos’s departure in the November 25 coup as giving way to a “bleak mood verging on despair” with martial law still in effect and economic prospects remaining grim. (Ibid.)
ior officers was becoming increasingly impatient with the situation. Almost all of them were declared or clandestine followers of Brig. Gen. Ioannides, the Commander of the Greek Military Police (ESA) and self-appointed watchdog of Papadopoulos’ leadership of the “revolution” at least since 1970.

4. These officers, many of whom owed their position to Ioannides’ influence when he set up a watchdog group under President Papadopoulos, believed that the “revolution” had been betrayed by the majority of its original leaders. Mistakes had been made; some considered that the military had assumed too direct a role in the government and had been corrupted by it. As a result the military was losing the respect of the Greek people. Its part in such frauds as the July referendum caused it to lose further ground in its struggle to maintain its integrity. These effects were magnified by the cult of personality developing in an atmosphere of increasingly blatant corruption.

5. Ioannides had never made any secret of his intention that if the day ever came in which it appeared that the principles of the 1967 revolution were about to be irreversibly compromised he would try to remove Papadopoulos from power. In his estimation and that of his followers, almost everything that the Markezinis government did from the day it took office brought that moment nearer. Throughout October and early November, morale among the military slumped. More and more of the younger officers began to question the route the government was taking. And, finally, to corruption, another issue was added: a formal return through elections to the very same type of parliamentary regime that had been ousted in 1967. The student disturbances, accompanied by bloodshed, forced the military to the front in the distasteful role of saviors of a regime that had abandoned the revolution. The critical level of dissatisfaction had been reached. It was the ideal occasion for Ioannides to move.

6. The Hellenic Armed Forces Today. The coup of Nov. 25 has severely affected the effectiveness of the Armed Forces. While such traditional defense functions as border defense still go on, no officer in any service can be confident of his position after the turmoil caused by the recent major upheavals in the top ranks. The continuity offered by orderly promotion is completely lacking. Our military contacts and analysis indicate lessening of command respectability and the creation of an atmosphere of uncertainty within the military.

7. Senior Officers Inexperienced. Three major changes in the Hellenic Army hierarchy occurred during the period June through November: one consisted of normal retirements and promotions in June; the second followed the July plebiscite and the elevation of Gen. Angelis to the Vice Presidency in August; the third followed the coup of Nov. 25. This third change was clearly a purge and brought very
inexperienced officers into the highest positions of leadership. Today, all of the lieutenant generals, eighty percent of the major generals, all of the brigadier generals, and eighty percent of the colonels in the Hellenic Army (the major force) have six or less months in grade. Nine of the top ten Army commands have had three incumbents within nine months; the other has had two.

8. At least sixty middle-ranked Navy officers were imprisoned and later discharged as a result of the abortive Navy mutiny of May 1973. Even before then, the Navy’s capability as a fighting force was in question. The Hellenic Navy now finds it necessary to give most middle grade officers at least tow billets, due to the shortages in these grades.

9. In the Air Force, unrest at the same time but unrelated to the Navy mutiny, led to the dismissal of a number of Air Force colonels and lieutenant colonels. Following Nov. 25, dissatisfaction within the middle ranks led to the dismissal of further key officers—including the Chief, Deputy Chief and Operations Director. Because of these early retirements and forced organizational changes, the HAF lacks either experienced or innovative officers to provide effective leadership at the tactical/operational level.

10. The merry-go-round comings and goings of senior officers have seriously jeopardized the Hellenes’ ability to implement long term planning. This has been clearly reflected in JUSMAGG’S discussions with SHAFC regarding equipment needs in the period ahead. The officers now holding senior command and staff positions at the headquarters in Athens simply do not have the requisite experience to organize and direct a widescale military establishment. Given time, and allowance for errors, the new commanders should master their assignments. Whether they will have the time in office and grade to gain the required proficiency will likely depend upon their ability to extricate themselves from the political morass in which they are now wallowing. Certainly an attack on Greece by an outside hostile force such as Warsaw Pact member would quickly erase all signs of internal Greek schism as Greeks united against a common enemy. Barring this, the senior military give no indication of how or when they will find the key to their political problems.

11. The Middle Grades—Key Role in the Balance of Power. The middle-ranking officers (lt. cols. and majors) of the Armed Forces, especially of the Army, are key arbiters of power. This is particularly true because of their ties to the operational units equipped to impose their will. Who commands the operational military units can effectively command the country. These officers were held in line for over six years under George Papadopoulos’ leadership and Ioannides’ patronage. They deferred to the hierarchy appointed by the “leader of the 21st of April revolution”.
The fall of Papadopoulos at their insistence and with their planning and support has given them an unforgettable taste of politics and power. They are reported to be intensely nationalistic and appear not particularly attracted to the notion of early political normalization via the reestablishment of constitutional government. They are indifferent, perhaps even hostile in instances, to “political” solutions for Greece’s many problems. Certainly the coup has intensified their attitude that the military, in the name of the “revolution” can override such considerations as law and legitimate political power. Appeals appearing to involve simply the return of “old politicians” are not likely to be welcomed. Among the middle ranks, the major unifying factor on Nov. 25 was the desire to remove George Papadopoulos. Agreement on a future course was not then material. Now, this group appears to be without unity of purpose or direction. It is still possible they will be swayed by effective senior leadership, particularly if persuaded that the future of the Armed Forces, including themselves, could be irreparably damaged by their open association, for example, with the business of governing Greece in a time of world economic crisis.

12. Politics and the Military. Ioannides and the senior officers could pull the military out of its morass if they could unite upon a political course for the nation. Moreover, the stated intent of the Armed Forces in establishing a “civilian” government while the coup leaders remained in uniform was to remove the Armed Forces from politics. Yet, in fact, the appointed government was given responsibilities without sufficient authority to act; the uniformed leaders retained the authority to act without concurrent responsibilities. And, the President of Greece remains a full general on active duty. More than two months after its installation, the new regime still has no clear political or economic program. It clearly gives the impression of being the administrative branch executing orders and policies determined by the military oligarchy. There is obvious disagreement between the senior generals who stand up front and the younger officers behind the scenes who supported the change and feel their power and views should play a key role in Greece’s future.

13. The failure of a leader to come forward and gather in the reins and appurtenances of power (as George Papadopoulos did in 1967) has been the predominant contributor to the military disarray and governmental inactivity. It is universally acknowledged that BGen Ioannides makes all policy decisions from backstage. It is thought that if the domestic situation so deteriorates that anarchy and civil disorder appear imminent, Ioannides will try to step forward to take complete control. Alternatively, he may seek civilian government. He has already attempted to maintain his leadership bona fides by holding a series of pep rallies at military camps throughout Greece. His message has been one of personal pride and devotion to country. However, he is austere
and puritanical, has no charisma and no viable “national view” of Greek society and its dynamics.

14. If Ioannides does move for overt control, it is questionable whether he will have as wide approval, overt or tacit, as he did in November. He is already toeing a delicate tightrope between the senior appointed leaders and other, more zealous, middle grade officers. There is no doubt that in trying to restore discipline, the Ioannides pep rallies have created more disciplinary problems. These meetings are often reminiscent of gatherings of a “Praetorian Guard” or “Committee of Public Safety.” Few unit commanders can be appreciative of such overt forays into their areas of responsibility.

15. More important, it seems likely that before Nov. 25, in order to obtain at least the tacit acceptance of many moderate officers, Ioannides may have bandied the possibility of bringing Karamanlis back to head a Government of National Reconciliation. This would help account for the almost universal euphoria which pervaded Greece in the days immediately following Nov. 25. If true, a supporter once double-crossed is hardly likely to be fooled a second time. In any scenario which forecasts Ioannides reaching out to save Greece in time of imminent disaster, it seems likely that he will be actively opposed by the same moderates who until now have given him license to proceed.

16. A Bleak Future? The politicization of the Armed Forces is eroding its integrity as a military organization. In contrast to the early days of the Papadopoulos regime, the Hellenic Army does not stand united behind its leader. Loyalty to those holding effective power has become more important than efficiency. Unless firm leadership emerges, singly or in groups, dissidents can now look to the possibility of redressing their grievances by replacing those in power with their own patrons. The ease with which the November coup occurred has already offered encouragement to other groups to begin planning the next one. Many young officers have come to regard a coup as a legitimate—and feasible—way to get what they want, or what they perceive to be in Greece’s best interests. There have already been several reports of officers talking in this manner. At the moment all this is just talk, but the readiness with which such ideas leap to their minds shows that these officers may be coming to accept a coup as a way of life. As long as they see politics as an acceptable second calling, they pose an immediate threat to the leaders, who must face the realities of day-to-day government on the one hand, and on the other must satisfy the often misdirected nationalistic ideas of the younger officers.

17. Unless the leadership pulls itself together, the military’s preoccupation with the strategies of political power-brokering, the absence of discipline and the dearth of leadership at the top make it seem certain that Hellenic Armed Forces may continue to lose overall military-
operational effectiveness. The Armed Forces are a vital element within the equation of Greek stability. Their instability is reflected throughout the Greek society. United, the military might find the key to an effective government which corresponds to the aspiration of the Greek people. In this event, the Greeks might even forgive and forget. However, until someone reestablishes military discipline and withdraws the military from the day-to-day government, it will be difficult to come to grips with the broader social, economic, and political problems which now confront Greece. As things now stand, the Greek Armed Forces have become a symbol of repression, tyranny, and disarray. Their association in their present state and posture with NATO and the U.S. remains ominous for our future security interests in Greece.

Tasca

10. Action Memorandum From the Director of the Policy Planning Staff (Lord) to Secretary of State Kissinger


US POLICY TOWARD GREECE

We prepared the attached study on considerations affecting our relations with Greece for use at an analytical staff meeting. We have not been able to fit the meeting into your schedule and may not be able to do so for some time. Also, Ambassador Tasca will probably be in Washington next month and you may prefer to wait until then before having a general meeting on Greece.

There are no immediate critical issues that need to be resolved in our dealings with Greece; I believe, however, that you may want to look over the paper we have prepared since the situation may be deteriorating and there are decisions in the offing that will have to be taken in a broad policy context.

1 Source: Library of Congress, Manuscript Division, Kissinger Papers, Box CL 324, Policy Planning—History, Selected Papers, V. 3, European Affairs, 1973–75. Secret; Exdis. Printed from a copy that indicates Lord signed the original. Drafted by Thomas Thornton of the Policy Planning Staff.

2 See Document 12.
The attached study was prepared by a drafting group chaired by S/P and including representatives of NEA, PM, H, EUR and INR. As is customary with such papers we did not specifically clear it with these bureaus; their views are, however, fully reflected in it.

At the end of the paper there is a series of “interim decisions.” I would not suggest that you make any decisions on the basis of this paper without fuller discussion with the bureaus concerned; you may, however, find these “interim decisions” useful as a way of approaching the problem.

I regret the length of the paper, but accept the fact that the detail provided is necessary for dealing with this complex situation. If you are pressed for time, you may want to move quickly through Sections I–III which provide background on the political dynamics of Greece; Section IV A. (Homeporting) presents important data that you need not, however, absorb in detail. The remainder of the paper sets forth the basic philosophical problem, and I suggest that you devote your principal attention to it. Throughout we have provided underlining which should facilitate rapid reading.3

Larry Eagleburger, in reading this paper, felt that the Navy’s position on homeporting got short-changed in the presentation—especially as regards their requirement for maximum time on station overseas. Even if this is the case, however, I believe the conclusions that we reach are still valid.

After the study was completed we received a cable from Athens (Tab C to the study)4 that provided a disturbing country team assessment of the effect on the Greek military of its involvement in politics. The cable suggests that the Greek military’s capabilities have suffered greatly and that politicization of the armed force could lead to further coups. This is certainly a factor that we will want to take into account in our dealings with the present Greek government.

Action Requested:

Do you wish to meet with concerned parts of the Department to discuss the current situation in Greece?5

Yes; arrange early meeting.
Yes; wait until Tasca returns.
No.

3 Printed below as italics.
4 Not attached but printed as Document 9.
5 Kissinger did not initial any of the options.
Attachment

Paper Prepared in the Department of State

I. Introduction

Four months have passed since the ouster of the Papadopoulos government in Athens. We have been able to form an adequate general impression of the new leadership, and its pattern of its intentions and attitudes toward the United States is emerging gradually. While there are no pressing issues to be resolved in bi-lateral Greek-US relations, we believe that it is now time to develop an overall US approach to the new government for these reasons:

—Ambassador Tasca is to testify before a predictably skeptical House committee on March 27. You may well be invited to testify on Greece soon thereafter. Ambassador Tasca will need to have clear policy guidance if he is to testify most effectively; also what he says will inevitably impact on certain bi-lateral issues in US-Greek relations, as well as broadly on the attitude of the Greek people and government toward us.

—Renegotiation of the agreement under which we have use of certain Greek and naval facilities is proceeding slowly and the Greeks obviously hope to drive a hard bargain. Our overall approach toward the Greek regime should influence the way we conduct these negotiations.

—Perhaps most important, we do not want to build up a policy toward Greece solely by the accretion of small ad hoc decisions. Where US-Greek relations end up some months or years from now should, to the extent possible, be the result of conscious, fully-articulated decisions on our part as to what best serves immediate and long-term American interests in Greece.

This paper is designed to illuminate the broad context of US-Greek relations and provide the framework for developing an overall policy approach toward Greece. To do this, it:

—discusses the nature of the present Greek regime, its attitude toward the US and likely future developments within Greece (Section II);
—describes some current issues in US-Greek relations (Section III);

and

—delineates general lines of approach that we can take toward the Greek government (Section IV).

This last section also attempts to set the Greek problem into the framework of a much broader question that affects our relations with

6 Secret; Exdis. Drafted by Thorton on January 8 and revised on January 30 and March 19; other principal contributors were John Day and Lieutenant Colonel Frederic Flemings (PM/ISO).
a number of countries: how to deal with an unpopular regime that offers important contributions to our security interests.

II. The Current Greek Government

A. Its Intentions and Character

“The President received me in full uniform, with four stars on each shoulder, and wearing dark glasses.”—Ambassador Tasca’s comment on his first meeting with President Gizikis.

The government that has ruled in Athens since November 25 is a direct descendant of the Papadopoulos regime that seized power in April 1967. Politically it has harked back to the simplistic puritanism of the early Papadopoulos years but lacks even the benefits of novelty that Papadopoulos initially enjoyed. It shows no signs of articulating a program that has relevance to Greek reality. Moreover, it has erased the tentative moves toward democracy that Papadopoulos made, and shows no promise of moving toward representative government. In the literal and figurative sense, it is a reactionary government.

The ostensible leaders of the government—President Gizikis, Prime Minister Androultosopoulus and the cabinet—are political nonentities without a power base. The power behind the regime is Brigadier Ioannides, who, under the Papadopoulos regime, was head of the military police and an anti-democratic hard-liner. He has an unsavory reputation, and is commonly linked to the tortures that caused so much international protest under Papadopoulos.

An additional drawback to the regime is that it disposes of even less technical capability for dealing with Greece’s growing economic, political and social problems than did Papadopoulos’ group. It can develop such a capability only by coopting politicians and technicians but its prospects for doing so are poor. The government simply does not command sufficient respect or confidence.

B. Attitudes Toward the US and NATO

The new regime is not a group of “Atlanticists” who see their relationship with the US and NATO based on shared values. Virtually inexperienced in the world outside Greece, their point of view is narrowly nationalistic. Their fanatic anti-Communism is based on deep fear of a threat from the North that impels them to value their ties to the United States and NATO. They tend to believe, however, that we need Greece at least as much as Greece needs us, so that their approach to us is likely to be one of hard bargaining over such issues as base rights and homeporting—adversarial in style rather than cooperative.

Their nationalistic orientation is also likely to make them highly sensitive to foreign meddling in Greek affairs—e.g., efforts to press them to restore democratic institutions. They probably have only a limited appreciation of the political pressures under which we operate and would
react considerably more sharply than the Papadopoulos group to prod-
dings of this nature, probably cooling considerably the climate of US-
Greek relations at the official level.

Popular attitudes are a different matter. Greek appreciation of the
United States, backed often by family ties, has been remarkably strong. A
widespread feeling of good will continues to exist and will probably
persist in part under almost any foreseeable circumstances. There is,
however, an element of anti-Americanism growing in Greece that would have
been unthinkable a few years ago. In part this probably relates to a gen-
erational trend visible throughout Europe although this is much less
pronounced in Greece than, say, in Germany. A more substantial ele-
ment of disillusionment has grown from our previous association with
the Papadopoulos regime, intensified by the widespread belief that the
CIA was involved in the November 25 coup and that the United States
favors the present regime. This sentiment will grow as long as we are seen
to be identified with unpopular rule and will erode the principal long-term
force holding Greece close to the United States.

C. Prospects for Greece

The overthrow of Papadopoulos was greeted with euphoria, but
the honeymoon quickly ended as the nature of the new regime became
apparent. In addition, Greece is experiencing a major inflation induced by
both domestic and international factors, fueled now by the growing
cost of petroleum. The economic problem may be aggravated by de-
clining receipts from Greek workers in Germany, from Greek shipping
and from tourism—and especially by the lack of competent economic
management. If the inflationary trend continues (as seems likely), it will
only be a matter of time until opposition to the new dictatorship becomes man-
ifest with the students and some elements of labor in the vanguard.

The government will move quickly and harshly to stifle any oppo-
sition. It will not hesitate to make arrests or close newspapers that print
critical commentary. Repressive measures will further its isolation from
the politically active elements of the population and sharpen the incipi-
ent polarization within which leftist and Communist groups gain entree
to the moderate opposition. Repression will probably breed more oppo-
sition and repression in a vicious circle; foreign investment and tourism
will be scared off; and international criticism will become stronger.

Ioannides and his colleagues can probably stay in power indefinitely if
they remain united and command the support of the key military units.
This will be difficult to do, however, as pressures mount and offer further
opportunities for the display of governmental incompetence. Government-
mental legitimacy, already greatly eroded under Papadopoulos, has
been weakened still further and other military men may be tempted to top-
ple a junta that lacks any popular base. Already there are indications that
a number of senior officers are worried about the implications of the
Army’s direct involvement in managing the Government. These officers believe that the close identification of the Greek Army with the present regime is not only seriously discrediting the Greek military in the public mind but is also dividing the Army into factions and undermining its military capabilities. There is a third group of officers in the Army—so-called Qadafites—who reportedly favor a neutralist position for Greece.

In this situation, it is difficult to predict what forces will emerge in the Greek military in the coming months, but the life expectancy of the Ioannides regime is not good—a year would probably be a generous estimate. Greece could experience a series of coups, each varying from the other at most in degree rather than in kind.

The question of what will come after the type of regime currently in power is the critical one for long-term US interests in Greece—i.e., for continued Greek recognition that their interests are best served by closer association with the United States. There are numerous possibilities including a period of enlightened guided democracy, gradual relinquishing of control by the military to the politicians, a new type of military regime that is nationalist and neutralist, a leftist assumption of power resulting from polarization and radicalization, or even a reinstatement of moderate political rule resulting from a violent upheaval.

We cannot choose with any confidence among these, but believe that two valid general predictions are possible:

—The current type of regime cannot provide a long-term government in Greece; it lacks support and the capability to analyze problems and develop coherent plans and programs for dealing with them. Further, this type of regime is not likely to hand power over to the politicians willingly.

—The most natural and hence probably most stable system for Greece is parliamentary democracy of the kind that was fitfully evolving prior to the Papadopoulos coup. (The Greeks had finally managed to elect a majority party—George Papandreou’s Center Union—in their last free election in 1964.) Whether the monarchy would be restored is a matter of detail.

The justification for the first of these generalizations is inherent in the preceding discussion. The second is credible because of the way that Greeks prefer to go about doing politics. They are not wedded to an abstract concept of democracy, but the give and take of a parliamentary system helps satisfy their predilection for personal involvement with the sources of political and social power. Also, it provides scope for the exercise of the art of patronage which comfortably blurs the distinction between government and governed but is difficult to practice with distant, puritanical men of Ioannides’ stamp who want to recast Greek political life.

The two generalizations do give us important guidelines in assessing our relations with Greece. We are not likely to be dealing with Ioan-
nides or types similar to him indefinitely. The people who will rule Greece in the not too distant future will probably come from the political opposition that has chafed under the rule of Papadopoulos and now of Ioannides for nearly seven years.

The moderate political leadership in Greece perceives a close identity of interest among Greece, the US and NATO, and under no circumstances is it likely to turn strongly against the American tie. Its attitude toward the US will, however, be significantly affected by the degree to which it sees us as supporters of military dictatorship. Put in minimum and simplistic terms, there is probably an inevitable inverse relationship between the ease with which we secure Greek cooperation on security matters now and the ease with which we will be able to secure it from the kind of successor regime that is most likely and most desirable from our overall point of view.

III. Bi-lateral Security Issues

The expansion of homeporting in Athens to include an aircraft carrier (Phase II) has been postponed for at least six months by Secretary Schlesinger. The Department has had serious misgivings about this Second Phase of homeporting and welcomes the postponement. In addition, we will find it useful to keep Phase II in abeyance at least until other bi-lateral issues have been sorted out and we have a determination on how we wish to proceed in dealing with the Greek regime.

We do not know whether Secretary Schlesinger will ever reinvigorate Phase II; this will probably be determined in large part by the study underway on carrier inventory. Should we proceed with Phase II, however, there will be political costs. While the physical visibility of Phase II would not be great (six destroyer-type ships are already homeported in Athens and a rotational carrier spends considerable time there now), the political impact would be disproportionate. The Greeks would see this as a demonstration of our support for the Ioannides government and the regime will ensure that this implication is well publicized. The reaction in the US—especially in Congress—would also be considerable.

Thus as we consider the military requirements for Phase II homeporting, it will be important to keep these political aspects in mind as well.

The Souda Bay negotiations are the prime matter of current concern in our security relationships with the Greeks. Our Navy has used Souda Bay airfield (on Crete) under a 1959 agreement with the Greek government. In recent years, our anti-submarine aircraft have been using it, with Greek acquiescence, far beyond the levels provided for in the agreement. Also, the Navy has been using Souda Bay extensively outside the framework

7 See Attachment A for background on the homeporting issue. [Footnote in the original.]
of the agreement for logistic support of the Sixth Fleet. Now both the Greeks and the Navy wish to regularize this increased usage.

Additionally, should we decide to implement Phase II of homeporting, we would need to use Souda Bay as a training airfield for the aircraft of the carrier that would be homeported at Athens. (Airspace around Athens is too crowded for this kind of activity.)

The Navy has been negotiating with the Greek military for expanded usage (ASW plus training) since early 1972. With the advent of the new regime, Greek negotiators sought an amended agreement that would contain provisions unacceptable to us (e.g., summary unilateral termination by Greece and changes in status of forces.) In January, these negotiations were raised to the political level and the matter is now under study in the Greek foreign ministry.

The Greek military indicated that they expect a quid pro quo as part of the package including Souda Bay renegotiation and Phase II homeporting. At one point they expected a renewal of grant military assistance, which was terminated at their request in 1973,8 but they now appear to recognize that Congressional opposition makes a renewal of grant aid impossible. The Greeks have also mentioned fighter aircraft to modernize their air force; thus it is clear that they expect something substantial and the negotiations are likely to be lengthy and difficult.

A final issue relates to the level of FMS credit available to Greece. So far in FY 1974 we have provided Greece with $50 million in FMS credit which is to be applied toward the Greek purchase of F-4 aircraft. The possibility of an additional $10 million in credits in FY 1974 is still under review. The proposed FMS credit level for Greece in FY 1975 is $71 million. Increasing our level of assistance in FY 1975 to this level would be likely to enhance our negotiating position on Souda Bay and perhaps subsequently benefit possible negotiations related to Phase II homeporting. However, Congressional critics of the Greek regime will be watching closely and may launch a strong attack on any increase.

This complex of issues—Souda Bay negotiations, FMS and possible homeporting—make up a substantial element of our relations with Greece, both on security and political grounds. We will need to make a politico-military assessment of them if we are to manage them with maximum effect. We will need to determine what price we are willing to pay for facilities in terms of association with the Greek regime, problems in our relations with Congress, quid pro quo, and acceptance of agreements less favorable to the US than were previous defense agreements. In the broadest sense, these decisions must all be made in light of our overall posture toward the Ioannides government.

8 See Document 1.
IV. Overall Posture

A. Special Considerations

In appraising the various postures that we could adopt toward the Greek government, several special elements affecting Greek-US relations need to be examined.

The first is a widespread belief, nearly unique to the Greek polity, that the United States can and does determine the course of Greek politics. This is Sakharovism writ large; while few persons—Russian or other—seriously believe that the US can effect substantial short-term change in Soviet domestic politics, many persons—Greeks and others—take our capabilities vis-à-vis Greece as a matter of faith. As a result, US cooperation with a given regime is construed as support and becomes a significant factor strengthening the regime’s position. In the present circumstances the “evidences” of cooperation are our close military relationships (most visibly homeporting) and the widely accepted rumors about CIA and Pentagon support of the regime. These will be enhanced to the extent that we fall back from our previous policy of stating our hopes for a return to democratic government.

A second element is the ambivalent position of Greece within our alliance framework. Our relationship is technically defined by NATO, but in fact shows many discrepancies:

—The Greeks, while valuing their ties to NATO and Europe in general, in fact see their security mainly as a bilateral matter between themselves and the United States.

—The other NATO members show varying degrees of disinterest and distaste for Greece. It is geographically remote from the focus of security concern in Central Europe and a number of the NATO members find it repugnant to deal with the type of regime that Greece has had since 1967. Policy toward Greece has been a perennial bone of contention within NATO, and the issue was raised again by the Norwegians, backed by the Danes, at the December Ministerial meeting. The Benelux Foreign Ministers associated themselves with the Scandinavian criticism. The Greek Foreign Minister was obliged to reject these attacks as “flagrant violations” of the Alliance doctrine of non-intervention. We can expect much more of this sort of thing as the Europeans gain a fuller appreciation of the Ioannides junta.

—While we treat Greece within an overall NATO posture, our most pressing concern at this point is to be able to use Greece as an element of our Eastern Mediterranean strategy outside the framework of NATO. The other NATO members recognize this fact and it contributes to their

9 December 7–8, 1972, in Brussels. Documentation on the meeting is scheduled for publication in Foreign Relations, 1969–1976, vol. XLI.
lack of enthusiasm for our attempts to maximize our security position in Greece.

—The Greek government’s posture, however, is actually at variance with our role in the Arab-Israeli dispute. Although the regime was covertly helpful to us during the October fighting, its willingness to permit use of facilities in support of non-NATO contingencies is severely limited by concern for Greek interests and communities in Arab states.10

The third element relates to the approach that many Americans and other foreigners take to Greece. Lord Byron’s heart still beats in many breasts and the urge to “do something for Greece” is often near-uncontrollable.

—Expectations still run high that Greece, as the alleged home of democracy, should keep the tradition going. A rather more cogent argument along this line is that Greece was, in fact, developing a democratic system prior to Papadopoulos’ coup and, unlike many states with no democratic tradition, could probably make a go of such a system if given a chance.

—Greeks are intrepid emigrants. There are Greek communities all over the world and while their opinion is split on the current political situation in Greece, opponents of the regime are highly vocal and have been effective in fueling anti-regime sentiment.

Finally, we can expect the Congressional opponents of our policy toward Greece to intensify their criticism in the coming weeks and months. Ambassador Tasca’s appearance before the House Foreign Affairs Subcommittee on Europe will probably be the first occasion for concentrated criticism. The opponents of our policy will probably assert that the new regime is worse than the last one; that our attitude of forebearance while the Greeks work things out for themselves has not paid off; and that our claims about the strategic importance of Greece to US security interests has been put in doubt by the apparent Greek ambivalence toward our Eastern Mediterranean concerns. Some members may also express heightened concern about the well-being of American servicemen and dependents in Greece in light of the unstable and potentially explosive political situation there.

10 Publicly, the former Greek government under President Papadopoulos adopted a slightly pro-Arab posture during the recent war. Anticipating a negative response, we did not ask Greece for landing rights for our military supply airlift to Israel. The government was, however, privately helpful to the United States in a variety of ways. [2/3 lines not declassified] they allowed us use of Souda Bay airfield, to a much greater extent and for different purposes than is called for in our bilateral agreement. Souda Bay proved vital to the U.S. Navy for re-supplying the Sixth Fleet. Moreover, the Greeks placed no restrictions on: (1) the Sixth Fleet’s access to Greek ports; (2) the activities of the U.S. Naval Communications Station at Nea Makri; (3) the USAF facility at Iraklion, Crete [3 lines not declassified]. [Footnote is in the original.]
B. Pure Strategies

There is predictably no pure strategy that can cope with the conflicting pressures and special considerations that form the framework for our policy toward Greece. Equally predictably, there are extreme, or ideal policies that provide the parameters within which policy can be devised and at the same time provide the dynamic tension shaping policy. These pure strategies relate closely to the traditional debate in American affairs between:

— the hands-off approach of those who assert that we have no business meddling in others’ politics and should deal with governments solely in terms of their usefulness to our tangible national interests; and

— the moralist/interventionist approach of those who assert that we have a moral duty to speak out against injustice and, more specifically, that a “moral” element is essential to any policy that is to muster support at home and abroad for our role as a leader of an alliance that shares common values.

This debate is nowadays by no means relevant only to Greece; opponents of détente with the USSR, critics of South African apartheid, supporters of the Smith regime in Rhodesia, and opponents of the Thieu and Castro governments, all take part in it.

We by no means reject the moralists’ argument. Debate on these grounds tends to be inconclusive, however, for intensely personal choices are involved. A more useful approach is the test of American national interest over time—i.e., does a given policy offer a promise of maximizing our interests over the full range of foreseeable circumstances? This requires presenting the basic positions of the debate in terms that are relevant to the choices at hand—in the present case, the arguments that relate to the situation in Greece and, specifically, to our interests in Greece.

There are a number of arguments adduced by partisans of a hands-off approach toward Greece:

— Our semi-interventionist policy in the Papadopoulos years was not notably successful; his hesitant moves toward democracy were dictated mainly by internal considerations.

— We have declining leverage for pressuring the Greek regime. We no longer provide economic or grant military assistance (although FMS credits are still important) and Greece’s economic ties are increasingly with Europe.

— The Papadopoulos regime was generally cooperative in security matters and we can probably assure continued low-key Greek cooperation at a reasonable price.

— By applying pressure on the military regime, we risk alienating it, thereby losing the access that we need to important military and broadcasting facilities—or even forcing it to look elsewhere for meeting its security requirements.11

11 See Attachment B for a summary of U.S. facilities in Greece. [Footnote is in the original.]
—By intervening, we could at most bring down a government, not dictate a successor. The result might be chaos or a government that would be more harmful to our interests than the Ioannides regime. Andreas Papandreou is a favorite bête noir in this scenario.

—A final argument is hotly disputed and somewhat in contradiction to other points made earlier: that Greeks will always feel isolated, encircled and in need of an American security guarantee. Therefore we can maximize our position with the incumbent regime without much concern that a future government will make life difficult for us.

Supporters of the interventionist approach offer these arguments regarding Greece:

—Given the Greek belief that the United States strongly influences Greek politics, non-interventionism is illusory. A hands-off approach is seen as support for the incumbent government and is thus a form of intervention on its behalf. Our close military association with Greece underlines this consideration.

—Because of this belief we in fact have considerable leverage on the Greek political scene if we choose to use it.

—The Papadopoulos regime failed ultimately to meet the political and economic challenges of Greece. The successor junta is more odious and less competent; it will fail more dismally and rapidly, with grave consequences for the strength and stability of Greece—and hence for our long-term interests.

—Although the damage so far has been acceptable, our present policy does incur costs in our relations with Congress and our NATO allies. The benefits that we gain from the present government must therefore be discounted appropriately.

—As discussed earlier, our interests in Greece over the long-term will erode in direct proportion to our support of the current government and to its length of stay in power. And that long term may not be very long. When we made a similar set of judgments in 1969, it seemed reasonable to allow up to a decade of life-expectancy to military dictatorship. That decade is now over half gone and our original estimate seems too generous. Thus the short vs. long term calculus is increasingly unattractive and warrants reassessment.

C. Mixed Strategies

We do not believe that anything approaching the pure interventionist strategy would be a reasonable option for US policy. One could conceive of strong overt pressure or covert activity to dislodge the Ioannides group and install a democratic government, but such a course of action would be neither necessary nor desirable.

Something much closer to the hands-off policy is feasible and indeed, is approximately our present approach. Some modifications of that policy may over time be necessary, however, and there are several middle-ground options that might be desirable alternatives to maximize the trade-offs available as between the two pure strategies.

In the following discussion, we evaluate four viable postures in terms of these criteria:
—How much will it contribute to our long-term stake in Greece by establishing our bona fides with anti-regime forces?
—How much risk will it entail in our relations with Congress and our NATO allies?
—What kinds of precedents would we be creating for similar situations elsewhere?
—In the case of policies intended to effect change, what would be the chances of success?

a. We could maintain a substantially hands-off policy. This would involve a non-involved approach toward Greek internal affairs, modified only slightly—e.g., by the hold that we have put on high-level civil and military visits to Greece—to keep some daylight between us and the regime. This policy would probably derive the maximum short-term gains for our security interest as long as we make it clear that we expect this from the Greeks as their part of the bargain. It will be the most costly in terms of our relations with anti-regime forces and hence may involve maximum risk to our long-term interests. It will be the most difficult to sell to Congress and concerned NATO allies, but will avoid setting a precedent that could return to haunt us in such diverse places as the USSR, Chile or Portugal (also a NATO member).

b. We could seek to distance ourselves publicly from the regime but take no action. This would entail a nose-holding public posture in which we made clear our distaste for the regime but made equally clear that we did not consider it our responsibility to do anything about it. This policy would be received with approbation by the Greek opposition and their supporters in Congress and Europe, but would risk whetting their appetites for more direct action. It would have a limited, but positive impact as a precedent. The Greek regime would react negatively but its moves against us might be limited by the knowledge that we were holding back from taking any action. Its impact on developments in Greece would be problematical, but it would show that we do not fully support the Ioannides group and could be a significant factor heartening the opposition.

c. We could return to the policy that we followed in the latter years of Papadopoulos’ rule. Although we tended to blow warm and cool, our general approach was to urge the Greeks privately to move toward democratic rule and to affirm publicly (and to Congress in particular) that we were making such representations. This policy would probably have even less impact on Ioannides and his colleagues than it did on Papadopoulos. It would buy only a minimum (but perhaps an adequate minimum) of good will among anti-regime forces and is probably the minimum that Congressional critics of the regime will accept. The Greek government would probably not be impelled to move directly against our interests, but they would be irritated and probably be more sticky in granting us the kinds of access that we would need. It would not set important precedents.
d. We could revert to the policy that we followed in the early Papadopoulos years. This was a more outspoken approach. We left the post of ambassador to Athens open for some time; made public statements critical of the regime; and delayed supply of military equipment. Compared to the previous option, this approach would differ mainly as a sign that we were, in fact, “doing something”, albeit with little likely effect. It would probably be the course most acceptable to Congress and would be applauded in NATO, but would run some risk of creating a snowball effect in NATO and ultimately driving Greece from the alliance. If pushed hard, it could provoke retaliation by the Greek government against our security interests.

None of the mixed strategies is attractive in all respects. The “hands-off” approach probably best meets urgent short-term needs, but it does not provide well for long-term concerns, and being closest to a pure strategy, does not exploit the trade-offs that are available.

The policies of exhortation that we pursued variously vis-à-vis Papadopoulos do offer trade-off benefits but necessarily entail the related costs. Neither one offers convincing benefits, but either would offer a viable compromise strategy if one were required. Both also enjoy some sanctity of tradition.

The nose-holding option has many of the costs and benefits associated with the exhortation options; its main virtue is that it is probably as close as we can come, given Greek realities, to a policy of true non-intervention.

D. Concluding Observations

Even if some change in posture along the above lines is desirable, there is no compelling case for making it immediately. We can maintain a hands-off position that is welcome to the regime during the course of the important Souda Bay negotiations. It may be several weeks before we know whether the Greeks will maintain their current tough bargaining position on the use of these facilities, and the stance that they take may in part determine the type of public posture that we will ultimately choose. We might also, in the course of the negotiations, wish to use our ability to change posture as leverage. As these negotiations progress, we may need decisions from you on:

—whether we wish to use this leverage in the negotiations, and
— the extent to which we are willing to provide positive incentives to the Greeks in the form of political support, military hardware or other.

Ambassador Tasca’s Congressional appearance will present a problem in this regard. Members of the Committee will press him for critical statements about the present Greek government and, at a minimum, the publicity surrounding the hearings could feed back into the negotiations. His testimony will be crucial as the authoritative exposition of
our posture toward Greece, and must be based on a full consideration of the many factors involved.

While the various issues we have raised are of intrinsic importance, we are more concerned with their cumulative effect—that as we move into a relationship with the new government in Athens, we do not build our policy incrementally with ad hoc decisions:

—We have already adopted a hands-off policy that is generally interpreted as favorable to the regime.
—If Ambassador Tasca’s testimony affirms a US posture of toleration for the regime; and
—If we follow this with concessions in the course of the Souda Bay negotiations that are interpreted as drawing us still closer to the regime, especially beyond the NATO context; and
—If we increase FMS levels; and
—If we were to resume high-level military and civilian visits to Greece; and
—If we ultimately move ahead with Phase II of homeporting—

we will have moved well down the road of close identification with the incumbent government in Athens, entailing the various costs and benefits associated with this position. Wherever we come out, we should reach that point as a result of a series of conscious decisions based on an awareness of available alternatives, rather than arriving there unexpectedly.

Attachment A

HOMEPORTING IN ATHENS

Athens was selected from a number of possible sites when the Navy decided it would be beneficial to homeport one of its carrier task groups in the Mediterranean. Admiral Zumwalt’s renewed interest in homeporting arose from two concerns: the need to maintain the number of ships on station while at the same time accepting reductions in the overall number of ships in the active fleets and, secondly, the expectation that homeporting would reduce periods of family separation and thereby improve Navy morale and retention.

Phase I of the Athens homeporting was implemented in September 1972, involving six destroyer-type ships. Approximately 2,000 military personnel and 1,250 dependents were homeported. The ships, families, and household effects arrived almost simultaneously, without sufficient preparation, and serious dislocations resulted. Most of these problems have been reduced to a manageable level, but the Navy still lacks a recreational complex for the single sailors, who comprise some 75 percent of the homeported crew strength. One of the Department’s concerns in Phase II is to ensure that the “get them on the beach and sort them out later” experience of Phase I is not repeated.
The Navy had intended to proceed in early summer 1974 with Phase II of Athens homeporting. Involved were an aircraft carrier with its embarked air wing and a dependent support (hospital) ship, enabling the Navy to maintain a two-carrier force in the Mediterranean. It would bring an additional 5,100 military personnel and 2,550 dependents to Athens. The Department of State approved Phase II in principle over a year ago. However, the Department deferred final endorsement pending resolution of uncertainties which existed in the Navy plan, particularly location of airfield facilities to accommodate the air wing when the carrier is in port and determination that adequate medical, recreational and educational facilities will be in being, fully staffed and operational before Phase II dependents arrive in Athens. Also, the Department indicated a need for clear indications that homeporting is meeting its objective of improving morale and raising retention rates.

The State Department welcomes Defense’s determination to delay for six months or more any final decision to go ahead with Phase II. It will provide more time to evaluate the new government and will permit a better measure of the success of Phase I in terms of improving morale and retention rates. The Navy would also gain more time to develop support facilities and negotiate the necessary air base support facilities for the carrier air wing. Further, we believe that a postponement will not impair the Navy’s two-carrier posture in the Eastern Mediterranean. This judgment is reinforced by Secretary Schlesinger’s decision to maintain a 15-carrier force through 1975.

Attachment B

U.S. DEFENSE AND BROADCASTING INTERESTS IN GREECE

Greek Ports

Beyond homeporting in Athens, access to Greek ports by elements of the Sixth Fleet is very important to the Navy in terms of logistic support and maintaining on-station time in the Eastern Mediterranean without excessive periods at sea between port visits.

Souda Bay NATO Maritime Airfield

ASW aircraft operate regularly from the base and carrier attack aircraft occasionally fly training missions there. Considerable amounts of Sixth Fleet logistic support stages through the facility.

Athenai Air Base

Most Military Airlift Command flights to the Middle East and South Asia stage through Athens. MAC terminal and maintenance support facilities located there make the field a focal point for logistic sup-
port of other U.S. military activities in Greece and for the Sixth Fleet. Some airborne reconnaissance missions operate from the base.

**USN Communications Station—Nea Makri**

The station provides primary command and control communications for the Sixth Fleet in the Eastern Mediterranean and the Black Sea. It also provides the HF link to Cyprus, Italy, Spain, Germany, and Turkey and serves as the area’s diplomatic telecommunications relay.

**Tropospheric Scatter Stations**

Five stations provide wideband command and control communications. They also provide the wideband communications link with U.S. Defense activities in Turkey.

**Iraklion Air Base**

[1 paragraph (2 lines) not declassified]

**NATO** [less than 1 line not declassified]

The U.S. and FRG are the principal users of this Greek operated facility. It is employed primarily for annual.

**Timbakion**

An air weapons training facility which is much needed by NATO is being developed and is due to be operational in mid-1975.

**NATO Depots**

POL, ammo and mine storage facilities are available for U.S. use at Souda Bay.

[Less than 1 line not declassified]

[1 paragraph (4 lines) not declassified]

**Broadcasting Stations**

The Voice of America maintains facilities at Rhodes, Thessaloniki, and the newly-opened station at Kavalla, representing an investment in excess of $30 million. These facilities broadcast to Eastern Europe, the USSR, and the Middle East. It is hard to imagine relocating these facilities, for there is no potential site for relocating them which would be politically acceptable to other countries or technically acceptable to the United States.
Athens, March 8, 1974, 1650Z.

1438. Subj: U.S. Expression of Concern to Senior Greek Military.

1. I appreciate the substance and thrust of the Dept’s telegram 43153. The situation here continues to be discouraging. Interference by the hardline Ioannides junta has weakened the Armed Forces and incapacitated civil government. Popular resentment is continuing to build up against repressive political and capricious economic policies. The inherent instability of this power structure portends further change, possibly accompanied by civil unrest. There is widespread belief that the US is somehow responsible for this unhappy state of affairs.

2. Quite apart from the obvious danger of open unrest, however, I am increasingly concerned about the evolving chauvinistic attitude of the Ioannides junta as indicated in intelligence reports. If this group succeeds in creating a puppet military high command in addition to a puppet civil government or takes over direct ruling power itself, I fear that the policies it will impose in matters of defense and foreign policy as well as in the domestic, political and economic fields could also be adverse to our interests. These contingencies deserve serious and prompt attention.

3. In view of the foregoing, I look forward to discussing current developments in Greece which could adversely impinge on our national interests. In that connection I think the approach mentioned in reftel3 could be very helpful in protecting our bilateral security interests. Such an approach would have to be made with great care to the right individuals, however, to avoid its being mistaken as endorsement of the regime or encouragement to impose order on the Armed Forces.

1 Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 594, Country Files, Middle East, Greece, Vol. IV. Secret; Exdis.

2 In telegram 43153 to Athens, March 4, the Department voiced its concern with the erroneous yet prevailing belief in Greece that the United States had played a role in the November 1973 coup, the lack of popular support for the Greek military regime, and the concomitant discrediting of the Greek military among the masses, all issues that could adversely affect the bilateral security relationship. The Department reiterated its policy that the U.S. Government refrained from “direct involvement in the internal politics of Greece,” but offered suggestions for ensuring bilateral security interests. (Ibid.)

3 In telegram 43153, the Department proposed reiterating the long-standing U.S. interest in maintaining the integrity of the Greek military.
and the country by whatever means necessary. I would want to participate in it myself and to be supported with parallel action by a senior U.S. military leader, preferably in the JCS. An approach at a lower level or by an outsider is not likely to be effective.

Tasca

12. Minutes of Secretary of State Kissinger’s Regional Staff Meeting

Washington, March 20, 1974, 3:18–3:54 p.m.

PROCEEDINGS

(The meeting convened at 3:18 p.m., Secretary Kissinger presiding as Chairman.)

Secretary Kissinger: Who would like to lead off?

Mr. Lord: Mr. Secretary, we thought this was a timely paper not only because of reports of our relations with Greece and to take advantage of Ambassador Tasca’s presence but also because it points up the basic dilemma we have in our foreign policy with many countries of different ideological views. We tried in this paper to treat this dispassionately in the U.S. interest as opposed to straw-man options, and Mr. Thornton of my staff will give a very brief presentation paper, and Ambassador Tasca and Mr. Davies perhaps could fill in some of the details of the discussion.

Secretary Kissinger: Unless everyone has already read it.

O.K.; can you do it in five minutes?

Mr. Thornton: Yes, sir.

The reason for going about a policy review for Greece now is that we have a new man since last November, which the paper characterized as not only in accord with our policies politically but also it’s not moving towards representative government.

1 Source: National Archives, RG 59, Transcripts of Secretary of State Henry Kissinger’s Staff Meeting, 1973–77, Entry 5177, Box 3, Secretary’s Analytical Staff Meeting. Secret. The following people attended the meeting: Kissinger, Rush, Sisco, Donaldson, Sonnenfeldt, McCloskey, Holton, Eagleburger, Lord, Thornton, Maw, Weiss, Tasca, Davies, Churchill, Hyland, Hartman, Springsteen, and Vest.

2 Document 10.
Second, it’s been giving us a little more time in an adversarial approach, particularly relating to the Souda Bay agreement. Now, with Ambassador Tasca here, it’s an eminently good time to press this interest.

There is the FMS question, Souda Bay renegotiation, and the homeporting thing.

What we’re trying to do in here is to raise the question of a general approach to the regime, to look at this in a broad framework of relations with Greece—and, particularly, as Win said, with our particular interests with Greece—so when we get to individual actions, we’re not going to build policy incrementally—rather, we’ll have some focus.

Greece, again, like many other places, confronts us with the usual dilemma of how you deal with a regime that is important to your short-term national interests and long-term also and provides very definite security advantages but, at the same time, causes us problems in dealing with it simply because of the political nature of the regime.

In addition, in Greece, you have a particular problem, as we see it, in balancing off short- versus long-range.

In other words, it’s what you get today as opposed to what you may get some years from now.

I would like to make some judgments on what this paper says on this. The first is this regime of Ioannides—we will name it after him—is not going to last very long. The experts who drafted this part of the paper said a year would be a generous estimate; and even with this type of regime, this narrowly based dictatorship is probably not going to be around too long.

The second is one which is not particularly critical in Greece—

Secretary Kissinger: Why is that? I mean, who is going to overthrow them? In fact, there are two contradictory statements in there. One says they can stay in office there indefinitely if they are united; the other says they cannot stay there for more than a year.

Mr. Thornton: Yes. The fact that it is not going to be able to cope with the problems and there’s going to be increasing discontent. The likelihood is they would have another military regime. And, who knows? Maybe another one after that. But ultimately, if there’s a center of gravity, it’s going to be towards a political regime. I think the paper calls it “democratic regime.” Maybe one should say political regime rather than a military regime. And this would be over some period of years.

Mr. Tasca: Well, I think the point on that, I might underline, is the regime you have now is the most narrowly based regime they’ve ever had I think in this century—in their history—since 1821, since the revolution of 1821. Actually, there are only about, say, 20 or 30 officers—
maybe 10 or 12—and they have no other support. This regime is in a politically isolated country. They have nobody for them. And even the businessmen who used to be for Papadopoulos are very skeptical. They are concerned and they are worried about what this regime is going to do to business. And, of course, that has other implications—which I will touch on later. But there is an instability in the fact that this narrowly based regime does represent only a sector of the military picture. They are one part of it. If you take the air force, the air force at best is neutral towards this regime. The navy is definitely hostile, and Admiral Arapaca—there’s nothing he would like better than moving against the regime, if he had an opportunity to do it. And, as far as the army is concerned, I think that there’s a lot of instability developing, and the intelligence is showing it, because of a situation in which every major officer from brigadier general up to lieutenant general is new in his job since last June and all the colonels are new, or nearly all the colonels are new—and where a brigadier general, with his majors and captains, gives orders to the two-star generals and the three-star general is an abnormal situation; it’s one that has the seeds of disillusion in one form or another.

Secretary Kissinger: How does the brigadier general give orders to the major general?

Mr. Tasca: Because he’s the one that master-minded the coup in November.

Secretary Kissinger: Who is the brigadier general?

Mr. Tasca: That’s Ioannides.

Secretary Kissinger: Oh. He is a brigadier?

Mr. Tasca: Yes, he is. He’s preferred to operate in the background. There’s a group of officers who are majors and lieutenant colonels and they decide what the policy is and then they give orders to the civilians, and the civilians order the so-called government that is nothing but a group of men that are administering the major policy decisions that are made by Ioannides and his officers.

Secretary Kissinger: Yes; but now, assuming all of this is correct, what policy decision does it involve for us?

Mr. Tasca: Well, what it involves for us is that in the struggle that’s developing between the more senior officers and Ioannides—well, there are a number of elements. First of all, it’s important that within this struggle that’s developing I think that our interests, in terms of security, would lie at whatever weight appropriately we can throw in the direction of the people who want to get back to some normalization—which means getting back in contact with a reasonable majority of the Greek people—to assure that our security interests will not be jeopardized with the regime they have with the United States and with NATO—which is now increasingly the case, and which is the main
thrust of Androutsopoulos and was of Papandreou—which is what this whole policy objective is about.

The second point is that as far as the Greek people are concerned—
Secretary Kissinger: Wait a minute. Before we get to that—
Mr. Tasca: Yes.
Secretary Kissinger: —how do we associate with the Greek people?
Mr. Tasca: Well, I’d like to submit, Mr. Secretary, that I think our policy in this Administration to date has been reasonably successful. It’s been difficult, but I don’t think there’s any other policy to be followed today—
Secretary Kissinger: Which is what?
Mr. Tasca: Which is, the way I’ve interpreted it, protecting the higher part of our security interests—but, at the same time, making it clear that the United States has a part in Greece which, I also submit, cannot be compared with any other country—because they are a nation which has a history and a cultural tradition and a place that’s different—and we do feel that we want the Greeks, because of our bilateral relations—and the Congress of the United States has made it very clear that if we don’t make progress in this sense we won’t even be able to maintain our security relations. Sooner or later, with the repression that’s going on in Greece, we’re going to lose in the Congress of the United States; we won’t be able to give them the military credits, the military supplies. And if they don’t do that they will go French. If they don’t do that, they will go Arab. And that, in my judgment, would mean Quaddafi and Libya—because they have had relations there; they have trained the Libyan air force and the Libyan navy.

The third point is: As far as NATO is concerned, the British have adopted it. The Scandinavians have adopted it—
Secretary Kissinger: I still don’t understand what you think our policy is.
Mr. Tasca: Saying publicly that we’re for democracy in Greece, the way we’ve said in the past.

The last thing that was said was said by Secretary Rogers back in ’73, and I don’t think we should change that. If we change that, we’ll face a whole new host of problems that we don’t want to face. And if

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3 In telegram 135038 to Athens, July 11, 1973, Rogers sent an oral message to Papadopoulos as follows: “We have consistently held that the form of government in Greece is a matter for the people of Greece to decide. We therefore welcome, as do all the friends and allies of Greece, Papadopoulos’s pledge that the Greek people will be given an opportunity for free expression on their opinion on their future, through the scheduled plebiscite and general elections. In the spirit of respect and affection that has long characterized relations between our countries, we cannot fail to stress the importance that must be attached to the exercise of genuine freedom of choice on the part of the Greek...
I go to Congress and testify before the Rosenthal Committee, if he asks me if we’re still publicly for democracy in Greece and I say we think it would be nice to do it if it’s their business, I think we’re going to raise a lot of other problems in Congress.

Secretary Kissinger: Which is pretty close to my convictions.

Mr. Tasca: Well, all I can do is tell you how I see it. And I think it’s a mistake to change our policy at this time.

Secretary Kissinger: Of course, I haven’t seen any great results from our policy. You want us to say once a year that—

Mr. Tasca: Mr. Secretary, I’m not sure there have been no results. First of all, we’ve maintained our security interest during this period. I think during the Arab-Israeli war, if we had gone to the Greeks and we said, “This is important because we’re going to have a confrontation with the Russians,” they would have come through.

I think, as far as NATO is concerned, it would have been possible during the NATO meetings to come to the fore because of the posture we took.

I think, as far as the Congress is concerned, the testimony I’ve given, we’ve had a lot of support in the Congress, because we were able to show that we publicly made it clear to Greece we thought in terms of our security relations—which is what I happen to believe: that the Greeks have got to get back to some kind of representative government.

And so I think, when you look at those factors, I’d say our policy, considering the difficulties, has been rather successful. I think it’s been quite successful. The fact that we could get the Dutch—Vanderstahl—to go along with our policy—and the Dutch, the Scandinavians and the Danes. And I think we’ll find with the British Labour Party is going to take a very strong position on Greece, as they’ve already shown in the last week, where a fleet visit has been set.

That means that that posture is a posture that’s going to help us with our Congress, as well as the public opinion that counts—the one that’s going to be running the country again, and with our own public opinion.

electorate. In the broadest sense, the conduct of the plebiscite and the elections to follow will inevitably have an effect on the alliance and on the traditional cordial relations between our two countries.” (National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 594, Country Files, Middle East, Greece, Vol. IV)

4 Tasca testified before Congress on March 27. This is presumably a reference to the House Foreign Affairs Committee, chaired by Congressman Benjamin Rosenthal (D–New York).

5 Reference is to Max Van der Stoel, Dutch Foreign Minister.
Now, that’s the way it looks to me.

Secretary Kissinger: Joe, this is one area in which you haven’t started a crisis yet. What do you think?

(Laughter.)

Mr. Sisco: Well, I’m not entirely satisfied with our present policy, and I have never been entirely satisfied with the totally hands-off policy that we have pursued. I feel that our present policy does not sufficiently and clearly enough disassociate ourselves from Greece in this respect.

I detect two developments that bother me: One, any Greek leader that you talk to today, in our discussions on the base, takes the point of view that there is not really a mutuality of interest between ourselves and Greece within the NATO framework—in other words, any time we discuss a base—and they’re talking in terms of quid pro quo. It’s basically in the context that they are doing us a favor.

I want to put it very crudely. I don’t think the present—

Secretary Kissinger: That puts them in a very unusual position within NATO.

(Laughter.)

Mr. Sisco: Well, not so unusual.

I think, in that respect, this is fundamental in our dialogue with the Greeks. And I don’t think it’s a very healthy one.

Secondly, if the assessment is correct that this is the most narrowly based government in the history of Greece—and if the assessment is correct that Ioannides is not apt to last over this next year, that it may be a palace coup or a coup within the group—then it seems to me that the policy of, I believe, too close association with this present crowd is going to cause difficulty for us—

Secretary Kissinger: Just a minute. Who is associated? What is your definition of “too closely associated”?

Mr. Sisco: Well, I think that, basically, to the degree to which you have a public opinion in Greece, that Greece—the Greek people—basically feel that we are fully behind this present group.

I think there was a period of time under Papadopoulos where they made certain commitments—actually wrote a letter to the President, specified dates—none of which they carried out.

Secretary Kissinger: But, again, why should we assume that it is in the United States’ interest? Where else are we requiring governments to specify dates for elections in communications to the United States?

Mr. Sisco: Well, Greece has a unique relationship to the United States in this regard. This goes all the way back, insofar as movement towards representative government. It goes all the way back to commitments that Papadopoulos made to the President.
Secretary Kissinger: Well, I know, but that’s what we made it do. My question is: Why is it in the American interest to do in Greece what we apparently don’t do anywhere else—of requiring them to give a commitment to the President to move to representative government?

Mr. Tasca: Because—may I add a note on that, Mr. Secretary?

Mr. Sisco: Go ahead. I want to say something further.

Mr. Tasca: —well, I think because Greece and the Greek people—in terms of their position and public opinion in Western Europe—are quite unique. You can go back to the constitutional Greece or the Greek lobby—whatever you want to call it—and they’ve got a position in Western Europe and the United States that Brazil and Chile and these other countries don’t have. None of those countries has a Androutsopoulos—a Greek refugee who’s been activitated [active?] and who for four years has been leading a very vigorous fight on our policy in Greece.

Secretary Kissinger: But that just means we’re letting Androutsopoulos’ particular group make policy.

Mr. Tasca: How do you stop it?

Secretary Kissinger: Well, I’m just being the devil’s advocate. You can say the Department of State doesn’t have a Political Science Division. It conducts the foreign policy of the United States. It deals with any government—communist or non-communist—within the context of the foreign-policy objectives of the United States. That way you don’t get caught with each individual government in giving approval and disapproval. Why is that wrong?

Mr. Tasca: Well, that may help you with other countries, but it wouldn’t get you to first base as far as Greece is concerned.

Secretary Kissinger: Why not?

Mr. Tasca: Because Greece has had a foreign factor since 1821 and since the revolution. We’re right in the internal Greek foreign institutions, whether you like it or not; we’re part of their value system, part of their political process. And we ought to get out of it. But it’s going to take time to get out. In the meantime, we’re going to be responsible.

Secretary Kissinger: But if we’re going to be manipulating their domestic structure, we’re not going to be able to get out. If we make pronouncements about their domestic structure, we are obviously doing it for some effect.

Mr. Tasca: Well, I think we are having some effect. This isn’t something you can measure. But, after all, within the Greek armed forces—that’s where the first game is going to be played. It’s going to be very important how the United States stands. These people are going to be watching us. If we change our policy and we give them the impression
that we’re not as much of a democracy as we were, we in effect are
intervening in the Greek situation—we’re intervening in favor of
Ioannides.

Now, another thing about Ioannides to remember—
Secretary Kissinger: Well, in that case we cannot change our pol-
icy because whenever we change to a neutral stance, we’re going to be
accused of interference or non-interference.

Mr. Tasca: Well, another thing, Mr. Secretary: That depends on
what happens to the Greek situation.

Secretary Kissinger: Well, what’s your definition of democracy in
Greece?

Mr. Tasca: Well, there’s some reasonable consensus of, let’s say, the
majority of people. And the institutional form of that consensus is
something for the Greeks to define.

Secretary Kissinger: And we hold that view with Greece—not Yu-
goslavia, Morocco, Algeria. How about Algeria?

Mr. Tasca: I don’t think it’s the same kind of a problem.

Mr. Thornton: Well, Mr. Secretary, nobody thinks we can influence
the situation in Algeria. In Greece it’s different. This is a qualitative
difference.

Secretary Kissinger: Why should we not adopt the position that
we, therefore, don’t influence things?

Mr. Tasca: Then you’re intervening. You’re intervening in favor of
Ioannides now.

Mr. Lord: The paper suggests an interventionist approach. The is-
ssue seems to follow a policy of complete hands-off—which the paper
says is probably going to be, for the maximum benefit, short-term. So
it’s a very reasonable short option, it seems to me. Or there are shad-
ings—which we call a nose-holding option. You don’t go for election
time; you merely make statements that you can proffer—that we would
like to have democracy. But some kind of symbolic test which would
be very close to a hands-off policy, which may give you some repre-
sentation on the Hill—or you can refer it back to the previous policy
of trying to influence them privately or publicly—which leads toward
democracy, which gets more intervention. But I don’t think we should
set it in terms of pure policy here.

Mr. Sisco: I wouldn’t think so either.

Secretary Kissinger: But we surely can’t be arguing about whether
I’m going to revoke something my predecessor said in August ’73, which
did not make front-page headlines in most newspapers that I read.

Mr. Lord: As I understand present policy, over the last few months
we haven’t been saying anything about democracy. Therefore, we have
to be clear in our own mind what is “present policy.”
Mr. Tasca: We haven’t said anything publicly about democracy. In my discussions with him, the position I’ve taken is that it’s their business, and, in the press of discussing that, from the standpoint of bilateral relations and cohesiveness of the NATO Alliance, there ought to be some real advantages in their moving ahead. But it’s their business, without any question of deadline or dates.

But the question, increasingly, that’s being asked by people in the opposition and some very distinguished people who brought Greece into NATO, is that they’re surprised that since Rogers has left no statement has been made publicly on this subject. And I may very well get that on the Rosenthal Committee—why is that so—

Secretary Kissinger: And what will you say?

Mr. Tasca: What will I say? That’s what I want to get instructions about.

Secretary Kissinger: Tell them to ask me.

Mr. Tasca: All right.

Secretary Kissinger: I’m up there often enough.

Mr. Tasca: May I put one other note on the security side—because I want to be sure that’s put on the table too. There’s one thing about these people that is worrisome, and that is: They’re very primitive in their foreign-policy approach.

And there’s evidence now that they could easily get into an argumentation with Turkey on the question of the Aegean Sea and Cyprus. I think the oil-exploration problem in the Aegean Sea does tend to indicate that these people might get into a real confrontation with the Turks on that. And I think that would raise all the problems that Cyprus did.

Secretary Kissinger: Yes, but that’s a foreign-policy problem. That I think we are capable of making judgments on.

Mr. Davies: Mr. Secretary—

Secretary Kissinger: What would satisfy the Rosenthal Committee would be a Secretarial statement every year—or is there some quota?

Mr. Tasca: I don’t know. I don’t think it’s a matter so much of satisfying Rosenthal, because I think his posture—as I understand it—I appeared before them in ’71—I think their posture is something that would not be in harmony at all with our objectives, or the national interest, as I understand it—as we conceive it in the area. But what I’m thinking about is some kind of posture that we can use to defend the position that we’re taking, opposing as an alternative the kind of thing that might raise more questions than it answers.

I think we’re talking about a fairly restricted range in terms—we’re not talking about any extreme change in policy but trying to keep this
in a position where we don’t raise new problems. And I submit that by keeping the kind of posture we’ve had—Ioannides expects it; he’s not going to be surprised—it helps us to reconcile these very difficult elements.

We’ll still have problems, but we’re in a better position than saying, “It’s none of our business. It’s their business.”

Secretary Kissinger: What is the subject of this meeting—whether we should change what Rogers said in August? Has anyone proposed this? What exactly are we trying to accomplish here?

Mr. Thornton: Well, the paper is kind of set up to accomplish where we come down within the range at either extreme, for that matter, or somewhere on one of the various possibilities within the range between hands-off and intervention—and not only in terms of, let’s say, the Rosenthal Committee but also in terms of what is going to protect our long-range interests as well as short-term interests.

Mr. Lord: There are two aspects of the problem—to what extent does anyone think you should pressure the Greeks privately—and I don’t sense much sentiment for that. The other question is: To what extent do you say anything publicly about their political system.

Secretary Kissinger: But, with all respect, this issue is being put in a hopelessly abstract manner because the issue isn’t between democracy and non-democracy. And we don’t support—whether Rogers or I make a statement once a year is relatively unimportant. What our Ambassador does day in and day out is a helluva lot more important.

And if they get the idea we’re against it, that’s one thing. If they get the idea we’re an active force for it, that’s another thing. But before we can even make that judgment, one would have to know what the likely political evolution is as between Papandreou and this fellow.

I don’t know whether it’s in our interest to rush to the defense of Papandreou—

Mr. Tasca: No. I agree completely.

Secretary Kissinger: —even if he’s for democracy. So even before one can make any judgment of what the likely evolution is, of what our right stance is, I would like to get some assessment from Bill what the likely evolution is—

Mr. Hyland: Yes, sir.

Secretary Kissinger: —and what we are starting. I mean, if we are pressing them and if we make our displeasure known to a certain point and if we’re as influential as you say we are, then we’re going to trigger a political process or we’re going to demonstrate our impotence. If we demonstrate our impotence, we’re going to drive these people into a Quaddafi situation. If we don’t correct them, then before we can make
a reasonable decision we’ll have to know what the likely evolutions are that can occur.

The Papandreou situation is a possibility—that’s one thing. We’ve worked with him before. And, if we can work with him, obviously, from our point of view, it would be best to have a government that protects our security interests and doesn’t put you before the Rosenthal Committee. If, however, we cannot get this, if we have to choose between our security concerns and some other evolution, then we have a tough problem.

If you could produce a Papandreou tomorrow in a stable government, I wouldn’t even want to know how you did it. But before we make any decisions like this, I think we ought to know what the probable evolutions are and what the probable impact is about taking a certain course.

I think we can survive Congressional hearings if we know what’s right. And we should know what we really want in Greece, what is in our national interest. If we can combine that with our moral values, so much the better—and with the Congressional pressure.

So, Bill, could you produce something fairly quickly and let the Ambassador see it?6

Mr. Hyland: Yes, sir.

Mr. Tasca: May I make one very brief comment on this, Mr. Secretary? I think the way we would appraise the problem which you raise—which is, clearly, the most fundamental issue—is, as of right now, there’s very likely no7 opportunity that the army would allow Papandreou to come back and any normalization would have to take place on the basis of Papandreou not coming back. This is not to make it possible for Papandreou to come back and make it impossible for the communists to have any voice in the new government. So you’ll be talking about—

Secretary Kissinger: Of course, you could be wrong, because I knew Papandreou when he was an American professor working on monetary planning.

Mr. Tasca: But they don’t trust him, and the army certainly doesn’t trust him. And he’s very outspoken in some of the statements he’s made about taking Greece out of NATO and kicking the Americans out of Greece.

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6 Hyland sent Kissinger an INR analysis on March 29; a copy is in the National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 1312, NSC Secretariat, Contingency Plans 1974, Cyprus and Greek-Turkish Contingency Plans. NEA and Tasca submitted comments separately on April 5. (Ibid.)
7 An unidentified hand crossed out the word “the” and added “no.”
Secretary Kissinger: I’m not saying that Papandreou would come back. I have no judgment of who would come back, because they are great specialists in starting political upheavals whose consequences we don’t foresee—I don’t mean in Greece but as a nation. So if Bill—

Mr. Hyland: Yes, sir.

Secretary Kissinger: —could do this, and then let you take a look at it—

Mr. Tasca: Yes, sir.

Secretary Kissinger: —then when do I have to make a decision? I mean, I don’t even know what the decision is that I’m being asked to make.

Mr. Lord: That’s the whole point. It’s not that you’re asked to make decisions. There is a feeling that perhaps incrementally you might slide into a posture—but maybe the right posture, that someone should know you’re doing it.

Secretary Kissinger: Basically we conduct foreign policy here, not domestic policy. We don’t muck around with the countries.

Now, before we change that course, I want to hear overpowering reasons why we should.

Now, it could be that Greece is a special case, I don’t deny that. I’m perfectly open-minded on that. But there’s no danger of my sliding into that posture. That is my posture. It’s one that I’ve tried to impose on Sisco when he didn’t slide cables past me when I was in the White House—

(Laughter.)

—which he did, not without success, from time to time.

(Laughter.)

Mr. Sisco: I think what the paper considers is a very, very narrow range; and it actually considers a narrow range within basically I think the guidelines of policy over the last four or five years. I don’t think anybody here assumes that we can influence the situation in Greece in the kind of decisive manner that was described here, and I don’t think that anybody has suggested this kind of an all-out interventionist policy because I just don’t think we’ve got this kind of capacity. I think that we’ve got security interests there.

The questions being posed in this particular paper between these ranges are: How do we protect that security interest—not only in terms of the present government but in circumstances where our assumption and our assessment is that this narrowly based government may very well be out of power a year from now, and how do we prevent whatever comes out a year from now from being a Quaddafi Government or an anti-American Government? That’s the way I see the issue.
Secretary Kissinger: That’s a very important question. And if it is our judgment that this government is going to be substantially modified, then it is important for us to know whom to deal with—

Mr. Sisco: That’s right.

Secretary Kissinger: —and how to protect our interests in the next group so not to identify with it that our interests go down the chute with the next government.

Mr. Sisco: That’s right.

Secretary Kissinger: That does not mean whether we should take public positions against the government or we should have contacts with many of the leaders. I still would like to consider whether it is not better for us, in the long term in Greece, to have a very catholic approach to all political groups, and contacts with all political groups, and work with each political group that gets into office, unless it is violently anti-American—whether that is not a healthier posture for us to be in rather than to make public pronouncements of what we think about this or that political group—which would mean a degree of association with any government and a degree of association with any political group that may be functioning there and greater public aloofness, if that government is as precariously situated as you say that it is. That would raise many practical questions, aside from the moral questions which you raise (addressing Mr. Tasca).

Mr. Tasca: Well, I might say this: I don’t think that we should get into a position where we are ever supporting one particular government as against another government. And the general posture that we’ve taken—which I think is the right one—is that they can adopt any form that they want; and we do make contact with all elements but, when we think sometime of a government that has some kind of relationship to the people, some kind of leadership which is going to have to build the kind of government that’s going to help to strengthen our relations and also their posture in NATO.

Secretary Kissinger: It’s just a question of to what effect we’re doing it. If we don’t have the capacity to change the government, then we can do it for one of two reasons—either for our domestic reasons or to win the favor of a group that’s going to get into office in Greece—either as a result of what we say or no matter what we say.

If it’s the first, our domestic policy, you know, Rosenthal is a problem. But I think, on the whole, we do best on the Hill if we do what we think is right and let the Hill worry about their predilections.

On the whole, we’ve done well on the Hill with the approach that we defend our best judgment of the right foreign policy and take an occasional flap. If we believe that our action may change the government or may move it in a certain direction or that there is somebody waiting in the wing to take over, then I’d like to know who that is.
Now, that’s what I’d like to iron out in our analysis, and then we can make a judgment.

I’m not likely, while I’m in the Soviet Union next week, to make a pronouncement on Greek politics.

(Laughter.)

Mr. Sisco: I think you could apply, sir.

Secretary Kissinger: But if somebody can get some Congressional wives for me, it’s not bad.

(Laughter.)

Mr. Sisco: And you might support Security Council Resolution 242 in relation to Greece.

(Laughter.)

Secretary Kissinger: In fact, if we could reach Greece next week and the Soviet Union, I’d be a happy man.

O.K.; can you do that?

Mr. Tasca: Yes, sir.

Secretary Kissinger: And, Joe, I want to see you for a minute. Win, I want to see you for something.

(Whereupon, at 3:54 p.m., the meeting was adjourned.)

13. Interagency Intelligence Memorandum

Washington, April 18, 1974.

[Omitted here is a table of contents.]

SUBJECT

Greece Under Ioannidis: Implications for US-Greek Relations

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1 Source: Central Intelligence Agency, NIC Files, Job 79–R01012A. Secret; No Foreign Dissem. This memorandum was prepared under the auspices of the National Intelligence Officer for Western Europe. It was principally drafted by CIA with the participation of representatives of DIA, INR, and the intelligence components of the Departments of the Army, Navy, and Air Force.
Major Judgments

The Ioannidis regime has not attracted support outside the military establishment and has not shown decisive or talented leadership. Nonetheless, it can withstand challenges from civilian politicians, youth, and labor as long as it retains the loyalty of the military.

Although Ioannidis has a far-flung network of informers and the support of strategically placed junior and middle-grade officers, his position is not secure. Even among his own backers there are alternative leaders, such as Armed Forces Chief Bonanos. Some followers of deposed President Papadopoulos remain; there is also a hard core of tough nationalists who would like Greece to adopt a more independent posture toward the US and NATO. And the silent majority of the armed forces would probably favor military disengagement from politics.

Yet all military factions are united in rejecting return to an entirely free political scene. And if the Ioannidis regime were ousted—something that could happen soon, but might not come for a few years—it would probably be replaced by another group of military officers.

Some factions might allow civilians more latitude than others would. Some senior officials might be inclined to turn to former Prime Minister Karamanlis, who would not return unless given a free hand—something that would be difficult for the military to accord. Hard line younger officers would probably dispense with even a facade of civilian rule.

The Ioannidis regime is more adventurous than its predecessor in regard to Cyprus and Turkey, and is more narrowly nationalistic in dealing with the US. The mixture of these elements poses even more problems for the US than were raised by the Papadopoulos regime.

While the present government views cooperation with the US as the base of its foreign policy, it will not shift domestic policies to repair what it considers unsatisfactory relations with Washington. Moreover, Athens, in its quest to extract more aid, is likely to become even stickier in dealings in regard to US facilities in Greece. It may seek to renegotiate the broad range of security arrangements to gain greater control of US military activities as well.

Continuing routine dealings by the US with the Greek Government alienates critics of the regime without fully satisfying Ioannidis. While civilian politicians would prefer the US to distance itself from the military rulers, a Karamanlis regime would not be likely to display dissatisfaction over past US policies by severing major ties with Washington. There is some risk that a more representative regime would feel under popular pressure to retaliate against the US, but any likely successor would be very reluctant to destroy this connection.
I. Prospects for the Regime

1. Since it took power in November 1973, the clique of military officers led by strongman Ioannidis and its puppet government in Greece have not managed to attract support outside of the military establishment. Those political forces that hoped that the ouster of Papadopoulos would speed the return to parliamentary government were rapidly disappointed. Military force remains the only important prop of the government. And sharply deteriorating economic conditions—runaway inflation—and the absence of decisive leadership are further eroding the position of the rulers. From the beginning they have been unable to attract qualified administrative talent, and there is increasing factionalism and politicization in the army.

Civilian Sentiment

2. Figures from the pre-Papadopoulos days have shown little disposition to risk the consequences of speaking out against the regime. Though disenchanted with the current government, they do not seem to have attempted to organize opposition to it. None of the prominent personalities of the old political scene is likely to emerge as a center of resistance to the present rulers. Ex-Prime Minister Constantine Karamanlis remains the choice of many within Greece as an alternative to the military regime, but perhaps because he feels the military rulers may turn to him for help, he has yet publicly to attack the regime from his self-imposed exile in Paris.

3. Youth and workers have the potential to challenge the regime—but it’s still only a potential. Their open agitation played a significant part in Papadopoulos’ downfall. Yet thus far they have made only half-hearted efforts to challenge the new government and seem cowed by its no-nonsense approach to law and order. Government determination to act decisively against dissidence was illustrated by the recent arrest of some 45 members of the outlawed Communist party accused of publishing pamphlets urging youth to boycott classes.

4. For the students to rally significant overt support from labor and other elements of society would require either (a) signs of weakness or indecisiveness on the part of the government in acting against dissidence, or (b) an issue, such as overt army or police brutality, which would bring the people out in the street. Public outrage over such incidents during the riots last November has cooled somewhat, but could be rekindled by another violent confrontation. Also, economic distress is clearly working in the dissidents’ favor as it did in November. And students and labor would enjoy popular sympathy, if not overt support, should they again openly defy the government.

5. No combination of civilian forces, however, could topple the regime without the support of important elements in the military. The
growing number of civilian dissidents recognizes this fact. Yet action by students and workers could have reverberations within the military establishment. If the government failed to cope satisfactorily with this challenge, factions within the military could be provoked to move against Ioannidis.

**Factionalism in the Military**

6. The officer corps is not solidly united in its loyalty to Ioannidis. Through his control of the military police and security forces, Ioannidis has a far-flung network of informers which makes it hard to catch him unawares. He has thus far maintained himself behind the scenes, where he has the greater flexibility in dealing with opposition. Yet it is clear that Ioannidis’ performance has not satisfied all segments of the officer corps. Already some officers are voicing their dissatisfaction to the tentative, ad hoc approach to policies that has characterized his puppet government.

7. Though the situation has not yet jelled and our evidence remains scanty, it is possible to identify various long-existing factional tendencies among the officers:

   a. **A group presently loyal to Ioannidis.** These officers themselves are not completely unified in view and include other possible leaders, such as Armed Forces Chief Bonanos, who might eventually make their own bid for power. This group is united in distrust of democratic processes and is intensely and narrowly nationalistic. It wants the army to hold power indefinitely, because it fears that any form of democratic government would lead to political turmoil and eventual Communist takeover. It is the best organized of all military groups and is supported by the entire military police organization as well as some strategically placed junior and middle-grade officers in all the services. These officers are determined to purge pro-Papadopoulos elements from the army and punish those involved in corruption under the previous government. It was pressure from within this group that overcame Ioannidis’ reluctance to move against officials involved in corruption under the Papadopoulos government. And similar pressure would tend to inhibit Ioannidis from giving in to popular demands to liberalize the regime.

   b. **Other proponents of continued military rule.** While differing little with Ioannidis in their views of the proper military role, there are other more or less amorphous groupings which aspire to power. The purges undertaken by Ioannidis have not removed all the former supporters of Papadopoulos. It is hard to tell how many would fall in this category, but, though the most prominent and dangerous of these were removed in the November coup, Ioannidis still believes they pose a significant threat to his regime. Another fringe group of younger officers is commonly referred to as the “Qadhafites.” They are a hard core of tough nationalists who would like to see Greece adopt a more inde-
ependent posture toward the US and NATO, particularly in negotiations for use of facilities. But most of them supported Ioannidis in November because they believed he would impose a more nationalistic regime.

c. Moderates, who comprise the silent majority of the officer corps. They are distressed by the politicization of the military establishment and favor the armed forces’ disengagement from politics. At the same time, they fear that return to an entirely free political scene would lead to political anarchy. They would thus support a restricted form of political freedom to prevent the type of political free-for-all which preceded the army takeover in 1967. Many of the professional younger officers sympathize with these views and would prefer to stick to military duties without becoming involved in political activity. A number of senior officers are also in this category. This group is directly influenced by family and friends outside the military who are disenchanted with the regime.

8. Ioannidis has launched a program ranging from purges to pep rallies to counter dissidence within the army. He has taken care to place his own supporters in key military posts. Continuing purges of the military establishment are dangerous, however, and even newly rewarded generals may switch sides if they feel threatened.

What Kind of Successors?

9. For the present, Ioannidis and his supporters hold sway. But theirs is an uneasy rule. As grievances accumulate, the government will become increasingly vulnerable to another military coup by those who are either impatient with the regime’s lack of progress or fearful that they will be purged because of real or imagined anti-government plotting on their part.

10. It is not yet possible to set a timetable for this development nor to specify what group of officers would emerge in control. Some US observers believe that the regime’s lack of talent, public hostility, and military factionalism will lead to Ioannidis’ downfall rather soon; they would be surprised if he lasted much more than a year. Others, stressing his ability to cow opposition, give him a fair chance to survive somewhat longer. But most agree that the present regime is unlikely to remain as long as the six-year term that Papadopoulos enjoyed. And when it goes, it is most likely to be replaced by a new clique of military conspirators, similarly adept at plotting but unskilled in administration. There could even be a succession of military coups.

11. Yet while any military successors would probably be unwilling to allow civilian politicians to run the whole show, some military factions might allow civilians more latitude than others would. For example, the senior officers from the “silent majority” might be inclined to delegate greater responsibility to civilian government. To form such
a government they might seek younger civilians not tainted by involvement in the older political scene, or turn to former Prime Minister Karamanlis. But Karamanlis would not return without guarantees of a free hand in governing—something that would be difficult for the military to accord him. Even the moderate officers would no doubt be prepared to intervene if the civilians threatened the military’s autonomy or appeared to be failing to provide stable and effective government. The hard line younger military, on the other hand, would probably dispense with even a facade of civilian rule and would talk more of a lengthy process of basic social reform as necessary before permitting any movement toward return of parliamentary government.2

II. Implications for the US

12. The Ioannidis regime has yet to develop its own distinctive and well-articulated foreign policy: it is continuing along the general lines followed by Papadopoulos. The officers who control the government are strongly committed to the West and are intensely anti-Communist in outlook. At the same time, they are even more nationalistic and parochial in their views than their predecessors. They are more adventurous than Papadopoulos in their approach to the Cyprus problem and worried about a military confrontation with Turkey. The mixture of these elements poses even more problems for the US than were raised by the Papadopoulos regime.

Cyprus and Turkey

13. Like many Greek officers who have served on Cyprus, Ioannidis has a special interest in the island’s fate. But his interest is combined with deep distrust of Makarios and an exaggerated view of the Communist threat on Cyprus. The danger that Greece will increase its activity in Cyprus is probably not imminent because Ioannidis seems now to be devoting his primary energy to consolidating his position internally in the Greek army. If he succeeds in this effort, however, he might at some stage try to unseat Makarios. Such a move would introduce great strains into Greek relations with Turkey and would face

2 In airgram A–135, May 22, Tasca asserted that the interagency memorandum overstated Ioannides’ position, despite his strength within the military. “Nevertheless, intrigue against him continues within the Armed Forces and among 1967 coup members. Also, there is evidence of increasing concern among the silent majority of military officers at the continued politicization of the Armed Forces. The business community is becoming alienated; unemployment among the politically sensitive construction workers can create new sources of tension; and the Greek people are turning from apathy to antipathy toward political repression in the absence of any hope of a return to democratic government.” (National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 1312, Saunders Chron File, NSC Secretariat, Contingency Plans 1974, Cyprus and Greek-Turkish Contingency Plans)
the United States with the difficult task of dampening conflict between NATO allies.

14. At least as ominous for the US is Ioannidis’ approach to relations with Turkey. The Greeks and Turks have long had differences about the territorial waters of the Aegean. The recent discovery of oil in an undisputedly Greek area off the island of Thassos, indicating that the Aegean may overlay rich deposits, has made this dispute more potentially explosive. The Greeks and Turks are in dispute over claims to the right to drill elsewhere in offshore areas in the Aegean. Thus far the Ioannidis regime has been unwilling to negotiate with the Turks over this thorny issue on the grounds that even to agree to talks would compromise the Greek position on the disputed area. Ioannidis’ inflexibility on this point may stem partially also from a calculation that confrontation with Turkey would help solidify his internal military support as well as distract popular discontent with his government. The Greek military has begun to take certain precautionary measures for possible conflict with Turkey. While the Turkish government has sought to dampen tensions, already a cycle of action and reaction seems underway which eventually could embroil Greece and Turkey in confrontation.

Relations with the US

15. Like its predecessors, the Ioannidis regime views cooperative relations with the US as the base of its foreign policy. Moreover, the reservoir of pro-US sentiment among the ruling military circles appears stronger and more pervasive than any minority tendency that would wish to loosen these ties. At the same time, the government is unwilling to shift domestic policies to repair what it considers the unsatisfactory present state of relations with the US. While the Greek rulers would like US endorsement of their regime and open-handed assistance, they do not expect Washington to be that forthcoming. What they fear particularly is difficulty in acquiring the weapons they believe they need to modernize their armed forces to cope with “local war situations.” And they are sensitive to overt signs of US displeasure with their regime. They will especially watch to see how the US treats them now that both sides have had some months to assess the November coup.

16. In this context, the new rulers are currently reviewing the conditions under which military facilities are made available to the US. They regard US facilities in Greece to be worth more in terms of aid than the US is presently providing under Foreign Military Sales, and they are more avid than their predecessors in desiring the US to up the ante. For example, they are raising difficulties and causing delays in present negotiations over the use of facilities at Souda Bay. Thus far, they are still feeling their way along, and are unsure how much the
traffic will bear. The Greeks are considering turning to other Western arms suppliers if the US will not allow them to purchase the quantities they believe they require.

17. There has also been a growing ambivalence toward the US among the Greek civilian body politic. On the one hand, underlying pro-US sentiment still remains strong among the public as well as one can judge. The emotional and family ties binding Greeks in general to the US are too profound to be sundered by surface disagreements. On the other hand, because the US is widely regarded as the moving force behind this—and any other—regime in Greece, there is a well of popular suspicion of US motives that can be exploited to promote anti-Americanism if the opportunity arises. And popular resentment of the US seems sure to grow. This could impel the regime to become even stickier in its dealings with the US.

18. Dealing at a routine level with the Greek regime and avoiding identification with it as far as possible can create a growing irritation in relations. But it does not threaten an abrupt crisis. Pained as the present rulers may be with the lack of US enthusiasm for their regime, they seem ready to accept this posture with resignation. They recognize that the US urged Papadopoulos to restore parliamentary rule and they would impute no special motives to continuation of this pressure on them as well. Yet they will remain resistant to liberalizing the political system to satisfy their foreign allies.

19. Even with deferral of the second phase of the homeporting agreement, Ioannidis and his colleagues may seek to renegotiate the broad range of mutual security arrangements between the two countries. The Greek military, which would dictate the Greek stance on these matters, views American facilities as hostage to extract concessions on the acquisition of American military equipment. Though the Greeks will base their appeal for weapons on NATO force requirements, the underlying aim would be to acquire the capability to handle potential hostilities with Turkey and Bulgaria and also to meet the expectations of the Greek officer corps. Ioannidis probably sees his ability to secure weapons from the US or elsewhere as critical to his own survival.

20. In addition to assurance that the US would supply modern weapons in some quantities, the Greeks will press for changes to give them greater control of US military activities and to limit the privileges and immunities of American personnel in Greece. We regard this as essentially a bargaining ploy, but it may nonetheless lead to significant alteration of the US position in Greece. During the October war, the

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3 Reference is to the Arab-Israeli war of 1973.
Papadopoulos regime, while adopting a policy publicly at variance with that of the US, was nonetheless [less than 1 line not declassified] helpful in various ways. For example, it [1 line not declassified] allowed more extensive use of US facilities in Greece than is provided by bilateral agreements. In the future, we could not expect this type of cooperation from the Ioannidis regime, unless the US were prepared to be more forthcoming in a variety of military matters.

21. US willingness to continue to deal with the military rulers would not be popular with civilian politicians within Greece. In the unlikely event that Andreas Papandreou (or someone of his political stripe) were to return to head a new Greek regime, he probably would use alleged US support for the Ioannidis government as a pretext for action against the US. It seems unlikely, however, that popular resentment against the US would impel Karamanlis, if he should be recalled by a military regime, for example, to sever major ties with Washington. There is some risk that a more representative regime would feel under popular pressure to retaliate against the US for its alleged identification with military dictatorship, but the US and NATO’s role in Greece’s security system is substantial; a likely successor regime would be very reluctant to destroy this connection.

22. Efforts by the US to distance itself from the present rulers would complicate bilateral working arrangements. Given the sensitivity of the Ioannidis regime, it would probably react by pressing the US on the use of facilities. How far the government would go in restricting US activities in Greece would depend on how much open displeasure the US expressed. Merely urging the Greeks to permit an early return to parliamentary procedures would not appear to the Athens regime nor to its opposition to be much of a change in the policy the US pursued toward Papadopoulos. Public characterization of the present regime as repressive—thus encouraging additional opprobrium from other NATO allies—would be seen by Ioannidis as unnecessarily irritating and would provoke him to retaliate, without, however, convincing most critics of the regime that the US had abandoned Ioannidis. It is likely that under these circumstances the Greek attitude toward military relations with the US would become much less cooperative across a broad range of issues.
14. Telegram From the Embassy in Greece to the Department of State

Athens, June 14, 1974, 0900Z.

3705. Subject: Foreign Policy Views of Brig. Gen. Ioannides. Following message was transmitted to Ambassador Tasca from Brigadier General Ioannides:

1. Greek/Turkish Dispute: Greece really does not want war with Turkey as the only winner in such a war would be the Soviet Union. Greece will not attack Turkey (preemptive) but will not permit Greek interests in Aegean or Cyprus to be jeopardized. The U.S. can assist in preventing a Greek-Turkish war by selling Greece the arms it needs to achieve a level of military strength sufficient to prevent a Turkish attack on Greece. It will do no good, however, to sell arms to Greece and then give twice that amount to Turkey, as has been the U.S. custom. If Greece cannot buy arms from the U.S. (it prefers U.S. arms to any other) then France, Germany, and other countries will get the orders.

2. Souda Bay: Ioannides would rather not sign an agreement at this time. The press would demand to know the details, especially the “rent” to be paid to Greece as is now paid to Spain, Turkey, etc., for base rights. He is willing to let U.S. forces simply use Souda as we have in the past without an agreement.

3. Cyprus: Ioannides sees one of two things happening in Cyprus. Either Cyprus will slowly drift left and become a Cuba of the Mediterranean (this drift will be caused by the Communist propaganda which is being taught in the school system), or the 80 percent Greek majority will achieve union with Greece. The one thing that cannot happen is union with Turkey.

4. Aegean Oil Rights: To suggestions that Greece give Turkey some oil rights in the Aegean, the answer is no. If Turkey has Aegean oil rights, so does Bulgaria, Yugoslavia, and perhaps other countries. The Aegean is Greek. The potential wealth can be shared, however, by extremely heavy Greek purchasing of Turkish products, even more than can be used, thus providing a financial benefit to Turkey.

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1 Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 594, Country Files, Middle East, Greece, Vol. IV. Secret; Exdis.

2 In telegram 3704 from Athens, June 14, Tasca informed the Department: “In order to maintain flexible and effective communications with Brigadier General Ioannides, I have opened a separate and additional channel to him, via DAO and the Greek military.” This was the first message transmitted through the alternate channel. (Ibid., Box 1312, Saunders Chron File, NSC Secretariat, Contingency Plans 1974, Cyprus and Greek-Turkish Contingency Plans)
5. Greek Morale: The Government of Greece has been receiving letters from hundreds of Greeks now in foreign countries pledging to return to Greece if war with Turkey should come. Ioannides is 100 per cent sure that if attacked by Turkey, the Greek people will unite and fight.

6. Comment: Substance of foregoing generally conforms with earlier messages, though tone somewhat more moderate. One point worth underlining is implication that GOG intends to continue the 1959 agreement in effect as far as Souda Bay is concerned. This may be the Greek way of conceding that any special approach to Souda, outside of general context of our military relation, may not be practical.

Tasca

15. Interagency Intelligence Memorandum


SUBJECT
The Likelihood of Conflict Between Greece and Turkey

Principal Judgments

Greek-Turkish relations are currently troubled over conflicting claims to the right to sovereignty and potential minerals in the bed of the Aegean Sea. These claims are longstanding, but did not gain serious dimensions until early in 1974 after oil was found off the Greek island of Thassos, suggesting that the Aegean might overlie other significant deposits. The Turks have issued claims to sovereignty over areas of the seabed that the Athens government regards as Greek. The Greek Government has thus regarded the Turkish request for negotiations to delimit the continental shelf as a challenge to Greek sovereignty and has maintained that even to agree to negotiate would grant unacceptable validity to the Turkish claims.

1 Source: Central Intelligence Agency, NIC Files, Job 79-R01012A. Secret. This memorandum was prepared under the auspices of the National Intelligence Officers for Western Europe and Conventional Forces. It was principally drafted by DIA and CIA with the participation of representatives of INR and the intelligence components of the Departments of the Army, Navy, and Air Force.
The posturing of both sides in the last two months has heightened tensions. Although these moves and countermoves could touch off an armed conflict, neither Greece nor Turkey is actively seeking to trigger hostilities with the other. Neither wants to risk dislocation of its relationship with the US and NATO over this issue. Current international meetings where both the Greeks and the Turks are represented may offer an opportunity for direct but informal contacts to defuse the issue.

While deliberately initiated war thus seems unlikely in the near future, some sort of armed clash or incident remains possible. With present inflamed tempers, incidents could lead to a localized engagement. Should Athens unilaterally declare a 12 mile territorial limit, the danger of incident would increase. But it seems likely that Athens and Ankara would seek to prevent larger-scale conflict from developing.

Even if negotiations were to begin, the issues would not yield easily to satisfactory solution and the controversy is likely to be prolonged. Thus the issue of delimiting the continental shelf boundary and of oil exploration in this disputed area is likely to drag on, carrying with it potential for future damage to NATO.

The recent period of heightened tensions raises the question of the relative military capabilities of the Greek and Turkish armed forces. Turkey has a clear numerical superiority in its military forces, particularly in its ground and air arms. This superiority probably would permit a successful but limited Turkish offensive in eastern Greek Thrace and seizure of some Greek Aegean islands near the Turkish coast. Neither side, however, has the capability to support a prolonged and intensive military campaign. Both would require extensive resupply from other countries if fighting lasted more than a few weeks, even at relatively low levels of intensity.

Both countries, even in the event of hostilities, would be vying for US assistance and would probably avoid any actions which would almost certainly cause a rupture of relations with the US.

I. The Likelihood of Hostilities Between Greece and Turkey

Genesis of the Dispute

1. Greek-Turkish relations are troubled over conflicting claims to the right to sovereignty and potential minerals in the bed of the Aegean Sea. But the controversy is heightened by centuries of latent hostility reflected in the last 50 years in conflict over the treatment of respective minorities and Cyprus. Even common membership in NATO has not dissipated this mutual mistrust.

2. The present governments in Greece and Turkey have had less contact than their immediate predecessors and have yet to establish an
effective dialogue to compose their differences. From the start, the Ioannidis regime in Greece has shown itself to be narrowly nationalistic and parochial in its views. It has not pursued an easily discernible approach to the Cyprus problem. While worried about a military confrontation with Turkey, Ioannidis may have viewed dispute with Turkey as helpful in solidifying his personal military support as well as in distracting popular discontent with his government. And indeed, there is evidence that the current controversy with Turkey is a popular cause within the Greek armed forces. At the same time, the Greek regime has avoided brash moves that would risk armed conflict with Turkey.

3. The formation of the Ecevit coalition government in Turkey in January 1974 also added momentum to the rise of tension in Greek-Turkish relations. While Ecevit has little in his background to suggest particular animosity toward Greeks and has publicly renounced aggressive intent, the weakness of his coalition regime and his inexperience in government leadership may have given more scope to popular nationalist suspicions of Greece. In any event, the coalition government protocol committed him to pursue the exploitation of offshore mineral resources and to accelerate prospecting for basic energy resources. In addition, his initial government policy proclamation endorsing a federated state in Cyprus contradicted earlier assurances that the Turks were not seeking a "federal" solution and that they accepted the principle of a "unitary" Cyprus. Ecevit’s statement, therefore, was read in Greece as provocative.

4. It was the discovery of oil, however, that triggered the present crisis. Conflicting claims to the seabed in the Aegean are longstanding, but this controversy did not gain serious dimensions until early in 1974 after oil was found in what promised to be substantial quantities off the Greek island of Thassos in the northern Aegean. The seabed here is undisputedly Greek, but the presence of oil suggested that the Aegean might overlie other significant deposits. The Turks have long been frustrated by seeing valuable oil reserves discovered near their borders (in lands formerly part of the Ottoman Empire), while Turkey has had only minor success in finding oil in commercial quantities within its own boundaries. The Turks granted concessions to the Turkish Petroleum Monopoly; and in order to press its claim to the Anatolian shelf, the Ankara government in February 1974 sent Athens a note for-
mally asserting sovereignty over the seabed up to the 100 fathom line, notwithstanding that the area in question lay to the west of the numerous Greek islands that line the Aegean coast of Turkey. And the Turks asked for negotiations to delimit the continental shelf.

**Current Maneuvering**

5. The Greek Government regarded the Turkish request for talks on this matter as a challenge to Greek sovereignty. Athens maintained that even to agree to negotiate would be tantamount to admitting that Ankara’s position had some validity. Hence, the Greek regime delayed answering the Turkish démarche. Greek contingency plans for military action against Turkey were dusted off, some troops were moved to the islands off the Turkish coast, and in general the Athens regime took steps to prepare to defend its claimed rights by force if it should deem necessary.\(^3\) At the same time, informally, the Greeks sought to enlist US backing for their position. And on May 24 Athens finally replied to the Turks in an ambiguous fashion, hinting that it might entertain some sort of preliminary discussions, though not agreeing to formal negotiations. A subsequent note on June 14 reaffirmed the basic Greek position.

6. Greece has for some time indicated an intention to extend its territorial waters from the present six miles to 12. Since such a move would apply to its many islands, it would effectively transform the Aegean into a Greek lake. Athens is not likely to act before the Law of the Sea Conference in Caracas has considered the question of territorial waters, but a unilateral extension by Greece would be viewed by Ankara as a serious challenge to its claimed rights in the area.

[Omitted here is a map of the Aegean seabed.]

7. The Turks throughout have sought to force Athens to agree to negotiations over the status of the disputed seabed. In April, the Ankara government publicized its decision to permit oil exploration in the seabed west of the Island of Lesbos. When this announcement failed to induce the Greeks to negotiate, the Turks increased the state of readiness of their forces and prepared to send a Turkish hydrographic vessel into the Aegean to conduct surveys of the area in question.\(^4\) And after the Greek Foreign Office rejected Ecevit’s hopeful interpretation of the May 24 note as acceptance of negotiations, Ankara announced

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\(^3\) Intelligence cables, May 20, 23, 30, and 31, reported Greek troops reinforcing the Greco-Turkish border and the Dodecanese Islands. (National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 1312, NSC Secretariat, Contingency Plans 1974, Cyprus and Greek-Turkish Contingency Plans)

\(^4\) Intelligence cables, May 26 and 28, reported the Turkish General Staff’s issuance of a national general alert to all military forces. (Ibid.)
that it was dispatching the hydrographic vessel accompanied by Turkish naval units, some of which were on route to participate in the bilateral NATO exercise “Good Friendship.” This move was calculated to demonstrate Turkish determination to press for Ankara’s alleged undersea rights. Subsequently, the Turks announced that the hydrographic vessel was returning to the Dardanelles after five days in Aegean waters.

8. While these Turkish tactics contributed to the increase in tensions, they have not yet accomplished the aim of securing full-scale negotiations. Ioannidis, although viewing the Turkish actions as provocative, decided to ignore the Turkish hydrographic vessel and has assured the US that he would not consider military response unless and until actual oil drilling began. Athens cites the precedent of having tolerated Soviet surveying operations in international waters over the Greek seabed. Moreover, Ioannidis may have adopted this more relaxed position because there is geological evidence from oil company research indicating that oil is highly unlikely to be found in the research particular area under dispute. The Greeks are relying on what they regard as a strong legal case, improving their military readiness but avoiding action that would provoke the Turks.

The Likelihood of Armed Conflict

9. Although these moves and countermoves could touch off an armed conflict, neither Greece nor Turkey is actively seeking to trigger hostilities with the other. The leadership in both countries is aware of the far-reaching implications of military conflict between NATO members. Both states would like to be less dependent on the US, but still regard their relations with the US as the central facet of NATO membership and of their defense strategy. From past experience in crises over Cyprus they fear dislocation of this relationship if war should break out. What pressures emanate from the respective military establishments to have recourse to arms have not reached proportions so far that would lead the decision-making levels deliberately to initiate armed conflict.

10. The pressure for war is also reduced by current high-level diplomatic contacts. The respective foreign ministers discussed the problems at the NATO meeting in Ottawa on June 18–19. The Law of the Sea Conference now convened in Caracas provides another opportunity for discussion. From the start, Athens has wanted to await the outcome of the Caracas Conference before considering the possi-

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5 As reported in telegram 3700 from Athens, June 13; telegram 4684 from Ankara, June 14; telegram 3744 from Athens, June 15; and telegram 3776 from Athens, June 17. (Ibid.)
bility of substantive negotiations with the Turks in hopes that the general principles worked out here would bolster the Greek case. The Turks, on the other hand, pushed for negotiations before the Conference.

11. While deliberately initiated war thus seems unlikely in the near future, some sort of armed clash or incident remains possible. Greek and Turkish naval units in the disputed area could through some miscalculation exchange fire. With present inflamed tempers, other incidents (say over fishing rights) could lead to a localized engagement. Should Athens unilaterally declare a 12 mile territorial limit, the danger of incident would increase. But even in these cases, it seems likely that Athens and Ankara would seek—undoubtedly through US mediation—to prevent larger-scale conflict.

12. The present crisis has demonstrated the mutual mistrust between Greek and Turk. Even if negotiations were to begin, the issues would not yield easily to satisfactory solution. The controversy is likely to be prolonged at least in part because it will be particularly difficult for the Turks to force the pace of mineral exploration. The amount of actual exploratory activity that the Turks can perform is extremely limited. Oil drilling rigs are in short supply and are already committed to drill elsewhere. Moreover, as long as the area remains in dispute, oil companies will be unwilling to make available the oil rigs necessary for actual drilling. Thus the issue of delimiting the continental shelf boundary and of oil exploration in this disputed area is likely to drag on, carrying with it potential for further damage to the NATO alliance.

[Omitted here are sections II, “Balance of Forces” and III, “The Likelihood of Seizure of U.S. Nuclear Weapons.”]

IV. Impact on Other Countries of Greek-Turkish Hostilities

On the US and NATO

39. Active hostilities between Greece and Turkey would have a serious adverse effect on intra-NATO relationships and on the military balance between NATO and the Warsaw Pact. Some NATO countries, particularly those in northern Europe, would likely make strong diplomatic overtures to both combatants in the search for a cease-fire. If one participant were seen clearly to be the aggressor, there might even be some public comment calling for its removal from the alliance. Should either Greece or Turkey suffer serious military reverses, it might come to feel abandoned by its allies if they did not bring pressure to bear on the “victor” to restore the situation.

40. Under any circumstances, in the aftermath of full-scale hostilities between these two NATO partners there would be a weakened NATO posture against Soviet political and military pressures in the area. Continued bitterness between the two could extend for a
considerable period after the end of hostilities and seriously disrupt allied efforts at combined military planning for the region.

41. Even a widening split between Athens and Ankara that did not lead to open hostilities would, at the least, exacerbate the isolation that, because of geographic location, characterizes southern NATO. At the worst it would cause a serious breakdown of defenses on the southeastern flank.

42. Considerable pressures would be exerted by both sides to enlist the US as an ally to the disadvantage of the other. Each side would be likely to cast the other in the role of aggressor as it appealed for US assistance and perhaps even direct military support. The situation is further complicated because US forces are stationed in the two countries.

On Cyprus

43. Greece and Turkey have several times threatened to go to war over the Cyprus question, but Cyprus stands a reasonably good chance of escaping direct involvement in hostilities between the two over other issues, especially in a conflict of short duration. A Greek-Turkish conflict would, however, raise intercommunal tensions and increase the chances of serious strife on the island. It is within Turkey’s capabilities to cut off Cyprus from any Greek access, and to launch a successful landing on the island, if it chooses. Ankara would take such action only in the unlikely event of a Greek attempt to take over the island or in order to protect a threatened Turkish minority on the island.

44. If hostilities did break out on Cyprus, it is doubtful that the two British Sovereign Base Areas or the aircraft located there would be attacked deliberately. It would not be in the interest of either Greece or Turkey to take provocative action against the British, some of whose aircraft there are NATO-committed.

[Omitted here are several maps and annexes.]
16. Telegram From the Mission to the North Atlantic Treaty Organization to the Department of State

Brussels, July 4, 1974, 1925Z.

3745. Subj: Greek-Turkish Dispute.

1. On July 4, SYG Luns invited to his office Ambassador of U.S., U.K., France, FRG, Italy, and Belgium for discussion of initiatives Luns intended to take in near future regarding Greek-Turkish dispute over Aegean. Luns said that he feared the possibility of conflict between Greece and Turkey and that he had concluded that he should take an initiative very quickly to try to engage the two countries in efforts to de-fuse the situation. He believed that as in the case of the Middle East, if one tried to solve all of the issues in one package, very great difficulties would ensue. Therefore, he favored a step-by-step approach of the kind which had proven successful in the Middle East context.2

2. Luns then said that he favored leaving aside for the time being the legal aspects, the question of minorities, and question of Cyprus. He thought it desirable to concentrate on the issue of oil and mineral wealth in the Aegean and to try to solve this problem now before major discoveries of oil were made. Therefore, he intended to propose to the Greeks and the Turks that they might establish joint companies to exploit the oil and mineral resources of the Aegean. The question of percentage of participation and other specifics of such joint companies would be matters for later decision.

3. In making such a proposal, he had in mind that he did not wish to call into question the legal rights which Greece insisted upon and that, on the other hand, Turkey should be able to say that it has a reasonable share in the mineral resources off its shores. He recognized the danger that the Government of Greece might think that NATO or its Secretary General was trying to impose a solution and he intended to be discreet in his manner of proceeding with this initiative, thinking first of preliminary contacts with the Greek and Turkish PermReps on the Council. This might be followed up, if appropriate, with visit to Athens and Ankara by A/SYG Kastl or by the SYG's Chef du Cabinet Paul Van Campen. He intended to avoid all publicity, Luns stressed. He would hope at a suitable time to elicit diplomatic support from the allies represented in this meeting.

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1 Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 1312, Saunders Chron File, NSC Secretariat, Contingency Plans 1974, Cyprus and Greek-Turkish Contingency Plans. Secret; Priority; Limdis. Repeated to Athens and Ankara.

2 Reference is to the incremental agreements Kissinger concluded with the shuttle diplomacy he began in the wake of the October 1973 Arab-Israeli war.
4. Luns anticipated that if his initiative were at all successful there might be follow-up discussions, perhaps in NATO headquarters, in which he would assist. He thought this approach would avoid the creation of ad hoc machinery which the Greeks did not like and yet start a process of negotiations. As regards timing, Luns said that he intended to make a brief statement in the DPC on July 5, in which he would exhort the Greeks and Turks to refrain from any actions which might lead to use of force. At Belgium Ambassador De Staercke’s suggestion, Luns said he might also refer to the “Three Wise Men’s report” of 1956 and to a resolution of the North Atlantic Council which was adopted as a result of that report, which called for submitting disputes to good offices procedures within the NATO framework. Luns said he would follow this up with private démarches to the Greek and Turkish delegations to NATO during the week of July 8. Luns said that he intended to undertake this initiative on his own responsibility, although he would be grateful if his intentions were reported to capitals.

Rumsfeld

17. Editorial Note

In Greece, the failure of the July 15, 1974, coup in Cyprus to realize fully the goals of the Ioannides regime, and the threat of war with Turkey over Cyprus, led to political turmoil. Constantine Karamanlis, a former Prime Minister of Greece who had gone into self-imposed exile in 1963, reemerged as a viable political leader for Greece. On July 17 he spoke out against the coup and the Greek military regime. The Embassy in Athens reported his statement in telegram 4561: “He warned ‘dramatic events in Cyprus constitute national disaster and can have painful consequences for the (Greek) nation at home and abroad.’ He also urged a return to democracy in Greece and offered to lead return to normalcy and national reconciliation.” (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy Files, 1974)

Within a week, Ioannides’ colleagues quietly ousted him from power and asked Karamanlis to return from exile. Events moved quickly and quietly within the Greek Government. When Tasca met with President Gizikis on July 21, Gizikis made no mention of the political turmoil within the Greek junta. (Telegram 4716 from Athens, July 21; ibid.) On July 23 Tasca reported that another former Prime Minister, Panayiotis Kanellopoulos, would replace Ioannides and form a government of national unity and return Greece to democracy. (Telegram
4872 from Athens, July 23; ibid.) Although Kanellopoulos’ name had been discussed when the senior generals in the junta informed Gizikis on July 22 that they would no longer take orders from Ioannides, two days of meetings between civilian and military leaders resulted in Gizikis calling Karamanlis in Paris to ask him to return to Greece. On July 24 Karamanlis returned from exile to be sworn in as Prime Minister at 4:15 a.m. (Telegram 4899 from Athens; ibid.) Later that day, Tasca met with Karamanlis and delivered a congratulatory message from Nixon. (Telegrams 4954 and 4962 from Athens; ibid.)

18. Telegram From the Embassy in Greece to the Department of State

Athens, July 26, 1974, 1200Z.

5049. Subject: Future of King Constantine. In the present situation there may be some who believe King Constantine should be brought back. It is my considered view that Karamanlis has so many grave issues facing him that we should not complicate his task by raising the constitutional question in any form at this time. Most of the Army is strongly opposed to the King, and many of the politicians are also opposed. He is clearly at this time, particularly now that Karamanlis in fact is back, likely to constitute a divisive factor. I urge, therefore, that we refrain from getting into this subject in any way and let the Greeks decide this issue for themselves.

Tasca

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20. Telegram From the Embassy in Greece to the Department of State

Athens, August 15, 1974, 1120Z.

5704. Subject: Greece, NATO, and the US—Some Reflections. In evaluation the Greek Government’s decree to leave NATO, ¹ I believe it is useful to bear in mind a number of essential facts:

1. The GOG and the Greek people are highly frustrated because of their inability to come to the aid of their fellow Greeks in Cyprus. The conflict with Turkey is aggravated by the fact its historic adversary Turkey is involved. The country is still vividly associated with four centuries of occupation and their own war of independence.

2. During the crisis, it has felt let down by its NATO allies which it felt could have compelled Turkey to observe its cease-fire.

3. On the other hand, I believe when the dust settles the basic elements tying Greece to the United States and its NATO allies will be given their appropriate weight. They are a small country surrounded by hostile and potentially hostile forces. Geographically, they clearly need friends. With democracy in the process of being restored, many friends will be apparent.

4. Our traditionally close ties with this country, and particularly its people, will prove to be strong and I believe can be decisive. They

¹ Source: Ford Library, National Security Adviser, Presidential Country Files for the Middle East and South Asia, Box 10, Greece, Exdis to Secretary of State 1. Secret; NIACT; Immediate; Exdis.

² Telegram 5665 from Athens, August 14, transmitted the text of the announcement, in which the Greek Government stated that NATO had failed to “stem Turkey from creating a situation of conflict between two allies.” (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy Files, 1974)
know that the American people are friendly and mean well. The Greeks who are keyed into realities, and others must or will realize the most difficult dilemma which has faced our government in the development of the crisis—i.e., the overriding necessity of seeking to bring our important allies together without irreparable damage in our or NATO’s relations with either one in the imperative interest of Western security in the Eastern Mediterranean.

5. Their decision to remain in the Alliance, French style, does underline their understanding of the importance of the security protection which the alliance provides them against the potential dangers from the Warsaw Pact area. I do not believe Caramanlis wants to act hastily with regard to unravelling their participation in NATO military structure where basic military elements are involved such as NAMFI, our NATO use of Souda Bay, etc. Clearly, however, the practical implications of Greece’s decision to withdraw from NATO, and the speed with which the Greek Government proceeds to disengage from the military portions of the alliance, will depend upon events in Cyprus and in Ankara over which Caramanlis and his pro-Western colleagues have little or no control. The US and NATO have become, almost inevitably, the scapegoats for Greek frustration over the Cyprus problem. The sooner we can manufacture a settlement that meets Greek as well as Turkish minimum objectives, and which is not injurious to Greek self-respect, the sooner we can begin to mitigate the effects of Greece’s decision to loosen its military cooperation with NATO. That decision is thus far rhetorical but it cannot remain so for long in the absence of US action which the Greeks will interpret as responsive to their concern about continued Turkish military advances on Cyprus and what they regard as a blunt and unheeding Turkish diplomatic posture.

6. In the short term we must act promptly along the following lines:

A) Demonstrate that we are mindful of Greece’s importance to the US and the Western alliance and that we have not “chosen Turkey over Greece”. Our desire to avoid public criticism of the Turks is logical in view of our intention to retain diplomatic leverage in Ankara, but our even-handed public posture has cost us leverage in Athens and has contributed to Greece’s psychological estrangement. I continue to believe that a trip by the Secretary to Ankara and Athens is indispensable to reverse the disturbing trends we are witnessing in Greece.

B) Demonstrate also that we understand Caramanlis’ domestic and personal problems; that we regard him as a friend and want him to succeed in restoring strong and effective parliamentary government. Here again a visit by the Secretary would do more than anything else in the short term. Eventually, and depending on future developments, we should consider a visit by Caramanlis to the U.S. In this connection I do not believe that a Mavros visit to Washington can accomplish
much. Mavros is the least articulate and most politically threatened of the present Greek leaders and the dialogue between our two governments requires a clearer channel of communication than he can provide.

7. In the longer term we should consider the following:

A) Once Greek relations with Turkey have quieted down, and I must frankly say that many Greeks fear Turkish aims against Greece are not limited to Cyprus but other objectives such as the eastern Greek islands off the Turkish coast, Thrace, etc., we should make every effort to be as forthcoming as possible in the Greek program to modernize their Armed Forces. In this regard, the military from the lowest to the highest ranks still prefer our equipment over that of our allies although sometimes delivery schedules and economics have forced them otherwise.

B) Some assistance in obtaining credit to carry them over the difficult balance of payments position they are facing could of course also help to underline our basic interest in a friendly and strong Greece.

C) With the exception of significant military modernization, we should encourage our NATO allies similarly to act along the foregoing lines. Summit level meetings with Caramanlis would be particularly in order as they become feasible. Ambassador Vlachos told me last evening that Greece was deeply offended that Secty General Luns had refused to postpone his vacation sufficiently to be present at the NAC meetings to deal with the Greek-Turkish crisis. Steps need to be taken to repair this feeling of wounded philotimo.

D) Forward movement in Greek association with the Common Market, including the renewal of the remaining tranches of financial assistance suspended after the 1967 coup would of course be useful.

8. The foregoing are suggestive. For the present, we should make clear in every way possible American friendship and attachment to Greece. When the GOG gets around to sorting out its policies we shall have ample opportunity to make clear to the Greeks the truly reciprocal security interest we have in the availability of facilities to our Armed Forces in Greece.

9. One word of caution in closing this message. The left, notably Andreas Papandreou, will, of course, do everything possible to exacerbate Greece’s relations with the U.S. and the West. We should, therefore, expect a major effort of these forces in key Greek sectors against the U.S. position in Greece. They will have their successes. But I believe that with Caramanlis at the helm and other intelligent and Western oriented leaders such as Mavros, Pesmazoglu, etc., if we act decisively and in depth and breadth, our position in Greece can be maintained in its essential aspects.

Tasca
21. **Telegram From the Embassy in Greece to the Department of State**

Athens, August 15, 1974, 1250Z.

5705. Subject: Initial Assessment of Greek Withdrawal from NATO.
Ref: (a) Athens 5653 (NOTAL); (b) Athens 5665. ²

Summary: GOG decision to withdraw from NATO probably taken without full realization of its impact. Earlier experience, however, suggests that GOG contemplates a relationship with other NATO countries like that of France but a base-rights relationship with USG similar to Spanish example. Since GOG has not thought through impact of withdrawal, we can only estimate impact on US security interests in Greece. End Summary.

1. Action taken by GOG August 14 to withdraw from North Atlantic Treaty Organization, while continuing to adhere to the North Atlantic Treaty, clearly has far-reaching implications. We attempt in this cable to give initial assessment of meaning of Greek action and its implications for US-Greek security relationship. As situation matures, we will have further comments.

2. Following commentary is based on assumption that any clash between Greece and Turkey would be confined for all essential purposes to Cyprus and that it would be brief, leaving mistrust and unhappiness between two countries but without legacy of hatred toward each other and bitterness toward bystanders which full-scale war would engender. Latter eventuality would require considerable re-evaluation of US position in Greece.

3. We believe this decision, like the January 1973 decision to forgo further grant military assistance, ³ was taken without adequate thought to ramifications for Greece’s future security needs. We doubt that impact of decision on NATO infrastructure program or implications for

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¹ Source: Department of State, RG 84, Athens Embassy Files: Lot 96 F 335, Box 1, DEF 4–6 1974, Greek Withdrawal. Secret; NIACCT Immediate. Drafted by Robert Pugh (POL/ MIL), approved by Monteagle Stearns (DCM), and cleared in draft by General Burke (JUSMAGG) and Elizabeth Brown (POL). Repeated Immediate to the Secretary of Defense, Ankara, Nicosia, London, Thessaloniki, USNATO, JCS, USNMR SHAPE, US-CINCEUR, CINCUSNAVEUR, CINCUSAFE, CINCUSAREUR, USDOCOSOUTH, and COMSIXTHFLT.

² In telegram 5653, August 14, Tasca reported that the Greek Foreign Ministry would announce Greece’s withdrawal from NATO, but that it would remain an alliance member for political purposes. (Ibid.) Regarding telegram 5665, see footnote 2, Document 20.

³ See Document 1.
future operations of NAMFI, Souda Bay or NAWTC at Timbakion, for
goof, were fully taken into account. We assume that as a minimum, GOG intends to withdraw Greek military personnel from NATO com-
mmands in Brussels, Naples and Izmir; to cease participating in various NATO committees, etc. involved in military activities; and to align Greece’s defense activities with its own concept of Greece’s national interests and not necessarily in accordance with NATO plans. Whether withdrawal would go beyond this is matter we doubt GOG has thought through and might in any event depend upon outcome of current events.

4. Whether or not Greece’s decision is irrevocable, and speed and extent to which it is implemented, clearly depend on our ability to de-
fuse the Cyprus crisis and formulate a settlement that Greeks can live with. Should Greece contemplate re-integration, we do not believe that assignment of Greeks to NATO headquarters on Turkish soil would be possible for the foreseeable future. Thus, reintegration might be ac-
complished in headquarters in Naples or Brussels but not in Izmir.

5. For Greece (as for Turkey) NATO has always meant a multilat-
eralized relationship with the United States. There is considerable rea-
son to think that Greece intends by its withdrawal action to put pres-
sure on alliance but not to give up the central relationship with the United States. In this scheme of things, GOG doubtless believes that Greece’s strategic position is such that USG will wish to continue close security relationship within or without NATO, and we presume that this Greek judgment is not wide of the mark. Question then is what kind of relationship would GOG envision and how would this accord with United States view of USG-Greek security relationship under North Atlantic Treaty but outside NATO?

6. Our experience in negotiating with GOG on base rights and re-
lated issues is that GOG feels that fundamental changes are overdue. Although this feeling manifested itself under two authoritarian regimes which preceded current government, it evidently developed from Greek perceptions which are not necessarily dependent upon shared views on best means of governing Greece. They seem to be held both by Greek military leaders and Foreign Ministry. Salient features of these changes, as predicted by our recent experiences, would include:

a) Existing as well as additional US facilities and other manifesta-
tions of US presence should not result in any cost to GOG. This conviction results from reappraisal by Greeks of advantages and disadvantages for Greece of Alliance relationship, stimulated basically by unfortunate 10% local currency deposit requirement and imminent expiration of grant military assistance which together prompted Greece early in 1973 pre-emptively to announce renunciation of further grant aid. We have sensed and experienced results of this in several contexts,
but in future would expect further GOG demands to restore what it perceives as financial balance.

b) Restoration of balance might be expected to take form of quid pro quo for US use of Greek facilities which would put Greece in category of base rights countries. Spain is model GOG probably has in mind and Spanish experience might be quite relevant in our future security relationship with Greece.

c) NATO SOFA and bilateral US-Greek implementing agreement concerning jurisdiction over US military personnel might well be challenged, with elimination of latter as first objective. Since other provisions of NATO SOFA have proven to be troublesome in GOG’s views, its general applicability might also well be challenged and a superseding bilateral more favorable to Greece demanded.

d) Assertion of close Greek control over unilateral US activities, such as special reconnaissance missions, might also be anticipated. A heightened desire to avoid irritating Arab countries could well emerge from a Greek attempt to broaden its foreign policy base in wake of withdrawal decision and humiliation on Cyprus, making reconnaissance missions particularly vulnerable.

7. Greece’s withdrawal from NATO also could have implications in following areas, and probably in other ways not immediately called to mind:

a) [11 lines not declassified]

b) US Sixth Fleet visits to Greek ports might be less welcome in the short term but their basic acceptability from Greek point of view should not lessen significantly in longer term. Dormant Phase II of homeporting would probably be far less acceptable to GOG in aftermath of likely unhappy resolution of Cyprus problem. Presence of Sixth Fleet in eastern Mediterranean will still be seen as important to Greece’s defense against threat from north, but it will take some time for Sixth Fleet to get rid of onus for failure to intervene to stop Turkish invasion of Cyprus, however unrealistic or unfair we know that Greek view to be.

c) Future of multilaterally-used NATO installations on Greek soil, NAMFI and NAWTC, is very uncertain. It is difficult to envision continued functioning of these installations with Greece outside of NATO, yet considerable value they have for integrated training argues in favor of their continued operation. If this could be accomplished, it would keep Greeks engaged with NATO in meaningful fashion and thereby make possible reintegration decision that much easier.

d) Impact on NATO infrastructure program is not clear to us. We presume infrastructure funds could not be utilized to maintain the many Greek facilities erected through this program. Any construction USG might normally wish to have funded through infrastructure presumably would have to be unilaterally funded now.
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e) Greek participation in NATO exercises would again seem to be excluded for foreseeable future, but slack might be taken up to great extent expanded program of bilateral exercises with US Navy, or even multilateral exercises (excluding Turkish units) without NATO identification.

f) Status of JUSMAGG should not be altered so long as Greece continues its extensive weapons modernization program. JUSMAGG’s charter predates Greece’s original entry into NATO, and it plays a significant role in assisting Hellenic Armed Forces modernization effort, so it should not suffer as result of recent withdrawal decision.

8. As indicated above, as GOG assesses meaning of its own decision and we are able to discuss matter with contacts at various levels, we shall refine this analysis.

Tasca

22. Paper Prepared in the Central Intelligence Agency\(^1\)


ATHENS’ FRUSTRATIONS WITH THE US AND THE PROSPECTS FOR THE GREEK LEFT

The Greek Popular Mood

The Greeks are angry at the US because the alternatives are either very frustrating or very unpalatable. They should be angry at the Turks, and they are, but they cannot afford to respond militarily to the Turks because they know they probably could not win.

The other obvious alternative, blaming themselves, for the Cyprus disaster is also distasteful. Even though the Karamanlis government was not involved in the decision to oust Makarios, it would not be politic to overly chastise those who were at a time when Karamanlis is attempting to develop widespread support.

\(^1\) Source: Central Intelligence Agency, Executive Registry, Job 80–M01048A, Box 3, Greece, Folder 17. Secret; No Foreign Dissem; No Dissem Abroad; Background Use Only; Controlled Dissem. The paper was prepared in response to Kissinger’s request for an assessment of current Greek resentment of the United States and was transmitted by a covering memorandum from Acting DCI Vernon Walters on August 29.
But someone has to be blamed for the humiliation Greeks have suffered over events in Cyprus in the past six weeks. The US became a likely target because of the alleged US “tilt” toward Turkey over the Cyprus issue. This allegation fell on fertile ground in Greece. Not only did the sense of national frustration have to be relieved in some fashion, but there is an underlying tendency among Greeks to believe that the “American factor” is the principal determinant of events in their area. This notion derives from a long history of great power involvement in Greek politics.

Karamanlis’ Position

Karamanlis does not share the average Greek citizen’s view about the extent of US responsibility for Greek reverses on Cyprus. Nevertheless, Karamanlis probably felt obliged to make some dramatic gesture to placate public opinion, and his actions against NATO and the US are designed, in part, to relieve this frustration.

By adopting an anti-US attitude and dangling the prospect that it could get worse, Athens no doubt hopes that Washington will be encouraged to influence the Turks to moderate their position. This type of diplomatic brinkmanship has limitations, however, and Athens has already shown signs of wanting to avoid irreparable damage to Greece’s relations with the US and NATO. Great fanfare has been given to Athens’ intention to withdraw from NATO, for example, but Greek officers have not yet been ordered to leave their posts at various NATO commands, and the Greek government is considering ways of maintaining various connections with NATO even as it indicates its intention to formally withdraw.

Finally, Karamanlis’ step is of great importance to his political position. The moves against the US and NATO pre-empt, at least temporarily, the primary issue on which his government would be vulnerable to attack from the Greek left. This is not to say that Karamanlis has adopted an anti-US policy simply to secure a domestic political advantage. He is genuinely upset with US Cyprus policy, but he also recognizes that the anti-US gestures he has been making are popular and will give him time to consolidate his own political position.

Position of the Left

For the moment, the left is at a disadvantage because it is badly disorganized and divided into separate factions. There are several communist groups, but most appear to have grown more conservative during their years of political exile and are probably willing to limit their contest with Karamanlis to the ballot box.

The reported plans of maverick leftist Andreas Papandreou are less reassuring. Although he has reportedly cautioned his followers to avoid provocative actions in the near future, Papandreou plans to
resume his “unrelenting struggle” once the Cyprus issue subsides. According to a reliable source, this will entail a campaign of demonstrations and public disorders designed to topple the Karamanlis government and catapult Papandreou to power.

Karamanlis appears to have two principal options in dealing with excesses by Papandreou-led leftists. He could place severe limitations on leftist political expression and participation as he did during his previous administration. Such a policy would strengthen his position with the right, but it also could rally the left around Papandreou who might then be in a position to seriously challenge the government.

Alternately, Karamanlis may seek to coopt some of the left’s program and even some of its more moderate leaders in an effort to keep it divided and Papandreou isolated. This option could create some disaffection among Karamanlis’ supporters on the right, but he probably could convince them of the possible long run advantage of such a policy, particularly as it pertains to Papandreou.

Karamanlis’ performance to date, particularly his threat to leave NATO, suggests he favors courting the left. He has already included several representatives of the center and some moderate leftists in his cabinet. He has also toyed with the idea of offering a cabinet post to well-known leftist composer Mikis Theodorakis who could be expected to attract many youthful supporters away from Papandreou. He reportedly is considering legalizing the Moscow-backed communist party, particularly if he receives some sign that it might abandon its present close relationship with Papandreou.

The more moderate United Democratic Left is also showing signs of distancing itself from Papandreou. Ilias Iliou, its principal spokesman, reportedly believes Papandreou’s expected extremist tactics will hurt the left and intends to make every effort to isolate him. Shorn of support from the other leftist groups, most of which have considerable organizational experience, Papandreou’s loosely organized, amorphous movement could probably be contained by the Karamanlis government.

Karamanlis’ efforts to contain the left and deal with Papandreou could, however, be jeopardized either by a humiliating Cyprus settlement or successful Turkish encroachments in the Aegean. Such reverses would almost certainly strengthen the left, which would blame Karamanlis’ continued association with the west for any losses to Turkey. In such a situation, the left’s chances of assuming power would be enhanced.

Prospects for Relations with the US

If a Cyprus settlement that preserves Greek dignity can be negotiated and further troubles in the Aegean avoided, US-Greek relations
may improve. At best, however, they would likely be less cordial and more businesslike than they were during Karamanlis’ first term. According to a senior Greek foreign ministry official, Karamanlis does not want to “dismantle” Greece’s cooperation with the US but he is inclined to “restructure it.” This will reportedly involve, in the coming weeks and months, a renegotiation of the “modalities” of many of Greece’s agreements with the US. The US sixth fleet homeporting agreement is a likely candidate for revision. The official emphasized, however, that Greece had no desire to abandon its place in the western camp or have the US relinquish its role as Greece’s closest friend.

This view is probably shared by most members of the military who, until the present disillusion with the US role in the Cyprus issue, have been western oriented and very pro-American. The military reportedly viewed Karamanlis’ moves against the US and NATO as regrettable but necessary given the US failure to give more support to the Greek case on Cyprus. This appears, however, to have been an emotional reaction and most military men would probably not want to pursue such moves any further and might even prefer they be rescinded once emotions are cooled. The armed forces high command, for example, has concluded [less than 1 line not declassified] that Greece’s withdrawal from NATO would create havoc in its defense establishment and leave it incapable of defending itself. Moreover, the military and probably Karamanlis recognize that too hostile a policy against the US could cause it to “tilt” even closer to Turkey. Consequently, Karamanlis will probably be aiming to limit the damage to Greek relations with the US and NATO arising from the Cyprus problem, and not exacerbate it.

At the same time, Karamanlis is looking forward to a closer relationship with Europe. He is motivated in this direction by the political and economic benefits of closer integration into the European Economic Community and related institutions. He is also looking for an alternate arms supplier because he believes US and Greek interests do not coincide in the revived Greco-Turkish rivalry to the extent they do vis-à-vis the threat from the Soviet bloc.

The French are the obvious candidate for the Greeks to look to for assistance because they are the world’s third largest arm supplier, because of their own loose relationship with NATO and because Karamanlis has established pro-French sentiments during his eleven years of exile in Paris. The French, meanwhile, are anxious to accommodate the Greeks for the same reasons and because they are concerned over what they see as the vulnerability of the Karamanlis government to a challenge from the Greek left.

France and the other European states also have appeared anxious to encourage the trend toward democratization in Greece and prevent
a drift toward neutralism. They have been receptive to the Greek initiative for closer ties and are expected soon to unfreeze Greece’s association with the EC and readmit her to the Council of Europe.

If Things Turned Really Sour . . . .

Should Greece be forced to accept a humiliating settlement over Cyprus or if it does not receive what it considers adequate US backing in the Aegean controversy, the Karamanlis government would be under severe pressure to eliminate the US presence in Greece. This pressure would emerge from the left but it would probably encompass most, if not all, Greek political groupings and would even receive support among substantial segments of the military, particularly the junior officer corps. In such a situation, Karamanlis would probably terminate all bilateral agreements with the US and either swing completely toward Europe or adopt a neutralist posture.

Should Karamanlis fail to take severe action in such circumstances, his government would either be voted out of office or overthrown by a coalition of leftists, both in and out of the military. A new government, which would almost certainly have a leftist or at least neutralist orientation, would probably sever remaining ties between Greece and the US.

23. Telegram From the Department of State to the Mission to the North Atlantic Treaty Organization

Washington, August 30, 1974, 1945Z.

191420. Subject: Greece and NATO. Ref: USNATO 4524; Athens 6210.2

1. Letter from PM Caramanlis to President Ford (Athens 6210), which UK also has received and which Embassy Athens assumes has been delivered to other allies, indicates that “Greece shall recover forthwith over her entire territory, airspace and territorial waters full exercise of her sovereignty which was heretofore limited on account of her...
participation in NATO and as a result of the permanent presence on Greek soil of foreign military installations and facilities or of the regular use of Greek airspace and territorial waters by foreign military aircraft and naval vessels. Greece is willing to examine with her allies the practical measures called for by the implementation of these decisions.” The allies thus face the need to begin considering approaches to be taken in dealing with GOG, based on careful consideration of implications of full or partial Greek withdrawal from NATO’s integrated military structure, as well as possible steps to encourage Greece to reconsider its position. (We are considering implications for US facilities in Greece and will provide further guidance as appropriate on this aspect.)

2. Accordingly, you should initiate informal bilateral discussions with SYG Luns and selected allies (UK, FRG, Italy and Belgium or Netherlands) on implications of Greek decision. Our initial thinking is that France should be excluded from this circle since France is not a member of the DPC, though we would welcome your views on holding talks also with French at NATO. For the present, and in order to avoid any indications to Greece that other allies are acting precipitately, all discussions should be conducted on a highly confidential basis. In initiating discussions, we believe USNATO could draw appropriately on the excellent analysis contained USNATO 4524, identifying it as Mission analysis.

3. A principal objective of consultations would be to consider with key allies development of a common “damage assessment,” outlining the impact on the NATO and Greek defense postures of Greek withdrawal and defining the magnitude of increased tasks which will have to be shared to close resulting defense gap. In the course of such a study, it may also be possible to identify “pressure points” to be used in discussions between the other DPC allies and Greece on the shape of future defense cooperation in the event of Greek withdrawal. We see as the benefit of this the development of a heightened awareness on the part of other allies of the potential implications of Greek withdrawal and of coordinated tactics aimed at promoting Greek reconsideration of their decision.

4. In the course of discussions, you may draw as appropriate on the following additional considerations.

5. France’s withdrawal from NATO followed several years of signaled French dissatisfaction and partial withdrawals of French forces (i.e., naval) from participation in NATO activities. Postulated on a calculated Gaullist policy, France sought and gained greater “independence,” and expanded its global as well as European influence at least partially because of its break with NATO. Greece’s proposed withdrawal, however, appears based almost entirely on a desire to find a
public scapegoat for its humiliation by Turkey. This suggests that basically cosmetic face-saving devices (e.g., restructuring of subordinate AFSOUTH commands to separate Greek and Turkish forces) could, after Cyprus tempers cool, greatly help Greek leadership rationalize a reconsideration to their public. We strongly hope the Greek leadership over time may conclude that withdrawal from NATO’s military structure would not only expose Greece to greater pressures from the Warsaw Pact, but also weaken it further in relation to Turkey which already has shown an interest in assuming some of Greece’s former NATO military responsibilities in the Eastern Mediterranean. These factors would likely add to other pressures on the Greek Government to find ways over time of perpetuating as many links as possible with the alliance, in contrast to the French position.

6. Even if it withdrew from integrated military activities, Greece would remain bound by the provisions of the North Atlantic Treaty and would sit in the NAC. However, it would be reasonable to assume that, as principal gestures of disengagement, Greece, like France, would not continue to sit in the Defense Planning Committee (DPC), nor would it assign officers except in a liaison capacity to the NATO military headquarters. We assume, too, that absence from the DPC would also entail Greek non-participation in NDAC and the NPG. [1 line not declassified]

7. Beyond this, we agree with the view expressed in USNATO 4524 that, because of its economic weakness and exposed military position, Greece may seek to engage itself more fully than France in other institutions and activities associated with the integrated military structure of the alliance. Greece may judge that, by staying somehow linked in bilateral military arrangements with the US it is preserving a central element of its security policy, [4½ lines not declassified].

8. For both military and financial reasons, we suspect that Greece is likely to seek continued involvement in NADGE, NATO’s air defense, early warning and other communications systems and NATO weapons research and development. It would also clearly be in Greece’s interest to continue to participate in the infrastructure program, now paying for military construction in Greece at the rate of about $15 million per quarter. However, it is difficult to see how Greece could continue to benefit from the infrastructure program as long as Greece refused to be part of the NATO integrated military structure, a prerequisite to having facilities qualify under NATO infrastructure criteria. Greece would also likely be interested in continued participation in NATO military exercises, and in maintaining the closest possible liaison with NATO military authorities charged with developing integrated defense plans for southern Europe. Such arrangements are conceivable, though they would complicate planning and implementation
and, in any event, Turkey would remain in a position to constantly exercise a check on the quality and quantity of Greek participation.

9. It is also possible that Greece would agree that the NATO air weapons training center and NATO missile firing installations could be made available on some reimbursable basis to NATO forces. Similarly, it might be prepared to continue operation on NATO’s behalf of naval communications facilities. Too, the Greeks like France likely will be prepared to provide overflight rights. However, the Greeks cannot undercut the alliance military posture to the extent the French could (and still can) by prohibiting such flights.

10. While recognizing the possibility of creating a unique relationship tailored for Greece, and willing to carefully consider any Greek proposal, the risks of encouraging Greece to assume it will continue to have all of its previous benefits without past costs is that it would set an example for other allies, and thus over the longer term could lead to a serious degradation of NATO’s military structure. Thus, it would seem preferable to leave Greece in the position of demandeur, should it withdraw, and to deal with Greek requests for continued military cooperation in a way that would lead Greece back to full military integration. As the Secretary stated on August 19: “...we assume that all of our allies, including Greece, join in collective defense in their own interests. We are willing to strengthen these common alliance ties and to help the Greek Government in any way possible. We will not be pressured by threat of withdrawal from the alliance. . . .”

11. Insofar as work of the alliance at NATO headquarters and elsewhere is concerned, we believe that it should move forward, insofar as possible on a “business as usual” basis. As issues arise, we would be prepared to deal with them as required. Moreover, we recognize, for example, that military exercises may have to be altered or cancelled, and we are already dealing with these case by case.

12. In sum, it should be up to the Greek Government to take the initiative to alter its relationships with its allies; we must avoid even the suggestion of making GOG take undesirable decisions because of perceived pressures by her NATO allies. Finally, it will be in our interest to extend as long as possible discussions with Greece on its future NATO role in order to give time for tempers to cool and to avoid prematurely closing doors to Greek participation.

Ingersoll
Brussels, September 10, 1974, 2205Z.

4875. Subject: Cyprus: Informal Meeting of the Thirteen on the Karamanlis Letter. Refs: (A) USNATO 4844; (B) USNATO 4845; (C) State 198059.2

1. As reported in Refs A and B, Secretary General Luns convened an informal meeting of the thirteen PermReps (minus Greece and Turkey) at 4:00 p.m. September 10 to discuss a response to the Karamanlis letter. Luns said that although it was up to each government to respond individually, he thought it useful to have a discussion so that the views of PermReps could be exchanged.

2. He called initially on U.K. Ambassador Peck who essentially repeated points in British text provided in Ref A.3

3. In general, most PermReps favored British approach, in essence a low-key reply of an unprovocative nature. De Staercke (Belgium) described the informal meeting of the thirteen as a way to develop a basket of ideas from which various allies could draw in their responses. He strongly supported the outline provided by Ambassador Peck. Hartog (Netherlands), Busch (Norway), Menzies (Canada), Svart (Denmark) and Boss (Germany) endorsed the general British approach. All indicated their governments felt that a reply to the Karamanlis letter was required. De Staercke was particularly emphatic about the obligation to respond.

4. Rumsfeld, drawing on Ref C, said Washington questioned whether a written response to the Karamanlis letter was required at this time, but that in any event Washington was interested in having the views of the other allies. Rumsfeld said that if Washington decided to reply, he personally felt that it could be much along the lines advocated by the allies. If and when a response is made, it could be short

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1 Source: Department of State, RG 84, Athens Embassy Files: Lot 96 F 335, Box 1, DEF 4–6 1974, Greek Withdrawal. Secret; Immediate; Limdis. Repeated Priority to all NATO capitals, the Mission in Geneva, USUN, Nicosia, USNMR SHAPE, USCINCEUR, and USDOCOSOUTH.

2 Telegrams 4844 and 4845, both from USNATO, September 9, and telegram 198059 to USNATO, September 10, are ibid.

3 As reported in telegram 4844, the British Government preferred a short and unprovocative reply that merely acknowledged Karamanlis’ message, assured him of the mutual value of Greece’s membership in NATO, and expressed hope that the present strain would not unduly damage the alliance or joint efforts to improve East-West relations.
and unprovocative, essentially indicating that the letter had been re-
ceived, that the subject was important, and that we wished to consult
with our allies on its implications. Rumsfeld emphasized the U.S., while
questioning the need for a written reply now, was not advocating that
no response whatsoever be made.

5. Catalano (Italy) noted the particular importance of the Greek
matter to Italy because of Italy’s geographic location. In addition to
supporting a response to the Karamanlis letter, he felt it was necessary
to conduct studies within the alliance to examine the implications of a
Greek withdrawal and also to determine what needs to be done to close
the security gap which would be created by Greece’s withdrawal. Luns
indicated that a study of this matter was under way. He presumably
had in mind the work being done by the international staff.

6. Ambassador De Rose (France) appreciated being invited to the
meeting and was there because France had also received the Kara-
manlis letter and they were interested in hearing the views of the other
allies. However, they were, for obvious reasons, in no position to give
their views on how the French would reply to the letter or to suggest
to other allies how they should reply.

7. The Secretary General indicated he would be meeting with
Greek Foreign Minister Mavros at 6:00 p.m. tomorrow (September 11).
He would see him again at a dinner the following day along with Am-
bassador De Staercke. Luns said he intends to dispel any impressions
Mavros may have that NATO failed to call a Foreign Ministers meet-
ing based upon a Greek request. He also said that he would empha-
size to Mavros that the Government of Greece had signed a contract
when it joined the alliance and that it could not unilaterally decide un-
der what conditions it would withdraw. Luns will also emphasize to
him the implications of Article 5 of the North Atlantic Treaty, indicat-
ing that once Greece withdraws from the military side of NATO, mil-
itary assistance would not be automatic.

8. Comment: It is obvious that the other allies intend to respond in
the near future to the Karamanlis letter along the lines suggested by
the British. Mission recommends that in light of these allied intentions
Washington give early consideration to the position it wishes to adopt
concerning a response to the Karamanlis letter. U.S. failure to respond
to the letter while all of our other allies do so might be misinterpreted
and could be prejudicial to improving our relations with the Govern-
ment of Greece.

Rumsfeld
25. Telegram From the Mission to the North Atlantic Treaty Organization to the Departments of State and Defense

Brussels, September 16, 1974, 2050Z.

5002. Subject: Greece and NATO.

1. At DPC meeting afternoon September 16 (which Greek representatives did not attend), SYG Luns announced that he had been officially advised by Greek delegation to NATO that henceforth Greek representatives will not attend meetings of Defense Planning Committee (DPC), Executive Working Group (EWG), Defense Review Committee (DRC) and Nuclear Planning Group (NPG). Luns added that SACEUR has received official notification from the Commander in Chief of Hellenic Armed Forces that effective August 14, 1974, all units of the Greek Army, Navy and Air Force are withdrawn from assignment, commitment, or ear-marking to NATO.

2. De Staercke (Belgian) remarked that it was curious that GOG had not withdrawn its representatives from NATO Military Committee (MILCOM). Although recognizing that Greece would wish maintain effective liaison with NATO military authorities while sorting out and adjusting its relations with the integrated military structure of the alliance, De Staercke said it was illogical that Greeks in MILCOM should be in position to decide or even block normal NATO business. Logically, he maintained, Greece should become one party of new contractual relationship, NATO being second party. Luns agreed, saying that he would speak with Greek Ambassador calling attention to manner in which France, while not member of MILCOM, maintains liaison with that body.

3. Rumsfeld expressed agreement with De Staercke observing that DPC has every bit as much pending business to define NATO–Greece linkage as MILCOM. It would therefore be logical to have same GOG relationship to both groups. Menzies (Canada) said MILCOM meetings divided into sections A (which France attended) and B (which it did not attend) seemed a useful model. Picking up Rumsfeld’s point, De Staercke said that both DPC and MILCOM had to review all NATO relations with Greece in their totality and work out new modus operandi satisfactory to both parties.

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1 Source: National Archives, RG 59, Records of Henry Kissinger, 1973–1977, Entry 5403, Box 10, Nodis Memcons, 9/74. Confidential; Immediate. Repeated Priority to all NATO capitals, USNMR SHAPE, USCINCEUR, USLOSACLANT, USDOCOSOUTH, CINCUSAREUR, CINCUSAFA, and CINCUSNAVEUR.
4. Eralp (Turkey), while saying he might be speaking prematurely, pointed out that Greek withdrawal from NPG will raise the question of Greek/Turkish rotation in that body.

Rumsfeld

26. Intelligence Memorandum

SR IM 74–2


IMPLICATIONS OF THE GREEK WITHDRAWAL FROM MILITARY PARTICIPATION IN NATO

Principal Conclusions

The decision of Greece to withdraw from military participation in NATO could have important consequences for the defense of the Alliance’s southern flank. How significant they will be depends on how the Greek government decides to implement its decision in practical terms.

—The decision to withdraw was probably taken without full consideration of its consequences for Greece. As these consequences become more clearly understood, the Greeks may develop second thoughts on the subject.

—Although the Greeks probably had the French example in mind when they made their decision, it is unlikely that they will attempt to follow the French precedent closely. Unlike France at the time of its withdrawal, Greece possesses no nuclear weapons and all of its contiguous neighbors are potentially hostile.

—The leaders of the Greek armed forces have concluded that military withdrawal from NATO would seriously weaken the country’s defense. They will probably attempt to keep the Greek position as vague and tentative as possible and may eventually press for a return to the NATO military structure.

—In the event of a Warsaw Pact attack in the southern region, Greece probably would enter the war in its own interests, regardless of whether formal NATO treaty obligations existed. Greek capabilities in such a case would, however, be degraded if, in the years prior to the...
attack, there had been no joint military planning or exercises with other NATO states.

The future relationship of Greece to NATO—including decisions on the questions of maintaining [less than 1 line not declassified] foreign bases in Greece, and continuing joint planning and exercises—will be determined primarily by the outcome of the Cyprus crisis and other issues outstanding with Turkey. If the Cyprus affair can be settled without further damage to Greek dignity and no new crisis develops in the Aegean, relations between Greece and NATO will improve, but the Greeks' bitter memories of the crisis would make it unlikely that relations with NATO could ever be restored to pre-Cyprus terms.

Implications of the Greek Withdrawal From Military Participation in NATO

The decision of Greece to withdraw from military participation in NATO could have important consequences for the defense of the Alliance's southern flank. How significant they will be depends on how the Greek government decides to implement its decision in practical terms. NATO's experience with France has shown that such a withdrawal does not preclude the continuation of some measures of military cooperation.

Greece probably will decide, as did France, that it is expedient in terms of national interests to maintain some military ties with other NATO members, though they may be informal and unacknowledged. This is especially likely because of the problems Greece has traditionally experienced with its neighbors. The Greek military in particular will continue to be concerned about a possible threat emanating from neighboring Communist states, especially in view of the uncertainty surrounding future developments in Yugoslavia. The future development of Greek relations with NATO, however, will be determined by a number of factors, notably the outcome of the Cyprus crisis and the domestic political situation, which cannot be predicted on the basis of current information.

The decision to withdraw from military participation in NATO was probably taken without full consideration of its possible consequences for Greece. It stemmed from frustration over the inability or unwillingness of the US and other NATO allies to persuade Turkey to exercise restraint in its Cyprus policy, rather than from a calculation that such an action would be of positive advantage. A strong tide of popular emotion made it necessary for the Karamanlis regime to make some dramatic gesture, and the decision to withdraw bolstered his domestic position. While the Greeks probably hoped that such a gesture would cause NATO to put pressure on Turkey to moderate its position, Athens evidently did not study how it would implement
its decision or consider the practical consequences for the Greek armed forces.

Steps to Withdrawal

The possibility of Greek withdrawal from NATO had emerged in July during the first phase of the Cyprus crisis. After the Turkish invasion the Ioannides regime issued an order recalling Greek officers from Brussels and other NATO headquarters, although this was later modified to a notice of possible recall as part of the country's general mobilization. The Greeks did withdraw their personnel from the NATO regional headquarters in Izmir, Turkey, and discontinued cooperation with Turkey in the areas of NATO communications and joint planning.

The 14 August announcement by the Karamanlis government concerning Greece's withdrawal from NATO offered few details. It stated that, in view of the Alliance's inability "to stem Turkey from creating a situation of conflict between two allies," Greek forces would be withdrawn from NATO and that Greece would only participate in the political activities of the Alliance. Since that announcement, some government spokesmen have maintained that the decision is irrevocable, while others have hinted that it might be reconsidered. Athens has been proceeding, however, as if it intended to carry through.

Prime Minister Karamanlis' letter to NATO heads of government in late August left little doubt that Greek forces had been placed under national command. Subsequently, official notice was given to NATO by the Greek commander in chief that Greek forces were no longer NATO assigned or earmarked. Greece has also announced its intention to cease sending representatives to the Defense Planning Committee, the Defense Review Committee, the Executive Working Group, and the Nuclear Planning Group. The Greeks plan to continue to participate in the Military Committee (composed of the chiefs of staff of all member countries except France and Iceland) during the withdrawal period.

The withdrawal steps taken by the Greeks so far could be reversed merely by an announcement to that effect. In addition, Athens has not removed its officers assigned to the various NATO headquarters (with the exception of Izmir). The other NATO members, while still hoping for an eventual Greek return to full participation, have nevertheless begun to prepare for negotiations with the Greeks on the withdrawal.

The French Example

The Greeks probably had the French example in mind when they made their decision and may attempt to follow at least the general outlines of that precedent as they implement their withdrawal. The Greeks almost certainly recognize, however, that there are differences between their situation and that of France at the time of its withdrawal from
military participation in NATO in 1966. The significance of these differences for the Greek position is striking:

—France was already a nuclear power, with both warheads and the means of delivering them; [1/2 lines not declassified].
—France had an independent arms industry and was in fact a major exporter of weapons; Greece is heavily dependent on other countries for major weapon systems and even for many smaller weapons.
—France was capable of fulfilling its force goals without foreign assistance; Greece has traditionally relied on such assistance.
—France did not perceive any military threat from her neighbors; all four of Greece’s contiguous neighbors are potentially hostile.

In view of such important differences, it appears unlikely that the Greeks will attempt to follow the French precedent blindly, but they may adapt it to their special circumstances.

Protecting the Southern Flank

One major implication of the Greek decision is that the Greek government, like the French, would no longer consider its armed forces under any obligation to assist militarily a fellow NATO member that became the victim of Warsaw Pact aggression. In theory this would have some potential consequences for NATO’s defense of northern or central Europe. If the Pact were planning an attack on these regions, any concern by the Soviets about a NATO response on their southern flank might be lessened if Greece were not a military member of the Alliance. In fact, however, Greece’s primary mission in NATO war plans does not involve her forces in any other capacity than to counter a Pact attack in the southern region. This mission would call for Greek forces both to engage directly in combat operations and to provide support for other NATO units reinforcing the area.

Were such an attack to occur, the danger to Greek interests would be such that, formal NATO treaty obligations or not, Greece probably would feel compelled to enter the war in its own interests, although its reaction would depend on an assessment of the purpose and aims of the Pact attack and its prospects for success. Greek capabilities in such a case would, however, undoubtedly be degraded if, in the years prior to the attack, there had been no joint planning of military activities with other NATO states, especially the US and Turkey. The Greek forces would be at a disadvantage if they had not been taking part in peacetime military exercises with such states.

[Omitted here is a map of Europe and the Mediterranean area showing the NATO members.]

An important question for the future, therefore, is whether Greece will be willing to continue such exercises and joint planning for the use of its armed forces in wartime, despite the lack of a treaty commitment to military cooperation or a formal integrated military structure.
The Greek armed forces probably will favor the continuation of such activities, and liaison may be maintained with such NATO military organs as the Defense Planning Committee and Nuclear Defense Affairs Committee even if Greece is no longer formally a member of them.

**Arms Acquisition**

Another question is how the acquisition of modern weapons and equipment by the Greek armed forces will be affected by their withdrawal from the NATO system. Traditionally Greece has received NATO guidance in the formulation of its force goals and has been heavily dependent on foreign military assistance for the fulfillment of these goals. If such assistance does not continue, the effect on Greek military capabilities will certainly be adverse, although the Greeks probably will try to compensate for this by increasing their own military expenditures and by efforts to obtain support from other states, particularly France. Even if NATO assistance does continue, it is probable that Greece will try to avoid relying on it exclusively and will attempt to establish ties with other states.

The French have indicated a willingness generally to support Greece in its new policy course. The nature of such support will apparently include the supplying of advanced weapon systems, possibly on easy credit terms; political support for the Greek effort to move closer to the European community; and advice concerning various legal and technical aspects of its new relationship with NATO. The French will probably provide as much support as they can along these lines, but a French spokesman has acknowledged the dissimilarities between the Greek situation and that of France at the time of its withdrawal.

**Bases in Greece**

Another question is whether Greece, like France, will demand the closure of foreign military bases on its soil. Some of these bases are NATO installations, but most are the result of bilateral agreements between Greece and the US. Of particular interest:

—US facilities, actual and projected, for the support of Sixth Fleet units. The loss of these facilities would be an inconvenience and would make it more difficult to counter Soviet naval activities in the Mediterranean, but would not constitute an insurmountable obstacle to Sixth Fleet operations. There have been some indications that Greece will eventually terminate the agreement whereby a US destroyer squadron is home-ported there, but no definite steps have yet been taken.

—NATO training facilities on the island of Crete. These are used by Alliance members primarily for training air and air defense crews. Such training cannot be conveniently conducted in the crowded confines of central Europe; other training facilities would have to be
found, resulting in increased expenditures and disruption of training plans.

—[1 paragraph (5 lines) not declassified]

—US and NATO communications facilities. Loss of these facilities would significantly reduce the capability to communicate with Turkey and US naval units in the eastern Mediterranean. Some communications to Turkey have already been blocked by the Greeks.

—US air facilities. Loss of these facilities, plus those maintained by the Greek air force, would reduce NATO’s capability to augment its forces in the southern region, as well as the US capability to support operations in the Middle East. Some restrictions have already been placed on US use of these installations. In the event that US air facilities were to be closed down entirely, however, the Greeks would probably favor some contingency planning, either with the US or with NATO, for their use in a crisis.

It should also be noted that Greek air defense installations operate as part of the NATO integrated system. A refusal to continue cooperation in this system would reduce NATO early warning radar coverage of the sector encompassing the Balkans and the adjoining seas. Greece has already stopped passing early warning information to the NATO net, but has made no formal decision to end this cooperation. NATO’s experience with France has shown that a country can continue to participate in the air defense system even after other measures of military cooperation are terminated.

Maintaining a Tentative Position

How Greece will decide such questions remains unclear. The leaders of the armed forces have concluded that military withdrawal from NATO would seriously weaken the country’s defense. They recognize that Karamanlis’ decision was probably necessary under the circumstances, but will attempt to minimize its impact on the relationship of the armed forces to other NATO forces, especially those of the US. If the Cyprus question can be resolved on terms satisfactory to Greece, the armed forces may eventually press for a return to the NATO military structure. However, such pressure is highly unlikely in the near future. The main effort of the military leadership will probably be confined to keeping the Greek position as vague and tentative as possible.

Premier Karamanlis will be generally sympathetic to the military’s arguments. However, he is also aware that popular emotions are running strongly against continued ties with the US and NATO and that his decision to withdraw Greek forces from the alliance has deprived the left of a powerful weapon it might have used against his government. Thus far, Karamanlis has been successful in his efforts to neutralize the left on this issue without actually getting into the practical details. Sooner or later, however, he will have to make more definite decisions on the questions of [less than 1 line not declassified] bases, joint planning, exercises, and so forth.
Outlook for NATO

Karamanlis’ decisions will be determined not only by the domestic situation but by the outcome of the Cyprus crisis and other issues outstanding with Turkey. A Cyprus settlement humiliating to Greece or successful Turkish encroachments in the Aegean (involving, for example, the exploitation of oil deposits) would strengthen the Greek tendency to blame NATO and the US for Greek failures. In such a situation any Greek government would probably break completely with NATO militarily and possibly even politically.

If the Cyprus affair can be settled without further damage to Greek dignity and no new crisis develops in the Aegean, relations between Greece and NATO will improve, but the Greeks’ bitter memories of the crisis would make it unlikely that relations with NATO could ever be restored to pre-Cyprus terms. At the very best NATO will have to cope with a situation in which there is little or no cooperation between the two alliance members in the eastern Mediterranean. Additional restrictions will probably be placed on the use of US and NATO installations, even if such installations are not actually reduced, and any plans for future installations—for example, to home-port a carrier—will be impractical.

More generally, current Greek behavior may encourage other NATO members to contemplate a similar policy. Several members, [1 line not declassified] have recently experienced difficulties with their military role in the Alliance. Although their problems are very different from those of Greece, they might be tempted to use the French and Greek precedents to justify some attempts at disassociation, thus creating a centrifugal tendency that could seriously weaken NATO.
27. Telegram From the Embassy in Greece to the Department of State

Athens, November 1, 1974, 1629Z.


1. Caramanlis and the Greek Government at the moment view Makarios, as they view almost everything else, in the light of the coming Greek elections on November 17. Thus far in the Greek electoral campaign Cyprus has been a national rather than an electoral issue. Because Greece’s options are so limited, it has been difficult if not impossible for candidates opposing Caramanlis to argue plausibly that if elected they would handle the issue better than he has. Caramanlis himself has adopted a cautious and, in our view, realistic strategy, emphasizing that the Cyprus crisis was triggered by the colonels whose shortsightedness was exploited by the Turks to move toward their longstanding objective of partition. He has been careful not to indicate publicly what he would regard to be an acceptable Cyprus settlement or how the Greek Cypriot leaders should compose their differences either with the Turks or among themselves.

2. To be effective this strategy requires Caramanlis to give quiet support to Clerides while avoiding an open break with Makarios with whom Caramanlis has a long history of troubled relations. Caramanlis realizes that Makarios has it in his power to convert Cyprus into a Greek political issue simply by stating publicly that the Caramanlis government is not doing enough to defend Greek Cypriot interests. Andreas Papandreou in particular would seize a statement of this kind and use it against Caramanlis in the campaign. Of all the leading candidates in the Greek election, Papandreou has been the most outspoken, calling for the early return of Makarios to Cyprus. He and the Archbishop cooperated in the past, notably in 1964, when their combined efforts sabotaged the Acheson plan. Their views on foreign policy would appear to be very similar, favoring non-alignment with an anti-Western bias.

3. Papandreou’s evident desire to turn the Cyprus issue against Caramanlis has thus far been frustrated by the reticence of Makarios.

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1 Source: Ford Library, National Security Adviser, Presidential Country Files for Middle East and South Asia, 1974–1977, Box 11, Greece, Nodis to Secretary of State 4.

2 Telegram 240013 to Islamabad, Kabul, Ankara, and additional posts, November 1, is about the return of Makarios to Cyprus. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy Files, 1974)
Little as he may like Caramanlis, the Archbishop is doubtless inhibited from openly criticizing the Prime Minister by the knowledge that Caramanlis is likely to emerge from the elections with a strong parliamentary majority. Makarios cannot, therefore, afford to antagonize him at this stage. The result has been an uneasy truce which neither Caramanlis nor the Archbishop has any reason to disturb for the time being.

4. We conclude from the foregoing that Caramanlis will continue to handle the Archbishop in a gingerly way before the elections, that his leverage after the elections will increase in direct proportion to the margin of his success, but that in the future as in the past he will use his influence discreetly and stop well short of the point where he would risk an open break with the Archbishop. Caramanlis might be willing to suggest to Makarios before November 17th that the Archbishop postpone his return to the island, but it is most unlikely that he would be willing to make a real issue of it.

Kubisch

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28. Intelligence Memorandum¹


SUBJECT
The Greek Elections

PRINCIPAL CONCLUSIONS
Prime Minister Karamanlis will win this month’s election; the size of his victory will determine how flexible he can be on Cyprus, NATO, and in relations with the US.

If he does not gain an outright majority in parliament, he will form a coalition government with the Center Union–New Forces led by George Mavros. Such a coalition government would be much like that which took over this summer when the military stepped down.

¹Source: Central Intelligence Agency, Executive Registry, Job 80–M01048A, Box 3, Folder 17, Greece. Secret; No Foreign Dissem; Background Use Only. Prepared in the CIA. According to an attached note from [name not declassified] NIO/WE to Acting DCI Walters, November 5, the NSC requested the memorandum.
Popular discontent with seven years of military rule, plus anti-American sentiment over Cyprus, provide the left wing with promising terrain to exploit; but the left is split between Andreas Papandreou’s Panhellenic Socialist movement and the United Left. They nonetheless may take up to one third of the national vote, with 20 percent going to Papandreou and 10–12 percent to the United Left. The left therefore will be a vocal factor in the new parliament.

Right wing forces seem unlikely to win more than 10 percent of the vote. Although pro-junta forces cannot be discounted as potential perpetrators of a coup against Karamanlis, they probably lack sufficient support in the army to bring Karamanlis down. This could change should the army eventually conclude that the government was drifting too far left or that there was a danger of Papandreou gaining power.

The Greek economy, although still troubled by a combination of inflationary pressures and balance of payments problems, does not pose immediate problems for Athens; to a certain extent, the Karamanlis government will continue to benefit from the effects of the austerity program instituted by the junta in 1973.

A Karamanlis-led government will not accept a solution on Cyprus that does not include some satisfactory resolution of the Greek Cypriot refugee problem; failing that, it would rather have no solution at all.

Athens is in an ambiguous holding action as far as military participation in NATO is concerned. Given progress on Cyprus, Karamanlis would probably eventually rejoin the military side of NATO. In the absence of a settlement, he might move further away, but not irrevocably.

Although Karamanlis can be expected to try to improve relations with the US, the public relationship will remain correct and businesslike in the absence of a Cyprus settlement. The Greek-Turkish dispute over sovereignty in the Aegean may also influence the Greek attitude toward the US and NATO, and Karamanlis probably would hope for backing from the US and other NATO countries should the going get very rough with Turkey on this question. In any case, Athens will continue its attempts to expand economic and political relations with Western Europe as insurance against further deterioration in Greek relations with the US.

1. Greek voters go to the polls on November 17 in the first parliamentary election in 10 years. No one knows for sure what effect seven and a half years of military dictatorship will have on the electorate, nor to what extent the trouble on Cyprus and in relations with Turkey will rally the voters around the commanding figure of Prime Minister Karamanlis. The old political parties are in disarray and the new ones are just staking out their territory. The election is taking place under such unique circumstances that the traditional patterns of
voting—heavily influenced by patronage and family ties—may not apply. Estimates of the outcome are necessarily tentative, particularly in the absence of scientific polling.

2. The new parliament is empowered to revise the constitution. If Prime Minister Karamanlis gets an absolute majority of seats, he will be able to tailor the constitution to his needs—setting up either a strong presidency or a strong prime ministership. If Karamanlis does not do sufficiently well in the election, there will be much political infighting over the form of the constitution and the nature of the governing coalition.

3. The election is to be followed within 45 days by a referendum on the monarchy. The parties of the center and left oppose a return to the monarchy. Karamanlis has avoided taking a stand on the issue and without his support, the vote is not likely to re-establish the monarchy.

*The Probable Outcome*

4. Karamanlis’ conservative New Democracy party is expected to win at least a plurality of votes in the elections. It may win a majority, but despite public statements to the contrary, Karamanlis and his aides are not confident at this point that they will be able to do so.\(^2\)

5. A majority government under Karamanlis would be more flexible on Cyprus and more favorable to US and NATO interests than would a coalition, which would be forced to strike a compromise between differing personalities and policy views. The chances of Greece re-entering the military side of NATO would be best under a strong Karamanlis government.

6. Should Karamanlis fail to gain control of parliament, he will probably form a coalition government with the Center Union–New Forces led by former foreign minister George Mavros. Such a government would be similar to orientation to the one that took office last July when the military stepped down. There are few major ideological differences between Karamanlis and Mavros. They used to differ on the monarchy, with Mavros favoring a republic and Karamanlis, the King. The Prime Minister has changed his mind on the issue, however, and is taking a neutral stand on the return of the King. Mavros also favors harsher measures against individuals who collaborated with the military regimes than does Karamanlis.

\(^2\) Political manipulation of the electoral laws is an important part of Greek politics. Under the present reinforced proportional representation law, drawn up in 1963 under a Karamanlis government, it is possible to win an absolute majority of seats in the 300-member parliament without a majority of the popular vote. The law favors large parties and works against small parties and coalitions. To enter the second distribution of seats, individual parties must win 17 percent of the votes, two-party coalitions 25 percent and three-party coalitions 30 percent. [Footnote in the original.]
7. Mavros, however, has been less pragmatic than Karamanlis regarding Cyprus and more favorable to the return of Archbishop Makarios to the island. He has also been more critical of the US and more insistent that the Greek withdrawal from NATO is irrevocable. Mavros’ policy statements are often erratic, reflecting his personality, political ambitions, and the need to make concessions to the left wing of his party.

8. We have received reports that Karamanlis was dissatisfied with Mavros’ performance as foreign minister and might replace him in a future cabinet. Mavros, however, has told Ambassador Kubisch that he and Karamanlis have already agreed on a post-electoral coalition irrespective of how well New Democracy does in the elections. We suspect that the purported agreement between the two is not so firm as Mavros portrays. Nonetheless, although Mavros might be a little difficult for the US to live with, a Center Union–New Democracy coalition would provide a stable and effective government which would keep Greece on a pro-West course and act responsibly on Cyprus and in the Aegean.

9. Such a government would try to avoid a Cyprus settlement which required Greek acceptance of the fait accompli brought about by Turkish military actions on Cyprus. If faced with such a prospect, it would prefer no settlement at all. An honorable settlement for the Greeks would involve some increase in the present distribution of land and wealth held by the Greek Cypriots, some withdrawal of the Turkish army, and the return of a significant number of Greek Cypriot refugees to the Turkish-controlled area. A Karamanlis–Mavros government would probably accept that some form of bi-regional federation is inevitable.

The Political Setting

10. Greek politics have traditionally been characterized by a multiplicity of parties. These parties have usually been clusters around political prima-donnas, rather than parties based on programs, philosophies or socio-economic interests. Of the 19 parties competing in next month’s elections, the most important are Karamanlis’ New Democracy and Mavros’ Center Union–New Forces. The nucleus of Karamanlis’ party is the conservative National Radical Union (ERE) which

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3 The large number of parties is somewhat misleading. The election hinges essentially on five political groupings: New Democracy: —Konstantinos Karamanlis’ conservative group;—Center Union–New Forces: Georgios Mavros’ centrist group;—United Left: a temporary alliance of three Communist groups;—Panhellenic Socialist Movement: Andreas Papandreou’s radical left group;—National Democratic Union: Petros Garoufalias’ right wing anti-Communist group. [Footnote in the original.]
won a majority in parliamentary elections in 1955, 1958 and 1961. This was the party of the economic and political establishment until it was outpolled by the centrist, more progressive Center Union in 1963 and 1964. The Center Union won a clear majority of the vote in 1964 but was badly split a year later when over half the deputies left to form another party. The Center Union never became much more than a loose amalgamation of personally oriented groups, organized to oppose the predominant influence of the military, the Palace, and the political right. The “New Forces” group, which has joined the Center Union for the election, is a collection of prominent personalities, all relatively young and moderately liberal, who were associated with resistance to the junta. Many of them had been in the left wing of Center Union prior to the military coup in 1967.

11. The parties that will compete in the elections are just beginning to announce slates of candidates and stake out positions on the issues. Because of the circumstances under which Karamanlis came to power, his prestige and popularity are high. Many view him as a necessary transition figure between military dictatorship and civilian rule and as the only leader who can forge sufficient national unity to deal with such sensitive issues as Cyprus and relations with Turkey. Karamanlis is also helped by the reinforced proportional representation electoral law, which favors larger parties.

12. All parties except New Democracy have criticized the timing of the elections, claiming that it does not allow them time to organize. Leftist Andreas Papandreou has denounced the elections as an “electoral coup” designed to prevent the left from making a good showing by depriving it of time to prepare. An early election works to Karamanlis’ advantage as he is still riding the crest of a wave of popularity caused by the return to civilian rule.

13. Karamanlis’ New Democracy slate includes 288 candidates, 194 of which are political debutantes. The New Democracy candidates are drawn from a broad spectrum of society, but the large number of political newcomers and unknowns would probably be a drawback in an election not held under crisis conditions. Breaking into Greek politics has always been difficult and the Greek voter is usually more influenced by traditional and patronage-related considerations than by programs or new faces. When the names of the candidates are published, however, it may well be that the list in each of the 56 electoral districts will in fact be headed by well known figures with the new faces lower on the list. Karamanlis is an old political pro, and it is probable that he knows what he is doing on this score.

The Left

14. The left is likely to benefit in some ways through reaction to seven years of military rule. Popular discontent with the military
governments has coincided with an increase in interest in Marxism among many Greek university students. Demography and political psychology suggest that the electoral base for the left may have broadened in the past decade. The cities now contain half the population, up from a third only a decade ago. Unions are weak, but there are more industrial and blue collar workers who are potential conscripts for the left. Anti-NATO, anti-American, pro-EC, pro-neutralist, and pro-domestic reform slogans appear to evince considerable popular response. Overall, the left has a promising terrain of national sentiment to exploit.

15. The Communist left was electorally tested in 1949 when 12 percent voted for the extreme left. During the subsequent two decades, when communists were forced to merge politically with the communist-front EDA, that party’s vote ranged from 12 percent to 25 percent in national elections (12 percent in the last elections held in 1964). The 25 percent vote in 1958 was an aberration and the traditional strength of the Communists—still discredited for their role in the civil war—has been between 10–15 percent.

16. The left is now split between Andreas Papandreou’s Panhellenic Socialist movement and the United Left. The latter grouping embraces the Moscow-backed Greek Communist Party (KKE-exterior), the dissident Communist Party (KKE-interior), and the communist-front United Democratic Left (EDA). The Moscow-backed party probably joined the alliance, which is not likely to last beyond the elections, as a result of Soviet pressure and financial inducement. The Soviets reportedly have given that party, legalized for the first time in more than a quarter of a century, more than $2 million for its election campaign. A unified campaign by the United Left alliance will enable it to exploit the government’s policy of giving equal time on national radio and TV to all major political groups. The United Left expects to lose votes to Andreas Papandreou, and by its own assessment—with which local observers agree—the United Left will probably not get more than 10–12 percent of the vote.

17. Andreas Papandreou, probably the most feared and controversial figure on the Greek political scene, is trying to carve out a constituency between the Communist left and the Center Union. But in many respects he is more radical than the Communists, who are eager to appear respectable and who thus have been circumspect in their behavior. Papandreou’s ideology—intensely nationalist, militantly anti-American, anti-NATO, neutralist and vaguely socialist with a large dose of expediency—is ambivalent enough to attract a diverse constituency. Because his views are considered extreme, both the right

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4 [2 lines not declassified] [Footnote is in the original.]
and center think they must head him off. [less than 1 line not declassified] he might get as much as 20 percent of the vote. Much depends on his ability to attract support from the left wing of the Center Union, which he had so far not been able to do. His campaign has gotten off to an unimpressive start.

The Army and the Extreme Right

18. Certain elements within the army are dissatisfied with the policies of the Karamanlis government, especially the legalization of the Communist Party and the ongoing purge of individuals who supported the military juntas. Some of these elements will support the right-wing anti-Communist National Democratic Union (EDE) led by Petros Garoufalios. Although the party is unlikely to get even 10 percent of the vote, any votes it does pick up will be drawn from Karamanlis’ conservative constituency, the army, and former supporters of the junta. Although monarchist, EDE has avoided taking a stand on the return of the King.

19. Other discontented army elements will inevitably turn to coup-plotting but, for the time being, they seem to have adopted a wait and see attitude. The embassy’s most recent estimate is that the junta forces, although still a factor that cannot prudently be discounted, do not have the necessary supporting base in the army to bring down Karamanlis. A prolonged period of stable rule under Karamanlis could lead to increased civilian control over the highly politicized army and a lessened threat of military intervention. Should the army eventually conclude that Karamanlis is being too lenient toward the Communists or allowing the kind of political climate to develop which could lead to the assumption of power by a leader like Andreas Papandreou, the danger of another military intervention would increase.

Economic Situation and Outlook

20. Under the junta, the Greek economy experienced six years of extremely rapid real growth—averaging 8.6 percent annually—but it overheated severely in 1973. Consumer prices shot up by 30 percent while the chronic trade deficit almost doubled to $2.4 billion.

21. Faced with these mounting problems, the government imposed an austerity program late in 1973. The economy responded quickly, with industrial production falling 11 percent from January to June. The rate of inflation slackened at the same time, and in the second quarter some improvement was observed in the balance of payments—despite the impact of higher oil costs.

22. Just before its ouster, the junta decided to begin easing restraints. This policy was implemented by the new civilian government. The Cyprus crisis diverted men into the armed forces, delaying a production comeback, and disrupted the important tourist industry, but did not fundamentally alter the economic situation.
23. Some further policy easing—particularly of credit restraints—is likely by year’s end. Industrial production should begin a recovery, if it has not already done so, but probably will not equal its previous peak during the next six months. Real GNP growth this year will be close to zero but should recover substantially in 1975. Inflation and the external payments situation meanwhile have shown further improvement: a 10 percent inflation rate—one-third that of 1973—is possible for the year, while the current account deficit may be held slightly below last year’s $1.2 billion. Foreign loans needed to cover this deficit have already been obtained.

24. In sum, the economic situation does not pose immediate problems for Athens, and to a certain extent the Karamanlis government is benefiting from the effect of the austerity program instituted by the junta.

The US and NATO

25. At the height of the recent wave of anti-US feeling caused by what the Greeks perceived as Washington’s failure to stop the Turks on Cyprus and its support of the former juntas, Karamanlis wryly remarked to an American official that he was the “last pro-American” in Greece. Given a working majority in parliament he can be expected to try to improve relations with the US, particularly if he can portray the US position on such issues as Cyprus in a positive light. Should the situation on Cyprus worsen, he would try to put increased pressures on the US. In the absence of a Cyprus settlement, public relations with the US will probably remain correct and businesslike. Prior to the elections, Karamanlis may make another gesture against NATO or US installations designed to show his independence but it is unlikely to be a significant one.

26. Greece is in an ambiguous holding action as far as its military participation in NATO is concerned. It has announced its intention to withdraw from NATO’s integrated military structure but has done little to implement it. While Greek representatives in Brussels do not attend meetings of the Defense Planning Committee and the Defense Review Committee, they do participate in meetings of the Military Committee and continue to discuss infrastructure matters. Behind the scenes they keep themselves informed on developments in meetings from which Greece has absented itself. Athens has announced its intention to send a representative to the next Nuclear Planning Group ministerial meeting. Greece has never threatened to leave the political side of NATO, and George Mavros has indicated a desire to be honorary president of the next spring’s ministerial session of the North Atlantic Council.

27. A Greek foreign ministry official has told the US embassy that—at Karamanlis’ request—he is currently drawing up a list of possible steps Greece might take to implement its withdrawal from NATO. He asked if the US government had an input to add. From the sug-
gestions that the official made—that the US might make a gesture by reducing its military installations somewhat—it appears that the Greeks are casting about for a visible gesture that would mollify Greek public opinion without irrevocably damaging its relations with the US.

28. Other officials have implied that decisions on NATO and US bases will be deferred until after the elections. Defense Minister Averoff has publicly hinted that, given satisfactory progress on Cyprus, Greece might rejoin NATO. Failing such progress, Karamanlis might move further away from NATO, but not irrevocably so since he needs the US and would continue to hope that the US would promote a better outcome on Cyprus; he is more likely to remain in the present holding action for some time.

29. The continuing Greek-Turkish dispute over sovereignty in the Aegean may also influence the Greek attitude toward the US and NATO. Karamanlis probably would hope for backing from the US and other NATO countries should the going get very rough with Turkey on this question. Strong governments in Athens and Ankara might be able to resolve their differences over the Aegean in the context of a Cyprus settlement, but negotiations would be long and difficult in any case.

30. Whether or not relations improve with the US, Athens will continue to strengthen its ties with France, Germany and the European Community. Relations with Europe had been frozen in the seven years of military rule, and with the return of a civilian government, a thaw was to be expected. The bad turn in relations with the US made the “European option” even more important to Athens as insurance in case relations with the US do not improve significantly. For their part, France, West Germany, and the other EC members hope to reciprocate Greek interest in a closer relationship, both through bilateral and EC channels. The development of the “European option” is limited, of course, by the requirement for the EC members to maintain some balance between Greece and Turkey (both EC associate members) and by the level of Greece’s economic development which precludes immediate full membership in the EC. The extent to which Greece receives support from the European countries, however, will influence, though it would not guarantee, the longer-term survivability of moderate policies in Greece.
Athens, November 15, 1974, 1655Z.

8236. Subject: Greek Elections: Background and Significance.

1. The Greek elections that will take place on Sunday, November 17, are likely to decide more than the identity of the next Prime Minister of Greece. Indeed that question was probably answered by the discredited colonels in July when they acquiesced in the return of Constantine Caramanlis to Athens and by the Greek people themselves when they greeted his return with a spontaneous outburst of emotion that has tinged almost everything that has happened since with anticlimax. There is no reason to doubt, nor any sign to contradict the general expectation that Caramanlis will be returned to power on Sunday with a clear parliamentary majority.

2. The more difficult and far-reaching question is what kind of society Greece has become in the ten years that have elapsed since the last election, and how the changes that have occurred will affect the theoretical basis of Greek political life. The Monarchist–Venizelist split that animated Greek democracy in the inter-war period was rendered meaningless by the civil war, at least to the politicians. It lingered on in the popular consciousness, as political myths often do, for another fifteen years, until it was generally revealed to be an anachronism in 1965 by the formation of a “Venizelist” cabinet supported by “Monarchist” votes in the Greek Parliament. The Stephanopoulos government of that year, it seems clear in retrospect, confirmed the bankruptcy of the old political system and prepared the way for the seven-year military receivership which ended last July.

3. What Sunday’s elections will decide is the context within which Greek political life will evolve in the post-Venizelist period. We say post-“Venizelist” advisedly, because Venizelism was the Greek expression of political views that in the more industrialized countries of Western Europe are variously called liberal, social democratic or socialist. These political movements did not previously develop in Greece because no social and economic constituency existed to sustain them. In the past ten years Greek society has changed profoundly and the evidence suggests that Greece today is closer in economic and social terms to the Italian than to the Turkish model. From 1964 to 1973 per capita GNP at current prices has tripled, rising from $624 to $1820, and agri-

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1 Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy Files, 1974. Secret; Niact Immediate; Limdis. Repeated to Thessaloniki.
cultural production, which ten years ago accounted for 75 per cent of Greece’s export earnings now accounts for only 40 per cent. Athens and Thessaloniki have increased their population by one million, which means that roughly one-third of the entire population of Greece lives in these two cities, whose voters, together with those of Piraeus, will elect 84 of the 288 regional deputies in the Greek Parliament.

4. In short, Greece has become significantly more urbanized and industrialized since the last elections were held in 1964. These changes are bound to affect voting patterns and the participation of an estimated 500,000 new voters—that is, voters who have come of age since 1964—could have a multiplier effect since they are less likely to follow traditional patterns than older voters. The success of Caramanlis in enlarging a conservative constituency whose voting strength is 35–40 per cent of the electorate will be of critical importance in determining Greece’s political stability in the immediate future. As significant for the country’s ultimate stability may be the way the rest of the electorate chooses to redefine Venizelism in terms appropriate to the new Greek society. This then can well be a watershed election whose results will not only determine who leads the Greeks but how and where he will lead them.

5. In this process the voters are receiving only intermittent and contradictory advice from the country’s political leadership who are themselves just beginning to appreciate and to translate into words the dimensions of Greek social and economic change. Perhaps unsurprisingly, the appreciation of change is most acute among the leaders who were out of Greece during the period of military government and therefore better able to perceive what was happening than those who remained at home. The two leaders who have made the most conscious effort to present new programs are Caramanlis and Andreas Papandreou, although their political approaches are radically divergent at all points. Those like Mavros, Eliou and Garoufalias, who stayed in Greece, are resuming the political debate more or less where it was interrupted in April of 1967.

6. Programs do not win elections in Greece, and the results on Sunday will be more affected by the personality and style of party leadership, and the calibre of individual candidates, than by other considerations. Nevertheless, in an election where the old political reference points can no longer be relied on with absolute confidence and where both candidates and voters are reexamining the assumptions on which the old political system was based, the programs of the parties are being scrutinized more carefully and to the extent they are convincingly projected by party leaders may be more influential than ever before.

7. This is made more likely by the absence of campaign issues that clearly confer political advantage on one party or another. At first
glance it seems remarkable that an election taking place after ten years
of political inertia should be so featureless. These explanations seem
reasonable. The first derives from the sense of political euphoria that
has existed in Greece since the return of Caramanlis, reducing the bit-
terness that characterized previous Greek elections just as it has re-
duced the significance of the issues. The second is the feeling prevan-
t among many Greeks that the elections represent a political
threshold and that only when the door has been firmly closed behind
them can they begin to make up their minds about other issues. Greek
voters appreciate that very real and still unresolved questions of Junta
punishment, Armed Forces stability and loyalties, and the divisive
Cyprus problem, lurk in background and that prospect for effective
restoration of Greece to political normality depends upon government
that emerges from these elections to unusual degree. The last, but by
no means the least significant explanation is that Caramanlis, who
probably has the most to lose from divisive debate, has been supremely
successful in disarming potentially dangerous issues like punishment
of the Junta, Cyprus, the Crown and Greece’s relations with the United
States. In this as in other respects he has shown himself to be the most
astute political leader in Greece and has reinforced his already impos-
ing stature as a national leader. Many Greeks may vote for Caraman-
lis as a figure above politics in order finally to close those anomalous
parentheses opened by the military coup of almost eight years ago.
Next parliamentary elections seem more likely to precipitate heated
clash of party policies among which voters will clearly make choice be-
fore casting their votes. November 17 should wipe the political slate
clean and open the way to a fresh start for Greek political life.

8. Against this background, Embassy is providing in septel\(^2\) its
best estimates of probable results of Sunday’s elections.

Kubisch

\(^2\) In telegram 8235 from Athens, November 15, the Embassy estimated that Kara-
manlis would receive 45–50 percent of the votes cast, but remained uncertain whether
Mavros or Papandreou would come in second. The Embassy considered Karamanlis’
win a foregone conclusion, owing to his recall from exile the previous July. The sig-
nificance of the November 17 election was that it would mark a return to democracy,
and only subsequent elections would determine the course of leadership in the years to
come. (Ibid.)
Telegram From the Embassy in Greece to the Department of State

Athens, November 20, 1974, 1610Z.

8327. Subject: Greek Political Leadership—Andreas Papandreou.

1. Summary. In the 1974 Greek election Andreas Papandreou sustained deep and perhaps even mortal political wounds. With about 14% of the vote going for him, Papandreou would have a tolerable showing except for the fact that much of the balance of 86% of the vote was self-consciously cast against him. Papandreou's frenzy in the final week of the campaign had the negative effect of driving undecided middle class voters toward Caramanlis. In the campaign, Papandreou tried to create the impression that he was the main alternative not only to Caramanlis, but to the political and social traditions of Greece itself. His defeat showed how unwilling the Greek people were to accept his vision of a socialist, nonaligned Greece, outlined as it was in the lurid language of class warfare and conspiracy.

Papandreou has the immediate task before him of sustaining his financing, his charisma and his liver. At the age of 56—and his father was 76 when he last won the premiership—he would appear still to have prospects, though, in view of his own weaknesses, not very bright ones. He first has to deal with the personal problems of his ambivalent personality, cope with the political and psychic drag of his American roots, and come up with a program to attract more middle class support. He is not likely to get good counsel either from the Left or Center, which resent the fact that his votes largely came out of their flanks, nor from his parliamentary base which at a dozen deputies is too small to discipline his dominant personality. End Summary.

2. Papandreou or simply “Andreas” as he is called by friend and enemy alike, has sounded his anti-American theme since 1964 with a brashness that strikes many as uncharitable if not psychotic. From US he gained his higher education (Harvard Ph.D. 1943), his wife, Margaret, his reputation earned at Minnesota, Northwestern and Berkeley,

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2 In telegram 8304 from Athens, November 20, the Embassy reported the final election results: New Democracy (Karamanlis) 54.37 percent; Center Union (Mavros) 20.42 percent; PASOK (Papandreou) 13.58 percent; and United Left 9.45 percent. The remaining 2.18 percent did not receive enough votes for a seat in Parliament. (Ibid., RG 59, Central Foreign Policy Files, 1974)
as a brilliant economist, and four children with dual citizenship. In 1967
the intervention of President Johnson freed Papandreou from junta im-
prisonment and possibly saved him from death. There are a number of
alumni of the American Embassy who recall that Andreas and Margaret
were charming and positive personalities on the Athens scene in the in-
terim years 1959–63 when Papandreou was trying to determine his na-
tional identity and his political fortune. They also recall the tension that
existed between Andreas and his father over the “Americanness” of his
wife and children, and his own efforts, against his father’s wishes, to
preserve his American citizenship. Even at the present advanced stage
of his professional anti-Americanism, Papandreou is the only Greek
politician who travels with American friends—the California liberals,
Stanley and Betty Sheinbaum, and the economist Paul Sweazey, re-
turned with Papandreou to help launch his campaign in Greece.

Papandreou has given back to America his citizenship which he
voluntarily renounced early in 1964 on the eve of first standing for
elected office in Greece. At the recent campaign rallies, his wife stood
beside him, smiling benignly as cheerleaders led the “Out Americans”
chanting. Even Greeks most critical of the United States and American
foreign policy found this hard to understand or to condone. For those
who view him as shamefully ungrateful to his adopted land, there is,
possibly, sweet irony in the common accusation made even today, from
the Extreme Right and Left, and all Greek humorists, that he is a life-
long CIA double agent.

3. After Ioannides and Papadopoulos, Andreas Papandreou is
probably the most disliked Greek around. Some of this hostility against
him is a judgment not on Andreas but on his critics—their envy, jeal-
ousy, sense of personal betrayal, frustrated opportunism, ego drives—
the usual complex of rages that attend and undermine all leading Greek
politicians. But the national antipathy goes deeper than the merely petty.
Evangelos Averoff-Tossitsas, whom most consider a gentleman and a
moderate, not too long ago told the American Ambassador, “Andreas
is the only man alive who I would kill with my own hands. He is nei-
ther a Greek nor a human being.” There is a consensus among the po-
itically thoughtful that Andreas’ own degree of opportunism and his
tendency to personalize issues strain even the liberal perimeters of
Greek political invective. His socialism is viewed by many liberals not
as a sincerely held and carefully reasoned philosophy of government
but as an expedient strategy which tomorrow could be traded for com-
munism, personal authoritarianism, or some other tactical facade for
self-advancement. His susceptibility to the latest gossip, rumor, and per-
sonal flattery is perhaps inordinate even by Greek standards.

4. Papandreou’s personal following—and he has as fanatical sup-
porters as any Greek alive—is based on certain achievements—real or
symbolic—in addition to the charisma of the name and the dextrous exploitation of popular resentments. He is genuinely admired, as he is feared, because he threatens the Establishment, notwithstanding his own roots in it and his personal proclivity for a luxurious standard of living. In the early nineteen sixties he was among the first in Greece to challenge the outmoded educational system and the economic distribution of wealth—again with his American experience more than true Marxism in the foreground of this thought. It is debated whether the economic boom of the junta years is more attributable to Andreas’ blueprints for economic advance, which the junta largely inherited, or to Karamanlis’ and even Markezinis’ earlier achievements in the superstructure, but Andreas indisputably brought to Greece a professional talent for theoretical analysis and organization that was novel and needed. He was an early advocate of reorganizing the old-fashioned political party organizations, and his new group, PASOK, has shown some success in realizing progressive ideas and techniques of party work. Papandreou has shown certain personal strengths in the brief campaign just ended. He is not an innately great orator, as was his father, but then neither are the other national figures. In his rallies, he successfully established rapport with the crowd, which made his speeches more exciting and more dangerous than those of the other national figures. Under the right circumstances, Papandreou will say anything. On television and in smaller gatherings, he is particularly convincing and personable. He appears to have energy and made more campaign appearances than any other national candidate, even though he is supposed to have a weak liver derived from a too great fondness for Scotch over the years. In the early 1960’s, Papandreou was the hero of the radical youth, but during the years of exile he lost some of his appeal by being exclusively a propagandist, not a resistance fighter. The rapid growth of the PASOK youth since his August 1974 return to Greece suggests he has worked effectively to reestablish his bona fides as a radical leader. At the same time, he tried to moderate in the early weeks of his return his more extreme slogans so as not to get too far in advance of the greatly enlarged middle and lower middle class. In the closing stages of his campaign, this reserve was abandoned, however, in favor of extreme attacks against Caramanlis and the old Center. Although the campaign was not based on issues, Papandreou went as far as any candidate in trying to focus public attention on knotty economic issues such as the Common Market. His vehement anti-Establishment views even had an echo among junist apologists, one of whom said, “What Greece needs is an Andreas Papandreou committed to the West.”

5. It is the matter of his uncertain political commitments and loyalties, not to mention his chameleon-like proclivities, that constitute the great divide between Papandreou and the public trust which he
lacks. Perhaps he will never be able to win that trust because he did, in fact, spend the first twenty-two years of his adult life in an alien land and still sees Greece through American eyes. In fact, Andreas has perhaps put his fortunes in an impossible squeeze. He is the expatriate whose repeated thunderings against his adopted land only serve to underscore his ambiguous loyalties; and he is the ever aging politician committed to wooing the young vote. The results of the November 17 election suggest that he has become a political exile in his own country.

Kubisch

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3 The Ambassador initialed next to his typed signature.

31. Memorandum From A. Denis Clift of the National Security Council Staff to the President’s Deputy Assistant for National Security Affairs (Scowcroft)¹


SUBJECT

Greek Homeporting Considerations

Since September 1972, the Navy has permanently homeported six destroyers in the Athens area under the terms of a technical agreement between the Hellenic and U.S. navies. These ships currently fill close to one-third of the Navy’s destroyer commitment to NATO in the Mediterranean area. They are due for normal rotation and replacement on a phased schedule over the next six months.

The uncertain future of our bilateral arrangements with Greece, coupled with a variety of relatively minor problems encountered by the Navy in homeporting the ships in the Athens area, has prompted a recent U.S. decision to replace the first of these units with a destroyer deploying to the Mediterranean on a rotational basis, rather than with a permanent homeporter. Concerning the other ships, I have learned informally that there are two basic options under active consideration

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¹ Source: Ford Library, National Security Adviser, Presidential Country Files for Middle East and South Asia, Box 10, Greece 2. Confidential. Sent for action.
within the Department of Defense in regard to the possible termination of destroyer homeporting in Athens:

—Option one would terminate homeporting immediately and return the ships to the United States. NATO force commitments would be met by deploying units on a rotational basis. The reasons cited for this action are low crew morale, reduced personnel retention, and various operational/maintenance problems.

—Option two would maintain the present arrangement intact and terminate homeporting only at the request of the Greek government.

I am concerned that Defense may take further homeporting decisions on the basis of Navy operational/personnel/logistical considerations without adequate consideration of the long range foreign policy implications involved.

At this particularly critical time, when the United States and Greece are reviewing bilateral and NATO arrangements, precipitate action on homeporting might jeopardize Greek-US and Greek-NATO relations and have an adverse effect on our overall efforts in the Eastern Mediterranean. Accordingly, it is important that policy decisions on Greek homeporting be coordinated with the NSC. If you agree, a phone call to General Wickham, drawing on the points outlined above, would request the desired coordination.

Alternatively, you may wish to sign the memorandum to Wickham at Tab A\(^2\) which would request coordination on Greek homeporting.

**Recommendation**

That you either telephone General Wickham or sign the memo to Wickham at Tab A requesting NSC coordination on Greek homeporting.\(^3\)

Jan Lodal concurs.

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\(^2\) Not attached.

\(^3\) There is no indication as to whether Scowcroft approved either recommendation.
32. Minutes of Secretary of State Kissinger's Staff Meeting

Washington, January 13, 1975, 8:07–8:44 a.m.

[Omitted here is discussion unrelated to Greece.]

Mr. Hartman: We sent you a memo a while back on how to handle the preparations for these negotiations, and you suggested a NSSM. I’d like to suggest that we limit the NSSM to the one issue that I think requires that kind of an in-depth study—[1 line not declassified]

Secretary Kissinger: No.

Mr. Hartman: —because we’ve got, as far as all the other base installations—

Secretary Kissinger: If we have [2 lines not declassified] will be leaked and we’re going to be beaten to death in the Congress before the study is a third completed.

Mr. Hartman: Well then, we’re going to have a very abbreviated study because the Greeks are going to be coming, in about two weeks, with their list.

Secretary Kissinger: All these studies are done in one afternoon, anyway. What does it mean—“study”? You don’t have officials studying papers.

Mr. Hartman: Well, just to get the inventory of the installations; and some assessment of their relative strengths will take some time.

Secretary Kissinger: Are you telling me you can get ready for a negotiation but you can’t get ready for an internal meeting?

Mr. Hartman: No. I’m just saying if we start on the base inventory—

Mr. Sisco: I want to sit down with the intelligence people.

Secretary Kissinger: The Pentagon wants to pull out of Greece, or it thinks if it throws half the bases away it can save the other half. I mean, we know what’s going on. I believe for us to stampede out of there will just accelerate the whole process.

Those are the facts. We don’t have to have a big study on that subject.

Mr. Sisco: I think it’s easier to accomplish that informally and quickly.

Secretary Kissinger: I want it in the national security system; I do not want it informally. I do not want a treaty between State and De-
fense on this. This is a matter that has to go to the—I would not let that be used to bust this national security meeting, which is what the Pentagon wants.

Mr. Hartman: Then we’ve got to get moving on it very quickly.

Secretary Kissinger: Why? I mean, I just don’t understand the reasoning, according to which you can be ready for a negotiation but not for a senior review group meeting.

Mr. Hartman: No. The strategy, as I understand it, was we were going to let Greece take the initiative.

Secretary Kissinger: All right.

Mr. Hartman: They will be coming to us very shortly.

Secretary Kissinger: And we can tell them we can take a week to think about it, if necessary.

Mr. Hartman: All right—if it’s only a week.

Secretary Kissinger: Why can’t we speed it up if it’s in the process?

Mr. Hartman: Well, I think there’s quite a bit of work—to straighten out the work for the facilities we now have.

Secretary Kissinger: Don’t we need it for the negotiations too?

Mr. Hartman: We need it for the negotiations. For example, Averoff’s office is already coming to us saying: “I think we can save your homeporting.” Well, the question is: Do we want them to save our homeporting? Do we want to agree early with him on the limit of what we can do?

Secretary Kissinger: Fine; I agree with that. That ought to be determined. But why is it easier to determine that without a review group meeting?

Mr. Hartman: Well, we can have a review group meeting. But I think if you can get the NSSM off, say, in the next few days, we’ll give you a draft.

Secretary Kissinger: Well, why is it I haven’t seen a draft yet?

Mr. Hartman: Well, the normal way this is done is we haven’t been suggesting drafts to you. I think you have in the White House; they’re considering the NSSM.

Secretary Kissinger: Well, why don’t you work on a draft—but just so that we don’t get into too many review group meetings without my views being known, I do not favor [1½ lines not declassified] because I think it will send entirely the wrong signal. So, at any rate, at least I’d need a lot of convincing before I go along with that.

What do you think, Hal?

Mr. Sonnenfeldt: I think that part is fine.

Secretary Kissinger: I mean, if the Greeks push us out of Greece, [3 lines not declassified].
Mr. Hartman: Well, we have a legal issue that we’re going to have to solve—less than 1 line not declassified—and that is that if we end up in these negotiations without a specific recommitment to the integrated NATO structure, then there’s some question about whether our current agreement applies.

Now, we may have to have a different kind of—

Secretary Kissinger: That is a different issue; and that is something that must, of course, be discussed.

Mr. Sonnenfeldt: That’s an issue.

Mr. Hartman: Yes.

Secretary Kissinger: And if we do it, I think we must do it as part of a study in which the Turks participate. I don’t think it’s going to be easy to convince them that this has no political significance.

Mr. Sisco: I think we’ve got a reasonable chance of retaining much of what we got there now.

Secretary Kissinger: There are two separate problems: One is the base negotiation. The second is—you saw the conversation between Schlesinger and Kubisch—

Mr. Hartman: Yes.

Secretary Kissinger: —[1 line not declassified].

Mr. Hartman: Well, there are some technical reasons why you want to take some of the things that are there now out. I mean, if you look at why they’re going to be used and how they’re going to be used, it will make a lot of sense.

Secretary Kissinger: The whole thing doesn’t make a helluva lot of sense. For that same reason, I don’t want to start the process without a careful NATO consideration of it, because all the arguments that apply to Greece will apply to Western Europe and, the next thing you know, the signal of a general American withdrawal.

I admit they don’t make too much sense, but they don’t do damn much either, and I’m not saying they shouldn’t be kept—[5½ lines not declassified].

Mr. Hartman: We’ll work it out.

Secretary Kissinger: But we can issue a NSSM today, and I think you can start an informal one—they’ll arrive. Therefore, we have to go into it with the greatest care.

Mr. Sonnenfeldt: The NSSM ought to be on the broad subject.

Secretary Kissinger: No. The NSSM must be on the broad subject for the reason of my concern that I’ve expressed.

Mr. Hartman: O.K.

[Omitted here is discussion unrelated to Greece.]
33. National Security Study Memorandum 215


TO

The Secretary of Defense
The Deputy Secretary of State
The Director of Central Intelligence

SUBJECT

U.S. Security Policy Toward Greece

The President has directed that a comprehensive review of U.S. security policy toward Greece be undertaken. The study should identify U.S. interests, including those interests as they relate to NATO, and offer recommendations for U.S. policy aimed at their protection, particularly in the context of future U.S.-Greek negotiations on U.S. bases and facilities. The study should take into account such factors as:

—The nature of the U.S. military presence in Greece, and its relationship to specific U.S. security interests;
—The relative priority of U.S. bases and facilities in terms of their contributions to U.S. and NATO security;
—Homeporting, including the impact of termination on U.S.-Greek and Greek-NATO defense arrangements;
—Greek objectives regarding the U.S. presence in the country and specific U.S.-Greek bilateral agreements;
—[less than 1 line not declassified];
—Greece’s needs for economic and military assistance and possible U.S. initiatives to satisfy those needs;
—The impact of a resolution of the Cyprus crisis on U.S.-Greek relations;
—The impact of U.S.-Greek bases and facilities negotiations on overall Greek-NATO defense arrangements.

The President has directed that the study be undertaken by an NSC inter-agency group comprising representatives of the addressees of this memorandum and a representative of the NSC staff and under the

1 Source: Library of Congress, Manuscript Division, Kissinger Papers, Box CI 316, National Security Council, NSSMs. Secret. A copy was sent to the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. The proposal for a NSSM on policy toward Greece had first been suggested in June 1973. See Document 3. After several attempts at a draft, the need for a NSSM was deemed “OBE” on December 13, 1973, in the weeks after the internal coup in Greece. The drafts are in the National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 1335, NSC Unfiled Material, 1973.
chairmanship of the Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs. The study should be forwarded no later than February 7, 1975 for consideration by the Senior Review Group.

Henry A. Kissinger

34. Defense Intelligence Agency Intelligence Appraisal


GREECE–TURKEY: THE AEGEAN SEABED DISPUTE

Summary

The discovery of oil in the Aegean in January 1974 and an undemarcated seabed has resulted in overlapping claims of continental shelf rights by both Greece and Turkey. The Cyprus crisis preempted a possible conflict over the seabed issue last summer, but the problem has again surfaced as the principal point of contention between the two NATO allies. The Aegean issue is potentially more explosive than Cyprus since both Greek and Turkish national interests are deeply involved. Many Greek military officers believe a confrontation with Turkey in the Aegean is inevitable this summer and have prepared extensive defense plans for the Aegean islands as well as Greek Thrace. Athens views the islands as an integral part of the mainland and can be expected to defend them at all cost.

For its part, Turkey is determined to resume oil exploration in the Aegean this spring and can be expected to react firmly to Greek threats or military ventures undertaken to prevent such activity. If it could be agreed upon, the most feasible solution would be a joint exploration and exploitation agreement between the two countries.

Barring negotiations on the seabed issue, there is danger that an incident will escalate into a major confrontation as a result of misinterpretation or overreaction on the part of either side. Although the issue may be submitted to the International Court of Justice, prospects for a full settlement in the near future are not encouraging.

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1 Source: Ford Library, National Security Adviser, NSC Staff for Europe, Canada, and Ocean Affairs: Convenience Files, 1974–1977, Box 9, Greece, Greece 1975 1, NSC Secret; No Foreign Dissem. Prepared by Robert P. Myers (DI–5). Two maps were attached but are not printed.
Background

The Treaty of Lausanne in 1923 defined the Greek-Turkish mainland boundary and ceded the eastern-most Aegean Islands to Greece and the Dodecanese Islands to Italy. Italy subsequently turned the Dodecanese Islands over to Greece in the 1947 Treaty of Paris.

Greece discovered oil off Thasos Island in January 1974. The size of the oil reserves has not been established, but estimates range up to 300,000 barrels per day. Greece’s current national consumption runs about 200,000 barrels per day. As a result of the discovery and its own need to find new sources of energy, Turkey issued several oil exploration contracts that centered on areas previously selected by Greece, principally near the islands of Limnos, Lesvos, and Khios. The Turkish Government thereupon proposed that negotiations be undertaken regarding the seabed demarcation between the two countries, but Greece was unwilling to negotiate and took the position that sovereign rights are nonnegotiable.

Despite Greek threats to oppose exploration with force, Turkey began preliminary oil surveys in the Aegean in the spring of 1974. A Turkish navy hydrographic ship, the Candarli, conducted limited seismic surveys under cover of a naval exercise, and tensions heightened as both countries placed limited forces on alert. Greece refrained from taking any military action, claiming that any country could survey on the open seas but that actual explorative drilling would not be permitted in the disputed zone. The Aegean issue quickly abated with the Cyprus coup and the subsequent Turkish invasion.

Although the Cyprus conflict temporarily took the spotlight off the Aegean issue, animosities were increased between the two countries that have substantially lessened the possibility of a negotiated solution on the issue. Turkey now claims that Greece has violated the spirit and intent reached at Lausanne by fortifying several of the Aegean islands and by proposing an extension of its territorial waters from six to 12 nautical miles.

Political and Legal Aspects

The Greek legal position is based primarily on the 1958 Geneva Convention, which acknowledges that a coastal state has the sovereign right to explore and exploit natural and mineral resources on its continental shelf. Greece maintains that its mainland continental shelf rights are equally applicable to the Greek islands. Since the irregular and somewhat undefined continental shelf in the Aegean has not been demarcated, Greece claims that the islands are an extension of its own continental shelf and that the Turkish continental shelf drops off abruptly close to that country’s mainland. The 1958 Geneva Convention states that in the absence of any negotiated agreement, the boundary should
be a median line, every point of which is equidistant from the territorial sea of each state. Since Greece, a signatory to this convention, views the islands as an integral part of the mainland, it believes the median line should be drawn between the mainland of Turkey and the easternmost Aegean islands.

Turkey did not sign the 1958 Geneva Convention and claims a continental shelf to a depth of 600 feet in accordance with the latest legal concepts regarding the Law of the Seas. This contour interval encompasses several of the Greek islands. Although Turkey accepts the concept of a six-nm territorial-waters limit surrounding the Greek islands, it rejects the idea of the islands maintaining individual continental shelves and regards the Greek islands in the eastern Aegean as a geological part of the Anatolian landmass of western Turkey. The Turks therefore claim the area outside the six-nm limit surrounding the Greek islands lies within their own continental shelf.

Ankara believes the Aegean should be divided by an equidistant line that uses only the respective mainland coastlines as basepoints but allows the Greek islands to retain their six-nm territorial waters limit. It will not accept the Greek position because that would leave Turkey virtually no Aegean area under its sovereignty. Ankara would therefore be deprived of any large economic gain should oil be discovered in the Aegean near its shores.

[Omitted here are comparison tables of Greek and Turkish Armed Forces.]

Political-Military Implications

Under the Ioannidis regime, the Greek armed forces took an extremely hard line in the 1974 Aegean dispute. As a result of the humiliation suffered over Cyprus, the present Greek Government will be forced to do likewise. Greek Prime Minister Karamanlis, however, is a sophisticated politician and, unlike his predecessor, can be expected to seek a political solution. If the Turks deny him this option though, he could not refuse to go to war over the issue that involves sovereignty, and remain in power. Many officers in the Greek armed forces believe that war with Turkey over the Aegean controversy is inescapable and that possession of the easternmost Aegean islands—not oil—is the real issue. They believe the Turks, because of their success on Cyprus, will force a confrontation to justify a military takeover of the islands.

Military inferiority, made manifest in the inability to defend Cyprus, has been one factor that has deterred Greece from war with Turkey. However, efforts are being made to improve Greek military capability as quickly as possible. Numerous arms acquisitions—jet aircraft, medium tanks, armored personnel carriers and antitank weapons—have been made since the Cyprus invasion, and many items are now beginning to
enter the Greek inventory. The army now believes it can successfully defend Greek Thrace and major Aegean islands.

[3 lines not declassified] Since last summer, the Greeks have fortified the Aegean islands and increased their military strength there and in Greek Thrace, and have conducted reconnaissance of potential areas of conflict. While it is not seeking a military confrontation with Turkey, Greece will fight for its claimed rights if peaceful efforts fail in negotiating some kind of settlement.

The Greek military can be expected to take an extremely nationalistic role and to overdramatize the possibility of war with Turkey. They believe fear of war would ease civilian pressures aimed at purging any lingering junta elements from their ranks. The military view such purges as detrimental to their ability to defend the homeland.

Last spring Turkey maintained a low profile in the Aegean dispute and described the controversy as an economic rather than political or military problem. Since the Cyprus invasion and as a direct result of the current impasse in forming a viable government, this is no longer the case. The Irmak government is not supported by the political parties and therefore is susceptible to statements made by them against it. Consequently, the government must respond to these statements in order to retain any vestige of power.

Recent charges by former Prime Minister Ecevit that Turkey was not safeguarding its rights in the Aegean prompted the Irmak government to announce its intentions to accelerate oil exploration. Even though the politicians are at odds over domestic and foreign issues, they are united when national interests are concerned.

The Turkish military, enjoying their victory on Cyprus, would welcome a Greek military action in the Aegean as they are only too eager to teach the Greeks another lesson. While there is no evidence of a Turkish military build up or intent to force a confrontation with Greece, selected air force and Jandarma units were swiftly placed on alert in reaction to recent aggressive statements made by the Greek Minister of Defense concerning the Aegean. Actions of this nature will most likely continue as each side reacts to statements and any military exercise that may be perceived as a threat.

Turkey is determined to explore for oil in the Aegean and will provide security with naval forces as required. Should military action be necessary, the Turks have contingency plans for invading the major Greek islands off the Turkish coast. The annexation of these islands would be a major Turkish objective in any military confrontation.

Prospects for a Settlement

The prospects for a settlement in the near future are not promising. Neither side is willing to grant concessions on what it considers
its legal rights and claims. Events on Cyprus have influenced the situation considerably and have aggravated age-old animosities. Prospects for a joint Cyprus-Aegean “package deal” in which each side would make offset concessions apparently is not now acceptable to Turkey. Any such deal would require some Turkish concessions in the Aegean since they are not expected to accede to Greek demands on Cyprus.

The Greeks recently proposed that the Aegean issue be taken to the International Court of Justice to which Turkey has agreed “in principle”. Turkey has previously utilized court decisions to support its claim to the Aegean, but in recent months it has pressed for direct bilateral negotiations.

There are two principal approaches for resolving the Aegean dispute. One calls for a negotiated agreement involving adjudication and arbitration to determine the seabed boundaries. The other is a joint exploration and exploitation agreement for the disputed areas without attempting to delimit boundaries. The latter is viewed as most feasible since it is unlikely either will concede rights they already consider theirs.

Both countries are anxious to continue preliminary seismic and magnetometric surveys to determine the extent of oil reserves, but actual exploratory drilling will probably not take place until 1976. Should large reserves be found, each side will become more adamant in declaring its rights, thereby greatly increasing the possibility of a military confrontation.

Greece has previously balked at negotiations not only because of national pride but also because it firmly believes its position is fully supported by international law and the 1958 Geneva Convention. Turkey has expressed a willingness to hold negotiations on the issue at any time but is not likely to make any substantial concessions, particularly under the aegis of its caretaker government. In the event negotiations are not undertaken there is the danger that either side will overreact to, or misinterpret the other’s intentions, leading to an incident that could escalate into a major confrontation.

1. After a slow start, caused principally by lack of clear guidelines and preparation on the Greek side, our talks about bilateral military agreements and US facilities in Greece are beginning to come into focus. The Feb 12 meeting (reftel) provided clear insights into what the Greeks regard as key problem areas. As the Greek side indicated, the complaints they articulated yesterday may be supplemented by others as the discussions proceed, but there is little doubt at this stage that Greek discomfort is more political than functional and that the US facilities and operating procedures which trouble them most are, paradoxically, those which (A) are most conspicuous and (B) least conspicuous.

2. Thus US facilities at Hellenikon (Athenai) air field, Elefsis and, to a lesser extent, Soudha create problems for the Greek Govt because they are prominent and well publicized installations, two of which are located in the immediate vicinity of metropolitan Athens. The Greek negotiator stated unequivocally that the GOG intends to reassert its sovereignty over Hellenikon and the site of Elefsis, terminating homeporting in the process. The discussions seemed to indicate room for compromise on Hellenikon, but the Greeks were not particularly responsive on homeporting, although they acknowledged the importance of the Sixth Fleet’s presence in the Eastern Mediterranean. In the case of inconspicuous, indeed virtually unknown, facilities operated by the US in Greece, [1 line not declassified] the problem for the Greeks is reversed. That is, it is the discreet nature of these facilities and the limited knowledge of them within the Greek Govt which makes Greek officials uncomfortable.

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2 Telegram 1196 from Athens, February 12, reported on the first day of the negotiations. The Greek side called for eliminating some U.S. facilities, terminating homeporting, revising privileges and immunities, and increasing Greek access to U.S. facilities. In turn, the U.S. side described the benefits of U.S. military bases and the presence of the Sixth Fleet to Greek security interests and expressed an understanding of the Greek desire to modify privileges and immunities as well as Greek access to U.S. facilities. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy Files, 1975)
3. Characterizing the Greek sensitivities in this way suggests two lines of possible compromise. As far as Hellenikon is concerned, we believe there is a fair chance that the Greek Govt can be convinced that US facilities there, at least in part, serve their defense needs and should be retained. It will, however, be necessary to examine carefully ways in which marginal services at Hellenikon can be dispersed or relocated and ways in which Greek sovereignty can at least nominally be asserted over the facility by incorporating it into the Hellenic Air Force base at Hellenikon. Concerned Washington agencies should begin promptly to examine this problem so that we can formulate some alternative solutions to the Greek problem which do not create intolerable inconveniences for US. A similar approach may be possible in the case of Soudha, although we infer that the Greeks are less concerned about the American profile of Soudha than about the possibility persuading US to pay something for it in the form of expanded Hellenic Air Force facilities there. Although the Greeks were not encouraging about homeporting, we believe it might be possible to retain usage rights at the Elefsis pier for non-homeported units of the Sixth Fleet, although the homeporting arrangement would probably have to be considerably revised or replaced entirely.

4. Regarding the mosaic of inconspicuous but in many cases important facilities such as Tatoi, we believe that our approach should be double pronged. On the one hand, we will have to satisfy the Greeks that the basic functions of these facilities, most of which are communications assets of one kind or another, do not derogate Greek sovereignty or involve Greece in unacceptable risks with their neighbors, and, on the other hand, convince them that the facilities directly or indirectly serve Greek defense needs. The Greek officials with whom we are negotiating are suspicious of these facilities in part because they know so little about them. It should therefore be possible to satisfy the Greek Govt that the facilities serve a valid purpose and are covered by valid agreements without opening the doors wide or declassifying the facilities. In most cases it should be possible to pacify Greek anxieties by means of sanitized briefings and by visits to the installations by authorized Greek representatives.

5. The latter obligation is one which we cannot avoid and should not try to avoid. We expect that the Greek side will soon request a tour of US facilities. This could come within a matter of days, depending upon the sense of urgency felt by the Greeks. We will need prompt clearances from Washington from the agencies concerned to their Mission counterparts authorizing guided tours and briefings when requested. Any delay in responding to a Greek request would exacerbate Greek suspicions and unnecessarily complicate the negotiating process. For this reason we will need contingency clearances to conduct guided tours of certain classified facilities and component elements of the Mis-
sion early next week will send messages identifying the facilities which we think the Greeks will want to see and outlining the type of sanitized briefing we have in mind.

6. After three days of intensive talks, it is our tentative conclusion that the Greeks will seek changes in our operating relationship which are more than cosmetic but less than vital. It is encouraging that the Greek side does not challenge the basic assumption that bilateral military cooperation with the US is important for Greece and that, in the wider context of our regional responsibilities, an effective US military role is positive and stabilizing. We believe that assumption underlies the thinking not only of the Greek negotiating team but of the Greek Govt itself. Without it a true meshing of our interests would be impossible. With it there may still be difficult problems of detail but the eventual conclusion of our negotiations with the Greeks would be satisfactory both for us and for them. Kubisch”

Ingersoll

36. Memorandum From the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger) to President Ford

Washington, February 27, 1975.

SUBJECT

Greek Bases Negotiations

The opening round of the U.S.-Greece bases negotiations was held in Athens during the week of February 10–14. The highlights of this first round are as follows:

—The Greek side defined three broad objectives for the negotiations: 1) to reduce—but not eliminate—the American military profile in Greece; 2) to up-date, consolidate and tighten existing bilateral defense arrangements; and 3) to monitor and control more directly U.S. military activities in Greece.

—[2 lines not declassified]

—The U.S. negotiating team maintained a “listening brief” in order to elicit initial Greek views. The U.S. side pointed out the important

1 Source: Ford Library, National Security Adviser, Presidential Country Files for Middle East and South Asia, Box 10, Greece 2. Secret. Sent for information. Ford initialed the memorandum, indicating that he saw it.
role that U.S. bases and facilities on Greek soil play in the defense of
NATO and Greece.

—Embassy Athens evaluated the Greeks' position as sufficiently
forthcoming to provide for "an eventual conclusion—satisfactory to
both sides," although the talks are likely to be protracted and hard.

—The Greek team also made clear their need to conclude the ne-
gotiations in the form of "bilateral cooperation agreement, defining
joint defense installations to remain in Greece . . . (to) be submitted to
the vote of the Parliament."

The talks are currently in recess and are tentatively scheduled to
reconvene in mid March.

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37. Telegram From the President's Deputy Assistant for National
Security Affairs (Scowcroft) to Secretary of State Kissinger¹

Washington, March 8, 1975, 0155Z.

Tohak 27. I have just seen Tosec 30 which recommends you order
Defense to cancel the sale of Redeye missiles to Greece.² I disagree.

There is no question that it was outrageous of Defense to negoti-
ate the sale without checking with State or with us, nevertheless, the
State arguments for cancellation do not appear persuasive to me.

First of all, it will be taken by the Greeks to be a slap by us. They
made the contract in good faith and have absolutely no reason to un-
derstand the circumstances or reasons for its cancellation at this late
date.

In addition, the rationale for our earlier concern over sale of the
Redeye has lost much of its logic. The Soviet SA–7 has been widely
distributed by the Soviets including, directly or indirectly, to the Fed-
ayeen. Besides, I know of no reason to think the weapon is more likely

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¹ Source: Ford Library, National Security Adviser, Trip Briefing Books and Cables
for Henry Kissinger, 1974–1976, Box 7, 3/5–3/22/75, Tohak 2. Secret; Sensitive; Eyes
Only. Sent to Borg, Adams, and Rodman for Kissinger with a request to deliver at the
opening of business. Kissinger was in Egypt.

² In telegram Tosec 30, March 6, Hartman and Vest informed Sisco that the Depart-
ment of Defense, without coordination with the Department of State, had author-
ized the sale of 1,000 Redeye missiles to Greece. The Department of State proposed can-
celing the sale on the grounds that sale of this type of missile had been strictly limited
because of its adaptability to terrorist use and that its possible use in the Cyprus dispute
would damage the fragile Greek-Turkish relationship. (Ibid.)
to get into irresponsible hands from Greece than from the other countries to which we have furnished it.

Possible Greek terrorism against Turkish commercial aircraft is, it seems to me, restrained not so much by an absence of the Redeye as by the possibility of retaliation either against Greek civil aircraft or the Greek population in Cyprus. In case of acquisition by the PLO, there are no such countervailing pressures.

Lastly, while it should not be governing, the sale is now at the point that Defense would have to pay for the entire contract plus cancellation charges. The Army does not need additional Redeye missiles. They could conceivably be sold elsewhere but where else would we be any better off than in Greece?3

I do believe it is worthwhile, however, to keep track of Redeye sales and I do concur that Defense should clear any such sales.

Warm regards.

3 Kubisch met with Averoff several times, including on April 15, in order to receive Greek assurances that the Redeye missiles would not be misused. (Telegram 2916 from Athens, April 15; National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy Files, 1975)

38. Telegram From the Department of State to the Mission to the North Atlantic Treaty Organization and the Embassy in Greece

Washington, March 15, 1975, 1802Z.

58882. Subject: Greece and NATO.

1. At present, the allies are in a “holding pattern” on the Greek/NATO relationship, with the US and most other allies endorsing the view that the initiative on clarifying this relationship should be left to Greece. Greece appears to want to delay NATO negotiations until the US-Greek negotiations have moved further, or indeed been completed. We have come to the view, however, that it is appropriate to begin to move now to start the process of clarifying the Greek role in NATO, for the following reasons.

1 Source: Department of State, Athens Embassy Files: Lot 96 F 335, Box 1, DEF 4-6, 1975 Greek Withdrawal. Secret; Priority; Exdis. Also sent Priority to London, Bonn, and NMR SHAPE.
US/Greek bilateral negotiations can make some progress, but are limited by the interconnection between the US bilateral role in Greece, and Greece’s NATO ties. The alternative to recommitment of forces to NATO, bilateral US-Greek arrangements not tied to NATO, would pose serious problems with Congress, and would have global implications as a precedent. A second complex problem is posed by the fact that the NATO infrastructure program in Greece overlaps with US use of facilities there, as, for example, at the Souda Bay airfield, which is built with NATO funds. In sum, the bilateral negotiations with Greece can make progress on certain issues, but cannot be wrapped up completely unless and until the Greek NATO role is clarified.

There is also the broad question of the type of bilateral arrangements we want in Greece, and the value we attach to US facilities there under various circumstances: if Greece is in NATO’s military structure, or if it has withdrawn, or is in some intermediate category. We can only approach this question in more specific terms as we have more appreciation for the likely future Greek role in NATO.

The major question of a new Greek relationship with NATO as a precedent for other allies.

2. In addition, there are internal pressures within the NATO context that are at work because of the ambiguous Greek role, including:

Infrastructure—new projects for Greece are frozen and work on previously approved projects is being disputed by Turkey. More generally, the issue of existing infrastructure facilities in Greece will need resolution, and NATO claims against Greece are a possibility if a satisfactory resolution to the question of Greece’s force commitment to NATO does not emerge.

Turkey’s concerns over its communications and radar/early warning links with NATO, which are subject to interruption by Greece. Turkey has asked for development of alternative channels, a costly and complex process.

Allied command arrangements for southeastern Europe. The ambiguity concerning the Greek role was one factor in Turkey’s decision to opt out of Wintex 75; the whole question is a central one for NATO military planners in planning southern flank defense.

Overflight rights, including over the Aegean.

3. Approach to Greek/NATO negotiations.

Our approach to these negotiations would be to encourage Greece ultimately to resume the fullest possible role in NATO, at the same time seeking to avoid backing Greece prematurely into a corner that would make it formalize, under pressure, a low degree of participation, closing the door on further integration into NATO. The central issue in negotiations is likely to be the nature of the Greek force commitment to
NATO. The present NATO categories of “assignment” and “earmarking” involve, for Greece, some forces under NATO command, and some other forces earmarked to be placed under NATO commanders in certain contingency situations. We would of course prefer to see Greece come to restore its commitment under these categories. We recognize, however, that this may pose political problems for the Greek Government since Caramanlis has renounced precisely these categories. In this regard, the redefinition of force commitment categories currently under study in NATO may be helpful to the GOG. We will need a closer reading over time of the possibilities this recategorization exercise provides, as well as the effect of possible Greek force.

Commitments as a precedent for other allies. We will wish to impress, with other allies, on Greece the need for a satisfactory resolution to this question.

4. Timing considerations.

Greek domestic politics, Greece’s relations with Turkey, and the Cyprus issue interact to place limits on how fast, and perhaps how far, Greece may be able to move in defining its role in NATO in the direction we desire. An acceptable new Greece/NATO relationship will not quickly be defined; we should be prepared for a slow, possibly groping process. During this period, for the reasons stated above, it may not be possible to bring our bilateral negotiations with Greece to a formal conclusion, although we would seek to make tangible progress on individual issues.

5. For USNATO: You should approach Luns, and drawing on paras 1, 2, 3, and 4 above, explain that we believe it time to move to clarification of the Greek role in NATO, making clear that we do not seek an adversary or unduly hasty process. You should indicate that we prefer that Greece take the initiative, though we believe that the process should be launched in any case in the next few weeks. You should also outline the idea of initial discussions between Greece and a small group of allies which Luns might convene, pointing out that we recognize that a larger group, including Turkey and all other DPC members, would eventually have to take part in any decisions.

6. You are then authorized to approach, at your discretion, UK, FRG and Italian PermReps, as well as PermRep Dean De Staercke along the same lines indicating our preference for a small, informal meeting in the weeks ahead and suggesting that this idea by raised with Greeks by one or more of these PermReps.

7. Once the approaches in paras 5 and 6 have been undertaken, you should approach Greek PermRep Theodoropoulos along the following lines:

—We are interested in progress in US-Greek negotiations which began in February, and will continue to approach them with this goal.
However, we are increasingly aware that the interconnection between the Greek role in NATO and US-Greek bilateral defense arrangements is complex and pervasive. Thus, we cannot view the bilateral negotiations wholly in isolation from the Greek/NATO relationship, which in our view needs further clarification.

—Various aspects of US activities in Greece are tied in with activities funded by NATO infrastructure. It may be difficult to envisage new bilateral agreements or arrangements relating to NATO-funded facilities when the status of these is uncertain in NATO.

—[9 lines not declassified]

—More generally, we will be in a better position to evaluate the scope and nature of our bilateral defense ties with Greece when we have a clearer view of Greece’s role in NATO. We cannot view our bilateral relationship with Greece or any other ally in isolation.

—We thus believe it is necessary to move toward clarifying the Greek role in NATO. We would prefer for Greece to take the initiative in this regard. We suggest, as earlier, that initial discussions could take place with Greece and a small group of allies—perhaps the UK, US, FRG, Italy, the Dean of PermReps, and Luns—so that they could be on an informal basis without commitment.

8. For Athens: You are authorized to make parallel presentation to GOG at level you deem appropriate once USNATO has undertaken approach to Theodoropoulos.

Ingersoll

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39. Memorandum From A. Denis Clift of the National Security Council Staff to Secretary of State Kissinger


SUBJECT

U.S. Security Policy Toward Greece

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1 Source: Ford Library, National Security Adviser, NSC Staff for Europe, Canada, and Ocean Affairs: Convenience Files, 1974–1977, Box 10, Greece, Greek Base Negotiations 1975 (3). Secret. Sent for action. Conferred in by Clint Granger and Jan Lodal of the NSC staff. There is no indication that Kissinger saw the memorandum.
In response to NSSM 215, the Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs has sent the President a review of U.S. security policy toward Greece, with emphasis on U.S. policy and [1 line not declassified]. The concerned agencies—State, Defense and CIA—have also submitted comments and recommendations on the NSSM response. An analytical summary of the response is at Tab II.

By way of background, the Government of Greece, following announcement of Greece’s plans for military withdrawal from NATO, requested that the United States enter into formal negotiations on the future of the U.S.-Greek security relationship, including the status of U.S. bases and facilities on Greek soil. The first round in these negotiations was held in mid-February at Athens; the second session will open on April 7, also at Athens.

During this same general period, [1½ lines not declassified] within the Departments of Defense and State.

The NSSM response, supported by agency comments and recommendations, affirms the U.S. objectives in bilateral negotiations of preserving intact the fundamentals of the U.S.-Greek security arrangement [less than 1 line not declassified] while encouraging Greece’s return to full participation in NATO. At the same time, the study states that the U.S. should seek to regain full effective use of those U.S. facilities considered most important to U.S. security interests adding that if concessions are necessary to obtain Greek support for these principal U.S. objectives, the United States should agree to consolidation or reduction of facilities considered least essential to retain. State—while concurring in these objectives—adds that the negotiators must be provided maximum flexibility in order to safeguard U.S. interests while accommodating Greek needs.

As there is interagency consensus on U.S. objectives in the negotiations, I see no need for an SRG meeting. At the same time, [2 lines not declassified] I believe it would be correct to have the President formally approve the U.S. position in a decision memorandum.

2 Document 33.
3 Sisco forwarded the paper on February 8. A copy is in the Ford Library, NSC Institutional Files (H-Files), Box H–33, NSSM 215.
4 Colby relayed CIA’s concurrence in a memorandum to Kissinger on February 20; Deputy Secretary of Defense Clements relayed the Department of Defense’s concurrence in a February 22 memorandum; and Springsteen relayed the Department of State’s concurrence in a memorandum to Scowcroft on March 7. (Ibid.)
5 Printed as Document 40.
6 See footnote 2, Document 20.
7 See Documents 35 and 36.
The memorandum for your signature to the President at Tab I would forward the NSSM response and related agency comments/recommendations, and your recommendation that the President approve the position on negotiations agreed to in the NSSM response. With the President’s approval, the accompanying NSDM for your signature would so inform the agencies.

Recommendation

1. That you sign the memorandum for the President at Tab I.
2. With the President’s approval, that you sign the accompanying NSDM.

8 Attached but not printed.
9 There is no indication that Kissinger signed the memorandum.
10 Printed as Document 43.

40. Paper Prepared by the National Security Council Staff


ANALYTICAL SUMMARY

Response to NSSM 215—“U.S. Security Policy Toward Greece”

1. Introduction and Background

On August 14, 1974, the new Greek government under the leadership of Prime Minister Constantine Caramanlis announced its withdrawal from NATO’s integrated military structure. This decision, which was taken at the height of the Cyprus crisis, reflected the frustration of the newly installed Greek government and the people of Greece over being unable to assist militarily their brethren on the island and in seeing their NATO allies, particularly the United States, fail to forestall the Turkish action. In subsequent statements, the Greeks referred to a “new relationship with NATO” and the fact that the status of U.S. and NATO bases on Greek soil would have to be revised.

1 Source: Ford Library, NSC Institutional Files (H–Files), Box H–58, NSDM 291. Secret. Regarding the complete NSSM response, see footnote 3, Document 39.
2 See footnote 2, Document 20.
At the request of the Greek government, a preliminary round of talks on the future of the US-Greek security relationship was held in Athens during the week of February 10–14. The second round in the consultations is scheduled to begin in Athens on April 7.

NSSM 215 directed that a comprehensive review of U.S. security policy towards Greece be undertaken to identify U.S. interests and offer recommendations for U.S. policy aimed at their protection, particularly in the context of future US-Greek negotiations on U.S. bases and facilities. A study has been completed by an ad hoc interagency group chaired by State. The study is summarized below with NSC staff comments in parentheses. Formal agency comments/recommendations were submitted separately and are incorporated in this summary.

In format, the study is introduced by a brief overview of the development of our bilateral security relationship with Greece, together with an analytical discussion of Greece’s decision to withdraw from NATO’s military arm and a brief look at the various factors expected to influence Greece’s approach to negotiations (pp 1–5). Greece’s security relationship with NATO is examined in detail, including the legal and institutional aspects of Greece’s withdrawal decision and the value of Greece and NATO of the Greece-NATO association (pp 19–25 and Annex H). Finally, the study takes up the legal problems relating to U.S. facilities and forces, specifically the bilateral Status of Forces Agreement which regulates our day-to-day relations with the Greeks on most military matters (pp 25–28 and Annexes D and E).

Against this background, the study lists some six likely assumptions underlying Greece’s approach to negotiations both with the United States and Greece. These assumptions can be summarized as follows: 1) to reduce the American military profile in Greece; 2) [1 line not declassified]; 3) to update, consolidate and tighten current bilateral agreements, and; 4) to assert Greek sovereignty by monitoring and controlling more directly U.S. military activities in Greece (pp 29–31). The study then identifies U.S. policy objectives in the US-Greek and Greek-NATO negotiations: 1) preservation of the fundamentals of the US-Greek security relationship intact; 2) [less than 1 line not declassified]; 3) return of Greece to full participation in NATO’s integrated military structure, and; 4) as a concessionary measure if raised first by the Greek side, reduction or consolidation of certain bases/facilities identified in the study

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3 See Documents 35 and 36.
4 Document 33.
as least essential to retain (pp 32–33). Policy options to attain these objectives are presented on pages 34–41; [1 line not declassified].

(Our security relationship with Greece is of relatively longstanding, dating from March 1947 when the Truman Doctrine was promulgated and when the U.S. began to take over from the UK the responsibility for protecting and preserving Western interests in Greece. Since that time, the U.S. has invested nearly $4 billion in economic and military assistance to the Greek government.)

(Though the Communist guerrilla war ended in 1949, the Soviet-bloc threat to Greece’s independence remained, and in 1952 we led the way for the admission of Greece to NATO. Under the NATO aegis, we subsequently concluded agreements providing for the establishment of both U.S. and NATO security facilities in Greece.)

The study specifically identifies U.S. security interests in some five major bilateral bases/facilities, as well as three major NATO installations where there is a significant U.S. stake.

(The study points out (correctly, we believe) that in the past decade, for a number of reasons, the Greeks have come to believe that foreign bases/facilities on their soil serve US/NATO rather than Greek defense interests. More than any other factor in recent years, the Greek military junta’s strong support of United States and NATO security interests in the Eastern Mediterranean has worked to produce a change in the Greek attitude towards the US/NATO presence in their country. Thus, the study points out that even if the events of last summer had not occurred on Cyprus, it seems likely that the Greeks would have eventually sought to alter the nature of their security relationship with both the United States and NATO.)

II. Likely Assumptions Underlying Greece’s Approach to Negotiations

With the U.S. and NATO

Greece has asked for negotiations to revise the US-Greek security relationship. A preliminary round of talks on this subject was held in Athens during the week of February 10–14; the second round will open on April 7. The study makes six basic assumptions—generally borne out by the first round of talks—about the Greek approach to the negotiations:

—First, the Greek Government is firmly committed to a policy of close alliance with the West, particularly the United States.

—Second, the Greeks will seek an overall reduction both in the number of U.S. military personnel stationed in Greece and in the number of facilities.

—Third, the Greeks will also seek to alter the general agreements under which the United States operates in Greece, specifically, the Military Facilities Agreement of 1953 and the bilateral Status of Forces Agreement of 1956.
—Fourth, the Greeks will endeavor to ensure that all American bases/facilities in Greece be clearly seen by the public as serving the defense needs of both Greece and the United States.
—Fifth, the Greeks will move cautiously on the NATO front in the next few months, and that the outcome of the bilateral talks will shape their approach to NATO.
—[2 lines not declassified].

The study provides a detailed discussion of factors which might have an influence on the outcome of the negotiations. These include domestic pressures on Prime Minister Caramanlis, the Cyprus situation, Greek-Turkish relations in general, future levels of U.S. economic and military assistance, and the attitude of NATO nations (some of which are anxious to clarify Greece’s status in the Alliance), and Congressional reactions.

III. U.S. Objectives and Alternatives Approaches to the Negotiations

U.S. objectives in the US-Greek and Greek-NATO negotiations are necessarily conservative. We will want to conduct the negotiations in such a way as to help the Greek Government handle its perceived domestic problem while preserving the fundamentals of the US-Greek security relationship and while encouraging Greece’s return to full participation in NATO. We will want to regain full effective use of the facilities we consider most important, and we will want to consider consolidating or reducing facilities we consider least essential to retain.

The study presents five alternative approaches to the negotiations:

—One would be a reactive, time-buying approach which would allow the Greeks to set the pace in the negotiations and which would hopefully lead them to see the advantages in maintaining the status quo in their relations with the U.S. and NATO. Under this option, we would (a) play for time on any Greek request for a reduction in the number of U.S. facilities, (b) be willing to make concessions on the status of forces issue, but maintain the NATO SOFA as the baseline below which we would not go, and (c) [1 line not declassified].

—A second would involve the U.S. taking the initiative by offering to cede at an early stage homeporting and other non-essential activities and to propose a memorandum of understanding incorporating changes desired by the Greeks in our Status of Forces Agreement.

—A third approach, essentially time-buying, would entail trying to deflect the negotiations away from discussion of specific U.S. facilities directly into status of forces issues.

—A fourth alternative [2 lines not declassified].

—A fifth alternative [1 line not declassified].

Defense believes that the study adequately addresses U.S. policy and policy options with regard to Greece with the exception of the fourth and fifth alternatives listed above [12 lines not declassified]
[1 paragraph (5 lines) not declassified]
IV. [less than 1 line not declassified]

[9 paragraphs (53½ lines) not declassified]

It is for the above reasons that we are now pressing for the beginning of discussions between Greece and NATO on the nature of the future relationship.

V. [1 line not declassified]

The study divides U.S. and NATO facilities in Greece into three basic categories:

—most essential to retain;
—desirable to retain; and
—least essential to retain.

Those in the first category include Athenai AFB near Athens; the Souda Bay complex in Crete; [1 line not declassified]; and the NATO Missile Firing Installation on Crete. In the second category are the NATO Air Weapons Training Center at Timbakum, Crete; personnel support activities at Athenai AFB; and air facilities at Larissa. The last category includes homeporting and various communications sites throughout Crete.

VI. Greece and NATO

A central issue in Greece-NATO negotiations will be whether Greece participates in NATO’s integrated military structure and if so the nature of its force commitment to NATO.

Based on its statements and pattern of participation in NATO to date, Greece probably expects to be able to tailor a relationship with NATO in which it retains major benefits of membership but refrains from official commitment of its forces to NATO, possibly eliminates or alters the status of certain NATO-funded facilities, and calls into question the NATO Status of Forces Agreement governing Greece as well as other Allies.

The study points out that Athens may well wish to see how bilateral negotiations with the U.S. go before making decisions on its strategy for dealing with NATO. Thus the outcome of the US-Greek bilateral consultations will likely shape the results of the Greece-NATO negotiations.

Among NATO-related arrangements and facilities, the study indicates that Greece places importance on the following:

—[1 line not declassified];
—participation in the NATO intelligence and communication system;
—continued participation in NATO’s infrastructure program;
—membership in the NATO Military Committee;
—participation in the full range of NATO planning; and
retention of specific facilities such as airfields, naval bases, command and control facilities, and certain NATO training sites.

The paper provides a complete discussion of the legal and institutional arrangements governing Greece’s participation in NATO, as well as an analysis of contrasting Allied views on Greece’s continued participation in NATO military/defense activities.

41. Memorandum From A. Denis Clift of the National Security Council Staff to Secretary of State Kissinger


SUBJECT

US-Greek Base Negotiations

We are now approaching the second round of US-Greek base talks, scheduled to begin in Athens on April 7.

State, without White House clearance, has sent the message at Tab A to Embassy Athens, providing guidance for the talks.

NSSM 215, U.S. Security Policy Toward Greece, was issued to ensure that preparations for the talks would go forward in the NSC system, this bearing in mind such contentious interagency issues as homeporting [1 line not declassified].

The NSSM response worked a very useful effect in that it brought DOD around and led to interagency agreement [2½ lines not declassified].

The NSSM response also reached the conclusion that, despite the internal U.S. Navy decision to give up homeporting as soon as possible, this “concession” to the Greeks should be in return for meaningful Greek concessions. This quid pro quo approach has been weakened in the instructions at Tab A; Navy clearly plans to give up homeporting in this round, concessions or not.

1 Source: Ford Library, NSC Institutional Files (H–Files), Box H–33, NSSM 215. Secret. Sent for action.
2 Attached but not printed.
3 Document 33.
4 See Document 40.
The approach the U.S. Government is taking in these talks—[less than 1 line not declassified] to U.S.-Greek and Greek-NATO linkages, to homeporting—involves interagency policy issues that should be confirmed in a decision memorandum. I recommend that action be taken on Log #1737, March 21, 1975, which forwarded the NSSM 215 response together with a proposed NSDM.5

Recommendation

That action be taken on the NSDM forwarded with NSC Log #1737.6

5 Document 39.
6 The NSDM was issued on April 8; see Document 43.

42. Memorandum From Director of Central Intelligence Colby to the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger)1


SUBJECT

Intelligence Alert Memorandum: Possible Conflict in the Aegean

1. As the attached roundup indicates,2 Greek-Turkish tension over the Aegean is at a dangerous level.

2. We continue to believe that both governments, in their rational calculations, want to avoid the dangerous and essentially unpredictable situation of large-scale hostilities over this issue. Indeed, we would estimate that the chances are against either side deliberately deciding to initiate war.

3. What is equally important, we think that each government credits the other with a desire to avoid serious conflict over this issue. At the same time, each government is aware of political limitations on the other at home, of the fact that there are some hawks on the other side, and that rational calculations may not always prove controlling.

2 Attached but not printed.
4. Indeed, there may be some sentiment in Turkey for launching a pre-emptive strike against Greece—before the Turkish military capability declines too far as a result of Turkey’s inability to obtain armaments. We do not think this reasoning prevails in the Turkish government. However, it cannot be entirely discounted as a factor. In any case, the Turks are concerned about Greek reinforcements of certain Aegean Islands, and some days ago made a formal démarche to the signatories of the 1947 Paris Treaty pointing out these violations.

5. Meanwhile, the readiness of both sides to play “chicken,” to keep testing each other’s resolve—e.g., by Turkish overflights of the islands and Greek shooting at the overflights—could easily bring them into explosive confrontation in which neither side felt strong enough to back down.

6. The Intelligence Community is keeping this situation under close review. The US missions in Athens, Ankara, Istanbul, and Nicosia are fully alert, and NSA has alerted units that could pick up reflections of unusual military activity. A roundup of Greek forces on the Aegean Islands, requested by the Embassy in Ankara, is being prepared in CIA and DIA. The attached current intelligence roundup gives the highlights of the situation at the moment.

7. This memorandum has been discussed with offices in CIA, DIA, State/INR and NSA, and they are in agreement.

W.E. Colby

43. National Security Decision Memorandum 291

Washington, April 8, 1975.

TO
The Secretary of Defense
The Deputy Secretary of State
The Director of Central Intelligence

SUBJECT
U.S. Security Policy Toward Greece

1Source: Library of Congress, Manuscript Division, Kissinger Papers, Box 315, National Security Council, NSDM, NSDM 7/74–11/76. Secret. A copy was sent to the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff.
The President has considered the response to NSSM 215 on U.S. security policy toward Greece submitted by the Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs on February 8, together with the formal agency comments and recommendations relating thereto.2

The President has confirmed that negotiations should proceed with Greece relating to U.S. bases and facilities in Greece and the bilateral Status of Forces Agreements, with the understanding that the following guidelines will shape the U.S. position:

—The principal U.S. objective in the negotiations is to preserve to the extent possible the existing U.S. security arrangements with Greece while encouraging Greece’s return to full participation in NATO. The United States should seek to regain full effective use of those U.S. facilities considered most important to U.S. security interests. If concessions are necessary to obtain Greek agreement to these U.S. principal objectives, the United States may agree to consolidation or reduction of facilities considered least essential to retain.

—[5 lines not declassified]

—In response to Greek initiative and in return for Greek support of principal U.S. objectives, the United States may agree to the termination of homeporting.

—The United States considers the NATO Status of Forces Agreement (SOFA) as the limiting framework for any agreement on the alteration of the status, privileges and immunities of U.S. forces in Greece.

In approving the U.S. position for these negotiations, the President recognizes the interconnection between U.S.-Greek security relations and Greece’s NATO ties, and again emphasizes the importance attached to full Greek participation in NATO.

The President has directed that the senior U.S. negotiator should submit a report on the results of these negotiations, including such ad referendum agreements as may be developed, for his review as soon as possible.3

Henry A. Kissinger

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2 See Document 40 and footnote 4 thereto.
3 These instructions were sent in telegram 182835 to Athens, April 11. (Ford Library, National Security Adviser, Presidential Country Files for Middle East and South Asia, 1974–1977, Box 10, Greece, Exdis from Secretary of State)
44. Memorandum From A. Denis Clift of the National Security Council Staff to Secretary of State Kissinger


SUBJECT
Possibility of Greek-Turkish Conflict in the Aegean

With the memorandum at Tab A, the Director of Central Intelligence has submitted an addendum to his April 4 intelligence alert memorandum concerning the possibility of Greek-Turkish conflict in the Aegean (NSC Log #2101). The addendum provides an assessment of the Greek reinforcement of certain islands in the Aegean area:

—Greek forces in the Aegean are concentrated on six of the major islands lying in close proximity to the Turkish mainland—Limnos, Lesbos, Chios, Samos, Kos and Rhodes, with surveillance units deployed to several of the smaller islands as well.

—The increase in the number and capability of the Greek military forces on the islands has been substantial over the past few months and is continuing. Ten infantry battalions were deployed to the islands in February. Additionally, five fighter aircraft were moved to Limnos in March. This marks the first time that combat aircraft have been actually based on the islands.

The Director’s assessment coincides closely with the information we have been receiving on this subject. In a recent conversation with our ambassador in Athens (cable at Tab B) Greek Foreign Ministry Political Affairs Director Tzounis openly admitted that Greece has been reinforcing the islands in violation of several international treaties. The official stated that the treaty restrictions on militarization of these islands were to “insure the maintenance of peace.” He added that Greece had acted “only in response to Turkish threats”, and that Greece could not leave the islands defenseless in view of present circumstances.

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2 Attached but not printed.
3 Document 42.
4 Not attached; most likely a reference a telegram 2693 from Athens, April 7. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy Files, 1975)
TO
The Secretary of Defense
The Deputy Secretary of State
The Director of Central Intelligence

SUBJECT
U.S. and Allied Security Policy in Southern Europe

The President has directed a review of U.S. and Allied security policy in Southern Europe and along NATO's southern tier over the near- and mid-term. The study should examine the viability and effectiveness of U.S. and Allied security aims, arrangements, forces and bases in light of changes in the area, and should develop and assess U.S. and Allied near- and mid-term options.

The framework for the study should encompass:

—Overall U.S. interests in the region, including the U.S. political, military and economic relationship with NATO, the EC, and Western European states;
—U.S. security aims vis-à-vis the Soviets in the region; and
—U.S. interests vis-à-vis the Balkan states.

The study should consider inter alia:

—Present and potential changes in the area that bear on U.S. and Allied security policy, including domestic political developments and changes in external policies in Southern Europe, the evolution of Soviet capabilities, trends in Allied forces in the area, and the impact of economic factors, including energy, on the region;
—The political and military implications of changes in Southern European membership or participation in NATO;
—The consequences of elimination or curtailment of U.S. and Allied bases and facilities in the area (taking into account the Azores study being carried out in response to NSSM 221);2
—Prospects for an increased Allied and Western European political and military role in the area;
—The implications of new military and intelligence capabilities and technologies for U.S. force and base structure in the area.

Source: Library of Congress, Manuscript Division, Kissinger Papers, Box CL 316, National Security Council, NSSMs. Secret; Exdis. A copy was sent to the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

The study should assume continuation of the current policy line in base negotiations with Portugal, Spain, and Greece and postulate a range of outcomes for purposes of analysis.

The study should be prepared on a priority, need-to-know basis by an NSC Ad Hoc Group composed of representatives of the addressees, the JCS and the NSC staff, and chaired by the representative of the Department of State. The completed study should be transmitted no later than May 28, 1975, for consideration by the NSC Senior Review Group.

Henry A. Kissinger

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46. Memorandum From the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger) to President Ford


SUBJECT

U.S. Economic and Military Assistance to Greece

In your April message to the Congress, you indicated—in the context of your broader remarks on Turkey, Greece and Cyprus—that we were consulting with Greece on economic and military assistance programs and that proposals would be submitted to Congress in the near future.

This memorandum reviews the current status of US-Greek consultations on economic and military assistance.

In early January, the Greek Government formally requested U.S. assistance for 1975 in the following specific areas:

—Military assistance.
—Economic assistance.
—Financing of capital equipment, raw materials and agricultural products through Export-Import Bank, Commodity Credit Corporation (CCC), and other agencies.

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—Influence on international organizations such as the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development (IBRD), and the International Monetary Fund (IMF) to increase their lending to Greece.

So far, we have been able to be helpful in the following ways:

—Chairman Casey of the Export-Import Bank visited Greece in mid-April to explore the possibility of expanding Eximbank activity in Greece.

—We are supporting the IBRD’s plan to approve loans to Greece this year approximating $135 million. (Loans amounted to about $40 million last year.)

—The IMF is prepared for increased Greek borrowing under the oil facility.

—We are planning to reschedule all of the principal and interest payments due this year for direct military credits (about $10 million).

—We are also planning additional Foreign Military Sales (FMS) credit of $15 million for FY 1975 beyond the present $71 million program.

—We are continuing to explore the possibility of renewed CCC credit to Greece. The amount will depend on market conditions.

Prime Minister Caramanlis has made it clear that the Greek Government is primarily interested in substantial amounts of military assistance. This is motivated in great part by Caramanlis’ desire to recoup military losses suffered during last summer’s Cyprus crisis and to bring Greek forces up to par with those of Turkey. To this end, the Greek military has recently submitted a list of equipment amounting to about $800 million to be spread out over a number of years. The Greeks have expressed the hope that the equipment would be provided primarily under grant aid rather than some form of outright purchase. We have told Caramanlis that there would be difficulties in providing grant military aid in the amount envisaged, particularly in view of the state of the U.S. economy and considering our military aid commitments worldwide. We have made clear the additional problem of providing grant military aid to Greece while Turkey—a fellow NATO ally—is subject to an embargo on arms supplies. The Greeks have carefully separated the economic/military assistance request from the ongoing base negotiations. Approval of a program that substantially meets Greek requirements would have favorable impact on the base negotiations and facilitate efforts to encourage Greece to return to full participation in NATO.

State is tentatively planning a FY 1976 program for Greece in the range of $65 million in grant military assistance, in addition to the $90 million in FMS credits already planned. They are also considering the possibility of increasing FMS credit for Greece to the point where a total program of combined grant and credit would amount to approximately $175 million. (By comparison, the proposal for Turkey in FY 1976 is $180 million, including $63 million in grant military assistance.)
The precise legislative strategy for handling Greece’s stated economic and military aid requirements is under study. Both the option adopted and the timing involved will be influenced by other issues, including Congressional action on the Turkish aid cut-off, the pace and success of the Cyprus negotiations, the Aegean dispute between Greece and Turkey, and the outlook for our base discussions with Greece.

While continuing to seek substantial economic and military assistance from the United States, Prime Minister Caramanlis has been active on other fronts as well. Reports from Athens state that Caramanlis was successful in obtaining “substantial” economic and military aid from France during a recent trip to Paris. Unconfirmed press reports indicate that the assistance may range as high as $800 million in long-term, low interest loans with a French pledge to speed up deliveries of modern weapons for Greek forces.

47. Memorandum From the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger) to President Ford


SUBJECT

U.S.-Greek Bases Negotiations—Round Two

The second round of the U.S.-Greek bases negotiations was held in Athens during the period April 7–29. This memorandum reviews the status of the negotiations to date.

Background. During the first round in the negotiations in February, the Greek government requested an adjustment in their security relationship with the United States along the following lines:

—Termination of homeporting;
—Closing out of all U.S. operations at Athenai (sometimes called Hellenikon) Air Force Base near Athens;
—“Hellenization” of all remaining U.S. facilities in Greece, including Greek participation to some degree in U.S. communications operations;
—Revision of the bilateral Status of Forces Agreement (SOFA) to bring it in line with the NATO SOFA;

The Second Round. Our principal objectives in the second round were to:

—Obtain Greek agreement to continue the U.S. presence at Athenai Air Force Base, with the fewest possible changes in current activities;
—Use the termination of homeporting as a quid for Greek support of principal U.S. objectives;
—Hold the line on the SOFA issue as much as possible, while expressing our intention to be forthcoming in certain selected areas, and;
—Avoid bilateral negotiation of issues which touch on the Greek-NATO relationship such as [less than 1 line not declassified] installations built with NATO funds, steering such talks into the NATO forum.

Substantial progress was made toward achieving principal U.S. objectives:

—The Greek government agreed to allow a continued U.S. presence at Athenai Air Force Base (a principal U.S. objective in the negotiations) in exchange for the termination of homeporting by the U.S. Specifically, the United States will retain “essential” operations at Athenai (logistics flights, [2 lines not declassified]), while giving up certain non-essential support functions. Additionally, to meet Greek political needs, the base will be “Hellenized”, i.e., given the “cosmetic” appearance of a Greek rather than American facility.
—Action on the status of forces issue was confined to technical “working group” meetings designed to establish a framework for further discussions.
—The Greeks were informed that further progress in the bilateral negotiations will depend in large part on early clarification of Greece’s future role in NATO. The Greeks expressed their full understanding of this point, but indicated their desire to move cautiously to avoid inflaming volatile Greek public opinion on the NATO issue.

Outlook. Future negotiating sessions will focus on:

—Reaching agreement on the status of forces issue;
—Determining the degree of Greek participation in U.S. communications operations;
—Working out the details associated with continued U.S. access to and “Hellenization” of Athenai Air Force Base;
—Arranging for the U.S. Navy’s periodic use of the pier facilities near Athens vacated as a result of the termination of homeporting;
—Elimination, reduction or consolidation of certain other U.S. facilities considered “least essential” to retain from our standpoint, and;
—Financial compensation for the residual value of U.S. facilities turned over to the Greeks as a result of the negotiations.

The talks are currently in recess. A date for resumption has not been decided.
In the United States, Congressional and press reaction to the joint communiqué issued at the close of this round in the negotiations—particularly the termination of homeporting—was favorable, citing the beginning of a “new and more mature U.S.-Greek relationship.” In Greece, the public expression of views has been curtailed by the effects of a newspaper strike, but observers believe that Prime Minister Karamanlis’ image has been strengthened in relation to his parliamentary opposition on the left.

48. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Greece

Washington, May 27, 1975, 2349Z.


1. During round two of the US-Greek base negotiations, we explored numerous aspects of future American-Greek defense cooperation. Our efforts in the months ahead need to be directed primarily toward: (a) consolidating the bilateral understandings already reached, through discussions among experts on both sides, leading to arrangements which can later be endorsed at the political level and (b) insuring that the future Greek-NATO relationship is clarified in a manner which provides for fullest possible Greek participation in the integrated military command structure. Our new bilateral arrangements with Greece should be consistent with and complement the Greek-NATO relationship.

2. We endorse Embassy Athens recommendation (reftel) that no date be considered now for a third plenary round of bilateral negotiations, but we recognize we may have to revise our planning if Karamanlis and Bitsios push for an early third round when they meet the President and the Secretary in Brussels. Our preference is to postpone such a round until well on into the fall and after issues have been resolved at the subgroup level. By that time, Greeks [garble] which are

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1 Source: National Archives, RG 84, Athens Embassy Files: Lot 78 F 160, Box 60, DEF 15, Bases and Installations 1975. Secret; Immediate; Limdis. Repeated Priority to USNATO, USNMR SHAPE, USDLMC, USCINCEUR, CINCUSNAVEUR, CINCUSAFE, and CINCLANT.
2 Dated May 1. (Ibid.)
only now beginning (USNATO 2634), should have proceeded to the point where key issues have been delineated and possible avenues of resolution identified, [1½ lines not declassified] Greek eligibility for infrastructure funds.

3. As the Embassy appreciates and as we informed the Greeks, considerable time is needed by Washington agencies to develop and staff proposals we plan to make on various issues and the Greek proposals for technical training and shared-use at facilities. A tentative work program and timetable for joint planning purposes is set out below:

A. Tatoi: we understand that a decision on this subject cannot be delayed until round three and, as indicated in State 109638, we are prepared to discuss this issue directly with GOG, while investigating alternative sites in the weeks ahead. A decision on this subject should be possible by early June.

B. Homeporting: specific proposals for future US use of the pier at Elefseis and other residual homeporting facilities are being developed by DOD. These will be ready for presentation to the Greeks in further technical level discussions in Athens by early June.

C. Hellenikon Air Base: a comprehensive package of proposals to substantially reduce US personnel and visibility at Hellenikon is being developed by DOD. After this work is completed, a small team will be prepared to return to Athens to present this package in subgroup discussions with the Greeks. If an agreement can be reached in the subgroup it could then be confirmed at the Calogeras–Stearns level. Thereafter, the US team would return to Washington and initiate action to draft an implementing technical agreement. We do not desire to implement visible changes at the airbase until after subgroup agreement is confirmed by Calogeras–Stearns. Changes, however, could be initiated before the formal technical agreement has been completed and signed if the Greeks feel the domestic political situation requires such action. We appreciate that pressures may be heavy to move ahead quickly on Hellenikon, but we would prefer to have the Greeks approach us to resume subgroup meetings rather than initiate action ourselves to fix the date. We hope to complete preparations for further subgroup discussions by late June. However, a delay until early or mid-July would facilitate extensive staffing on this complex issue.

D. Telecommunications: we are breaking down this issue into the same three categories discussed in round two—[less than 1 line not declassified] defense communications system at other sites. After staffing

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3 Dated May 12. (Ibid., RG 59, Central Foreign Policy Files, 1975)
4 Dated May 10. (Ibid.)
is completed in Washington, we would be prepared to discuss these topics one by one in Athens, preferably after work on the Hellenikon subgroup is finished. This would suggest that telecommunications issues should be addressed some time in late July or August. We would prefer to leave to Greek initiative the calling of future subgroup meetings on this subject.

E. SOFA: a draft revision of existing Greek-US SOFA agreements is now under preparation in DOD, a process which will not be completed until mid-summer. It will embody specific alternatives discussed in Athens at the subgroup level. It would be helpful to check with Economides and others in the Foreign Ministry to determine when they would prefer to resume bilateral SOFA discussions with us.

F. Umbrella Agreement: we are putting off until further progress has been made bilaterally and in NATO the decision whether we will accommodate the Greek proposal for an umbrella agreement. For internal purposes only, we are putting together a counterdraft to the Greek text received in round two. We would plan to seek comments from addressees and DOD on the merit of this redraft. We wish to avoid discussion of this matter with the Greeks at the moment; and to look at this question once more when the Greek-NATO relationship is fully clarified.

4. Other Subjects: we will continue over the summer to examine those facilities in Greece deemed “least essential to maintain” in NSSM 215. Although some of these facilities were mentioned to the Greek side in round two, we should avoid referring to these discussions even in the context of a trade-off—for example, for Tatoi. Least essential should not be read as not essential and it appears that interested US agencies who fund and manage these facilities do not agree that they are available as trade-offs without a detailed evaluation of what we would obtain in return.

5. Comments by Embassy Athens and USNATO on the above time schedule would be welcome.

Ingersoll
GREECE AND TURKEY: MORE ARMS FROM WESTERN EUROPE

The unresolved Cyprus and Aegean islands disputes have motivated both Greece and Turkey to look increasingly to Western Europe for military equipment. Although the US has been their major supplier, Ankara and Athens alike must have serious doubts as to how long this situation will last—the former because of the Congressional embargo on US arms to Turkey; the latter, though able to buy US military supplies, because it feels the need to diversify its sources.

Even if Greece and Turkey are successful in their accelerated efforts to acquire arms from non-US sources, they are not likely to fulfill their long-term requirements. Their arms purchasing efforts in Western Europe are essentially emergency stopgap measures at a time when, in their perception, there is the possibility of armed conflict between them. To some extent, of course, Athens and Ankara may see their arms moves as demonstrating to Washington a certain ability to do with something less than complete reliance on the US.

But neither the Greeks nor the Turks probably want to go so far as to establish what in effect would constitute multiple supply systems for their armed forces. Such major diversification would

—substantially add to existing maintenance and logistics problems;
—require new training programs;
—involve some restructuring of their armed forces;
—create undue delays in deliveries since the production systems of few if any countries other than the US and the USSR are geared to provide arms in a timely fashion and in the amounts and type required.

Under these circumstances, there would be a net reduction in the operational capabilities of their armed forces and a net increase in the cost effectiveness of their supply and backup systems.

West German Arms Transfers Resumed. Bonn recently has resumed arms shipments to both Greece and Turkey that had been suspended in August 1974 shortly after Turkish military operations were launched in Cyprus. The German action, under consideration for some months,
followed the Bundestag’s approval in mid-April of $25.9 million each for Greece and Turkey for surplus military equipment in the form of grant aid. The materiel list for each country includes small patrol boats, Cobra SS–11 anti-tank rockets, jet aircraft, ammunition, spare parts, uniforms, engineering equipment, trucks, and medical supplies.

Embassy Bonn has been informed that some of the German equipment has already reached Turkey and that deliveries to Greece should arrive during the month. While the Greeks have not yet formally accepted all items on the German list, it is expected that they will do so very soon. German officials have also suggested that both Athens and Ankara may in time receive the M–48 tank when it is replaced by the Leopard, both German-produced items.

Ankara: More German and Italian Arms. Next to the United States, West Germany is Turkey’s major arms supplier. Total military deliveries to Ankara since 1964, when Bonn first began providing arms, amounted by 1974 to almost $245 million, with another $175 million in commitments still unfulfilled; about 80 percent of the total value of the military agreements with Ankara have been grant aid. Deliveries during 1973 and 1974 amounted to about $25 million each year, the lowest for any period since 1970. The bulk of the German arms to Turkey has been ground forces equipment, largely small arms, artillery, mortars, trucks, and radios. However, Ankara has also received a number of aircraft, mainly 158 F–84 jet fighters, and several coastal patrol boats (including nine Jaguar Class) and two 1,000-ton (Type 209) submarines.

The Cyprus and Aegean islands disputes with Greece since mid-1974 have accelerated Ankara’s efforts to procure additional military equipment from Germany, primarily to strengthen Turkish naval capabilities. During October 1974, Turkey signed three agreements with Germany, valued at $105 million and covering the purchase of 21 Jaguar patrol craft and two additional 1,000-ton submarines. None of these items has been delivered thus far during 1975.

For its air force requirements, Turkey turned to Italy, Ankara’s third largest arms supplier; since the mid-1960s, there have been some $139 million in agreements and $52 million in deliveries. During the latter part of 1974, Turkey signed two agreements with Italy, valued at approximately $86 million, for the purchase of 18 F–104 fighters (including

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2 Converted from 60 million marks at the average March 1975 exchange rate of 2.319 marks to the dollar. [Footnote is in the original.]

3 Two TF–104 trainers for Turkey and 33 T–33 trainers for Greece; only 22 of the latter are flyable. Since both types of aircraft are of U.S. origin, Bonn cannot legally turn the TF–104s over to Turkey until US restrictions have been lifted. [Footnote is in the original.]
spare parts and training) and 20 AB–204B helicopters. The sale of the fighters, around $75 million, reportedly is being financed by Libya; nine were delivered during 1974 and seven during 1975 before the US arms cutoff last February. 4 Ankara apparently is continuing to negotiate for additional Italian arms and as recently as last April had submitted a shopping list for a wide array of equipment, most of which, if not all, reportedly would be purchased for cash. This tends to suggest financing by third parties, presumably Arab countries.

**Athens: More French and German Arms.** Until last year, Germany had been Greece’s principal secondary source for military equipment—approximately $111 million in agreements since 1963, virtually all of which was delivered by 1972. In contrast to Turkey, less than 10 percent of the arms agreements has been grant aid. The major German deliveries included 69 F–84F fighters, 60 M–47 tanks and tank recovery vehicles, 40 Noratlas aircraft transports, four 1,000-ton (Type 209) submarines, and Cobra and Milan anti-tank missiles.

During the first quarter of 1975, Greece signed a $43 million agreement with Bonn for the purchase of at least 40 20 mm. AAA guns. There are no additional details on this accord. Athens reportedly is also interested in procuring additional submarines from Bonn.

Greece appears to be turning increasingly to France, heretofore Athens’ third largest arms supplier. From 1965 through 1972, France had provided Greece with some $56 million in military equipment—mainly 60 AMX–30 tanks, 50 Exocet guided-missile naval craft, and 4 Combattante II guided-missile control boats. There were no French arms deliveries to Greece in 1973 and virtually none in 1974. However, during the first half of last year, even before the Cyprus crisis erupted, Athens signed at least four arms agreements with Paris, valued at more than $350 million, to cover the purchase of 40 Mirage F–1 fighters, 250 AMX–10 and AMX–30 tanks, and 4 Combattante III guided-missile boats. These agreements raise total French arms commitments to Greece to more than $400 million, all in the form of cash or credit sales.

Despite increased Greek interest in French arms, none of the 1974 agreements has yet resulted in new deliveries from France. While there are conflicting reports as to the reasons for the delays, the 1974 contracts are cash sales, even though payments with interest are extended over several years, and the Karamanlis government almost certainly would feel strained to meet financial obligations of this size from its

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4 Although both the F–104 and the AB–204B are of U.S. origin, special licensing arrangements for the latter permit its third-country export to Turkey without US approval. [Footnote is in the original.]
own resources. Easing of the 7.5 percent interest rate on the accords, extensions of longer term credit, or even a foreign loan would help activate deliveries, but there is no evidence that any of these is about to occur. In short, Greece’s efforts to increase its inventory of French military hardware has proceeded little beyond the contractual stage.

50. Memorandum of Conversation

Brussels, May 29, 1975, 9:30–10:45 a.m.

PARTICIPANTS

Greek:
Prime Minister Caramanlis
Foreign Minister Bitsios
Ambassador John Tzounis
Ambassador Molyviatis, Office of the Presidency

U.S.:
The President
Secretary of State Kissinger
Lieutenant General Scowcroft
Assistant Secretary for European Affairs Hartman

President: (The first few remarks were made during the picture taking and I did not hear them all.) We want very much to be helpful on the Middle East. I am looking forward to my meeting with Sadat.

Caramanlis: That is very important.

President: There is a great interest in Greek affairs in the United States and I am very pleased to have this meeting. We have many good citizens who came from Greece. You know they have a large organization called AHEPA.

Secretary: Yes and they are very passionate too.

President: They are all good American citizens and traditionally they have been leaders in their community.²

Caramanlis: Yes, there is a new generation now and I understand you have as many as two million.

President: No, I think there are three million. One of them had a great influence on my life when I worked in a restaurant in my hometown.

Secretary: I was saying to your Foreign Minister that he is the toughest negotiator.

President: Mr. Prime Minister, we have been greatly impressed and we are favorably inclined toward you and what you are trying to do in Greece. We think that you have had a major success in your elections and, indeed, I am envious of your majority. It is our strongly held belief and feeling that there should be a democratic development in Greece. This is what Americans wanted and we were very pleased by the return of democracy to Greece. We hope and trust that we will be able to work together both in our bilateral relations and in your region and the world.

Caramanlis: Mr. President, I would like to thank you too for meeting me at this critical time. I would also like to thank you for the trouble and time which you have taken and the offers of help which you have made. In times when we have to face such large problems the help of friends such as the United States is very much valued. We are establishing a democracy but it needs consolidation. To do so we must solve the current problems. The dictatorship left many unpleasant situations but I can assure you that in a year or so Greece will be a healthy democracy. We have solved the problem of the return of parliamentary democracy, we have solved the problem of the Monarchy and this next week we will have a constitution. There will be no abnormality remaining. I must tell you in all frankness that I have been able to do much of this because the people have put their trust in me. Beyond these successes we have also been able to re-establish discipline in the Army but for all of this trust to be justified there must be success in dealing with our many problems. If not, the confidence in me will erode in time. And this is particularly true of the Greek-Turkish problems, the Cyprus situation and the economy. Now, Mr. President, how do you wish to proceed?

President: We greatly admire all that you have accomplished in restoring democracy to Greece and in restoring order and authority. It

² Ford, Kissinger, and Scowcroft met with AHEPA leaders on April 25, 12:45–1:25 p.m. (Memorandum of conversation; Ford Library, National Security Adviser, Memoranda of Conversations, Box 11, 4/25/75)
is a tribute to your great leadership. We too recognize that if the moment is not seized when problems can be solved then the solution is impossible. I would like to discuss Cyprus and Greek-Turkish relations and how we can be helpful to you.

Caramanlis: Let me begin by discussing recent history. Before my return to power there was a coup in Cyprus caused by the Greek Junta and they got rid of Makarios. The Turks claimed to act as a guarantor power which they said gave them the right to restore the legitimate regime and protect the Turkish population. The guarantee as written into the London and Zurich Agreements provides that it is for the restoration of legitimacy and the protection of territorial integrity. Legitimacy was restored in three days after the invasion. I came back and took over the government of Greece and Clerides took over in Nicosia. After that there was no reason to remain on Cyprus. The purpose of the guarantee was achieved. But they are still there. Several weeks later they occupied 40 percent of the island. I remember those days very well because your Foreign Minister woke me up at four o’clock in the morning. There was no shred of excuse for the second Turkish move. You don’t just create strategic plans overnight. The military operation must have been planned for some time. The occupation of 40 percent of the island follows very closely a military plan known as Attila. This proves premeditation. Two hundred thousand refugees were created by this move. You can say it is not huge but the total population of the island is only half a million. They also took in the 40 percent the largest area in resources. On August 14 I faced an explosion in my Army and among the population. I went to the General Staff Headquarters and they demanded that I act. There was pressure for a declaration of war. Naturally everyone felt humiliated but I took the unpopular decision to tell the people to be quiet and trust me. I said that we would get help from our friends to find the solution. In that dramatic moment I had three choices: first, go to war; second, withdraw from politics once again or, third, withdraw from the military side of NATO. I chose the third alternative as the least painful. That is the story of Cyprus. It is very difficult to prove something that is self-evident but the Turks are in the wrong. The Greeks have shown moderation in spite of everything that has happened. We still show moderation. For a long time the Turks have asked for a geographic federal solution. In our view there should have been a return to the London and Zurich Agreements but we have accepted a geographic federation on two conditions: first, that the territory controlled by the Turks be in relation to the percent of their population and, second, that the solution allow for a return of refugees. This would be an honorable and reasonable solution but the Turks continually want to present us with fait accompli. What should we do?

President: We think we should proceed from the assumption of the facts as they are.
Caramanlis: Before you comment, let me finish my explanation. Beyond Cyprus we have the problems in the Aegean. We are in favor of the status quo which has existed since 1913. But the Turks are continually creating problems about the continental shelf, about air corridors and, in fact, they want to split the Aegean Sea which would mean that many of our islands would be in a Turkish sea. We have proposed taking the matter to the ICJ but the Turks, while accepting this in principle, refused in Rome to draw up the documents which would refer the case to the ICJ. I must tell you that if all of these matters are not solved and they are prolonged they could lead to war and that should not be excluded. In both countries tempers are running very high and it would be a shame if war were to break out under the noses of our Allies. I have done and will do all that I can to avoid war but we need to return to a comprehensive approach which will contribute to averting this danger. Again I cannot and will not indicate how you can help. That is something you must decide for yourselves.

President: The two most important questions are Cyprus and the Aegean. We would like to contribute to a solution of these problems. We feel certain developments in that area are unfortunate for NATO and they have created tremendous problems in the United States. Something must be done. We have a reflection of this in our Congress where aid to Turkey has been cut off. We feel that that action has been harmful to our influence with the Turks and our ability to get concessions from the Turks. We were able to reverse the action in the Senate and it is possible we will be able to change views in the House. It is my feeling that if Congress retains the limitation our influence will be lessened. Therefore, we have held many consultations with Congressmen. We have told them that we need additional time to clear up this festering unhealthy situation in NATO. We have told them how harmful it is if something is not done and that we are approaching the time when the Turkish authorities may close U.S. military bases which will be harmful in terms of our overall defense. We have said that it is time for Congress to act and the sooner the better. We are encouraged by the talks going on in Vienna between the two communities and we hope that progress will be achieved. But I must say that our leverage is lessened as long as the embargo on Turkish aid remains.

Secretary: May I add a word, Mr. President, on the Turkish political situation. This is my assessment of the domestic problem. Caglayangil wants a settlement. Demirel basically wants a settlement but he is very fearful that Erbakan will break up his coalition if he moves toward a settlement. I have told the President, Mr. Prime Minister, that I am ready to form a government in Turkey because I have talked to all the politicians. I have seen the heads of all the parties and I have told them all that now is the time to settle this matter. The key is Ecevit. If you and he were the Prime Ministers dealing with this prob-
lem I am convinced it will be settled. In opposition, however, Ecevit will use this issue to try and break up the coalition. I had a long talk with him in Ankara.\(^3\) I know him well. He used to be a student of mine.

Caramanlis: That’s why we Greeks suspected you were pro Turk.

Secretary: Demirel is afraid to lose his majority. If he had your majority he would probably favor a quick settlement but Demirel needs the restoration of American aid so that he can show that he has achieved something. To help him we are prepared to take a public position against what Ecevit is saying in the right circumstances. I have told Ecevit directly that he should not wish to take responsibility for leaving this problem unsolved and causing a dangerous situation to develop. There are two issues: There is a growing nationalism against the United States and there is an historical antipathy against the Greeks. But let me give you my assessment. Now is the time for a rapid move toward a settlement. We have already convinced the Turks first that they are going to have to give up some territory and, second, that the central government has to have some power. We do not believe that you can get the territory back down to 18 percent even though what you say is just. But there has to be a contraction of what the Turks now hold. We have never explored the question of percentages but it must be considerably less than 40 percent. The trouble is that the Turks now have an alibi to do nothing because of the aid embargo. Demirel is scared of Ecevit.

Caramanlis: I understand all this but what you seem to be saying is that because of these ridiculous internal problems we, the Greeks, must pay. This is crazy and unreasonable that we should have to pay blackmail. Now let me talk about aid. I know that you have discussed this with the Foreign Minister indirectly.\(^4\) Aid can be used in two ways in this situation: first, as a threat...
I would have to disapprove restoring aid to fit public opinion in my country. We cannot shout from the housetops that we want aid restored to Turkey. Despite these pressures I have made no public statement.

President: I understand your position completely but we must have a change in this action. There is little or no chance to make progress in the negotiations while the embargo lasts. Historically, as you know, I have always given full support to close U.S.-Greek ties. I have a personal feeling about the history and future of Greece and I support you. But if we don’t get a solution to this problem it will make all of our tasks more difficult. I have done my utmost to get American Greeks to change their minds. Once the cut-off is lifted then I can judiciously handle the timing and the amount of aid given to Turkey. But the Turks will not move until we have removed the embargo. It will complicate our bases and Western security. I hope negotiations can be seen to be making progress in order to get the Congress to move but I appreciate your public position.

Caramanlis: I understand. I do not wish to become involved in U.S. internal politics. Even if the aid ban is lifted, I do not believe the Turks will be more reasonable. Their internal difficulties will continue. Therefore, the problem will not be any different.

Secretary: I agree with you that if aid is resumed it will still be difficult to get a settlement but if it is not, it will be impossible. Also let me emphasize what the President just said to you that if aid is restored the Administration can restrict its flow (Bitsios explains in Greek). Even with aid restored it is going to be very very difficult to get a solution but now the Turks have the alibi and they do not fear pressure. We wish to assure you of our desire to be helpful and we recognize that the only solution is to get the Turks to make solutions.

President: If the Congressional aid ban is removed, then it will be up to me. I have the flexibility. It will be up to the Executive Branch to decide.

Secretary: This fellow Erbakan [less than 1 line not declassified]. He will do something to try and prevent a negotiation. That is why it is very important to neutralize Ecevit. Without Ecevit no settlement is possible.

Caramanlis: Your conclusion is disappointing. Instead of asking concessions from the Turks you seem to be asking why the Greeks won’t pay.

Secretary: The Turks must give up three things: first, territory; second, a federal government with real powers; and, third, some refugee return. There are no concessions from the Greeks on those items.

Caramanlis: I don’t see much light here. In any case, I will see Demirel myself on Saturday. I have a solution soon on the way and if it is not an honorable and just solution, there can be no viable peace on Cyprus. We are just buying future trouble.
Secretary: It is not in our interest to do anything to weaken the Prime Minister.

Caramanlis: Nor do I wish to weaken myself. If the solution is unjust, it is not viable. You should know that from history.

Secretary: What should we say to the Turks?

Caramanlis: It is difficult to say. I told you how I see the situation and perhaps you and the Foreign Minister can discuss this further tomorrow.5

President: We would certainly not advocate an unjust solution but a continuation of this problem is worse. We are in favor of an honorable solution but we would very much appreciate it if you could indicate to us how we can be helpful. A suggestion of what we might say and we would be happy to do it. This is in our mutual Western interest.

Caramanlis: This is a case of the two sides having difficulty and the third party giving a suggestion to the wrong one. The Turks are at fault. Therefore, it is up to the Turks for moral and political reasons to come forward with a proposal. They are the ones that should be pressured. We are ready to defend our interests and we will fight if we have to. This is a question of national pride but I am trying to block it. How long can we go on feeling humiliated? There is great pressure to react. I have tried to be moderate in order to facilitate a solution. Ask the Turks what their intentions are. If there is a war Turkey will be the first victim because they will open the way to the Soviets. We will not fall to the blackmail of Turkey. When people feel humiliated the Army is very pro-Caramanlis although there is beginning to be some criticism. I may be forced to reconsider the policies of my country. The most helpful thing you can do is to say to the Turks what you have already said to us but say it publicly that the United States will not tolerate military action.

Secretary: We have already said this privately. If there is any move in the Aegean, there will be total American opposition.

Caramanlis: The Turks moved on to Cyprus as a guarantor. We too are guarantors and I have the right to send troops there. You should say publicly that you will not allow any action that could lead to war. You should say publicly that you will help avoid war. This will make the Turks more reasonable.

President: We oppose any military operation and we will make a maximum effort to avert a war. We will work to avoid such a situation from arising, but if I’m to be able to put pressure on Turkey then I must get the aid restored. I am confident that if the limitation is removed it will help in the negotiations. We oppose military action in the Aegean.

5 Ford and Kissinger met with Demirel and Caglayan on later the same morning; see Document 227.
That is our position. There is some question as to whether we should say that publicly but the policy is clear and we would oppose military action whether by Turkey or any other party. This is the same position we have taken in the Middle East where we have opposed military action. We believe that a stalemate leads to the temptation to use force.

Caramanlis: What should we do. My experience I have used to give you my advice on what you could do to create hope but you must make the final judgment. If you say something in public it will not provoke a reaction but instead create a better climate. It will urge moderation and it will also state that the United States will not allow any side to take military action.

Secretary: I am going to be briefing the press, perhaps we can plant a question and I can respond along the lines the Prime Minister has suggested.

Caramanlis: In order to avoid any misunderstanding let me speak in total and sincere frankness. I do not believe in hiding my thoughts and avoiding substance. What I am recommending is not to protect Greece when I ask you to make this statement. If it comes to a question of protecting Greece I will protect Greece through our own actions. But I am asking for a statement like this only to make the Turks more reasonable.

Secretary: If there is a danger of war, we would totally oppose military action.

Caramanlis: This will relieve the Turks of their threats. If the Turks act in any way that is provocative this will help.

President: I think we can handle this in answering a press question and the Secretary will do this. 6

Secretary: What I would say is that we would strongly oppose military action by either side in this conflict.

Caramanlis: Or any action that could lead to a deterioration.

President: We can respond in this way. This hopefully will be helpful. We can make this clear just as we did in the Middle East.

Caramanlis: Let me explain our attitude toward NATO. We were forced to withdraw from the military part of the Alliance. It gave us no pleasure to do so. There was no other way. We can only change this when the reasons for this action have been removed. The causes must

6 In telegram Secto 02047 from Brussels, May 30, Kissinger relayed the text of his press conference of May 29. In his prepared statement, he said about Greek-Turkish tensions: “We believe that while these negotiations are going on, neither side should take any military actions or make any military threat or take any steps that could lead to military action, and we have expressed that conviction to the parties concerned.” (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy Files, 1975)
be lifted. If I return to the military part of the Alliance before the problem is solved and we later get into a conflict what will happen to the Alliance then. First we must restore normality. I have explained the problems. I have not told you how they can be settled but we hope that you will do your best to help.

President: We want Greece back in the Alliance.

Caramanlis: I am for the Alliance. I am the most pro-Western politician in my country.

Secretary: We’ve always admired your great statesmanship.

Caramanlis: This has even been detrimental to my political fortunes.

President: If we can help we will do what we can. We will do all that we can. We want the Cyprus problem solved and we want the Greeks back in NATO.

51. Memorandum of Conversation

Helsinki, July 30, 1975, 1 p.m.

PARTICIPANTS

Greece:
Prime Minister Caramanlis
Foreign Minister Bitsios
Chef de Cabinet Molyviatos

U.S.:
The President
The Secretary of State
Mr. Arthur A. Hartman, Assistant Secretary for European Affairs

There was a brief discussion in the garden of the President’s previous stops and then of his future travel plans including his plans to meet with the Japanese Prime Minister.

Caramanlis: I was in Romania a short time ago and I thought of inviting the Romanians to join us at the NATO Summit.

The Secretary: Yes, they and the Chinese are the best allies of NATO and the Common Market.

1 Source: Ford Library, National Security Adviser, Memoranda of Conversations, Box 14, CSCE, 7/26–8/4/75. Secret; Nodis. Drafted by Hartman. The meeting was held at the Ambassador’s residence. Ford and Kissinger were in Helsinki for CSCE talks.
The President: Aren’t the Albanians here?
The Secretary: No and that’s because they follow the Chinese line.
Bitsios: Yes, they think all of this is a conspiracy.
Caramanlis: I am going to be making separate visits to Bulgaria and Yugoslavia as well as Romania.
The President: I understand that Romania and particularly Bucharest was very lively in the pre-war period.
Bitsios: Yes, they called it the Paris of the East.
The Secretary: That’s because it was decadent.
The President: Do they still have very much oil?
Caramanlis: I think about half of it is gone.
Molyviatos: We have very warm relations with Bulgaria now.
The Secretary: That was not true historically.
Caramanlis: Yes, this is the first time.
The Secretary: In times past the Bulgarians wanted an outlet to the Aegean and thought they should have a piece of Greece.
Bitsios: The Bulgarians are annoyed with the Yugoslavs because of the Macedonian minority question.
Caramanlis: We could have better relations with Bulgaria than Turkey. What we need is a new equilibrium.
The President: What do you think is going to happen in Yugoslavia after Tito?
Caramanlis: I think it is going to be very difficult. There are three possibilities. The Russians may take control. It may split up. Or, because of the strength of the Army, it may remain unified and have the same independence. It is a big preoccupation for us. One of the reasons we want to restore good relations with Turkey is so that we will not have that problem when the transition occurs in Yugoslavia.
The Secretary: If the Turkish situation is improved then you feel you can play a helpful role in the Balkans.
The President: Who is the emerging leader in Yugoslavia?
Caramanlis: It is difficult to say but I think they have a 50–50 chance of maintaining their unity and independence.
The President: It would not be healthy if the Soviets move in.
Caramanlis: If the Russians move in, then Yugoslavia would cooperate with Bulgaria. That is why our relations with Turkey are important.
The Secretary: Yes.
Caramanlis: Our relations with Yugoslavia are good.
The Secretary: The reason that the civil war in Greece ended was because Yugoslavia closed the borders.
Bitsios: Yes, that is true.
Caramanlis: There were two reasons—the Truman Doctrine and Tito closed the borders.

The President: We all owe Tito a lot. I can remember when I was in Congress some of my colleagues questioned giving military aid to Tito but it was the right thing to do because it helped in Greece and in the Mediterranean generally.

Bitsios: Are your relations with Yugoslavia good?
The President: Yes.
The Secretary: There are only occasional press attacks due to their non-aligned position.

The President: Who is the Foreign Minister?
The Secretary: Minic.

Bitsios: There are rumours that he may head the collective leadership after Tito.

The President: What do you think of Portugal today?
Caramanlis: I think it is hopeless.
The Secretary: That is my view.

The President: Do you think that they should stay in NATO if they are Communists?
Caramanlis: There may be a civil war there. It depends on the conservatives.

Bitsios: It is also bad for Spain.

The President: I noted that the Workers’ Associations in Spain have voted and they have chosen either liberal or Communist leadership.
The Secretary: Yes.

Caramanlis: The Portuguese situation has a dangerous effect in Spain and Italy. In my view when situations develop that are bad they need immediate measures to correct them.

The Secretary: You’re right. We have wasted a year on Portugal mainly because the West Europeans said there was no problem.

Caramanlis: In the case of Portugal, Cyprus and Arab oil, we now have a big problem which creates hostility but if these crises are dealt with quickly they usually can be solved and we can avoid confrontation.

The Secretary: It is a pity that we were not able to make progress on Cyprus in December. You were ready but then Ecevit’s resignation and our own domestic problem delayed a solution plus the vested interests in Turkey.

Caramanlis: The situation is now worse than Brussels. You will recall that I expressed our position on Cyprus. The responsibility for lack of progress rests with Turkey. This is dangerous. We are realistic. If
there is no progress there will be even greater danger and even outside the area of Cyprus.

The Secretary: Have you seen that Demirel will see Brezhnev?
Caramanlis: Yes, they have given credits to Turkey.

The President: I think about $500 million.

The Secretary: Our tragedy is that our influence has been reduced and we never had a chance to use it.

The President: I am sure you know, Mr. Prime Minister, that I am extremely disappointed by the vote in the Congress last week. I had personally put my prestige on the line. I saw 325 Members of the House. I was convinced and I am convinced that a continuation of the embargo is a handicap to a Cyprus solution, undermines NATO, is no help to Greece, and involves the closing of U.S. bases which are deeply connected with U.S. national security. We made a fair and proper presentation. But we lost. And I am afraid that all the circumstances I foresaw will take place. Our leverage is not zero; it is negative. The closing of the bases is extremely serious. If the Turks maintain their adamant attitude on Cyprus it will certainly delay a solution and also lead to problems in the Aegean. Frankly I must tell you, Mr. Prime Minister, there were people in your Embassy who were actively opposing my efforts to obtain House action. A letter was sent by your Embassy (the President shows the letter) saying that Administration statements were in error.

The Secretary: Statements which I had not made.

The President: That letter was publicly distributed on the floor of the House and it was very damaging. Your Embassy bypassed established channels. If they thought that a statement of that kind had been made they should have asked the Secretary whether or not it was true before making any public comment. There were large numbers of people from your Embassy in the galleries who by their presence gave an unfavorable atmosphere. I can tell you what we have been trying to do—we want to help solve the problem but I must tell you in a friendly and firm way that I do not believe the activities of your Embassy were the proper way for your Government to act.

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2 On May 19 the Senate passed S.846, 41–40, which permitted resumption of most military aid to Turkey. On July 16 the House Foreign Affairs Committee reported a substantially revised S.846 to the House. The amended version sought to answer the concerns of Turkish aid opponents. It still prohibited direct military aid grants but allowed for “1) the shipment of arms contracted for with the United States before the embargo went into effect, 2) cash sales of arms on the commercial market, and 3) future U.S. government sales and credits for NATO-related items.” On July 24 the House voted 206–223 to reject the amended version of S.846, despite intensive lobbying by the White House. The following day Turkey ordered the cessation of operations at the 27 U.S. bases on its territory. (Congress and the Nation, 1973–1976, Vol. IV, pp. 866–867)
Caramanlis: As Prime Minister of the Greek Government I had knowledge of the statement. All during this time I have tried not to take a position although I have been under extreme pressure from the press in Athens to state publicly that the Greek Government is against lifting the embargo. In spite of this pressure I resisted but when I was informed by Members of your Congress that the impression was being given that the Greek Government favored lifting the embargo, I was obliged to issue a denial because if it was believed in Greece that I favored the lifting of the embargo there would be strong public opposition to me in Greece.

The Secretary: If you had come to us, we would have issued a public denial. Our case did not rest on Greek support and we never said that that was the position of your Government.

Caramanlis: A man by the name of George Christopher who was the Mayor of San Francisco mailed a letter in which he purported to quote me and I denied that this was a quotation from me.

Hartman: Your Embassy said that no one had the right to speak for you but they did not really deny the quotation.

The Secretary: It is clear but we never said that you favored the lifting of the embargo.

The President: I have understood that the Greek Government was not going to take a stand. We have always said that we could be more effective in helping Greece and moving toward a peaceful settlement on Cyprus if the embargo were lifted.

Caramanlis: You should not think that you will have more influence. But I don’t want to connect these issues. It is up to you to decide on arms but in my view your leverage will not be increased by a lifting of the embargo because, after all, you have tried both—lifting the embargo and continuing arms shipments and both have failed. In my view the way to achieve progress is to discreetly get commitments from the Turks so that their pride is not involved and then lift the embargo contingent on their taking action later. I understand that they do not wish to make concessions under pressure and that is why you would have to get their discreet agreement.

The Secretary: That is a reasonable solution but the trouble is it could not be kept secret because we would have to tell the Congress and they would make it public. This was the President’s own personal position and he felt that there would be a moral obligation for the Turks to make progress and he told them in Brussels that if progress was not made it would lead to an enormous effect on Turkish-U.S. relations which we would initiate. In fact, I cautioned the President that he might be promising more than he could deliver.

3 See Document 227.
Caramanlis: It was not for me to say how you handled your Turkish relations. But whether we wish it or not those relations are linked with Cyprus. All the issues involved are linked and if a solution is not found, we will continue to have problems.

The President: There is no question about that.

Caramanlis: I have the impression that this situation has not been handled right. We all know how to arrive at a solution to this small problem and a solution exists—it is not like the Middle East—but all the same if a solution is found all the dangers will automatically disappear. After all it is a rather small question. I have adopted a position. I am willing to satisfy Turkish demands. I have accepted a geographic federation. I am prepared to accept two zones but on condition that enough territory is returned so that their percentage is roughly equivalent or in some relation to their population. It can be 1 or 2 or 3 percent more than the 18 percent of their position. This would facilitate the return of refugees. I am willing to give the Turks whatever federal powers they want. I can impose such a solution now. I am strong enough in Athens and I can control Makarios.

The Secretary: If you can, you are the only one.

Caramanlis: If the Turks do not move now in a few months it may not be possible. You must convince the Turks.

The President: We want your good Government to continue and to prosper. We favor very strongly the Caramanlis government in Greece and we are very apprehensive of the festering of this Cyprus problem and its potential effect on you. We want to help. Just this morning I received a message that the Congress is going to try for another bipartisan compromise and this has my full support. If it fails and they must act by Friday things will be much worse five weeks from now when Congress returns. We are going to try and outside parties could help to reverse the narrow defeat. After all, we only lost by a vote of 206 to 223. Until the last few seconds of the vote I thought we had won. But I must tell you that my dear friends in AHEPA have been very difficult. They have been misinformed. They are a fine people but they have to be told of the dire circumstances that will follow if this next effort fails. If we go through five weeks with nothing happening the situation will be worse. This is not a partisan effort. After the vote both

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4 Turkey’s response to the defeat of S.846 prompted the White House to revive the bill. On July 31 the Senate voted 47–46 to pass a new bill, S.2230, which contained language that partially lifted the embargo that the House had rejected. Though due to adjourn for summer recess, the House awaited the Senate action on the new bill, but proved unable to act on it prior to the recess because of parliamentary delays by opponents of the bill. Further action had to wait until September and October. (Congress and the Nation, 1973–1976, Vol. IV, pp. 866–867)
Senators Scott and Mansfield condemned the House action. But we have a chance to rescue that situation and this is a last effort. You are a judge of what you can do but you must also know that you can never tell what kind of backlash there could be. If this situation deteriorates further, the American people will want to blame someone for the effects on our national security. You will have to decide what role you can play. Maybe none.

Caramanlis: My Government cannot help the American Government, and speak in favor of supporting the enemy. That would be political suicide.

The Secretary: Brademas and Sarbanes say that they have a way of clearing their statements with Bitsios but you know, Mr. Foreign Minister, that every proposal we have made we have cleared with you and that we have tried to use our pressure to obtain Turkish concessions. We think, Mr. Prime Minister, that you have exercised great statesmanship. But then the Greeks come to us and say that they hear that the State Department is anti-Greek. They say that we are not doing enough.

Bitsios: I will see to it that the word is spread that you are helping.

The Secretary: I am afraid that this has become a personal issue for some people. The Congressmen say that they have a source in the Prime Minister’s office who says that we are not doing anything to help with the Turks and that in fact we might be colluding with the Turks in order to produce a stalemate.

Caramanlis: That is gossip and it is just not true. If I have to say something to the American Government I will do so directly. I don’t wish to say anything about large States but it is absolutely essential for a small State that it speak sincerely and honestly.

The President: Mr. Prime Minister, you told me in Brussels\(^5\) that you were concerned about the Aegean and that you wanted to keep that situation quiet. I spoke very firmly to Demirel about this as you asked me to. If we are able to get the embargo lifted I asked him do I have your assurance that you will negotiate on Cyprus in a meaningful way. He gave me that assurance and we were firm with him. That is why I am personally disappointed. John Brademas is a friend of mine but he keeps saying that we are not pressuring Turkey and he is doing things which, in my view, are totally undermining my ability to influence Turkey.

Bitsios: I have always praised the efforts of your Secretary of State. I have mentioned his trip to Ankara but it is the Turks who have been negative. I can deny categorically stories that you are not doing anything.

\(^5\) See Document 50.
Caramanlis: I certainly do not agree with such statements.

The Secretary: We think that the Turks are shortsighted. We know that it is essential for the Turks to make significant concessions. The only thing which I see as a major obstacle is the percentage of territory required to negotiate a solution. And if I may say so—and I have tremendous admiration for the Prime Minister personally—all of your terms seem to be reasonable. Turkey had an opportunity to achieve a settlement and with the exception of some tactical errors we may have made last August each new negative factor was used by the Turks as another excuse to delay.

Caramanlis: As you know, we have taken the initiative to try to deal with the Aegean problem. We did not think it was an issue but we agreed to refer the matter to the Court at The Hague. The Ministers agreed to meet in Rome to discuss such a referral but the Turks said that they were not ready. One or two months have passed and they say they may not be ready until September.

The Secretary: They may want to wait until they get through their Senate elections in October.

Caramanlis: Do you think in view of the fact that your Congress has acted the way it has this is the moment when perhaps the Europeans can take an initiative?

The President: We would welcome a fresh approach and if the EC-Nine wish to do something, we would certainly welcome it and the sooner the better. We would have no objection.

The Secretary: As a matter of fact, we told Prime Minister Wilson at breakfast this morning that if the Europeans wish to make an effort we considered it to be in our interests and we would support it.

Caramanlis: The Europeans do not have the same possibilities that you do.

The President: We have no pride of authorship. We want the problem solved.

The Secretary: The difficulty is that you have acted in a statesmanlike way but the Turks have responded to domestic and local considerations. We thought that if we could give Demirel a victory by fall that he got aid restored when Ecevit had lost it that he could then be strong enough to make concessions. The President took a large domestic risk but as you may know the Greek-American community is not known for its dispassionate analysis. We all know that they expect more out of these negotiations than is possible.

Caramanlis: You have the same problem with the Jews.

The President: Yes, that is right. We have two problems.

The Secretary: To have both the Jews and the Greeks against you is really too much. But I can say that the Greeks are more charming.
Caramanlis: All of this springs from a small question. Why can’t we go to the heart of the matter?

The Secretary: Concretely I must say, Mr. President, that our influence has suffered to the detriment of Greece and of us. If the Turks move toward the Soviets it would be a strategic setback but I don’t think that they will go very far in that direction.

Caramanlis: Not even if you push them.

The Secretary: But they can go toward the radical Arabs—Iraq and Libya—where the money is.

Caramanlis: Libya has invited me to come on a visit.

The Secretary: The central question is really up to the Turks. From what you have said it is clear that the refugee question depends on the percentage of area. You say that the percentage of territory should be roughly equivalent to the population.

Caramanlis: Slightly more.

The Secretary: In my view that is not possible and, therefore, let me get at the heart of matter. When we were in Ankara in March the Turks told us privately that they might come down to something like 33 percent from 40. I know that that is too high and what we must now do is to narrow the range. At some point couldn’t we or the Europeans put forward a percentage which neither party could itself suggest but which both would accept. This percentage would be higher than 18 but much lower than 40. Then maybe both of you could accept it.

Caramanlis: A true solution to this problem must be honest and satisfactory. It cannot be imposed for long if it is not viable. Otherwise, you are just buying future troubles. The solution must be permanent and just.

The President: I can say with all honesty that the Secretary and I have spent as much time on this problem as we have on the Middle East and we are glad to make this effort. In fact, my efforts on Cyprus are harmful to me from a domestic political point of view. My AHEPA friends think that I have double-crossed them but I have continued to try to help even though this is a political liability. If the Europeans want to take an initiative I would welcome it.

Caramanlis: But they can’t replace you Americans.

The President: We would welcome their leadership and we will continue to try to be helpful if the parties want us to be helpful.

The Secretary: Both sides have to want us to be helpful.

Caramanlis: The position I have adopted could greatly facilitate finding a solution to this problem. I adopted it in the full knowledge that I have a responsibility for peace, toward the West and toward the Alliance. The moment I adopted this position, others opposed it and it is indeed against my own popularity. You must understand that Greece
feels humiliated and that many demand war. I have not responded to Turkish provocations. I have not spoken from a balcony saying that Americans should stop aid to Turkey but I have done all of this in the full knowledge that I wished to avoid dire consequences. If I were to try to do more I would have a problem in Greece itself. The position I have adopted could solve this problem for the future.

The President: We recognize that you represent the best Greek Government possible and we strongly support you. We want to work together constructively. If the parties want us to, we will help but we are stymied at the present time. We would welcome a European initiative and I will say so to my European colleagues. We will stay in the wings but remain willing to help. Maybe we will be fortunate this week in achieving a modified lifting of the embargo. If not, I can assure you that we will try even with our hands tied.

Caramanlis: You must take into consideration that Turkish policy is against their own best interests.

The President: And they seem to be getting help from the wrong people.

52. Telegram From the Embassy in Greece to the Department of State

Athens, August 29, 1975, 1600Z.

6619. Subj: Commutation of Death Sentences: Additional Consideration Underlying Prime Minister’s Decision. Ref: Athens 6618.2

1. During conversation with DCM today, MFA’s DirGen of Political Affairs John Tzounis (PROTECT) suggested a reason for the speed with which Caramanlis commuted sentences of junta leaders which has not been mentioned in polemics between government and opposition (refel). Tzounis said that in his personal opinion Caramanlis was worried lest Greek elements and civilian supporters of junta make pub-

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2 Telegram 6618 from Athens, August 29, reported that the commutation of death sentences of three junta leaders, including Papadopoulos, by the Greek Government remained a “hot issue” in Greek political circles. (Ibid.)
lic appeal to Prime Minister to commute sentences. Had this happened Caramanlis would have been in a difficult position. Any subsequent decision to commute sentences would have been criticized by the opposition as an indication that GOG was bending before military and juntaist pressure. Prime Minister would in fact have been forced to permit executions to take place simply to avoid creating impression that junta leaders were being spared because they enjoyed widespread support in the Greek military and among the public at large. Only by acting with utmost speed could Caramanlis make absolutely clear that he was acting independently on the basis of his and the government’s best judgment and not under pressure.

2. Under the circumstances and despite the obvious risks, Tzouinis believed that Caramanlis had made the right decision and that the political furor touched off by the commutations would die down without inflicting permanent damage on the government.

3. **Comment:** Tzounis is close to the Prime Minister and, while we do not know whether he is privy to Caramanlis’ thinking on this subject, we consider his explanation of the factors underlying the commutation to be extremely persuasive.

Kubisch

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3 The Ambassador initialed above his typed signature.

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53. **Telegram From the Department of State to the Mission to the North Atlantic Treaty Organization and the Embassy in Greece**

Washington, October 4, 1975, 0032Z.

236950. Subject: Greek-NATO Negotiations. Ref: a) USNATO 5148 DTG 201410Z Sep 75, b) USNATO 5077 DTG 181005Z Sep 75, c) USNATO 5330 DTG 301933Z Sep 75, d) USNATO 2286 DTG 241807Z Apr 75 (Notal), e) USNATO 2635 DTG 121835Z May 75 (Notal).2 London pass to Mr. Hartman.

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1 Source: National Archives, RG 84, Athens Embassy Files: Lot 96 F 335, Box 1, DEF 4–6, 1975 Greek Withdrawal. Secret; Priority. Repeated Priority to all NATO capitals, Nicosia, USNMR SHAPE, USCINCEUR, and USDOCOSOUTH.

2 None printed. (All ibid.)
1. We share disappointment expressed by other allies about overly
general nature of Greece’s statement on its defense relations with
NATO (ref b). Looking ahead to the process of continuing Greek-
NATO discussions on this subject (ref c), following are considerations
which are presented as a general frame of reference for addressee posts.

2. We are well aware of the obstacles in the present political en-
vironment to rapid progress on the Greece/NATO relationship. Ac-
cordingly, we are not optimistic that Greece will wish to cooperate in
the rapid resolution of outstanding issues with NATO, and we recog-
nize that there are probably limits on how fast US and others can force
the pace, at least in the near future.

3. At the same time, we want to leave no misunderstanding with
Greece or other allies about our strong view that Greece should resume
its full responsibilities as a NATO member, and that productive dis-
cussions on this important subject should move forward. In the US
view, the quality and integrity of the alliance must be preserved on the
basis of unqualified participation, not on the basis of partial member-
ship or special arrangements. In the specific case of Greece, our bilat-
eral defense arrangements [less than 1 line not declassified] are intimately
linked to the Greek role in NATO.

4. Further, we appreciate Turkey’s concerns with major questions
posed by ambiguous Greek role in NATO, including early warning,
communications, and problems of command and control in southeastern Europe. These problems would be best worked out in cooperation
with Greece, and through Greece’s return to the NATO military struc-
ture. They are, however, questions that cannot be postponed indefi-
nitely, and Greece should be kept aware of this fact. We are encour-
gaged that Greece, in its September 17 statement, said that practical
military arrangements in these areas can and will be found.

5. Against this background, we believe the US suggestion (ref a)
that an open-ended ad hoc group under the DPC address the Greek-
NATO relationship is a positive one, providing a forum which will keep
Greece aware of US and allied views, and permit movement toward
resolution of issues, while at the same time allowing greater flexibility
than the more formal DPC framework. Similarly, we believe the sug-
gestion (ref a) by the chairman of NATO’s Military Committee that, in

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3 As reported in telegram 5148, during the September 17 meeting of the NAC, the
Greek representative described the background of the Greek decision to change its rela-
tionship with NATO and his country’s sense that it had to look out for itself, without
the help of allies, against a menace from within the alliance.

4 As reported in telegram 5330, Luns met with the Greek representative who had
stated that Greece would offer proposals in October for the evolution of its military re-
lationship with NATO as a basis for negotiations.
parallel with the work of this ad hoc group, SACEUR/SHAPE work
privately with Greece on specific military problems, is also positive.
Conceptually, we can divide major problems in the Greece-NATO mil-
tary relationship into two categories. One focuses on the commitment
of Greek forces to NATO. The other relates to NATO’s requirements
for an orderly defense structure in southeastern Europe, including
questions of command and control, early warning, and communications,
as underscored by Turkey. To the extent that NATO, through
SACEUR, can develop with Greece a more satisfactory pattern of pro-
visional arrangements in both categories, while at the same time ex-
ploring avenues for future progress and resolution, we believe these
problems can be eased for a time. The US will of course wish to be kept
well informed of the status of the Greece-SACEUR discussions.

6. Mission may draw on paras. 3–5 as appropriate with Luns,
Greek Delegation, and other allies. Mission may also point out that
Greece some time ago presented a paper on its future NATO relation-
ship which was informally discussed with a small group of allies (refs.
c and d). We are disappointed that results of these discussions were
not reflected in the Greek presentation September 17. Athens should
also find occasion to outline these views to GOG, including especially
that portion of para. 3 on US-Greek bilateral defense relationships.

Kissinger

54. Memorandum of Conversation

Washington, October 17, 1975, 10:25–10:47 a.m.

PARTICIPANTS

President Ford
Amb. Jack B. Kubisch, U.S. Ambassador to Greece
Dr. Henry A. Kissinger, Secretary of State and Assistant to the President for
National Security Affairs
Lt. General Brent Scowcroft, Deputy Assistant to the President for National
Security Affairs

The President: It is good to see you again. How are things in
Greece?

1 Source: Library of Congress, Manuscript Division, Kissinger Papers, Box CI 282,
Memoranda of Conversations, Presidential File, October 1975. Secret; Nodis. The meet-
ing was held in the White House Oval Office.
Kubisch: Much better than a year ago. We have a good government now. Karamanlis asked me to bring this letter. [He hands the President the letter, Tab A.]² It is warm and friendly, but you can see how touchy and proud the Greeks are. He misunderstood one point about linking aid with going back into NATO. We have straightened it out.

The President: How are we doing on the aid negotiations?
Kissinger: Okay. We have offered a $30 million development loan. He wanted 100. We have now raised it to $65 million.

The President: Agriculture came in and asked for—how much?
Scowcroft: $250 million in economic aid.
Kissinger: Our total now comes to $225.
Scowcroft: But that is not on the same basis.
Kissinger: True. There is no way we can give them that much. They are really not entitled to economic aid.

[Discussion of aid budget submission.]

The President: You know what a problem we had getting the embargo lifted. Do you think the Greeks will negotiate?
Kubisch: By all means. They just want to get it out of the way. Cyprus is 500 miles away and is solely an emotional problem. They want it out of the way and will concede any reasonable terms. If there is no settlement, the prospect of a war in the Aegean is high, and the Greeks can’t afford that.

The President: How about the refugees?
Kissinger: Solving the territorial issue will solve most of that. The big problem will be Makarios and the weak central government. The best would be to get Makarios to sign it.

Kubisch: That is right. Unless Makarios blesses it, the Greeks won’t accept it. Karamanlis thinks if we can do something within 60 days or so, he has enough leverage to force him to agree.

The President: Give the Prime Minister my best wishes.
Kubisch: If Cyprus is settled and the bilateral things get settled, it would be good to cap it with a Karamanlis visit here.

The President: It would be good politics here also. Maybe next summer.
Kissinger: All it takes is good will. There is little to settle.

² Attached but not printed. All brackets are in the original.
55. **Interagency Intelligence Memorandum**

DCI/NIO 2282–75

Washington, October 24, 1975.

[Omitted here is the table of contents.]

GREECE UNDER CARAMANLIS

**Note**

This paper focuses on Greek internal problems, with some consideration of foreign policy issues, particularly as they affect domestic politics.

**Précis**

Caramanlis has moved quickly to consolidate his political base in the 15 months since he was called back from 11 years of self-imposed exile to lead a country momentarily shattered by the junta’s disastrous move against Makarios and the subsequent Turkish move onto Cyprus. He has sought to depoliticize the military, transform Greece into a stable democracy, and end the country’s international isolation brought on by seven years of military rule. Caramanlis has made progress on all fronts and the *short-term* prospects for his government are much more favorable than seemed possible when he took over.

Enjoying considerable popularity and unprecedented control of parliament, Caramanlis has no serious challenger either in his own New Democracy party or within the weak and divided political opposition.

In an effort to reform the Greek political system, Caramanlis has secured the passage of a new constitution designed to eliminate some of the traditional shortcomings of democratic governments in Greece. (The new system, which provides for a sharing of power between president and prime minister, will not be put to a real test, however, so long as Caramanlis remains in complete control.) He has given all political forces, including the Communists, the right to compete freely in the political marketplace, but he will remain sensitive to the military’s concern for maintaining order and will come down hard against anarchical manifestations.

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1 Source: Central Intelligence Agency, Executive Registry, Job 80–M00165A, Box 17, Greece. Secret. A note on the first page reads: “This memorandum, prepared under the auspices of the National Intelligence Officer for Western Europe, was drafted by CIA/OCI with contributions from DIA and State. It was reviewed and endorsed by a working group of analysts from CIA, DIA, State/INR, and the services, chaired by a representative of INR.”
Most military officers see Caramanlis as the politician best able to govern Greece. Nevertheless, he must continue to cope with a continuing—albeit reduced—threat from those in the military who could become so alarmed over political developments and/or fearful for their own future that they would try to remove him.

With the help of some talented economists and international financial assistance from those anxious to bolster Greek democracy, Caramanlis has the means to weather short-term problems caused by the present unfavorable international economic conditions and the junta’s mismanagement of the economy. Structural reforms will be necessary for sound and steady economic growth.

Caramanlis has moved adroitly to contain strong anti-US and anti-NATO sentiment among Greeks arising from the Turkish invasion of Cyprus and resentment of the junta’s relations with the US. His formula for partial withdrawal from NATO and renegotiation of US bases has gone far to assuage nationalist sentiment, without irretrievably alienating the defense support which is indispensable to Greece.

Caramanlis’ handling of the Cyprus and Aegean issues will have an important bearing on whether his domestic and broader foreign policy objectives can be carried out, and could even affect his tenure. While he has shown flexibility on the Cyprus issue, he sees himself boxed in by Turkish intransigence with little further room for maneuver. Should the Turks show a willingness to compromise—particularly on the territorial question—he would probably press Makarios to reciprocate. Caramanlis has less flexibility on the Aegean issue, which involves the question of Greek sovereignty and Athens could well be drawn into a military confrontation should the Turks again make probes in contested areas.

The longer-term prospects for political stability in Greece, particularly after Caramanlis, are not as promising. His departure may well lead to increased factionalization of his party composed as it is of at least three groups and a similar number of potential heirs. This could eventually split the party. In such circumstances, the opposition may become more aggressive. Greece might then experience another period of political instability, although much will depend on the state of the economy and relations with Turkey. Should the politics of confrontation and mob violence again overshadow parliamentary due process, the military may again feel compelled to intervene either openly or from behind the scenes, unless a political alignment that is able to prevail over the left and right extremes again emerges.

Discussion

Caramanlis and the New Order in Greece

1. Greece has made a remarkably smooth transition from military rule to parliametary democracy over the past year. Most of the
credit goes to 69-year old Prime Minister Caramanlis, who has out-
maneuvered his domestic opponents and skillfully begun to institu-
tionalize his predominance. There is at present no serious challenge to
his authority from either the extreme left or right; even the once highly
politicized army seems for the most part to accept his leadership. There
is also no successor in sight who could command comparable popular
support and this could spell trouble for Greek democracy once Cara-
manlis departs the political scene.

2. Caramanlis returned to Greece following 11 years of self-
imposed exile during which he formulated plans for reforming the
Greek political system. He hoped to make it capable of sustaining a
democratic rule without succumbing to the anarchy and disorder that
prompted the military to intervene in 1967. He has pursued this ob-
jective first by consolidating his own political base, and then embark-
ing upon a series of institutional changes which he hopes will eventu-
ally transform Greece into a stable and progressive democracy along
West European lines.

3. The first stage in Caramanlis’ carefully orchestrated plan to so-
lidify his political base was the holding of parliamentary elections last
November, about four months after the Cyprus crisis led the junta to
call him back to Greece. His party received almost 55 percent of the
vote in the elections, which showed his own popularity, his mastery of
electoral dynamics, and the weakness of his opposition. Helped by the
crisis atmosphere of the period, Caramanlis imposed on his colleagues
a complex system of reinforced proportional representation under
which he could have won a slim majority in parliament even if he had
gotten only 41 percent of the popular vote. But with his overwhelm-
ing victory, Caramanlis’ New Democracy party now has unprecedented
control of parliament, holding 216 seats out of 300.

4. Caramanlis has used this control to push through a new con-
stitution providing for a strong executive. The opposition objected to
the substantial powers granted the presidency under the constitution
but succeeded only in partially whittling down these powers. The
opposition boycotted the final vote on the constitution but let it be
known that the boycott did not imply a denial of the validity of the
constitution.

5. Caramanlis created a strong presidency to balance the prime
ministry and to provide the additional element of stability and contin-
uity the former monarchy was supposed to provide but often did not.
He turned the presidency over to a hand-picked candidate, Constan-
tine Tsatsos, a long-standing follower and personal friend not likely to
challenge his authority as prime minister. His critics describe this
arrangement as designing a lion’s costume to be worn by a mouse. In
any case, the new system is not likely to be put to a real test as long
as Caramanlis remains in control.
6. Believing that no one else has his capabilities for governing Greece, Caramanlis was clearly unwilling to give up the day to day control of party and government affairs he enjoys as prime minister, at least for the time being. In addition, the appointment of someone other than himself as prime minister and party head might have exacerbated factionalism and possibly even have split the New Democracy party. Over time, Caramanlis will doubtless work to build up the party’s organization and articulate an ideology, in order to step up to the presidency while continuing to run the party through a trusted associate.

Political Parties: An Overview

7. Political parties in Greece have traditionally been extensions of prominent personalities. Political leaders relate to party members and supporters through an informal system of clientelism—personal ties and mutual obligations among constituents, party members, party leaders, and the bureaucracy. Programs and principles are relatively unimportant. The development of modern political parties based on programs rather than personalities was further complicated by the suspension of political life during the seven years of military rule. More fundamentally, however, their evolution has been stunted by the firm grip of tradition and the continued emphasis by Greeks on individual relationships as the key to political institutions.

8. Caramanlis’ New Democracy fits the typical mold. It is a congeries of diverse interests held together by loyalty to Caramanlis. The party consists of former members of the conservative National Radical Union led by Caramanlis between 1955–1963—minus some of its more extreme rightist elements—along with a considerable number of younger men with more liberal and progressive ideas. It includes center-right, rightist, and monarchist elements and draws its support from the upper class, the propertied middle class, and the countryside, particularly the Peloponnese. The party has little formal organizational structure. Its program reflects a vaguely defined conservatism with some liberal and progressive overtones.

9. Caramanlis’ commanding stature has so far served to foster an unusually high degree of party discipline that has enabled him to get his way in parliament. Although the monarchists in his party resented his calculated neutrality in the referendum in December 1974 (in which 69 percent of the electorate rejected the return of the King), they did honor his request that they avoid campaigning on the King’s behalf. The entire party voted in favor of the new constitution and only four members opposed the election of Constantine Tsatsos to the presidency. Some of Caramanlis’ institutional reforms also contribute to party cohesiveness. The constitution prohibits deputies from changing their party affiliation during their term without resigning their seats in parliament. This provision will discourage the party switching and frac-
tionalization that was the bane of previous Greek parliaments. The weak and divided state of the political opposition also helps Caramanlis enact his programs.

The Opposition

10. The Center Union–New Forces, with 20 percent of the vote in the November election and 61 parliamentary seats, forms the principal opposition. Headed by George Mavros, it consists of the Center Union Party (founded by George Papandreou in the mid-1950s) and a group of outstanding younger men (headed by John Pesmazoglou) who distinguished themselves by their opposition to the junta. The party has half-heartedly attempted to pass itself off as a socialist party, although it is basically centrist and includes center-right elements. Indeed, it is difficult to distinguish it ideologically from the New Democracy. Mavros and Pesmazoglou served in Caramanlis’ transitional government last fall, and the party has suffered from its lack of an individual identity. Its sources of support are less clear-cut than those of the New Democracy, but its strength is especially high among the urban intelligentsia and the salaried middle class. The party is also strong in Crete and parts of northern Greece. Center Union–New Forces is as poorly organized as New Democracy, but it lacks the leadership Caramanlis gives to his party. An effort is under way, however, to convene a party congress later this year or early next year to outline a program and devise a party apparatus. The reform-minded Pesmazoglou has been leading the effort to make it a modern political party.

11. The Panhellenic Socialist Movement of Andreas Papandreou received only 13.5 percent of the votes in the last election, finishing third, and now has 15 parliamentary seats. Papandreou’s party consists of elements from his father’s Center Union and some figures active in the resistance against the junta. The party draws its support from elements of the urban intelligentsia, from part of the working class, and from students. Papandreou’s radical Marxist rhetoric, along with the widely held belief that it was his machinations and antics in the 1960s that helped provoke the military intervention, have served to dampen his appeal. Papandreou’s party has also been beset by ideological and personality differences. To meet this challenge he dissolved the central committee and is seeking to rebuild the party from the grass roots. Except for the municipal elections last spring, Papandreou has refused to cooperate with any of the other opposition parties, but he is shrewd enough to do so if and when he thinks it will help him. A fiery orator with a magnetic personality, he could again play a leading role in the personalistic politics of Greece.

12. The Communist opposition in Greece has been weakened by its fractionalization during the seven years of military rule. Greek Communism is now represented by (1) the pro-Soviet Communist Party of
the Exterior led by Harilaos Florakis, (2) the independent, nationalist-minded Communist Party of the Interior led by Babis Drakopoulos, and (3) the former Communist front United Democratic Left led by Ilias Illiou. The three parties, though bitter competitors, did unite temporarily to contest the parliamentary elections, but they received only 9.5 percent of the vote and eight seats. All three parties are anxious to appear respectable and are quick to condemn violence as well as the inflammatory rhetoric of Papandreou. Although the “exterior” party is better organized and heavily financed by the Soviets, the other two parties are more dynamic and seem to have been more successful in recruiting younger converts. The legalization of the Communist parties by Caramanlis has enabled them to make some gains within the labor movement, the press, and among students, but their constant infighting reduces their effectiveness as an opposition force. Prospects for growth in the longer term are improving with the trend toward urbanization and industrialization, but the Communists have yet to demonstrate that they will be a major force in Greece.

Manipulating the Opposition

13. Caramanlis has shown great skill in dealing with the political opposition, taking care not to alienate any important group. Recognizing that there is little his opponents can do to hurt him, he has assumed an “above politics” approach and is slow to respond to the attacks against his government. Although he briefs George Mavros regularly, he generally ignores the other opposition leaders. The Prime Minister also manipulates the opposition press, flattering it with his confidences in return for press cooperation in presenting the issues in a favorable light.

14. Caramanlis has preempted many of the opposition’s favorite issues with “old pro” dexterity. His announcement last summer that Greece was withdrawing from the military wing of NATO—although he did not follow it up with serious action—took the steam out of that issue as did his decision to renegotiate the status of US bases. His legalization of the Communist parties removed another long-standing complaint from that quarter. His limited purge of junta leaders and supporters from the government and the military has partially defused that issue. Caramanlis remains vulnerable to criticism from the right for doing too much against the junta and from the left for doing too little, but so far he has walked the tightrope between them quite deftly.

15. Within his own government, Caramanlis has reportedly accused some of his ministers of inefficiency; a minor reshuffle of the cabinet could take place soon. [14 lines not declassified]

The Military

16. Despite the wide support for Caramanlis and his unassailable position in the parliament, the military remains, at least in an indirect
sense, a strong constraining factor. Caramanlis has to cope with the continuing—albeit reduced—threat that elements in the military could become so alarmed over political developments or fearful of their own future that they would try to remove him.

17. Under the junta, there was a continuing effort during the seven years of power to weed out “politically unreliable” elements in the armed forces. Military divisions from this period have continued: those who support the monarchy, the “hard-liners” who were at the forefront of the revolution, those who were generally in sympathy with the goals of the revolution, and those who opposed the revolution and thought the military should return to the barracks. There were, in addition, factions within the pro-revolutionary officers along lines of personal allegiance as well as ideology. Many of these on the losing side were retired or forced out of service soon after 1967, including most of the senior officers and many of the supporters of the King. And after November 1973, the hard-line supporters of General Ioannides dominated the armed forces.

18. Upon his return to power Caramanlis was confronted with a military establishment thoroughly screened and purged of active anti-junta elements, and he has since been working to redress this situation. In the past year almost all of the key, hard-core junta supporters have been retired or separated from the military, or are being tried for various crimes against the state. Furthermore, numerous officers who were retired by the junta during its tenure because of their political and anti-junta beliefs have been reinstated. Partly as a result of this manipulation, most officers now support Caramanlis and are willing to allow him his way.

19. Although political stability has been regained under Caramanlis, and this is a very important factor to the military, there is concern in some circles that he has excessively appeased leftist elements. The legalization of Communist parties, the growth of the leftist movement, and the return of the detested Andreas Papandreou—all developments since Caramanlis’ return—have spurred continuing military concern over liberalizing political trends. The military would not accept or permit a leftist government to take office. A deterioration of law and order brought on by student or leftist agitation could also provoke serious coup plotting in Athens. However, most of the restiveness that is now evident seems based more on fear for individual careers than anything else.

20. Plotting has been endemic in the Greek armed forces. Some senior officers who harbor memories of the Greek civil war are standing in the wings. They see themselves as ready, with the military organization and ability, to save the motherland if that becomes necessary. Also, there still remain a few highly politicized junior officers
commissioned during the junta years, who are ripe for exploitation by coup plotters. Many of these would probably be responsive to Ioannides, who is serving a life term for his role in the 1967 coup and awaiting trial for masterminding the 1974 coup against Cypriot President Makarios. There is no evidence that Ioannides has given them the green light, but he is not likely to accept a lifetime of incarceration without some effort, however risky, to regain his freedom.

21. Defense Minister Averoff has been Caramanlis’ “bridge builder” to the armed forces. He has counseled the Prime Minister to go slow in rooting out junta supporters to avoid alarming the officer corps. At the same time, he has repeatedly assured the officers that their personal careers are secure and that only key figures of the junta will be punished. In this regard, both Averoff and Caramanlis were infuriated by recent newspaper stories questioning the government’s failure to act against several active duty officers named by the papers as having collaborated with the junta. Averoff has voiced his concern that attacks of this type could stir new unrest in the military. Caramanlis’ awareness that there is a continuing current of unrest in the armed forces was demonstrated by the government’s rapid move to commute the death sentences handed down to former junta leaders Papadopoulos, Pattakos, and Makarezos. It was doubtless Averoff who counseled Caramanlis to take this action, and both of them will be closely watching military restiveness.

Students and Labor

22. On the volatile university scene, the government is proceeding cautiously. It is anxious to avoid violent confrontation with students that could snowball and force it to choose between alienating either the military by tolerating agitation or the political opposition and the broader electorate by using repressive tactics. In an effort to follow a middle course, Caramanlis has acquiesced in some “dejuntization” in the universities: the abolition of decrees that put universities under strict government control and the suspension of suspected pro-junta professors pending an investigation of their performance and activities during the junta period. The government has also promised to look into student grievances on educational reform. Meanwhile, an effort is being made to halt the growing domination of the student movement by an extreme leftist minority. The government has ruled, for example, that all students must participate in school elections.

23. Labor unrest also has the potential to force Caramanlis into the unpalatable choice between leniency or repression. The laws that brought the trade unions under strict government control have been abolished, and the new constitution confirms the right to strike except for political motives. Upper-level union officials appointed by the junta have been removed from their posts, and special courts have nomi-
nated their temporary successors. The labor movement will be in a state of flux until the completion of the elections for union, federation, and confederation officers next year. The government’s relations with labor will certainly be affected by the results, especially since Papandreou and the Communists are making a determined effort to get their supporters elected to union posts. Caramanlis is now working on a law to prevent leftist domination of the labor movement, but labor will continue to be a difficult problem area for the government for a long time to come.

The Economy

24. On the economic front, the Caramanlis government is grappling with stagnation, inflation, and a serious balance-of-payments problem as a result of junta mismanagement of the economy and adverse world-wide economic developments. Real gross national product declined two percent in 1974. Prices rose at less than half the previous year’s rate but by year end had still climbed 13.5 percent over December 1973. The government did well to hold the current account deficit to about $1.2 billion in light of skyrocketing oil prices, a decrease in invisible earnings from tourism and worker remittances, and greatly expanded defense outlays.

25. At first inclined to give priority to fighting inflation, the Caramanlis government opted for a policy of mild stimulation aiming at a growth rate of 2 to 4 percent this year. Most indicators now suggest that real growth in GNP will be in that range. The government also seems likely to meet its goal of holding inflation under 15 percent. The balance-of-payments deficit has replaced stagnation as Greece’s most serious economic problem, with Greek officials now estimating they will have to borrow some $500 to $600 million to finance the deficit. Prospects for such borrowing are favorable in the coming months as North American and European states and financial institutions are sympathetic to bolstering Greek democracy. Borrowing may become more difficult later next year because of balance-of-payments and debt-servicing problems.

26. Structural reforms are necessary to place the economy on the path to sound and steady growth, especially in view of Greek ambition to become a full member of the EC and compete effectively with the other members. Some key elements for the modernization of the Greek economy include the fostering of larger, more efficient enterprises, application of modern technology, a greater emphasis on export trade, a consolidation of the fragmented agricultural sector to increase farm income and output, and exploitation of the country’s energy sources. The government’s recently revealed outline of its five-year economic development plan addresses itself to these problems. But it will take more sustained effort than the amorphous New Democracy seems likely to provide to make much progress toward solving them.
Problems with Turkey: Cyprus and the Aegean

27. Caramanlis’ handling of the Cyprus and Aegean issues, and Turkey’s response, will have an important bearing on whether his domestic and broader foreign policy objectives can be carried out; indeed, his performance could also affect his very tenure in office. Caramanlis is faced with a dilemma over the Cyprus situation. Personally, he favors an agreement with Turkey over the island. But because of national honor and fear his government might not survive, he will not accede to what he considers a humiliating settlement. Caramanlis would require some flexibility from Turkey on the territorial question and on the return of Greek Cypriot refugees. While he has not been willing to get out in front of Greek Cypriot negotiator Clerides, Caramanlis privately accepts the tradeoff of bizonality and a weak central government in exchange for Turkish concessions on territory and refugees. He has even said that he will press Makarios to accept these terms.

28. Caramanlis is pessimistic that the Turks will respond adequately to the Greeks, and probably feels that he has little further room for maneuver. Therefore, rather than offer another Greek concession at this time, which likely would erode his popular support in Greece, he expects the US to try to persuade Turkey to be forthcoming.

29. Caramanlis sees greater potential danger in the Aegean problem. Provocative Turkish actions here could force his hand in ways that he would prefer to avoid, including military action. This issue involves Greek sovereignty in such a direct way that he has very little scope for compromise. If he does not maintain a tough posture, he is sure to be attacked by his domestic opposition.

The US and NATO

30. In dealing with the US and NATO, Caramanlis also is on the horns of a dilemma. He realizes that Greek security interests require continued close ties with his allies. But he recognizes at the same time that too close association with his allies could hurt him politically at this time because of anti-American sentiment arising out of the Cyprus crisis. While he has considerable flexibility in handling this problem, he is unlikely to move boldly because of these constraints. Caramanlis, in his treatment of the issue, has moved adroitly to contain nationalist public sentiment and to prevent it from driving a wedge between Greece and the West.

Prospects

31. The short-term prospects for the Caramanlis government are good. With the support of a solid majority of the electorate and an overwhelming majority in parliament, Caramanlis is in a strong enough political position to provide the country with forceful and dynamic leadership on domestic issues. His domestic and foreign policies to date
have served only to confirm the support of those who voted for him, while the behavior of his New Democracy colleagues in parliament thus far suggests they will continue to accord him their loyalty as he moves to make his imprint on Greece.

32. Nonetheless, Caramanlis will continue to face numerous problems:

—Plotting in the military; a desperate move against the government cannot be entirely ruled out, though Caramanlis seems likely to continue to command the guarded support of most Greek officers, who see him as the politician most capable of ruling Greece.

—Extremist rhetoric is gradually re-emerging on the part of his civilian political opponents. They are, however, weak and divided, and recognize there is some validity in the slogan “Caramanlis or the tanks.”

—Students and labor unions, many under extreme leftist influence, are increasingly prone to agitation. Caramanlis is more concerned about provoking the military by seeming to tolerate anarchy than about alienating the left by infringing on their democratic freedoms. Thus he would probably move quickly to quell disorder from this quarter.

—Deterioration of the economic situation could also trigger dissent. But present trends are favorable, and Caramanlis is likely to enjoy further economic success thanks to the help of a group of talented economists and international financial assistance.

33. The longer-term prospects for stable, progressive, and democratic rule for Greece are less promising. This is particularly true after the Caramanlis era ends—whether through death, electoral defeat, or another self-imposed exile. Despite his efforts, Caramanlis is unlikely to be able to overcome the social and cultural traditions which militate against turning the New Democracy into a modern political party. Increased factionalization of the party into center-right, rightist, and royalist wings seems likely and this could eventually split the party. In this situation, a scramble to fill the political vacuum when Caramanlis departs is all but inevitable. The New Democracy itself contains at least three potential heirs: Minister of Coordination Papaligouras, Minister to the Prime Minister Rallis, and Defense Minister Averoff. The accession of any one of these could alienate the others. As the New Democracy’s cohesion thus erodes and as it loses popular support—as it is likely to do in any event—the kind of political paralysis that helped bring the military to power in 1967 could recur, unless a new alignment of center-left and/or center-right forces capable of overshadowing the left and right extremes comes into being.

U.S. AND ALLIED SECURITY POLICY IN SOUTHERN EUROPE

[Omitted here is a table of contents.]

Summary

US policy toward Southern Europe since 1947 has succeeded in minimizing Soviet influence in the region and gaining a paramount position for the US and NATO throughout the Mediterranean area. We enjoy a complex of military facilities and bases which contributes to our role in the Middle East [less than 1 line not declassified] as well as to the security of Southern Europe itself. US presence and influence have helped keep Communists and neutralists out of power in most countries of the area and thus contributed to the strengthening of their ties with the rest of Western Europe.

It would be in the US interest to maintain these positions. But a number of developments now raise questions about how, to what extent and at what costs, US/NATO positions can be maintained. Relaxation of cold war tensions, changes in the East-West military balance, and the disappearance of regimes that cooperated closely with the US are all contributing to a diminution of US influence in the area and a possible increase in that of the Soviet Union. We face pressures to reduce our base and force structure, a desire by some allies to dilute their participation in NATO, and growing influence on or even presence in the governments of some NATO members of Communists or others who are hostile to the Alliance.

None of this should be overstated. There are political factors which will impel at least some of these countries to move closer to Western Europe. Moreover, there is considerable flexibility in the Western military position in the Mediterranean. We may be able to compensate for the relative diminution of our presence by technological developments (e.g., in airlift, or aerial refueling), more selective use of remaining US forces and bases, and more reliance on other Allied forces. Moscow is not likely to achieve a military edge in the area.

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1 Source: Ford Library, NSC Institutional Files (H–Files), Box H–35, NSSM 222. Secret; Exdis. The paper was forward to the Departments of State and Defense and the CIA for agency comment on December 24. (Ibid.) NSSM 222 is Document 45.
Country Assessments

—Moderate forces in Portugal have won a second chance with the formation of a government with minimal Communist participation. But the unity of the forces supporting it, military and civilian, is fragile and it faces formidable economic and social problems and determined leftist opponents. The situation remains fluid and confused. One possible outcome could be a military-dominated, authoritarian government which would embrace at least the rhetoric of a non-aligned foreign policy and want a scaling down of Portugal’s already modest participation in NATO. We do not, however, expect a Portuguese move into the Soviet orbit. Many military men, as well as leaders of moderate political parties, look to Socialist governments and parties in Western Europe for assistance.

—Post-Franco Spain will see a very precarious attempt at “controlled liberalization.” A reasonably successful political evolution would permit Spain to draw closer to its West European neighbors but at some cost to US influence, since democratic elements will want to make gestures of reducing ties to the US and so to Spain’s dictatorial past. A reassertion of conservative and/or military rule, by prolonging Spain’s isolation from Europe, would make the US tie seem more valuable. But even a rightist regime might try to hold the line against change at home by striking nationalist foreign policy poses that would affect Spanish relations with the US as well as with Western Europe.

—At least for the near term Italy, for all its political turmoil, is the least likely country of the Southern area to call into doubt its ties to the West or to be tempted by any sort of radical nationalism or Mediterranean non-alignment. Nonetheless, continued political instability and the growing influence of the Communist Party will inhibit Italy’s effectiveness as a NATO ally. While we foresee no near term threat to present US military arrangements, it probably would not be possible to transfer there major facilities lost elsewhere in the area. In general, Italian politicians will be reluctant to accommodate any new NATO initiatives which might be at all controversial at home.

—The change of government in Greece has significantly improved that country’s relations with Western Europe, but dealings with the US will remain troubled unless and until a Cyprus settlement is reached. Karamanlis will need some further reduction in the US military presence beyond those already agreed in order to blunt criticism of those who urge a complete break. But he will continue to maintain as much of a de facto military role in the Alliance as the domestic political traffic will bear. Indeed, Athens’ desire not to be further isolated in the event of serious deterioration of Greek-Turkish relations will put a limit to erosion of its ties with the US.

—US relations with Turkey were soured by the stalemate over military sales and aid and will probably never return to their former
degree of cordiality. Ankara, however, sees its long-term political, economic, and security interests with the West, and the Turkish political elite is committed to national development along Western lines. Turkey has looked first to its NATO allies in Europe to offset its growing isolation and to obtain military equipment and spare parts. But some kind of accommodation with the USSR and limited arms purchases cannot be ruled out.

—Malta will need some economic support to replace UK/US base rental fees in March of 1979. For all his neutralist, anti-super power convictions, the erratic Dom Mintoff will bargain hard for economic advantage. Thus, he might agree to Soviet non-use of Malta, or possibly to continued Western military use of the island. He will threaten, as part of this bargaining, to accept Soviet or Libyan overtures.

—Developments in post-Tito Yugoslavia could have an important impact on NATO’s southern flank. We are relatively sanguine about the outcome—because we believe Moscow sees more to gain from détente than from an overt move to reestablish Soviet hegemony and because the Yugoslav military would move in to cope with an externally or internally generated threat to the country’s integrity and independence. But a precipitous unravelling of the Western position in Southern Europe might change Moscow’s perception of the risks of meddling in Yugoslav affairs. And a collapse of Yugoslav independence could demoralize moderates in neighboring states who would be sensitive to the advance of Soviet power nearer their borders.

The Soviet Union probably has no grand design for Southern Europe. Moscow can wait with some patience for events which it may think are moving in its general interests, at least in the sense that any diminution in US influence, or in the anti-Communist coherence of the region, is a gain for Soviet policy. Moreover, a more activist Soviet policy to woo one party (e.g., Turkey) would only offend others (e.g., Greece). We cannot of course rule out the possibility that Soviet leaders will be overcome by enthusiasm for some opportunity for rapid and dramatic Communist gains and in the process perhaps revive a sense of unity and purpose among other NATO states in the region. But neither can we depend on Moscow to do that job for us. Instead, Moscow is likely to continue the relatively good behavior which aims to foster the impression that no European state has anything to fear if it adopts a more equivocal posture vis-à-vis the US or if the local Communist influence grows.

US Interests

For the foreseeable future, minimum US interests in Southern Europe include the following:

—Prevent the Mediterranean power balance from shifting to Soviet advantage;
—Contribute to maintaining the confidence and sense of security of pro-Western elements in Southern Europe, preventing further political unraveling there which could in turn make Central Europeans feel exposed and threatened.

—Keep enough political influence with the Southern European governments at least to prevent their acting against our vital interests (e.g., with radical Arab states or the Soviets) even if we cannot win their active support to the degree we would wish.

—[3 lines not declassified]

—Preserve sufficient US access to Southern Europe and the Mediterranean to maintain a positive psychological impact on the Middle East situation, however restricted our actual use of the individual facilities in case of an Arab-Israeli war.

Issues and Options

In trying to keep enough of a military and political presence in Southern Europe to serve these purposes, we face the complex problems of defining the kind of role we wish to play in Southern Europe and the Mediterranean in light of impinging circumstances on the one hand, the availability of required resources and feasible policies on the other. Specific issues include these:

—How can we manage our relations with each of the countries concerned in order to preserve as much US influence as possible?

—Should we promote the development of closer political, economic, and military links between the Southern European states and the rest of Western Europe, even at some cost to US political influence and economic interests and perhaps to our military position?

—Should we allow partial NATO membership by others besides France, or continued NATO membership by governments with Communist members, or should we insist, instead, on a more cohesive if smaller Alliance?

—Should we hold out for our present base and operating rights, reducing them only when a host government insists, or should we seize the initiative by proposing some cutbacks ourselves or working to increase the military role in the area of other allies?

This last issue includes a large number of others. There are arguments for and against such propositions as these:

—Withdrawing nuclear ballistic missile submarines from the area would not significantly degrade our strategic capability because the equivalent capability can be provided elsewhere;

—The Southern flank countries already have lost much of their value to us as a resupply route to the Middle East in times of emergency;

—There is little likelihood of Soviet military aggression against any of the Southern flank countries independent of a general NATO—Warsaw Pact conflict;

—US military facilities in the countries of the region have become more of a source of friction in our dealings with them, or an instrument for their blackmail of us, than a contribution to broader NATO defense interests;
—Technological progress may make it possible for the US to satisfy its own purely military needs in the area—naval and air access and intelligence gathering—with less reliance on foreign bases.

Our possible responses to all these questions can be grouped under a number of broad “strategies.” Should we adjust to and hopefully ride out present trends in Southern Europe, accepting a diminution of our role? Should we try to compensate for this by drawing other West European powers more deeply into the region’s affairs? Or by possibly accepting quite a different definition of NATO membership and its purpose? Or should we try to control events by making clear our determination to resist unfavorable trends, bargaining hard against any reduction in military rights, and rejecting partial members of NATO or members with governments judged to be incompatible with the nature of the Alliance?

A. Bilateral Relations

There are a number of steps Washington can take to influence events in individual countries. We can continue encouraging West Europeans to take the lead in supporting Portuguese moderates and in making that support conditional on Portugal’s remaining on the democratic path. We should continue to avoid anything which leftist forces could portray as a US or NATO “attack” on Portugal or its revolution.

In Spain, we can let our military contacts know our general support for a pluralistic system as being in Spain’s best interests and step up our own relations with democratic oppositionists as well as with moderates in the regime. We also should continue to support and plan for Spain’s closer integration with the West. In Spain, as in Portugal, European political parties and labor unions are in a better position than we to strengthen contacts with and give support to democratic forces. We should encourage them to take the lead in doing so.

In Italy the most important thing we can do to strengthen democratic forces is help the country out of its economic difficulties. We also can emphasize our support for Christian Democratic-Socialist alliances as the best means to that end, and our continued opposition to Communist participation in the national government.

The best, and perhaps only, way to improve our position in both Greece and Turkey is to help find some resolution of the Cypriot issue and help keep Greek-Turkish disputes over the Aegean from leading to conflict between them. In the meantime, while showing willingness to renegotiate American military arrangements with both, we should take every opportunity to remind each of the value to itself of those arrangements and of a firm, effective Alliance.

B. The Southern Flank and the EC

We could try to reinsure against a diminution in the US role in Southern Europe by anchoring these countries more firmly to their
neighbors in Northern and Central Europe. Military “devolution” would mean trying to get the French and Italians, and also perhaps the Germans and others, to play a larger role in their own defense and so establish more balanced and durable security arrangements for the area within the NATO system. It could also include at least token multilateralization of some US military facilities in order to put them under NATO sponsorship and so make them more palatable to local political opinion. Political-economic “devolution” would mean supporting close association with or full membership in the European Community for the states of Southern Europe.

The possible risk in this policy is that it might accelerate the loosening of ties with the US without providing anything viable and effective to replace them. The prospect of being able to develop European ties might make it easier for wavering Allies—Greece is an obvious example—to rationalize, and justify to conservative opinion at home, decisions to reduce military links with the US. And France—most eager of the European Community partners to draw Southern Europe into the Community’s orbit—would be pleased to become a major if not the chief military arms supplier and external political influence in the region. On the other hand, most Europeans would use whatever influence they might acquire over Southern Europe defense policies to urge good behavior within NATO, even while possibly competing with the US for economic access to the region.

Realistically, “devolution” could at best supplement and possibly compensate for declining US influence in Southern Europe, not provide a substitute for it. No combination of European states will be able to take on the bulk of our present military role. Leaders of Italy, Greece and Turkey are well aware of their exposure to the power and proximity of the USSR. Their continued desire for some visible US military presence (perhaps in NATO rather than specifically US facilities) should put a limit on both the erosion of our role in the area and the growth of West European or indeed Soviet influence.

C. The Alliance: Institutional Integrity

1. A Jagged Alliance?

We probably could force other Allies to accept the expulsion of members who opt for only partial participation (e.g., Greece), but at considerable cost to harmony in what was left of the Alliance. Moreover, expulsion would likely lead to the loss of all US military installations in the country concerned and of whatever US influence remained, as well as foreclose the possibility of some (e.g., Greece) eventually returning to full membership.

Allowing partial Alliance membership, on the other hand, would tend to undermine its effectiveness and coherence and encourage others to opt for the political and strategic advantages of NATO
membership while contributing little or nothing to its conventional military arm. It might also undermine public support in the US for an alliance in which we seemed to be carrying the burdens while others enjoyed the benefits at small cost.

2. Communists in NATO?

This dike already has been breached to a degree, with Iceland in the past and Portugal at the moment. But the risk to NATO’s secrets is considerable, and the erosion of its ideological contour could be dangerous to its public image and support, in the US and abroad. Clearcut US opposition to NATO membership for governments which include Communists might at least stiffen the resistance of Christian Democrats and even Socialists in Italy to PCI participation in that government.

But adopting such a policy would require a clear decision that we would prefer a shrunken, more ideologically cohesive alliance, even in cases where Communists are not the controlling members of their government and not necessarily permanent ones. This policy would almost certainly require us to relinquish military facilities which we might have been able to keep and would encounter stiff opposition from other NATO members. Recent events in Portugal suggest the value of a less clearcut approach in cases short of Communist takeover: isolating such a government from sensitive alliance activity until the situation improves—or is lost.

D. Base Structure

Rather than holding out for our present base and operating rights and negotiating reductions only as they are forced on us, we might seize the initiative by ourselves proposing cutbacks of marginal, politically vulnerable or technologically obsolescent facilities. We might actually improve our chances of keeping essential facilities by helping pro-US governments accommodate domestic pressures for a visible reduction in our presence. This policy might be accompanied by—or even conditioned on—a correlative transfer of some degree of US defense responsibilities to other Allies.

On the other hand, we would be risking the loss of facilities which we might otherwise have kept while stimulating demands for more “victories” by local politicians over Washington. Further, giving up even marginal facilities before we have to might signal to some that the US was disengaging from the area or downgrading its importance. Certainly this policy would need to be implemented with a careful assessment of its effect on each individual local political situation, as well as on the likely reactions of the Soviets, West Europeans and Middle Easterners.

[Omitted here are portions of Section I unrelated to Greece and Turkey.]
The Greek government is now in safe and sensible hands and presents us with little problem of Communist or neutralist influence at this time. Nevertheless, it is negotiating to reduce the US presence at existing installations in Greece and in principle has taken the country out of NATO’s military system. The negotiations will bring significant reductions in the US presence in Greece. When and whether Greece will return to NATO integration is likely to be tied to progress on Cyprus and relations with Turkey. This question confronts the Alliance with its most direct structural challenge since de Gaulle set the example in 1966.

The Karamanlis government does not question the wisdom of Greek alignment with the West nor the need of a special relationship with the US. But domestic political considerations deriving from the Greek-Turkish dispute have led it to seek a lower US profile in Greece and a greater degree of influence over US activities there. Agreement was reached in late April to end homeporting in Greece for five destroyers of the US Sixth fleet. This will reduce the number of US personnel in Greece by about 3,000 out of an estimated total of 13,000 military and dependents. It was also agreed that the US would close down its air base at Hellenikon near Athens, while retaining some essential facilities there on an expanded Greek base.

The Greek government will probably seek further reductions in the size of the US military presence and modifications in the bilateral Status of Forces Agreement in an effort to blunt criticism from those in the country who favor a complete cut in Greek security ties with the US and NATO. We believe that the government will seek to maintain security ties with the US at a reduced level [1 line not declassified]. Greek-NATO negotiations began in September.

Other than withdrawal of forces from NATO command, the Greek Government has made no move to implement its August 1974 decision to withdraw from the military arm of NATO. The official statements about the withdrawal contrast sharply with continuing Greek participation in most of NATO’s defense-related activities. Greece’s participation in the NATO Military Committee and most subordinate headquarters remains essentially the same as before, although Greece abstains from activities of the Defense Planning Committee (DPC). The Greeks are still searching for ways to maintain a maximum de facto military role in the Alliance. They appear willing to undertake to commit forces to NATO in the event of a clear threat of aggression but are hesitant to discuss the central issue of force commitments in peacetime.

Their inhibitions in this matter flow from the same source as their initial decision to reduce their ties to both NATO and the US, namely, the Greek-Turkish dispute over Cyprus. Greek frustration at their own impotence in the face of Turkish action in Cyprus led them to try to
exert pressure on Turkey by way of the US and NATO. Their lack of success has, so far, stood in the way of their retracing these steps. US-Greek and NATO-Greek relations will continue to hinge on progress on Cyprus and relations with Turkey. Should Greek relations with Turkey improve with respect to Cyprus, the political pressure on Karmanlis would be reduced, though whether even then he could resume full NATO participation is uncertain. But even if relations with Turkey should seriously deteriorate, the Greeks would not want to cut themselves off from the US. There thus seems to be a limit on how far Karmanlis is likely to go in weakening ties to the US.

The prospects for a negotiated settlement on Cyprus are questionable. Greece is anxious to cut its losses and remove Cyprus as a constant point of friction with Turkey but it is not likely to negotiate in place of the Greek Cypriots, or to accept a Turkish zone far out of proportion to the Turkish Cypriot population. It is possible, however, that the Greeks may strongly press the Greek Cypriots to make a deal if the Turks appear willing to accept a reasonable territorial offer. Makarios, for his part, prefers to “make do” in a truncated Greek Cyprus rather than to legitimize Turkish aggression in return for marginal concessions. And the Turkish government, though it wants eventual international recognition of the new situation in Cyprus and rapprochement with Greece, is weak and must proceed with caution, particularly with respect to territorial questions, bizonal arrangements and the degree to which the Turkish minority should share power—the issues which remain the key to progress.

In short, the best we can hope for now is continuation of the present state of relative peace on Cyprus, coupled with continuing efforts through intercommunal talks to move toward a negotiated settlement. Insofar as Cyprus and Greek-Turkish relations are concerned, this situation does not cause intolerable problems in Greece for the US. But, while failure to achieve a negotiated settlement may be tolerated by Greece, it will retain a destabilizing potential for internal Greek and Greek Cypriot politics, remain a sore point in US-Greek relations, and complicate our effort to bring Greece back into full Alliance participation.

The Aegean problem could again have an equally destabilizing potential in the sense that more important national interests are involved in the long run, though the governments are now more disposed to a calm approach. Since October 1973, when the Greeks discovered oil off the island of Thasos, Greece and Turkey have been bitterly divided by a range of interlocking issues relating to control of the Aegean Sea. The core issue has to do with overlapping claims, based on the complicated geography of the area, to the resources on and beneath the Aegean’s continental shelf. Most of the other issues currently troubling Greek-Turkish relations concern the continental shelf dispute either directly
or tangentially. For example, there is already a dispute over the control of air traffic over the Aegean. Moreover, the Greeks favor an international standard for territorial waters of 12 miles, while Turkey argues that a 12-mile rule in the Aegean would give it access to its own Aegean ports only on Greek suffrnce. Finally, Greece, arguing that the Turkish intervention in Cyprus and Turkish attitudes toward the Aegean show Turkey’s hostility to Greece, has militarized the Dodecanese Islands in contravention of the Treaty of Paris of 1947 and another group of three islands near the Turkish coast in contravention of the Treaty of Lausanne of 1923. Turkey, in turn, has made reconnaissance flights over several of these Greek islands despite treaty provisions prohibiting military overflights. It has also initiated the creation of a new Army, focussed totally toward the Aegean islands.

The Greeks are satisfied with the status quo in the Aegean. The Turks, who will not permit Athens to make the Aegean a Greek lake, are insisting that improved relations can come about only through give-and-take negotiations involving some splitting of the differences on all the issues. The continental shelf issue is now stalled. The Greeks state that both countries concurred in recent bilateral meetings to refer the question to the International Court of Justice, while the Turks insist that these meetings also called for prior Greek-Turkish negotiations to identify areas of agreement and disagreement. The issue still has the potential of sparking a clash between these two allies, with all the consequences that would imply for their domestic regimes and their foreign orientations.

As Karamanlis’ honeymoon period gradually comes to an end he may become less able to undertake bold strokes toward a settlement with the Turks on Cyprus or the Aegean issues. The prospects, then, are at best for an extended period in which Greece and Turkey cautiously explore, by fits and starts, areas of accommodation. Although the civilian and military leadership in both Greece and Turkey will want to avoid it, periodic tension and the possibility of an armed conflict will persist. For that reason, Greek unhappiness with the US for not bringing more pressure to bear on Turkey will also persist, and so will the continuing threat of a further deterioration of US-Greek and Greek-NATO relations.

In the longer term, Greek ties with the US and NATO will be greatly affected by Karamanlis’ ability to solidify his political base and develop political structures that will survive his passing from the scene. With an overwhelming parliamentary majority, he has the political force to make needed changes in Greek political life, as evidenced by the adoption of a constitution providing for a strong president. But the left, which won only 22 per cent of the vote in the last election, may do better the next time when memories—and fears—of the junta are not so fresh. Karamanlis’ objective is to strengthen his base and pick up support from those who are alienated from his conservative policies without alarming the right and especially the army.
Recent Greek political history does not encourage excessive optimism as to Karamanlis’ chances of establishing what would be the best (though not the only) framework for taking care of our own policy interests in Greece: a stable, democratic political system that will maintain a pro-Western foreign policy even in the face of continuing frustrations with respect to Turkey. Greece has a breathing space but not yet a long-term answer to its political and institutional problems. The same is true, therefore, for US-Greek relations.

**Turkey**

Turkey’s ties to the US have become severely strained by the Turks’ resentment over the US arms embargo. Despite Congressional easing of the embargo in early October, US military assistance has become an issue in partisan political debate. The Turkish Government, claiming that the US abrogated the bilateral Defense Cooperation Agreement by imposing the embargo, has initiated negotiations to draft a new Agreement. In addition to wanting to control US activities in Turkey, the Turks are also seeking guaranteed access to US arms. The future of US-Turkish relations will depend, in large part, on the outcome of these negotiations.

At the best, the Turks will not in the future allow themselves to depend upon the US as completely as in the past, particularly with respect to military equipment. The need for spare parts to keep their military machine rolling has demonstrated to them the value of diversifying sources of supply. Western Europe is Turkey’s first choice as a supplemental source of equipment. But the Turks know that the European Allies cannot take care of all their needs. If Turkey is able to satisfy its basic military needs through the pipeline aid it now receives from the US, from whatever FY 1976 security assistance Congress approves, and additionally from its West European allies, its current close ties with NATO will most likely be maintained. If Turkey cannot maintain its military strength at a satisfactory level by depending upon these sources, it could intensify its search for arms and for financial assistance in procuring arms from Iran and the Arab world. Ankara might then also seek a political stance more independent of the Alliance than heretofore. Even some kind of eventual accommodation with the Soviets is not to be ruled out, including possible purchase of military support equipment and a non-aggression pact.

In addition to the motives for possible adjustments in Turkey’s foreign policy described above, pressures from the religious-based National Salvation Party and extremist groups for a closer alignment with the Moslem world might intensify. Differences and prejudices engrained by time will be difficult to overcome, however, and without strong Arab inducements—in the shape of substantial financial assistance—no lasting relationship is likely to develop. Even such inducements would be unlikely to sway the Turkish political elite from their
long-standing commitment to economic and social development along Western lines.

The two major Turkish parties recognize that their country’s long-term political, economic, and security interests lie with the West. They would like to remove the major irritant to continued cooperation with the West by achieving a rapprochement with Greece. However, the persistence of weak government in Ankara compounds the problem of reaching a settlement on Cyprus. Even at the best, however, the Turks will want their continued relationship with the US to be on a different basis than before. They want less dependence on the US as a source of military supplies and greater control over US facilities in Turkey.

[Omitted here are portions of Section I unrelated to Greece and Turkey.]

II. Conclusions

These conclusions can be drawn from the foregoing analysis:

1) Despite the growth of the Soviet fleet, pressure on the NATO base structure and other constraints, the military balance of power in the Mediterranean still rests with the West.

2) The US has some flexibility in responding to political pressures on its base structure and can accept certain operating, tenure or occupation restrictions on its bases in individual countries without markedly reducing its objectives in the area and its ability to implement them. Compensations for base losses can be effected in certain cases but would entail military, economic or political costs. Opportunities exist for some relocation of US facilities from areas under political pressure, such as CONUS basing of SSBN’s. Additionally, some operational flexibility could be achieved [2 lines not declassified]. New systems over the next five years provide alternatives for airlift and certain intelligence capabilities not dependent on location. On the other hand, the prospects for devolution of current US military missions in the Mediterranean to our Allies are limited by weaknesses in Allied capabilities, political constraints which would also act upon them, and the fact that certain of our roles can be performed only by the US.

3) The political environment we face in Southern Europe is ambiguous and in flux. In some respects the US and NATO position continues to have strong foundations. Several of the countries continue to feel a need for alliance with the US against a too powerful and too near Soviet Union. Détente has weakened but by no means destroyed this factor, nor is it likely to. Some governments also value the US tie as an element in their domestic stability.

4) There are, in fact, some prospects for improvement in the Western position. These include the possibility of closer ties between
post-Franco Spain and NATO and of a reduction in the Greek-Turkish
tension which is the main immediate source of US and NATO diffi-
culties with both countries. Another stabilizing factor would be the in-
crease of Western European influence in the area. Neither the European
Community nor its members is going to be in a position to take over
the major US stabilizing role in the Southern European area for the
foreseeable future. But both the EC and its members can contribute to
the orderly evolution of the area by means of the economic assistance
they can provide and the political influence which, in varying degrees,
they possess. US-European coordination of policy toward the South-
ern countries should thus be a major goal if the leverage we have
among us is to be applied most effectively.

5) Nevertheless, US influence is in decline in all of the area coun-
tries, in different degrees and for different reasons. Decline, of course,
does not mean disappearance (US influence may still remain very con-
siderable even if it is reduced as compared to the height of the cold
war), nor is it necessarily balanced by an increase of Soviet influence.
But the US will have to modify some of its policies with respect to both
bilateral and multilateral relations if it is to maintain even an adequate
(i.e., less than desirable) level of influence in countries it has hitherto
largely been able to take for granted.

6) One consequence of this change will be that US access to the
military facilities which underpin its and NATO’s position in the
Mediterranean will be under continuing pressure for the long-term. It
is not possible to say with any certainty just which installations will be
affected, to what extent, or when, once we get past the present round
of negotiations. Planning for these future contingencies must be hy-
pothetical, whether it is a question of seeking to modify or terminate
certain missions, devolve them on our allies or relocate certain facili-
ties to places outside the five countries (none of which is likely, in any
case, to accept more US facilities than it now has). The timing and ex-
tent of US military cutbacks will, in turn, have a bearing on the inter-
nal stability and foreign policies of all the countries whose stability and
policies are affected, however intangibly, by the US military presence.

7) A second consequence will be that NATO risks becoming an in-
creasingly jagged alliance in the Southern flank, with Portugal, Greece
and possibly others joining France in a less-than-full type of member-
ship, while Spain, on the other hand, might be assimilated to the Al-
liance but also, possibly, in a less-than-full relationship. At a minimum,
through emphasis on particular national problems, and through an
emotional and self-centered approach to NATO’s activities on the part
of these Southern European states, the institutional integrity and ef-
fectiveness of NATO will suffer. The US may face a choice between
a shrunken but relatively homogeneous alliance from which half-
members have been dropped and a more irregular alliance including Southern flank countries (and perhaps others to whom they will set an example) in a variety of membership relationships.

8) A third consequence is the problem of governments in some of these countries which include Communists or others who are hostile to NATO. Such an alliance would be very different, in homogeneity and ideological contour, from what it has been since its inception. The US choice would be between ejecting such members (at some point to be determined when Communists et al enter or come to dominate certain governments) or putting up with them (perhaps with limits on their participation in Alliance affairs) for as long as they continue to want to maintain membership.

9) The Soviet response to this situation has been cautious and is likely to remain so, at least while the main thrust of its foreign policy is toward détente with the US. Negative developments in the six countries are not mainly the work of the USSR, but it will exploit them when it can do so with minimal risk to its relations with the US. Nevertheless, if the USSR is able to reassert its influence in Yugoslavia after Tito’s passing, it will be in a good position to exert political pressure further afield (though a success of that sort could also have counterproductive results for the USSR).

[Omitted here are Section III, “Issues and Options,” Section IV, “Strategies,” and two Annexes.]

57. Telegram From the Embassy in Greece to the Department of State

Athens, December 24, 1975, 1337Z.

10150. For the Secretary. Subject: Death of Richard S. Welch: Some Preliminary Comments. Refs: Athens 10112, 10113 and 10116.

1 Source: National Archives, RG 84, Athens Embassy Files: Lot 78 F 160, Box 63, POL 23–8, Assassination of Richard Welch. Confidential; Immediate; Exdis. Drafted by George Barbis (POL), cleared by Monteagle Stearns (DCM) and R. Estes (OSA), and approved by Kubisch.

2 Telegrams 10112, 10113, and 10116 from Athens, December 23, reported the shooting of Welch outside his home upon returning from a reception at the Ambassador’s residence, the Embassy’s confirmation of Welch’s death, and the Greek Government’s statement. (Ibid., RG 59, Central Foreign Policy Files, 1975)
1. The assassination last night of Dick Welch has sent a sharp shock wave through our Embassy and the American community in Greece. As of late this morning December 24, we still have no hard information as to who committed this terrible crime and why.

2. The Greek Government has been cooperative and vigorous in initiating an extensive investigation and is making a major effort to apprehend those responsible. In addition, senior Greek officials have informed me that additional security measures have been undertaken for the protection of U.S. officials in Greece.

3. During the night I spoke repeatedly by telephone with Minister of Coordination Papaligouras (the senior Minister in Athens at the present time in view of Caramanlis’ absence in Corfu), Defense Minister Averoff and Foreign Minister Bitsios. Averoff also personally came to the Embassy during the night on instructions from the Prime Minister to convey officially the regrets of the Greek Government over this tragic event and to assure me that the Greek Government was taking all appropriate action to get to the bottom of it. In addition, President Tsatsos abruptly terminated an official dinner last night and sent his Diplomatic Counselor to see me to convey his personal and official regrets. Prime Minister Caramanlis also personally called me from Corfu early this morning for the same purpose.

4. Despite the shock and sadness we all feel here over Dick’s death, the Embassy is of course open today and functioning as normally as possible although I have ordered that certain additional security measures be taken. We are also flying the flag at half mast for today. We have received innumerable calls and visits from Greeks and representatives of other Governments expressing their sympathy and abhorrence over this event.

5. Although we do not as yet have any firm clues as to who the perpetrators of this crime are or why they did it, the environment in which we operate here certainly has played a part. You are undoubtedly aware that we continue to be subject to attacks and criticism in the press—although somewhat more muted now—and there has been a renewed upsurge lately of virulent anti-CIA stories, based mostly on news stories filed from Washington. This was given a special impetus last month when the English language Athens News published a list of alleged CIA officials in Athens (Athens 9252). Dick Welch was named as the CIA Station Chief here in this and other stories that followed, which also gave his home address. Some papers also printed pictures of his residence.

3 Dated November 26. (Ibid.)
6. In addition to this general atmosphere of animosity toward the CIA there are, of course, numerous groups in Greece, including Greek Cypriot students, refugees and others, who have particularly strong feelings about the alleged activities and responsibilities of the CIA in connection with the Junta and the subsequent Cyprus tragedy. It is too early to say whether the assassins came from these or any other Greek Cypriot or Greek group of either extreme. Hopefully the investigation being conducted by the Greek police authorities will reveal the identity of those responsible quickly. I intend to see that they spare no effort.

7. By septels we are reporting Greek press reaction to the assassination and information regarding the family’s desires for returning the remains to the U.S. including funeral arrangements. Mrs. Welch has remained at her residence and is bearing up extraordinarily well under the circumstances and with considerable courage. Dick’s seventy-five year old father, Colonel Patrick Welch, is also bearing up relatively well. Mr. Welch’s three children, who are at present in England, have already been notified of their father’s death.

Kubisch

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58. Memorandum Prepared in the Central Intelligence Agency


SUBJECT
Assassination of Senior US Embassy Official in Athens

Possible Perpetrators

1. Although we do not yet know the identities or the affiliation of the assassins, various individuals and groups do seem to stand out as possible suspects. These range from the extreme left to the extreme right and their home base could be Greece, Cyprus or elsewhere.

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1 Source: Central Intelligence Agency, Executive Registry, Job 80–M00165A, Box 17, Death of Richard Welch. Secret; Not Releasable to Foreign Nationals.
2. The perpetrators of the assassination may well have been extreme leftist Greek youths, possibly associated with the violence-prone splinter groups of the far left. These have been implicated in other violent activities such as the storming of the US Embassy last April on the anniversary of the military takeover in 1967. Four members of the Revolutionary Communist Movement of Greece were recently convicted for their role in the attack on the embassy. Such groups, which reportedly have fraternal ties to Palestinian students in Greece and possibly to elements of the Palestinian Liberation Organization, roundly condemn the traditional communist left as bourgeois and opportunist.

3. It is in fact unlikely that the country’s three main Communist parties, which have condemned violence and seem more interested in improving their respectability, were involved. Even extreme leftist Andreas Papandreou is probably shrewd enough to see the folly in such actions despite his shrill anti-American and anti-CIA rhetoric, although he may not have total control over his numerous youthful followers. Any of the main leftist parties, especially the Moscow-backed Communist Party of the Exterior, could have been responsible for the recent revelation of the identities of alleged CIA case officers in Greece however.

4. There is an outside chance the assassins were right-wing provocateurs. In light of the revelations of the names of the alleged CIA employees, rightist elements may have considered this an opportune time to act in the belief that blame would be heaped on the left.

5. Alternatively, the assassins could have been Greek Cypriots. Various reports have confirmed the existence of extremist groups on the left and right in Cyprus whose avowed aim is to attack Turkish as well as British and American targets. Extreme leftist Vassos Lyssarides, himself the object of an assassination attempt, is one of the most vocal propagators of anti-American and anti-CIA rhetoric. There may also be a connection between this most recent shooting and the earlier assassinations of the Turkish ambassadors to Austria and France. The assassins of the Turkish ambassadors have never been identified, although speculation has centered on Greeks or Greek Cypriots as well as on Armenians or Turkish dissidents.

**Motives**

6. Virulent anti-Americanism and a corresponding desire to rid Greece and Cyprus of US influences are the most likely motives behind the assassination. It was probably also an act of revenge, stemming from a belief that the US has been the principal obstacle to the realization of leftist aspirations going as far back as the Greek Civil War in the 1940s when massive US assistance prevented a communist takeover. Many Greeks also believe that the US installed and sustained the military juntas that ruled Greece between 1967 and 1974 and are convinced that the US engineered or at least could have prevented the
Turkish invasion of Cyprus. Greek anger has been fueled by the revelations of the junta’s use of torture on a large scale against leftists as well as by the stories of CIA involvement in Greece and Cyprus emanating from the US press and the Congressional hearings.

7. In the event the assassination was rightist-inspired, the aim of the right would clearly be to force the government to abandon its policy of toleration toward the left that it has viewed with such alarm.

**Political Implications**

8. The assassination will increase the level of recriminations between the left and right which has grown substantially in the past few months. The Caramanlis Government will now come under greater pressure from the right to take some measures against the left. Caramanlis has thus far resisted such pressures, preferring instead to maintain a middle of the road policy between left and right but he may now bow to pressures and adopt a policy less tolerant of leftist activity.

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**59. Telegram From the Embassy in Greece to the Department of State**

Athens, December 30, 1975, 1645Z.

10243. Subject: Greek Government Offers Reward for Information Leading to Solution of Murder of Richard S. Welch. Ref: (A) Athens 10187 (Notal) (B) Athens 10189 (Notal).2

1. Despite the blackout ordered over the weekend (ref A),3 the Athens press has continued to print stories on the Welch assassination based largely on foreign press reports. However, the principal story in the press on December 30 is the announcement by the Ministry of Public Order of monetary rewards for information in connection with

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1 Source: National Archives, RG 84, Athens Embassy Files: Lot 78 F 160, Box 63, POL 23–8, Assassination of Richard Welch. Limited Official Use; Immediate. Repeated Priority to Ankara, Nicosia, Thessaloniki, and DIA with a request to pass to USIA. Drafted by John Collins (POL); cleared by Stearns, Edward Alexander (PAO), and R. Estes (OSA); and approved by Barbis (POL).

2 Telegram 10187 from Athens, December 29. (Ibid.) Telegram 10189 from Athens, December 29. (Ibid., RG 59, Central Foreign Policy Files, 1975)

3 As reported in telegram 10187, the Public Prosecutor’s Office in Athens ordered a press blackout of the Welch murder investigation in response to ongoing major coverage in the Greek press of the Welch murder. The stories had more speculation than facts to report about who was responsible for the murder.
2. The Ministry’s announcement states that the Greek Government had authorized payment of five million drachmas to anyone providing specific information on the identity of the murderers; a sum of between one and two million drachmas will be given for information which contributes to clarification of the affair. The announcement asserted that anyone providing such information could be assured that his anonymity would be protected in every way. The Ministry cited as a basis for this the justified public interest and the need to accelerate the investigation so that an early solution to the crime, which is both “hideous and unprecedented in Greek experience,” can be found.

3. Press reports also covered the simple ceremony (ref B) held on December 29 at the Athenai (U.S.) Air Base when the remains of the deceased departed for the United States. Several newspapers carried a photograph of an honor guard of Marines carrying the coffin onto the aircraft.

4. There have been no leads in the investigation. The Greek press had reported earlier that two different organizations have claimed credit for the Welch murder. One called itself the “Organization of Officers of the National Idea” and the other the “November 17th” organization (after the date of the 1973 events at the Polytechnion). However, the police have apparently not taken either of these claims seriously.

5. Comment: In response to press queries the only replies we are making have been in connection with arrangements for the departure of the remains of the deceased and of the family, and biographic information of a general and unclassified nature. More specifically, we are making no comment in response to questions about the effect of the assassination on our bilateral relations with Greece and are of course refraining from any comment on the crime itself or the investigation.

6. Department, USIA and other Washington agencies dealing with the media should bear in mind that although a virtual blackout exists of local comment on the murder, the Greek press continues to reproduce foreign press accounts and statements. It is in fact relying on these to keep the story rolling. As usual “quotations” are frequently wrenched out of context and elaborated to suit the editorial purposes of individual Greek papers. In these circumstances it is particularly important for US spokesmen to avoid speculative comment of any kind, whether for attribution or on background, and for VOA to confine its treatment to hard news developments.

Kubisch

4 The Ambassador initialed next to his typed signature.

SUBJECT
U.S.-Greek Bases Negotiations—Status Report

The third round in the U.S.-Greek bases negotiations ended on February 13. The following is a brief summary of developments to date and issues which remain to be negotiated. We have made substantial progress in our bases negotiations with the Greeks. Principal problems to be ironed out are our use of the air facilities at Souda Bay, Crete.

Status of Forces Agreement

Except for one relatively minor issue, agreement has been reached on a new Status of Forces Agreement (SOFA). State expects that this issue will be quickly resolved and that the new agreement will be formally implemented shortly through an exchange of notes. The new agreement will reduce somewhat the privileges accorded U.S. military personnel in Greece, but they will still enjoy rights in excess of those provided for in the basic NATO SOFA.

Telecommunications

Through the work of a special subgroup, which has met periodically over the past six months, we have concluded several agreements on ways by which the Greeks can benefit directly from our telecommunications facilities. Specifically, we have agreed to provide them training, equipment, and the use of spare circuitry.

Command and Control

The Greeks are seeking the “Hellenization” of our facilities through an agreement which would define the responsibilities and duties of the American and Greek commanders of each facility, provide for the flying of the Greek flag, and call for the maintenance of external security by Greek guards, etc. DOD is preparing a draft agreement on this
subject, and we have offered to host at an early date a subgroup meeting to discuss it.

Hellenikon Air Base

This has been the most difficult issue in the negotiations. Last spring we agreed to close the separate U.S. Air Force Base at Athens International Airport and combine it with the adjoining Greek Air Force Base, commonly called Hellenikon. Since then, we have been battling with the Greeks over the number of U.S. military personnel who would be permitted to remain at the facility. In the last negotiating session, the Greek side finally agreed we could keep approximately 1050 personnel on the base and we could relocate a number of support activities off the base in the Athens area. (There are now about 1500 U.S. military personnel on the base.) The agreement is, however, [1 line not declassified]. In round three, we described in general terms what we could offer, and we invited a Greek team to visit the U.S. for further discussions. The team will probably come here in early April. State is reasonably optimistic that we can develop a package which will satisfy the Greeks, thus nailing down the Hellenikon issue.

Souda Bay

In the third round, we made a strong approach to the Greek side to lift the remaining restrictions on our operations at Souda Bay which were imposed during the 1974 Cyprus crisis. A special subgroup met several times to discuss these restrictions, as well as our interest in revising the existing (1959) agreement to permit expanded use by the U.S. Navy of Souda Bay airfield. State believes it will be difficult to achieve our objectives, at least in the near future, because of the Greek Government’s sensitivity to the leftist campaign in Crete against foreign bases.

Umbrella Agreement

The Greek side has emphasized interest in an overall military facilities agreement which would be submitted to the Greek Parliament for approval and to which would be attached as annexes the separate agreements that we have concluded on specific subjects. In round three, we told the Greeks that we could agree in principle [2 lines not declassified]. The Greeks listened to our presentation on the Greek-NATO relationship, but gave no hint as to whether or when they would reply.

Besides the visits to the U.S. [less than 1 line not declassified] and a subgroup session on command and control, State expects that there will be subgroup meetings on Souda Bay and possibly on Hellenikon in the next two months. Depending on the progress achieved in these
meetings, a fourth negotiating round will probably be scheduled for May. Although we could conceivably conclude our bilateral negotiations in this round [1½ lines not declassified] State's current guess is that a fifth plenary will be needed in the summer or early fall.

61. Backchannel Message From the Ambassador to Greece (Kubisch) to the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (Scowcroft)\(^1\)

Athens, March 4, 1976, 1733Z.

399. Subj: Caramanlis Visit.

1. I am happy to tell you that Caramanlis accepts with pleasure the June 15–16 dates and is very much looking forward to his visit and meetings with the President.

2. He would like to receive a suggested program for his stay in Washington, including when he should plan to arrive and depart. He is considering spending a few additional days in the U.S. after leaving Washington and is open to suggestions as to where he should go. He anticipates many requests to meet and attend functions of Greek-American groups in the U.S.

3. He wants the visit to cap our steadily improving bilateral relationship and therefore believes it should also have at least one major substantive aspect. Since he feels a Cyprus settlement is improbable—given the situation in Turkey—he would like to see some kind of U.S.—or NATO—related plan to guarantee peace in the Aegean. This would have a tremendously favorable impact here and pave the way for a return to NATO as well.

4. Caramanlis envisages a brief one or two sentence announcement of the visit, both in Washington and Athens, but is inclined to defer it for a while longer. However, he is open to our suggestions on this.

5. I will await your guidance on how to proceed.

6. Warm regards.

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Memorandum of Conversation

Washington, March 31, 1976, 3:30 p.m.

PARTICIPANTS
The Secretary
Under Secretary Sisco
Mr. Eagleton, EUR/SE, (notetaker)
Ambassador Alexandrakis
Mr. Loukas Tsilis

Secretary: It is always a pleasure to see someone who controls more votes in the Congress than I do. (laughter)

Alexandrakis: I am always impressed by your speeches.

Secretary: With the friendship of Greece my career will be complete. But frankly, all of my life has been more associated with Greece than with Turkey. It was our strategy during the first week of the Cyprus crisis to protect Greece. Everyone wanted me to condemn Greece but I thought that to do so would only encourage the Turks. In the second round there was entirely too much confusion. We were going through a Presidential transition. Callaghan was getting emotional. Mavros was no help, if you don’t mind my saying so. We really had no great strategy, we lost control of events.

Sisco: We have often discussed this. I believe if we had been more involved at Geneva the outcome might have been different.

Secretary: The fact is that the Turkish proposal at Geneva you would accept now, but if we had pressed it at that time it would have produced anti-American riots in Athens. Were it not for the Presidential crisis at that time we might have been able to do more.

Alexandrakis: Yes, I have a message from Foreign Minister Bitsios (hands the Secretary a letter which he reads). In the March 31 letter, attached but not printed, Bitsios characterized the U.S. decision for restoring a defense cooperation agreement with Turkey as “massive military aid to the wrongdoer,” not because Greece opposed a U.S.-Turkish agreement to consolidate allied defense but because the particulars of the agreement would weaken that defense. Any aid to Turkey would push two NATO allies closer to the brink of disaster. Greece viewed the current situation as a failure of the Greek decision to exercise moderation in negotiation while enabling Turkey to gain a military advantage over Greece.

1 Source: Library of Congress, Manuscript Division, Kissinger Papers, Box CI.275, Memoranda of Conversations, Chronological File. Secret; Nodis. Drafted by Eagleton and approved in S on July 13. The meeting was held in the Secretary’s office.

2 Reference is to the Turkish proposal for an autonomous Turkish Cypriot administration. See Document 126.

3 In the March 31 letter, attached but not printed, Bitsios characterized the U.S. decision for restoring a defense cooperation agreement with Turkey as “massive military aid to the wrongdoer,” not because Greece opposed a U.S.-Turkish agreement to consolidate allied defense but because the particulars of the agreement would weaken that defense. Any aid to Turkey would push two NATO allies closer to the brink of disaster. Greece viewed the current situation as a failure of the Greek decision to exercise moderation in negotiation while enabling Turkey to gain a military advantage over Greece.
Alexandrakis: We are faced with Turkish expansion and aggression, statements by Turkish officials are there to prove it. Turkey will be carrying out petroleum research in the Aegean in May and Greece will have to take counter-action. Vice President Turkes said recently that all islands within 50 kilometers should be Turkish.

On a personal basis I would like to make some additional comments. I would ask for your attention in this delicate situation to make something clear. It is my duty to call your attention to the danger of a lack of US understanding of our views on these issues. This is not a threat, but there are developments that ensue that would be unfortunate.

Secretary: Do you mean inside Greece?
Alexandrakis: Inside Greece and in the area.

Secretary: I have difficulty evaluating what you are saying. We have made clear that we were negotiating with Turkey. We have explained that the agreement provides a level comparable, or a little above, what we have always given Turkey—the same level considering inflation. This has been presented in a manner that allows Turkey to present this to its people. The Exlm Bank loans also are similar to those of recent years. I cannot accept the proposition that this constitutes anything new. Delivery of major military items will mostly be in the period 1978–79, so this cannot affect the immediate situation.

As for provocative acts by Turkey against Greece, we would strongly oppose this. If you mean military force we would oppose it and support you against it.

As for provision for a Greek agreement, this should be comparable. I have not studied this, but we want to strengthen Greece and the present Government of Greece. We cannot change the fact that our affection is unrequited. Really this has been a tragedy. You have been a chief actor in using pressure to get us to do things. Normally when a foreign government comes to us as a friend we don’t fail it.

In Cyprus the objective is to get back territory. There are two ways to do this. You chose Congress’ way. We had our own way. We want the friendship and cooperation of Greece and are prepared to show great friendship and cooperation ourselves. You should have a comparable agreement. You can assure your minister that we will make every effort to respond to your needs.

Alexandrakis: There are two things: Aid and security. A Turkish agreement will enhance Turkey’s aggression.

Secretary: We made it clear to the Turks that our relationship will depend on progress on Cyprus. Furthermore, we have to get appropriations from Congress every year. Congress will not be receptive if there is any Turkish aggression. It has been our assumption that Cyprus will be settled. We will do our utmost to promote this.
Alexandrakis: I don’t really have any control over the Greek-Americans.

Secretary: Mr. Ambassador, your Israeli colleague tells me he has no control.

Alexandrakis: We don’t have such control as they have.

Secretary: Some of your people are influenced from the Cypriots. I genuinely believe that if two things had not happened, if Ecevit had not resigned and the Congress had not passed the embargo, we would have settled Cyprus in early 1975. It is not right for the Greeks and Americans to be estranged.

Alexandrakis: I agree, we suffer from this.

Secretary: I never joined the harassment of your previous government. I was neutral; but now I have great admiration for your prime minister—and your foreign minister. We should try to calm the situation. As for provocative Turkish military action, we will oppose it.

Alexandrakis: A public statement would be helpful.

Secretary: Can we do this?

Sisco: Perhaps we can when we go to the Congress with the Turkish Agreement.

Secretary: Let’s see about this. We could say that we want things settled peacefully and would oppose any military action. Let’s try a formula such as “assistance to Turkey is for NATO defense.” Of course this is in the agreement.

Alexandrakis: Yes, this is nothing new.

Secretary: Then we could say we would oppose a military move against a NATO ally.

Alexandrakis: You were kind to say you envisage a similar agreement for Greece. If this could be said publicly—

Secretary: Why don’t you get instructions to this effect and we will let you know what we can say by Friday.4

Alexandrakis: If you could say it would be the same level.

Secretary: We can’t say that, but we can say that we are prepared in principle to make a multi-year agreement with Greece.

I want you to know I understand your domestic problems. We feel Caramanlis should be strong domestically. We should be able to say we are making a multi-year agreement with you. Tell Bitsios I think of him with great respect.

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4 During the noon briefing on April 2, Kissinger remarked: “Greece will, of course, continue to be able to obtain military equipment from the United States during the period of the proposed agreement with Turkey.” (Telegram 080223 to Athens, April 2; National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy Files, 1976)
Alexandrakis: I know he feels the same way.
Secretary: We will do our utmost to be helpful.
(On the way to the door)
Secretary: There was really nothing in the agreement that should cause you problems. In it the Turks encompass a number of things we had been discussing with them for some time. The planes will not arrive until 1978–79.
Alexandrakis: Caglayan said there would be F–4’s in the interim.
Secretary: Yes, there will be 14 F–4’s over a period of 15 months.
Alexandrakis: What about the ships?
Secretary: There will be a thirty year old destroyer and two old submarines.

63. Memorandum From the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Scowcroft) to President Ford

Washington, April 8, 1976.

SUBJECT

Reply to Prime Minister Constantine Caramanlis of Greece

Following the signing of the US-Turkish Defense Cooperation Agreement (DCA), Prime Minister Constantine Caramanlis of Greece sent you the following message:

“April 1, 1976

Dear Mr. President:

I am convinced that the recent United States-Turkish agreement raises most serious problems for Greece and dangers for the peace of this region.

Our two foreign ministers have already exchanged views on the situation and I have the feeling that these problems can be resolved to the benefit of the United States, Greece, Turkey and the Free World.


2 The agreement was signed on March 26, but Congress did not act upon it because of the embargo, which was not lifted until 1978. See Document 247.
Knowing your statesmanship and your personal interest in settling the tragic situation obtaining in this area of the world, I would be obliged if you would give your full support to the arrangements now being discussed.

Warm regards,

Sincerely,

Constantine Caramanlis”

The Prime Minister’s message reflects the Greek government’s concern that the new US-Turkish defense agreement favors Turkey over Greece and may serve to destabilize the delicate balance of power in the Eastern Mediterranean area. In this connection, the Greek government “suspended” talks with the United States on the future of U.S. bases in Greece and asked for assurances of U.S. support for Greece in the event of a Greek-Turkish confrontation in the Aegean, together with a level of U.S. aid for Greece equal to that assured Turkey in the new DCA. Additionally, Prime Minister Caramanlis has contacted the heads of government of the EC–9 asking that they express Greece’s concerns to the United States.

As you know, Secretary Kissinger has been giving the Greek request careful study and has been in close and continuing contact with Greek Foreign Minister Bitsios on this matter. They are currently working to reach agreement on an exchange of letters for public release, stating U.S. support for assistance levels for Greece comparable with Turkey while avoiding an explicit commitment on our part to intervene in any Greek-Turkish dispute in the Mediterranean or Aegean.

The message for your approval to Prime Minister Caramanlis at Tab A would thank him for his letter of April 1, note the continuing contacts between the Secretary of State and the Greek Foreign Minister, and express your confidence that the present concern of the Greek government over the US-Turkish defense agreement can be resolved in a way which will benefit both countries and help preserve and strengthen the peace and stability of the Eastern Mediterranean area.

The text of your message has been cleared with Douglas Smith of Robert Hartmann’s office.

Recommendation

That you approve the message to Prime Minister Caramanlis at Tab A for immediate dispatch to Athens.  

3 Not attached; the letter was transmitted to Athens in telegram 086496, April 9. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy Files, 1976)

4 Ford initialed the approve option.
64. Memorandum of Conversation

Washington, April 14, 1976, 4 p.m.

SUBJECT
Secretary’s Meeting with Greek Foreign Minister Dimitri Bitsios

PARTICIPANTS
Greece
- Foreign Minister Dimitri Bitsios
- Ambassador John Tzounis, Director General, Ministry of Foreign Affairs
- Ambassador Menelas Alexandrakis, Greek Ambassador to the United States
- Anthony Nomikos, Minister, Greek Embassy
- Loukas Tsilas, Counselor, Greek Embassy
- Panayotis Vlassopoulos, Aide to Minister Bitsios

United States
- The Secretary
- Under Secretary Sisco
- Monroe Leigh, Legal Adviser
- Assistant Secretary Hartman
- William Eagleton, EUR/SE (notetaker)

The Secretary: As I understand it, we have settled everything on the exchanges? Could I have your reaction?

Bitsios: I would like to have Mr. Hartman’s interpretation of your message.

The Secretary: We have changed it to “actively and unequivocally” and removed the part in the first paragraph.

Bitsios: The formula regarding your position in case we ask for credits and loans. Your position is definitely that the sums should be omitted.

The Secretary: Yes.

Bitsios: Paragraph four of the principles. How does it read?

The Secretary: “Security assistance.”

Bitsios: That is difficult for us.

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1 Source: Library of Congress, Manuscript Division, Kissinger Papers, Box CL 275, Memoranda of Conversations, Chronological File. Secret; Nodis. Drafted by Eagleton on April 16 and approved in S on July 7. The meeting was held in the Secretary’s office. Several meetings took place in preparation for this 4 p.m. meeting, Kissinger, Sisco, and Hartman met with Alexandrakis on April 1. (Memorandum of conversation; ibid.) Internal State meetings were held on April 2, 5, and 14 (9:45 a.m. and 1:15 p.m.). (Memoranda of conversations; ibid.)

2 Kissinger’s reference is to a proposed exchange of letters between himself and Bitsios regarding further discussions of issues of interest between Greece and the United States.
The Secretary: Why?

Bitsios: My Government needs military assistance. The price of new weapons is increasing all the time.

The Secretary: [1 line not declassified] This does not change the fact. Such aid is guaranteed under our “Security Assistance Act.”

Tzounis: Why can’t we call it military assistance?

The Secretary: [4 lines not declassified]

Bitsios: What is the problem with Turkey?

The Secretary: We have given them a rough idea of our planning, and we have had an outraged reaction from Caglayangil no less strong than yours was. They say that this might jeopardize their agreement, and they are worried that we might be exchanging letters on the Eastern Mediterranean. They would certainly react. We have not given them the exchange or the figure. They would consider about $400 million appropriate. Their argument is related to the size of population and military forces. [5 lines not declassified] This is the fact, but our advice from Ankara is that we are going to have a violent reaction even if the documents are unchanged.

Bitsios: We have all tried to be careful not to raise sensitive issues. I suppose removing part of the first sentence was related to this problem. For me it was embarrassing since it had been agreed to. But it was understandable. However, I don’t think we should go so far as to ask the Turks how to describe the $700 million.

The Secretary: We have not given them figures or formulations. Security Assistance is the name of the Act under which our military assistance is given.

Bitsios: We discussed this with the Prime Minister, and my mandate is to stand by the term military.

The Secretary: If I threw in my pants, would it work?

(Laughter)

(To Hartman) Did we accept the word military?

Hartman: I said I would convey it to you.

Alexandrakis: You said you accepted it.

The Secretary: He said he would accept it but that the son of a bitch in charge may not go along, or something to that effect.

Hartman: Not really.

The Secretary: Let me discuss this with my colleagues. I will call you back on it this evening.

Tzounis: This is an important point for us.

The Secretary: We will call you before 7 p.m. We can still work on the text tonight.
What are we signing?

Hartman: The document of principles. The letters will already be signed and they will be released tomorrow.\(^3\) Hamilton is releasing your exchange today.\(^4\)

The Secretary: Is this on his initiative?
Hartman: Yes.
The Secretary: We will make it available in our Press Office.
Tzounis: The economic assurance is an oral one.
The Secretary: You can use it, however, and I will confirm it. We can refer to it in general terms.

(To Hartman) When is your backgrounder?
Hartman: Tomorrow afternoon.
The Secretary: The only thing remaining is that you (Hartman) should make it clear in the briefing [8 lines not declassified]. You had better explain this.

Tzounis: [less than 1 line not declassified] It will be signed at the time of the US-Greek agreement?
Hartman: Yes, but we will sign the proces verbal now (tomorrow).
The Secretary: Should we talk about Cyprus? I had thought it might be useful for an American to be engaged, since neither side seems to be able to come forward with realistic proposals. An American could explore the possibilities with both sides and perhaps introduce some ideas of his own. This might open things up. This would help avoid the debate on who puts forward the first proposals. As it is now, the Greek side will propose very little and then the Turks will come back with little. It might save some of the steps if an American put forward something to which the parties could react.

We have discussed this with the Turks, who were at first reluctant. They now agree, however, if it is done in the context of other Greek-Turkish problems. I have asked David Bruce, but he won’t do it. Perhaps Tyler or someone else.

\(^3\) Kissinger and Bitsios signed “Principles to Guide Future U.S.-Greek Defense Cooperation” on April 15 at 12:30 p.m. The text of the agreement was reported in telegram 90619 to NATO and related military commands on April 16. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy Files, 1976)

\(^4\) Telegram 90622 to NATO and related military commands, April 16, relayed the exchange of letters between Representative Lee Hamilton (D-Indiana) and Kissinger on April 8 and 13, regarding the U.S.-Turkish Defense Cooperation Agreement of March 26. While Hamilton supported strengthening the U.S.-Turkish relationship, he wanted assurances from Kissinger that the agreement would not raise the level of tension between Greece and Turkey in the eastern Mediterranean. (Ibid.)
Bitsios: The difficulty is the linkage between Cyprus and other difficulties we have with the Turks. Have you discussed this with the Cypriots?

The Secretary: No, we have discussed this only with CaglayanGil.

Bitsios: The position of the Cypriots is that they refuse the direct involvement of the Greek Government in seeking terms of a solution. They do not want the Greek Government discussing terms. They want this to be done between the communities. Secondly, they are convinced that they have fulfilled their obligations by putting forward proposals suggesting a 20% basis and leaving open the door to a bizonal arrangement. In their proposal there is nothing to exclude a bizonal system, and they suggest 20% and they suggest using some maps that have already been discussed as a starting point.

The Cypriots are convinced that Denktash should now be making his own proposals. So this is what is in the minds of the Cypriots.

It will be a political impossibility for the Government of Greece to discuss behind the backs of the Cypriots any concrete suggestions. In Brussels we discussed procedural questions. I don’t think they will accept that we discuss solutions.

The Secretary: I don’t exclude that—it does not need to be exclusively with your government. We could say we were concerned with Greece and Turkish questions, including Cyprus.

Bitsios: If he could go to Cyprus and put his suggestions to the two sides, it would be different.

Hartman: The trouble is there will be two proposals, and both will be bad. There is even a question whether the two sides will meet. The first thing is to get them back to meeting.

Bitsios: I hope that if Denktash puts forward proposals, we will be back in business. I did not expect Denktash to like the Cyprus proposals.

The Secretary: We can do our utmost to produce a Turkish counter-proposal.

Bitsios: Our differences with Turkey are as follows: one, the continental shelf; two, air space. We have made some concrete proposals and had four rounds on air space. We have exhausted the subject. We said they could consider our proposals open.

On the continental shelf, we have proposed taking the matter to the International Court. They accepted this but have been reluctant to proceed. Tzounis had a meeting with them in Bern, with legal experts on both sides. Unfortunately the difference between us is so far apart that our proposal to send the question to the Court was clearly justified.
The Secretary: You don’t see too much of a problem with our designing an American. We know the Cypriots’ first proposals are far less than what the Archbishop has told me he would be prepared to do. I am not eager to have the United States put forward proposals.

Tzounis: How do you envisage an American initiative? Would it be related to the intercommunal talks?

The Secretary: Yes. We would have to work this out with Waldheim beforehand.

Bitsios: You know Makarios’ position regarding a solution.

The Secretary: I even have the suspicion that the Archbishop might not have told me everything he is prepared to do.

Bitsios: What did he tell you?

The Secretary: He said 25%.

Bitsios: That is correct. Caramanlis came to you and said he was backing this position.

The Secretary: I have not told the Turks about it. Don’t you think if the United States put forward 25% all hell would break loose?

Bitsios: I have the impression Makarios thought you would bargain with the Turks on this basis. You do not really need the Government of Greece involved in this. You could bargain directly with the Turks.

The Secretary: First of all, I think we should try to elicit a Turkish proposal before we address the question of whether there is to be an American emissary. I would recommend that we make an urgent approach to the Turks asking them to put forward their proposals.

Tzounis: There was an understanding in Vienna that proposals would be exchanged in six weeks, then that there would be a meeting in May and if a basis were found that the subject would be referred to subcommittees.

Hartman: The resignation of Clerides has made the question of their talking more difficult.

Bitsios: I have received a report that the Turks will be appointing another man to talk with Papadopoulos. They, of course, say there will not be the same personal relationship. Apparently Clerides made a commitment in Vienna but did not inform Makarios when he got back. He went to Denktash on the 25th of March and gave him the Greek proposals. Denktash then called his Assembly and said he had the proposals. This ruined Clerides.

The Secretary: In my study of the Cypriot mentality I have some problem in understanding his not telling Makarios. He must have discussed it with the Archbishop.

Hartman: What did you agree to in Brussels?
Bitsios: That the territorial issue was to be discussed first. Caglayangil said yes, but the Cypriot proposal must be put forward first. We agreed.

Hartman: Clerides was carrying out this agreement.

Bitsios: In Vienna he agreed on the exchange.

The Secretary: In my view Clerides is not as skillful as the Archbishop.

Bitsios: Denktash did not respect the agreement.

Tzounis: Clerides made a mistake in not informing Makarios.

The Secretary: It is almost inconceivable in Cyprus that he would make such a proposal to Denktash and not tell the Archbishop.

Alexandrakis: Clerides has this personal weakness.

The Secretary: What do you think we can do? We can encourage the Turkish proposal. It is now premature for an American to go out. If you say 20% and the Turks say 38%, then the United States cannot say 28%—the gap is too wide. You have to narrow it more.

Bitsios: They can’t say 38%, since they have that much now.

The Secretary: Their Government is weak and is getting weaker. I have told the Turks that now is the time for them to make a deal. Caremanlis has been a real statesman. You have gone about this in a far-sighted way.

I would like to have the Turks put forward some proposals no matter how bad they are, but on a continuing basis. The new agreement with them gives us some handle because of the Congressional problem. I think we can get them to put forward a proposal. I personally believe once they begin to talk about percentages they should look at specific areas and then figure out what percentage it is. Suppose you agree on 26-1/2%. How do you compose it? My advice would be—if I were a mediator in this negotiation—get both of them to put forward proposals, then forget about the proposals and talk about areas. The Germans had an idea of three zones, Greek, Turkish and Federal.

Bitsios: This wouldn’t work.

The Secretary: That was my view. I think our major effort is to elicit a Turkish proposal as a next step. Then Waldheim would have to follow up. Then we will be meeting at NATO and can discuss the next step. We are prepared to be active. An American emissary is now premature.
Bitsios: Yes.

The Secretary: We can be helpful after proposals have been set out. There has been no disagreement between us and our allies on how to handle this.

Bitsios: Regarding the Aegean, there is a problem with the seismic ship that the Turks intend to send out. It is called The Hora. They have said that in May they will send it into unspecified areas of the Aegean. This will create great problems. Is there anything you can do?

The Secretary: I will look into it.

Bitsios: I have sent a message to Caglayangil regarding this problem and about the Turkes statement. The answer was that the Foreign Minister speaks for the Government and we should not consider Turkes. But Ecevit is prompting the Government.

Hartman: Do you understand that the ship is to take soundings?

The Secretary: Are you saying they cannot do seismic research?

Tzounis: We say they cannot on our continental shelf.

Bitsios: International law requires them to ask permission of the government and to share the information. If it is purely scientific you can do seismic research.

Tzounis: We are relying on the Continental Shelf Convention. In the first three articles it says that islands do have their own continental shelf.

Bitsios: I don’t see why they don’t want to send this matter to the International Court.

The Secretary: They perhaps think they will lose.

Leigh: No one can predict the outcome of the Court.

Bitsios: We have taken a risk in suggesting it.

Tzounis: We have said ahead of time that our position to some extent will be eroded—we will not get 100% of what we want, but politically it is easier to follow the decision of the Court.

The Secretary: We have favored going to the International Court.

Tzounis: The Turks agree in principle but won’t discuss the arrangements.

Hartman: They want to negotiate it first.

The Secretary: I had a student who was hanged in Burundi. According to the law he was allowed to have a Belgian lawyer, but not an interpreter, so he could not communicate with the Court.

We will have to take this up with the Turks. We are eager to have an easing of the situation. It is not tolerable to have two of our close allies in an attitude of hostility toward each other.
We will make a significant effort to bring about progress on Cyprus, and we will make an effort to get the Aegean problem to the International Court.

I have to meet now with the Black Caucus. I suggest we meet tomorrow at 11:30.5

Bitsios: What about the military matters we raised.

The Secretary: We will discuss that tomorrow. I believe we will be able to make some progress on some of it.

5 The meeting was held on April 15 at 11:45 a.m. in the Secretary’s office. In this final negotiating session with Bitsios, Kissinger asked that Greece discuss with the United States any plans to declare a 12-mile limit on territorial waters. The Secretary also offered U.S. help with expediting weapons deliveries to Greece. (Library of Congress, Manuscript Division, Kissinger Papers, Box CL 275, Memoranda of Conversations, Chronological File)

65. Memorandum From the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Scowcroft) to President Ford


Secretary Kissinger has asked that I pass to you the following message.

“When I saw Greek Foreign Minister Bitsios this morning2 I told him that the cancellation of Caramanlis’ visit3 had not been well received in Washington and that your reaction, as well as mine, was the same. I observed that they must understand that a substitution of President Tsatsos for Prime Minister Caramanlis would not be appropriate. Bitsios defended

1 Source: Library of Congress, Manuscript Division, Kissinger Papers, Box CL 276, Memoranda of Conversations, Chronological File. Secret; Sensitive; Nodis. A notation on the memorandum indicates the President saw it.

2 The conversation took place at 8 a.m. in the SAS Hotel while Kissinger was at a meeting of the North Atlantic Council in Oslo. (Memorandum of conversation, May 20; ibid.)

3 After meeting with Karamanlis on May 17, Kubisch reported from Athens that the Greek Prime Minister had decided that a visit to the United States would be harmful to him, President Ford, and U.S.-Greek relations, and create a political mess for both countries. (Telegram 4767 from Athens, May 17; National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy Files, 1976)
Caramanlis’ decision as having been made to avoid his having embarrassing confrontations with the Greek-American community, members of Congress and the press which might have damaged US-Greek relations.

“When I told Bitsios that it might be difficult to schedule a visit by either Caramanlis or Tsatsos later this year he replied that Greece would want its Chief of State to pay his respects to you during the Bi-centennial Year. I told him that we would see what could be done, but reiterated that we would not want a visit by Tsatsos to be considered a substitute for the Caramanlis visit.

“Our meeting, aside from expressing this disappointment, was positive. I assured Bitsios that we are prepared to be as helpful as possible in moving the Cyprus negotiation ahead. I told him of my message to Genscher which I was asked by the Greek Government to send. In it, I urged Genscher to press the Turkish Cypriot leader (on a visit to Bonn) to be more flexible. Genscher did so and I was able to tell Bitsios that a major effort was made, but that the Turkish Cypriots had made no promises. I will urge Schmidt to take an equally firm line when he visits Ankara next week. I also told Bitsios that I had urged Waldheim to take a more active role in bringing the two Cypriot groups together, and that you had sent a message to Demirel. I said I would encourage the Turks tomorrow to get into the substance of the problem.

“Finally, I urged early conclusion of our bilateral negotiation—not to help us with the Turkish Agreement—but to respond to our common desire to restore our traditional close relationship. He agreed that these should move forward and said that the Greek negotiator had reported good progress thus far.”
66. Memorandum From the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Scowcroft) to President Ford


SUBJECT
Status Report on United States-Greek Base Negotiations

Background

In late March, the Greek Government interrupted the renegotiation of the U.S.-Greek security relationship which had been underway at Greek initiative since early 1975, and asked that we conclude an agreement with Athens similar in tone and form to the Defense Cooperation Agreement we had just signed with Turkey. The United States accepted this request and began developing with the Greek Government a statement of “Principles,” designed to cover the future negotiation of a U.S.-Greek Defense Cooperation Agreement. This statement of “Principles” was signed in Washington by Secretary Kissinger and Greek Foreign Minister Bitsios on April 15, 1976. By June, negotiators had completed the texts on the basic Defense Cooperation Agreement and two appendices concerning Status of Forces and Command and Control, but negotiation of four appendices concerning major U.S. facilities in Greece (Nea Makri, Souda Bay, Iraklion, and Hellenikon) remained at an impasse. Unlike the Turks, the Greeks refused to decouple the basic agreement from detailed annexes regarding the facilities, thus making impossible early submission to the Congress of the Greek agreement. The State Department believes the Greeks were probably dragging their feet to obstruct movement of the companion Turkish agreement through Congress.

To break the logjam, Ambassador Kubisch met on July 17 with Foreign Minister Bitsios to stress the firmness of our position and note that it was in Greece’s interest to settle these major negotiating issues.

Current Status

Foreign Minister Bitsios has responded somewhat positively to this latest approach by Kubisch by indicating Greek acceptance of some

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1 Source: Ford Library, National Security Adviser, Presidential Country Files for Middle East and South Asia, Box 10, Greece 6. Secret. Sent for information. A notation on the memorandum indicates the President saw it.
2 See footnote 3, Document 64.
3 Kubisch reported from Athens on his meeting with Bitsios in telegrams 7240, July 17, and 7268, July 19. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy Files, 1976)
U.S. positions and by suggesting that compromise is possible on others. The Greeks have agreed:

— not to press for U.S. funding of any projects outside the basic $700 million, four-year ceiling agreed upon in April by Secretary Kissinger and Bitsios; and
— [2½ lines not declassified]

However, the Greeks still:

— resist the U.S. request for expanded U.S. utilization of Souda Air Field in Crete;
— insist on sizeable manpower reductions and relocation of dependent support facilities from Hellenikon; and
— request assistance in expanding their Defense Communication System into portions of the Aegean militarized in contravention of the 1947 Treaty of Peace with Italy.

**Future Prospects**

Negotiations resumed in Athens on July 26 with U.S. negotiators instructed to test the Greek willingness to solve remaining issues quickly. If agreement is not reached by mid-August, it will be clear that the Greeks are again deliberately dragging their feet.

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67. Memorandum of Conversation

New York, August 14, 1976, 8:30 a.m.

**PARTICIPANTS**

**US**

The Secretary
Under Secretary Habib
Ambassador Bennett
Mr. Laingen, Notetaker

**Greece**

Foreign Minister Bitsios
Amb. Alexandrakis

**SUBJECT**

The Aegean Crisis

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1 Source: Library of Congress, Manuscript Division, Kissinger Papers, Box CI. 344, Department of State, Memoranda of Conversations, External. Confidential; Nodis. The meeting was held in the Waldorf Towers, where Kissinger stayed while attending a UN Security Council session. He met with Foreign Minister Caglayangil later that morning; see Document 245.
Kissinger: Habib thought I couldn’t see you without first getting a briefing from him!

Bitsios: Go ahead and brief him.

Kissinger: No, that won’t be necessary. I am pleased to see you again, as I always am, although I regret the circumstances that bring you here. I have been following the debate closely, as well as the events that led up to the debate.

We have great sympathy for the problem this presents your government. We have no interest in seeing this turn into a conflict. We have no desire to see it end in humiliation for Greece or indeed for either side.

How long will you be here?

Bitsios: Until the resolution is adopted.

Kissinger: How does it look? Do you have the European draft? I saw what is said to be a European draft only late last night and have not had a chance to study it.²

Bitsios: (after some hesitation) This Sismik incident came upon us in an already overcharged atmosphere, thanks to Cyprus and other problems.

Moreover this was not necessary. To send out the Sismik did not help the atmosphere or contribute to the delimitation of the continental shelf. On the contrary, we were in the midst of negotiations when this happened.

Kissinger: I thought there were no negotiations at present?

Bitsios: There were indeed.

Kissinger: But hadn’t they been interrupted for almost a year?

Bitsios: No, they were adjourned temporarily; each side was to study the proposals of the other side. During the last round in Bern, the head of our delegation gave a fair warning to the Turks of the implications were the Sismik to sail. We said don’t do it. We said it would be unwarranted, unnecessary and unhelpful.

Kissinger: I suspect their action is a product of the Turkish domestic situation.

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² Habib gave Kissinger a copy of the draft resolution on August 13, which the British had given to USUN. It did not call for the Turkish ship to stay out of the disputed waters but asked the two sides to refrain from action that would increase tension and to resume negotiations. The draft also referred to the ICJ and its jurisdiction over such matters. (Ibid., Box CL 149, Geopolitical File, Greece) As part of the ongoing dispute between Greece and Turkey over the status of the Aegean waters, Turkey announced on August 5 that its seismic survey ship, Sismik, would conduct operations August 5–16 in the disputed waters around the Greek island of Lesbos. (Telegram 6034 from Ankara, August 6; National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy Files, 1976)
Bitsios: I don’t know. The third point is that even when the ship was ready to sail, we twice attempted some kind of discussions. But these failed. The Turks were determined to sail it—as necessary, as many Turkish politicians urged all over the Aegean.

Even when we handed over our second note of protest we urged that the ship’s itinerary be stopped and that we go to negotiations. The answer was no.

To make a long story short, it is clear that if this doesn’t stop, we will soon have a situation of really extreme danger to say the least. And the prospect for negotiations will be totally disrupted. So my coming here was to ask that the ship’s movements be stopped and that we resume negotiations.

I have seen the draft resolution. I am not sure it covers the needs I have expressed but we need to study it further.

Kissinger: What do you say about the argument of our legal people that if the ship makes no contact with the ocean floor in its research, your rights are not endangered?3

Bitsios: Kubisch explained that position to us. But we have consulted with American and other international lawyers and don’t see it that way.

Kissinger: If those lawyers are Greek-American lawyers I am not so sure about that advice!

Bitsios: No, these are pure American, Harvard professors! They all agree that with modern technology, contact with the ocean floor is not necessary.

If they were prepared to negotiate in Bern why are they doing and saying the things that they are now?

Kissinger: I have not seen Caglayangil’s statement of yesterday; the Department feels that if I see things like that within 12 hours, I might become operational!

Bitsios: Well I leave that problem to Ambassador Bennett.

Kissinger: What did Caglayangil say?

Habib: He made essentially three points. The first that they were already in a state of negotiations with Greece when the Greeks already knew about the ship and that was sufficient Greek acceptance of it in itself. The second point was that the Aegean is clearly not yet delimited in its continental shelf so that Turkey has a right to do research.

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3 C. Arthur Borg, Executive Secretary of the Department of State, sent a memorandum summarizing the legal issues to Scowcroft on August 13. (Ford Library, National Security Adviser, Presidential Country Files for Middle East and South Asia, Box 10, Greece 6)
The Secretary: That point seems understandable to me.

Habib: The third point was that the Turks have always felt that bi-
lateral negotiations were necessary before going to the ICJ. These were
the main points: there was also criticism of Greek militarization of cer-
tain Aegean islands.

Bitsios: Oh yes! That is what is described as the chauvinism of
Greece.

Bennett: Much was also made of the obligations of Greece under
the Lausanne Treaty.

Bitsios: The point is that there is no question of legal arguments.
The legal issue can be resolved by the Court. I must say, I would like
to ask Caglayangil why not go to the Court if he is so certain of his
case. The real problem is that an atmosphere has been created by Turk-
ish actions bringing us very near to war. All it would take is a small
incident; indeed we depend for peace on the sang froid of the mere
captain of some small ship somewhere.

A number of things were underway. Another meeting was planned
on air rights; another one was expected on the continental shelf prob-
lem. But all of this has been blown up out of proportion because of
their insistence on this ship.

Kissinger: Are you meeting Caglayangil here?

Bitsios: I might but I don’t know.

Kissinger: What is the sequence in the Council now?

Bennett: The next meeting is on Tuesday morning.

Kissinger: When do we speak? I prefer that we speak among the last.

Bennett: That depends on how things go but it could be something
like Thursday. However, if a resolution can be put together by Tues-
day morning, the debate could be finished that day. The practice is for
everyone on the Council to speak at some point, either before or after
the resolution is adopted.

Kissinger: I didn’t like at all what the Department drafted for your
speech so I have sent them back to the drawing board. What that draft
contained couldn’t possibly offend anyone, which of course would be
totally uncharacteristic for us.

Bitsios: My concern is that Caglayangil will start the usual bazaar
leak process. I am not going along with that game. I have one or two
points on which I will want clarification.

Kissinger: Let’s look at the text. I would like to get Caglayangil’s
reaction. What is yours? I assume it is not 100% acceptable but I as-
sume neither side will get everything it wants.

Bitsios: I am not sure the present draft will give a sufficiently strong
message to the Turkish politicians that the Security Council won’t con-
done further research by their ship.
Kissinger: Well, I should think the language in the first operative paragraph about refraining from acts contributing to tension does that and so I doubt that this will be acceptable to the Turks.

Bitsios: That language is fine with us. But what is necessary here at the outset of the text is that the whole process concerns the delimitation of the continental shelf. It is dangerous to leave that issue vague.

Kissinger: What other things are involved?

Bitsios: If the language in paragraph 6 could be put at the beginning of the text the whole thing would be more clear. 4

Kissinger: You understand that this is not our draft?

Bitsios: Yes, I could start asking for various clarifications of the text but beyond what I have indicated, I think I should best take the approach that this is a resolution directed at the Greek Government from the Council and we accept it. If I did this, this would hopefully stop a bargaining process from beginning. I think it is correct of the Council to take the approach with the parties of saying here is our resolution and how we feel about it and you can take it or leave it.

Kissinger: Have we talked to the Europeans who are drafting this?

Bennett: Yes.

Kissinger: What is the Turkish reaction? Do they have the text?

Bennett: Yes, they do but I don’t know how they feel about it since they only got it last night from the British. The British also gave a copy to the Japanese President of the Council as a courtesy.

Kissinger: Suppose it is accepted by both sides as it now reads and the Sismik then proceeds to continue its sailings?

Bitsios: Then we will all know that the Turks are deliberately provoking to the extreme.

Kissinger: How do you answer the argument made by the Turks that if they don’t send their ship, they are in effect giving up their legal arguments?

Bitsios: This issue does not have merits on the basis of law. It does not depend on the sailing of the ship. On the other hand, according to the international law, if the ship is sent and the other side doesn’t react, then the other side loses its rights.

Kissinger: Not if you protest it.

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4 Paragraph 6 noted a May 31, 1975, joint communiqué by Greece and Turkey to resolve the continental shelf dispute in the ICJ. (Library of Congress, Manuscript Division, Kissinger Papers, Box CL 149, Geopolitical File, Greece) See footnote 3, Document 246.
Bitsios: The Turks claim that our islands are mere protuberances of the Anatolian mainland and that the Greeks have no rights in that area.

Kissinger: I understand what they say but they also say that their legal claims need to be enhanced by research of the kind done by the ship.

Bitsios: If they go West of our islands with the ship that in effect establishes rights that we cannot allow.

Kissinger: But again, not if you protest. The question is whether force should be used. There is no question that you should acquiesce to the Turkish claims. The question is how you react and with what means.

Bitsios: The choice in this situation for Caramanlis was very difficult. He chose this course of going to the Council. Public opinion and our military were very aroused. It took Caramanlis’ prestige and willpower to say; no, we will first try the peaceful procedures.

But we risk over-taxing Caramanlis’ prestige and ability, particularly when Cyprus remains unresolved.

Do you really doubt Turkey’s ultimate intentions and the philosophical attitude behind their basic foreign policy? All of this is consistent with the ambition of Attaturk.

Kissinger: I think their domestic situation is so paralyzed that both major parties there are competing to see who can be most nationalistic. But I don’t have the impression of some master plan. The only Turkish politician smart enough to have a master plan of that kind would be Ecevit. Demirel’s approach is purely political. I have never heard him express a conceptual phrase. Caglayangil is probably capable of a conceptual approach.

Bitsios: But Caglayangil has no power.

Kissinger: Exactly.

Bitsios: He is difficult to deal with; he often denies what he says earlier.

Kissinger: This may reflect his domestic situation. Basically I have a rather high opinion of Caglayangil as a human being. But I agree he doesn’t have much power. I don’t think he has a conceptual plan to humiliate Greece.

I remember the first time I talked with a Turkish Foreign Minister. That was Gunes. He spoke with great passion about Turkey’s position. I didn’t know anything much of the problem then; I was in my phase of not understanding the intensity of Greek-Turkish hatred.

Then there was the situation at the time of the Cyprus invasion. There was an Aegean crisis then too and they had troops in the Aegean technically ready to move on that issue; they facilitated their invasion of Cyprus.
Someone told me that the Turkish press is publishing texts of my telephone conversations at the time with Ecevit. I haven’t seen them but this may mean my reputation in Greece will be at stake.

Bitsios: No, your reputation in Greece will not be damaged by a leaked telephone conversation!

Kissinger: I would think my reputation in Greece is probably already beyond repair. I suspect that even if I could restore Syracuse to Greek control and reestablished the Athenian Empire, I would still be accused in Greece of being anti-Hellenic. I have reconciled myself to my fate as far as Greek public opinion is concerned.

Bitsios: On the contrary! There are ways and means to rectify that. Indeed the television cameras are available out in the hall.

Kissinger: I will have to talk to Caglayan. I see nothing the US needs to object to in this resolution. But our concern is to prevent the intensification of tensions so I want to see Caglayan before giving you a definitive judgment. I will be in touch with you through your mission later today.

Bitsios: I understand your position. But if Caglayan starts watering down each paragraph that will put us out of business.

Kissinger: I agree, but I would at least like to get his opinion.

Bitsios: Our dilemma is very clear. Either the Council lets things drag on and allows the Turks to continue their operations which will mean we reach a point of no return, or the Council urges the Turks to discontinue what they are doing and enter into negotiations.

Kissinger: Would you be prepared to avoid any activity on your part in that area?

Bitsios: Yes.

Kissinger: I am thinking out loud here; if we say that both sides have made their position clear, could you acquiesce in some Turkish activity?

Bitsios: That depends on where it is.

Kissinger: No one challenges your rights beyond the median line drawn with the mainlands as base points. There is the further problem of activity between that line and the Western edge of the islands. Is it possible that you would agree that there would be no activity in that area?

Bitsios: It depends on what kind of activity. We haven’t done any research of this kind in some time. What they say about our earlier research is a half-truth, reflecting the fact of some research on our part in the early 60’s.

Kissinger: The task is to find a formula that clearly defines the disputed zone and that will note that Greece has conducted research in these areas and that Turkey has now also done so. That doesn’t make
that area less disputed, but it could be agreed that for the present, in
those areas, no one shall conduct further research.

Bitsios: Don’t introduce that idea in the Council. I cannot accept
that their claim is equal to ours. Our claim is based on international
law, on the 1958 Convention.\(^5\) Their claim is based on nothing.

Kissinger: Our lawyers in the Department claim there is a good
basis for use of the median line between main lands.

Bitsios: On what grounds?

Kissinger: I have not gone into that in any detail. The point is that
this will not be settled on the basis of US legal views or indeed on
purely legal grounds of any kind.

Bitsios: Before we made our decision we had made our legal study.

Kissinger: Look, I have never questioned Greek intelligence! So I
assumed you had made a good study.

Bitsios: Basically your idea is already contained in operative para-
graph one.

Kissinger: What if we said something like this after the resolution
was adopted.

Bitsios: We believe they have violated our continental shelf many
times. We don’t say that they should take the ship back to Istanbul.
They can continue sailing it, so long as it is not in their territorial
waters.

Kissinger: It seems to me that there are two issues involved. The
first is to determine what kind of resolution is acceptable. Certainly
there is no reason why the US should object to this draft. If Caglayangil
wants to make basic changes that is another matter. I don’t want to get
into the dispute.

But this is only the first step. Suppose the Turks say, if the resolu-
tion is adopted, that the ship doesn’t increase tensions and off they go
again? Then we have the problem all over again. So how do we stop
another exploratory voyage of this kind? It is in this connection that a
US statement might play a role. I am not insisting that we do it but
someone needs to. If we are to move from the resolution to talks that
are not complicated by sailings of the ship we cannot rely on an auto-
matic effect of the resolution. My question is how we avoid Turkey ig-
oring a resolution.

\(^5\) The 1958 Continental Shelf Convention established the exclusive right of the
coastal country to exercise sovereignty over its continental shelf for the purpose of ex-
ploration and exploitation of natural resources. Signed at Geneva on April 29, 1958 and
What if the US and the Nine made separate statements appealing to both sides.

Bitsios: But we cannot go along with the median line.

Kissinger: I am not saying you should accept the median line as a final settlement. There clearly is still a disputed area.

But we can’t just let things drift. We cannot have another war in the Aegean.

Bitsios: We need a moratorium of some kind. Operative paragraph one can be interpreted as such.

Kissinger: By both sides?

This is not just a legal matter. There are high political risks and in that situation we are not going to be dragged step by step into it.

Bitsios: But if we begin talking of median lines in the Council we will have a debate on that.

Kissinger: But if we have this resolution and then in two or three weeks there is more of the same kind of tension then where are we?

Bitsios: Ambassador Bennett could stand up in the Council next week and point out that operative paragraph one amounts to a moratorium. You could assure Caglayangil when you see him today that we have no intention to follow him with any provocative actions on our part.

Kissinger: I realize there are no reasons for the US to try to define the disputed area. But supposing we simply say that neither side should engage in provocative acts in the disputed area . . . after all that is what the first operative paragraph really says.

Bitsios: (draws a rough map of the Aegean)

Kissinger: Look, I have looked at the maps and we are not going to try to draw new lines or take new legal positions on our part. That would be absurd. We are engaged with Canada now and we know what the problem is like so we are not going to go into the Aegean and take on the responsibility of drawing new lines. But the point is that there are disputed areas . . .

Bitsios: Not in a legal sense but I agree there are such areas in a political sense.

Kissinger: Look, if I were to get any further into the legal arguments I would have to get you together with Monroe Leigh. But I am not eager to do this; to inject our legal position could only complicate the problem. We have not taken a formal legal position; what you have seen from us are only internal papers that have no formal status.

Well, I will be seeing Caglayangil later this morning. Let’s decide what we say to the press.

Bitsios: Before we do that I have a message for you from Caramanlis that I want to convey.
Kissinger: Should we meet alone?

Bitsios: Yes, then we can come back and resume talking about how we deal with the press.

(Secretary and Bitsios leave the room)

Alexandrakis: I hope any statement to the press by you avoids the traditional expression of calling for restraint on both sides. You could say we are studying the positions of both sides and seeking the views of both so you could better understand the respective positions.

Bennett: We could also note that working drafts of a resolution are circulating.

Habib: Do I understand your Minister has said that you are inclined to let the Security Council take its position and then you would live with it?

Alexandrakis: Yes, we are prepared to accept it as it is.

Habib: In other words you would leave it to the Council. You would accept Caglayangil’s latest statement for the record and then go on from there. Obviously any resolution has to be generally acceptable to both sides.

I hope the Minister understood what the Secretary was saying about disputed areas. Obviously there is a disputed area. That does not mean that everyone agrees exactly where that disputed area is.

(Secretary and Bitsios return)

Kissinger: We left it that I will call the Foreign Minister after I have seen Caglayangil. Meanwhile I will go out and express my appreciation that Greece has initiated the process of peaceful procedures looking toward a settlement, which is what we all believe should happen, and that we believe in the meantime that neither side should resort to actions that would jeopardize the atmosphere of these negotiations. And I hope the next time, Mr. Minister, you come to the US for a calm visit.

(Secretary and Minister meet with the Press in the hall)
68. Memorandum From the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (Scowcroft) to President Ford

Washington, undated.

SUBJECT

Status of US-Greek Defense Cooperation Negotiations

When the Greek base negotiations resumed in Athens on September 1, three basic documents were virtually complete—the Defense Cooperation Agreement text, the Status of Forces Agreement and the Command and Control appendix. Negotiations on the supplementary documents had reached an advanced stage, but issues which we had considered resolved have now been reopened by the Greek side.

Based on sensitive reports from sources close to Greek Prime Minister Caramanlis, we believe that the Greeks have been stalling to prevent progress in Congressional passage to the Turkish Defense Cooperation Agreement. They have been successful in this. While hearings on the Turkish DCA were finally held on September 15 by the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, further Congressional action this year is unlikely. Additionally, sensitive sources indicate that Caramanlis is stalling until after the U.S. elections.

The State Department reports that the following specific problems are holding up progress in the negotiations:

—[1 line not declassified];
—disagreement over cost estimates for construction by the U.S. of Greek communication facilities;
—Greek insistence on limiting U.S. air operations at Hellenikon; and
—a Greek reversal concerning a U.S. proposed periodic review provision for the use of Souda Bay.

U.S. negotiators believe it is unlikely that this issue will be satisfactorily resolved before the end of the month.

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1 Source: Ford Library, National Security Adviser, Presidential Country Files for Middle East and South Asia, Box 10, Greece 6. Secret; Sensitive. Sent for information.
New York, September 29, 1976, 11:30 a.m.

SUBJECT
Secretary’s Meeting with Greek Foreign Minister Bitsios

PARTICIPANTS

Greece
Foreign Minister Dimitry S. Bitsios
Director General for Political Affairs John Tzounis
Chef de Cabinet Cleom Catsambis

US
The Secretary
Under Secretary Habib
Assistant Secretary Hartman, EUR
Nelson C. Ledsky, Director, EUR/SE (notetaker)

The Secretary greets Bitsios and photographs are taken.

Foreign Minister Bitsios: How have you been?

The Secretary: Thank you, quite well. I appreciated very much all the courtesies extended to me in Greece during my recent stop. As you know, I had a very good meeting with John Tzounis there.

You have a beautiful country. I was much impressed by the countryside in Crete.

Foreign Minister Bitsios: Yes, Crete is a lovely part of our country. We were happy you were able to stop at Souda Bay.

The Secretary: What part of Greece are you from?

Foreign Minister Bitsios: From an area further north on the mainland.

The Secretary: From what I could see, it is simply a lovely country to vacation in, but of course I can’t go to Greece on a vacation.

Foreign Minister Bitsios: Why not, I think you would be well received.

Tzounis: Well, of course there are many other places north of Greece that are equally beautiful.

The Secretary: Where?

1 Source: Library of Congress, Manuscript Division, Kissinger Papers, Box CI 276, Memoranda of Conversations, Chronological File. Secret; Nodis. Drafted by Ledsky on September 30 and approved in S on October 13. The meeting was held in the Secretary’s suite at the Waldorf Towers Hotel. Kissinger met with Turkish Foreign Minister Caglayangil earlier that morning; see Document 246.

2 Kissinger stopped in Crete the previous week.
Tzounis: Well, I know Bucharest and Rumania quite well. That country is equally beautiful.

The Secretary: I suppose Eastern Europe is beautiful, but the Communist system everywhere has destroyed the cities and made everything excruciatingly dull.

Foreign Minister Bitsios: You have traveled extensively in Eastern Europe, haven’t you?

The Secretary: Yes, I think I have been in every Eastern European capital except Sofia. East Berlin, Warsaw, Prague, Moscow, they are all incredibly gray and dull. Belgrade is just a little better.

Tzounis: You are correct. It is as if all development stopped when the Communists arrived. Those countries that were taken over later are a little better. Bucharest, for example, is twenty years ahead of Moscow.

The Secretary: It is fascinating to me how frozen in their development Eastern European countries are. The Nazis at least had popular support. I don’t know any country in Eastern Europe where the regime enjoys any popularity. What they have done is to try to seek support through appeals to the petty bourgeois. I have a friend from Hamburg who says when he wants to see what Germany looked like in the Twenties and Thirties, he goes east to the GDR. But Communism has helped prevent some people from moving too fast. If the Chinese, for example, had a free enterprise system, they would probably take over the world.

What should we discuss this morning? Can we settle Cyprus and the Aegean before our elections?

Foreign Minister Bitsios: I had a long conversation with Caglayan-gil on Monday afternoon. Tzounis has already briefed Hartman on the details. We agreed with the Turks to proceed to negotiations. I will meet Caglayan-gil again on Friday and see if we can go deeper into the Aegean questions, but when I read his speech yesterday at the UNGA, I became terribly discouraged again. Quite frankly, I think Caglayan-gil has already ruined the spirit necessary for any meaningful negotiating process, and he has done so just prior to what he knew was to be a crucial discussion with me. Already on Tuesday, I read a report from Ankara in which the Energy Minister talked about the possibility of a further sailing of the Sismik in April.

The Secretary: We have made an analysis of the Sismik and have concluded that unless it accidentally scraped the bottom and hit oil, it couldn’t possibly find anything.

Foreign Minister Bitsios: That may be so, but the sailing of the vessel has a nuisance value. It churns up political difficulties.

The Secretary: I find the whole thing pointless. The sailing of the Sismik doesn’t mean a thing. It could sail for twenty years and find nothing.
Foreign Minister Bitsios: But let me return to what I was saying. Following up on the Minister of Energy’s speech, Caglayangil spoke yesterday about the Aegean islands. Like the Prime Minister, he refrained from calling them Greek islands. It was a violent speech in my judgment, talking about demographic factors in connection with the future delimitation of the continental shelf. The Turks are simply trying to capitalize on every aspect of the Security Council resolution.3

Then, finally, there is this information about a U.S. company which may begin drilling for oil in the Aegean in the near future, if the Turks have their way. We gave this information to Hartman yesterday.

Hartman: Yes, Mr. Secretary, we are checking on this report.

Tzounis: This latter element is most distressing. Even the Court says that drilling would constitute a serious matter.

Foreign Minister Bitsios: But the most worrisome aspect is the fact that I already spotted on Monday a certain aloofness in Caglayangil’s attitude. Then, instead of scheduling a second meeting some time in the middle of this week, he suggested we meet again only on Friday,4 the day before my scheduled departure from New York. I simply don’t know what they have in mind. There seems to be a new element in their position, but what it is, I am not sure.

For example, when I raised Cyprus with Caglayangil, he asked me if Greece was not losing interest in this subject. I told him it was not up to us to negotiate. The two communities have their own forum for conducting the negotiations, but two years have gone by without results, and it was time to produce something concrete. Caglayangil admitted Cyprus was the key to the relationship between Greece and Turkey, but he then turned around and said that all that Turkey could offer was “modest border rectifications.” I said that we would have to negotiate on the Aegean for the moment and not Cyprus, but I made clear that the Turks would have to make more meaningful concessions on Cyprus if there was ever to be an understanding. We will see what will happen on Friday, but frankly I am not optimistic.

The Secretary: Are the Turks more flexible in the exchanges of letters I understand have occurred between the two Prime Ministers?

Foreign Minister Bitsios: There has been no recent exchange of letters. I know of none.

The Secretary: Well, with respect to the Aegean what can be done now? Can you give me some idea of how you perceive a settlement’s

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3 See footnote 2, Document 246.
4 October 1.
being worked out? Tzounis, for example, when I spoke to him at Souda Bay, talked about some form of joint exploration and exploitation.

Foreign Minister Bitsios: I think any kind of joint exploration would be premature. First we must tackle the delimitation question. On this we cannot allow the Turks to have anything West of the Aegean Islands. That would be contrary to anything done anywhere else in the world. With this single reservation, we can probably then proceed to accommodate the Turks in some fashion with respect to the area east of the Greek Islands. Once delimitation is settled, there can be joint ventures in the areas adjacent to the delimited line. But the joint ventures cannot be in the whole Aegean as the Turks seem to want. The whole area is simply not open for joint ventures. As I said before, they are now advancing demographic arguments contrasting their 40 million to our 9 million as criteria to be used in the delimitation question. That is sheer nonsense. We have repeatedly said that the Aegean is not a Greek lake. But Greece is made up of islands and the mainland. In fact, our territory is half islands. So this is a major matter with us.

The Secretary: You have, as I understand it, 3,000 islands. If one figures six miles around each island, what does that do? What would be left for the Turks? The Turks claim they would be enclosed.

Foreign Minister Bitsios: Those statistics mean nothing in terms of navigation. They can sail anywhere and even with respect to the continental shelf, there would be much remaining open to them. If we were to declare a twelve-mile limit, that would involve, as I understand it, 80% of the continental shelf, but, Mr. Secretary, let me point out that we have not claimed the twelve-mile limit.

Tzounis: According to our calculations, on the basis of the six-mile limit, there are 92,600 kilometers of the Aegean open outside territorial waters.

The Secretary: If there were no islands, the median line between Greece and Turkey would be easily definable. It also seems to me that whatever is west of the median line cannot be laid claim to by Turkey.

Foreign Minister Bitsios: Right. Exactly our position.

The Secretary: It seems to me desirable to define the disputed zone. Nothing west of the median line would be in that zone.

Foreign Minister Bitsios: That is certainly so. But you can draw many other lines and therefore it is important to know just what the Turks are claiming. The sailing of their Sismik has alarmed us in this regard.

The Secretary: I am trying to restore some balance. The Turks have implied that anything surrounding the six-mile limit is open for discussion, but in my view they shouldn’t be able to claim anything west of the median line.
Tzounis: Exactly right. Based on our own calculations, Mr. Secretary there would then be approximately 25% of the Aegean open for discussion.

The Secretary: I am not making any proposals. I just want to restore sanity.

Tzounis: Let me give you some technical details. There have been anywhere from 27 to 30 Court decisions on matters of this kind. Seven involved islands. On no occasion were islands enclaved within the territorial sphere of a second country.

Foreign Minister Bitsios: Just before we entered this room we received a telephone call from Athens. It was from Prime Minister Carmanlis. He wanted me to tell you that he had read Caglayanil’s speech before the UNGA yesterday, and that he was aware of the information concerning possible US involvement in Turkish drilling in the Aegean, information which we have already passed to Hartman. The Prime Minister believes it is imperative that Turkey understand that they must cease trying the patience of Greece and the Greek people. The Prime Minister is simply not prepared to accept any new provocations. Either he will quit his position, or there will be a violent reaction.

The Secretary: Will you tell this to Caglayanil when you see him on Friday? Would you prefer that I pass this message to Caglayanil? Would you object if I did so?

Foreign Minister Bitsios: No, to the contrary. I think it would be very useful if you could emphasize this point. The point should be made that not only would future unilateral actions on their part blow up whatever chance there is for a negotiated settlement, but that Greece will have to react directly to any new provocation.

The Secretary: What can we do at this time to be of assistance?

Foreign Minister Bitsios: It seems to me that it would be useful if you could ask them to be moderate in the negotiations. If they want more than 50% of the Aegean, there can simply be no negotiation. There also must be no new initiatives on their part while the negotiations are in progress.

The Secretary: Can you give them some idea of what part of the Aegean you are prepared to discuss? That is what they asked me this morning. What proposals are you prepared to make?

Foreign Minister Bitsios: We will give them on Friday some idea of the area open for negotiation.

The Secretary: When I saw them this morning, I asked that they not push their old notion of your withdrawing your case before the International Court of Justice.

Foreign Minister Bitsios: I think they have accepted the idea of a long delay, six months or longer.
The Secretary: (to Tzounis) When we spoke in Souda Bay last week, I think you referred to the possibility of a nine-month delay on each side.

Tzounis: Yes. I outlined then that we would ask for a six-month delay in responding to the Court’s request for a memorandum, and that we might then ask for a ninety-day extension on the six months. The Turks would have the same opportunity, so that if all the delays were added up together, there would be a total of perhaps eighteen months.

Foreign Minister Bitsios: Returning to the question of your possible role, I simply don’t see what else you can do but to urge moderation upon the Turks at this point. The situation is serious. I know the Turks always say that war is unthinkable, but then they turn around and do exactly what they want to without regard for the consequences in the area.

The Secretary: We will talk to Caglayangil again. If after your own talk with him on Friday you think of any other way in which we can be helpful, I would appreciate your telling me, and I will do everything I can to assist.

Foreign Minister Bitsios: We will contact you after our meeting on Friday.

The Secretary: I did want to say that in my speech tomorrow in the General Assembly, I intend to mention the need for movement on the Cyprus question. I will refer again to the idea of principles. You will recall that I spoke along similar lines in my speech last year, and we have now fixed up my points a bit. I think it would be useful if both sides could look at them and consider them further. Of course we recognize that it is up to the two communities to decide whether they want to make progress. I would appreciate it if you would also take a look at these principles. I hope you will not find them too painful.

Foreign Minister Bitsios: The key point is that they (the Turks) occupy the key territory on Cyprus.

The Secretary: Well, you will note that one of our principles talks about the necessity of a return of territory.

Foreign Minister Bitsios: In ending, Mr. Secretary, I must say again that we see things as drifting. What is required is that this drift be checked and that the situation in the Aegean not proceed to deteriorate in the step-by-step fashion it has over the past few months.

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5 Kissinger and Tzounis met at Souda Bay Air Force Base on September 23 from 6:35 to 7:21 p.m. They primarily discussed the Greek-Turkish Aegean dispute and Greek-U.S. base negotiations. (Memorandum of conversation; Library of Congress, Manuscript Division, Kissinger Papers, Box CL 277, Memoranda of Conversations, Chronological File)

6 The address is published in the Department of State Newsletter, No. 183, October 1976, pp. 2–5, 36–39.
The Secretary: One of our problems is that we have never had a coherent strategy. Maybe after the elections, assuming that the Republicans win, we should see if we can get together and take a look six to twelve months ahead.

Foreign Minister Bitsios: I am ready to sit down for a discussion of this kind at any time. We could even do it before the elections.

The Secretary: The issues in the Eastern Mediterranean must be settled peacefully. We simply cannot allow the situation to drift into war.

Foreign Minister Bitsios: Even a brief encounter between the two sides would be catastrophic. The consequences could not be calculated, but I do not see how either party could survive in the Western camp after such a collision. This is not because the two Governments would want to leave the West, but because the internal forces brought into play by such a cataclysmic event would overwhelm the present regimes.

The Secretary: You are right. I agree that both the parties would probably be lost to the West. What is important is that we stay in touch to make sure that the drift is halted and that the process of negotiation is begun.

70. Memorandum From A. Denis Clift of the National Security Council Staff to the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (Scowcroft)\(^1\)

Washington, October 1, 1976.

The CIA has submitted at our request an assessment of recent reports of coup plotting in Greece (Tab A).\(^2\) The assessment concludes that:

—coup plotting against Caramanlis has been endemic since 1974 but must now be taken more seriously because Caramanlis’ Aegean policy is seen by many as being too soft on Turkey;

—two normally disparate factions—the monarchists and junta loyalists—may be conspiring together;

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\(^2\) Dated September 30; attached but not printed.
—leftists under Papandreou have contacted the plotters but of the three factions Papandreou’s group represents the least threat;
—King Constantine has been contacted by the monarchists and apparently has approved a plot tentatively set for October or November;
—the Caramanlis government in general is alert to coup possibilities, does not believe an attempt is likely soon, [2 lines not declassified];
—the plotters do not appear to have the capability, organization, coordination, or proper political circumstances to attempt a coup now and the odds appear against such action;\(^3\)
—the chances of success for an attempted coup now would be minimal because plotters lack the support of the rest of the officer corps; and
—Caramanlis is sensitive to the danger and will avoid extreme concessions to the Turks.

\(^3\) Scowcroft underlined and highlighted this section.

71. **Memorandum From A. Denis Clift of the National Security Council Staff to the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Scowcroft)\(^1\)**


**SUBJECT**

Coup Plotting in Greece

[less than 1 line not declassified] Greece’s former King Constantine may be having second thoughts about throwing his support to three groups in Greece planning to overthrow Prime Minister Caramanlis’ government (Tab A).\(^2\)

An earlier September report\(^3\) stated that Constantine had directed his choice for prime minister, Spyros Theotokis, to make contact with the plotters—the royalists, former junta sympathizers and followers of

\(^1\) Source: Ford Library, National Security Adviser, Presidential Country Files for Middle East and South Asia, Box 10, Greece 6. Secret; Sensitive. Sent for information.

\(^2\) Intelligence Report, October 13; attached but not printed.

\(^3\) Summarized in Document 70.
George Papadopoulos—and indicate the King’s support for the coup. While in Athens, Theotokis was unable to meet with key plotters or discover more about their plans. Theotokis’ contact in Athens stated that he was being closely watched.

After returning from Athens, Theotokis reported this to Constantine who stated: “At least we have a Prime Minister in Greece who is respected in Europe and a democratic government which is recognized by the world. I wonder if I should have got mixed up with plotters of whose integrity and seriousness of purpose I am ignorant.” Constantine continued that he fears the plotters will either act successfully without his knowledge and undercut his position or create prolonged violence that the Turks could use to their advantage. Theotokis then tried to strengthen Constantine’s resolve.

This report tends to reinforce the CIA analysis we forwarded to you on October 14 which stated that the plotters are not well organized and that the Caramanlis government is closely watching the situation.

\(^4\) Document 70.
Cyprus

72. Intelligence Note Prepared in the Bureau of Intelligence and Research


CYPRUS: WILL MAKARIOS’ NEW MANDATE SPUR INTERCOMMUNAL TALKS?

Archbishop Makarios has been proclaimed President for a third 5-year term. The February 18 election was cancelled in the absence of a candidate in opposition to Makarios.

A rally arranged for February 8 to climax Makarios’ campaign and to mark his “reelection” came off without incident. The crowd, however, was somewhat smaller than expected by Makarios supporters, thanks in large measure to the campaign of violence launched last month by the pro-enosis zealot, General Grivas. This campaign, apparently designed to embarrass the Archbishop and intimidate his followers, reached a climax when some 20 police stations were raided the night of February 6–7 and emptied of arms and ammunition.

Heretofore careful to keep his criticism of Grivas within prudent limits, Makarios has met the General’s most recent challenge with scathing verbal attacks. Without naming him, he has taunted Grivas, in effect, for being so afraid of defeat that he did not put forth a candidate in opposition to Makarios.

Overtures Toward the Right. Secure in his new mandate, Makarios has recently indicated his intention to start a dialogue with the right. He also plans to call on the two Greek Cypriot center parties to unite. These efforts at fence-mending should serve to enhance Makarios’ position as national leader. They also point to the possibility that Makarios is becoming embarrassed by his reliance on a base of support that includes a large leftist contingent. It is doubtful, however, that he would go so far as to risk alienating the left, since the center and right could not be expected to fill the gap created by a defection of the well-organized Communist Party (AKEL) and independent leftists.

Turks on Edge. In the meantime, the Turkish Cypriots are concerned that violence within the Greek community may spill over into attacks

1 Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970–73, POL 15–1 CYP. Secret; No Foreign Dissem. Drafted by Bernard Rotklein and cleared by George Denney, Jr., and Curtis Jones, Director, INR/Near East and South Asia.
on them. Providing he does not adopt the pro-enosis slogans of the Grivasites, any success Makarios may achieve in unifying the Greek Cypriot community behind him should calm Turkish nerves by reducing violence and improving the atmosphere for the intercommunal talks. On the other hand, accommodation toward Grivas’ views would seriously jeopardize the talks.

The Intercommunal Talks. The expanded talks, which began last summer, have been generally marking time in recent months as it became clear that Makarios would call a presidential election. Prior to that time, however, some significant progress had occurred, and it was assumed that reelection would enable Makarios to make the concessions required for success. His investiture speech, scheduled for February 28, may provide a hint of further flexibility in Makarios’ position on key issues. His brief references to the talks in his February 8 address, however, were far from conciliatory.

An Old/New Complication. Another issue complicating the intercommunal negotiations reemerged last fall when Makarios, in a press interview, raised the question of “second-stage” talks. Such talks, involving Greece, Turkey, the UK, and Cyprus, would be necessary to revise the 1960 Treaties of Guarantee and Alliance that ushered in Cypriot independence. These treaties provided for the stationing of mainland Greek and Turkish troop contingents on Cyprus and the right of intervention by the UK, Greece, and Turkey—either in concert or unilaterally. The two accords are intimately related to the delicate balance between the two communities on Cyprus, and it has long been clear that changes in the Cyprus constitution affecting that balance would require convening the interested powers for a fresh look at the treaties. Nonetheless, Makarios’ surfacing of the problem of second-stage talks has caused reverberations of concern in Athens and Ankara. The Turks are particularly jealous of their right of intervention, considering it indispensable to the safety of the Turkish Cypriot minority. Even if the intercommunal talks succeed, the Turks may view any attempt by Makarios to tamper with this right as evidence of bad faith.

By raising the issue of second-stage talks, Makarios has reminded all concerned of the long road yet to travel before the Cyprus problem can be solved.

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2 For documentation on the negotiations leading up to these treaties, see Foreign Relations, 1958–1960, volume X, Part 1 and Part 2. They were known as the London–Zurich Accords or Agreements.
73. *Intelligence Report Prepared in the Central Intelligence Agency*

OCI No. 1456/73  

**CYPRUS—AN OLD PROBLEM**

Summary

The conflict between the Greek and Turkish communities on Cyprus has had repercussions far beyond the island. Greece and Turkey have twice threatened war to protect the interests of their communities on the island. The US and UK have been caught up in the island’s problems, the Soviets have occasionally tried to take advantage of the situation, and a UN peacekeeping force has been on the island for almost a decade, keeping the lid on deep-seated intercommunal antagonism.

Cypriot intercommunal problems continue to elude a satisfactory solution. Animosity between the two communities is deeply rooted in the island’s history, and independence in 1960 did not help. Major hostilities erupted in 1963 and again in 1967, and passions continue to smolder. Though talks between the communities have helped to keep the level of violence down, they have made little progress toward basic solutions—despite the addition of “advisers” from Greece and Turkey, as well as a UN observer. The talks remain deadlocked; the Greek Cypriots will accept nothing less than majority rule, and the Turkish Cypriots demand greater participation in the administration of the island than their 20-percent minority would seem to justify.

Total political supremacy on the island is a basic goal of President Archbishop Makarios. A shrewd political maneuverer, his tactics have at times created misunderstanding and mistrust in both communities. Makarios clings to the conviction that he was hoodwinked into accepting the original terms for independence, which included a protective veto for the Turks; he is dedicated to expanding the already dominant Greek Cypriot position on the island.

Cyprus has been relatively quiet since 1968, but trouble has been brewing since late last year. This time the threat lies within the Greek Cypriot community. George Grivas, a leader of the fight for independence, secretly returned to the island late in August 1971. The aging guerrilla leader has always been a fierce champion of enosis—union of Cyprus with Greece—and he is now a bitter foe of Makarios, who favors enosis in theory but not in practice. Grivas has carried out a

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1 Source: Central Intelligence Agency, Office of Current Intelligence, Job 79-T00861A, Box 22, Folder 14. Secret; No Foreign Dissem.
series of terrorist acts against the Makarios government, and there is a
danger that violence could eventually spill over into the Turkish
Cypriot community.

This working paper defines the major issues, identifies the principal
players, and provides some historical background of a complex
problem that promises to be with us for a long time.

The Problem

Part of Cyprus’ problems grew out of the London–Zurich Agree-
ments, which gave the island its independence from Britain in 1960.
The agreements sought to bring about cooperation between the two
communities by limiting the power of the Greek majority and provid-
ing guarantees for the Turkish minority. The agreements, not surpris-
ingly, failed to overcome the hostility and mistrust. By 1963 the ma-
chinery of government had ground to a halt, largely because there was
(and is) no sense of Cypriot nationalism among the islanders; cultural
and ethnic chauvinism divides Greek Cypriots from Turkish Cypriots,
and their separate political administrations prevent the development
of any sense of nationhood.

The limited sovereignty granted to Cyprus by the London–Zurich
accords also contributed to the intensification of communal disputes.
Although the agreement made Cyprus an independent nation, it gave
the UK, Greece, and Turkey—the “guarantor” powers—the right to in-
tervene in concert or unilaterally if any one of them believed the status
quo on Cyprus were being threatened. This provision virtually ensured
outside interference in Cypriot problems. The trouble became interna-
tional when Greece and Turkey became protective of their island com-
munities, as they did twice in the sixties.

The upheaval in 1967 exemplified how a relatively minor incident
in Cyprus can spiral into an international problem. General Grivas, then
commander of the Cypriot National Guard, sent armed patrols into two
Turkish Cypriot villages from which the guard had withdrawn three
months earlier. Makarios probably did not favor this move, and Grivas
was motivated in part by a need to do something about his sagging rep-
utation. Fighting continued for several days, and the Turks threatened
to invade the island. Only an agreement by Athens, after US mediation,
to withdraw Grivas and its illegal troops from the island ended the con-
frontation. Troops from both Greece and Turkey were introduced into
Cyprus prior to the 1967 clash in numbers beyond the terms of the
London–Zurich agreements. After the 1967 clash most of these illegal
troops were removed. The mainland contingents on Cyprus are gener-
ally now kept within the treaty limits: 950 for Greece and 650 for Turkey.
Greece and Turkey seem more reluctant to intervene militarily today
because of the international disapprobation provoked by the 1967
episode. Both communities are still armed camps, however, and
weapons are easily smuggled onto the island. A single spark, perhaps struck by the enosists, could lead at any time to renewed violence, which would again tempt mainland guarantors to intervene.

The main division on the island is between Greek and Turkish Cypriots, but there are also serious divisions within the two communities themselves. The continued jockeying of these forces creates instability within each community and minimizes the possibilities for compromise.

The Divided Majority

Archbishop Makarios would reject any arrangement that detracted from the concept of a unitary state run by the Greek Cypriots. He regrets signing the London–Zurich Agreements because they granted a separate status to the Turkish Cypriots. His desire to achieve a unitary state in Cyprus is evident in the intercommunal talks, where he has been willing to cooperate on minor issues, but not on the concept of majority rule. The Archbishop also wants Cyprus to be a totally independent state, free from outside interference. Although he is a devoted believer in Hellenism—the cultural identity of Greeks—he opposes enosis in the belief that political union between Cyprus and Greece would greatly diminish his power. His public position is, “enosis is fine, but not now.”

Other Greek Cypriots do not share Makarios’ view on enosis. Some want it now; others would accept temporary independence with union to come later. Makarios plays these factions against each other with notable success, but occasionally radical elements within the Greek Cypriot community push the enosis issue.

The most persistent of these is George Grivas, whose terrorist campaign against the British was a significant factor in London’s decision to give up its former colony. Grivas believes Makarios sold out the island’s interests by signing the London–Zurich Agreement, and he has never given up his self-appointed mission to make Cyprus a province of Greece. In his latest effort, Grivas pulled together about 500 men who were willing to fight openly for enosis. Grivas and the Archbishop have been waging an increasingly hazardous battle for the support of the community since 1972, when Grivas turned his guerrillas loose in a terrorist campaign to discredit Makarios. The increase in violence in their dispute is a reminder that civil war could again visit the island.

As the months of 1973 wore on Grivas’ forces were demoralizing the police and embarrassing the government with well-coordinated raids and bombings of police stations and other public buildings. Makarios countered by purging the police of many Grivas adherents and by creating a tactical reserve unit. This police unit, composed of 500 trusted officers and men, arrested many of Grivas’ supporters and confiscated large amounts of arms. Grivas struck back by kidnapping Makarios’ minister of justice and continuing the bombings.
Makarios would like to be rid of the General, but is constrained by certain factors. Grivas is a hero of the struggle for independence, and to arrest him would risk alienating the enosisists among the Greek Cypriots. Moreover, Makarios must be concerned over Athens’ reaction. As a result, the Archbishop has been limiting his actions to rounding up Grivasites and to denigrating his group as “bandits.”

Grivas is an avid anti-Communist and has vowed to destroy the party on Cyprus. The Communist Party supports Makarios and his drive for an independent Cyprus. Another leftist faction, led by Vassos Lyssarides, who is close to Makarios, is determined to block Grivas by any means. It has about the same strength as the Grivas force. Up to now, Makarios has held Lyssarides back and prevented a blood bath involving these two radical extremes within the Greek Cypriot community. Should the Grivas forces make any really determined and forceful push to fulfill the general’s lifelong goal of enosis, there is a good possibility that Makarios would allow Lyssarides to use all his resources against Grivas.

Makarios always has blamed Athens for part of his problems. He believes—with some reason—that the Greeks want to weaken his control of Cyprus and that this was why they allowed the exiled Grivas to return to the island. Inasmuch as Athens cannot openly oust the Archbishop, supporting Grivas has been the logical decision.

Makarios also blames Athens for the attempt by the Cypriot bishops to defrock him in the midst of Grivas’ terror campaign. Grivas openly supported the action of the rebel bishops, but it was they—rather than the Archbishop—who were subsequently defrocked.

The Greek Government had avoided publicly coming between the two rivals, but by late summer newly designated President Papadopoulos clearly and openly castigated Grivas. Papadopoulos urged that an end to his terrorist campaign would be the highest service the general could render to Cyprus and the “national center,” meaning Greece. Papadopoulos may have feared that the intracommunal struggle was risking more direct Greek involvement at a time when he had his hands full giving his own administration—the “Hellenic Republic”—a changed look. British and Canadian démarches also had urged Athens to curb the general’s activities.

Whatever Papadopoulos’ motives, Grivas responded by branding the Greek leader’s intervention a betrayal of the cause of Hellenism. A verbal battle continues on the island, but violence has tailed off and Makarios appeared to be winning the latest round. Whether the general is ready to give up the battle, however, is still questionable.

The Turkish Cypriots see all this instability within the Greek Cypriot community as a threat to their own security, fearing that the fighting could spill over into their enclaves and lead to another inter-
communal clash. Troop maneuvers and alerts within the Turkish enclaves are held to prepare for this eventuality. The Turkish representative to the intercommunal talks cites the recurrent violence to justify demands for greater autonomy.

The Turkish Cypriot position has become more inflexible since February 1973, when Rauf Denktash took office as the Turkish Cypriot vice president of the island. Denktash has little of the dynamism of Makarios, but he is a strong leader, has the support of the Turkish community, and has done a good job at the intercommunal talks. He favors direct intervention by Turkey to force compromises from the Greek side.

Some of Denktash’s goals have created tensions between the Turkish Cypriots and Ankara. The relationship between the Turkish military on the island and the Turkish Cypriot administration has always been touchy. Denktash insists that the vice president must have autonomous control of both the military and political affairs of the Turkish community. His position challenges not only Makarios’ authority as president, but also Ankara’s insistence that its commander of the Turkish mainland force on Cyprus control military matters within the Turkish community and review political decisions. Strains between Ankara and Denktash surfaced recently when Turkish troops on the island went on maneuvers in direct violation of an agreement between the two communities not to hold exercises or parades that might increase intercommunal tensions.

These differences are likely to continue. The Greek side might cite the Turkish maneuver as an example of overly aggressive Turkish behavior, but the Turks would justify their position by pointing to the instability on the Greek Cypriot side. This sort of argumentation serves only to continue the polarization of the communities.

The Outsiders

A dozen or more nations have an active interest in the Cyprus question. Aside from simple bilateral interests, many countries believe that the balance of power in the Mediterranean could be upset if Cyprus were to slip over the edge.

Greece and Turkey

Greece and Turkey have had an uphill struggle since 1968 to prevent tensions on the island from harming their bilateral relations. Greek President Papadopoulos has made it clear that Greek-Turkish hostilities over the island would not serve Greek interests. To prevent any misunderstanding over Cyprus, there is now a “hotline” between Athens and Ankara and foreign ministers of the two countries meet periodically. Efforts are being made to separate problems Greece has with its Turkish minority and Turkey with its Greeks from the Cypriot
communal problem. Both nations have urged their respective communities on the island to resolve their differences and return to some degree of harmony.

Despite these efforts, another Greek-Turkish confrontation is always possible. For Turkey, the fact that more than 100,000 Turkish Cypriots live under the Greek Cypriots is an emotional issue that cannot be easily dismissed. Turkish military leaders add fuel to the issue by contending that Cyprus in unfriendly hands would be a threat to Turkey’s security. They maintain a force in southern Turkey to remind Greece and the Greek Cypriots that they are ever ready to defend the Turkish Cypriots. Turkey trains and arms the 10,000-man defense forces of the Turkish Cypriots and provides Turkish officers to command them. Without Turkey’s moral, military, and increasing monetary support—now about $30 million a year—the Turkish Cypriots would probably be forced to knuckle under to the Greek majority or to leave the island.

Similarly, most mainland Greeks still have strong emotional ties to the substantial number of Greeks outside Greece. Greece’s influence over the Greek Cypriots has diminished in recent years, partly because almost 8,000 Greek troops were withdrawn in 1968, and partly because Athens has been trying to improve relations with Turkey. Another factor that has reduced the role of Greece in Cyprus is the enmity between Makarios and junta leader Papadopoulos. The Greek President apparently regards Makarios as the main obstacle to peace on the island and improved relations with Turkey. Makarios worries about Greek-Turkish rapprochement on the Cyprus problem that might lead the two nations to collaborate to oust him.

Other NATO states

NATO wants to preserve a strong southeastern flank against the growing Soviet presence in the eastern Mediterranean. NATO’s strength in the area depends largely on the US Sixth Fleet and the military support of Greece and Turkey. Another Greek-Turkish confrontation over Cyprus could seriously impair that effectiveness. NATO members are also concerned that a weak government in either country might use the Cyprus issue to divert attention from problems at home and cause another confrontation, with all the headaches that would entail.

[2 paragraphs (15½ lines) not declassified]

The US

The US shares the same basic concerns as the UK and other NATO allies regarding Cyprus. The US has made two unsuccessful attempts since the London–Zurich Agreements to mediate a settlement to the intercommunal dispute. In a major initiative in 1964, Dean Acheson
proposed partitioning the island along ethnic lines, but this would have meant shifting population and Makarios turned down the proposal. A stern warning from President Johnson to Ankara in 1964 may have cooled the Turkish fervor for an invasion of Cyprus, but it also weakened US relations with the Turks. As a result of Cyprus Vance’s hectic mission of November 1967, Athens, under Ankara’s pressure, recalled Grivas and most of the “illegal” Greek and Turkish troops were withdrawn. US political and financial support of the UN has helped preserve a peace-keeping force on Cyprus, but diplomatic pressure by the US and others has, through constant use, lost much of its effectiveness.

The USSR

The Soviets have drawn the most benefits from the festering Cyprus issue. They like Makarios’ efforts to preserve Cyprus’ independence and to stimulate antipathy between the Greek and Turkish mainlanders. The Soviets want to keep the island from becoming a NATO base and thus weaken NATO’s southeastern flank—goals which are served by either continuing friction or independence. The Soviet position is aided by a strong, well-organized Communist Party that encourages good relations between the USSR and the island. Although the Russians themselves have sent no arms to Makarios since an agreement in 1964, they have not prevented other Communist nations, particularly the Czechs, from delivering arms. A shipment of Czech arms contributed greatly to the 1967 outburst, and a shipment last year helped produce current uncertainties. Moscow is careful to ensure that the Cyprus issue does not disturb its relations with Greece or Turkey, but applauds Makarios for the discomfort he causes NATO. The Soviets have consistently supported Makarios at the UN, but have refused to contribute to the maintenance of the UN force on Cyprus.

The UN Force

The principal peace-keeping, peace-making task has fallen to the UN. A peace-keeping force, now composed of 3,000 troops and police from Australia, Austria, Canada, Denmark, Finland, Sweden, and the UK, has been on the island since 1964. Because of its small size, the force has been unable to prevent outbreaks of violence on the island like that of 1967, but has successfully mediated a number of minor intercommunal squabbles. Ironically, because of these successes, as well as financial reasons, the contingent has been cut back over the years, despite the constant underlying threat of violence. Financial backers of the UN force would like to reduce the numbers even further. Suggestions about changes in the force always raise questions about whether it is really needed. Its mandate is renewed every six months; the next review will be in December.
The Road Ahead

While others are using diplomatic persuasion to influence Cyprus’ future, the islanders themselves have been discussing ways to resolve their problems. Since 1968, representatives from both communities have been talking intermittently on constitutional issues. The representatives have made no progress on major issues, but the talks do provide a channel of formal communication; indeed, they may offer the only hope for settlement of the basic issues.

In 1971, arguments over the degree of autonomy to be granted to the Turkish Cypriots led to a breakdown in the talks for several months; it took strenuous pressure from the UN Secretary General to get them started again. Local autonomy was discussed again last fall, and another deadlock set in. A UN observer and constitutional experts from Greece and Turkey are pressing hard for compromise on this issue. The UN observer has had some success in inducing the two sides to discuss issues previously considered not negotiable. Still, in the fall of 1973 settlement of these issues seemed remote.

The turmoil in the Greek community now diverts the attention of the participants and helps them to put off the painful compromises required. The Turkish Cypriots continue to prepare for new violence. Ankara provides Turkish Cypriot forces with new weapons; considerable quantities of arms have been smuggled in over the years, most often by ship. A few Turkish Cypriots would welcome new intercommunal violence; they believe that disruption on the island and a subsequent military action from the mainland are the only way to attain the rightful status for their community.

Thus, in the short term, political conditions will not change very much from their present deplorable state. Makarios is extremely popular and is not likely to relax his hold. He has demonstrated a capacity to outwit and outmaneuver his opponents. Grivas and other Greek Cypriot opponents will continue to work against him and at times will use violence to press their case. The Turkish Cypriots will insist upon full recognition of their rights. Greece and Turkey will find their dealings with the island more a liability than an asset, and neither will wish to project itself more actively into the Cypriot maelstrom. The international community, wishing above all to prevent a major power showdown in the eastern Mediterranean, will seek to maintain the status quo. Cyprus, in short, will not change much, and this means that a violent eruption is possible at any time.

[Omitted here are chronological and “Armed Forces Breakdown” appendices.]
74. **Telegram From the Embassy in Cyprus to the Department of State**

Nicosia, April 4, 1974, 1550Z.

575. Subject: Adjournment of Intercommunal Talks. Ref: Nicosia 558.2

Summary: Osorio is working on a formula to provide basis for resumption of talks. Both he and Turkish Ambassador relatively confident that talks will be resumed after GoCyprus maximizes its propaganda advantage. If USG approached by GOCyprus, we suggest Dept make sympathetic noises but downplay importance of crisis by gently reminding GOCyprus of flimsiness of present pretext for stalling talks. End Summary.

1. Osorio has given us description of April 3 intercommunal session which makes it clear that Clerides went into session with intent to sandbag it. He pointblank asked Denktash whether he could disavow GOT position on federalism. Denktash tried to waffle in terms he used with press on Tuesday (reftel),3 saying he did not object to term unitary so long as this meant system similar to that established under 1960 agreements (e.g. bicomunal state). Clerides demanded explicit answer, despite Osorio intervention that Denktash could hardly be asked to disavow Turkish Prime Minister. During meeting, Osorio started trying to draft an agreed statement of basis on which talks were being conducted, avoiding controversial terms. Meeting wound up in unusual situation of four (including Dekleris) against Clerides. Only small solace from this exchange, according to both Osorio and Turkish Ambassador, was that Clerides was willing to use term “bicommunal” in describing nature of agreement sought; this of course is term dear to Turkish hearts. (Note difference this account from Greek version Athens 2034).4

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1 Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy Files, 1974. Confidential; Priority. Repeated to Ankara, Athens, London, US NATO, USUN, USDOCOSOUTH, and USEULCOM.

2 Telegram 558 from Nicosia, April 3, reported the adjournment sine die of the intercommunal talks. Cyprus formally démarched the UN Secretary General protesting Turkey’s “federal” position, but Clerides did not view the suspension as permanent.” (Ibid.)

3 Telegram 558 also reported that on April 2 Denktash downplayed the “federal” issue and claimed that Ecevit’s remarks on federalism had been misinterpreted. (Ibid.)

4 Telegram 2034 from Athens, April 2, reported a Greek view that the Turks had altered the basic position of the two sides agreed to at the inception of the intercommunal talks in 1968. (Ibid.)
2. Osorio and Turkish Ambassador both considered Clerides’ action a negotiating tactic rather than deliberate effort to end talks. (Turkish Ambassador admitted privately that both sides had been staking out tough positions in recent negotiations and that elaborate treatment of recent Denktash visit to Ankara was a part of this game.) Osorio, however, was concerned that talks if suspended too long might be difficult to resume. He is also, he said, profoundly disturbed by sharply tougher attitude with which Dekleris returned from his most recent visit to Athens. Osorio noted that both experts had seemed to have patents from home capitals to make serious effort at solution; he now feared Athens had changed that signal. (He asked particular protection on this estimate.)

3. Osorio thinks best way to get talks going again is for Waldheim or preferably Osorio to keep working at text of a statement which he can issue, reporting both sides’ concurrence, describing purpose of talks and hopefully avoiding inflammatory words. He has talked to Denktash since meeting, believes Denktash will go along with this procedure, and even permit Osorio to give press his own gloss as to what the statement means which would permit him to say things Denktash could not explicitly approve. Osorio tried same idea on Makarios, who made anticipated rumbling sounds, indicated he thought it necessary for Turks explicitly to disavow federalism, but carefully avoided making this into an absolute demand. (Foreign Minister yesterday made considerable point to me of the argument that if the Turks pointed out that federalism was simply a dream but not necessarily obtainable, this would match Makarios’ “feasible” policy on enosis, and would provide adequate justification to continue talks.) Osorio notes that GO-Cyprus is really on fairly weak ground, if it breaks up negotiations on basis of statements which were made in Ankara but never repeated in the talks themselves. He is operating on assumption that Makarios will go along when GO-Cyprus has extracted enough political capital from this issue. Osorio admits that GO-Cyprus might demand that its feelings be assuaged by a statement from the UNSYG, but if possible he thinks problem could be managed better if Osorio could do it. (Note: we agree.)

4. Comment: We are being treated to some Chinese opera. If GO-Cyprus comes into Dept for support, we recommend that Dept make appropriate sympathetic noises, but then downplay crisis by pointing to conciliatory noises by Denktash, to fact that statements made in Ankara hardly constitute grounds for suspending the talks in Nicosia. We should also express hope that Osorio can develop a formula which will reassure all parties that there has been no substantial change in the basis on which the talks are proceeding. On such a basis, we believe all parties’ interests would be served by returning to table.
5. The issue of real concern in Nicosia is not this mini crisis, but rather what Athens is up to (septel). Osorio points out, and we agree, that Makarios has little interest in successful conclusion of the talks, at best, and with present uncertainties as to whether Athens would launch a propaganda attack on him if the talks were successful, he is even less likely to feel much interest in proceeding very fast. In short, he probably has an interest in seeing the talks continue, but not in seeing them succeed immediately. End comment.

Grant

5 In telegram 576 from Nicosia, April 5, the Embassy reported Cypriot uneasiness at Greece’s larger motives regarding Cyprus. Speculation ranged from Athens hoping to keep the Cyprus situation “in the air,” to hoping to control Makarios or hinder inter-communal talks. “GOC remarked that it was difficult to determine who actually ran GOG.” (Ibid.)

75. Study Prepared by the Interdepartmental Group for Near East and South Asia


CONTINGENCY STUDY FOR CYPRUS

1. Summary

Cyprus is a foreign policy problem for the United States because strife between the Greek Cypriots and Turk Cypriots brings Greece and Turkey into military confrontation unhinging NATO’s southern flank; because Cyprus’ crises are invariably raised in the Security Council; and because such crises have the potential to complicate our evolving relations with the Soviets and affect the atmosphere in which the United States and the Soviet Union deal with the Arab/Israeli conflict.

In addressing the various Cyprus contingencies, the only asset effectively available to policy makers is the degree of diplomatic/political influence that the USG can bring to bear on the situation. The important decisions relate almost exclusively to diplomatic strategy and

1 Source: National Archives, S/S–I Files: Lot 83 D 411, Box 3418, NSC Contingency Plans: Cyprus. Secret. The paper was drafted by Thomas Boyatt and Richard Erdman of the Cyprus Desk, reviewed by the Contingency Planning Working Group, and transmitted to the Washington Special Actions Group on May 6 by Brandon Grove, Jr., Alternate Chairman.
tactics, and focus on the questions of whether, when, with whom, and how to use our diplomatic influence in an evolving contingency scenario. We believe that the best answers to these questions are: (1) that the USG should use its influence, (2) that this influence should be used in any given Cyprus scenario before the situation degenerates into a crisis, (3) that US influence should be applied evenhandedly to all of the parties including Greece and Turkey and (4) that joint initiatives under UN or third party aegis are preferable, but that when the chips are down the US will be required at the crisis stage to act unilaterally.

Of the six contingency scenarios, the first deals with the status quo which provides tolerable stability. The other five contingencies involve various developments all of which have great potential to evolve in a manner that threatens basic US policy interests. A deadlock in the local talks (Contingency 2); a spontaneous outbreak of violence (Contingency 3); an attempted coup by pro-enosis forces (Contingency 4); a mainland Greek putsch against Makarios (Contingency 5); and a joint Greco-Turk attempt to occupy and partition Cyprus (Contingency 6) all provide real possibilities for generating a military clash between Greece and Turkey and a diplomatic clash between the US and the Soviet Union.

With respect to Contingencies 2 and 3 we recommend active US diplomatic involvement under UN aegis or jointly with interested countries and suitably supported in Nicosia, Athens, Ankara and the UN. With respect to Contingencies 4, 5 and 6 we recommend low-key joint diplomatic representations to Greece and Turkey to prevent them from undertaking potentially disastrous para-military or military adventures in Cyprus.

The continuing challenge for the United States is to avoid a Cyprus crisis without becoming too involved in the Cyprus dispute itself.

[Omitted here is Section II—The table of contents.]

III. Basic Plan

A. Contingencies

The permutations and commutations of contingency scenarios in the Cyprus situation are practically endless. The list below attempts to outline the basic directions in which events impacting on US policy interests would probably evolve. US diplomatic involvement in past Cyprus crises amply demonstrates that rapidly evolving situations invariably entail unanticipated combinations of and unexpected gradations between predicted contingency scenarios. However, this contingency study is based upon its 1970 predecessor and both are outgrowths of our historical experience with Cyprus. It is worth noting that in the 1967–73 period variations of contingencies 2, 3, 4, and 5 actually occurred.

1. The intercommunal talks, which the USG supports as the best hope for a peaceful solution of the Cyprus problem, either continue in
some form or are postponed with both parties accepting an uneasy status quo and avoiding armed clashes.

2. The intercommunal talks reach an impasse or break down completely with tensions rising rapidly. Fighting between the Greek and Turkish Cypriot communities erupts with Greece and Turkey heading toward confrontation as they support their compatriots on the island.

3. A major outbreak of intercommunal violence occurs spontaneously (e.g. Makarios is assassinated and chaos ensues, pro-enosis guerrilla group attacks Turkish Cypriots, Turkish Cypriots initiate hostilities hoping to provoke mainland Turkish intervention) generating an immediate armed confrontation between Greece and Turkey.

4. Pro-enosis Greek Cypriots, possibly with the help of mainland Greece or Greek officers, initiate efforts to overthrow the Government of Cyprus (GOC). This effort might include an attempt to assassinate Archbishop Makarios.

5. The Greek Government attempts to subvert the GOC and remove Makarios from office or closely control his activities. This development occurs without the knowledge of the Turkish Government whose reaction remains unpredictable.

6. Greece and Turkey, acting jointly, attempt to “solve” the intercommunal problem through joint or parallel steps to occupy Cyprus militarily and partition the island between them.

B. US Interests

US interests in Cyprus are basically determined by the linkage of the impact of local crises, resulting from Greek and Turkish Cypriot communal conflict, upon other parties. The most important of our concerns flowing from the situation is to neutralize the Cyprus problem’s potential to embroil NATO allies Greece and Turkey in armed confrontation and/or conflict, thus unhinging NATO’s southeastern flank.

A second US interest involves the Soviet dimension. The Soviet Union over the years has monitored the Cyprus situation closely, consistently supported the island’s independent status, and opposed efforts to extend mainland Greek or Turkish influence or control. In reacting to the various contingencies—most of which would arouse Soviet suspicions of a “NATO plot” to subvert Cyprus’ independence—the US must therefore consider whether and how its moves might complicate our evolving relations with the Soviets and affect the atmosphere in which the US and the Soviet Union deal with the Arab-Israeli conflict.

In the international sphere Cyprus crises have been invariably brought before the UN Security Council as posing threats to international peace and security. The problem is periodically before the Security Council which maintains a UN Force (UNFICYP) on the island and supports a good offices role for the SYG. Consideration of the Cyprus problem
in the UN framework engages US interests in terms of our relations with
the Security Council and other UN members, and focuses international
and domestic attention on US reactions to the dispute. It also provides a
proven and generally acceptable multilateral option to supplement, or, if
necessary, supplant bilateral efforts during a Cyprus crisis.

Finally, the US has an interest in the maintenance of our now much
reduced communications facilities on the island. It is likewise impor-
tant for us that the two British bases on Cyprus (which are currently
"sovereign" bases) remain in friendly hands.

Contingencies 2 through 6 would all engage in greater or lesser
degree the US interests noted above. In the past we have reacted by
using diplomatic capital to contain the situation. In 1964 Secretary Rusk
sent the Ball mission and later the Acheson mission to try to resolve
the crises. With the outbreak of the 1967 fighting President Johnson
sent Cyrus Vance as a special emissary. Vance found a formula for
avoiding a war between Greece and Turkey on that occasion, and, in
1968, US diplomacy was successful in arranging for local negotiations
between Greek and Turkish Cypriot representatives. When these ne-
gotiations were broken off in 1971, the US participated in a diplomatic
initiative which achieved resumption of the talks with the addition of
constitutional experts from Greece and Turkey and the Special Repre-
sentative of the UN Secretary General. Because of our interests in the
wider ramifications of the Cyprus dispute, US involvement has been
constant and in times of crisis intense. Our broad goal remains the pro-
motion of a viable intercommunal solution that will remove Cyprus as
a potential cause for a Greco-Turk clash on NATO’s southeastern flank.

C. Assumptions

The dominant factors expected to affect the Cyprus situation dur-
ing the next two to three years are:

1. Archbishop Makarios will continue to be the major political force in
the equation. In the last five years Makarios has twice been over-
whelmingly and democratically elected President of Cyprus. He has
the strong support of the Greek Cypriots. When the Government of
Greece tried to use diplomatic and political means to pressure Makar-
ios into resigning in February–March 1972, his reservoir of popular sup-
port was a key factor in his turning aside of the Greek effort. In addi-
tion to his domestic political support, the Archbishop has for over a
decade been consistently successful in dealing with greater and more
powerful countries (Greece, Turkey, Soviet Union, UK and the US) ei-
ther in neutralizing their actions which he opposed or in mobilizing
actions he supported. The Archbishop is a “big leaguer.” His stature
and charisma far exceed that of any mainland Greek leader (which no
doubt accounts at least partially for the dislike of recent Greek juntas
for him). This international standing together with his internal sup-
port gives Makarios and the GOC a freedom of action not enjoyed by Greece with its political instability, or by Turkey with its fragile coalition government.

In short, the primary assumption of this study is that US reaction to any contingency scenario regarding Cyprus will have to take very heavily into account the qualities and capabilities of Archbishop Makarios. Conversely, the departure of Makarios from the political scene—through death, overthrow, or assassination—will transform the political equation (most likely bringing House of Representatives President Glafkos Clerides to the presidency), create considerable political instability, and increase the chances of a spontaneous outbreak of violence on the island (contingency 3).

2. Both Greece and Turkey will maintain to the extent possible their present policies of rapprochement in the context of NATO. Both countries place great importance on their NATO connection and understand the importance of friendly bilateral relations in this regard.

3. Animosity between Greece and Turkey is still a factor. The coexistence of Greece and Turkey within NATO is 25 years old while their ethnic antagonisms reach back 1000 years. It is important to understand that in the evolution of any of the contingency scenarios posited, once blood is spilled, Greco-Turk hatreds are likely to very quickly boil to the surface as they did in 1963, 1964 and 1967.

4. The Soviet Union will maintain its watching brief on Cyprus. The Soviet interest is in ensuring Cyprus' continued independence and neutrality. If the Soviets see this interest threatened, they will not hesitate to use diplomatic pressure on other involved parties, including the US, to protect and promote their interest. Thus, when rumors of coup threats reached a peak in March (1974), the Soviets reminded Greece and Turkey that they would not remain indifferent to actions hostile to Cyprus' independence or territorial integrity. At the same time, the Soviets requested Britain and the US to use their influence to dissuade Greece and Turkey from taking any provocative steps. The Soviet Embassy here approached us “in the spirit of détente.”

There has been and there is no evidence of Soviet intent to use its military power to influence crisis situations in Cyprus. Such action would risk confrontation with Western powers and run counter to the basic Soviet interest in the independence and neutrality of Cyprus. In any case, it is highly unlikely that Greece, Turkey, Britain, or the US would permit the situation on Cyprus to deteriorate to the point where the Soviets would find intervention either necessary or worth the risk.

On the other hand, Soviet military and operational capabilities are improving—witness the improved performance of the Soviet Mediterranean Squadron during the October '73 Middle East Crisis. Thus, the possibility of Soviet military intervention to forestall Greek, Turkish,
or other Western military intervention can no longer be dismissed out of hand. If the Soviets ever did decide to intervene militarily, it would only be after Soviet diplomatic efforts to involve the US and others in stabilizing the situation and to counter Western (i.e. Greek and/or Turk) military moves had failed.

Soviet military intervention—were it to occur—would very probably take the form of subtle naval diplomacy. The Soviets, for example, might position a few ships just outside Cypriot territorial waters or, at Makarios' invitation, they might make a show of naval force within Cyprus' waters. In an extreme case—again at Makarios' invitation—they might even make a port visit to Limassol or Famagusta to buttress Makarios' position and to demonstrate that they would not remain indifferent to a Greek or Turkish invasion attempt.

5. During a crisis, the dispute will at some point be brought before the UN. Given the decade of UN involvement, the presence of UNFICYP, and the role of the SYG's Special Representative, the UN Security Council is likely to be involved early in the crisis. Makarios is most likely to turn quickly to the Security Council to gain UN support for Cypriot independence and against Greek-Turkish intervention. The other three parties (Greece, Turkey, and Turkish Cypriots) are less likely to find a sympathetic voting line-up in the Council unless they seek to cool the crisis on the basis of continued Cypriot independence and territorial integrity.

6. U.S. interests in containing Cyprus situation will continue. Because of the fragility of the Cyprus situation and its capacity to threaten U.S. interests in the eastern Mediterranean and beyond, the imperatives of the situation will require the USG to continue to involve itself diplomatically in the situation in order to prevent another Cyprus crisis.

D. Key Issues

In addressing the various Cyprus contingencies, the only asset effectively available to policy makers is the degree of diplomatic/political influence that the USG can bring to bear on the situation. We have no military or AID relationships with Cyprus but we do make a substantial contribution to the maintenance of the UNFICYP ($66.5 million since 1964). The military and economic aid and assistance which the USG provides to Greece and Turkey is linked to our crucial NATO and bilateral relationships with these countries and is in effect unavailable for leverage except in the most extreme circumstances. U.S. military intervention—even the more subtle forms of naval diplomacy—is not a viable means of influencing the Cyprus situation. Such a course would be widely criticized and would provoke a Soviet counter-move (shifting their fleet). This would nullify any moves on our part, increase tension on Cyprus and involve us directly with the USSR. Above all—assuming that timely and appropriate diplomatic action were taken—US military intervention would be avoidable.
Any Cyprus contingency situation is, therefore, almost totally and uniquely diplomatic. The important questions which will confront the policy maker in determining courses of action relate exclusively to diplomatic strategy and tactics and can be subsumed under four headings: whether to use U.S. diplomatic influence, when to exert such influence, with whom; and how.

1. **Whether.** In any given Cyprus contingency short of an acute military confrontation between Greece and Turkey, one attractive approach is to answer all four questions negatively on the grounds that the USG should “stay out” of the intricate Cyprus problems. The “no action” option is always appealing in that U.S. silence is less likely to offend the parties—particularly Greece and Turkey—than a more active stance. The risk of this approach is that the Cyprus situation itself is likely to deteriorate to the point of a Greco-Turk military confrontation requiring U.S. intervention in most difficult circumstances. As an example, in the summer and fall of 1967 Embassy Nicosia was recommending a USG request to the Government of Greece to recall General Grivas from Cyprus. Embassy Athens took the position that it was impossible to approach Colonel Papadopoulos and the junta with such a request. In November 1967 General Grivas overran two Turkish Cypriot villages generating a first-class confrontation between Greece and Turkey. The U.S. was then required not only to go to the Government of Greece with the request that they withdraw General Grivas but also that they withdraw 10,000 Greek troops from Cyprus. At the same time special emissary Cyrus Vance was required to put maximum pressure on Turkey to prevent an invasion of Cyprus.

2. **When.** The question of timing has in past Cyprus crises been crucial. Here again the power of inertia and the attractiveness of doing nothing rather than doing something unpopular—particularly with allies Greece and Turkey—has a critical impact on the problem. In opposition to the “no action” option, another approach which attracted a great deal of support just after the USG managed to scrape through a crisis (as in 1964 and 1967) is the activist approach. Following special emissary Cyrus Vance’s 1967 crisis diplomacy which was successful in avoiding a Greco-Turk war, both Deputy Secretary Vance and Ambassador Charles Yost undertook critical surveys of the Cyprus situation with a view to recommending a consistent U.S. policy approach. The main conclusion of both studies was that the USG should actively promote a viable intercommunal solution to the Cyprus problem to remove it as a potential cause of a Greco-Turk clash on NATO’s southeastern flank. Both studies recommended that the USG either directly or indirectly mediate the substance of the Cyprus dispute. While this approach had a great deal of support in the aftermath of crisis, USG policy has become more and more passive as the distance from the crisis has increased. In any case, policy makers must decide whether the USG
should make representations to the parties before a crisis erupts. The hope in adopting this timing is to prevent a crisis, but the problem is that without a crisis the parties may be less amenable to accepting USG views. A different timing approach would be for the USG to move in the context of an ongoing crisis when it would be clear that our basic interests are threatened. The hope in this approach is that the pressures of the situation will make the parties concerned more accommodating, but there always is the risk that the crisis will be too far advanced to contain.

3. With Whom. The Cyprus problem is basically a quadrilateral dispute involving the Governments of Cyprus, Greece, Turkey and the Turkish-Cypriot Community. The path of least resistance is to put maximum pressure on the Government of Cyprus and the path of most resistance is to bring pressure to bear on NATO allies Greece and Turkey. The simplistic approach is for the USG to support or at least accept whatever Greece or Turkey can agree upon. The problem with this approach is that it is often difficult for Greece and Turkey to agree on anything and, if they do agree, Archbishop Makarios maintains an enormous capacity to upset any Greco-Turk agreement by playing the Russian card, and/or taking the matter to the UN Security Council. The historical record demonstrates that USG diplomatic successes in averting a Greco-Turk war over Cyprus in 1964 and 1967 and in achieving the establishment of negotiations in 1968 were based upon our even-handed pressure on all parties to compromise.

4. How. In the past the USG has acted unilaterally in truly emergency situations and, having gained time, has moved to involve others—particularly the UK, Greece and Turkey under a UN umbrella to take needed action. For example, during the 1967 crisis the USG averted a Greco-Turk showdown through the unilateral diplomatic vehicle of the Vance mission. In 1968 a joint UN–US–UK effort achieved the initiation of the local talks. In 1971 the local talks, which had reached an impasse, were rejuvenated through diplomatic activities in which the Government of Greece took the lead supported by ourselves, the British, the UN and to a lesser extent Turkey.

In summary, the policy maker will have at his disposal the single asset of U.S. diplomatic influence and will be faced with the questions of whether, when, with whom, and how to use this asset in an evolving contingency scenario. In general terms, the best answers to the questions posed are: (1) the USG should use its influence, (2) this influence should be used in any given Cyprus scenario before the situation degenerates into a crisis, (3) U.S. influence should be applied even-handedly to all the parties including Greece and Turkey and (4) joint initiatives under UN or third party aegis are preferable, but when the chips are down the U.S. is likely to be required in an acute crisis situation to act unilaterally.
76. Telegram From the Embassy in Turkey to the Department of State

Ankara, June 25, 1974, 1401Z.

5012. Subject: Cyprus Danger Signals in Greece–Cyprus Relations.
Ref: Athens 3936.

1. We suspect that from GOT viewpoint, current Cyprus situation seems somewhat less complex than it may appear to GOG and GOC. Turks derive some grim satisfaction from “Greeks fighting Greeks,” whether antagonists are Makarios and Ioannides, Makarios and Grivas, or Makarios and Papadopoulos. (This despite fact they got along pretty well with latter.)

2. GOT has little desire get involved in favor of one side or the other. Its basic interest in Cyprus rests on concern for Turkish community there and unwillingness for strategic reasons see unrestricted or unchallenged Greek control of island (e.g., enosis).

3. Thus, most Turks prepared indefinitely live with present situation. In face of clearcut prospect of suppression Makarios by Ioannides or any other “hostile” Greek leadership, GOT might be prepared be a little easier on Makarios, but as yet we have seen no sign of this here.

4. We concur wholeheartedly with recommendation for US policy contained para 11 ref tel.

Macomber

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1 Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 1312, Saunders Chron File, NSC Secretariat, Richard M. Nixon Cables/Contingency Plans 1974, Cyprus and Greek-Turkish Contingency Plans. Secret; Exdis. Repeated to Athens, Nicosia, and USUN.
2 Dated June 24. (Ibid.)
3 In telegram 3936 from Athens, Tasca expressed increasing concern with the crisis atmosphere developing in Cyprus: “In my view, we should limit U.S. action to reinforcing our approaches to UNSYG, urge NATO SYG to keep attentive watching brief and encourage both to work directly with the London–Zurich signatories. Within this context, when opportunities occur, consistent with our secondary role in the complex of problems, we should seek to discourage solution based upon violence, and gambling that somehow violent solution will bring positive gains to any of the parties of lasting value.” (Ibid.)
77. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassies in Greece and Cyprus

Washington, June 29, 1974, 1907Z.

141500. Subject: Greece–Cyprus Relations. Ref: Athens 3936; Nicosia 1224.

1. We share concerns of Athens and Nicosia regarding gravity of relationship between GOG and GOC. From various reports, it is evident that Ioannides is seriously considering way to topple Makarios from power, a move which could have disastrous consequences for US interests in Eastern Mediterranean as well as for peoples of Cyprus, Greece, and Turkey. In our view effort to remove Makarios by force contains unacceptable risks of generating chaos eventually causing Greco-Turk confrontation; involving Soviets in Cyprus situation; and complicating developing US-Soviet détente.

2. We know that Ioannides has long been obsessed with issue of communism both in Greece and in Cyprus and that his dislike for Makarios has bordered on the pathological. Until recently, our impression has been that he preferred to play for time on Cyprus problem until he had consolidated his position in the internal Greek context. Now, however, he apparently feels that Makarios is seeking to take advantage of Greek-Turkish tensions and the Greek regime’s domestic difficulties to reduce Greek influence on the island and that this effort is a personal challenge which he cannot ignore.

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2 See footnotes 2 and 3, Document 76.

3 In telegram 1224 from Nicosia, June 27, the Embassy agreed with the Embassy in Athens about the gravity of the Greece/Cyprus situation and that démarches would not be useful. Deconfrontation best served the interests of the United States, Cyprus, and Greece. Grant recommended that the United States, in approaching Ioannides, stress that “Athens could have trouble Sovs and Third World if it went after Makarios.” He concluded, “If GOGreece would give its officers meaningful command not to engage in anti-Makarios propaganda, dissociate the NG from EOKA–B activities, and find some means to recognize legality of GOCyprus Council of Ministers’ role in selection of cadet officers, we think Makarios (probably already shaken) would be glad to defer any larger plans for asserting control over NG.” (National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 592, Country Files, Middle East, Cyprus, Vol. I)
3. *For Ambassador Tasca:* We have carefully weighed recommendations in Athens 3936 and Nicosia 1224 and have concluded you should send a signal to Ioannides. Through whatever channel and means you deem most appropriate, our view that any effort to remove the Archbishop from power by violent means could have disastrous consequences not only for the two communities on the island, but also for Greece and Turkey and that, therefore, we would be strongly opposed to any move of this nature. Our basic position remains that we would welcome any settlement which would be acceptable to the parties involved. We strongly believe that lasting settlement can best be achieved by peaceful (underlined) means.4

4. *For Nicosia:* You are to take no action whatsoever on the above. Subsequent to Ambassador Tasca’s approach to Ioannides, we will advise you whether we want anything done.

Sisco

4 Tasca reported on his meeting in telegram 4179, July 1. (Ibid.)

78. **Telegram From the Embassy in Cyprus to the Department of State**

Nicosia, July 9, 1974, 1645Z.

1302. Subject: Greek Embassy View re NG Controversy.

*Summary:* Greek Embassy recommends Athens accept Makarios’ demands. Admits military opposed. Says NG reduction will lead to de-confrontation. Expresses fear over possible leakage of arms. *End summary.*

1. In conversation with EmbOff July 8, Greek Embassy officer [*name not declassified*]—protect) said Embassy has recommended to Athens that it accept Makarios’ demand for withdrawal of Greek mainland officers. [*name not declassified*] said Embassy has further recommended that GOGreece agree provide 100 officers to train reconstituted NG (though Embassy hopes convince Archbishop of need for additional

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mainland personnel). Embassy argument reportedly based on rationale that it impossible for Greece to completely extricate itself from responsibility for Cyprus; defense and presence of even limited number mainland officers will make this defense more credible.

2. [name not declassified] admitted this view not shared by military colleagues here. Said they advocating either direct confrontation or total renunciation of Greek responsibility for island’s defense. (Latter course reportedly enjoys more support among military officers.) Thus far, [name not declassified] said Greek Embassy has no info which policy Athens will pursue.

3. Despite lack of guidance, [name not declassified] maintained NG general staff proceeding plan for force’s reduction to 5,000 men. Initial study indicates this extremely complicated and will require extended period to implement. [name not declassified] noted that 5,000-man force will be totally unable defend Cyprus against external enemy (read Turkey) and said Makarios apparently has totally discounted possibility that Aegean crisis could spill over onto Cyprus.

4. In [name not declassified] view, only way maintain defensive capability will be complete reorganization of NG’s reserve. However, fact that large number NG recruits depart island for university studies immediately upon discharge will make this task virtually impossible.

5. [name not declassified] maintained drastic reduction in NG strength will inevitably lead to unilateral deconfrontation. Guard simply will not have enough people to man barricades while maintaining reserve strength. In his view this a positive development and he probed, at considerable length, on possible Turk Cypriot reactions.

6. At end of conversation, [name not declassified] advanced “personal view” that it “impossible” for GOGreece to simply reject Makarios’ demands. Admitted, however, that he not sanguine that rational counsel will prevail in Athens. On local scene, [name not declassified] expressed fear that pro-EOKA mainland officers may divert considerable quantity NG arms to dissidents prior surrendering control of NG camps.

7. Comment: [name not declassified] is very open, forthcoming Greek officer who is normally an accurate reporter. While possibly not fully read into Embassy planning, above probably reflects his honest assessment of current trends. End comment.

Davies
Memorandum From Rosemary Niehuss of the National Security Council Staff to Secretary of State Kissinger

Washington, July 15, 1974, 6 a.m.

Subject

Cyprus Coup by Greek-Officered National Guard and Death of Makarios

According to late reports from embassy Nicosia:

—The Greek-officered National Guard on Cyprus has taken over the government and Archbishop Makarios is reported dead.
—All reports coming from the National Guard forces have stressed that this affair is purely internal to Cyprus and within the Greek community and have urged calm. Among the reports of sporadic firing associated with the coup are none which yet allege any serious incidents involving Turk Cypriots.
—A “Government of National Salvation” has been announced, based on the following:

—The new government has been created “to restore spiritual unity of Greek Cypriots, restore harmony in the Church of Cyprus and prevent Armed Forces from falling into the hards of ‘anarchy and criminal elements’.” Those responsible for the latter have been removed.
—The new government will continue the intercommunal talks.
—The foreign policy of Cyprus will remain unchanged, in particular non-aligned aspects.

—Thus far, the reaction of the Turk Cypriot community has been a plea for calm by its leader Denktash and a call for UN intervention.

This situation is the “dynamic” solution to Athens concern about Makarios that junta leader Ioannides, according to reliable intelligence, has been speculating on in recent weeks. Makarios’ efforts to remove the Greek-officered National Guard, Athens main instrument of influence on the island, provoked this turn of events.

The intelligence community is closely monitoring for reports of Turkish and Soviet political and military reactions. As of this writing, neither Ankara nor Athens has made any official statement about the coup.

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2 Telegrams 1339, 1340, and 1344, July 15. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy Files, 1974)
There are two possibilities on the Turkish side: (a) If any fighting associated with the coup begins to spill over into the Turk Cypriot community and seriously threatens it, Turkey may move to fulfill its promise of immediate military assistance and all the implications that such a move would have for a broader Turkish-Greek confrontation. (b) If the Turk Cypriot community remains relatively unaffected and its needs met by the new government, Ankara may well acquiesce in these developments. In that regard, it is worth noting that the coup leaders have said all the right things about the coup—that it is internal to Cyprus, that the new government promises a continuation of the inter-communal talks (and not enosis which would draw Turkey in) and that foreign policy will remain unchanged.

The Soviets will be attentive to these developments. They have been a staunch supporter of Makarios—under whom a strong local communist party has developed in the last decade—and, according to reliable reports, have been concerned about tensions brewing between Athens and Nicosia and the prospect that Athens might move against Makarios. They do not want Cyprus NATOized.

We will discuss our options at a WSAG meeting this morning.

80. Minutes of Meeting of the Washington Special Actions Group

Washington, July 15, 1974, 10:18–10:43 a.m.

SUBJECT
Cyprus

PARTICIPANTS
Chairman—Henry A. Kissinger
State
Robert Ingersoll
Joseph Sisco
Wells Stabler
Thomas D. Boyatt
Robert McCloskey

1 Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Institutional Files (H–Files), Box H–096, Meetings Files, WSAG Meetings. Top Secret; Codeword. The meeting took place in the Situation Room of the White House.
SUMMARY OF CONCLUSIONS

It was agreed that:

—The aircraft carrier America, due to return to the U.S. on regular rotation today, will remain at Rota, Spain for at least the next twenty-four hours;
—State and Defense will prepare a joint message for transmittal to appropriate embassies today outlining U.S. policy in the current situation.2

Secretary Kissinger: I thought we would have a quick review of the situation and discuss briefly what we can or should do about it. Bill (Mr. Colby), would you like to brief?

Mr. Colby briefed from the attached text.3

Secretary Kissinger: Bill (Mr. Clements), do you have any views?

Mr. Clements: Not really. I don’t have anything to add. I’ve just been listening. Frankly, I’m not clear on what is going on.

Secretary Kissinger: Joe (Mr. Sisco), do you have any views?

Mr. Sisco: I’ve got a couple. . . .

Secretary Kissinger: Maybe we should hear from the Chairman (General Brown) first.

General Brown: From our viewpoint we have only one item. The carrier “America” was scheduled to begin its return to the States today. We have sent out instructions to hold for 24 hours at Rota, Spain because movement of our ship west (or east) might “say something” and we might want to avoid any such impression at this particular

2 Apparently a reference to Document 82.
3 Not attached. A copy is in the Library of Congress, Manuscript Division, Kissinger Papers, Box SCI 21, WSAG 11/73–4/76.
time. Besides there would be a gap as her relief is not expected for 12 to 14 days. So, we thought it would be better to hold her for a time. Is that all right?

Secretary Kissinger: Yes, let’s hold her there, I agree completely. I don’t think it would be wise for her to move anywhere, east or west, for that matter as it might indicate something.

General Brown: No, under no circumstances.

Secretary Kissinger: It shouldn’t move either way.

General Brown: Then we will hold her for a while.

Secretary Kissinger: Which carrier is supposed to replace her?

General Brown: I think it’s the “Forrestal.” No, it’s the “Independence.”

Mr. Sisco: The way I see it, over the next 24 to 48 hours there isn’t a great deal we can do. The situation is too confused and we’ll just have to wait until it clarifies. I think, however, our two objectives are very clear: (1) do what we can to avert war between Greece and Turkey; and (2) do what we can to avert Soviet exploitation of the situation.

The situation offers great opportunities for Soviet intervention. I think we must operate on the assumption that what is important is that the integrity and political independence of Cyprus be maintained. What this means will depend on how the situation evolves on the ground. So far it has not become an intercommunal matter.

Whether this is a limited objective coup inspired by Greece or will lead to a prolonged civil war will depend partly on whether Makarios is alive and whether his Communist supporters and others will fight. Our best interests are protected within the framework of the territorial integrity of Cyprus.

I suggest that we continue to operate quietly, that not to internationalize the situation would be in our best interests. Over the next 24 hours we should get a reading on the situation from both the Greeks and the Turks. By the way, the Cypriot Ambassador called to see you this morning. I recommend that you (Secretary Kissinger) see him sometime today.

Secretary Kissinger: What is his name?

Mr. Sisco: Nicos G. Dimitriou.

Mr. Clements: Henry, I think we ought to get a reading on the situation. We are tasking the attaché in Turkey—and perhaps State should do the same—to go see the military people and come back to us with some thinking. There have been some rumblings out of the Turkish military and we ought to find out what they are up to.

Mr. Sisco: From what I’ve seen so far there is no collusion between the Greeks and the Turks.
Secretary Kissinger: I think our first objective should be to prevent any kind of Soviet action. Whether they succeed depends on the degree this stops being an internal Cyprus problem. So we must keep this as an internal affair and keep it from becoming internationalized. Someone in the Department told me this morning of the pro-Makarios problem, that his supporters might start a scrap with the Turks to internationalize the situation.

The other thing we ought to do is get some sort of coordinated line on this thing, so that we can all speak with one voice. Could we get a few simple themes (to Mr. Sisco and Mr. Clements)? Can we draw up something that we can agree on?

Mr. Clements: Absolutely. There’s no problem.

Secretary Kissinger: To the Turks we want to point out the dangers of internationalizing the problem. We want to advise on preserving the present structure on the island; we don’t want the Turks to become provoked and want them to understand who is provoking and why. I think it would be a good idea to tell the Turks that we support them, that is, the maintenance of their existing rights on the island. We should tell the Greeks that there should be no—that we oppose any change of the existing political status of the island or of the Turk Cypriot rights.

Mr. Sisco: We need a public line for the noon briefing. I think we ought to put out a low-key statement, indicating we continue to operate on the assumption that the political integrity of Cyprus will be preserved. We don’t want to alarm the Turks and we don’t want to give them an excuse for exploiting the situation.

Secretary Kissinger: Bob (Ambassador McCloskey), do you have anything you would like to say?

Ambassador McCloskey: It has been my observation that Makarios has been deeply worried for several years now that he would be killed. He has been worried about it for some time.

Secretary Kissinger: Why wasn’t he killed earlier?

Ambassador McCloskey: There have been several attempts to kill him over the last few years but they all failed. His (Makarios’) overriding concern all this time is that Grivas is behind the whole thing. But I am a little disturbed by this report that Sampson has been put in as the new leader.

Secretary Kissinger: I’ve never heard of him. Who is he?

Mr. Boyatt: He is a killer. He has already got twelve notches on his gun. I’ve known him personally for several years.

Secretary Kissinger: It seems to me that our immediate objective is to keep this thing from becoming internationalized, the Greek-Turk problem, the Soviet angle. There is really nothing we can do at this
time internally but we can keep it from becoming an international issue.

Mr. Colby: He (Sampson) is far to the right. This could stimulate Communist elements.

Secretary Kissinger: Can we get some cables off right away on what our line is? Can you (to Mr. Sisco and Mr. Clements) get together on what we send out so that both the Embassy and Defense are saying the same thing?

Mr. Sisco: Sure, we’ll make it a joint message. We can get it out very quickly.

Ambassador McCloskey: There is one thing, the UN question. Do we want the UN involved?

Secretary Kissinger: Not until it becomes an international issue. At this moment we don’t see it that way and I think that taking it to the UN would only internationalize the situation, which is what we want to avoid. Am I not right?

Ambassador McCloskey: Somebody could talk to (Secretary General) Waldheim. That might be a way to keep it out of the UN.

General Brown: How about NATO?

Mr. Stabler: They have a watching brief.

Secretary Kissinger: We can tell (Ambassador) Rumsfeld what we are doing—give him our position. If NATO calls for a meeting we’ll just have to see what happens. No problem if they want to offer to mediate. But I see no objection to telling Rumsfeld what our line is.

Mr. Sisco: And could we slip in, could you see the Cypriot Ambassador?

Secretary Kissinger: Yes, let’s make it 12:30 today. Does he know anything? We will let you (the WSAG members) know what he says.

Mr. Sisco: He (the Cypriot Ambassador) doesn’t know what is going on. He probably knows less than we do.

Secretary Kissinger: Then why see him?

Mr. Sisco: It would be consistent with our policy line on the integrity of Cyprus.

Secretary Kissinger: We don’t want to pick a fight with the Greeks. We want to keep this fairly low key. We want to let them know our thinking, but in a low-key way. Can (Ambassador) Tasca do this?

Mr. Sisco: He is out of the country—no, he’s back now.
Secretary Kissinger: O.K., before the end of the day let’s get these people informed of our views. We’ll take another look at the situation on Wednesday, or maybe tomorrow, depending on how the situation develops, and the next time we meet we should discuss the Greek-Turkish Aegean problem, too.

81. Telegram From the Embassy in Greece to the Department of State

Athens, July 15, 1974, 1615Z.

4494. Subject: Cyprus: Further Reflections from Athens.

1. The evidence to date seems clearly to implicate Ioannides with the coup in Cyprus. It is also clear operation against Makarios was carefully planned, as declaration called “Government of National Salvation” demonstrates. This is a carefully prepared document taking into account main threats to successful execution of coup. Whether Ioannides has in fact unlocked Pandora’s box or provided principally for the replacement of Makarios with some far more pliable Greek remains to be seen.

2. However, the brutality of the operation as well as the skillful manner in which it was pursued indicate once again how dangerous and unreliable General Ioannides can really be—a concern which my reporting and analysis of the November 25 coup clearly reflected.

3. Makarios apparently misjudged Ioannides, believing his confrontation with Turkey would make him more amenable to elimination of the Greek National Guard officers as a major power element on the island. Instead, in the Ioannides posture, there is evidence the Greek military considered the Greek military presence in Cyprus important in their own overall military posture vis-à-vis Turkey, because it kept important Turkish forces in southern Turkey and away from Aegean and Evros areas. Makarios meanwhile sought continued and perhaps
strengthened support of Eastern Europe, Russia, Peking and probably other Third World elements.

4. Ioannides and his cohorts, it must be remembered, are fanatically anti-Communist. With them, whose leaders participated in the “sacred war” against Communism in Greece in the 1940’s, only Christianity, perhaps the obverse to them of Communism, ranks in national values with it. Makarios in his misjudgment committed in eyes of Greek military regime the unpardonable sin of not only rejecting and repelling the “Motherland” but adding insult to injury by publication of the Makarios letter to Ghizikis without GOG approval. The philotimo of the Greek military was sharply and clearly challenged at a time of national crisis with Turkey. These probably led to decision for violent confrontation with Makarios.

5. Available information [1 line not declassified] indicates GOG made last effort to deter Makarios but failing had clearly completed contingency plans to remove him. Dept will recall that earlier Ioannides stated flatly he could get rid of Makarios within 24 hours whenever he wished. Frankly, this proves once again how dangerously narrow a view Ioannides holds (see Athens 8294 November 27, 1973—“Greece’s apparent master: Demetrios Ioannides: some fears”), but even more alarming his willingness to resort to violence and perhaps even murder. This bodes darkly indeed for a peaceful solution to the Aegean problem between Turkey and Greece. A negative substantive reaction on our part will likely lead to negative substantive reaction from them.

6. A further question in present context of the problem is the effect upon the internal stability of the regime. Certainly, the people of Greece will not be happy with the violent extermination of Makarios and loss of liberty of the island. In fact, the real opposition to these military adventures, to call them what they are, is likely to deepen greatly. On the other hand, Ioannides remains effectively in control of the armed forces at this point. His stress on clearing out “anarchic” elements on the island will not weaken his present hold. Greek military are even likely to feel that clearing out the “Communist” elements on the island against prospect of an imminent confrontation with Turkey may make a lot of military sense. Thus, the immediate effect upon Greek regime’s stability does not appear visibly negative.

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4 Makarios wrote Ghizikis on July 2, as reported in telegrams 1276 and 1303 from Nicosia, July 5 and July 9, respectively. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy Files, 1974)

5 Not printed. (Ibid.)
7. Of course, if the context should change in a fashion clearly demonstrating ineptness on the part of Ioannides and his adherents as “sacred custodians” of Greek national interest, this could affect reaction. While fight on Communism, internal and external, and the confrontation with Turkey will not impair Ioannides’ strength, serious difficulties with the U.S. and its NATO allies could create problems for his continued leadership.

8. Look forward keenly to comments from Nicosia, Ankara and London regarding their reaction to all this.6

Tasca

6 The Embassy in Ankara responded in telegram 5589, Document 85. No response from Nicosia or London was found.

82. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Greece1

Washington, July 15, 1974, 1947Z.

152379. Subject: Cyprus Coup. For Ambassador From the Secretary.

You should seek an immediate appointment with Ioannides to convey the following:

1. We wish to have immediately from the GOG an appreciation of the situation in Cyprus.

2. As to our policy, we wish GOG to know that the United States continues to regard Cyprus as a single, sovereign and independent state and our actions in this matter will be governed by this continuing fundamental tenet. We have made the same point to the GOT.2


2 Instructions were transmitted in telegram 152380 to Ankara, July 15. (National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 1312, NSC Secretariat, Richard M. Nixon Cables/Contingency Plans 1974, Cyprus and Greek-Turkish Contingency Plans)
3. Consistent with the above principle, the United States cannot condone any action by the GOG to change the political and constitutional structure of the island.

4. We continue to support a peaceful resolution of the Cyprus problem through the intercommunal talks with a view to assuring appropriate guarantees for the security of the Turkish community.

5. We strongly urge all parties to exercise the utmost restraint and avoid actions which might further destabilize the situation in the Eastern Mediterranean, exacerbate relations between two NATO allies, and give an opportunity to forces extraneous to the area to exploit the situation to the detriment of Western security interests.

Kissinger

83. Transcript of Telephone Conversation Between Secretary of State Kissinger and the Soviet Ambassador (Dobrynin)¹

Washington, July 15, 1974, 5:30 p.m.

K: Anatoly. We just got a message from Cyprus that your Counselor asked the British High Commissioner how the British would feel about the introduction of Soviet troops to restore order.

D: Troops?

K: I can’t believe this.

D: I have no information. I have no telegram telling me this. I doubt that very much.

K: I can’t believe he would do this.

D: I doubt this and you don’t have anything from your mission? Your mission in Moscow?

K: In Moscow?

D: I mean in Moscow. They might have been in touch with them.

K: We have nothing from Moscow and nothing from Cyprus. Only that there is still fighting going on.

D: Who was it . . .

¹ Source: Library of Congress, Manuscript Division, Kissinger Papers, Box 396, Telephone Conversations, Anatoly Dobrynin. No classification marking.
K: Your second man in the Embassy.
D: The second man come to the British...to me it sound unbelievable.
K: Me too. If you planned something like this you would talk to us.
D: Yes.
K: You know, we would not look on it with favor.
D: I know . . .
K: Let’s see if it calms down. There are plenty of troops there.
D: What is the latest report?
K: The latest report is they are still fighting.
D: What about Makarios?
K: I have a report from Israel. They say they heard him on the radio.
D: I know, but nothing from your Embassy. I will check with Moscow. I don’t have anything at all.
K: I don’t want to start a crisis to keep you here. I don’t want anything to interfere with your vacation.
D: I know. I want to get away. I know this could come about only if Makarios asked for it and then it would have to be discussed. But if Makarios is not there we would not do it on our own. This I am sure. This is not done at all. I doubt very much they do this on their own.
K: That is my view.
D: Ok. Be in touch.
84. Transcript of Telephone Conversation Between Secretary of State Kissinger and the Soviet Ambassador (Dobrynin)¹

Washington, July 15, 1974, 6:30 p.m.

D: Hello Henry. The Ambassador of Cyprus has just informed me that Makarios is alive and in UN troops [?], he is in another place.

K: I have seen that as an unofficial report.

D: This is what he mentioned to me. I don’t know if it is official.

K: I’m glad you called. I was just getting ready to call you. I just had an unofficial report that he is in a town called Phados.

D: I heard . . .

K: Well, we got the first letter the same. If that is true it puts a new complexion on the situation.

D: And it says he has asked the Secretary General to have Security Council tomorrow to discuss and according to this information the Ambassador has . . . in this area, where Makarios is, it is quiet, where the Archbishop is, but in Nicosia there is strong fighting. This is what he mentioned to me.

K: Let us see if we can keep our actions coordinated. The United States has no unilateral interests there. And we support the existing Constitution. Can we stay in touch with each other before we take any drastic moves?

D: I will send a telegram saying let’s coordinate our actions.

K: We are in favor of the existing Constitutional arrangement. Let’s check before doing anything. I will let you know if we plan anything. We don’t plan to do anything until we get a report but we have made those demarches² I told you about.

D: Ok, Henry.

¹ Source: Library of Congress, Manuscript Division, Kissinger Papers, Box 396, Telephone Conversations, Anatoly Dobrynin. No classification marking.

² Presumably a reference to telegrams to the Embassies in Athens and Ankara instructing the Ambassadors to relay the American view that Cyprus was a sovereign state and that the current crisis should be resolved peacefully. See Document 82.
85. Telegram From the Embassy in Turkey to the Department of State

Ankara, July 15, 1974, 2330Z.

5589. Ref: Athens 4493, 4494.¹

1. Turkish policy on the Cyprus coup is still evolving. Yet two judgments which will be important as USG moves to prevent spread of conflict and protect its own interests can now be suggested with some confidence:

(A) GOT will move strongly, directly, and unitedly to prevent enosis by all means, including use of force, when and if it is convinced enosis is imminent. This is not only nationalist and emotional reaction but part of accepted Turkish grand strategy.

(B) Until so convinced, GOT likely attempt lay responsibility for action on Geneva signatories, UN, NATO, and US—unless Turk Cypriots come to suffer substantially, in which case direct action of some kind would again be likely.

2. Other, more subtle, choices and actions will probably for time being seem less important to Turks than to Greeks, Cypriots themselves, NATO, UN, and even Russians: e.g. comparative virtues Makarios (if he is still alive) and Clerides, reinforcement or not of the Turkish contingent, role of UNFICYP, etc. At same time, GOT will continue deeply suspicious of Ioannides government and Ankara is already clearly very fearful that any government led by Sampson is an enosis government. For these reasons and because of its own political necessity, the GOT can be expected to undertake military alerts and troop movements within Turkey which will inevitably increase tension even while it awaits international action.

3. In this situation, we see first sine qua non for the prevention of intra-NATO fighting as the blocking by all means available to the US of enosis or anything that looks like it. Second is the prevention of

¹ Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 634, Country Files, Middle East, Turkey, Vol. IV: Secret; Niact; Immediate; Exdis. Repeated to Nicosia, Athens, London, USNATO, USUN, USNMR SHAPE, USDOCOSOUTH, CINCUSAFE, COMSIXTHFLT, and USCINCEUR.

² In telegram 4493 from Athens, July 15, especially paragraphs 6–10, Tasca urged reiterating the U.S. interest in maintaining peace between Greece and Turkey and finding a long-term settlement for Cyprus. To that end, Tasca suggested promoting the return to the democratic structure just overthrown in Cyprus by concluding the intercommunal talks and arranging early elections, and he also envisioned a continuing role for the UN. Tasca thought that the United States should reiterate its opposition to violence as a solution, enlist the assistance of NATO allies and Secretary General Luns, and consult with the British regarding their reaction to the events. (Ibid., RG 59, Central Foreign Policy Files, 1974) Telegram 4494 is printed as Document 81.
significant hurt to Turkish Cypriots. In terms of avoiding Greek-Turk clash, these two, we think, are even more important than stopping a civil war between Greeks on Cyprus. After achievement these two objectives comes series of goals set forth paras 6–10 Athens 4493, with which we wholeheartedly concur. We will refine our thoughts on these and other ideas in Athens 4493 and submit ASAP.³

Spain

³ In telegram 5609 from Ankara, July 16, Macomber urged a concentrated effort to diffuse the Cyprus situation for fear of an armed Turkish intervention. Turkey viewed the coup as a major step toward enosis, a violation of the 1960 agreements, and a product of Hellenic (not Greek Cypriot) officers. (National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 1312, NSC Secretariat, Richard M. Nixon Cables/Contingency Plans 1974, Cyprus and Greek-Turkish Contingency Plans)

86. Minutes of Meeting of the Washington Special Actions Group¹

Washington, July 16, 1974, 10:36–11:20 a.m.

SUBJECT
Cyprus

PARTICIPANTS
Chairman—Henry A. Kissinger
State
Robert Ingersoll
Joseph Sisco
Robert McCloskey
Wells Stabler
Thomas D. Boyatt
Defense
William Clements
Robert Ellsworth
Harry Bergold
JCS
Lt. Gen. John W. Pauly
CIA
William Colby
George Lauder

¹ Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Institutional Files (H–Files), Box H–096, Meeting Files, WSAG Meetings. Top Secret; Codeword. The meeting took place in the Situation Room of the White House.
NSC Staff
Richard T. Kennedy
Harold H. Saunders
Rosemary Niehuss
James Barnum

SUMMARY OF CONCLUSIONS

It was agreed that:

— that the two U.S. naval task forces now in the Mediterranean would remain out of ports, in a holding position;
— that Ambassador Tasca ask President Ioannides for an unambiguous statement on Greek intentions toward Cyprus;
— that the Turkish Government be asked what they want to prevent on Cyprus;
— that our assessment of the situation be sent to relevant diplomatic posts; and
— CIA would prepare a situation report on the status of forces on Cyprus.

Secretary Kissinger: Bill (Mr. Colby), do you have a briefing for us?

Mr. Colby began briefing from the attached text.²

Secretary Kissinger: What time? (In reference to the scheduled meeting of the UN Security Council.)

Mr. Colby: Sometime this afternoon, I think 3:00 p.m.

Mr. Sisco: Before Bill goes on I would like to bring you up to date with some later information. I was just on the phone to Buffum in New York. USUN has been informed that Weckman (the Special UN Representative on Cyprus) saw Makarios this morning—talked to him. Makarios said that the British had offered him (Makarios) protection and evacuation to any place he wanted to go. Makarios refused, but asked for UN protection. Waldheim is planning to convene the UNSC this afternoon to deal with this request.

Secretary Kissinger: I just talked to (British Foreign Minister) Callaghan on the phone five minutes ago.³ He says that Makarios has accepted—wants British protection. From what I understand, the British are flying him to the aircraft carrier Hermes and then to Malta. He was asking whether we had any ideas on where Makarios could be taken next. Everyone, at least now, agrees that Makarios is alive.

Mr. Sisco: Well, our information seems to be conflicting. I would think that the Callaghan information is more reliable.

² Not attached and not found.
³ Kissinger phoned Callaghan at 10:15 a.m. (Transcript of telephone conversation; Library of Congress, Manuscript Division, Kissinger Papers, Box 384, Telephone Conversations, Chronological File)
Secretary Kissinger: I told him (Mr. Callaghan) the line we were taking and he said go easy on the legitimate government issue because Makarios is leaving the island.

Mr. Colby continued to brief.

Secretary Kissinger: What do you think they mean by this? (In reference to plans for a special Turk parliamentary meeting to be held July 18.)

Mr. Colby: It could mean that they intend to move their forces to Cyprus.

Secretary Kissinger: I just can’t believe that. I just can’t believe they want Makarios back in power.

Mr. Sisco: The Turks would intervene to (a) protect the Turk Cypriot community and (b) to prevent enosis from taking place.

Secretary Kissinger: It just seems inconceivable to me that they would support him (Makarios).

Mr. Colby continued to brief.

Secretary Kissinger: They are moving in an easterly direction away from Cyprus? (In reference to Mr. Colby’s briefing on Soviet fleet movements.)

Mr. Colby: Yes.

Secretary Kissinger: What kind of forces do we have in the Eastern Mediterranean now?

Gen. Pauly: There are two main task forces. One has the aircraft carrier Forrestal with it and the other is an amphibious task force. That group is located south of Crete. The task force with the Forrestal in it is now somewhere between Crete and Athens. There are other small elements around, but those are the two main task forces. We’ve told them all to remain out of the ports, in a holding position and to be prepared for a 24 hour lead time in case they are needed.

Secretary Kissinger: I don’t think we ought to do anything with them now, even if the Soviet ships are moving, am I right?

Mr. Sisco: Definitely. They are close enough anyway if we have to call on them. They are in a holding pattern and can be moved quickly. Besides, any movement might be seen as attempts to internationalize the situation. Holding is consistent with our policy.

Mr. Colby resumed his briefing which touched on the Greek-Turk Aegean dispute . . .

Secretary Kissinger: Let’s finish with Cyprus first.

(to Mr. Clements) Bill, do you have any views?

Mr. Clements: Only that I think we ought to keep the forces where they are. No movement.

Mr. Sisco: I suggest we continue to maintain a low profile, remain cautious. Anything else at this time would be counterproductive. The situation is as murky today as yesterday. We just don’t know what’s going on. First, if the UK provides Makarios protection, that changes the situation. Second, we need to provide some guidance for today’s UN meeting. Also, Henry, we need some guidance on what to do about recognition.

Mr. Clements: Joe, (Mr. Sisco) I don’t understand what you said earlier about the UN. What’s happening at the UN?

Mr. Sisco: Well, in general, the way I understand it, the Secretary General will make this report to the Security Council. It’s scheduled to meet at 3:00 p.m.

Secretary Kissinger: Is (Ambassador) Scali there?

Mr. Sisco: Yes. I believe it will be Rossides (the Cypriot UN representative), who represents Makarios, who will raise the question. He will say that they will ask for the UN to support Makarios consistent with UN resolutions. The Soviets will jump in.

Secretary Kissinger: It seems to me we have to have a firm understanding of the situation before we jump. We have to look at the possibility of (1) civil war and the role of Makarios forces or (2) the Sampson regime establishes control with Makarios off the island. I think we ought to be careful that we don’t provide the Soviets the excuse to legitimize the situation. I propose that in the noon briefing, if asked about recognition, we say that the issue has not arisen, or something like that. But, we do not want to be positive about who we do recognize. If Makarios is off the island, this might raise the Soviet angle.

Mr. Clements: That sounds reasonable to me. This UN thing concerns me, however. I mean, it could be a stamp of endorsement that would be premature from our standpoint.

Mr. Sisco: I agree.

Secretary Kissinger: Our first objective is to prevent the situation from becoming internationalized. We need to put stronger pressure on Athens, and today. We must get our Ambassador in to see the President, or Prime Minister, or whoever it is, and get our views across forcibly. We’ve got to get somebody in there who will ask the Greeks for a statement of their intentions. [1 line not declassified] We want an unambiguous statement of Greek intentions towards Cyprus from him. We want to defuse the Turk angle. They mainly want to prevent enosis. If civil war develops then we’ll have to assess the situation then. As far as the public line is concerned, we can say that the recognition issue just hasn’t arisen. Tomorrow we can decide on the internal situation when we know just where Makarios is. Callaghan can’t be wrong.
Mr. Ellsworth: I might suggest that (Ambassador) Macomber also say something to the Turks. There has not been enough attention here to Turkey. It really fears the new Cypriot government.

Secretary Kissinger: O.K., but what should he say? Ask what they want to achieve.

Mr. Sisco: We need to make the point with Greece not to fool around with this troop rotation tomorrow.

Mr. Ellsworth: Something like, “don’t do anything”, just play it cool.

Secretary Kissinger: [1 line not declassified]

Mr. Colby: I don’t want to use it, but the Ambassador is insisting on it.

Mr. Lauder: [1 line not declassified]

Secretary Kissinger: Let’s get the word to Ioannidis. I don’t care which way, but do it.

Mr. Sisco: Ambassador Tasca should go see Ioannidis and tell him what we said yesterday.

Secretary Kissinger: Right.

Mr. Ingersoll: There is also a protocol problem of a reception for military attachés in Athens in a few hours. We should get a cable out to them for some guidance.

Mr. Clements: What’s this you’re talking about?

Mr. Stabler: It’s the annual reception for military attachés that the Greek Government is holding this afternoon.

Mr. Sisco: The question is, should all of them go—I think there are 12—or only a few?

Secretary Kissinger: I think we should cut it down a bit. Tell the top man not to go. Second-level our attendance.

Mr. Clements: O.K.

Secretary Kissinger: We should also write an assessment of the situation and send it to the various posts. Ambassador Davies in particular, and cut the number of attachés to the reception to about four. What do you want to do at the UN?

Mr. Sisco: Providing the British information is correct, we ought to try to slow or deflect it. We should tell Scali to limit this round to what they want to say. Cyprus, Greece, and Turkey will certainly want to say something. We can be sure of that. They can go ahead and have their say, but we should say nothing. All we should say is that we support the territorial integrity of Cyprus.

Secretary Kissinger: Good. I agree.

Mr. Colby: There is a good chance that resistance will develop on the island if the Turks invade.
Secretary Kissinger: What, Makarios and the Communists? But if he (Makarios) is off the island, it seems to me resistance would collapse.

Mr. Sisco: If he remains on the island, there is a better chance, I agree. Makarios in the past has had Communist support. He also has a broad-based popular support.

Ambassador McCloskey: That’s right, in past elections Makarios has received upwards of 95 percent of the vote—in honest elections.

Secretary Kissinger: At issue here is what is the balance of forces if a civil war develops. If the organized forces are Communist, it’s an entirely different situation than if they are not.

Mr. Sisco: What are the political leanings of Makarios’ Tactical Reserve Forces?

Mr. Boyatt: They are basically pro-Makarios. They are certainly not Communist.

Secretary Kissinger: We don’t have a basis on which to move until the situation clarifies. It’s too complicated at this point. When talking to Callaghan, I could give him no ideas on what to do with Makarios. I just don’t think it is in his (Makarios’) interest to leave the island.

Mr. Clements: What is the size of the organized forces there, again?

Mr. Colby: There are 950 regular Greek forces, 650 Greek officers in the National Guard, and about 6,000 total forces on the island.

Mr. Sisco: Through the London-Turkish agreement the Greeks have a right to station officers on the island.

Secretary Kissinger: Our objectives as I see it are: (1) to prevent the internationalization of the situation, and (2) if civil war develops to conduct ourselves so that the Communists aren’t encouraged to exploit the situation. The first thing we have got to do is decouple the Greeks, and do it today. We also have to get the Turks to stay out of it. If he (Makarios) is indeed leaving, it seems to me that organized resistance will collapse. Callaghan told me it was at Makarios’ initiative to leave. Callaghan said that Makarios asked to be moved to a British Sovereign Base and from there to Malta. I just don’t understand his reasons for not staying.

Mr. Boyatt: I can’t either. It’s quite unlike him. He has guts, and this I don’t understand.

Secretary Kissinger: One thing we cannot accurately assess is what paramilitary forces are going to do. History has proved this. We have to see what develops on the island before we can really do anything. I see no problem on the recognition thing. We don’t want to recognize Sampson. He’s just a figurehead anyway, isn’t he?

Mr. Stabler: That’s right. If asked, we should just say that the question of recognition just hasn’t arisen.
Mr. Colby continued to brief on the implication of the Aegean dispute.

Secretary Kissinger: Do we have anybody who can talk to the Turks?

Mr. Ellsworth: I've got some contacts in New York. I would like to get their assessment of the situation.

Secretary Kissinger: Can Macomber see Ecevit?

Mr. Sisco: Sure.

(At this point the Secretary was handed a cable from which he read.)

Secretary Kissinger: Callaghan has just reported that Makarios is now in a Sovereign Base Area. He is not off the island yet. I had better call Callaghan and get some clarification because we can't make a judgment until we know the status of Makarios. We need to get a better view of the ground situation on the island. Can I get that from you (to Mr. Colby)?

Mr. Colby: You can have what we have, but it isn't much.

Secretary Kissinger: We have to find out what the situation on the ground is first, then we can decide who we will support.

Mr. Colby: We aren't getting much information. We are getting some traffic now on military moves, but it isn't much.

Secretary Kissinger: (to Mr. Colby) Give me a situation report by the end of the day. Today we will concentrate our moves on Athens and Turkey. We want a clear reading on what the Turks want. Tomorrow we can take up the internal situation.

Mr. Clements: What are the Greeks doing? What is their objective in this?

Mr. Colby: They want to take over the country. They think that Makarios is nothing but a bloody Communist.

Secretary Kissinger: We have to keep the Turks and the Soviets out of this. We must see how the internal situation on Cyprus evolves.

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4 Telegram 8934 from London, July 16. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy Files, 1974)
87. Transcript of Telephone Conversation Between Secretary of State Kissinger and United Nations Secretary General Waldheim

July 16, 1974, 11:50 a.m.

W: This is Waldheim speaking.
K: Yes, Mr. Secretary General.
W: Mr. Secretary, I am grateful for you returning my call. The reason is, you have probably heard from Buffum, that we have a serious development and I wanted to inform you of a cable that we have received. This would give a clear picture of the situation. I received from my special representative and Commander in Chief in Cyprus—I don’t know if you have been informed by Buffum.
K: I think Sisco has told me about it.
W: Makarios may request a meeting of the Security Council to discuss, what he terms, Greek military intervention in Cyprus. We know four members of the Greek Government are being treated for wounds received during the coup d’etat in the last two days, so there was some involvement. I want you to know that we have these indications that the Greek military contingent is involved. And he also asked me to convey to you and others to help keep Cyprus independent and sovereign. I sent a message to the government of Athens and Ankara stressing the importance of maintaining . . .
K: I notice the Greek Government has affirmed this.
W: Yes, the important thing is, well it is not so important, but that the Archbishop asked that the British send a helicopter to evacuate him to a British base on the island and the British High Commissioner accepted this on the condition that the Archbishop would accept evacuation to the United Kingdom and in the meantime, our commander in chief there has asked for protection, so Makarios refused to evacuate the island and I have now authorized our commander in chief to grant protection. Of course, that will cause problems in the future. This will be a problem.
K: Yes.
W: This is most important information which I got this morning. I asked Rossides whether he will ask for a meeting of the Council. He did not . . . I consulted with the President of the Council and we decided there should be a meeting at 3:00 this afternoon. The situation is

1 Source: Library of Congress, Manuscript Division, Kissinger Papers, Box 384, Telephone Conversations, Chronological File. No classification marking. Kissinger was in Washington; Waldheim was in New York.
very confused and all kinds of rumors around the world and I think it is important that the Council be informed.

K: I appreciate this very much and your information is later than ours.

K: I talked with Callaghan who reports they were evacuating Makarios and that didn’t sound right to me.2

W: I agree. But for us it will be a problem if the new military government is in control and no President is sworn-in, then we have a problem of what to do with Makarios.

K: How about you and I talking tomorrow and exchanging information then.

W: Yes. I think it is important to avoid intervention by the Turks. Our information is that the Turks . . . will report that they will not provide or do anything which could create deterioration of the situation, but this is the real danger.

K: We are dealing with the Turks today and I will keep you informed and I understand we are going to get together next week or soon.

W: Yes. I want to talk to you.

K: Very nice to talk to you and I appreciate your keeping me informed.

W: If I hear anything else I will let you know immediately.

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2 See Document 86 and footnote 3 thereto.

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88. Telegram From the Embassy in Greece to the Department of State1

Athens, July 16, 1974, 1645Z.

4528. Subject: Cyprus Coup: Meeting with General Ioannides. Ref: State 152379.2 For the Secretary.

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1 Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 1312, Saunders Chron File, NSC Secretariat, Richard M. Nixon Cables/Contingency Plans 1974, Cyprus and Greek-Turkish Contingency Plans. Secret; Immediate; Exdis. Repeated to Nicosia, Ankara, and USNATO. A handwritten note by Clift, presumably to Scowcroft, reads, “Read this one in detail!”

2 Document 82.
1. I used secure reliable channel directly to General Ioannides to deliver message reftel. He began by explaining he had personal message from USG. After emissary had read two paragraphs, Ioannides commented message must be same as that Ambassador had given Kypreos, in which case emissary wasting his time since he would receive message anyway. Emissary explained his job was to finish reading message and hand it to him and would do so, to which General Ioannides said fine.

2. After emissary completed message, the General literally blew up, jumped up, backed up, knocked over a table, broke empty glass and uttered a strong obscenity. He continued that one day Kissinger makes public statements regarding non-interference in Greek internal affairs and a few weeks later the USG says “consistent with the above principles...” and threatens interference. “No matter what happened in Cyprus I (Ioannides) will be blamed. If I had pulled the troops out the former politicians would have blamed me for turning the island over to the Communists. Some day USG will realize that on 15 July 1974 Cyprus was saved from falling into the hands of the Communists”.

3. General then calmed down, came over to where emissary was sitting and said he knew he understood him: diplomatic talk is time-consuming but he would answer in as diplomatic fashion as possible because he had diplomatic mission.

4. General stated that Greece also believed in non-interference and in a free, independent, sovereign state of Cyprus; Greece would abide by the decision of the majority of the Greek Cypriots, most of whom were nationalists, and these nationalists were the ones who had moved against Makarios. It was immaterial whether these Greek Cypriot nationalists moved with or without the prior blessing of Greece or whether Greek officers subsequently assisted them. At this point he went off on a tangent stating that neither Greece nor the Greek Cypriots had asked for enosis, that GOT had obviously accepted these developments in Cyprus, that Turks understood that the matter was an internal Greek Cypriot affair.

5. According to Ioannides only real resistance left on Cyprus were Communist supporters of Makarios in Paphos; these supporters were even singing EAM/ELAS\(^3\) songs. Most of the rest of island was in nationalist hands. General Ioannides stated that everyone should forget that Makarios was an international figure, that he was a national hero, that he had served several useful functions and that he was a man of the cloth; Makarios had become a rotten priest homosexual; he was perverted, a torturer, a sexual deviate and the owner of half the hotels

\(^3\) Reference is to the Greek Communist resistance movement of World War II.
on the island. To preserve his position and to continue his activities, Makarios was willing to sacrifice seventy per cent of the Greek Cypriot population (only thirty per cent were AKEL) and entire anti-Communist Turkish Cypriot population. Ioannides asserted Greek Cypriots in National Guard realized these facts and had begged motherland for chance to act against Makarios; General claimed that he only assisted after being presented with a fait accompli.

6. At this point emissary interjected and told Ioannides point-blank that, with coup only twenty-four hours after his reporting to us regarding a possible overthrow of Makarios this was very difficult for anyone to believe. At this point the General again blew up with arms waving, knocked over the same table, broke a second glass and, between obscenities, stated that he did not plot and arrange the coup, initial plan and approach was from Greek Cypriot nationalists on 13 July, after latter learned that GOG intended to accede to Makarios’ demands to reduce number of Greek officers in National Guard. General stated he could not accept at least 85,000 Greek Cypriot refugees from Makarios’ tyranny. This coupled with Makarios’ anti-regime efforts, made him decide to assist Greek Cypriot nationalists. The General stated that if Makarios succeeded in kicking Greeks out of Cyprus what could keep him from thinking he could not kick junta out of Greece. After deciding to assist Greek Cypriots, the General claimed that he did not tell the Armed Forces leadership nor any Greek official. He limited knowledge of his intentions to few select officers on 13/14 July; no one else knew and even after events unfolded on 15 July only a handful of people were aware of his role. Ioannides justified this action by asserting that if he had briefed numerous people they would have raised suggestions, advice, alternatives, and possible problems. He added that he acted on spur of the moment.

7. Ioannides declared that game was now over for Makarios, that Greek Cypriots had booted him out, that National Guard and Greek officers had assisted nationalist Greek Cypriot brothers, and that only resistance now was in Paphos. In reply to emissary’s direct question Ioannides stated that Makarios was still alive “but who cares; he now has no power and no one, if he believes in principle of non-interference in internal affairs of sovereign nation will assist him—not even the Russians unless Turks ask them to do so and the Turks just don’t care.”

8. In reply to question whether Greeks were in direct touch with Turks, General stated we have not bothered the Turks; we have not declared enosis. Turks agree that “the principal thorn” (i.e., Makarios) is gone and, “I am not in touch with the Turks.” He expressed view that Greece and Turkey could now proceed at some future time to sit down, talk and solve their differences. Indeed, according to Ioannides Greeks
might even be willing to share profits of petroleum finds in a joint exploration company; however, Greece would never surrender Aegean continental shelf because this would mean Turkish control of Greek islands. He also expressed belief that Greek and Turkish Cypriots could probably solve their difficulties peacefully, quietly and amicably. He even joked that in a year or perhaps more realistically ten, the Turks might want to sell their share of Cyprus for increased percentage of petroleum rights. Again in reply to direct question, General Ioannides stated that he was not in contact with any Turkish official; however, he added that Turks were “officially aware” that enosis was not the objective at this point and that Greek Cypriots did not intend any bloody action against Turk Cypriots.

9. When asked for specifics on Makarios, Ioannides stated that according to Greek information, Makarios was alive and in hands of British at Episkopi Base; he had gone there with assistance of Canadians and British on island.

10. At this point Ioannides summed up as follows:
   A) He stressed that he too had a God; he was definitely not anti-American; “even a jackass needed a post to be tied to” and in his case it was the U.S.
   B) His hasty decision on 13 July might have been stupid. Instead of abandoning Cyprus and letting U.S. worry about its fate and pour money down another rat hole, he had allowed love of country, a moral obligation to the Greek Cypriot nationalists and his “philotimo” to overrule logic and to assist Greek Cypriots.
   C) Greece would do whatever was necessary to preserve its national identity and to stay anti-Communist. If this meant keeping Yiaros open it would stay open as long as it was necessary and he would accept no static from anyone on this score. Indeed, he had instructed a Greek official to tell British officially that whenever the British let Irish political prisoners out of British jails, he would free the forty-two Greek political prisoners on Yiaros.
   D) He personally didn’t like Nikos Sampson, but that was Greek Cypriot nationalist decision. He knew Sampson personally and in his opinion Sampson was “crazy.” He jokingly remarked that new Cypriot Minister of Defense Dimitriou was very pro-American and that our Embassy there would soon realize this. He also knew Dimitriou personally.
   E) While shaking hands at close of conversation Ioannides stated, “Remember we too believe in a free, independent and sovereign Cyprus, we too believe in non-interference, along with Turks and especially with Kissinger. We too believe that the Cypriots should be free to solve their own problems, be they Greek Cypriots, Turk Cypriots or both.”

Tasca
4530. Subject: Potential Aftermath of Coup.

1. Makarios’ escape from assassination once again could represent a signal failure in the execution of the coup. Moreover, Cypriot radio announcement quickly following the coup that Makarios killed indicates this part of pre-established scenario. The carefully prepared Sampson statement of the strong anti-Communist “Movement of National Salvation” also undoubtedly part of same scenario. Failure to kill Makarios clearly complicates the consolidation of a new regime by Sampson backers.

2. With Makarios now in a position of personal safety combined with British Foreign Office announcement it continues to recognize Makarios government, position of the rebels could become precarious. This is particularly likely if resistance on the island should continue. It seems difficult to believe that, with the expertise of the Greek Cypriot Communist Party, one of the best organized Communist parties anywhere, a very strong Communist-dominated trade union and an active Socialist party under strongly leftist Lysarrides, who had developed some sort of para-military forces of his own, armed resistance to Greek led Cypriot National Guard, will not continue. In circumstances, one could expect the USSR to seek to rush military supplies to those resisting, although island probably already possesses large supplies of arms clandestinely cached. USSR would then simply be responding to request of legitimate head of an independent government and UN member.

3. If fighting should continue, it seems likely GOT would feel under increased pressure to augment its forces in Cyprus. They are legitimate under terms of London–Zurich agreements as one of three guarantor powers. In the event Turk Cypriots killed, injured or seriously threatened, pressure upon Turkey to act likely to be even greater.

4. In latter event, hard to believe Ioannides would not feel he must augment Greek forces. Incidentally, if fighting is protracted or threatens to become so, Ioannides may try to augment Greek forces in any feasible way, e.g., even clandestine infiltration since the longer and

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1 Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 1312, NSC Secretariat, Richard M. Nixon Cables/Contingency Plans 1974, Cyprus and Greek-Turkish Contingency Plans. Secret; Immediate; Exdis. Repeated Priority to Nicosia, Ankara, USNATO, and USUN.
more independent the resistance, the more disastrous the entire operation could become for Ioannides.

5. Embassy believes there is reason to lay this operation at the door of KYP, Greek central intelligence organization. A clear failure by Ioannides, given Greek tendency to abandon leaders who fail, could seriously undermine Ioannides junta. Ioannides is likely to feel under pressure, and our contact with him today indicates his actions may reflect this nervous condition, so that he may move to ensure establishment of Sampson regime as soon as possible. Unless he succeeds he could well fall into great trouble with other members of military hierarchy, particularly since Ioannides now claims he did not keep them informed, assertion for which there is some supporting evidence.

6. A final word about Sampson; a review of our biographic data and knowledge about this man confirms the impression we have had of him hitherto. His is an out and out gangster, a gorilla-type with no compunctions against murder and assassination. He may well be considered as potentially a pliable tool for Ioannides, but it seems more likely he would be a marked liability in most respects.

7. The GOT may feel that in the final analysis it is better off dealing with a direct agent of Athens rather than both Athens and Makarios. This was Papadopoulos’ line, and GOT, recalling this, may feel a deal between the two military to settle Cyprus issue along with others between Greece and Turkey, may now be easier to realize. This is particularly true in light of strong public assurances GOG and Sampson group are putting out proclaiming their firm adherence to the principle of a united, sovereign and independent Cyprus, as well as their continued support for intercommunal talks to establish stabilized and viable relations between the two groups on the island.

8. At same time it should have been clear to Turkish Government from initial stages of Athens/Nicosia quarrel that tolerance of Greek regime leaders had definite limits. Uncharacteristically relaxed attitude on Turkish side supports speculation that Greek/Turkish communication in private channel, probably military, may have provided reassurance essential to avoid escalating Turkish reaction. If true, Turkish military leaders with firsthand knowledge of intentions of Greek counterparts could constitute significant element in maintaining Ankara/Athens balance in this crisis.

Tasca
Ankara, July 17, 1974, 1329Z.

5629. Subj: Cyprus Coup: Amb–PriMin Meeting. For Secretary From Ambassador. Ref State 154148.1 I had eighty minute meeting with PriMin noon (local time) July 17. Acting FonMin (normally DefMin Isik) and DCM Bergus also present.

After I had made points outlined para 1, ref tel,2 PriMin responded as fols:

1. Current GOT assessment of situation:
   A. Coup appears to have succeeded. While there are still undoubtedly Makarios resources on island, they probably are lying low now so as to avoid risk of exposure and destruction at this time.
   B. Coup completely engineered by Greek Govt.
   C. GOT does not fear de jure enosis move in immediate future. On contrary, Turks believe that Athens will maintain fiction of separate-ness, as this will enable GOG in effect to have two votes in UN, while it has one foot in NATO camp and another in non-aligned world.
   D. GOT does not accept this as an internal Cypriot problem. On contrary, it is international matter involving violation of an agreement to which Turkey is a party and guarantor.
   E. Deterioration of position of Turks on island is inevitable, if new regime stays in power.
   F. Vulnerability of Turks on island greatly increased by lack of their having secure access to sea coast.
   G. Current situation therefore completely unacceptable to the GOT. If acceptable situation not recreated, Turkey will have to directly intervene with military force on island.
   H. If intervention necessary, it will be “bloodier” the longer it is put off. Therefore, GOT not prepared to delay intervention beyond “few days”.

1 Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 1312, Saunders Chron File, NSC Secretariat, Richard M. Nixon Cables/Contingency Plans 1974, Cyprus and Greek-Turkish Contingency Plans. Secret; Niact Immediate; Nodis.
2 Dated July 17. (Ibid.)
3 According to telegram 154148 to Ankara, the Embassy “made fully known to GOG, including Ioannides, our support for single, sovereign and independent Cyprus (and you should give Ecevit gist of State 152379), and urged the GOG to carry out the rotation of their contingent on Cyprus in a routine way without increasing the total number of their forces on Cyprus (State 154147).” Telegram 154147, July 17, is ibid. Telegram 152379, July 15, is printed as Document 82.
I. Situation has brought to head growing GOT conviction that Greek Turks cooperation within NATO must be terminated (see septel).  

J. GOT seeking to work closely with British as a “joint-guarantor” on this situation. (Shortly after his advising me that they were seeking high level meeting with British message was handed to PriMin saying UKG had agreed to such meeting right away in London. PriMin read me message and indicated that he and Isik would be leaving immediately for UK. He will arrive there tonight. He expected visit to last for day or so.)

K. With respect to Soviet attitude, PriMin said Russians were restless over situation, and not keeping this a secret. He saw considerable significance in official TASS statement that Cyprus developments endangered détente. Sov Amb had repeated this statement in meeting with Pres Koruturk last night. I said that we had heard of Soviet offer to put troops on island and that was one thing situation definitely did not need.

2. GOT objectives:
   A. PriMin said that GOT basic objective is restitution of Cyprus’ constitutional govt. By this he meant return of Makarios to his head of govt position, or if this not feasible, that Makarios successor should emerge through previously established constitutional procedures.
   B. That Greek officers of Cyprus National Guard must leave the island.
   C. That a secure corridor to the sea must be obtained for Turkish community.

3. I asked PriMin if he and British should reach agreement on above objectives during London meetings, how he expected them to be brought about. PriMin said “We will see. They have bases there. If they do not use them now what are they for? We will see what the British think. We will explore all peaceful solutions before considering others.”

4. At end of conversation PriMin summarized situation as follows:
   A. New regime on Cyprus completely unacceptable to GOT. GOT hopes status quo ante can be restored without Turkish military intervention. If this is not done, GOT prepared carry out military intervention. It believes latter would be better done within a few days rather than waiting weeks or months.
   B. If new regime retains control of island, GOT might be willing hold off military intervention if a corridor to the sea guaranteed to Turkish residents of island. This, combined with clear Turkish military superiority in area, would give GOT assurance that it could rescue Turkish population if that were needed.

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4 Not found.
5. PriMin wishes to stay in close touch with USG and would be very grateful to have Secretary Kissinger’s comments on foregoing. He expressed hope that these could be conveyed to him while he was still in London.

Macomber

91. Minutes of Meeting of the Washington Special Actions Group

Washington, July 17, 1974, 10:10–10:48 a.m.

SUBJECT
Cyprus

PARTICIPANTS
Chairman—Henry A. Kissinger
State
Robert Ingersoll
Joseph Sisco
Robert McCloskey
Wells Stabler
Thomas D. Boyatt
Defense
William Clements
Robert Ellsworth
Harry Bergold
JCS
Gen. George S. Brown
Lt. Gen. John Pauly
CIA
William Colby
George Lauder
NSC
Richard Kennedy
Harold Saunders
Ms. Rosemary Niehuss
James G. Barnum

1 Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Institutional Files (H–Files), Box H–096, Meeting Files, WSAG Meetings. Top Secret; Sensitive. The meeting took place in the Situation Room of the White House.
Secretary Kissinger: Bill (Mr. Colby), would you like to brief?

Mr. Colby briefed the attached text.²

Secretary Kissinger: What do you think they want to achieve by doing that? (referring to information that Ankara is moving troops into positions in southern Turkey)

Mr. Colby: They probably want to move into this area (pointing to North Central Cyprus on the map). They probably want to establish an enclave in that area.

Mr. Colby continued to brief.

Secretary Kissinger: (To Mr. Stabler) Have we told the Turks that we know of their concern?

Mr. Stabler: Not yet, but a telegram is being prepared. . . .

Secretary Kissinger: That takes too long. Call the (Turkish) Ambassador. They should know right away what our position is.

Mr. Sisco: I’ll give him a call right now. (Mr. Sisco left the room.)

Mr. Clements: What’s this you’re doing?

Secretary Kissinger: Informing the Turks that the Greeks are not increasing the number of their forces in the island.

Mr. Colby finished his briefing.

Secretary Kissinger: Bill (Mr. Clements), do you have anything?

Mr. Clements: Well, Henry, I agree with Bill’s assessment. But I don’t really know why. I don’t think the Turks will move in (on Cyprus). They may make some noise, but I don’t think they’ll move.

Mr. Colby: Oh, I think they’ll try to avoid having to move. I didn’t mean to say that we think they’ll move. I think they’ll try the diplomatic route first, but may feel in the end that they have to move in.

Secretary Kissinger: To what end? Why should they do this?

Mr. Colby: To maintain the status quo ante.

Secretary Kissinger: I still do not understand why Turkey wants Makarios back.

Mr. Colby: Well, look at it this way. It’s either Makarios or Sampson at this point. Makarios is certainly better than Sampson from a Turkish point of view.

Secretary Kissinger is handed a cable.³

Secretary Kissinger: This just talks about the influx of forces; we already knew that. (Pointing to the map) If the Turks intervene, if they take that quadrant (Southwest), what is the proportion of Turks to Greeks in that area?

² Not attached and not found.
³ Not further identified.
Mr. Colby: It is largely Turkish.

Secretary Kissinger: If they take that quadrant (pointing to the northeast section of the island) what’s the population there?

Mr. Lauder: It’s about 50 percent Greek and 50 percent Turkish.

Mr. Colby: Their main purpose would be to establish themselves on some portion of the island just to gain a foothold.

Secretary Kissinger: With the ultimate objective of permanent occupation?

Mr. Colby: That’s one proposition.

Mr. Clements: But what would they want?

Mr. Colby: To partition or divide the island.

Secretary Kissinger: I am going to talk to the President about sending someone to London to see Makarios and Ecevit. Maybe Bob (Ingersoll). Bill, (to Mr. Clements) maybe we’ll send someone from Defense too.

Mr. Clements: Excellent!

Secretary Kissinger: Well, everybody’s agreed on that.

I think it is important that we send somebody over there to explain what our position is. The Sampson regime, it seems to me constitutes de facto enosis in the Turk view. He (Sampson) is a most unattractive guy. It’s not in our interest to have him. It’s my feeling that if Makarios is brought back it can be done only by the removal of Sampson and the Greek officers and Makarios would then have to lean more to the East.

Mr. Colby: Greece continues to pretend that this is strictly an internal Cypriot affair.

Secretary Kissinger: Yes, but once they (the Greek officers) are removed the balance of power changes. If a Greek engineered coup fails, it would be a disaster from the Greek standpoint. It would be more than a slap in the face, it would be disastrous.

Mr. Colby: Not necessarily.

Secretary Kissinger: How’s that? If a coup fails, it would weaken the influence of Athens in the entire area. As I assess the situation, for us the best outcome would be a Clerides government. I just don’t understand why the Turks would want to bring Makarios back. I don’t think (the Turks) understand our analysis of the situation. Somebody has to go to London and explain our position.

Mr. Clements: It’s one thing for the Turks to invade, and another thing to take over only part of the island. That would downgrade Greek influence throughout the entire area.

Secretary Kissinger: If the Turks bring Makarios back, he (Makarios) would have to rely more on the Eastern bloc. We can’t let Makarios become a stooge of the Turks.
Mr. McCloskey: Well, that would depend on how much support we give him (Makarios).

Mr. Colby: There seems to be no alternative to Makarios.

Mr. Boyatt: This is not a Greek-Turkish ethnic fight; it’s basically a political squabble.

Mr. McCloskey: Whoever has the blessing of the U.S. will also have the necessary popular support.

Secretary Kissinger: That means we can pick and choose whoever we want. That makes us king makers.

Mr. McCloskey: Whether we pick Makarios or Clerides it would stick because we could back them.

Mr. Boyatt: In my opinion Makarios would be the best for stability, but Clerides would be better from the Turkish standpoint.

Secretary Kissinger: Well, the first problem is that the National Guard is in control. How would you bring Makarios back?

Mr. Clements: That would be tougher than hell.

Secretary Kissinger: It would take a massive U.S.-Soviet effort and that would probably bring down the Greek government. How do we bring Makarios back?

Mr. McCloskey: I think we should work for Clerides.

Mr. Boyatt: We could try a diplomatic ploy. We could go to Ioannides, tell him to withdraw the Greek officers, and insist on a constitutional change, i.e., Clerides. Sampson certainly is not acceptable.

Secretary Kissinger: Yes, but what if Greece doesn’t agree? It might be tough to do. We all love to conduct these grand stand plays, but where do we go after that? What do we want after that?

Mr. Colby: The status quo ante.

Secretary Kissinger: Yes, that’s easy to say, but where are you after that?

Mr. Boyatt: We have stability because Clerides has been neutralized.

Secretary Kissinger: I’m not so sure that serves our long-term interest. The trick is to diffuse the situation without tilting the present structure.

Mr. Colby: I’m not sure that Ioannides has all that long a future.

Secretary Kissinger: Joe (Sisco) what do you think?

Mr. Sisco: I think there is a faint hope of a political compromise. I would think our hopes rest in the restoration of a constitutional arrangement under Clerides. He has support in Cyprus. In my view, Makarios has had it. Another point I would like to make is that I don’t see a Sampson–Ioannides axis as making for a long-range stability. It is a very shaky situation with the possibility of Turkish intervention.
Secretary Kissinger: I think both are primitives. (Makarios and Ioannides.)

Mr. Sisco: I share Bill’s (Mr. Colby’s) views. In my judgment the Turks won’t leave. That would be a difficult exercise.

Secretary Kissinger: I think constitutional continuity is what we want. We want to keep the Turks from interfering and the London talks from collapsing.

Mr. Clements: Do you feel that this will escalate to the UN?

Secretary Kissinger: Yes, I do, but it is not in our interest to get it there. I will talk to Callaghan and see what we can do. We will send somebody over to London to talk to the Turks. I will talk to the President about this in a while. We can’t let them run loose over there when they don’t know our analysis of the situation.

Mr. Ingersoll: It is in our interest to work out a constitutional solution and not get the UN involved.

Secretary Kissinger: If we can keep something going on in London, we can stonewall in the UN. We want to keep Britain and Turkey out in front of the game.

Mr. Sisco: The British judgement is that Makarios has had it.

Secretary Kissinger: Are there any other points? (To Mr. Kennedy) Can you arrange for a call to Callaghan?

Mr. Kennedy: Yes.

Gen. Brown: I have one minor point that sort of parallels what we have been talking about. This Turkish opium issue.

Secretary Kissinger: Let’s shut up a week on the poppy issue. We don’t need to get that involved now.

Mr. Sisco: I have one small point. [1 line not declassified]

Secretary Kissinger: That’s absolutely out of the question.

Mr. Sisco: I would think so, too. [1 line not declassified]

Mr. Colby: [1 line not declassified]

Mr. Ellsworth: Regarding the squeeze we are putting on the Turks on aid . . .

Secretary Kissinger: What is this?

Mr. Stabler: The shipment of some $20 million worth of spare parts for Ankara has not been resumed. It is part of the opium thing.

Secretary Kissinger: There is a difference between not giving additional economic aid and not giving spare parts. We should resume the spare parts. To hold up spare military parts would be a major blow to the Turks.
K: Can you hear me?
C: I think so. I think if about seventeen people get off the line I could hear you better.
K: I was thinking of sending Joe Sisco or Bob Ingersoll to London so that you could get a more first hand impression of our thinking on Cyprus.
C: That would be very good.
K: Is Ecevit going to stay over night?
C: Probably will leave in the early morning. Makarios is leaving at 11:00 our time and will be with you at 1:35. He will then ask for a Security Council meeting on Friday.
K: Right.
C: So that gives you time.
K: I will try to get someone over tomorrow morning and then have him go to Athens and Ankara.
C: I think it would be very valuable. I would like that. I’ll tell you our position and this is basically the European position—all the countries in the Nine and NATO. We think the ideal solution would be to get Makarios back. Whether we can do it by diplomatic means remains to be seen. Makarios asked for diplomatic activity to continue and the need for non-recognition of the new regime in Cyprus. When you look ahead for six months—will the situation be more than or less tense? Our estimation is more—that it would look to be more tense if we can’t get Makarios back—but the question is can we?
K: Some of our people are wondering if a compromise not be Clerides.
C: He couldn’t hold it. But the compromise might be an election in 3 months with Makarios back on the Island.
K: But how will you get him back?
C: What we would do? Well, hopefully you would exert your influence on the Greek Government about the national guard officers. The Turks under our guarantee Treaty may say to us what are you going to do and if action doesn’t seem possible—any of the three powers has the

1 Source: Library of Congress, Manuscript Division, Kissinger Papers, Box 384, Telephone Conversations, Chronological File. No classification marking. Kissinger was in Washington; Callaghan was in London.
right to take action. I think we can take it that we can talk about uni-
lar action and if so then there has to be US pressure on Greece. How
do you see it?

K: I see it similarly. But I am not sure about what we are embarking on when you say diplomatic action.

C: I think the Greek regime is a bit worried. ______ has called our man in Athens to see when tomorrow ... and I think he is going to ask what we and the Turks are up to. We think there is a chance that if there is concerted diplomatic pressure they might calm down by withdrawing some of their officers. I am thinking about the Turks tomorrow or tonight. But, if you think six months ahead, my view is that it is better to have Makarios there than Sampson.

K: That is almost certainly true, I agree.

C: The problem is three to one or five to one chance it won’t suc-
cceed, but it would be worthwhile to do...

K: Well, we want to avoid giving the Soviets an excuse to make what happens legitimate.

C: Yes. Again, looking six months ahead of Sampson—if Sampson stays, he would be accused of running a Fascist regime and the Russians are stepping up their activity so I come back again to—we may not succeed but it could be that we may crack the regime and get Sampson to withdraw.

K: Let me get somebody over to talk to you. We agree on the gen-
eral approach. We are not too far apart on it.

C: Well, send somebody, but I don’t think we can afford to lose much time to begin pressuring the Greeks.

K: He would be getting in there tomorrow morning.

C: Who will that be, Joe Sisco?

K: Joe Sisco or Ingersoll.

C: After he and I talk, he can talk to you and you can make up your mind.

K: Exactly.

C: After he and I talk, he can talk to you and you can make up your mind.

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K: He would be getting in there tomorrow morning.

C: Who will that be, Joe Sisco?

K: Joe Sisco or Ingersoll.

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K: He would be getting in there tomorrow morning.

C: Who will that be, Joe Sisco?

K: Joe Sisco or Ingersoll.

C: After he and I talk, he can talk to you and you can make up your mind.

K: He would be getting in there tomorrow morning.

C: Who will that be, Joe Sisco?
C: I didn’t know it til lunch and the House of Commons is anti-Greek on both sides.

K: Good, well, I’ll be in touch.

C: Alright. If anything comes out of the meeting with the Turks, I will give you a call. We have had a request—that if they . . . get out of us, they might act unilaterally.

K: You can tell them we are willing to exert ourselves with the Greek Government but I want to get our strategy more precise and also that we are not supporting Sampson.

C: I’ll tell them and I will leave it to you to tell them about who is coming.

K: You can tell them that we are thinking seriously about it. Call me.3

3 Kissinger and Callaghan spoke again at 5:04 p.m. Kissinger informed Callaghan that Sisco would likely be his envoy for the London talks. Callaghan, in the middle of meeting with Ecevit, informed Kissinger that Ecevit would like a joint U.S.-British statement condemning the new regime and restoring the old one, which both Kissinger and Callaghan believed too extreme. (Library of Congress, Manuscript Division, Kissinger Papers, Box 384, Telephone Conversations, Chronological File)

93. Transcript of Telephone Conversation Between President Nixon and Secretary of State Kissinger1

July 17, 1974, 4:30 p.m.

K: Mr. President.

N: Hello, Henry. How are we getting along with our Greek friends?

K: The problem in Cyprus is the Europeans have taken a united position that Makarios ought to be brought back and they want us to bring pressure on the Greeks. My worry is that Makarios now has to lean on the Communists and Eastern bloc. All our evidence is that the opposition is in total control of the Island. My recommendation is that first, we get someone over there to make our view clear and secondly, we work for a compromise in which neither Makarios or the other guy take over. . . . They want us to rake the Greeks but if they get overthrown then that will jeopardize our whole position.

N: I know that. I can see that, but not much support from Europe?

1 Source: Library of Congress, Manuscript Division, Kissinger Papers, Box 384, Telephone Conversations, Chronological File. No classification marking. The President was at the Western White House in San Clemente July 13–28. (National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, White House Central Files, President’s Daily Diary) Kissinger was in Washington.
K: No, but they know we are dragging our feet, but they don’t
know exactly what we want.
N: Who are you going to send?
K: Either Ingersoll or Sisco. Ingersoll has the advantage of taking
orders well, but Sisco is more knowledgeable.
N: Whatever you decide, it’s alright with me.
K: Sisco is necessary here to manage the thing on a day to day basis.
N: I see. What can he accomplish. Explain to them what we’re try-
ing to do.
K: The danger is this, if everyone runs to Makarios embracing him
as the legitimate head . . . and if the Soviets are the only ones to offer
to help restore him, we have no basis for resisting it.
N: I see the danger. We have no support.
K: We can not openly oppose Makarios but we can try to slow it
down enough so that perhaps we can crystalize enough support for an
internal solution. The Europeans are talking a tough game, but we have
to defend their position.
N: We have to defend their game plan.
K: Exactly.
K: If the Greeks collapse, then the left wing could take over or a
bunch of Greek colonels who could throw in with the Quadafi group.
N: It seems to me our course is to try to . . .
K: That’s is what I would propose, with your permission, to do.
N: I think it’s a good try.
K: And if it fails, we can join the consensus.
N: That’s right.
K: My analysis is if Makarios is brought back this way, he will have
to kick the Greek officers off the island and then the Communists will
be the dominant force and to balance the Turks he will have to rely on
the Eastern bloc. So the coup will have shifted the balance to the left.
N: I get it. Too bad he has to come back.
K: [1 line not declassified]
N: You have to go ahead. Use either man. You’re much closer to it.
K: Right and I’ll arrange for Ziegler to make the announcement.
Sisco\(^2\) and Ingersoll are the two who know our thinking best.
N: Ingersoll is a good calm man, if he knows our position.
K: That’s the advantage of Ingersoll. Well, I’ll keep you informed.

\(^2\) Kissinger called Sisco at 5:10 p.m. with the decision that he leave for London later
that evening. (Library of Congress, Manuscript Division, Kissinger Papers, Box 384, Tele-
phone Conversations, Chronological File)
94. Minutes of Meeting of the Washington Special Actions Group

Washington, July 18, 1974, 11:41 a.m.–12:22 p.m.

SUBJECT
Cyprus

PARTICIPANTS
Chairman—Henry A. Kissinger
State
Robert Ingersoll
Robert McCloskey
Wells Stabler
John Day
Defense
William Clements
Amos Jordan
Harry Bergold
JCS
Gen. George S. Brown
Lt. Gen. John W. Pauly
CIA
William Colby
George Lauder
NSC
Richard Kennedy
Rosemary Niehuss
David Ransom
James Barnum

SUMMARY OF CONCLUSIONS

It was agreed that:
— the JCS would draw up a list of what units were available in the U.S. and Europe for movement to Cyprus, and how long it would take to move those units to the island;
— that the carrier Forrestal and the amphibious task force would stay 24 hours distant from Cyprus at the present time; and
— there would be no cut-off of military aid to Greece.

Secretary Kissinger: Bill (Mr. Colby)?
Mr. Colby briefed from the attached text.2

1 Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Institutional Files (H–Files), Box H–097, Meeting Files, WSAG Meetings. Top Secret; Codeword. The meeting took place in the Situation Room of the White House.
2 Not attached and not found.
Secretary Kissinger: What’s this you’re talking about?
Mr. Colby: The Soviet statement (on its position on the dispute).
(The Secretary left the room to take a phone call at 11:45 and returned at 11:51)
Mr. Colby continued to brief.
Secretary Kissinger: Bill (Mr. Clements)?
Mr. Clements: I don’t have a lot to say. We do have this report that
DIA . . .
Secretary Kissinger: The one about Soviet forces at Odessa?
Mr. Clements: No, the one about [less than 1 line not declassified]. We
got it through your Sit Room. I think you have seen it already. We tend
to discount the information since [less than 1 line not declassified] are not
going to publish it until this afternoon.
Secretary Kissinger: Yes, I don’t put much credence in that. I don’t
think that would happen while Ecevit is in London. George (General
Brown)?
General Brown: There’s only one small point of concern to us. As
you know, our naval forces are now in a holding pattern—well to the
west of Cyprus as we discussed the other day. The amphibious forces
are 24 hours away from Cyprus. Do you think it would be wise to per-
mit them to come closer, say 10 to 12 hours from the island?
Mr. Clements: One thing that bears on that, Henry. You know we
have several military programs—hardware—ongoing with the Greek
regime. You may want to play with that one. I am not advocating we
stop the program, just that you may want to consider it.
Secretary Kissinger: Okay, I’ll think about that.
General Brown: Another thing. We have not upgraded any alerts.
I don’t know whether you might want to or not.
Secretary Kissinger: I don’t see any reason at this point. It would
only draw attention, wouldn’t it? The Soviets would know that we
have upped our alert status. How long would it take the 82nd Air-
borne, for example, to get to Cyprus if we had to?
General Brown: There’s one company on two hour alert at all times
at Fayetteville (North Carolina). It would take C130s to get them over
there. They could be loaded in about two hours, but it would take about
twelve hours to get them to Cyprus. I would say it would take 18 hours
to get one or two battalions there.
Secretary Kissinger: (to General Brown) Can I get a chart on how
long it would take to send troops over there? Could we slightly in-
crease the alert?
General Brown: Yes.
Secretary Kissinger: It’s a bit premature to increase the alert now.
No need at this point.
General Brown: There are, of course, other units in Europe and Germany that we could send on a quicker basis.

Secretary Kissinger: Get me a chart of the units available and how much time it would take from each place—here and in Europe. Can you do that? By the end of the day?

Mr. Clements: Sure. That amphibious force, however, is still what we want to count on; it’s the closest.

General Brown: Yes, but it’s 24 hours away from Cyprus right now. Maybe we should move them to within, say, ten hours distance.

Secretary Kissinger: No, I don’t think we should make any movements now. I think it’s premature. If the Soviets find out—and they will—they might misunderstand. We don’t know what this Odessa thing is anyway.

Mr. Colby: How long would it take a division to get there? Five or six days?

General Brown: At least. It would probably take a battalion about the same time.

Mr. Clements: Our best bet is still that amphibious group.

Secretary Kissinger: How many British troops are on the island?

General Brown: I think it’s about 8,000.

Secretary Kissinger: Are those all combat units?

General Brown: Some are. Some are housekeeping units. Not all, I’m sure, would fight.

Secretary Kissinger: I want to know what we have. Get me that chart.

Mr. Colby: I think I have it here, 2,700 British army troops and 5,300 Royal Air Force personnel.

Secretary Kissinger: The UN Security Council meets today. We have instructed our delegation to delay a vote on the resolution, if they can. We want to assess the Sisco diplomatic effort from London first. We have to find out first what is negotiable between the Greeks and the Turks. I agree that an ideal solution would be to get negotiations started, within the Zurich framework, towards a solution on which all sides would agree. I know some of my colleagues believe we are advocating the overthrow of the Ioannidis government, but that is not our policy. We still have the Cyprus problem with Turkish intervention. Our first objective is to avoid a Greek-Turkish war and Soviet intervention. We can worry about Ioannidis later. We do not want to tip

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our hand on a Cyprus solution yet til we know what will come out of it.

Mr. Colby: I’m not sure that we can stall Makarios that long.

Secretary Kissinger: Well, we’ll see. But how can you bring him back? It’s fine to say that everybody is behind Makarios—that is easy to proclaim. But the problem still remains of how to bring him back?

Mr. Colby: And we don’t want a split to develop between the U.S. and the Soviets over the Cyprus issue, with the Soviets backing Makarios.

Secretary Kissinger: Exactly. We are not opposed to Makarios. What we want to do is try to avoid taking a stand. It’s bad to get the Security Council involved.

Amb. Ingersoll: Have you heard from Joe (Mr. Sisco)?

Secretary Kissinger: No.

[Omitted here is discussion of an unrelated subject.]

Mr. Clements: We can’t do much til we find out what the British and Joe have been talking about.

Secretary Kissinger: We are not going to come out against Makarios. If he does come back (to power), fine, but it’s better that he comes back with U.S. backing than with Soviet backing. If the Turks go in and restore Makarios, he has no alternative but to lean more towards the Soviets and the Eastern bloc.

Mr. Clements: Exactly right. Let’s let the British move out in front on this thing.

Secretary Kissinger: And see what they offer for our support. If we declare first, the Soviets will get bold and we will give up our bargaining position. If we say that the Greek officers must go, how can they resist the pressure? We have a de facto government on the island and a de jure outside. We must find a compromise between the two. We do not want to elaborate a theme for Soviet intervention, or Turkish. If the Turks and the British want Makarios, then we will reassess.

[Omitted here is discussion of an unrelated subject.]

[Secretary Kissinger:] Now, (returning to the Cyprus problem) on our press line. For the noon briefing we want to say nothing about the Sisco visit. As far as Makarios, play it cool, don’t say anything if you can avoid it. Just repeat our standard line on the territorial integrity of Cyprus.

Mr. Colby: I would like to put in a pitch for what the British and Ecevit talked about.

Secretary Kissinger: Yes, of course. But, we don’t have a report yet. Oh, you said Ecevit and the British. I thought you meant Sisco. Ecevit proposed increasing the level of Turkish forces on the island and placing the National Guard under UN control and then Makarios might be
able to come back. This, of course, would make Makarios a Turkish stooge and he would then look for a counter to Turkish influence, i.e., the East bloc. This would amount to a total shift in the balance of power on the island in part towards Turkey, but really towards Soviet/East bloc influence. Even the UK is going along; they have pulled back slightly in their public line of support for Makarios. If Makarios accepts to come back, we still have the problem of how to get him back. If the Turks brought him back, he would look for a counter to the Turks. But we have nothing personally against Makarios.

Mr. Colby: How strong is Ioannidis?
Secretary Kissinger: I’m not worried about Ioannidis. If he falls, fine. That doesn’t worry me. Let him fall because of his own incompetence. Getting rid of Ioannidis is no more a worry than keeping Ioannidis; it’s no factor. Preventing a Greek-Turkish war and a shift in the balance of power are factors. I don’t think Ioannidis is going to survive very long anyway.

Mr. Colby: He is the weakest link in the chain.
Secretary Kissinger: It’s not in the interest of the U.S. to cooperate in the fall of Ioannidis. We should walk carefully on this matter and not go off half cocked.

Mr. Stabler: On the Sisco visit. He plans to go to Athens and possibly to Ankara. Should we announce that he is going to Ankara?
Secretary Kissinger: He is not going to Nicosia! What I said was that Sisco would go to Athens but that we can’t confirm that he will go on to Ankara. That depends on the results of his talks in London and Athens.

Amb. Ingersoll: I do think it would be wise, however, to say that he may go on to Turkey, just to bring the Turks into this thing.

Mr. Clements: I have just one quick thing on military sales to Greece.
Secretary Kissinger: I thought we made it clear yesterday that no ambassador will unilaterally decide about military aid programs. That is an interdepartmental matter and should be brought to this group for decision. We should be careful on heavy deliveries of military aid. Don’t stop the stuff already in the pipeline. We’ll know more in one week. I don’t exclude pressure on Greece at some point, but we must wait until we see what kind of position the US/UK/Turk talks produce. But I agree I wouldn’t send the heavy equipment.
95. Memorandum of Conversation


SUBJECT
Cyprus Crisis

PARTICIPANTS
Honorable Henry A. Kissinger, Secretary of State
Honorable Robert McCloskey, Ambassador at Large
Honorable William Buffum, Assistant Secretary for International Organization Affairs
Mr. Wells Stabler, Deputy Assistant Secretary for European Affairs
Mr. Lawrence Eagleburger, Executive Assistant to the Secretary of State
Mr. Edward Djerejian, Special Assistant to the Under Secretary for Political Affairs

Ambassador McCloskey: We want to review where we go from here. We want to send a message out giving our rationale.

Secretary: If we tie ourselves to Makarios without any precise way of returning him to power on the Island we will be giving anyone the right to support him. Also, such support for Makarios could foster unilateral attempts to get enosis. If we attempt a strong anti-Greek posture it could trigger a Turkish attack.

We want our European allies to understand that we do not want to elaborate any theory which would bring the Soviets in, or on the other hand establish a regime on the Island which would give the Communists any major role in Cyprus's internal affairs.

Nevertheless, we do not want to exclude the Makarios option at this point. We want to avoid the United Nations being used in an unconstitutional way during a Civil War which is a situation independent of the UN.

Specifically, I want it known that we are not drifting and our Ambassadors should understand that we want the situation to crystallize. What, in effect, is the possibility of the British using force on the Island?

Ambassador Buffum: There has been one report of British use of one Sovereign Base area, but this is highly unlikely.

Secretary: The British cannot use force. Also we have to determine what we would gain from supporting Makarios, except for psychic satisfaction and playing up to the New York Times.

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We are not opposed to the withdrawal of the Greek officers from the Island because it interferes with the internal affairs of Cyprus, but rather because it tips the internal balance on the Island and may foster the rabble in the National Guard.

Our Ambassadors should go into their host governments and not give the impression of a USG that is in doubt of its position but should definitely convey the current position that the USG is not going along with the howling mob. We want the situation to crystallize in order to enable concerted action later.

To attempt to overthrow the Greek Government to satisfy our goals and bring Makarios back is a high price to pay. Whatever our views of the Greek Government, to precipitate the present situation to a crisis which results in the overthrow of the Greek Government would open the way to Soviet intervention, force Turkish intervention and initiate a course of action that could not be sustained. Everyone must analyze the situation closely.

We must not be in an anti-Makarios position. In 1971 we were highly criticized over our policy toward India and now the Indians are coming to us. It just shows that it doesn’t work that way. We require a calm and cool approach to this present situation.

McCloskey: Do you want us to send any further instructions to Sisco?

Secretary: Sisco should surface the Clerides possibility with the Turks and the British and he should get the Greeks to London on Sunday to have them face up to the situation. Basically, we have to get ourselves in a situation similar to that in which we are in the Middle East where everyone needs us and comes to us. At that point we can deliver the Greeks.

I was pleased with the French reaction.²

McCloskey: Should we be telling the French any more?

Secretary: Tell the French they can share our analysis with the EC-9 as much as they wish to. You should send Ambassador Irwin a cable telling him to approach Sauvagnargues on this basis.³ That should make the French quite happy.

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² Reported in telegram 17519 from Paris, July 18. (Ibid., Central Foreign Policy Files, 1974)

³ Telegrams 156348 and 157174 to Paris, July 19. (Ibid.)
Joseph Sisco's mission to London, Ankara, and Athens began on July 18, 1974, when he met twice each with Foreign Secretary Callaghan and Prime Minister Ecevit. Excerpts of notes from his mission for those days summarized the meetings as follows:

"July 18—First meeting with Callaghan.

"Callaghan continues to support the legitimacy and restoration of Makarios on the Island. He claims Parliament and public opinion are very strong on this issue and he does not believe that UN efforts should be delayed. Callaghan agrees that restoration of Makarios in the long run would probably not be element of stability since he would be tempted to turn eastward. Callaghan claims, however, that public pressures force him to continue to support Makarios. Callaghan added that GOG would not do anything without hard USG pressure.

"Sisco emphasized that US and UK must make all out effort in UN to avoid legitimacy and restoration of Makarios since this would pre-judge further negotiations. Sisco also noted danger of Makarios being reintroduced and the unstable situation it would create. Sisco added that USG does not see Sampson as permanent feature of landscape.

"July 18—First meeting with Ecevit.

"Ecevit took hard line and his comments indicated he was sensitive to domestic situation in Turkey. He gave pro forma support for Makarios and continues to call for withdrawal of Greek officers. He places major emphasis on 'strengthening the Turkish presence in Cyprus and the need for Turkish access to the sea.' Ecevit agrees it would be useful to have further talk with Sisco in Ankara.

"July 18—Second meeting with Callaghan.

"In second meeting Sisco and Callaghan concentrated on possible elements of a package to resolve Cyprus problem. They include: (1) flexible constitutional arrangements, (2) Turkish access to the sea under UN supervision, (3) replacement of Greek officers in National Guard, (4) closer UN supervision of troop rotation, and (5) strengthening of Turkish presence on the Island. Callaghan notes that he does not necessarily preclude use of military forces by UK since there are important UK interests involved.

"July 18—Second Sisco–Ecevit meeting.

"In second session Ecevit took more extreme line presenting some ideas which were tantamount to partition. Ecevit noted that Turkey could not tolerate situation created by coup in Cyprus and believes that creeping enosis is taking place. He calls for two autonomous provisional governments. Also asks for free access to airports and seaports supervised by guarantor powers. Sisco agrees to examine all ideas and
discuss situation further with Ecevit in Ankara. Sisco also agreed to visit Ankara evening of July 19.

“During both Sisco–Ecevit conversations there were indications of a separation in Ecevit’s large delegation with pressures from home for a very hard line.

“Comment: Compared to the first session with Turkish Prime Minister, Ecevit’s proposals in the afternoon were very stiff. He called for a ‘Strengthening of the Turkish presence’ which no Cypriot or Greek Government could accept. He was also stronger in second meeting that he would not talk to Greeks.

“Sisco’s strategy on how to proceed in both Athens and Ankara was as follows: In Athens he would make all-out effort to get GOG to commit itself to talks with UK in London in spirit of London–Zurich agreement. He believed, however, that even this process would not likely be enough to stay Ankara’s hand. In Ankara he would tell the Turks that he is prepared to return to Washington to recommend to the Secretary and the President that US explore with Greek Government a return to Constitutional arrangements in Cyprus at an early date. This would involve Clerides taking over. In the meantime he would ask for Turkish assurances not to undertake any military action.

“Enroute to Ankara Sisco put together a ‘return to constitutional arrangements’ proposal which would entail Clerides assuming acting Presidency.” (National Archives, RG 59, Records of Joseph Sisco, 1951–1976, Entry 5405, Box 21, Cyprus 1974–75)

The notes summarized Sisco’s more extended reports transmitted in telegrams 9092 from London (ibid., Box 26, Cyprus Crisis, July 1974), and 4624 and 4625 from Athens, all dated July 19. (Ibid., Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 592, Country Files, Middle East, Cyprus, Vol. II)
97. Telegram From the Department of State to Certain Posts

Washington, July 18, 1974, 2354Z.

156312. Subject: Policy Considerations in Cyprus Situation.

1. Our principal objectives at this time are (A) to prevent a Turkish decision to intervene militarily, and (B) to avoid the development of positions by other countries which might contribute to the outbreak of civil war in Cyprus. In either event, the Soviets would exploit the situation to their advantage, thus enhancing their position in the Eastern Mediterranean and strengthening the Communists in Cyprus.

2. We must, therefore, seek to slow down actions either by individual countries or within the UN which might tend to precipitate either of the above two events and endeavor to gain time to develop a situation where a negotiated settlement on Cyprus can be achieved. The ideal solution would be to obtain a negotiated agreement between the UK, Turkey and Greece as the guarantor powers.

3. The situation is that while Makarios remains the de jure President of Cyprus, a de facto regime exists on the island and it has established full control. It seems unlikely that Makarios can reestablish himself without outside support. If the UN is permitted to adopt a resolution which legitimizes Makarios’ position and calls for his return on the possible pain of sanctions, then in the wake of certain refusal of the Western powers to undertake this mission, the Soviets would undoubtedly endeavor to fill the void, with all its implications. Makarios’ return to Cyprus under these conditions would only enhance the Soviet position in the Mediterranean and that of the Communists in Cyprus.

4. While the Turkish Government is presently supporting the return of Makarios, its demands to improve its strategic position on the island would not be viable since if Makarios should return under these conditions, he would be unwilling to appear as a Turkish satellite and would look to outside support, in all probability the Communists, to counterbalance the Turkish position. We must, therefore, urge the Turks to take a long-range view of the situation and recognize that their present posture could be seriously detrimental to their interests.

5. We also believe that the UK, in considering its present course, must face up to the probability that Makarios cannot be restored by...
political means and must recognize the fact that it does not have the means to accomplish this in any other form.

6. With respect to Greece, it is quite clear that the return of Makarios would be totally unacceptable since the whole objective of the regime has been the removal of Makarios. Moreover, Makarios’ return could only be accomplished through the removal of the Sampson regime and the withdrawal of the Greek officers of the National Guard. If Makarios were restored under these conditions, the influence of Athens in Cyprus would be reduced, and the consequent weakening of the balance of force would tend to make Makarios place greater reliance on the Communists and on the Eastern bloc.

7. The Sampson regime is clearly unacceptable to the Turks and to a good part of the international community. The US also cannot accept the Sampson regime. However, it is now in place and we believe it would be unwise to seek the removal of Sampson until a substitute solution is in sight. With regard to the Greek officers of the National Guard, we believe that it would be a mistake to take any position on that matter for the reason outlined in para 6 above and pending the development of a negotiated solution. However, we are not committed to the continuing presence of Greek officers in the National Guard.

8. It is important that our friends and allies understand that any course of action relating to Cyprus which results in the overthrow of the Greek regime, opens up the Eastern Mediterranean to Soviet meddling and exploitation, and invites active Turkish intervention would initiate a course of events which would be unpredictable, difficult if not impossible to control, and which would have seriously damaging effects on Western interests.

9. The thrust of our position at this time, therefore, is to avoid assuming a public posture which commits us to any particular course of action. We view as unlikely the restoration of Makarios and we do not accept a Sampson regime. Consequently, the situation in favor of either one or the other should not be allowed to freeze, thus creating the conditions for the development of a compromise and negotiated settlement which would permit the maintenance of constitutional arrangements in Cyprus, both in their internal and external aspects.

10. For Ambassadors or Chargés: Above should be used only in your discussions with highest level of government to which accredited.

11. For Ambassador Rumsfeld: You may use above in briefing Luns on US analysis of Cyprus situation, but for obvious reasons cannot be used in NAC session. However, you are authorized in NAC session to seek to slow down any moves which might compromise our objectives as outlined.

Ingersoll
Minutes of Meeting of the Washington Special Actions Group


SUBJECT
Cyprus

PARTICIPANTS
Chairman—Robert Ingersoll

State
Robert McCloskey
Wells Stabler
Dean Brown
John Day

Defense
William Clements
Amos Jordan
Harry Bergold

JCS
LTG John W. Pauly

CIA
William Colby
George Lauder

NSC
Richard Kennedy
Harold Saunders
Rosemary Niehuss
David Ransom
Col. Clinton Granger
James Barnum

Amb. Ingersoll: I am sorry gentlemen, but we have been on the telephone to the Secretary, who has been talking with Callaghan to get the British views. The British have promised to send us a cable
this afternoon on Joe’s (Mr. Sisco) visit and the British position. We’ll have it for you all shortly. Bill (Mr. Colby), do you have a briefing?

Mr. Colby briefed from the attached text. 4

Amb. Ingersoll: Bill, (Mr. Clements) do you have any views?

Mr. Clements: Bill (Mr. Colby) and I, we were talking about the situation before you came in. We have the same information that he has and are in substantial agreement. I would like to bring up the amphibious forces, however. As you know, we have ordered our amphibious group—with your concurrence—to move to about one hundred to fifty miles off Cyprus.

Amb. Ingersoll: How long do you estimate it will take them to get there?

Mr. Clements: Well, we’re thinking in terms of ten hours. That is, ten hours to the beach.

Amb. Ingersoll: Is that ten hours from where they are holding or from the one hundred miles away?

Mr. Clements: From the one hundred miles out. We could cut the time if we need to.

(Messrs. Ingersoll, Kennedy and Stabler were called to the phone at 2:52 p.m. and returned at 3:02 p.m.)

Mr. Stabler: That was the Secretary. 5 He had just received a message from Joe (Mr. Sisco) on the Athens visit. It is not clear if he saw Ioannidis. We’re not clear on that, but it probably was not possible. Joe said that the British Ambassador saw Ioannidis yesterday. Bill (Mr. Clements), do you have anything to add?

Mr. Clements: Only what I said before you left, that we have moved the units closer to the island; but I want to stress that the orders that have gone to the fleet are that they move for evacuation purposes only, not for intervention. The other thing we’re doing is beginning the process of drawing up some contingency plans, but they are purely contingency.

of their respective governments despite having the same overall policy toward Cyprus, owing to the fact that Britain remained a guarantor power of Cyprus.

4 Attached but not printed. Colby related information about Turkish military movements, which indicated that a Turkish invasion would occur July 21 or 22 or possibly earlier. (National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Institutional Files (H–Files), Box H–097, Meeting Files, WSAG Meetings)

5 Reference is to a group of phone calls made in the few minutes before and the first few minutes of the WSAG meeting. Kissinger talked to Ingersoll, McCloskey, Stabler, and Kennedy at 2:30 p.m. (EDT); French Foreign Minister Sauvagnargues at 2:45 p.m.; and McCloskey, Ingersoll, and Stabler at 2:50 p.m. (Library of Congress, Manuscript Division, Kissinger Papers, Box 384, Telephone Conversations, Chronological File)
Amb. Ingersoll: Yes, we at State have also told our escape and evacuation people to get ready. We have made no moves, just have asked them to get their plans up to date. I think it would be wise at this time to move the amphibious forces in closer.

Mr. Clements: Yes, they’re moving in now. You might want to mention what the Secretary decided to do yesterday.

Amb. Ingersoll: Yes, the Secretary suggested . . .

(Amb. Ingersoll was called to the phone at 3:05 p.m. and returned at 3:10 p.m.)

Amb. Ingersoll: Have we received that wire from Joe (Mr. Sisco)?
Amb. McCloskey: No. I understand we won’t see it until we get back to the Department.

Amb. Ingersoll: Why don’t we have it sent here?
Amb. McCloskey: Why not.

(Mr. Kennedy instructed the Situation Room.)

Amb. Ingersoll: Bob (Amb. McCloskey) would you like to explain our position to the people here on what we plan to tell the Turks, that we’re not opposed to Makarios, but are against Sampson. By the way, the Secretary is meeting with Makarios here on Monday.

Amb. McCloskey: I don’t know if you have seen the instructions to Ankara, but the emphasis is on convincing the Turks that military action won’t settle the problem on Cyprus or in the area as a whole, and would only invite Greek counter activities. It explains that we don’t support enosis and that we’re working to find a diplomatic solution that all will agree with. We have no U.S. proposals to make at this point, but are thinking of possible alternatives. It’s our thinking that if the Turks insist on the return of Makarios this can have only a destabilizing impact on the island and on the area as a whole because we think that Makarios will have to turn to the left inside the country and out in order to remain in power. Joe (Mr. Sisco) can raise the name of Clerides as a possibility, but not as a U.S. idea, of a compromise solution.

Mr. Clements: Have we said this publicly?

Amb. McCloskey: At State we have. We are saying that we think that a military solution is completely out of the question and that we are working for a solution through diplomatic processes. Privately we are thinking about alternatives.

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6 Kissinger called Ingersoll at 3:05 p.m. (EDT) and relayed his instructions for comments to the press. Kissinger wanted to emphasize that there was no American plan, only that the United States was discussing ideas designed to prevent a Greek-Turkish war and to restore constitutional rule. (Ibid.)

7 Telegram 156801 to Ankara, July 19. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy Files, 1974)
Mr. Clements: But we are not saying that we are looking for a plan to end this thing.

Amb. McCloskey: No, I think that probably we have taken enough of a beating. I think that by Makarios coming here and the Secretary seeing him on Monday this will tend to dim some of the criticism. Also, Senator Fulbright will see him (Makarios) on Monday, and the House Foreign Affairs Committee has made a similar invitation. One thing. This may not be a proper question to raise here, but apparently there is concern as to Makarios’ security while in the U.S. There have been some threats to his safety and the ambassador has asked us to supply him with a plane from New York to Washington on Monday. My inclination is not to do this.

Mr. Clements: Why?

Amb. McCloskey: Well, there is a fine diplomatic line here that you may not understand. What we are trying to say diplomatically is that we neither support Makarios or any other person. The fact that Makarios has been acknowledged by the Security Council, and if we supply him a plane, gives the impression that our position is one of leaning toward Makarios. This we want to avoid at the time being. This may be over worked, but...

Mr. Colby: There are dozens of planes we could charter that would avoid the whole problem.

Mr. Clements: Frankly the problem is completely lost on me. If we are worried about his security, let’s give him an unmarked air force jet. We could make it small and one with no insignia.

Amb. McCloskey: Their request is based on a security threat. I wouldn’t...

Mr. Lauder: The report came from a good source [less than 1 line not declassified] saying that orders have been given to assassinate Makarios anytime and anywhere in the world. Now, it is only one source and one report. We have no back up. We passed this on to the Secret Service because we felt we should. You can never tell about these things.

Amb. Ingersoll: Bill (Mr. Colby)?

Mr. Colby: Nothing to add to what George said. I don’t think he should fly in Air America, however!

Amb. Ingersoll: We’ll think about that. Should we talk a little about what happens if the Turks land? What should we do?

Mr. Clements: We’ve thought a little about that, but have had no real chance to discuss it. There are several plans we could enact, like

8 July 22.
embark by air, or take them to British base areas. There are all kinds of things we could do to protect our nationals. That is our sole mission at this point, protecting our nationals, right?

Amb. Ingersoll: Yes, that is all we are talking about. What is the complement of the amphibious forces?

Gen. Pauly: There is a total of five ships. There is one LPH and two LPDs. There are some 1800 marines on the LPH. In addition, there are 14 helicopters that could be used to evacuate personnel.

Amb. Ingersoll: Then you could evacuate all of the American personnel.

Mr. Clements: Sure. What we want is a secure situation on the shore, before we act. This we are going to have to get from you (State). We will have plans to cover all evacuation. All State has to decide is when.

Amb. Ingersoll: We will know better when we get a feel from Athens and Ankara.

Mr. Colby: There is also the British. They have some 5,000 Royal Air Force personnel on the island and 2,700 army.

Mr. Lauder: There are a great many tourists still on the island.

Amb. Ingersoll: Do we know how many are off yet?

Mr. Lauder: No.

Amb. Ingersoll: From what I have read, it sounds like the Berlin Airlift. Is there a port at the British base?

Mr. Lauder: The big port is at Famagusta. There is also a base there.

Mr. Colby: There is also a port at Larnaca.

Mr. Clements: One of the things that Joe (Mr. Sisco) is doing down in Ankara is impressing the Turks on the necessity of getting our civilians out of there, I hope.

Amb. Ingersoll: I have tried to reach the British Ambassador today but he is out. There is also a message coming in saying what they plan to do (regarding evacuation on Cyprus).

(Mr. Ingersoll was handed the attached cable from Athens (4269).)

Amb. McCloskey: (reading from cable) The Greeks have agreed to send someone to London to consult the UK as guarantor power in the spirit of the London–Zurich Agreement.

Amb. Ingersoll: At least he has something to talk about.

Mr. Colby: The real problem is getting the Turks to hold up an invasion until Monday.

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9 Attached but not printed; the preliminary number was 4269.
Mr. Clements: We could leave them out there in those small boats; they’ll be good and sick by that time.

Amb. Ingersoll: I believe this brings us up to date. We’ll have to see now how Joe does in Ankara. I believe you all should keep close. We’ll meet tomorrow morning at 10:00 a.m.

Mr. Kennedy: (to Mr. Ingersoll) I suggest that a WSAG Working Group be established to develop the various issues and options open to us in the event the Turks invade Cyprus. I also think it a good idea that the Working Group be kept in being at all times so it can do options studies for the WSAG as the situation develops.

Amb. Ingersoll: Good. (to all) We’ll set up a Working Group, and each of you name a principal. The first meeting of the Group should take place this afternoon.

99. **Telegram From the Embassy in Greece to the Department of State**

Athens, July 19, 1974, 1707Z.

4658. Polto 20. For the Secretary from Sisco. Department pass to selected posts and to Schlesinger and Clements.

Subject: Cyprus—Discussion With GOG Leaders.

1. I have just completed long discussions with GOG leaders (PM and FM) and including surprise and unannounced participation of General Ioannides and General Bonanos, #2 in the country.

2. I go with something from the Greeks to Ankara since I believe they are beginning to realize how serious the situation is and how equally serious it would have been for me to go to Ankara empty-handed. What I bring is probably not enough, but I have something. I have been authorized by the GOG to convey the following to the Turks.

A. Greece has agreed to go to London to consult the UK as a guarantor power in the spirit of the London–Zurich agreement. The PM said he had in mind for talks to take place on Monday.

B. Greece agrees to use its influence with the Government of Cyprus to work out practical arrangements which would strengthen

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1 Source: National Archives, RG 59, Records of Joseph Sisco, 1951–1976, Entry 5405, Box 26, Cyprus Crisis, July 1974. Secret; Flash; Nodis. Received at 1749Z.
the role of the UN on: effective control of certain seaports and airports in order to insure against importation of clandestine troops, arms and material coming into the country, and to assure regular rotation by Greek and Turkish units.

3. I got nowhere on the question which interested the Turks most, namely, a willingness to give the Turkish community access to the sea [garble—via?] some port or ports under UN supervision. As I expected, GOG saw this proposal as a form of separatism or partition (which it is) and it was therefore politely but firmly rejected. GOG rejected anything smar ting of partition, and I did not therefore put forward outright partition proposal which Ecevit gave me in my second meeting yesterday, since it might have cooled them on going to London.

4. I will of course make the most of all of this with the Turks and argue that the above can constitute the beginning of a serious process and that we will maintain a continuing interest as UK continues contact with GOG and Turks as a guarantor power in the spirit of the London–Zurich agreement. I do not believe it will be enough, and I believe it will be necessary to launch my recommendation of last night re constitutional arrangements (Clerides) in order to bulwark the above and to try to secure a commitment from GOT that it will not intervene militarily.

5. Finally, I have the distinct impression that no matter what is done in this situation, the Turks see it as an ideal time to achieve by military intervention a longstanding objective, namely, double enosis.

Sisco

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2 See Document 96.
3 See ibid.
100. Transcript of Telephone Conversation Between Secretary of State Kissinger and Secretary of Defense Schlesinger

K: Hello, Jim.
S: Yes, Henry.
K: I just wanted to bring you up to date. You know the situation and I want you to know what my thinking is and see whether we’re in step on it. My view is that—you know the methods that the Turks have asked us to pass to the Greeks about not firing.
S: Right. They’re landing.
K: They’re landing and they have orders not to fire at the Greeks if the Greeks don’t fire. So we’re going to pass that message and we’re also going to tell the Greeks that we think the best solution now is to have a negotiation as rapidly as possible looking for the return to constitutional government. And that we recommend the Clerides solution under these conditions. That’s—that means they have gotten rid of Makarios and they’ll have to give up Sampson. And we’ll send Sisco back from Ankara. Now we don’t think this will really fly but at least it’s a slender thread.
S: My feeling is that the Turks at this stage are not going to settle for anything less than a piece of the island.
K: No, the Turks have said that they are willing to stabilize their forces and that they are willing to keep the existing structure and they will accept any president other than Sampson.
S: That’s very generous of them. That’s good. OK...
K: If the Turks want a piece of the island then in my view we have to work for double enosis and give the Greeks the other part of the island so my view is there are now two possible outcomes. Either double enosis or Clerides.
S: Completely. Henry. I had a call from Ingersoll a bit ago who wanted to move the Americans down to the British base.
K: I tell you. My bloody outfit. When they got a crisis the first thing they can think up is something trivial. What do you think. I’m not against it, I just wish they’d do first things first.
S: Well, my feeling on that is we can afford to wait and see what circumstances develop.

1 Source: Library of Congress, Manuscript Division, Kissinger Papers, Box 384, Telephone Conversations, Chronological File. No classification marking. Kissinger was in San Clemente with President Nixon; Schlesinger was in Washington.
K: That is my feeling.
S: And it shows a certain nervousness on the part of the US Government.
K: Agree completely.
S: If there is a discreet withdrawal by car but the hint—the statement that I got—was we ought to move in helicopters and start removing Americans.
K: Well, to tell you the splendid reporting system I have they told me that you had offered helicopters. And I was under the impression that you were the energizing party.
S: Oh hell, I heard about this about 15 minutes ago.
K: OK, I'll take care of this. Of—if they convince me that we need it, I assume we can appeal to you.
S: You bet, you bet.
K: But I agree with you that we should play that part cool.
S: We can move by car.
K: That is my strong feeling too. If we go in with helicopters no one will ever know what they are in there for.
S: That's right. And miserable as the circumstances are, we still want to keep a low profile.
K: So we will work either for double enosis or for Clerides, whichever works out.
S: OK, bye.
K: Bye.

101. Transcript of Telephone Conversation Between Secretary of State Kissinger and Ambassador at Large McCloskey

July 19, 1974, 8:45 p.m. PDT.

M: Hello.
K: Hello, OK. Sisco is to go to Athens. Callaghan agrees.2
M: OK.

K: Before he goes to Athens he is supposed [to go?] back to the Turks and he is to tell them first of all that we object strongly to their actions, that it has strong consequences for everybody, we now believe that the Clerides solution is the only one and that he has been instructed to [go to] Athens to propose it, and that we expect the Turks to go along with us. And we are interpreting that phrase “go along with it”. Now is there anything else on his tortured mind? Has he told you our whole plan on the telephone?

M: No.

K: What is his objection? Callaghan does not want him in London.

M: OK, that is doesn’t know and no one could tell him that before now. [sic]

K: Well, what was he going to do in London? Will you tell me?

M: Mr. Secretary, I’m sorry. I don’t know what he was going to do in London. I had to be interrupted twice while I was speaking with him.

K: What is his reason for not wanting to go to Athens?

M: He says there is no way the Greeks will accept the Clerides proposal that has already been rejected by the Turks furthermore.

K: Then he has been writing out the cables.

M: But that is what he is saying to me over our rough connection.

K: As to who will be president under those circumstances, Ecevit said government in Turkey does not care. Now, what in the hell does that mean?

M: OK. I think I still have an open line to him. I’ll go back to him and tell him he must go, we will have detailed instructions for him there and . . .

K: Yeah, but before he goes we want him to go back into the Turks. By now what else have the Russians not picked up? What is there left to say? OK, we’ve said so much on the open line we might as well go ahead. But Sisco is going to Athens and he is going to stay there. Now has anyone talked to Tasca?

M: We have been trying to get a call into him also. Bob Ingersoll is trying to get that call through.

K: Yeah, but not before we have had an evacuation. OK, let’s get to Tasca, but let’s not do everything on an open line.

M: OK.

Transcript of Telephone Conversation Between Secretary of State Kissinger and Director of Central Intelligence Colby

July 19, 1974, 9:35 p.m. PDT.

K: Hello.
C: Hello, Henry.
K: Bill, how are you? Sorry to have kept you on the line.
C: That’s OK.
K: I just wanted to check in with you and to make sure you would of course be keeping a close watch on this thing. Can you get us out here—I’m in San Clemente—your estimate of how this thing is going to evolve.
C: All right. Fine.
K: And also what the Turkish capability is to put troops ashore. What is it, do you know?
C: It’s very good. They’ve got about I’d say about a regiment or so on the ships. They’ve got about 20 odd ships.
K: A regiment is what, 2000?
C: It’s 2 or 3 thousand, yes.
K: And then how many can they send?
C: And they’ve got some airborne also. They have an airborne brigade.
K: How many is that?
C: They apparently are going for Kyrenia on the north coast. That’s the first step.
K: But what do you think they’re after? They’re not after the whole island are they?
C: No, no. What they would be after would be Famagusta and Kyrenia and kind of a line between the two.
K: That kind of a quadrangle in the northeast.
C: Yeah. Well, call it almost the (inaudible) from roughly Baranaka on up and then just assert themselves and give themselves a position to bargain with.
K: What do you think the Greeks are going to do?

1 Source: Library of Congress, Manuscript Division, Kissinger Papers, Box 384, Telephone Conversations, Chronological File. No classification marking. Kissinger was in San Clemente; Colby was in Washington.
C: Well, the local Greeks will fight and there are some reports that there is some bombing at Kyrenia already. And the National Guard particularly will fight. This is the one with the Greek officers in them.

K: They will fight.

C: You will have a very unpleasant thing in Cyprus itself. The Greeks themselves are a bit far away, quite frankly. They are about at the range of their aircraft and they can’t do very much from there.

K: Even from Rhodes?

C: Pardon.

K: Even from Rhodes?

C: Well, but their basic airfield is back in Greece and Athens and that area.

K: What is the relative strength of those two armies?

C: The Turks are about 300,000 and the Greeks about 100,000. But most of the Greek forces are up in the north, up in Thrace. And if you had kind of a mixup, that’s where it would take place. Up in the northern area there, around Salonika.

K: Do you have any good ideas what we should do?

C: Well, I think the biggest thing is to get the Greeks not to fight. To say all right, let’s negotiate and discuss what ought to be done.

K: OK.

C: Their basic position has been that this is an internal affair in Cyprus. You know, so they have a face saving basis for saying, “Well, that was just a local affair. It’s not Greece.”

K: Yeah, OK. Thank you.

C: So in a sense they could say “Well, that was a great mistake down there in the island, but we’re above that.” I think the most important thing is to limit it to Cyprus and not let it go out beyond that.

K: OK, thank you.

C: We’ll pass on anything else we get, Henry.

K: Thank you. Bye.
San Clemente, July 19, 1974, 10:06 p.m. PDT.

K: Hello.
P: Hello, Henry.
K: Mr. President.
P: Apparently the battle is started, huh?
K: Yeah. They are apparently bombing Nicosia and firing on another town and we haven’t had a Greek reaction yet. I’ve got Sisco going to Athens under protest because he thinks it might be a little dangerous for him there.
P: Oh.
K: But I figure if Tasca can stand it, he must be able to stand it.
P: Dangerous in the sense of anti-Americanism?
K: Yeah. That’s all right, Mr. President, that’s what they pay under-secretaries for.
P: God almighty, that’s what they pay us all for.
K: That’s right.
P: And with Tasca there I should think he could have some—if anybody could have any influence with the people. Thank God he’s there; he’s a tough guy.
K: He’s a good fellow.
P: What does he report?
K: We haven’t had anything from Athens yet—not one word.
P: You think this is the kind of a thing that requires—that they feel my presence in Washington—that I have to get the hell back there for this thing?
K: Not yet, but if the Greeks attack the Turks, Mr. President, then I think you should go back to Washington. If it leads to a major war.
P: Yeah, and then what do we do there?
K: Not much but I think . . .
P: I have to be there.
N: That is all that matters is that you know we can do everything—I can do everything here that I could do in Washington.
K: You remember we had the same problem when the Mid East war started—you were in Key Biscayne and we advised strongly not to move.

N: In the Mid East we had basically interests that were—well—

K: We didn’t want to exacerbate the situation and there wasn’t anything you could do in Washington that you couldn’t do in Key Biscayne—But let’s see how the Greeks react, Mr. President. There is still a 10% chance that this thing will be settled by Monday.²

N: How?

K: Well, if the Greeks accept Clerides as a solution and if they—and if the Greeks and Turks then meet in London, I think we could get a ceasefire.

N: And you don’t want to go to the UN because that’ll get the Russians in it.

K: Well we can go to the UN in a few hours—it’s the middle of the night.

N: Oh, I know, I know.

K: But it won’t contribute much—we can do it tomorrow morning.

N: Well as you know Henry, there is always a damn symbolism in the UN—you and I both know what a mine field it is, but I don’t know.

K: The UN is going to meet again tomorrow morning, Mr. President. They met on Cyprus today.


K: Yeh. I think to call them in the middle of the night when neither of the parties involved—

N: No, no, no. That’s the point, I just—it is—

K: I would wait until tomorrow morning on the UN.

N: Just so we can avoid the appearance that we are not completely on top of it and I think we certainly are—now you are planning to go back tomorrow afternoon?

K: That is right, Mr. President. That’s night out there and that gives me a chance to get on top of it.

N: Hell, you are on top of it here too.

K: What I mean is I’ll be travelling while people are sleeping out there—in the Middle East.

N: True, true. Thank God it isn’t Syria and Israel or something like that—that’d be worse wouldn’t it?

K: Well before your term is over Mr. President, we’ll have that privilege too.

² July 22.
N: I hope not.
K: I hope not, but I wouldn’t lay odds on it.
N: That depends on our Israeli friends to a great extent—we are going to keep a very strong line there—anybody who gets arms from the US by golly to use it—this of course is the Cyprus thing—an . . .
K: [1 line not declassified]
N: [1 line not declassified]
K: [1/2 lines not declassified]
N: Yeah, yeah. It is really what we have here as far as the Turks are concerned as you pointed out is just one of the problems you have when you have a weak government and they want a foreign adventure to prove their toughness.
K: And a great opportunity—the Greek government . . . and the—and isolated itself; the Cypriot government can get no international support being headed by a professional gunman and so the Turks did what they have been wanting to do for 15 years—establish a predominant position on Cyprus.
N: And the Greeks will never let them do that.
K: No, but the only place the Greeks can fight them is not in Cyprus but some other place.
N: Now tell me just in that connection, Henry, what is the alignment of forces there—the Greeks don’t have enough forces there, I mean if they control the Cypriot government, I would assume that—
K: The Greeks have only about 9,000 men on the island and the Turks and the Turks have probably . . . over about 3,000 or 4,000, 2,000 seaborne and about 2,000 airborne, but the Turks are much better equipped and they can reinforce much faster.
N: They can, huh.
K: Yeah.
N: So what would the Greeks do—I’m just trying to—
K: Well, the Greeks will either negotiate or they will attack the Turks in Thrace.
N: Gosh.
K: I don’t exclude that they’ll negotiate Mr. President. If Sisco hasn’t lost his nerve completely, I think they can be gotten to negotiate.
N: God Sisco may lose his nerve, but Tasca won’t. Don’t underestimate what he can do. He will put the arm on him now.
K: No, no, I have already gotten instruction to him, Mr. President. And he has—he is already working.

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3 Instructions were relayed in telegrams 156801 and 157127 to Ankara, both dated July 19. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy Files, 1974)
N: And they know too the penalty of failing to negotiate is a—they just rupture their situation with us—they break it right, don’t they?

K: That is right. First.

N: That of course isn’t much of an option for us—consider what it does to NATO.

K: Exactly. No, it is a mess. It is two totally irresponsible governments going at each other.

N: We got to posture needless to say in a way that we are not—that we aren’t responsible for the damn thing. I don’t think—except for a few nuts—that what, that we could have saved this fellow—how could we have saved him.

K: Who Makarios?

N: Yeah.

K: There was no way we could have saved Makarios—the question was could we have brought him back faster. The answer was he didn’t even show up in London till Wednesday—4—that night we sent Sisco there—Mr. President, I have Callaghan calling me—should I take that call and then call you back.

N: You could do it and then call me. Right.6

4 July 17.
5 Kissinger spoke to Callaghan at 10:15 p.m. PDT. Callaghan suggested that if Sisco could persuade the Greeks to replace Sampson with Clerides, then the Turks might motivate the Turkish Cypriots to support a cease-fire. (Library of Congress, Manuscript Division, Kissinger Papers, Box 384, Telephone Conversations, Chronological File)
6 No record of this conversation has been found.

104. Editorial Note

On July 20, 1974, Joseph Sisco held meetings in Ankara and Athens, in the midst of the Turkish invasion of Cyprus. Excerpts of notes from his mission for that day summarized the meetings as follows:

“July 20—Early morning Sisco–Ecevit meeting.

“Sisco met during the early morning of July 20 with Ecevit. It was clear that Turks had already taken decision to intervene militarily and Ecevit refused to budge. Sisco told Ecevit that in Greek eyes, so far as Turkey is concerned, what had occurred in Cyprus had destroyed a large measure of confidence. Also GOG realized seriousness of situation and agreed to engage in dialogue. Sisco noted that Greeks said they were ready to fight. USG believes that intervention in Cyprus
would not be in Turkish interest. Sisco also floated Clerides idea with the Turks and stated we have no preconceived notions and are flexible on this matter.

“Ecevit said that he would consult with his Council of Ministers on the situation. Later he informed Sisco—after his Council of Ministers meeting—that the Turkish decision was irrevocable.

“In the early morning hours of July 20 the Turkish invasion force landed on Cyprus and Sisco returned to Athens. He met with the Acting Foreign Minister who demanded the immediate cessation of Turkish action and also said that general mobilization had been ordered. Sisco said that the USG wanted an end to the hostilities and wanted both Greece and Turkey to negotiate settlement in London. We would work to this end. He added that Greece bears certain responsibilities for the present situation. He added that U.S. would be closely associated with negotiations in London. He then left immediately for Ankara to try to obtain Turkish agreement to a ceasefire.

“On July 20 Sisco saw Ecevit and in very tough language laid it on the line and gave him ceasefire proposal. He told Ecevit that GOT conditions for starting talks had been met and let him know that prolongation of the conflict would result in severe damage to U.S.-Turkish relations. Ecevit said he would talk to military and Cabinet as soon as possible and get back to Sisco. In reporting back to the Department, Sisco noted that it was his judgment that Ankara does not take very seriously the Greek threat to declare war.” (National Archives, RG 59, Records of Joseph Sisco, 1951–1976, Entry 5405, Box 21, Cyprus 1974–75)

Sisco reported his meetings to the Department in telegrams 4664 (ibid., Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 592, Country Files, Middle East, Cyprus, Vol. II), 4667, and 4742 from Athens, and 5745 and 5746 from Ankara, all dated July 20. (Ibid., RG 59, Records of Joseph Sisco, 1951–1976, Entry 5405, Box 26, Cyprus Crisis, July 1974)
105. Minutes of Meeting of the Washington Special Actions Group

Washington, July 20, 1974, 11:07 a.m.–12:07 p.m.

SUBJECT
Cyprus

PARTICIPANTS
Chairman—Robert Ingersoll
State
Robert McCloskey
Wells Stabler
Dean Brown
John Day
Helmut Sonnenfeldt
George Vest
Defense
Amos Jordan
Denis McAuliffe
JCS
LTG John W. Pauly
Gen. Eaton
CIA
William Colby
George Lauder
NSC
Richard Kennedy
Harold Saunders
Rosemary Niehuss
David Ransom
Col. Clinton Granger
James Barnum

Mr. Colby briefed from the attached text.²

Mr. Ingersoll: Amos (Mr. Jordan), would you like to bring us up to date on where we stand?

Mr. Jordan: General Pauly is prepared to give us a run-down on the military factor.

Gen. Pauly: There are three main things that we have done since we last met. One is that we have directed the amphibious task force to

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¹Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Institutional Files (H-Files), Box H-097, Meeting Files, WSAG Meetings. Top Secret; Sensitive. The meeting took place in the Situation Room of the White House.

²Attached but not printed.
move south of Cyprus, about 40 miles off-shore, with express orders to assist in the evacuation of civilians—not U.S. intervention. The other task force with the Forrestal in it is to move behind the amphibious group for support purposes only. [8 lines not declassified]

Mr. Ingersoll: [less than 1 line not declassified]

General Pauly: [6 lines not declassified]

Another thing we are trying to do is to get ourselves into a better position in terms of reaction time. Number one, we are moving, in a casual manner, if I can use that term, two C–130s to Aviano (Italy) in case of evacuation. They have been instructed specifically to do this without attracting attention of any kind. Also, the question of the US assets (military equipment and people) in Turkey has also come up. You might want to address the desirability of doing this. We have 18 F–4s, for example, in Turkey. [less than 1 line not declassified] In Greece, there is a small detachment there for a gunnery meet. There are also two destroyers in port at Athens. They are slowly being brought back to a state of readiness.

There is also the problem of the replacement for the aircraft carrier America, which, as you know, has been holding at Rota, Spain. Its replacement, the Independence, sailed two days ago on its regular schedule. Now, normal procedure for the turnover of these ships is to time it so they meet about 950 miles off the European continent and exchange the baton. If we follow the normal procedure, this would mean the America would pull out on the 24th (of July) and they would meet on the 26th. We need a signal from you if you want to proceed the normal way or alter it some way. If we want to stick to normal procedure, the America must sail on the 24th.

Mr. Ingersoll: How much advance notice do you need?

Gen. Pauly: Twelve hours would be enough. They are already on standby, and instructions to sail could be given at the last minute. The task force proceeding to Cyprus should be in position to begin extracting civilians by 2:00 a.m. tomorrow morning, our time. We can begin to start extracting civilians by midnight tonight, our time, with the choppers.

Mr. Ingersoll: Where will the task force be then?

Gen. Pauly: Off the south coast of Cyprus, about 40 miles south of the British Sovereign Base Area.

Amb. McClosky: And where are they now?

Gen. Pauly: They were some 20 hours out. By now they must have eaten up at least six hours of that time.

Mr. Ingersoll: That’s amazing! I thought that yesterday you told me that they had been instructed to move. That was twenty-four hours ago. They must be closer than that by now.
Gen. Pauly: I’ll check that. When I returned from the meeting yesterday the message to move had still not gone out.

Mr. Stabler: From where will they pull the civilians?

Gen. Pauly: From the ports along the southern part of the country. I understand from the British Ambassador that the British are working with our people over there for an evacuation route.

Mr. Ingersoll: There is a good port at Dhekelia.

Gen. Pauly: We’ll probably use the choppers, there are 14 of them on the task force.

Mr. Ingersoll: Bob (Amb. McCloskey), would you give us a rundown on the latest diplomatic efforts?

Amb. McCloskey: The Secretary was in touch last night with the foreign ministers in Paris, London, and Bonn, explaining our position to them. I think we can expect the outcome of these discussions to show up soon in the deliberations of the EC–9. Our basic position is: (1) support a ceasefire; (2) get both Greece and Turkey to agree on negotiations with the British, in London; and (3) that our objective is to see the reestablishment of constitutional rule in Cyprus. In New York, at the Security Council, we are going to join with the British and the French in a resolution that calls for the three principles I just mentioned. The intention of our joining in the resolution is to show that the U.S. and the European countries are going in the same direction. Whether the resolution will reach a vote today is questionable. The Secretary has approved a statement to be made by (Amb.) Scali that, while critical of Turkey, puts the blame for the war on Greece.3

Mr. Stabler: Where is Joe (Mr. Sisco) now?

Amb. McCloskey: Joe is in Ankara and is scheduled to see the heads of the government today. The Secretary has instructed to be brutal towards the Turks in the sense that he can say that we will withhold all military aid in the event there is an all-out war.4 Joe will try to bring the Turks back to London with him, but his stay in Ankara is open-ended. The Secretary (Dr. Kissinger), by the way, is scheduled to leave San Clemente at 1:00 or 2:00 our time this afternoon. He’ll get back here early this evening.

Mr. Ingersoll: I thought Joe got agreement for the Greeks to send representatives to London.

Mr. Stabler: There is some confusion over that. I think it is if there is not an all-out war and a temporary ceasefire.

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3 For Scali’s statement of July 19 during a UN Security Council session, see Department of State Bulletin, Vol. LXXI, No. 1833, August 12, 1974, pp. 262–263.

4 Telegram 157969 to Ankara, July 20. (National Archives, RG 59, Records of Joseph Sisco, 1951–1976, Entry 5405, Box 26, Cyprus Crisis, July 1974)
Mr. Jordan: If I could, for a minute, turn to the military supply problem. We have, as you know, put a temporary hold on all military aid to Greece and Turkey.

Amb. McCloskey: What’s involved in that?

Mr. Jordan: Well, there were three barges of ammunition—bombs and 2.75 mm. rockets—that were heading toward Turkey, scheduled to get there tomorrow. There were seven barges of ammo headed for Greece. One of the problems was that all ten barges were tied together. The Greeks commandeered the three Turkish barges, so that ends the problem of whether or not to hold up on them. There are a number of things awaiting shipment from the U.S. and other places, such as M-48 tanks, some recoilless rifles, armored personnel carriers. There is also a shipment of TOW missiles for the Turks the end of the month.

Mr. Ingersoll: The Greeks got the three barges?

Mr. Jordan: Yes, the Greeks commandeered the ammunition. This business of the Greeks commandeering our vessels is something else again, it seems to me. Ever since this crisis began the Greeks have been obstreperous. I am wondering if we shouldn’t be increasing our distance from the Greeks.

Mr. Stabler: This was a U.S. ship they commandeered?

Mr. Jordan: Yes.

Mr. Sonnenfeldt: Has this been told to Congress?

Mr. Jordan: No, I don’t think they know. I know this will cause trouble in Congress, and we are worried. [2 lines not declassified]

Mr. Stabler: Has anything been done about the commandeering? Have we protested?

Mr. Jordan: Not that I know of, and the situation will just get worse. I think we must protest this vigorously.

Mr. Stabler: To their ambassador here?

Amb. McCloskey: I think it would be better to protest in Athens—through Tasca.

All: Concur.

Mr. Jordan: [5½ lines not declassified]

Mr. Colby: [2 lines not declassified]

Mr. Ingersoll: [1 line not declassified]

Mr. Colby: [less than 1 line not declassified]

Mr. Jordan: [1½ lines not declassified]

Mr. Colby: [2 lines not declassified]

Mr. Sonnenfeldt: [3 lines not declassified]

Mr. Ingersoll: Are we doing some thinking about evacuation in Greece and Turkey themselves?
Mr. Colby: How many people are we talking about in Greece?
Mr. Lauder: Some 31,000.
Mr. Ingersoll: Does that include tourists?
Mr. Day: No. There are some 20,000, plus tourists. We really have no idea how many.
Mr. Ingersoll: How many in Turkey?
Gen. Pauly: We have 26,000 (army and civilians) personnel in Turkey, and some 54,000 personnel in Greece.
Amb. McCloskey: How many helicopters do we have?
Gen. Pauly: Fourteen. They are big troop carriers.
Mr. Jordan: There are some 4,000 air-seats in the European theatre that we could call on for evacuation, if we have a secure airfield.
Mr. Ingersoll: Where would we move them?
Mr. Jordan: Rome.
Mr. Ingersoll: Well, our initial diplomatic goal is to achieve a ceasefire, to get negotiations started in London, and to work for the restoration of a constitutional arrangement. It looks to me as though double enosis is the only alternative if the above facts bear out.
Mr. Brown: Bill (Mr. Colby), do you think the Greeks would move into Thrace?
Mr. Colby: Well, they could. They could at least make a substantial demonstration of force. The Greeks also have six squadrons of F–4s.
Mr. Ingersoll: I thought we sent 17 F–4s to Athens in June. Bill Clements told me that yesterday.
Mr. Colby: It could be, my facts may not be up to date.
Mr. Jordan: I’ll double check the figures.
Mr. Ingersoll: I heard a radio report coming to work this morning that said that some Greek fighter aircraft headed for Cyprus were headed off by Turkish interceptors. Do we have any information on that?
Mr. Colby: I don’t, but looking at the map it’s an awful long way.
Mr. Ingersoll: I think the report said they were intercepted off Rhodes.
Mr. Kennedy: We’ve been unable to verify that report.
Mr. Ingersoll: Have we been in touch with the British about their military (evacuation) plans?
Gen. Pauly: No.
Mr. Sonnenfeldt: The aircraft carrier Hermes is south of the island, isn’t it?
Mr. Ingersoll: Somebody said that they docked at 4:00 yesterday afternoon. Somebody said that last night.
Mr. Colby: I think there is a ceasefire at Limasol—to get people out.

Mr. Ingersoll: We have held up all military aid to Greece and Turkey?

Mr. Jordan: Yes.

Mr. Kennedy: How much of that stuff will leak through to them. You know, we went through this exercise in the India–Pakistan dispute and we found out later that a lot of the aid we thought had been cut off slipped through. Can we get a firm, positive fix on where the stuff is?

Mr. Jordan: Yes, but I probably cannot get it until the first of the week since most of it is being shipped commercially. It is hard to get precise information.

Mr. Kennedy: I think we should get a paper on the status of the deliveries for this group because: (1) Congress may be a problem; and (2) the actual fact of it being delivered may be construed as a signal of our conveying favoritism toward one or the other.

Mr. Ingersoll: What are the chances of our getting such a status report?

Mr. Jordan: We ought to be able to do a better job now than in previous years. We do know the dates of sailings, the ports, and the names of the ships.

Mr. Ingersoll: Well, can we find out where they are?

Mr. Jordan: We will attempt to, but I don’t think we will be able to until the first of the week.

Mr. Ingersoll: Do we ever take steps to intercept these ships?

Mr. Sonnenfeldt: The ship captains and companies are usually very responsible.

Mr. Kennedy: What will happen is that the ships’ captains will just fail to offload the stuff.

Mr. Ingersoll: Well, I think it would be wise to root out the people to do it.

Mr. Sonnenfeldt: We’re only stopping deliveries selectively, right?

Mr. Jordan: I put a hold on everything.

Mr. Ingersoll: Including spare parts?

Mr. Jordan: Yes.

Mr. Sonnenfeldt: Including that $20 million package, or is it still too early?

Mr. Jordan: Still too early.

Mr. Sonnenfeldt: We need a clear decision on what goes or what is to be held.
Mr. Kennedy: The question is, is it stopped or not? We need to get that information. The military on the other end will surely know if it has been stopped or not.

Mr. Ingersoll: Do you think we ought to work up something in case a full-scale war develops? Do we have a contingency plan for full-scale war between the Greeks and the Turks?

Mr. Jordan: No, we don’t have full plans. More work has to be done on the existing contingency plans.

Gen. Pauly: The units in Greece and Turkey have their own contingency plans and they are up to date.

Amb. McCloskey: You can use the paper the back-up group did as a basis.5

Mr. Saunders: We’re going to up-date that today.

Mr. Ingersoll: It seems to me that we should meet again tomorrow. What, 10:00? 11:00? Okay, 10:30.

Mr. Kennedy: Could we get the back-up group to think through some options for the possible outcomes of the fighting on the island? At least we ought to think through some of the possibilities.

Gen. Pauly: There is one thing we are going to have to face. I strongly recommend we do some thinking about how to recover U.S. aircraft in Greece and Turkey.

Mr. Sonnenfeldt: Do you have a judgement on that?

Gen. Pauly: [less than 1 line not declassified]

Mr. Sonnenfeldt: On this military thing, I suggest we give very careful thought on how we handle the matter of recovering our assets and how we exchange those carriers. We don’t want to denude ourselves over this issue. A general U.S. pullback could send a signal to the Soviets. It’s an important thing, and something we should look at.

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5 Not further identified.
106. Transcript of Telephone Conversation Between Secretary of State Kissinger and the Deputy Secretary of State (Ingersoll)

July 20, 1974, 9:30 a.m. PDT.

K: Hello.
I: Yes. Henry.
K: Bob, that was a false alarm you got. Defense threatened to cut off aid [less than 1 line not declassified]. There is no cut off of military aid.
I: Good. They told us unequivocally in the meeting\(^2\) that Schlesinger told them to cut off shipment.
K: You’d better go back there.
I: I surely will.
K: And make sure that they get in touch with their Secretary and that shipments are not to be cut off but on the other hand they’re not to be delivered either. If you follow me. There should be in the next few days technical delays. There should be no formal announcement of a cutoff. We’ll never get it started again.
I: Well this was—they told us that they had already held u p . . .
K: It doesn’t make a G. D. difference Bob. You’re in charge of this operation until I get back. You just tell them what I agreed with Schlesinger.
I: Ok. You talked to Jim recently.
K: I just talked to him 5 minutes ago\(^3\) and he said it’s a misunderstanding but if it’s a misunderstanding you’d better make clear it doesn’t happen.
I: I’ll do that right away.
K: Has Hartman talked to the Turks.
I: And right after that he was going over to see Schlesinger.
K: I know. And he did and Schlesinger was not quite as tough as I would have wanted him but he was at least consistent with us. Did we tell him we’d have to cut off aid if there were no ceasefire.
I: I just heard the message described to me and he didn’t put that in there. I don’t know why.
K: Who, Schlesinger?

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\(^1\) Source: Library of Congress, Manuscript Division, Kissinger Papers, Box 384, Telephone Conversations, Chronological File. No classification marking. Kissinger was in San Clemente; Ingersoll was in Washington.

\(^2\) See Document 105.

\(^3\) No record of this conversation has been found.
I: No, Hartman. But we gave that to Joe and put it in a cable to him as well.4

K: What do you mean Hartman didn’t put it in there.

I: I just had read to me a memo on his conversations with the Turkish Ambassador5 and he didn’t say it. At least it’s not reported.

K: Well, it’s going to be a lonely department when I get back. You called the Turkish Ambassador. You get Hartman to call the Turkish Ambassador and you tell Hartman that the next time he doesn’t carry out instructions I want his resignation. I do not accept the principle that Assistant Secretaries have a judgment when they’re given an order.

I: Well, there may be . . .

K: There could be no misunderstanding. He was on the G. D. phone with me.

I: That’s what I thought. I don’t know that he didn’t say. I just heard the message read to me and it didn’t have it in it and I questioned it just before you came on the line.

K: There is no sense you doing it. Tell Hartman to call back the Turkish Ambassador. Tell him he did not make himself clear. He wants it clearly understood that the proposal for a cease fire that Sisco is bringing has our total support and that it is his view that it will lead—that if we threaten it to Greece it will lead to a cut off with Turkey also and we want him to know that as a friend so that there will not be a surprise if things don’t go properly.

I: I’ll do that right away.

K: Now, it took me an hour and a half to get Sisco to deliver this in Athens, now do you suppose we could deliver it in Washington. We’ve spent 2 hours longer already than I ordered it so tell Hartman it’s safe. And I want a call in 5 minutes that its been done.

I: Fine.6

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4 See footnote 4, Document 105.
5 Not found.
6 Kissinger and Ingersoll spoke at 10:15 a.m. PDT. In response to Ingersoll telling Kissinger that Hartman had delivered the message, Kissinger said: "My instructions this morning which Scowcroft wrote down was to say: Hartman should express his personal opinion that having threatened aid cutoffs to Greece it would certainly come to Turkey if they did not accept a Sisco proposal. It was not to be an official U.S. government threat at that point. It was supposed to be Hartman’s personal opinion. I will bet my bottom dollar he didn’t do it that way.” (Library of Congress, Manuscript Division, Kissinger Papers, Box 384, Telephone Conversations, Chronological File)
K: Hello.
I: Henry. I’d like to have Bill Buffum outline to you what we have on the U.N. right now.
K: OK.
B: It has been proceeding at a very leisurely pace indeed Mr. Secretary. The Council has still not met at this 2:30 p.m.
K: It has not met.
B: It has not met. They have been negotiating in the corridors all morning long on our resolution. The Russians have been dragging their feet throughout the day trying to get everything they can from yesterday’s text added to our text. And of course we’ve been stonewalling them.

K: Yes. Are the British and French with us?
B: They are generally although the French have been willing to accept the paragraph which would call for the withdrawal of all foreign military forces in excess of those envisaged in international agreement on the grounds that this now includes all excess Turks as well as Greeks. In other words those who landed yesterday.
K: Well that might not be a bad—except the Turks won’t like that.
B: No. Neither the Turks nor Greeks will like that. I said provisionally I did not think that accorded with your understanding with the French Foreign Minister and they are seeking further guidance from you.
K: Well I don’t think the French Foreign Minister ever expressed himself to me on that.
B: That is not covered of course in the agreement of the points to be put to the 9.
K: That is correct.
B: So I thought that went beyond what you had agreed. And what we are trying to do at the moment is get the Council President to announce as a simple consensus of opinion a common desire that there

1 Source: Library of Congress, Manuscript Division, Kissinger Papers, Box 384, Telephone Conversations, Chronological File. No classification marking. Kissinger was in San Clemente; Ingersoll and Buffum were in Washington.
should be a cease fire and negotiations among the parties. It is possible but not certain that the Peruvian President will do this. If he does not then our best choice I believe is to accept this modified draft as the French have worked it out.

K: I agree. That is such a shocking sentence for me to say to my friends.

B: Well, we’ve held the hard line until we heard from you.

K: No, I agree. If we have to do it that way but make sure we’ve got the British and French with us when it happens.

B: Oh, they will definitely be with us. They are dragging us at this point.

K: OK. Well, that’s not a bad position to be in.

B: Alright. Henry, Larry² just said you want a WSAG at 9:00 in the morning. We have our group here when you get in at 9:00 tonight.

K: Is that when I’m getting in?

B: That’s what he said.

K: Well, I’m leaving here at 2:00. Let’s just meet at the Department a half an hour after I arrive whenever that is.

B: You probably won’t be here before 10 or 10:30.

K: That’s what I would guess but can we work that out—I haven’t worked it out.

B: I’ll work it out with Larry.

K: OK now. Have we any idea what Sisco said to these guys.³

I: I’ve not seen a wire in yet and he wouldn’t tell me over the phone.

K: Well, I’ve never been wrong about Sisco yet and if he didn’t tell you he didn’t carry out his instructions.

B: He said he was sending a report very shortly thereafter but we haven’t received yet.

K: But the point is it would have been easy enough for him to say that he carried out the instructions.

I: I gathered that impression but he didn’t say so in any exact words.

K: What, that he carried out the instructions? We’ll give him a decoration.

I: We haven’t received his cable. How was the press briefing?⁴

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² Reference is to Lawrence Eagleburger, Executive Assistant to the Secretary.
³ See Document 104.
⁴ Kissinger held a background press briefing from 10:21 to 11:02 a.m. outlining the developments in the current crisis. (Text of Background Briefing; Library of Congress, Manuscript Division, Kissinger Papers, Box 122, Geopolitical File, Cyprus)
K: I kept it very, very low key and my major concern was to give the impression that we knew what we were doing. The questions were very friendly. You know they are lethargic out here.

B: The questions are friendlier in California than they are in Washington.

K: Yes and the group out here hasn’t been on top of all this excitement. You get the text. I did tell them that that airborne battalion in Europe has been alerted because I didn’t want them to find it out afterwards. But I made it very clear we are in no posture of confrontation with the Soviet Union. We are working cooperatively with them and so forth.

I: What one is this?

K: Well, that G.D. General Goodpath that just went ahead and alerted for 509th Air Force without telling anybody. And I didn’t want it to come out of Europe because if I did not say it and it hit suddenly it would sound as if something new had happened. So I listed it. I said it is a normal precaution, there is no alert, there is no confrontation and so forth.

I: Alright. We’ll make it all available back here.

K: They can use my name but not quotation.

B: Henry. I was not able to reach Fulbright but I talked to Mrs. Fulbright and I gave her pretty much the story and she’s going to get to him sometime this afternoon.

K: OK. Did you call Mansfield.

I: I spoke to Mansfield. He was very pleased that we gave him a briefing. He didn’t disagree with anything we’re seeking to do. In fact he said it seemed to be the right thing to do.

B: I got the same reaction from John Rhodes. I got him over.

K: Somebody should call Albert.

I: I’ve tried and we can’t get him. I am trying to reach Morgan in Pennsylvania.

K: Good. Many thanks. I’ll see you all tonight. I’ll give you a call just before I leave.
San Clemente, July 20, 1974, 1:15 p.m. PDT.

N: Well, Henry, how do you think the briefing went? Well?
K: I think it did. I calmed them down. The situation is now the Greeks have accepted our proposal. The Turks have received our proposal. We were brutal with them. They are having a meeting. They are playing it down, stalling. To get as much established as possible. They will have to decide by midnight this time. The proposals are placed for a ceasefire and the Turks to go into enclaves that they have there and the Turks are gaining a strong bargaining power. Their National Guard has been effectively defeated.

N: Are there many casualties?
K: There hasn’t been much fighting.
N: The Cypriots don’t fight much.
K: The Turks fight well. They are tough. If the Greeks don’t go to war in the a.m., I think we are all right.
N: I would think they won’t in view of what you say they said.
K: They are waiting for the answer and they may get antsy. [1 line not declassified] We are playing the hard line and are in step with all our allies.
N: If the Greeks did go to war, then I would come back to Washington.
K: And we would cut off all aid
N: That would stop the war.
K: They can’t fight long then.
N: That is the lever and we will use it if we have to.
K: I will call you immediately of further developments.
Joseph Sisco held more meetings in Ankara and Athens on July 21, 1974. According to notes, which summarized those meetings:

“The early morning of July 21 Sisco called Bayulken and in strongest language told him that Turkish failure to meet Sisco was forcing us to conclude that Turkey not interested in continuing its close relationship with U.S. Bayulken immediately called back and said meeting at Foreign Ministry scheduled for 8:15.

“During meeting with Turkish Foreign Minister, he gave Sisco piece of paper in which Ecevit accepted, subject to USG assurance of Greek acceptance, standstill ceasefire as provided in SC resolution. Foreign Minister also promised Turkish rep would be sent to London provided ceasefire in effect. He also raised issue of phantom Greek fleet and said it must be stopped. Sisco agreed to take Turkey’s proposal to Athens.

“Sisco met with Greek Prime Minister and Acting Foreign Minister on July 21 and was informed that the GOG accepts ceasefire as provided for in SC resolution effective 3:00 p.m. Cyprus time. During same meeting, Prime Minister told Sisco that there will be change of government within next 24 hours. For this reason the Greek Government at that time could not take decision to go to London for talks on the following Tuesday.

“During following meeting with Greek Prime Minister and Foreign Minister, PM agreed to present new Turkish idea on ceasefire to top-level Greek leaders. During the meeting, Greeks complained vociferously about Turkish duplicity and broken promises on ceasefire. Sisco showed PM hand-written copy of Ecevit ceasefire proposal. Sisco also added that if GOG wanted U.S. presence at proposed meeting between Greek and Turkish representatives, we would be there.” (National Archives, RG 59, Records of Joseph Sisco, 1951–1976, Entry 5405, Box 21, Cyprus 1974–75)

Sisco reported more fully on his meetings in telegrams 5750 and 5753 from Ankara and 4746 from Athens, all dated July 21. (Ibid., Central Foreign Policy Files, 1974)

UN Security Council Resolution 353 passed 15–0 on July 20. The resolution called upon all states to recognize the sovereignty of Cyprus, cease all firing and foreign military intervention, exercise restraint and cooperate with the UNFICYP. It also called upon Greece, Turkey, and the United Kingdom to negotiate a peaceful solution to Cyprus. (Yearbook of the United Nations, 1974, page 291)
110. Minutes of Meeting of the Washington Special Actions Group


SUBJECT
Cyprus

PARTICIPANTS
Chairman—Henry A. Kissinger
State
Robert Ingersoll
Robert McCloskey
John Day
Arthur Hartman
Helmut Sonnenfeldt
Defense
Amos Jordan
Harry Bergold
Denis McAuliffe
James Schlesinger
JCS
Gen. George Brown
LTG John Pauly
CIA
William Colby
George Lauder
NSC
Richard Kennedy
Harold Saunders
Rosemary Niehuss
David Ransom
James Barnum

SUMMARY OF CONCLUSIONS

It was agreed that:

—the WSAG Working Group would prepare a paper outlining U.S. options in negotiations, the balance of forces picture on the island in the event of a ceasefire, and the political balance on Cyprus following a ceasefire;

1 Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Institutional Files (H-Files), Box H-097, Meeting Files, WSAG Meetings. Top Secret; Codeword. The meeting took place in the Situation Room of the White House.

2 A paper outlining negotiating options is printed as an attachment to Document 112. Papers on the balance of forces and the political balance on Cyprus, both dated July 22, are in Library of Congress, Manuscript Division, Kissinger Papers, Box 123, Geopolitical File, Cyprus, Chronological File.
that the FBIS station on the northern coast of Cyprus be evac-
uated, with Greek and Turkish permission.

Mr. Colby briefed from the attached text.3

Secretary Kissinger: Who is doing the fighting, the National
Guard? (referring to heavy fighting near Karavas).

Mr. Colby: Yes, the National Guard. (continued to brief)

Secretary Kissinger: The whole town of Nicosia? [1 line not
declassified]

Mr. Colby: It’s hard to tell at this point. [1½ lines not
declassified]

Secretary Kissinger: What is he saying? (referring to a late report
that General Secretary Brezhnev was giving a report on the Cyprus sit-
uation over the radio).

Mr. Ingersoll: It’s still coming in, but as far as we can tell now, he
is not saying anything new.

Mr. Colby continued to brief.

Secretary Kissinger: What message? (referring to Mr. Sisco’s
message).

Mr. Colby: The one Joe (Mr. Sisco) is sending back regarding the
Turks ignoring the resolution to cease fire.4

Secretary Schlesinger: They should have withdrawn by now. What
was the latest time they were to withdraw?

Mr. Colby: They have ignored them all. The first was 9:00 a.m. our
time. I think that was pushed up to 11:00 a.m.

Secretary Kissinger: Did we send that message to the President?
(Ecevit).5

Mr. Ingersoll: Yes.

Secretary Kissinger: Well, there won’t be a ceasefire until we hear
from Ecevit.

Secretary Schlesinger: The ceasefire has been extended until noon?
Secretary Kissinger: I don’t know what time—there is no fixed
time.

George (Gen. Brown), would you like to add . . .

Gen. Brown: Just the NATO withdrawal . . .

3 Attached but not printed.
4 An apparent reference to telegram 5755 from Ankara, July 21. (National Archives,
Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 1312, NSC Secretariat, Richard M. Nixon
Cables/Contingency Plans, Cyprus and Greek-Turkish Contingency Plans, 1974)
5 The President’s message to Turkish President Koruturk was sent in telegram
158084 to Ankara on July 21. (Ibid.)
Secretary Kissinger: What’s the story in the Washington Post article this morning that we have cut off all military aid to Greece? Who leaked that?

Secretary Schlesinger: I can assure you that it did not come out of the Defense Department. Getler (the author) told Friedheim that he got the story straight out of the State Department.

Secretary Kissinger: Nothing would surprise me more than it was not leaked out of State!

Secretary Schlesinger: Getler claimed he was handed the story on a silver platter by the Department of State. The real story is that we have not held up on all military aid to Greece. The A–7 contracts are continuing, the F–4s are being held up at Rota (Spain), however. What is of more concern to me is the possibilities of more seizures (referring to the Greek seizure of three ammunition barges on Friday).6

Secretary Kissinger: They did? I didn’t know that.

Secretary Schlesinger: Yes, they seized three of our ammunition barges.

Secretary Kissinger: Well, the real situation is that we are not sending in any heavy equipment. We’ll blame it on administrative delays or something like that. The problem when you cut off that stuff, however, is that it is so hard to get it started again. If pressed, we’ll say that there are some delays because we are assessing the situation. If we say that the supply of military goods to Greece has broken down, we’ll have one hell of a time getting them resumed (Congress). Moreover, we’ll have to pay one hell of a price.

On the diplomatic side, I have talked at least five times with Ecevit since last night.7 All I could really get out of it was that they are totally confused. If their generals are as bad as their leaders, what can their captains and majors be like! Anyway, our efforts are aimed at getting a ceasefire. The Turks, by the way, were talking about a Greek armada off the coast of Cyprus somewhere. Do we know what they are talking about?

Gen. Brown: I think it was the one sighted off the southern coast. The problem is that it is within 25 miles of the coastline, and there are so many different types of ships in that area that we are having trouble identifying them.

Mr. Colby: They’re off Paphos.

Secretary Kissinger: Can the Greeks land on that end of the island?

Mr. Colby: Yes, it’s a safe area. They could at least introduce troops there.

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6 July 19.

7 No transcripts of these conversations have been found.
Secretary Kissinger: I’ll call Ecevit after this meeting. I think they are just stalling for time. I have real trouble assessing his motives and thinking. It’s my guess that they (the Turks) will accept a ceasefire by the end of the day. According to Callaghan, the Greeks have agreed to negotiations, in Vienna. I think Vienna is a mistake, I’d rather see them held in London where Callaghan can keep prodding them. Callaghan is now going to ask the Turks to send someone to Vienna. Sisco says they are in no position at the moment to do so. Our major effort now is to achieve a ceasefire; the talks can get started any time. If the Turks hold—what is the state of play on the island now?

Mr. Colby: Well, it’s unclear, but they do have a foothold.

Secretary Kissinger: It seems to me they haven’t done as well militarily as they have politically.

Mr. Colby: You’re right, they haven’t done very well militarily.

Secretary Kissinger: They didn’t go after Famagusta as we thought they would.

Mr. Colby: No, they put out some stories that they were going to take it, but apparently only for psychological purposes.

Secretary Kissinger: Then the Greeks are fighting better than we thought they would.

Mr. Colby: Yes, they are doing well.

Amb. McCloskey: What is their strength on the island?

Mr. Colby: About 9,000 National Guard troops, and plus 30,000 Reserves. The Turks have about 6,000.

Secretary Kissinger: Are the Greeks reinforcing?

Mr. Colby: Yes, today.

Secretary Kissinger: As I look at it, we have two problems. One is getting a ceasefire. Without one, we are impotent. The Greeks are also in no position to do much. And two, what our stance should be in the negotiations. What is your judgement as to the internal situation in Cyprus following a ceasefire? Anybody heard from Sampson?

Mr. Colby: We’ve heard nothing from him. The National Guard is running most of the operations. What we’ve heard is that the various Turkish communities are doing most of the fighting.

Secretary Kissinger: What will this mean for the negotiations?

Mr. Colby: Well, it will leave them less to negotiate with.

Secretary Kissinger: I’m trying to understand what the balance of forces would be when negotiations start so that we can chart a course.

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8 See Document 111.
Mr. Colby: If there is a ceasefire, it would seem to me that the Turkish effort failed. They wanted to seize a substantial area—more than they have now—and they have failed.

(Secretary Kissinger was handed a note)

Secretary Kissinger: Oh, this is what Ecevit has already told me—that there is to be a meeting of their NSC at 4:00 p.m. and a cabinet meeting at 6:00 p.m. The Greeks are complaining of heavy bombing in Nicosia. Anything could happen now. I could call Ecevit and tell him that if there is no ceasefire and there is war, this would severely jeopardize our relations.

Secretary Schlesinger: Well, you have to have a ceasefire before you can talk about a breakdown in a ceasefire.

Mr. Colby: It’s our understanding that the bombing in Nicosia has died down.

Secretary Kissinger: Well, let me talk to Sisco and see if he can set them straight.

Secretary Schlesinger: We have two related questions regarding NATO [*less than 1 line not declassified*] we would like to discuss.

(Secretary Kissinger left to take a call from Mr. Sisco at 9:56 a.m., returned at 10:00 a.m.)

Secretary Kissinger: What is the probability of having to evacuate U.S. citizens?

Mr. Ingersoll: The only possibility of getting them out is through the British Sovereign Base Area, isn’t it?

Gen. Brown: No, we can lift them out by helicopters.

Mr. Ingersoll: (Amb.) Davies is already starting to evacuate... Secretary Kissinger: Damnit! Davies is taking orders from here. I will not have an Ambassador, I don’t care who it is, making these decisions without clearing it through here. This is an interdepartmental matter and the decisions are to be made here.

Mr. Ingersoll: No, the cable, I believe, is asking for approval to evacuate.¹⁰

Secretary Kissinger: Nevertheless, I will not have an Ambassador making these decisions unilaterally.

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⁹ A transcript of the conversation is in the Library of Congress, Manuscript Division, Kissinger Papers, Box 384, Telephone Conversations, Chronological File.

¹⁰ Telegram 1591 from Nicosia, July 21. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy Files, 1974)
Sisco says that if we get no action from the Turks we will have to leave NATO. I’ll put in a call to Ecevit—it will give us some time in Athens. Seems to me that Ecevit is not doing well militarily. They are doing lousy militarily. We’ve got two governments in and outside the country. Under these conditions we may have to turn to Makarios. I’m not sure we have any alternative now. What is going to be the balance of forces if we get a ceasefire?

Mr. Colby: The National Guard is doing quite well, they have some 40,000 troops.

Secretary Schlesinger: I don’t think we can get an accurate picture of the balance of forces because the only thing we have is a ceasefire. They can bring in more troops under a ceasefire, reinforce here and there. That would change the whole picture.

Secretary Kissinger: It is against our interests to have the Greeks in there. A strong Turkish presence would be highly desirable. What went wrong, anyway?

Mr. Colby: They have turned out to be tough.

Mr. Ingersoll: How much ammo is on the island?

Mr. Colby: Lots of it. Every male over the age of 12 has a gun and lots of ammunition.

Amb. McCloskey: That’s right. Also, Sampson opened up all the caches.

Mr. Lauder: They have also received weapons from the Palestinians.

Secretary Kissinger: From Fatah?

Mr. Lauder: Yes.

Mr. Colby: All the Greeks on the island are cleaving together on this thing. They all act as one against the Turks.

Secretary Kissinger: Then once we have a ceasefire, we have a united populace.

Mr. Colby: At least for the moment. Some cracks will begin to show, primarily between the Makarios and Sampson forces.

Secretary Kissinger: Is the Clerides option still open?

Mr. Colby: That’s tough to say at this time.

Secretary Kissinger: Well, I think we ought to get a Working Group together today. Arthur (Mr. Hartman) would you take charge. You should look at what options we want in negotiations, look at the various political forces in the event of a ceasefire and what the political balance will be on the island.

Secretary Schlesinger: I’d like to bring up the issue that we only touched upon earlier. I think the larger question here is the future status of NATO. The actions we decide to take might militate against NATO, destroy it. Is that what we are prepared to do?
Secretary Kissinger: I think we have two separate questions here. If we have a peaceful solution today . . .

Secretary Schlesinger: The larger question is, is NATO going to survive in its present form? The other European countries have said that we have gone beyond the point of no return regarding Greece.

Secretary Kissinger: You want to kick the Greeks out of NATO?

Secretary Schlesinger: No, I am thinking more along the lines of some moves we might make to bring about a more sympathetic regime in Greece.

Secretary Kissinger: Well, there is a chance that will happen anyway.

Mr. Colby: If the Greeks leave NATO, it would be very hard to bring them back in later on.

Secretary Kissinger: No, what Jim is saying is, should we move to replace the current Greek government.

Secretary Schlesinger: That’s the question. I don’t have an answer. I’m not sure that the Greek Government could be shored up at this point.

Secretary Kissinger: Is it being shored up now?

Secretary Schlesinger: I don’t know.

Mr. Jordan: The fact that we have not turned off the military aid conveys the thought that we have not abandoned the regime.

Secretary Schlesinger: In fact, we are viewed throughout the world as supporting the Greek regime. The only point I want to make is that while we are looking at the political balance on Cyprus, we should also be looking at the larger question of how this would impact on NATO. [2 lines not declassified]

Secretary Kissinger: What kind of an arrangement do we have with them?

Secretary Schlesinger: We have a bilateral arrangement with the Greeks, allied with NATO. They are under a NATO umbrella. If we want to show our distaste of the Greek regime—I don’t know if we do or not—we could initiate actions [less than 1 line not declassified]. If a ceasefire does not occur, I think they may attack in Thrace. This is a regime, if I could say it in not too subtle terms, that is unsophisticated, irresponsible, that is growing increasingly desperate. [1½ lines not declassified]

Secretary Kissinger: [1½ lines not declassified]

Secretary Schlesinger: [less than 1 line not declassified] This homeporting business, by the way, is going down the drain. We have put Phase 2 in cold storage, and there is a question whether we will proceed with Phase 1. This is just one element we could use against the Greeks.
Secretary Kissinger: But what would we accomplish? What would happen a year from now?
Secretary Schlesinger: Well, I think we have to take each issue separately. Home-porting as far as we are concerned is OBE. Irrespective of the Cyprus situation, we don’t want to proceed with home-porting.
Secretary Kissinger: [1 line not declassified]
Secretary Schlesinger: [3½ lines not declassified]
Secretary Kissinger: [3½ lines not declassified]
Secretary Schlesinger: [1½ lines not declassified]
Mr. Sonnenfeldt: [1½ lines not declassified]
Secretary Schlesinger: [1 line not declassified]
Mr. Sonnenfeldt: [1 line not declassified]
Gen. Brown: [less than 1 line not declassified]
Mr. Jordan: [1½ lines not declassified]
Secretary Schlesinger: [2½ lines not declassified]
Amb. McCloskey: [1 line not declassified]
Secretary Kissinger: [1½ lines not declassified]
Secretary Schlesinger: [2 lines not declassified]
Secretary Kissinger: [2 lines not declassified]
Secretary Schlesinger: That’s quite possible. The Russians are doing so well at the moment anyway.
Secretary Kissinger: How are they doing so well?
Secretary Schlesinger: Well, NATO is not in such great shape.
Amb. McCloskey: It seems to me the Russians are more perplexed about this situation than NATO.
Secretary Kissinger: Well, we can’t settle the NATO problem today. Cyprus is our problem today. I don’t like overthrowing governments. I’m not sure the Greek government will last out the week, anyway. It seems to me there is no way it will survive.
Mr. Colby: The succession could come from the lower echelons—the generals first, then the majors and colonels.
Amb. McCloskey: How about Karamanlis?
Mr. Colby: He’s not around. The King, as you know, has already made some moves. He would probably command more popular support than anybody else.
Secretary Kissinger: That’s dangerous business in the middle of a war. I’ll talk to the President about it. Anything operationally we need to do today? Any views on evacuees?
Gen. Brown: I don’t know about the British capability to take care of those 350 people they have.
Mr. Colby: I’d like to take that batch out of the north coast.
Secretary Kissinger: Who's that?

Mr. Colby: The FBIS Station there. There are 12 Americans and their families plus some civilians.

Secretary Kissinger: We'll have to have both country's permission, won't we to get the helicopters in?

Mr. Colby: Yes.

Secretary Kissinger: I think we should get them out, by all means. Ask for permission to get them out.

Mr. Ingersoll: How about the Greek Cypriots there. Do you need permission for them?

Gen. Brown: I'd like to have both sides know we are coming to take them out.

(Secretary Kissinger left the meeting at 10:29 a.m. to take a call from the President and Foreign Minister Callaghan. He returned at 11:33 a.m.)

Secretary Kissinger: Okay, I've just talked to San Clemente and with Callaghan. Our analysis is not correct—that we have the support of the EC–9. Callaghan filled me in on what is being done. Our total support at this point is one—Britain.

Secondly, Callaghan has a report, who he describes as an excellent source, that there will be a Greek coup tomorrow and that the group that is to replace the present regime is infinitely worse and that it leans strongly to the Soviet Union. He has appealed to me to try to bring about a ceasefire today and he will try to get the talks started. If there is no objection, I will call Ecevit [I line not declassified]. I want you all to consider very carefully what we are doing here. I would propose to call Ecevit and insist on a ceasefire. Callaghan and Sisco are going to insist on talks—in Vienna. We don't have any other choice. Are there no objections?

Secretary Schlesinger: No. [I line not declassified]

Secretary Kissinger: [less than 1 line not declassified]

Mr. Colby: You've got to give Ecevit something.

Secretary Kissinger: Why?

Mr. Colby: We put him in an untenable position. We have to give him something he can take back to his generals.

11 According to telephone transcripts, Kissinger spoke with Ecevit at 10:40 a.m., Haig at 10:50 a.m., Callaghan at 11:15 a.m., and Haig at 11:20 a.m. (Library of Congress, Manuscript Division, Kissinger Papers, Box 384, Telephone Conversations, Chronological File) No record of a conversation with Nixon, who was in San Clemente, was found.
Secretary Kissinger: Our policy is to get rid of Sampson. What replaces him is no concern to us. The only issue is whether Makarios or Clerides or somebody else comes in.

Secretary Schlesinger: [2 lines not declassified]

Secretary Kissinger: [1 line not declassified]

Secretary Schlesinger: [3 lines not declassified]

Secretary Kissinger: I think this is as far as we can go today. We will keep you all informed on developments.

Gen. Brown: In our discussion on evacuation, should we prepare to move the task force closer into Cyprus?

Secretary Schlesinger: You’d have to move into the probable zone, no?


Secretary Schlesinger: I suggest we delay the question of evacuation until we see about the ceasefire. If we have a ceasefire, the whole problem disappears. We’ll have a clearer picture of that later today.

Secretary Kissinger: Evacuation is not one of my obsessions. [1 line not declassified] If need be, just discuss what is being done on the ceasefire.

111. Transcript of Telephone Conversation Between Secretary of State Kissinger and Turkish Prime Minister Ecevit

July 21, 1974, 11:26 a.m.

E: Hello. We have reached this decision. Of course, we all accept the terms for a ceasefire once the Council has decided it and we want it to materialize. We are ready at the earliest possible time tomorrow to discuss the minimum conditions of ceasefire after all that has happened anywhere in all the countries concerned. It can be in _____ or anywhere in Switzerland so that we don’t lose time travelling. And we will authorize our representative to declare for us the time of ceasefire for anytime tomorrow once the minimum conditions for ceasefire, for the supervision of ceasefire is complete. Would that be all right?

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1 Source: Library of Congress, Manuscript Division, Kissinger Papers, Box 384, Telephone Conversations, Chronological File. No classification marking. Kissinger was in Washington; Ecevit was in Ankara. All omissions are in the original.
K: I am afraid not, Mr. Prime Minister. I have to point out to you a number of developments. First, we have information and the British have also that there may be a coup in Greece tomorrow.

E: A which . . .

K: A coup in Greece which will bring in a group which is going to be even more difficult and which will move towards the Soviet Union.

E: Yes.

K: And I do not believe that this can be in the Turkish interest.

E: I see.

K: And this is the information I received from Foreign Minister Callaghan so it is not something I am telling you to make a point. He called me right now.

E: Even if that happens. If it is going to happen tomorrow, we will encounter the same difficulties tomorrow wouldn’t we?

K: Secondly . . .

E: I mean this strengthens my arguments. You see, we will be ______ the ceasefire today—sometime this evening. Tomorrow as you say there will be a change of regime—a coup in Greece so obviously the new rulers will say we are not committed to this arrangement.

K: Well, in that case—of course then you can start again if you want to.

E: This is a very new development and I’ll . . .

K: And the second consideration that I must put before you is that if the threat of war between Greece and Turkey isn’t ended, we will have to ask you to let us [1 line not declassified].

E: Yes.

K: And we will have to do the same in—on the other side and [less than 1 line not declassified] it will have profound consequences.

E: I see. Well, that is very important. Our Chief of General Staff is here. I’ll speak with him. We will leave the other subjects and then telephone you say within a half an hour.3

K: Good. Thank you.

2 See footnote 12, Document 110.
3 Kissinger and Ecevit spoke at 1:25 p.m. (Transcript of telephone conversation; Library of Congress, Manuscript Division, Kissinger Papers, Box 384, Telephone Conversations, Chronological File)
Briefing Memorandum From the Assistant Secretary of State for European Affairs (Hartman) to Secretary of State Kissinger


CYPRUS TASK FORCE

Effective today the Cyprus Working Group has been formally constituted into a Task Force under my chairmanship with Wells Stabler as deputy chairman and C. William Kontos as director. The Task Force will serve as the coordinating body for all Departmental activity relating to the Cyprus crisis.

There has also been established in the Task Force a special Cyprus Planning Group to prepare the Political and Military Intelligence Reports, the Situation Reports and analytical and policy papers for your consideration. The first such paper is attached. The chairman of this group is John G. Day (EUR/SE), and his deputies will be Philip Stoddard (INR) and Thomas Simons (S/P).

Attachment

Paper No. 1
Cyprus: Issues and Options

I. The Situation

—The Turks will probably insist on consolidating their position on the island so they will have a realistic basis for partition or at least negotiation. If their position creates a de facto partition, they will also have strengthened their hand for negotiating some other settlement.

—If the Turks insist on continuing the fighting to consolidate their position, the Greeks will probably attack Turkey across the Evros River in Thrace. In that case the Turks would probably respond with action against Greek Aegean islands. Neither side is likely to make major gains in Thrace, where the Greek geographic advantage balances the Turkish numerical advantage, but the Turks would make gains on the Ionian islands.

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2 Secret; Exdis. Drafted by Thomas Simons (S/P) and Philip Stoddard (INR/DDR/RNA). A note at the end of the paper indicates that it reflected discussion in an interagency group that included representatives of OSD/ISA, JCS, CIA, NSC, and S/P.
The purpose of this paper is to describe those options beyond the steps that would be taken for evacuation of Americans and protection of US facilities only (but including these steps where they could also constitute a modest show of US force).

II. Issues

The one longer-term issue that has to be considered now in judging the options is whether the US interest is served by Turkey’s consolidating its military position on Cyprus in such a way as to create a de facto partition which would put the Turks in a position to negotiate for formal partition or some other constitutional arrangement.

It should be noted that Turkish military occupation of the island’s northeastern third does not of itself constitute a viable partition solution (although it may lay the basis for one) due to the leopard-spot character of Greek and Turkish settlement. Additional and more complex arrangements, probably including exchange of populations, will be required if a stable solution is to be achieved. Various possibilities are described in the annex to this paper.

The present situation could lead in one of two directions:

—Double enosis is the more likely: it is a long-standing Turkish goal; once on Cyprus in force the mainland Turks are unlikely to withdraw and permit any other solution. At the same time, double enosis would mean NATO-ization of Cyprus and, coming on top of recent Soviet losses in the Mideast, would raise the issue of Soviet responses in its most acute form.

—Substantial return to the 1960 constitutional arrangements is also a possibility: it would defuse adverse international reaction to Turkish military intervention, would preserve Cypriot independence, and would thereby be more acceptable to the Soviets. At the same time, it is a potentially less stable solution than double enosis, and would make the return of Makarios as a hostage of the left more likely.

Combinations are conceivable, e.g., de facto double enosis which maintains formal independence, or formal double enosis with assurances or guarantees against changes in Cyprus’ military status.

III. Options

It is assumed that efforts to end the fighting on Cyprus and to prevent Greek-Turkish fighting will continue. The question is what steps we might want to take if the fighting on Cyprus continues and Greek-Turkish hostilities begin.

A. Military moves in support of political goals

1. Cut off military aid to one or both parties. We have already warned that we will not permit them to fight each other with an open supply line to the US, and we have taken the appropriate internal steps to permit a military aid cut-off. In the early stages of hostilities, however, this
is essentially a political gesture: it is the easiest to take, and the least likely to have a concrete impact. If we wished to signal a tilt, we could cut off aid to one party only. In this context, withdrawal of MAAG missions might also be considered; however, it could endanger access to essential facilities without affecting hostilities. Withdrawal of MAAG chiefs only might be a harmless gesture.

2. A show of force through introduction of modest US forces. Modest forces could be landed either to protect American facilities (like the Embassy) or to evacuate Americans; if the latter, they could deploy either in the British SBA’s (assuming HMG concurrence) or outside. If their mission were to show force in addition to the force shown by deployment for evacuation, forces additional to the Marines, who will be fully occupied with evacuation duties, should be deployed. This move, too, would be essentially a gesture, since such forces would be too small to have an impact on hostilities.

The 1800 Marines on TF 61/62 should be in position to deploy on Cyprus at daybreak July 21, and the 211 men of the Airborne Rifle Company now at Vicenza could deploy in approximately 17 hours.

3. Imposition of a naval blockade around Cyprus. The purpose would be to prevent further sea reinforcement of Cyprus. We could either threaten to make this move unless the parties desisted or actually make it. To minimize the likelihood of firing at NATO Allies, we should consider seeking a NATO mandate for this move. It might well provoke Soviet counter-reinforcement, given past Soviet practice and the current low Soviet posture in the Eastern Mediterranean, and the Soviets, in the Black Sea, are closer than we are in great force.

The Sixth Fleet has sufficient forces in the Mediterranean at present to accomplish this mission, using all available escorts and P–3 aircraft and the Forrestal for support, and they could probably be deployed within three days. Since this action would not prevent aerial resupply and would preclude Sixth Fleet assets from carrying out other assigned missions, it would be highly undesirable.

4. Use of US forces to impose a ceasefire on Cyprus. Even more than for a naval blockade, a NATO mandate should be sought to minimize the prospect and impact of firing at Allies. Even in conjunction with UK forces aboard the Commando Carrier Hermes, this move is of questionable feasibility: the UK estimated before the crisis that 20,000 men would be needed to keep the peace on Cyprus, and given the confusion of the terrain, the forces on the ground, and the political situation, this is considered an under-estimate. Given its questionable feasibility and high political risk, this move is considered emphatically undesirable.

In addition to the men on TF 61/62 and at Vicenza (2,011 in 17 hours), forces available are: the rest of the Vincenza Airborne Battalion now in Germany (861 in 83 hours); two Mechanized Battalions in Ger-
many (about 2,000 in 154 hours/6 days); and the 82d Airborne Division at Fort Bragg (about 14,000 in 192 hours/7 1/2 days): total about 19,000 men in about a week.

5. Possible military moves toward Greece and Turkey. Such moves might have two purposes: to pressure Greece and Turkey to stop fighting and to counter threatening Soviet gestures. Moves to pressure Greece and Turkey might include US or US-encouraged NATO threats to withhold military supply following hostilities [2 lines not declassified]. Either move might jeopardize Greek and Turkish post-conflict ties with NATO, since the threat to withhold military supply might provoke recourse to non-NATO suppliers, [1 line not declassified]. Military moves in the area to counter threatening Soviet gestures (deployment of Soviet forces to Bulgaria, Soviet moves in the Straits, pressure on Romania to guarantee transit) are difficult to envisage, and the appropriate response might be outside the area; at the same time, threatening Soviet military gestures in the area are considered unlikely barring a quite protracted extensive Greek-Turkish conflict in Thrace.

B. Political-diplomatic moves

1. Support efforts to convene peace negotiations in London. We have already undertaken this move. The “London–Zurich framework” for such talks would tend to drive results toward “restoration of the 1960 arrangements” rather than double enosis.

2. Pursue a ceasefire in the UN. We have also embarked on this move. The UN has an interest in helping bring about the cessation of international conflict, and the Soviets would be assured of some voice in the process. However, the Soviet voice cuts both ways, since Turkish intervention makes double enosis more and a neutral Cyprus less likely, and a UN role may somewhat enhance Makarios’ claims. The UN context therefore also pushes results toward “restoration of the 1960 arrangements.”

3. Discourage third-country resupply. We have also taken steps in this direction. The problem becomes acute in case of protracted major conflict where the US has cut off military supplies to one or both parties, and one or both are tempted to seek arms elsewhere. Since both parties now have US arms, airlift and POL are the most likely candidates, and the Soviets the most likely potential suppliers.

4. Activate NATO. Cessation of a Greek-Turkish war is a natural goal for NATO. In this context, efforts by both the SYG and SACEUR, who should enjoy the confidence of the military on both sides, might be considered. Injection of the NATO (and European) presence might mitigate the weakening of NATO’s Southern Flank which will result from the war. On the other hand, the Soviets will be sensitive to a NATO role if it leads toward deneutralization of Cyprus.
C. Post-Ceasefire Moves

1. **Expand the role of UNFICYP.** All forms of this step would involve a role for the UN and the SYG, but it could take several forms: putting both Greek and Turkish forces in place on Cyprus under it, to encourage restraint; putting US forces on Cyprus under it (though this would be impossible without Soviet agreement or inclusion); putting increased UK and Turkish co-guarantor forces under it (though this would tilt toward restoration of 1960 arrangements). Where disengagement of forces and exchange of populations is sought, the UN would have a natural role; however, the Soviets would be expected to seek to block double enosis using the UN role.

2. **Disengagement in Thrace.** It would be advisable to exclude the UN from this purely NATO area, and to provide for a NATO role in negotiating and enforcing disengagement arrangements there.

3. **A Force Freeze on Cyprus.** The purpose of this move would be to prevent increase of forces present at the time of ceasefire. It could take many forms, from commitments by the parties through UNFICYP monitoring to blockade.

**IV. Key Criteria**

Identification of the following factors may help principals weigh the options.

1. **The Problem of the Soviet Response.** It is very difficult to predict the Soviet response in a given situation. The Soviets face a profound dilemma. They have no obvious direct way to achieve their goal of preventing denuclearization of Cyprus. However, three probabilities stand out:

   —The Soviets are likely to be less supportive of Turkey now that the Turks have intervened militarily. They are likely to oppose double enosis until it is a foregone conclusion; the extent of their support for Turkey is likely to depend of the extent of Turkish support for Cyprus independence.

   —The longer the war lasts, the more likely we are to have difficulty with the Soviets: as a force in the UN, as a military supplier, as a Mediterranean naval power.

   —Formal partition of the island between Greece and Turkey is the outcome most likely to stick in the Soviet craw, since it would NATO-ize the island, and this political and military loss would probably not be outweighed by the war-weakening of NATO’s Southern Flank. Presumably, an outcome which did not change Cyprus’ military status or its formal international status would be less unacceptable.

   The Soviets would probably be most hesitant to respond directly to a Greek-Turkish conflict. They have few means of doing so, and would be unlikely to do so unless extensive Thracian hostilities were prolonged. Direct Soviet responses would jeopardize the prospects for weaker Greek or Turkish ties with NATO and better ties with the USSR following the
conflict. The Soviets would be more likely to respond elsewhere—in East Europe (strengthening the Warsaw Pact), in Central Europe or the Middle East—and most likely to factor a deterioration of their Eastern Mediterranean position into their overall détente calculus. Even in these cases, however, they would face the prospect that such moves would strengthen NATO more than a Greek-Turkish war would weaken it.

Assuming protracted major Greek-Turkish hostilities and a direct Soviet show of force (e.g. moving troops into Bulgaria, pressing Romania to guarantee transit, moving large naval forces through the Straits), we would have to consider such responses as heightened alert status for our forces, moving naval forces ourselves, supporting Romania, a Western move in Central Europe, or cutting the Soviets into the Mediterranean action by joint endeavors to reestablish the peace.

In considering military options, we should recall that forces deployed in the Eastern Mediterranean for the options outlined are likely to be inadequate for most major counter-Soviet responses.

In considering political options, we should recall that an active NATO role would support eventual counter-Soviet responses as well as post-conflict Greek and Turkish ties to the West.

2. The NATO Southern Flank. Hostilities between Greece and Turkey will degrade the NATO Southern Flank, and it would be desirable in considering options to choose moves which permit reinforcement of their post-conflict ties to the Alliance to the maximum feasible extent. Rebuilding their relations with NATO Allies, re-equipping their forces, and reweaving the NATO fabric itself will be priority goals in the post-conflict period, and we should avoid moves which jeopardize them where we can. As examples, activating NATO and discouraging third-country supply should serve these goals, while threatening post-conflict arms cut-off would not.

3. Other US Facilities. We maintain myriad facilities for both NATO and non-NATO contingencies and uses in both countries, and should to the extent feasible avoid moves which could place them at risk in a post-conflict period. In general, the greater the direct US military intervention, the greater the risk to these facilities.

V. [less than 1 line not declassified]

[1 paragraph (13 lines) not declassified]

Annex

Alternative Cyprus Settlements

Three political outcomes are identified in decreasing order of likelihood: (1) double enosis; (2) independence based on a return to the
1960 agreements; and (3) an independent, federated Cyprus. The difference between double enosis and the other two is that only double enosis offers a clearcut long-term solution to the communal problem. The trouble with double enosis is the Soviet dimension.

1. Double enosis has long been the preferred Turkish solution, and once in control of a large chunk of Cyprus, the Turks cannot be expected to withdraw easily and permit any other solution.

Double enosis, however, raises a host of difficulties. Because of the intermingling of the Greek and Turkish Cypriot communities, and despite the ingathering process of the past decade, large numbers of Greek Cypriots would be left in the Turkish-controlled areas, and thousands of Turkish Cypriots would find themselves living under Athens’ authority. The border between the two zones would be a source of continuing friction, for popular feeling would run high, and especially so if the intercommunal fighting had been bloody. War damage and the economic dislocation of population shifts would generate requirements for extensive foreign aid to both areas. Finally, the London–Zurich agreements would have to be junked and replaced by complicated new arrangements between Greece and Turkey. There are precedents in the 1923 and 1930 agreements following the Greco-Turkish War of 1921–23, but post-intervention tensions would make this a difficult process.

Most importantly, perhaps, double enosis would raise the issue of the Soviet response to the NATO-ization of Cyprus in acute form. The Soviets have strongly opposed any kind of enosis for a decade and have consistently backed the independence of a unitary Cypriot state.

While Soviet displeasure could probably not block enosis, measures to deal with it could include:

1. [6 lines not declassified]
2. [5 lines not declassified]

Lessening the corrosive impact of population problems would probably require costly compensation for property left behind and possibly require a substantial augmentation of the UN presence to supervise the resettlement process and police the buffer zone that would be required between the two parts of the island. The Soviets could block the UN role in this process, but if Greece and Turkey had agreed on double enosis, UN involvement would be unnecessary.

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3 The 1923 Treaty of Lausanne replaced the 1920 Treaty of Sevres, which was part of the post-World War I Versailles settlement but was never implemented due to the outbreak of the Greco-Turkish War. On June 2, 1930, Turkey and Greece signed an agreement that attempted to settle remaining disputes after their exchange of populations.
2. Independence based on the London–Zurich Agreements.

The Turks might use their control of territory on Cyprus to demand a return to some or all of the arrangements affecting local autonomy agreed to in 1960 but not fully implemented even before the 1963 clashes. This demand would strengthen the Turkish line that their intervention was in strict accordance with the Treaty of Guarantee and was aimed solely at a return to constitutionalism. It would tend to defuse adverse international reaction to Turkish military intervention, and it should be more acceptable to the Soviets, as it would maintain Cyprus’ independence.

Drawbacks to this outcome include its inherent instability and the fundamental unworkability of the 1960 arrangements. An attempt to return to the London–Zurich agreements—a basic Turkish hope after “renouncing” partition—would push the Cyprus dispute back to the unstable conditions that obtained from 1963 to 1967. If the 1960 apparatus could not be made to work during happier times in the first two years after independence, how could the Turks force the clock back after their invasion of the island? Moreover, even if Makarios resigned as President and the Turks agreed to accept Clerides in his place, Clerides is not a strong figure who could be counted on to slake the Turkish thirst for the kind of state within a state that would emerge from implementing the 1960 accords. The instability of the island under Clerides might pave the way for Makarios as a returned hostage of a revised left.

3. An Independent, Federated Cyprus.

The key feature would be substantial local autonomy for the two communities. While less beneficial to the Turks than a return to the local autonomy provisions of the London–Zurich agreements, it would reflect the thrust of the Turkish position in six years of intermittent negotiations, as well as the federation proposals the Turks advanced early in 1965. There are many precedents for federal solutions to communal problems, and, applied to Cyprus, these models would be less extreme than double enosis and would sound more realistic than return to the unworkable 1960 accords. Federation would give the Turks the “top-to-bottom” autonomy on which they have insisted since the intercommunal talks began in 1968.

On the other hand, a federal framework for a state consisting of very disparate parts is no assurance against strife. If those disparate parts were related through a commonwealth arrangement to two other countries, the problem of workability would become especially acute. A federal solution might mitigate the conflict in Cyprus by combining elements from the 1960 accords and the modifications of these arrangements that have emerged from the intercommunal talks in recent years. Turkey might then be able to assure its Cypriot compatriots of more
meaningful protection. But, the tension between the Greek preference for unity and the Turkish desire for maximum communal autonomy would create a permanent prospect for communal strife. No matter what promises and guarantees the Turkish invaders managed to extract from the Greeks, both sides would attempt to bend a federal solution to their own desires. Thus federalism contains the same inherent instability as a return to the London–Zurich arrangements and would be no more workable over the long term. While far more acceptable to the Soviets than double enosis, neither federation nor a return to 1960 would meet the basic test of stable practicality.

113. Minutes of Meeting of the Washington Special Actions Group

Washington, July 22, 1974, 10:42–11:25 a.m.

SUBJECT
Cyprus

PARTICIPANTS
Chairman—Henry A. Kissinger
State
Robert Ingersoll
Robert McCloskey
Wells Stabler
John Day
Amb. William Buffum
Defense
Amos Jordan
Harry Bergold
M/Gen. Denis P. McAuliffe
JCS
Gen. George S. Brown
LTG John W. Pauly
CIA
LTG Vernon A. Walters
George Lauder

1 Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Institutional Files (H–Files), Box H–097, Meeting Files, WSAG Meetings. Top Secret; Sensitive. The meeting took place in the Situation Room of the White House.
Gen. Walters: Before I begin the briefing, I would like to comment on the DIA report you probably have seen about the reported coup in Greece.2

Secretary Kissinger: Yes, I have a copy.

Gen. Walters: [1 line not declassified] they say they have heard the rumor, but that they have no hard information—only rumor. [less than 1 line not declassified] there is absolutely nothing to confirm the rumors. I know this Davos, and he has made noises in the past about a coup. I doubt . . .

Secretary Kissinger: [less than 1 line not declassified]
Gen. Walters: [less than 1 line not declassified]
Secretary Kissinger: [2 lines not declassified]
Gen. Walters: [1½ lines not declassified]
Secretary Kissinger: [1½ lines not declassified]
Mr. Lauder: [1 line not declassified]
Gen. Walters: [less than 1 line not declassified]
(Gen. Walters began to brief from the attached text)3
Secretary Kissinger: Sisco also reports that a coup is underway, but he wants out of there, and he’ll report anything to do it! I think he is just looking for another reason to leave.

Gen. Walters continued to brief.
Mr. Stabler: Joe says he is leaving tonight.
Secretary Kissinger: I want Sisco to stay where he is and to check with me before he leaves. If that meeting begins in Geneva, I want him

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2 Attached but not printed.
3 Walters stated in the attached briefing that “both sides, having agreed to a ceasefire for 1000 Washington time today, appear to be making efforts to improve their position.”
to go. The U.S. has got to be represented there, and I want him to go. (to Mr. Stabler) Make it clear to Joe that he either goes to Geneva or comes home, but that he does neither until he hears from us.

Gen. Walters continued to brief.

Secretary Kissinger: How could the Greeks land aircraft at Nicosia airport?

Gen. Walters: How could the Turks not stop it? A transport making a landing is a very vulnerable target. (continued to brief)

Secretary Kissinger: How much of Nicosia do they (the Turks) control?

Gen. Walters: We’re not sure about that. Turkish paratroopers landed around the city, but we are not sure just how much of the town they hold. The main invasion came from the beachhead north of the city, up here, near Kyrenia (pointing to map). They have established somewhat of a corridor between the beachhead and the Turkish Quarter in Nicosia, but we are not sure just how much of the city they control at this point. (continued to brief)

Secretary Kissinger: What was the name of that castle again?

Gen. Walters: St. Hilarion. It’s at the pass in the mountains between Nicosia and Kyrenia. (continued to brief)

Secretary Kissinger: Yes, but there could be some individual executions going on, couldn’t there? I mean, individual executions would not as a normal rule get reported. (In reference to a statement in the briefing that there have been no mass executions reported.)

Gen. Walters: Oh, I’m sure that executions of individuals probably were going on, particularly in the Turkish Communities. But, we have nothing to substantiate the claim that mass executions are being carried out. There has been a lot of killing on the island, and I surely would not rule out individual killings, particularly in the Turkish Communities. (continued to brief)

Secretary Kissinger: How has NATO frustrated or thwarted Greek designs?

Gen. Walters: I really don’t know, but the Greeks seem to have this perception.

Secretary Kissinger: What exactly is the situation on the island? I’ve got to know that for my talks with Makarios this afternoon. Isn’t the Turkish position on the island weaker now than before?

Gen. Walters: Well . . .

Secretary Kissinger: Wait, before that, George (Gen. Brown) would you like to say something?

Gen. Brown: There are two things. One, the Turks have not made the headway they expected. They underestimated Greek resistance and overestimated Turkish support on the island. However, and this is the
second point, they can re-supply and they control the air. Over time this will make a great difference. They can greatly strengthen their forces on the beachhead, which is already strong. They have a line of communication to the sea.

Secretary Kissinger: If I have learned anything since coming to Washington it is that you have only two choices in using force: either you use strong force or none at all. If you are going to use force, it should be used massively. There are no awards for moderate use of force.

Gen. Brown: There are indications that they have taken your advice.

Secretary Kissinger: How’s that?

Gen. Brown: They attacked their own ships yesterday, apparently sunk a couple.

Secretary Kissinger: What’s that?

Gen. Brown: We’re not sure, somewhere off the southern coast.

Mr. Ingersoll: I think it was that group off Paphos.

Secretary Kissinger: Well, I have to know the situation on the island. I have to know it so that we can chart our course in the negotiations. It seems to me that the Turkish position is weaker now than before they invaded.

Gen. Walters: They have 5,000 more troops on the island . . .

Mr. Stabler: But that doesn’t put them in a stronger position.

Gen. Walters: Five-thousand more troops . . .

Secretary Kissinger: I’m just trying to understand the situation. What is the Turkish position. It seems to me you can have two interpretations: (1) the Turks gained strength by establishing a beachhead, or (b) lost strength when Greek Cypriots overwhelmed Turkish Communities. Which one is right?

Gen. Walters: Well, I think that 5,000 troop advantage that the Turks have will begin to show up in the coming weeks.

Secretary Kissinger: I want somebody to tell me what the situation is on the island so that I can tell Makarios.

Gen. Brown: I would tilt toward the former (above). I think the Turks will pour in enough stuff during the ceasefire to put them in a better arguing position.

Gen. Walters: I agree.

(Secretary Kissinger was handed a message)

Secretary Kissinger: The Russians have an urgent message coming in. (to Mr. Kennedy) Can I take it down here?

Mr. Kennedy: We’ll get it switched down here.

Gen. Walters: The Turkish Communities have all but been eliminated.
Secretary Kissinger: Where does this leave Makarios?
Gen. Walters: The Greeks don’t want Makarios.
Secretary Kissinger: The Turks don’t either.
Mr. Jordan: I’m not sure we know which way the balance has tipped and don’t know if we ever will.
Gen. Walters: If a ceasefire . . .
(Secretary Kissinger was called out of the room at 10:58 and returned at 11:01)
Secretary Kissinger: That was the message from the Russians. They have a ship that is going into Larnaca for evacuation purposes. They have some 150 personnel they want to take out. They have asked for our assistance, and have also appealed to the British. They are not letting anybody else know. I said that we would give them our maximum support. (to Mr. Stabler) Get in touch with (Ambassador) Davies and their Ambassador there and tell them we have agreed to give maximum assistance. I hope they get the ship out of there fast.
Gen. Brown: I think we ought to tell the 6th Fleet also.
Secretary Kissinger: Yes. (Gen. Pauly leaves meeting)
Gen. Walters: The Turks don’t want him (Makarios).
Secretary Kissinger: The National Guard is overwhelmingly against him—it’s an anti-Makarios force. After all, that’s the unit that overthrew him. As long as it has Greek officers in command, it has to be anti-Makarios. Can they get rid of Sampson? Anybody heard anything from him lately?
Gen. Walters: We’ve heard nothing from him. He’s given one or two talks on the radio, but other than that, nothing.
Mr. Day: Ioannides says that Sampson is expendable.
Secretary Kissinger: Yes, but Ioannides is not in Turkey. My question is, can Sampson rally independent support on the island or is this a question that has to be settled between the Greeks and the Turks? As far as we are concerned, he is expendable.
Gen. Walters: Yes, no question.
Amb. McCloskey: It’s a question if Athens and Ankara can agree on anything.
Secretary Kissinger: As I look at it, the balance of forces picture is this. The Turks have not followed up their gains on the beachhead, and they are doing even less well in the communities. It seems to me that

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4 Kissinger spoke with Vorontsov at 11 a.m. (Transcript of telephone conversation; Library of Congress, Manuscript Division, Kissinger Papers, Box 384, Telephone Conversations, Chronological File)
it is unlikely that the Turks will be able to overtake the Greek Cypriots, even in time.

Mr. Ingersoll: We can probably rely on the Turks to keep reinforcing.

Secretary Kissinger: It seems to me that if Makarios were to go back, he would have to look around for additional support, and to my way of thinking that means the East Bloc and left-wing Cypriots. Well, that’s okay, we’ll know what to do then, although it is a very complex problem. I want to make it clear that we are not disassociating ourselves from Makarios, but by the same token, we have no incentive to push him. We’ll wait to see what emerges from the negotiations.

Mr. Jordan: There is the possibility that the Turkish army might overthrow Ecevit.

Secretary Kissinger: I don’t know so. He’s a strange one. He really stalled on the ceasefire, gave me the weirdest collection of excuses I’ve ever heard. First of all was the business about the phantom “Greek Armada”. Secondly, he gave us this stuff about the Greek airplanes using Turkish callsigns, and thirdly he talked about announcing the principle of the ceasefire but leaving the details to be decided later. We finally gave an ultimatum. The British and the French agreed to support us with separate messages but, in the event, their communications arrived too late, after the decision. Neither the Greeks or the Turks trusted the other enough to announce their ceasefire first. So we had to announce it. First the Turks accepted, then the Greeks.

Now we’ll go into negotiations. There is a task force under Hartman working on our negotiating positions. We’re going to bring Sisco back, I don’t think he’ll go on another mission again soon. He did a great job under impossible conditions. We’ll send Buffum here as our representative to Geneva.

Mr. Stabler: I thought the Turks were opposed to Geneva—wanted Vienna. The Greeks want Geneva.

Secretary Kissinger: Well, wherever it is, the Turks will go anywhere now.

Mr. Stabler: The Greeks say they won’t go until Friday. 5

Secretary Kissinger: It doesn’t matter when they get started—a couple of days doesn’t matter. I think we’ve come out of this crisis in a good position. Soviet impotence to influence the outcome or support their friends was again recorded. It will be noted in the Arab

5 July 26.
World in my opinion. In the meantime, anything that emerges from the negotiations is better for the U.S. With the balance of forces we can steer the negotiations. Bill (Buffum) we don’t want to put up with any sentimentality on the part of the Greeks. Is there anything else we need to take up?

Gen. Brown: When this thing started, the aircraft carrier America was in Rota, Spain, due to rotate back on the 24th of July. We put a hold on her, as you know. I would propose that we keep holding her, but would also like to go to sea for scheduled training exercises.

Secretary Kissinger: Absolutely, no problem with that. Go ahead with the training, but let’s hold a decision on bringing the ship back to the U.S. By the way, we are going to talk to (UN Sec. Gen) Waldheim about increasing the UN force on the island to help keep the peace. What was the situation on the island before this thing started? Were the Turks all in enclaves?

Gen. Walters: Yes, as you can see by this map.

Secretary Kissinger: Were they all self-governing?

Gen. Walters: Not all of them were, but a number of them did have self-government.

Secretary Kissinger: The enclaves that were under Turkish control, did they lose them all?

Gen. Walters: Yes, almost all.

Secretary Kissinger: Why were the Turks so incompetent?

Gen. Walters: Well, I think that one-to-five ratio was a big factor. They (the Turks) couldn’t even take Nicosia airport.

Gen. Brown: I think history will show that they were rather inept in the whole operation. I think analysis will show that their whole situation was amateurish. Their air support was ineffective.

Secretary Kissinger: And they didn’t even get their paratroopers anywhere near their enclaves.

Gen. Walters: Well, those enclaves are small and it’s hard to drop them right on them.

Secretary Kissinger: But at least it would have kept the Greeks busy.

Gen. Brown: The whole operation at Famagusta was a debacle. There was no pre-planning or coordination, just a debacle.

Secretary Kissinger: How is it that they are so incompetent? Are they (the Turks) really that strong on the island then?

Gen. Walters: Well, I don’t know . . . Incidentally, can we get those FBIS people out of there?

Secretary Kissinger: They’re not out yet? I thought we said yesterday to take them out.
Gen. Brown: No, I think you said you wanted to wait until the ceasefire.

Secretary Kissinger: Of course, by all means, get them out.

Gen. Brown: That is going to take some doing.

Secretary Kissinger: Let’s get them out.

Mr. Ingersoll: I have another question. I think there has been a misunderstanding on the delay of military equipment to Greece and Turkey. The Department of Defense says a delay only to Greece.

Secretary Kissinger: I thought we were going to delay only certain types of items.

Mr. Jordan: Our understanding was that we were to hold up major items only to Greece and ascribe the delays to technical reasons.

Secretary Kissinger: Correct! Everything else keeps going! We don’t want the Greeks to think that they are being cut off. We want to keep the sympathy of Greek officials.

Amb. McCloskey: We’re not holding up major items to Turkey too.

Mr. Jordan: They are continuing to be moved. We’ve only asked the suppliers to check with us before moving them on.

Secretary Kissinger: What are the major items? What have we stopped?

Mr. Jordan read from list.

Secretary Kissinger: We’re holding the two F–4s in Rota and the A–7 contract. Everything else goes forward. Only the F–4s and A–7 contract is being held. It would be useful to give at least the visual appearance that the hardware is coming in.

Mr. Ingersoll: And no delay on the military equipment to Turkey?

Secretary Kissinger: What is going in?

Mr. Jordan read from the list.

Secretary Kissinger: I see no reason to delay anything to Turkey. In fact, there is every reason to get the stuff to Turkey.

Mr. Jordan: There is another F–4 at the factory in St. Louis. It’s supposed to go in a few days.

Secretary Kissinger: Move it to Rota. Then, if we have to, we can say there has been a technical delay. Now, what are you going to say at Defense about this military aid business?

Mr. Jordan: What we are saying is that this whole question of military supply is in the hands of State Department. If the suppliers ask what they should do, we’re saying that we are trying to straighten out the situation, that it is all messed up in bureaucratic paperwork. As far as the press, we’re referring them to State.

Secretary Kissinger: That Getler article did not come out of State. It came out of Defense. The President absolutely does not want a
cut-off of military aid to Greece. If need be, I’ll get a Presidential Di-
rective on that, but you shouldn’t need one. I want to make it clear that
we are not to withhold military aid to Greece. The F–4s can be held
up, and the A–7 contract.

Mr. Kennedy: You mean, don’t sign it.

Secretary Kissinger: When is it supposed to be signed?

Mr. Stabler: It has already been signed, but it will take some time
yet to finalize.

Secretary Kissinger: I do not want the Greek Government to feel
that we have contributed to their rape.

Gen. Brown: If we delay the A–7 contract, we may have to rene-
gotiate the cost. Since deliveries won’t take place for months and
months, I think we should go ahead.

Secretary Kissinger: Now, the Department of Defense’s position is
what? What are you going to say about military aid.

Mr. Jordan: That it has never been stopped.

Secretary Kissinger: Can we say that at the noon briefing?

Mr. Ingersoll: Yes.

Secretary Kissinger: Good. I don’t want a hassle with Congress on
when and why we resumed aid. I think this has been a well-coordi-
nated and well-run crisis. I want to congratulate you all. We may meet
again tomorrow or the day after.

114. Transcript of Telephone Conversation Between Secretary of
State Kissinger and British Foreign Minister Callaghan

July 22, 1974, 11:25 a.m.

K: You wouldn’t take my call. I rang you this morning, and you
wouldn’t take my call.

C: [laughs] Well, now, what’s the situation?

K: Well, our understanding is that there is a coup in Greece.

1 Source: Library of Congress, Manuscript Division, Kissinger Papers, Box 384, Tele-
phone Conversations, Chronological File. No classification marking. Kissinger was in
Washington; Callaghan was in London.

2 Brackets in the original.
C: Yes.
K: And Sisco thinks they won’t be ready to meet tomorrow.
C: Yes, I am told that this man Davos (?) is taking over. Is that right?
K: That’s right, and our reading is that he isn’t so bad.
C: Our what?
K: Our reading is that he may be more moderate.
C: Yeah, you know you’ve got a broken voice. I don’t think it’s just
the accent of yours. It’s that bloody machine you’ve got there.
K: Do you want me to call you back?
C: I think I can just make it out, Henry, if you go pretty slowly.
Did you say that—uh, what did you say last?
K: I said that my impression—our impression—is that this fellow
may not be so bad to work with.
C: Ah, right, I agree, but I am told he’s pretty anti-Turkish.
K: Umm.
C: However, I’ll put it off, and what do you suggest? Wednesday?³
K: I would put it til Thursday.
C: Well, is that letting it go a big long?
K: Well, then do it Wednesday if you want.
C: I think we’d better try for Wednesday, and we may have to set-
tle for Thursday.
K: Good.
C: Because the situation is such that you’ve got this man Samp-
son still there.
K: I agree.
C: And Ecevit was ringing me up and saying that genocide is go-
ing on and there’s no authority to deal with.
K: Now we are talking to Waldheim . . .
C: Yes.
K: . . . to increase the UN force.
C: Yes.
K: And we will strongly support it if you will.
C: Yes, we will certainly strongly support that, although we shall
probably have to supply some people.
K: That’s what I would think.

³ July 24.
C: Yes, well all right. Well I would try and get that through, and we would have to add some people to the UN force and let them operate under UN auspices.

K: Good.

C: But I think in those circumstances it is all the more important we try and make it Wednesday if we can.

K: Good. And I will bring Sisco home, and I will send Bill Buffum.

C: Bill who?

K: Buffum.

C: All right. Yes.

K: He’s a very stable and solid and unexcitable fellow.

C: Very good.

K: And he will have my thinking in very great detail.

C: Would he come to Geneva?

K: If you want him.

C: Well, I think we’d better have him in London first.

K: Ok.

C: And then he can come on from London to Geneva when we start the conference.

K: He will be in London on Wednesday.

C: On Wednesday.

K: Unless it slips.

C: Unless it slips, yes. All right. We’ll see him here first thing Wednesday morning then, Henry.

K: He’ll be there first thing Wednesday.

C: And then he can consult with us before we go. And we will try and make the conference Wednesday afternoon.

K: Wonderful.

C: See if you can make that stick with the Greeks and with the Turks, will you?

K: I’ll do my best.

C: Right, old man. Good.

K: And I’ve really enjoyed working with you on this.

C: I really have. I think we’ve managed this not too badly, don’t you?

K: I think it’s come out as a net asset.

C: Yes, I think it’s good too. We’ve got to get rid of this fellow Sampson quickly, you know?

K: Well, I told you, we’d support that.

C: Yes. That’s right. OK. Well, when we get your man over here, we’ll talk, and we’ll try and coordinate again.
K: Now, look, I’m seeing Makarios this afternoon.4
C: Yes.
K: And I’m going to play it rather cool.
C: Don’t be too cool.
K: No, I’ll play it loose.
C: You must recognize, he’s the legitimate President until any other arrangements are made.
K: That’s right. No, no, I’ll be very friendly, but I will be non-committal.
C: Yes, that’s all right. I tell you, we will have to move very delicately on that one, Henry.
K: I agree with you.
C: Yeah, because we’ve got this big . . . well, I’ve got a lot of information I’ll tell your chap _____ 5 on that. And I know all the difficulties, but I take it you want to appear to be isolated on this one, you know. If we move, we’ve got to move together.
K: No, no, we are not going to make a commitment, but we don’t want a final decision made.
C: No, no, all right. Well, we are going to inform him through our UN ambassador there. Righto, we are going to inform him of what is taking place, and we will notify Denktash, the Turkish leader, too, and Clerides.
K: Right. And we will stay loose on it and very friendly.
C: Yes, that’s right.
K: And we will send you a reporting cable.
C: Yes, you keep it going for a bit, Henry. You take your uncle’s advice.
K: Oh, no, you can count on that. You can absolutely count on that.
C: And you must be absolutely filthy to Sampson.
K: You can count on that too. [laughter]6

4 Kissinger met privately with Makarios for 1 hour and 20 minutes, at which time Ambassadors Dimitriou and McCloskey joined them. Makarios handed Kissinger his six handwritten proposals for resolving the Cyprus issue, including demands for a return to the status quo ante and a mixed police force. Kissinger then briefed the Ambassadors on the private conversation and remained noncommittal on who should lead Cyprus. (Informal record of meeting, July 22; Library of Congress, Manuscript Division, Kissinger Papers, Box 123, Geopolitical File, Cyprus, Chronological File) Two other memoranda of conversations relating to the meeting are in the National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy Files, 1974, P770087–0271 and P670119–0415.

5 Omission in the original.

6 Brackets in the original.
Memorandum of Conversation

Washington, July 22, 1974, 4:30 p.m.

PARTICIPANTS

US
Secretary Kissinger
William B. Buffum, Assistant Secretary for International Organization Affairs (Notetaker)

UK
Sir Peter Ramsbotham, British Ambassador to the United States
Jeremy Greenstock (Notetaker)

SUBJECT

Cyprus

Ambassador Ramsbotham: I wanted to inform you that the UK was supplying scout cars and some additional troops to the UN as requested.

Secretary Kissinger: I was already aware of this and in fact had advised the Turkish Government of it since your man apparently was having difficulty getting through.

Ambassador Ramsbotham: We counseled the Government of Turkey to assure that the ceasefire holds. The Turkish Government should give orders to its forces and its Ambassador in Nicosia to calm down. He is blaming the UN for everything that is going wrong. British reports indicate the Turks have been continuing with their shelling this afternoon, and the Greek Chargé has said Greek Army units were being attacked. Does the United States have any information on the situation in Greece itself?
Secretary Kissinger: I don’t know. We had coup reports this morning, but the Prime Minister called me this afternoon and made no mention of it.2

Ambassador Ramsbotham: I saw Makarios this morning and took notes on a paper he showed me. It does seem sensible. It covers proposals for declaring the National Guard illegal. All that would be left would be Greek and Turkish contingents as well as a mixed force of UN military police. I doubt the police force idea will work because the Turks would not leave their own people with so little protection. However, these are generally rational ideas.

Secretary Kissinger: Makarios told me3 he did not want to raise the question of his own return to Cyprus and mentioned that Clerides is Acting President at the moment under the Constitution. However, elections must be held within 45 days. Makarios said he understood the United States wants him to stay away from Cyprus for some time, but I told him this was an unfair statement. We want the parties to work things out themselves. He is cold-blooded, and I told him we were looking at the situation in a cold-blooded way ourselves.

Ambassador Ramsbotham: Makarios said he will be going back to London in about 10 days and alleged he’s more concerned about the future of his country than himself.

Secretary Kissinger: He told me he would be happy to be relieved of his duties but made clear he is interested in getting re-elected. I told Makarios we will not oppose him. Makarios said that is not enough, that he needs our support to return. I replied that that would depend on who else he asks.

Ambassador Ramsbotham: Makarios expressed gratitude for British support in the Security Council, and I thanked him for not insisting on Cyprus participation in the next round of negotiations. I told him it was not good to have the Soviet Union as his principal supporter, and he agreed.

Secretary Kissinger: He did make several sensible points, such as telling his people that enosis would be impossible because of the Turkish opposition.

Ambassador Ramsbotham: I was concerned about the Turkish performance in Cyprus because they did not appear able to handle modern weapons well, and I think this has unhappy implications for NATO’s southern flank. They even failed to take Nicosia Airport.

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2 No record of Kissinger’s conversation with Androutsopoulos on July 22 has been found, but they spoke again on July 23. (Transcript of telephone conversation; Library of Congress, Manuscript Division, Kissinger Papers, Box 384, Telephone Conversations, Chronological File)

3 This refers to Kissinger’s meeting earlier in the day with Makarios. See footnote 4, Document 114.
Secretary Kissinger: What do you consider the balance of forces now is in Cyprus?

Ambassador Ramsbotham: I think it is about right. The Turks now have 5,000 more men there and still have pockets of Turk Cypriots around the island.

Secretary Kissinger: As far as the future government is concerned, we have no particular interest in any special group. We do not mind jettisoning Sampson, but not before we know who will take his place.

Ambassador Ramsbotham: We are not backing Makarios as the future President.

Secretary Kissinger: I object to him because he is ambitious, able and strong; with the present balance of forces in Cyprus he must get the Turks out, and this can only be done with Soviet help.

Ambassador Ramsbotham: I think you are wrong on that. I hold no brief for him; indeed, he has caused the UK a lot more difficulties than he has the United States, but he has handled that lot on Cyprus successfully for 14 years without outsiders like the Russians coming in.

Secretary Kissinger: I enjoyed talking to Makarios. He is wily and clever and gets subtle points. But I now see a balance of forces which will drive him to the Soviet bloc. Clerides might be able to do it.

Ambassador Ramsbotham: Maybe the Turks don’t feel so strongly now in view of their poor performance.

Secretary Kissinger: We are trying to be cold-blooded about who takes over and have no objection if Makarios could structure it satisfactorily.

Ambassador Ramsbotham: I would also go for Clerides. He is clever and brave, although he would run Cyprus differently. He is the ablest man there. He was in the RAF.

Secretary Kissinger: We would like to delay a bit and see how the balance of forces develops following the excellent British example of the 19th century.

Ambassador Ramsbotham: As far as the negotiations go, we want to wait and see what the parties themselves bring.

Secretary Kissinger: Callaghan told me the United States has supplied the muscle and now the UK would like to supply the brains. I guess he was really saying you don’t want us in the negotiations.

Ambassador Ramsbotham: I would certainly never have put it that way.

I want to mention with regard to Waldheim’s request to double the size of UNFICYP that we will have difficulty in increasing our force contribution as much as he would like, and we would like time to think over just what we can do. The financial considerations, among other things, are quite considerable.
Secretary Kissinger: I understand that. I did talk about this problem generally with Waldheim this morning and told him we would support an increase in size of the UN force. I wish someone would keep him off my back.

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Kissinger spoke with Waldheim at 9:40 a.m. (Transcript of telephone conversation; Library of Congress, Manuscript Division, Kissinger Papers, Box 384, Telephone Conversations, Chronological File)

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116. Telegram From the Embassy in Turkey to the Department of State

Ankara, July 22, 1974, 1954Z.

5815. Subject: Cyprus Situation.

1. Secretary’s message for PriMin, as conveyed to me by Buffum, passed to PriMin soon after 2045 local time. PriMin continues to be in National Defence Council meeting, and I have as yet had no response.

2. In meantime, information being received at Embassy here strongly suggests that Turks are not making effective effort to adhere to ceasefire and suggests that on contrary they are willfully continuing to ignore it, and placing entire effort in jeopardy. I have, on my own initiative, passed my “impression” in this regard to MFA SecGen Erez, but I do not feel I should pursue this further without having balanced appraisal from Department which concludes that Turks, in fact, constitute principal threat to ceasefire breakdown. Therefore, request soonest Department’s appraisal as to: a) seriousness of threat of ceasefire deterioration and b) which of the parties is the most responsible.

Macomber

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1 Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 634, Country Files, Middle East, Turkey, Vol. IV. Secret; Flash; Exdis handle as Nodis. Received at 4:45 p.m. Repeated Flash to Athens and Nicosia.

2 Transmitted in telegram 158100 to Ankara, July 22, Kissinger’s message to Ecevit welcomed the news of Turkish confirmation of the cease-fire. Kissinger called the act an “important act of statesmanship” and stated that the next indispensable step was a meeting of the three guarantor powers (Greece, Turkey, United Kingdom), which Callaghan had proposed for July 23. (Ibid., Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 634, Country Files, Middle East, Turkey, Vol. IV)
117. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassies in Turkey and Yugoslavia

Washington, July 23, 1974, 0159Z.

159043. Subject: Situation Report No. 14 (as of 1500 EDT, July 22).
1. Military Situation on Cyprus: Both Greece and Turkey agreed to a cease-fire on Cyprus beginning at 10:00 a.m. EDT. Commanders of both forces were subsequently notified, but sporadic fighting still continues, especially around Nicosia airport where the Turks are trying to gain control. The Turks apparently have a firm grasp on Kyrenia on the north coast. Despite the many flaws in the cease-fire, the Governments of both Greece and Turkey seem relieved it is in effect and have given no signs of wanting to abrogate it.

2. Talks: Greece and Turkey have agreed to meet this week in Geneva to begin talks on the Cyprus situation. The meeting will be held under UK auspices. Foreign Secretary Callaghan and Turkish Foreign Minister Gunes will attend, but Greece has not yet announced its representative. No agenda has yet been decided.

3. Greece: Rumors of a coup overthrowing the Greek Government and Brigadier Ioannides have been circulating all day. The rumors stated that Lt. General Davos, the Commander of “C” Corps in Salonika, would replace General Gizikis as President. However, these rumors have been denied by the Androutsopoulos government and the Army, and the US Embassy in Athens has been unable to verify their truth. The British Ambassador has reported that the present GOG seems shaky, but has the appearance of conducting business routinely.

4. NATO: The threat that Greece may pull out of NATO has virtually disappeared. Greek officers at NATO headquarters in Brussels are staying at their posts, but Greek officers assigned to subordinate NATO commands have been alerted to report home for mobilization. However, Greek sources expect they will remain in place. The NATO allies have expressed satisfaction at the cease-fire and the expectation of talks between the parties.

5. Turkey: Prime Minister Ecevit held a press conference at which he stated US “contributed greatly to establishment of a cease-fire.” He also said he was very pleased that “serious war” did not break out with Greece, and that he did not expect a change in US-Turkish relations.

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1 Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy Files, 1974. Secret; Immediate. Drafted by Richard Miles (EUR). Repeated Immediate to Athens, Nicosia, Moscow, London, USUN, USNATO, the White House, and CINCEUR.
6. In a press conference today, Foreign Minister Gunes stated that Turkey had put troops on Cyprus to ensure that the constitutional rights and physical safety of the Turkish community will be protected. Calling for a “sovereign independent” Cyprus, Gunes insisted that future constitutional arrangements must take into account the fact that there are “two sovereign peoples” in Cyprus. He seemed to be implying that Turkey will press hard for a federated regime in Cyprus.

7. Evacuation: Evacuation by helicopter from Dhekalia SBA to CTF 61/62 for onward movement to Beirut has been completed. In addition to American citizens, 80 Lebanese nationals are aboard.

Kissinger

118. Briefing Memorandum From the Assistant Secretary of State for European Affairs (Hartman) to Secretary of State Kissinger


THE IMPACT OF THE FORMATION OF THE NEW GREEK AND CYPRIOT GOVERNMENTS ON THE GENEVA TALKS

The return of Konstantine Karamanlis to Athens and the formation of a new Greek Government under his leadership represents a fundamental change in the political structure in Athens and the best hope for an early settlement of the Cyprus crisis. It is not yet clear whether the summons to Karamanlis was made with the concurrence of Ioannides, but it is doubtful that he will ever be able to regain the kind of power that he has exercised since last November.

Karamanlis was Prime Minister of Greece from 1955 to 1963 when he went into voluntary exile in Paris. He is the most respected political figure in Greece, among both the civilian population and the military establishment. His Government will have the support not only of his own party, the National Radical Union (conservative), but also of...
most of the members of the Center Union. Only Andreas Papandreou and his supporters and a hardcore associated with the left-of-center would oppose Karamanlis.

All the personalities who join Karamanlis in the new Government are likely to be strongly pro-Western and committed to Greece’s participation in NATO. All of them, however, have been critical of our failure to dissociate ourselves from the Papadopoulos and Ioannides regimes, and Karamanlis has personally felt slighted that we have not maintained regular contact with him in Paris in recent years. Thus, we will probably have to do some bridge-building with the new leadership initially.

On the immediate crisis in Cyprus, we can expect the new Greek Government to keep Greece’s pledge on a ceasefire and on talks in Geneva unless it believes that Ankara is involved in major violations of the ceasefire. Both Karamanlis and Foreign Minister Averof were personally involved in the London–Zurich negotiations, and both are well and favorably known to the Turks. Thus, the formation of the new Greek Government will probably be regarded by Ankara as a most welcome change. A few days ago, Karamanlis spoke publicly in favor of Makarios, but whether he will stick to this position or support Clerides is not yet known.

Ankara also undoubtedly welcomes the formation of a new Government in Cyprus under Clerides who has played the principal role on the Greek-Cypriot side in the inter-communal talks. Politically, he’s regarded as a moderate who has been more inclined than Makarios to grant the Turkish Cypriots a greater degree of local autonomy. Clerides is not popular with the Sampson extremists, but they are not likely to be a major factor as long as the Cypriot National Guard is under the effective control of Athens. By the same token, Clerides does not have a firm control of the Greek Cypriot center and left. As a representative of the Greek Cypriot position, Clerides will not be able to speak with as strong a voice in Geneva as Makarios did at London–Zurich.
119. Memorandum of Conversation

Washington, July 23, 1974, 2:30 p.m.

SUBJECT
The Cyprus Crisis

PARTICIPANTS
Henry A. Kissinger, Secretary of State
Joseph J. Sisco, Under Secretary for Political Affairs
Robert J. McCloskey, Ambassador at Large
William Buffum, Assistant Secretary, IO
Lawrence Eagleburger, Executive Assistant to the Secretary
Edward P. Djerejian, Special Assistant to Under Secretary Sisco (Notetaker)

PARTICIPANTS WHO ENTERED MEETING LATER
Robert S. Ingersoll, Deputy Secretary of State
Arthur Hartman, Assistant Secretary, EUR
William Hyland, Assistant Secretary, INR

Sisco: My judgment is that Prime Minister Karamanlis would be supported by the moderate wing of the Greek military. General Bonanos, who worked out the ceasefire, is not an extreme right-wing officer of the type that supported Ioannides. Karamanlis will have the support of the moderate military factions in the Greek Army.

Kissinger: But Karamanlis will have to govern democratically, which means the left in Greece will have to be unleashed.

Sisco: He would have the support of all the political leaders. Karamanlis is not an Ecevit. Karamanlis is a conservative. As long as he gets along with the military government, I think the possibility of the left being unleashed in Greece to introduce a man like Papandreou is an unlikely scenario.

Kissinger: My prediction is that Karamanlis will legalize the left. The Greek Army is demoralized. Within a year there will be an active left-wing movement combined with other political movements in Greece. Of course, this is a better government for us domestically here in the United States. It would be easier to work with. But we will see.

The nightmare now is that in the Mediterranean littoral many countries are turning away from political party rule and are turning towards the military. For example, in Portugal there is a movement

1Source: National Archives, RG 59, Records of Henry Kissinger, Entry 5403, Box 9, Nodis Memcons, August 1974. Secret; Nodis. The meeting was held in Kissinger’s office.
toward the military. In Spain, with Franco’s imminent demise, the military could come into power. Coupled with the events in Greece and Turkey, the whole northern littoral of the Mediterranean is in a state of political flux. These are realities. It is not a question whether we like military rule or civilian rule.

Sisco: Let us reserve judgment for the moment.

Kissinger: Where are we now from the foreign policy view?

Sisco: I want to add one point. Concerning the Geneva conference, I do not think there can be a meeting in Geneva without the Greeks being represented.

Kissinger: Is there any possibility of that?

Sisco: We have word that Callaghan may be talking about going to Geneva without the Greeks.

Kissinger: Get me Peter Ramsbotham on the phone.

Eagleburger: If they are expecting Buffum in Geneva, we ought to warn them that he may not be coming.

Kissinger: Will Karamanlis accept Makarios?

Sisco: I don’t know. What is important, however, is this middle group of officers.

Kissinger: You can’t be sure of how influential the military will be in Greece now. Karamanlis will not be a figurehead ruler. In fact, I am not sure General Bonanos can decide what will happen in Greece.

Buffum: I wonder if the military will be discredited after the politicians come to power.

Kissinger: The military has changed the balance of forces inside Greece. It will not be easy to override a civilian government in Greece.

McCloskey: Karamanlis will be more receptive to Makarios initially. We may have to think differently about Makarios.

Kissinger: We can go either way. Clerides emerged faster than we expected.

Sisco: Makarios has sent a message through the British to Clerides.

Kissinger: I saw that.

If a slight right-of-center government is established in Greece, we are fine. Also, if a left-center government comes to power, it would be a development which we could not have controlled or influenced in any case. If we had overthrown that government last week, we would be in deep trouble. There would have been no restraints on Turkey. We would have been blamed in Greece. This government fell on the basis of its own incompetence. If Greece goes left, it is because this gang destroyed the political process in Greece.

Sisco: Ioannides and General Bonanos were there when I met with the Greek Prime Minister and Foreign Minister. It is interesting that
Ioannides left before the meetings were over, but General Bonanos stayed throughout the meetings.

(McCloskey hands a copy of Makarios' message to Clerides\textsuperscript{2} to the Secretary.)

McCloskey: You've got to be really cool to send a message like this.

Kissinger: There is simply not enough of a balance of forces in Greece.

(Bill Hyland entered the office at this point.)

Kissinger: What is going on?

(Bill Hyland gave a brief summary of the latest intelligence reports on the political and military situation.)

McCloskey: Has there been any formal announcement on Clerides' swearing-in as President of Cyprus?

Sisco: We are going to ask Ambassador Davies about Clerides.

Kissinger: I want to know in what capacity Clerides was sworn in.

Sisco: The British are more worried about our jumping on Clerides than we are worried about the British doing so too quickly. It is under consideration.

Kissinger: Now it depends on the Greek Government if they want Makarios back. If that's the case, that's it, but let's not rush in.

Sisco: No one is rushing in.

Kissinger: (Secretary telephoned Ambassador Ramsbotham.)

I take it the talks will not start now. We should not start until the situation gets crystallized. Is Clerides Acting President or President? We will hold off recognizing him but would appreciate it if you would do likewise. In any case, we will do nothing until we have consulted together. We will keep Buffum here until the situation clarifies a bit. Please tell Callaghan. (End of telephone conversation.\textsuperscript{3})

The British have sent a message to Nicosia on the question of the recognition of Clerides. As for us, we should avoid any act which implies recognition, but should do everything to establish contact to conduct business. I take it there are two conversations with Clerides that Davies has had.\textsuperscript{4}

\textsuperscript{2} The message reads: “I have just heard the news that Sampson has resigned and you have assumed the duties of acting president according to the constitution. Until I return to Cyprus, you shall preside over my council of ministers with the exception of Odysseus Ioannides, who is hereby dismissed.” (Telegram 159167 to Nicosia, July 23; ibid., Records of Joseph Sisco, Entry 5405, Box 21, Cyprus, 1974/75)

\textsuperscript{3} Kissinger spoke with Ramsbotham at 3:04 p.m. (Transcript of telephone conversation; Library of Congress, Manuscript Division, Kissinger Papers, Box 384, Telephone Conversations, Chronological File)

\textsuperscript{4} Reported in telegrams 1680 and 1681 from Nicosia, July 23. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy Files, 1974)
Sisco: And a third today asking what our relationship would be.\(^5\)

Kissinger: Let’s give Davies a warm and friendly reply. We need Clerides as a bargaining function. Even if Makarios comes back, we do not want Clerides to resign prematurely. Ramsbotham thinks it is going to be hard to bring Makarios back. His support in Greece will not be as strong as before. We’ve got to get Clerides enough into play so that he doesn’t quit on us.

Buffum: It is noteworthy that only a few people rallied around Makarios after his overthrow despite his reported popular support on the island.

Kissinger: Makarios told me that when his palace was attacked, he simply walked out of his office into a car and drove off. They forgot to guard the rear door.

(Deputy Secretary Ingersoll and Assistant Secretary Hartman entered the office at this point.)

We would never give support to a conference without the Greeks being there. Under present conditions, it would not be good to have a conference convened tomorrow. Tasca has to know we are not bringing pressure on the Greeks to go to a conference tomorrow.

(The Secretary telephoned Ambassador Ramsbotham.)

Your Ambassador has told the Greeks that you are prepared to start a conference without them and that this reflects U.S. support. Under no circumstance will we support a conference on Cyprus without the Greeks, and we will have no one there under such conditions. Let us separate two problems: (a) we strongly support a conference on Cyprus with Greek representation; (b) you cannot count on our support for a conference which excludes the Greeks. The day after a coup d’état is not the day you should have a conference.

Joe Sisco is sitting here and he was prepared, had he stayed in Athens a day longer, to be named the new Prime Minister of Greece. (Laughter)

(The Secretary’s telephone conversation with Ambassador Ramsbotham ended.)\(^6\)

Greece and Israel are two countries where you insult a man by giving him a Cabinet position. Whichever man gets in the other guy will try to cut his throat. In any case, we can’t do anything before matters crystallize.

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\(^5\) Presumably a reference to telegram 1663 from Nicosia, July 23. (Ibid.)

\(^6\) Kissinger spoke with Ramsbotham at 3:23 p.m. (Transcript of telephone conversation; Library of Congress, Manuscript Division, Kissinger Papers, Box 384, Telephone Conversations, Chronological File)
Hartman: It seems that General Bonanos is behind the coup.
Kissinger: There is no way the military can turn power over to the civilians in these circumstances. They can turn power over to another government and have that government start its own momentum. Then, the military can try to intervene. However, total military rule is not viable in these circumstances. A political process has to be started in Greece and the army may try to influence it later.

Depending on how strong the left is in Greece, current events will bring the left to a more enhanced position in that country. We must see how this emerges. Frankly, the army would not have turned to the civilians if it had enough credibility of its own. The Greek military cannot enforce King Constantine who, in my mind, is absolutely ineffective. The military can no longer be decisive.

Sisco: In any case, the military may not be able to avoid Makarios.
Kissinger: I agree with Sisco that the Greek military cannot decide on Makarios.

In our policy we should not oppose Makarios, since we may want to have him back.

McCloskey: How did your talk with Makarios go?  
Kissinger: Makarios was playing a rough game. He asked me if we want him out of the non-aligned bloc. I told him that I was in no position to respond on the international position of Cyprus. I said I want to see what happens in the negotiations. My thinking is that if there is a stalemate, we can support Clerides. If there is no stalemate, we could also go for Makarios. I told Makarios not to go to the Russians. What Makarios has to get into his head is that in a crisis he cannot operate without us.

McCloskey: He knows this; he wants the U.S. to be involved.
Kissinger: He is a tough guy. I told him we do not oppose his coming back to power. Our not supporting Clerides at this point is the most meaningful gesture to him. He is an impressive figure.

Eagleburger: (Reading a cable)  
There is little chance in the next few days for the Greeks to produce someone in Geneva. Callaghan is worried about delaying further, especially because the Turks are getting steamed up. The Turks could get difficult. Callaghan is giving the go-ahead for the conference the day after tomorrow.

(The Secretary called Michael Alexander in London, the private secretary of Foreign Minister Callaghan.)

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7 See footnote 4, Document 114.
8 Not further identified.
Kissinger: I hope you won’t act without talking to us. What is the compulsion to have this meeting? I do not have the impression that the Turks are so upset. Please make it absolutely clear to your people that all the parties have to be there before we can do anything. We have to give the Greek Government 48 hours before they face a conference. We will handle the Turks with you. If the junta was still there, it would have been desirable to have a conference rapidly. However, in its absence, there’s no advantage to an early meeting.

(The Secretary ended his telephone call.)

Eagleburger: Callaghan will call you within the hour.

Hartman: The Turks have given us five locations on Cyprus where Turkish Cypriots are allegedly being wiped out.

Kissinger: Get that message to Waldheim in New York.

(The Secretary had a telephone call placed to Turkish Prime Minister Ecevit.)

Ingersoll: In your conversation with Schlesinger did you release the planes.

Kissinger: Yes.

Our view on Makarios is that if he is the most logical candidate, he should go back. However, he should go back as a result of talks with us. He is not inclined to rely on the Soviet Union, at least for this week. By next Monday we should have a good read-out on the situation when I next meet him. If the Greek Government wants Makarios and the Turkish Government does not have any objection, we have no objection.

Ambassador Davies should give us an assessment of the balance of political forces on the island.

(Mr. Hyland entered the office again.)

Hyland: Clerides has been sworn in as President of Cyprus.

Sisco: Was there any reference to Paragraph 2, Article 44, of the Cyprus constitution?

Kissinger: I want the question answered on whether or not Makarios is the strongest man on the island. I want an analysis soon. Davies should stop just short of recognition but should establish some relationship with Clerides.

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9 No record of this conversation has been found.
10 Hyland held a teletype conference at 3:25 p.m. with members of the Cyprus Task Force. (Library of Congress, Manuscript Division, Kissinger Papers, Box CL 123, Geopolitical File, Cyprus, Chronological File)
11 Davies had urged formal U.S. recognition of the Clerides government in telegram 1663, July 23. (National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 592, Country Files, Middle East, Cyprus, Vol. II)
(The Secretary spoke on the telephone to Turkish Prime Minister Ecevit at approximately 3:30 p.m.)

Kissinger: How do you see the situation? Mr. Prime Minister, give that view to my Ambassador. You got my cable this morning. When should the talks start in your judgment? That is a terrible mistake. My suggestion is that when there is no government, it is unfair to bring pressure on that country when they have no Foreign Minister. Give them the courtesy of forming a government. This is my personal view. I will not have the United States representative before Thursday in any event. Buffum will not come before Thursday.

(While awaiting a response from Ecevit, the Secretary stated the following to the group in the office: they want to open a conference and sit there and wait for the Greek. Larry, call Alexander and say that we have learned that Callaghan and Ecevit have agreed to a conference this Wednesday in Geneva without the Greeks.)

(To Ecevit on phone) We will not send anyone before we know the Greek Government has agreed to send someone to Geneva. You should proceed with what you have agreed to do. I have no right to get in the way of an agreement you have made with the British. Nevertheless, I would prefer to know that all the parties are coming. They do not have a government at this point. How can you hear anything from them when they don’t have a government? (End of telephone conversation)12

The British have an agreement with Ecevit that Foreign Minister Gunes and Ecevit will meet without the Greeks. Tell the British I want to inform them of the following: Ecevit told me they agreed to meet in Geneva, regardless whether the Greeks came or not. If the Greeks are not there, they will wait for them in Geneva. This will look like the raping of the Greeks and will only reinforce the myth of a U.S.-UK-Turkish rape of Greece. It would undermine any civilian group coming to power in Greece. We made no move without checking it with the British. We are astonished at this decision and we think it is a horrible idea. In sum, until we have official word from the Greeks, there will be no U.S. representative in Geneva.

Sisco: The principal reason the Greeks indicated that they would go to a conference is because the U.S. would be there.

Hartman: Have the Turks been in contact with the new Greek Government?

Kissinger: I don’t care. It is an insane idea to bring pressure on a government that has just been formed. Call Callaghan’s office. What is

12 Kissinger spoke with Ecevit at 3:30 p.m. (Transcript of telephone conversation; Library of Congress, Manuscript Division, Kissinger Papers, Box 384, Telephone Conversations, Chronological File)
the hurry? Ecevit is responding to British pressures. Until the U.S. Government gets definite information from the Greek Government, there will be no U.S. representative in Geneva. We would request also that they take no further unilateral steps.

By the way, Ecevit told me that Clerides has a great advantage in that he has the shade of legality. Ecevit told me that his Ambassador in Athens would check with the Greeks before Greek Foreign Minister Gunes goes to Geneva. If at the end of this Makarios comes back and it emerges after a U.S.-UK-Turkish gang-up on Greece, the Greek Government will be against us from the beginning.

(Eagleburger and Hartman left the office.)

Sisco: This is an attempted pre-emptive move by Callaghan. He wants to display assertive leadership. He says he has Parliament behind him and he thinks he can force the Greek hand. He is mistaken. The UK could play such a leadership role only if they maintain their credibility with the Greeks and the Turks.

Kissinger: If their first act is to restore Makarios, it would undermine the new Greek Government.

Sisco: They will adopt a pragmatic approach by dealing with Clerides for the time being.

Ingersoll: Did you get any feeling from Ecevit?

Kissinger: Ecevit wants to keep the Turks in Cyprus. He does not want Makarios back. Therefore, if the conference brings Makarios back, it should not be done by our imposing him on the reluctant Turks. It is not in our interests to shove him down the Turkish throat. It is possible that after two years Makarios will call for a unitary Cyprus which is against Turkish perceptions.

Sisco: Ecevit is trying to bridge the political gap in Turkey. The young leftists support him. Yet he cannot stay in power without the Turkish military. Therefore, the reason he is adopting the position he presently advocates is because he is trying to take care of both his political left and the military at the same time.

Kissinger: In the beginning Ecevit was interested only in increasing Turkish forces on the island and gaining access to the sea for the Turkish Cypriot community. However, by later adding the conditions of removing the Greek officers from the National Guard and returning Makarios to office, he knew the package would not be acceptable to either Makarios or to the Greeks. In fact, the first thing he said to Joe Sisco was “Now I don’t care who becomes President.” If we wants legality, he can get Makarios. If one analyzes this, any Makarios return to power would be bad for the Turks. Makarios is capable of unifying Cyprus. Also, he will try through the UN to get the Turkish forces pushed out of Cyprus in the future.
What the Greek Government wants I do not know. Perhaps Clerides is the best solution to the situation on Cyprus. As for the United States, we cannot impose Clerides, or, for that matter, back Makarios before the Turks and the Greeks have either acquiesced to Makarios or decide to oppose Makarios. If both the Turks and Greeks acquiesce to Makarios, it is okay. If both oppose Makarios, then we should go for Clerides. What we cannot have is a conference between the UK and Turkey opting for Makarios. The Greek Government could then blame it on us.

Buffum: The Turks could not accept Makarios without radical structural changes on Cyprus.

Hyland: Clerides was sworn in as Acting President of Cyprus.

Kissinger: What is Rodger Davies’ perception of his role? When he talks to Clerides, what signal is he giving? We better get guidance to Davies. He should understand that he should be extremely friendly to Clerides and just stop a shade short of recognition.

Sisco: We will have instructions sent out to Davies immediately.13 Davies has said that Clerides will have Cypriot support and can maintain himself in office. In my view, Rodger has been superb during this crisis.

Kissinger: I agree. Davies has done very well.

Hyland: Clerides told Davies that the Turks are moving heavy armor to other areas and that a Turkish offensive may be expected at dawn. Clerides urged that a message be sent to Turkey to cease and desist and to prevent a massacre on the island.

Sisco: These reports are coming from the right-wing military in Greece who are out of the picture. They are trying to give a rationale for intervention.

Hyland: In that respect, one general has claimed that there is a full-scale war on Cyprus.

Kissinger: Davies needs to know what he has to do. He has done an excellent job.

By the way, it’s good to have you back, Joe. You know I can’t do without a loyal opposition here. (Laughter)

(Eagleburger and Hartman returned to the meeting.)

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13 In telegram 159994 to Nicosia, Kissinger instructed Davies: “I want you to understand that you should be extremely friendly to Clerides and that you should continue to establish effective communications and contact with him, stopping just a shade short of recognition.” (National Archives, Nixon Presidential Material, NSC Files, Box 592, Country Files, Middle East, Cyprus, Vol. II)
Eagleburger: I gave them hell. Their final answer is that they have not agreed with Ecevit. If they learn tonight that the Greeks are not coming, then they will put off the conference for 24 hours. The Brits are getting in touch with Gunes to put it off and, in any case, they will not go tomorrow. I underlined your view that if there are no Greeks, there should be no meeting and that there should be no unilateral moves. Also, I stressed that we would like to be consulted.

Kissinger: The British tell us that unless they get word from the Greeks that they will not be there, there will be a conference. The problem is that there is no Greek Government to tell them they are coming or not. This is all a fabrication. For seven years they have been screaming for a Greek civilian government. It is not in their interests now to kill this government. In any case, they should avoid a UK-Turk or U.S.-UK-Turk gang-up on Greece. If Callaghan must go to Geneva, he should go and have separate meetings with the Greeks and the Turks.

Sisco: If the UK forces bilateral meetings with Turkey before the Greek Government is ready, then this can topple the Greek civilian political leaders from rule.

Eagleburger: We have a problem with reporting from Athens. The Embassy seems to be making direct approaches in Washington to the NMCC.

Kissinger: That is totally unacceptable. We must direct Ambassador Tasca that the Embassy should not make any approaches in Washington in any other channel than directly to me. At no level are they to call the NMCC. What we need now is clear reporting on the actual situation in Athens. Who is doing this at the Embassy?

Eagleburger: Whoever is doing it is working under Tasca’s orders. Kissinger: I have never seen such incompetence.

If you have the Greeks demonstrating in the streets, it means the military is finished. Under those conditions Greece cannot go to war. In the instruction to our Embassy in Athens tell them to inform the Greek Government we will not be sending a representative to Geneva before they have made their decision to go there themselves. Also, elicit from them a sense of timing.

As for the Turks, give Macomber in Ankara a feel where we stand, especially in relation to my conversations with Ecevit and what our position is on the Geneva negotiations.

On Clerides, we cannot tell until the governments have made their positions clear.

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14 Eagleburger spoke with Alexander at 3:45 p.m. (Transcript of telephone conversation; ibid.)
120. **Telegram From the Embassy in Cyprus to the Department of State**¹

Nicosia, July 24, 1974, 1330Z.

1723. For the Secretary from Ambassador. Subject: Cyprus.

Foreign Minister Dimitriou telephoned EmbOff and asked following be passed:

1. Makarios’ statement that he hopes return to Cyprus in two or three weeks has had an immediate and increasingly adverse reaction with Greek Cypriots. Greek Cypriots of all stripes (strong enosists, EOKA-B, the indifferent, etc.) other than AKEL and Lyssarides followers are already saying that if Makarios comes back blood will flow again and there will be civil strife on island, Greek will be fighting Greek again.

2. Present govt, including Clerides, are convinced Makarios’ return, if it is soon, would be a disaster here. The island needs time now for emotions to settle and for a return to some kind of stability and sanity. Greeks are pulling together, and hopefully under Clerides leadership they can be kept together—united and ready for a solution to Greek/Turk problem on the island.

3. Govt feels that Makarios’ early return would only disrupt orderly return to normality here. Perhaps if Makarios insists on returning, he could put off his return for at least three months. By that time the course here could be set, emotions soothed and his return would not be too disruptive. If, however, he keeps saying he will return in two or three weeks and if he does come back this soon, then civil strife is almost a certainty.

4. Clerides has relayed substance of the above to Karamanlis as has Dimitriou to Gen. Bonanos. They have urged that Makarios not be permitted to return for at least three months. Karamanlis replied he would think about it. Bonanos agreed that Makarios should not return, at least not for present.

5. Clerides govt, through Dimitriou, urges U.S. to exert its influence, indeed to take all possible measures, to avoid Makarios’ return to Cyprus in near future.

¹Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 592, Country Files, Middle East, Cyprus, Vol. II. Secret; Immediate; Exdis. Received in the White House at 7:13 p.m. Repeated Immediate to Ankara, Athens, London, and USUN.
6. **Comment:** Clerides in his press conference this morning publicly stated Archbishop should not return, and question of his return should be decided through elections. As incidental information, Dimitriou said Council of Ministers has told Clerides that he has a free hand to reshuffle the Cabinet as he wishes.

Davies

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121. **Memorandum From the Deputy Director of the Joint Staff (Ginsburgh) to the President’s Chief of Staff (Haig)**

DJS–1063–74


**SUBJECT**

Impact of Withdrawal from U.S. Military Facilities in Greece and Turkey (C)

1. (C) Reference is made to the 20 July meeting of the NSC Cyprus Planning Group during which the request of Colonel Richard T. Kennedy, USA, (Ret.) was orally conveyed to the Joint Staff representative. That request was to provide a supplemental paper giving a general appreciation of the impact of the loss of all U.S. military facilities, installations and capabilities (excluding intelligence elements) associated with withdrawal of U.S. Forces from Greece and Turkey as a result of the Greek/Turkish confrontation in Cyprus.

2. (S) U.S. facilities in Greece and Turkey are of major military importance to the United States. These facilities provide:

   a. Command, control and communications for the eastern Mediterranean.
   c. Major Military Airlift Command cargo and passenger facilities.
   d. [2 lines not declassified]
   e. A U.S. presence which demonstrates U.S. resolve to support NATO’s Southern Flank.

3. (S) U.S. military facilities in Greece and Turkey would, in general, be expensive to replace. In some cases, regardless of cost, replacement...
would be most difficult because of these nations’ geographic locations. The selection of alternative locations is complicated by increasingly difficult base rights negotiations and a trend toward greater quid pro quo that other countries are exacting as the price for their cooperation.

4. (S) The strategic importance of Greece and Turkey should be emphasized. Greece and Turkey are important links in the overall NATO defense to deter or defeat Soviet aggression and provide important forces in the Western line of defense across the southern border of communist-dominated Eastern Europe. They serve as a barrier between Warsaw Pact ground forces and the eastern Mediterranean.

5. (S) U.S. withdrawal from facilities in Greece and Turkey would:

a. Weaken the NATO Alliance and make the Mediterranean area more vulnerable to Soviet penetration and influence.

b. Encourage other NATO nations to reassess their positions and probably precipitate a major divisive move within the Alliance.

c. Diminish US influence and possibly change the pro-West attitude of Greece and Turkey.

d. Possibly induce either or both to leave NATO, adopt a passive attitude, or deny use of NATO facilities to the Alliance.

e. Cause other countries to question the credibility of US commitments.

f. Probably result in the denial of the use of Greek, Turkish and NATO facilities in both countries for US contingency operations.

g. [1 line not declassified]

h. Severely degrade US Mediterranean and Middle East communications/navigation support.

i. Possibly result in denial of US overflight rights which would adversely impact on US capability to support Middle East peacetime and contingency operations.

j. [3½ lines not declassified]

k. Possibly enable the USSR to overfly Greece and Turkey to conduct air operations against US and Allied forces operating in the eastern Mediterranean and littoral areas thereof.

l. Possibly result in the Government of Turkey becoming more amenable to USSR pressures for increased transit of USSR forces through and over the Bosporus, with resultant diminution of the influence of US and Allied forward force presence.

6. (S) Considering the above factors and the information contained in the Appendices hereto, ² the security interests of the United States would not be served by a permanent withdrawal of US defense facilities from Greece and Turkey.

Robert N. Ginsburgh
Major General, USAF

² Not attached.
US INTERESTS IN THE CYPRUS CRISIS: ISSUES AND OPTIONS

I. The Problem

Against Greek resistance, the Turks at Geneva are trying to push the cease-fire discussions into preliminary negotiations on a political settlement. As the talks approach the substantive aspects of the settlement, the risk of an impasse increases. In anticipation of this occurring, this paper analyzes the various arrangements that may be proposed to determine how they impinge on U.S. interests.

II. The Situation

Militarily, the situation on the island is relatively quiet. The Turks have consolidated and enlarged their enclave north of Nicosia, but the vast majority of the Turkish Cypriot enclaves outside the Nicosia–Kyrenia triangle have been eliminated or reduced, with the exception of Famagusta and the Kokkina area, where Turkish Cypriot militia are still holding out. The new government in Athens has threatened Greco-Turkish war if the Turks continue to advance in violation of the cease-fire, but international efforts over the past 24 hours have reduced the Turkish violations.

Politically, the situation is unstable in Greece and among the Greek Cypriot community. Clerides, trapped between the extremists on right and left, is moving cautiously out of fear of a move against him. In Greece, there are reports of coup plotting against Karamanlis by pro-Ioannides military elements. The Greek military probably will allow Karamanlis considerable latitude in trying to reach a settlement of the Cyprus issue, provided that Turkey does not push its advantages in Cyprus too far. The Turks seem united around Ecevit, but the political opposition and the military will be watching him carefully to be sure he does not bargain away Turkey’s gains.

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1 Source: National Archives, RG 59, Records of Henry Kissinger, Entry 5403, Box 3, Nodis Letters, Folder 5. Secret; Nodis. Drafted by Thomas Boyatt, Harmon Kirby, Richard Erdman, and Philip Stoddard. Cleared by Bruce Hirshorn, Lloyd George and Stabler. This was one of four papers that C. William Kontos, Director of the Cyprus Task Force, requested on July 25. The others are entitled “Turkish Politics After Cyprus,” “Preliminary Assessment of Turkish Military Operation on Cyprus,” both dated July 27; ibid., Box 9, Nodis Memcons, July 1974, Folder 2; and [title not declassified] dated July 29; Library of Congress, Manuscript Division, Kissinger Papers, Box CL 123, Geopolitical File, Cyprus, Chronological File.
Diplomatically, by invading Cyprus, continuing to advance after the cease-fire, and stating that Turkey intends to remain on Cyprus in force, the Turks are coming under increasing international criticism. The UK is anxious about Turkey’s aims, and the Turks, for their part, consider the UK pro-Greek. In these circumstances, Turkey’s only significant international support now seems to be coming from the US.

III. US Interests

Our fundamental interests in the area are: (1) to maintain the Western defense-deterrence capability, which requires NATO cohesion, the maintenance of US/NATO facilities in the area, and Greek-Turkish harmony; and (2) to contain Soviet influence.

An unstable Cyprus threatens both these interests. Greco-Turkish contention weakens the defense capability of the Alliance, and Greco-Turkish hostilities would deal it a severe blow. Further, if badly handled, the crisis could easily result in a better Soviet position on Cyprus and in either Greece or Turkey or both. Thus the US does not have fundamental objectives as regards Cyprus itself except in the context of Cyprus’ effect on other US interests.

IV. Intentions and Objectives of the Parties

**Turkey:** The Turks are determined to use their strong position on Cyprus to solve the Cyprus problem once and for all along the lines of de facto governmental separation of the two communities within the framework of an independent Cyprus. This is described by the Turks as “the restoration of two autonomous administrations” coordinated only at the top by the Greek Cypriot president and the Turkish Cypriot vice president. This arrangement must be recognized by the Greeks in a formal document. The Turks oppose a return to the 1960 constitutional system as unworkable. They also oppose the return of Makarios. They do not speak of partition (double enosis), presumably because they do not think that Greece, the US, the Soviets, and the international community would tolerate the disappearance of the independent state of Cyprus. Moreover, Turkey may try to use its gains on Cyprus to pressure Greece to resolve other Greco-Turkish issues, principally the dispute over Aegean oil and the demarcation of territorial waters. Turkey may calculate that, with Karamanlis in power in Athens, there is a good chance to solve outstanding problems. Finally, Turkey believes it is bargaining from strength and will not approach the negotiating process in a concessionary mood.

**Greece:** Karamanlis, like Ecevit, wants to resolve outstanding Greco-Turkish problems. However, he will be under pressure from his military not to capitulate to Turkish demands. The Greeks would prefer an independent, unitary Cyprus with minimal guarantees for the
rights of the Turkish community. They know that enosis is unacceptable to Turkey. In between, they would probably like the status quo ante without Makarios and without additional Turkish troops. Their minimum would be continued Cypriot independence. The Greeks might accept a federal solution if the Turkish military were reduced to a symbolic presence and if the federal arrangements were not simply a guise for Turkish extraterritoriality. If the Greeks concluded that there was no give at all in the Turkish position (i.e. that the Turks had effectively combined their autonomous enclave with Turkey) they might well move to do the same on the Greek side and approach the Turks on the basis of de facto enosis for both sectors.

_Cyprus (The Greek Cypriots):_ The Turkish Cypriots are under Ankara’s control, but Athens will have to take the views of the Greek Cypriots into account. Whatever Athens agrees to with the Turks will have to be sold to Greek Cypriot opinion (despite Ankara’s total misconception that Greece can impose its will on the Greek Cypriots). In the past, Athens has had trouble dealing with Makarios, but once brought around, he could deliver Greek Cypriot agreement. Clerides is more amenable to Athens’ direction and more appealing to the Turks, but may well be unable to secure acceptance of Greco-Turkish compromises. The leftists want continued independence under Makarios; the rightists want enosis without Makarios. The Greek Cypriots have the potential to sabotage an agreement between Athens and Ankara.

Like the mainland Greeks, the majority of Greek Cypriots could probably accept a federal solution if it did not involve a massive Turkish military presence or any other type of Turkish extraterritoriality.

V. _Alternative Models for New Arrangements on Cyprus_

_A. An Independent Cyprus with Extraterritorial Turkish Area(s) would involve:_

—An independent and sovereign Cyprus minus the Turkish area(s).
—Recognized or de facto Turkish control of the Nicosia–Kyrenia triangle.
—Turkey maintains a large number of mainland military forces in the Kyrenia enclave.
—Some freedom of movement.

_B. Partition would include:_

—Recognition of Turkish sovereignty over the Kyrenia enclave or some other area.
—The declaration, perhaps following a plebiscite, of the union of the rest of Cyprus with Greece.
—The optional transfer of Turkish Cypriots into the Turkish enclave and of Greek Cypriots out.
C. Federation and Demilitarization would include:

— An independent and sovereign Cyprus.
— The establishment of two communal structures—one Greek and one Turkish—autonomous at the local level and merged at the national level.
— The phased reduction, under UN supervision, of mainland Greek and Turkish forces to the symbolic presence of a few hundred each.
— Demilitarization of Cyprus—no local armies.

Discussion

Analyzing these three models, in terms of U.S. interests and objectives, leads to the following observations:

— Model A would be unstable and quickly evolve into Model B. This model also runs the risk of renewed fighting if the Turks decide to expand the Kyrenia enclave, or if Greece attempts to insert mainland Greek troops on the island. If the Greek Cypriots are required in effect to cede significant territory to Turkey, they would have little incentive to give up the historic goal of enosis to maintain an independent state, and Greece would be unable to refuse.
— Models A and B have the advantage of separating the Greek and Turkish communities but the disadvantage of creating yet another frontier.
— Model B would probably involve the eventual transfer of mainland Greek military forces to Cyprus to balance the Turkish forces already there.

Concluding Observations

Model A (extraterritoriality) is inherently unstable and therefore is the least preferable model from the US point of view. Model B (partition) is probably unacceptable to the Greeks and could result in more, rather than less, confrontation between Greece and Turkey. Model C (federation) poses a potentially serious political problem: Even if Greece and Turkey agreed on a federation scheme, the Greek Cypriots might conclude that the arrangement gave too much to the Turks, and they have the capability to undercut a Greek-Turkish agreement.

On the other hand, Model C (federation) recommends itself because it would minimize the Greek and Turkish presence on the island.
123. Memorandum From Director of Central Intelligence Colby to the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger)


[Source: Central Intelligence Agency, Executive Registry, Job 80–M01048A, Box 2, Folder 26, Cyprus. Secret. 2 pages not declassified.]

124. Memorandum of Conversation¹

Washington, July 29, 1974, 5 p.m.

SUBJECT
Visit of Archbishop Makarios

PARTICIPANTS
Cyprus
Archbishop Makarios
Ambassador Dimitriou

US
The Secretary
Ambassador Robert J. McCloskey

(Conversation already under way.)
Archbishop Makarios: I have been telling the Secretary that the Soviets are trying to exploit the situation and that their interest in this problem is not genuine. Yesterday they asked for a Security Council meeting and we were greatly disappointed at what proved to be a waste of time. But, as I said, to some extent the United States is giving ground to the Soviets.

The Secretary: We have three parties to consider and therefore our policy is more complex than for someone who backs only one of the parties.

Archbishop Makarios: We don’t want to do that.

¹ Source: Library of Congress, Manuscript Division, Kissinger Papers, Box CL 123, Geopolitical File, Cyprus, Chronological File. Secret. The meeting was held in the Secretary’s office.
The Secretary: We succeeded in bringing about the ceasefire. I don’t see any reason now to take an anti-Turkish position publicly because it will only aggravate the situation.

Archbishop Makarios: I am not asking that. I am interested in results. I believe only the United States can influence Turkey—and Greece—and Cyprus. Greece and Turkey are both members of NATO and both receive military aid from the United States. The Cyprus problem is only a small one for the United States and it is not proper to say that the United States must do this or that. We are not in a position to say anything to you about pressure.

The Secretary: We will not do anything under pressure, in no circumstance, and it is in our interest to make this clear. This is a fact of life, not a threat. You would do the same thing. I am not accusing you.

Archbishop Makarios: We are not...

The Secretary: You’re an able person. What do you see as a solution?

Archbishop Makarios: I am not satisfied with the position of the United States. It is in your interest to stop the Turkish invasion. I don’t say you should exercise pressure and in the process develop anti-U.S. attitudes. I don’t know what you’ve conveyed to Turkey. But, despite this, Turkey is continuing its invasion without showing any respect for the Security Council Resolution.

The Secretary: Turkey is not advancing any further.

Archbishop Makarios: They are now seeking to impose themselves in Cyprus. Greece is weakened. I don’t know whether Karamanlis can survive. The Turkish demands are unreasonable.

The Secretary: What?

Archbishop Makarios: 1) They won’t go back to the lines called for in the Security Council Resolution. 2) They are calling for federation. 3) Ecevit is saying “our troops will stay.” This is blackmail! And the airport is under their control. Furthermore (in the inter-communal negotiations) they are demanding that the Vice President should have veto power.

The Secretary: I thought you had agreed to the latter in the 1960 agreements.

Archbishop Makarios: Yes, they want changes. We also want changes. Talks have been going on for years.

The Secretary: What concretely do you want us to do?

Archbishop Makarios: Take a more decisive role. You are in a position to play this role. You can make certain proposals. Turkey will accept. When you sent Sisco to Athens and Ankara I have read that you used strong language. And now you are very cautious.
The Secretary: You don’t know what we say privately. There was an improvement in the situation last week as a result of what we did.

Archbishop Makarios: The situation is worse now. People have been uprooted and a great number of refugees have been created.

The Secretary: While the U.K. is negotiating with Greece and Turkey it is not proper for the United States to attempt to take over the negotiations.

Archbishop Makarios: But, behind the scenes . . .

The Secretary: It depends on what you want. You have addressed the important problem of the long term attitude of Turkey. From the point of view of the Geneva negotiations it is not necessarily decisive whether there are 20 or 23,000 troops there as far as this round of negotiations is concerned. It is important though whether agreement can be reached in a political context to reduce that number. Now, what we want is to settle this in terms of implementation of the ceasefire and thereby have that contribute to the further political negotiations.

Archbishop Makarios: What disturbs me is that the Turks will not be in for settlement. As time passes they will be consolidating their position there. The talks will take months or years . . .

The Secretary: I think they want a quick settlement, although it might have been their purpose to delay. Maybe we’re wrong.

Archbishop Makarios: Have they accepted a UN corridor?

The Secretary: (After checking by telephone.) Yes, they seem to have accepted that.

Archbishop Makarios: I understand the Turks will not withdraw unless there is a final agreement.

The Secretary: Yes.

Archbishop Makarios: If the talks are prolonged what will the situation be? Our people are suffering. They say they will accept the 1960 Constitution only with changes.

The Secretary: They haven’t said this to me. My impression is they may want to keep troops there.

Archbishop Makarios: Until a solution or forever?

The Secretary: Between a solution and forever. But I’m not here as their lawyer.

Archbishop Makarios: They invaded they say to restore order and safeguard the Constitution.

The Secretary: During the first week we knew once they got there it would be difficult to get them out, but we didn’t want to sanctify Turkish invasion.

Archbishop Makarios: Suppose Greece and the UK do the same?
The Secretary: The result will be double enosis. I don’t believe this should be the permanent solution. It is not being supported by the United States. There should be no Greek troops or that would lead to permanent partition.

Archbishop Makarios: What are the prospects for settlement?

The Secretary: Right now there are too many cooks. Callaghan needs a quick success. The Soviets have their own motives. The Government in Greece has its problems. And, Ecevit... We have been encouraging a settlement. We have not been all out active. We can’t be the only country to produce a settlement, but this may change. In this phase of the Geneva talks the prospects are good. In the next phase Turkey will have to change its position. There are still too many cooks.

Archbishop Makarios: I prefer an American cook. Going back to the Constitution—we don’t want only that.

The Secretary: What about the Mixed Police Force?

Archbishop Makarios: This would be a special force for collecting illegal arms. It would have equal numbers for Turks and Greeks. This is the only way to collect those arms.

The Secretary: We have no American view on this subject. We’d go along with what others want. Have you given this to others? Should we give it to the Turks? Do you mind?

Archbishop Makarios: No.

The Secretary: We could say these are your views and could let your Ambassador know. Basically, I understand you want us to play a more active role.

Archbishop Makarios: Yes. I believe you can play an active and decisive role.


The Secretary: We explained that if Greece and Turkey had gone to war neither could count on U.S. military assistance continuing. Some thought was given to cutting aid to Greece under its military regime. This could be used against Sampson.

Archbishop Makarios: What should I say my impressions are about our meeting today?

The Secretary: I wouldn’t presume to tell you what to say.

Archbishop Makarios: You will play a role?

The Secretary: Certainly, we will play a constructive role.

Archbishop Makarios: You can play a decisive role.

The Secretary: It is a question of timing.

Ambassador Dimitriou: (Referring to conversations in the UN) All believe if you were more active you could bring about a settlement. I
have talked to members of the British and other European delegations. They all believe this and therefore the Geneva talks would be successful.

The Secretary: We can’t conduct those negotiations. We have someone there and in each crucial development we have been asked our view and we have given it. We have been helpful in a quiet way. We have made major efforts in Geneva but it isn’t our style to do it so vocally. Nobody has yet put all his cards on the table, either the Greeks or the Turks.

Archbishop Makarios: We have no cards.

The Secretary: We know your views and have studied your six points. Unless you have others, we will send them to Turkey tonight.

The Secretary: You can say that I told you we will play an increasingly constructive role.

Archbishop Makarios: Am I satisfied?

Ambassador Dimitriou: You’d be justified in saying that.

The Secretary: If I say you’re not, I will be popular in Turkey. Frankly, it is better for me internationally if you’re not satisfied.

Ambassador Dimitriou: (To Makarios) Are you satisfied?

Archbishop Makarios: I didn’t get a clear answer.

The Secretary: Frankly, I can’t say. I had to study your 1960 Constitution. I didn’t know anything about it. Let me say we are in favor of independence. We are not in favor of partition. We are in favor of a solution agreeable to all three parties.

[Secretary interrupted meeting to take a call outside.] 3

The Secretary: (Continuing) We will play an increasingly constructive role. We cannot take a public position now that we are bringing pressure on anybody. That may change later. If you look at the Middle East negotiations you will see that we did not pressure the parties publicly. That is not in anybody’s interest.

The Secretary: I will say we had good talks. As negotiations continue we will play an increasingly constructive role. That we seek a solution within the context of the independence, sovereignty of Cyprus and its Constitutional arrangements. You should speak first. I’ll calibrate mine from what you say.

Archbishop Makarios: In case of a very urgent situation may I call you on the telephone?

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2 See footnote 4, Document 114.

3 Kissinger spoke with Stabler at 5:47 p.m. (Library of Congress, Manuscript Division, Kissinger Papers, Box 384, Telephone Conversations, Chronological File) Brackets in the original.
125. **Telegram From the Mission in Geneva to the Department of State**

Geneva, August 9, 1974, 1750Z.

5147. For Sisco from Hartman. Subj: British Intelligence Report.

1. Immediately after long session with Callaghan this afternoon I was called back to his office to read what Callaghan referred to as an alarming intelligence report. He thought that our people had access to the same report dated August 9 [less than 1 line not declassified]. The report is information obtained without the knowledge of the source [less than 1 line not declassified]. It reports a Turkish army plan to begin another military operation on August 20 designed to take over all areas above the line drawn five miles east of Morphou through the Nicosia area and on to Famagusta. The plan is to complete the operation in 18 hours using mainly elements of the 39th Infantry Division. Paratroop units are said to have already withdrawn from the island for use in this second phase operation. The report also describes a third phase, if Turkish demands are not met after phase II, which includes a line from Koutrophas, Lefka to Korinna. The airfield at Aghirda is said to be in shape to take Dakota aircraft.

2. Callaghan is ready to believe that the Turks are capable of this kind of duplicity. Gunes had assured him, as he had me, this morning that the Turkish armed forces have no intention of broadening their
territorial holdings. However Gunes had apparently alluded in an oblique way, as he had with me, to the possibility that further military action might be required if Turkey’s objectives were not obtained by diplomatic means. While not wishing to definitely rule out this possibility, I said that we had several pieces of information recently including an apparent air mobilization which had caused us to go into the Defense Minister twice in the last several days. We had been assured that “nothing was afoot”. Callaghan immediately began painting the picture of a British reaction to this contingency, including a British military reaction. He said that he would have solid backing for this because it was inconceivable that there would be any possible justification for the Turkish action and anyway “Wilson liked to play with soldiers”. Before he could work up any more righteous indignation I suggested that the first step was to obtain the best estimate of our intelligence services and of our respective Embassies. I promised him I would seek such an assessment and report to him tomorrow. I also mentioned that of course we were aware that a number of contingency plans had always existed in the TGS files. In fact some of those plans seem to have appeared in newspaper reports in the last few days from Ankara and it was at least possible that the air mobilization and leaks of further intentions represented Turk effort at psychological warfare.

3. Would appreciate soonest Washington assessment since this report will obviously color Callaghan’s attitude in the crucial hours of negotiation this weekend.

Dale

126. Telegram From the Mission in Geneva to the Department of State

Geneva, August 9, 1974, 1940Z.

5151. For the Secretary from Hartman. Subj: Cyprus Phase II—Callaghan Strategy.

1. We had a long exchange of assessments with Callaghan and his staff the afternoon of August 9. It led him to develop a strategy which he tentatively plans to use for concluding this phase of the Geneva talks

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1 Source: Ford Library, National Security Adviser, Kissinger-Scowcroft West Wing Office Files, 1969-77, Box 8, Cyprus 32. Secret; Immediate; Exdis Handle As Nodis. Sent with instructions to pass Niact Immediate to Ankara, Athens, London, and Nicosia.
and establishing a framework for ongoing negotiations. The strategy is designed to take into account what UK and we have ascertained to date as to the positions for the various parties, including those not directly involved, such as Makarios and the USSR. Callaghan also stated frankly that it is designed to meet his minimal political needs at home where he, as Chairman of a Labor Party approaching elections, simply cannot afford to be seen as completely selling out the new Greek Govt.

2. The basic elements of this strategy are simple and are set forth below.

3. On the constitutional side, Callaghan understands the strength of Turkey’s demand for a prior commitment in principle by Greece (as well as Greek Cypriots) to the concept of an autonomous Turkish Cypriot administration in a separate geographical area, within an independent, sovereign state. Without a prior commitment along these lines Turkey may refuse to agree to ongoing negotiations and resort again soon to military acquisition of additional territory. The wording of such a commitment, whether it be verbal or written, will be very important in order to minimize the political strain it will place on the Greek Govt and Clerides. However, the commitment, in one form or another, appears a sine qua non. My advice to Gunes was that the Turks should not demand excessive precision. Above all, but for obvious reasons I did not say this yet to Gunes, they should not insist at this session on a reference to the percentages of total land area or on a map of their zone. (I believe Callaghan understands the importance of trying to avoid a map approach to the regions in this phase.)

4. To balance the constitutional commitment by Greece, Callaghan will seek a commitment by Turkey on the phased reduction of troops, to begin following the conclusion of this phase of the Geneva talks and the beginning of working-level discussions on constitutional arrangements. (Dept. and Ankara will recall that Ecevit told me on August 4 that this was conceivable for him if the Greeks agreed in sufficient detail to the principle of the Turkish idea on geographic autonomous administration, and that it could begin before final agreement on the new constitutional arrangements.) Among the questions almost certain to arise are those of use of word “withdrawal”, time-table for reduction steps or phases, numbers to be evacuated in each stage, and linkage Greek numbers to Turkish numbers.

5. The ongoing talks, for which the above commitments are preconditions, are envisaged by Callaghan as taking place between Clerides and Denktash, preferably without Greek, Turkish, British or UN representatives either participating or observing. However, there would be some agreed formula (probably incorporated into a phase II Geneva declaration) which states that the talks are not on previous inter-communal basis and that the two will report results of their
efforts back to a tripartite Foreign Ministers meeting which would be
set for the first week in September. This would help meet Turkish con-
cerns that the talks not drag out, not be a reversion to the old inter-
communal formula (and 1960 Constitution), yet be associated with tri-
partite guarantors of 1960 Constitution. It would also help meet the
UK and Greek concern that they not be associated directly with draw-
ing up a new constitution for an independent state. Callaghan is reluc-
tant to have a British presence but he assumes that the parties will have
unofficial advisers and plenty of guidance from Greece and Turkey.
Waldheim has told Callaghan that old format for talks is dead and he
sees (and wants) no role for the UN. A potential problem in Callaghan’s
idea of framework is Clerides’ need for political support or “cover”
which might cause him prefer more direct Greek participation.

6. Conclusion:
A. I find myself more and more forced into the role of “professional
optimist” among these gloomy Joes. After listening to Callaghan in Lon-
don express his righteous indignation about even sitting down with fel-
loors who break their word (read Turkey), I gradually nursed him (with
no great opposition on his part since he was really letting off steam) to
the point where he began to see his role as impartial chairman and not
a moral arbiter of equities. Each time we see each other, however, he
has new bad news and half the conversation is nudging him back on
the positive thinking road. I congratulated him profusely on his first
day’s efforts to help assure that he goes out of his corner tonight in an
up mood. He was in good mood after our long discussion but his final
comment to me at short meeting a propos another Turk military action,
was an old Derbyshire miner’s saying more crudely put: “Never let
them kick you in the tail twice by the same boot.”

B. Needless to say both Gunes and Mavros are also pessimistic
since both realize that an agreement means receding from their pres-
ent positions. They both seem to have a detached view that assumes
things won’t work out and it will be someone else’s fault. Gunes has
been hauled back before by Ankara for being too “soft” and seems to
have lost his zest for negotiations. Mavros seems to fear he might be
instructed by Caramanlis to make concessions which would weaken
his political base. What is lacking is the human element and I can only
hope that Clerides and Denktash may supply it. I am afraid my own
appearance of optimism is only barely credible.

C. If Callaghan’s strategy is to succeed, it is clear he will require
our continuing support. At some moment this may well require firm,
high-level démarches to both Ecevit and Caramanlis. Addressees
should be thinking about how this can best be done. My guess is that
critical moment will probably hit August 11.

Dale
127. Transcript of Telephone Conversation Between President Ford and Secretary of State Kissinger

Washington, August 10, 1974, 3:40 p.m.

F: Yes, Henry.
K: Mr. President, sorry to bother you.
F: That's all right.
K: We are having some developments on Cyprus. Until I know how you want to work, I thought I should check with you on some of these actions. You know the Greeks and Turks are meeting under the British Chairmanship in Geneva and we have an Assistant Secretary there to be generally helpful.
F: Sisco?
K: No. Art Hartman. The British Minister represents a government that will have to stand for election so they are looking for a quick success and they are a bit like a bull in a china shop. Callaghan is not too experienced. The Turks want a quick result leading to partition of the Island into Greek and Turkish parts with sort of a general federal government which would however be very weak. They have about 15 percent of the island and want 30 percent. They might try to grab it. I have talked to the Prime Minister of Turkey. He was a student of mine and I have told him that we could not really in the first 48 hours of your term of office—be very relaxed about unilateral military action.
F: We sure cannot.
K: If that happens we might have to disassociate from that which we have tried to avoid. Our danger in Turkey and why we must maneuver carefully. They might turn very nationalistic and the Russians have been trying to exploit that but we cannot let them act unilaterally. I am writing a letter to Ecevit. He has promised to hold off for 24 hours. I am writing to Ecevit on my behalf outlining where I see the

1 Source: Library of Congress, Manuscript Division, Kissinger Papers, Box 385, Telephone Conversations, Chronological File. No classification marking. Ford took the oath of office as the 38th President at noon on August 9, following Nixon’s resignation. (Ford Library, National Security Adviser, President’s Daily Diary)


3 Kissinger spoke with Ecevit at 3:35 p.m. (Transcript of telephone conversation; Library of Congress, Manuscript Division, Kissinger Papers, Box 385, Telephone Conversations, Chronological File)

4 Telegram 175382 to Ankara, August 11, transmitted the letter to Ecevit. (Ibid., Box 238, Turkey, April–September 1974)
negotiations stand. The Turks propose two areas—one Turkish & one Greek. I think the Greeks we can push into a position where they would be willing to accept two or three autonomous Turkish areas but not one contiguous area. That would avoid a population transfer.

F: Right.

K: This would give us an opportunity to stall military actions long enough to get it working on the foreign minister level to see if we can get a compromise.

F: You think the letter to Ecevit will first hold off any military action and secondly maybe lead to some modification of their demand.

K: Right. The British are all out backing the Greeks right now and are even threatening military action against the Turks which is one of the stupidest things I have heard. All they have there on Cyprus are a few Phantoms and 1,000 troops. It is purely a political thing. They could not pull it off. They want to get a crisis started and we would then have to settle it and they would claim credit.

F: Why don’t you proceed. I will be here in Washington all weekend. It seems sensible to me and I would rely on your good judgment.

K: Right, Mr. President. If anything happens I will call you. I will not bother you with every tactical move.

F: The general idea, I approve.

K: It is to take a position which is between the British and the Greek position and the Turkish one so we can ameliorate the Turkish demand but not let the Turks claim that we were the ones that thwarted them and at the same time be tough against unilateral Turkish military moves.

F: And calm down our British friends a bit.

K: Yes. We will get a message to Callaghan.5

F: Sounds sensible to me.

K: When we get to regular morning briefings I will have it set up to give you a briefing so we can tell you what we expect for that day. You will not have such short term questions. However, they may come up from time to time. I will proceed on that basis.

F: Thank you, Henry.

5 Presumably sent in telegram 175407 to Geneva, August 11. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy Files, 1974, P840109–2567)
128. Memorandum of Conversation

Washington, August 12, 1974, 2:45 p.m.

SUBJECT
Cyprus

PARTICIPANTS
Henry A. Kissinger, Secretary of State
Robert S. Ingersoll, Deputy Secretary of State
Joseph J. Sisco, Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs
Wells Stabler, Deputy Assistant Secretary, EUR
Lawrence S. Eagleburger, Executive Assistant to the Secretary
William Eagleton, EUR/SE
Edward P. Djerejian, Special Assistant to Mr. Sisco

Stabler: Callaghan called Hartman. Callaghan had just talked to Denktash who said that his Turkish protectors have gone crazy and that they are ready to shoot their way [out]. He said there was nothing he could do with them. Art said that Callaghan will call you to see where we go from here. There is a Turkish Cabinet meeting on now.

Eagleburger: McCloskey thinks if Denktash says what he has, this is a serious situation.

(The Secretary called British Ambassador Ramsbotham into the office.)

Kissinger: Apparently Gunes has made a proposition to take it or leave it. Denktash said the Turks on his island have gone crazy. Should I issue a proclamation against the Turks?

(The Secretary placed a call to Turkish Prime Minister Ecevit). Ramsbotham: I thought both Denktash and Clerides were looking at the draft we had proposed. What happened?

Stabler: The Turks instructed Gunes to call a meeting tonight.

Kissinger: Have the Turks put forward their cantonal proposal?

Stabler: Their position is that the Geneva participants meet at once to establish agreement, in principle, on the one autonomous zone concept and then further discussions continue.

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1 Source: National Archives, RG 59, Records of Henry Kissinger, Entry 5403, Box 9, Nodis Memoranda of Conversations, August 1974, Folder 8. Secret; Nodis. Drafted by Djerejian. The meeting was held in Kissinger’s office and followed an earlier meeting at 11:30 a.m. (Ibid.)

2 Ecevit was apparently not available because he was in a meeting, but the two talked at 4:15 p.m. (Transcript of telephone conversation; Library of Congress, Manuscript Division, Kissinger Papers, Box 385, Telephone Conversations, Chronological File)
Ramsbotham: Acceptance of what?
Kissinger: One northern Turkish zone.
(Stabler showed the area on a map.)
Kissinger: Have they put this proposal forward?
Stabler: Yes, to Callaghan. They want acceptance of this larger area in the north and then to start substantive discussions on other arrangements.
Ramsbotham: The larger zone means almost doubling the triangle they presently hold.
Kissinger: There is nothing we can do until we hear from Callaghan. I will talk to Ecevit and tell him to put the proposal forward.
Ramsbotham: The Turks' excuse is Greece is sending in troops and that the British are doing something.
Stabler: This meeting has gone on for five days without any formal sessions. Basically they have been concentrating on the nuts and bolts of the Turkish enclave but have had no formal meetings to discuss the bigger issues. We should try to find out from Ecevit if he is indeed issuing an ultimatum. We have tried to resist this in the past.
Kissinger: What exactly have the Turks done? Assuming it is an ultimatum, what do we do? Use the 12 F-4s? After my call to Ecevit has failed, what do we do?
Stabler: If he is determined to go, there is not much we can do.
Kissinger: We would not support him in the UN Security Council and we would probably have to support a resolution against the Government of Turkey. Then what do we do?
Ramsbotham: What would the Soviet attitude be?
Kissinger: They would probably be against the Turks.
Sisco: The Soviets are in an awkward position as well.
McCloskey: If Ecevit confirms it is an ultimatum, we vote against them in the UN Security Council and then consider cutting off military assistance.
Kissinger: We will not do that. It will not be done, at least not right away. We are throwing the threat of military assistance around like it is charity. What is the long-range advantage to the U.S.?

3 Kissinger and Callaghan spoke at 5:05 p.m. and 5:50 p.m. They spoke about how to put the proposal forward and balance the Turkish demand for a quick response on the size of a Turkish enclave, the sense of an impending second Turkish invasion, and the need to get the Greeks to consider a Turkish enclave. (Transcripts of telephone conversations; ibid.)

4 Kissinger did so in the 4:15 p.m. telephone call. (Transcript of telephone conversation; ibid.)
McCloskey: They cannot continue to enjoy U.S. military assistance if they are running loose in an area the U.S. is interested in.

Kissinger: Let’s see what the situation is.

Ramsbotham: The Germans have begun to do something about assistance to Turkey.

Kissinger: We did that after the Suez crisis in ’56—a grandstand play and look where it got us.

(Turning to Mr. Sisco) Joe, prepare by 6:00 this evening a paper on exactly what we can do in this situation.5

5 Printed as Document 130.

129. Memorandum of Conversation1

Washington, August 13, 1974, 9 a.m.

PARTICIPANTS

President Ford
Dr. Henry A. Kissinger, Secretary of State and Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs
Major General Brent Scowcroft, Deputy Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs

[General Scowcroft came in late.]2

Kissinger: The problem in Geneva is that the Turks see that the more the negotiations are protracted the more difficult the unilateral military move becomes. The Greeks are procrastinating—they want to go home for 36 hours and then resume discussions. The Turks so far have refused to grant a 36-hour extension because it would make it that much harder to take unilateral action.

President: What would we do if the Turks moved?

Kissinger: We would have to vote against them in the Security Council. We would have our hands full to keep the Greeks from going to war. The Turks right now are extremely nationalistic. For a few years

1 Source: Library of Congress, Manuscript Division, Kissinger Papers, Box CL 123, Geopolitical File, Cyprus, Chronological File. Secret; Nodis. The meeting was held in the Oval Office.

2 Brackets are in the original.
ago, the Turkish tactics are right—grab what they want and then negotiate on the basis of possession. But if the Turks run loose on Cyprus, the Greeks could come unglued. We certainly do not want a war between the two, but if it came to that, Turkey is more important to us and they have a political structure which could produce a Qadhafi.

[Scowcroft left to call Macomber and returned after about 10 minutes.]

Kissinger: We have been trying to bail the Cyprus situation out after it got out of control. The British have made a mess of it. If the Turks move to take what they want, they will be condemned in the Security Council and the Soviet Union will beat them over the head with it. Some of my colleagues want to cut off assistance to Turkey—that would be a disaster. There is no American reason why the Turks should not have one-third of Cyprus. We will make a statement today that will get the New York Times off our back, but we should not twist their arm.

I would like to mention the Turkish poppy issue. President Nixon signed a letter to Ecevit which, because of Cyprus, we have not yet delivered. We could redo the letter for your signature, or I could send it. I think the whole poppy situation is a loser. Do you want to have a brawl with the Turks, or should I? Maybe I should do it.

President: The other side of the coin is that you already have very good relations with Ecevit and there would be less damage coming from me.

Kissinger: Let’s wait a bit. If we come out of the Cyprus thing all right, we will have more leverage. The Turks can’t focus on it now anyway.

President: Yes. Let’s wait a bit.

[Omitted here is discussion unrelated to Cyprus.]

3 Brackets are in the original.
130. Paper Prepared in the Department of State

Washington, undated.

Cyprus Contingencies

The Problem

The problem is what we should do if the Geneva conference breaks off because the Turks insist that the northeastern third of Cyprus be ceded to Turkey as a precondition for further negotiations.

Background/Analysis

If the talks are broken off, there will almost certainly be meetings of the UN Security Council and of the NATO Council. In these meetings, there will be pressure on the Turks to refrain from military action to enforce their claim and on both sides to resume talks.

If the Turks move out of the areas they currently hold to enforce their claim, they will be resisted by the Greek Cypriot National Guard. But, with over 30,000 Turkish troops on the island, resistance cannot be serious, or delay Turkish advances long.

If the Turks break out and do not halt soon, at some point the Greek Government is liable to attack Turkish forces. Turkey enjoys military preponderance everywhere, but frustration will force the Greeks to attack anyway, even with foreknowledge that they will lose. They cannot seriously reinforce on Cyprus, though they may move to do so, and are therefore likely to attack in Thrace.

There are therefore three contingencies: a breakoff of talks without a Turkish breakout on Cyprus; a Turkish breakout and hostilities on Cyprus without Greek-Turkish fighting elsewhere; and Greek-Turkish fighting outside Cyprus.

Our goal, as in July, should be to prevent Greek-Turkish hostilities and to get talks started. But the situation will be worse than in July—both governments will be passionately united, talking will appear to have been unproductive, and the Greeks will have no military option whatsoever on Cyprus, so that Thracian hostilities are more likely.

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The Soviet Angle

A breakdown of the Geneva talks and renewed hostilities on Cyprus will stimulate Soviet efforts to throw the crisis into the Security Council, where Moscow believes that it has a better chance of influencing its outcome. The Soviets have consistently criticized the Geneva venue and the Geneva declaration because they suspect the conference was seeking to arrange a partition of the island rather than to implement Resolution 353 of the Security Council.2

Given the circumstances, Moscow’s first priority at the UN will be to seek clear-cut public agreement in principle from Athens and Ankara to maintain Cyprus as a sovereign state on the basis of a new federal arrangement between the two national communities. Extracting such an agreement, however, poses monumental problems, the most pressing being time.

The Soviets have little ability to influence either Greek or Turkish actions quickly unless they opt either to assume a militantly threatening posture, i.e., seek to frighten the protagonists, or inject themselves directly by proposing a Tashkent-style mediation exercise. Given the NATO alignment and the likely repercussions of Soviet saber-rattling in the absence of a threat to USSR territory, we discount the prospect of resort to military posturing, i.e., maneuvers in the Balkans, at least until full-scale hostilities erupt in Thrace.

An offer to mediate would appear Moscow’s only feasible form of direct unilateral action at the moment, if indeed the USSR wants to become directly involved.

The Soviets have indications the Greeks might be responsive; they probably have doubts about the Turks.

The Turks, for their part, are acutely aware of Soviet objections to the thrust of their maneuvering on Cyprus; they would welcome Soviet background support but not Soviet involvement on the scene. In any event, Moscow will not proffer its services as mediator unless it has assurances from both sides that the services are acceptable. There is no such assurance at this point.

It would not be unrealistic to assume that the Soviets have already dangled some suggestion along this line before Athens. We doubt they have yet gone so far as to “promise” to keep the Bulgarian front quiet—or unquiet—in support of Greece. They probably have assured Athenas,

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2 The Geneva Declaration was signed on July 30 by the U.K., Greek, and Turkish Foreign Ministers at the conclusion of the first round of meetings at Geneva. It called for a ceasefire and security measures, implementation of UNSC resolution 353, and restoration of peace and constitutional government in Cyprus.
however, that Warsaw Pact intentions are related to preservation of an independent Cyprus, and they certainly have passed similar hints to the Turks by now. We would not rule out additional hints to Turkey that the USSR might even consider, in extremis, moving some of its naval vessels between Cyprus and Turkey.

Expectations that a Soviet mediation effort à la Tashkent will collapse on Turkish intransigence raises prospects of exacerbated Soviet-Turkish relations. However, it also raises prospects of a Greek-Soviet rapprochement as a consequence of the collapse.

Moscow could conceivably attempt to avoid the former and still gain the latter advantage by publicly proposing joint US-Soviet mediation. In that event, the US would have to decide.

—whether we want to participate in such a joint venture;
— if so, whether we think we could manipulate it to our advantage by neutralizing the possibility that it might result in closer Greek-Soviet relations.

Given time, the Soviets have some diplomatic assets at their disposal.

They were skillful in managing their relations with Ankara during the initial period of the Turkish intervention by maintaining a posture of benevolent neutrality. Strains developed only when Moscow began to suspect that Ankara was seeking partition rather than federation.

The Soviets could now try to convince the Turks that Ankara’s national interests would be best served by accepting a formula acceptable to the USSR, thereby assuring themselves of continued Soviet support on this issue as well as wider Turkish interests. Whether Turkey would be responsive to such an approach now is moot.

Athens is actually far less of a diplomatic problem since Karamanlis is already perceiving the advantage of striking a deal with the Soviets. Furthermore, Greece still formally backs the return of Makarios to Cyprus, which dovetails with Moscow’s own official position. We do not believe the Soviets will interject the Makarios factor at this stage of the crisis, nor attempt to diddle behind the scenes with the Archbishop, but we expect them to be keeping their channels of communication to His Beatitude open.

Contingency 1: Breakoff of Talks without a Turkish Breakout on Cyprus

In the event of the break-up or suspension of the Geneva talks and the concomitant threat of resumed military action either on Cyprus or in a wider Greek-Turk context, it will be important to develop urgently means of engaging the Governments of Turkey and Greece in discussions which have a chance of delaying military action which could rapidly escalate to Greek-Turkish conflict or possibly UK clashes with Turkey on
Cyprus. Options which might achieve this are considered in their order of effectiveness. However, it should be borne in mind that the possibility of carrying out the more effective options decreases as hostilities begin. The less effective options may still be possible after the outbreak of hostilities but their impact becomes even more questionable.

**Option I: Ecevit–Karamanlis Meeting**

Such a meeting, possibly in a third country, would make it difficult for the armed forces on either side to initiate action. There might be merit to having the meeting occur in a neutral (Vienna, Geneva) location or even in a non-aligned (Cairo, Malta) location to diminish the impression of a NATO or "guarantor powers" approach. From the US standpoint it would be best to have the UK call urgently for the meeting if the Geneva talks appear to be unsalvageable. The US would then support the meeting, referred to in Ecevit’s July 28 proposal of such a meeting. The UK could encourage the agreed host country to offer facilities. Rank UK and US (Sisco, Hartman) officials and possibly Greek and Turk Cypriot leaders should be on location in this scenario to help maintain contact.

**Option II: Geneva Recess Plus NATO Council**

Rather than let the Geneva talks fail, it would be better to have the participants agree to a recess during which a NATO Council meeting could be called to deal with the danger to the alliance of threatened hostilities between two member states. This would provide a potential delaying mechanism and avoid abandoning entirely the Geneva Guarantor Powers framework. This framework now has a useful status and recognition in SC resolution 353 but the Soviets will oppose reviving it in any future SC resolution in view of the threat to future Cypriot independence and non-alignment which they see in an agreement by the Guarantor Powers (they don’t like the Geneva Declaration). The NATO Council would not address the Cyprus problem per se (since that could immediately trigger a Soviet call for an SC meeting and resolution) but would convene specifically to examine a threatened weakening of the alliance caused by non-NATO related troop movements by Greece and Turkey.

**Option III: Geneva Recess plus Invitation to SYG**

On the same rationale as Option II, the Geneva talks would be recessed and the SYG asked to mediate between the parties. This could be a time-buying device but would probably only produce appeals by the SYG to us to restrain the Turks. It is unlikely that the SYG could be any more successful than Foreign Secretary Callaghan with the parties and, as far as the Turks are concerned, he starts off with two strikes against him. However, if faced by a possible Soviet-sponsored Security Council mis-
sion by three to five governments to Cyprus, (see Option V) an SYG role might be a lesser evil. Very possibly, the Turks would accept this idea only if it came about in this way, and by that time it might be too late to be effective. This option has the advantage of putting a prestigious office into play, a useful deterrent which does not, however, get the parties into direct negotiating interaction.

Option IV: Geneva Recess plus Presidential Emissary

In this option, the Geneva framework would again be preserved if at all possible, with an American intermediary volunteering, at the request of the parties, to revive negotiating momentum and buy time. The difficulty with this option is that it does not engage high-level officials face to face and runs the risk of the same kinds of delay and refusal which were used to frustrate Under Secretary Sisco’s bid in Ankara on July 19. The seriousness of the present situation would suggest that we would have to go back at least to the level of Sisco—or perhaps to a Presidential emissary who knows where the military and money come from in Congress (Laird? A current confidant of President Ford?). Assistant Secretary Hartman’s involvement with the present Geneva round would appear to rule him out if this round breaks down. This option also fails to engage the parties directly and has the added disadvantage of weakening the guarantor powers framework and putting the US in the middle, responsible in the eyes of both sides and their peoples for less-than-optimum compromises.

Option V: Security Council Action

Regardless of our ability to launch one of the foregoing options, the Security Council (SC) is likely to be convened if the Geneva Talks break down. Although we would not favor this, it can happen—either by the Greeks or Cypriots appealing the Turkish ultimatum, the UK reporting its findings on the Geneva talks and emphasizing their temporary recess, or the Soviets convening the SC as SC President for August.

The Soviet approach would be to (1) downplay the Zurich–London agreements (which so far have general mention in the main SC resolutions on Cyprus); (2) call for withdrawal of all non-Cypriot forces—(implying UK, Greek, and Turk); (3) play up the “Government of Cyprus” (meaning the non-aligned Makarios rather than the Greek and Turk Cypriot communities); and (4) assert the role of the Council in defending Cypriot independence against threatened dismemberment, perhaps through appointment of a SC mission to Cyprus. The Greeks, however, will not wish to see the Zurich–London treaty structure altogether abandoned; rather they would prefer reinterpretation to produce the withdrawal of the Turks—or at minimum their withdrawal to the July 22 cease-fire lines. This will somewhat inhibit the Soviet effort.
We should encourage the UK to propose, with our support, an alternative way of maintaining the negotiating momentum (e.g., one of the first four options) in lieu of a Security Council mission. The US–UK success in blunting Soviet efforts will, in the last analysis, depend on the credibility and acceptability of the chosen option which should, in the event of a SC meeting, be mentioned, endorsed, or encouraged by the SC if a resolution is being negotiated. Given the membership of the Council—Iraq and Mauretania as Moslem states will not be automatically aligned against the Turks—there is a good chance of neutralizing a Soviet effort in this manner.

The Soviets (possibly with Greek support) may be tempted at some point to try for a special Emergency Session of the General Assembly—where non-aligned votes are plentiful—especially if fighting breaks out again. A Special UNGA has no advantages for us and should be discouraged if at all possible with the argument that the Council continues to be effectively seized of the matter. If it should convene, it is unlikely to be able to act in a time-frame relevant to the present stage of the crisis and in any event the Turks will not consider its action binding.

Although we would not favor going to the Security Council as an option in and of itself, in the event of the breakdown of the Geneva talks, we should consider a preemptive move to the Council either alone or with the British once we select one of the previous four options. In this way we might get the Council to focus on and endorse the preferred option, thus inhibiting other efforts in the Council which could be unhelpful.

Contingency 2: Turkish Breakout and Hostilities on Cyprus without Greek-Turkish Fighting Elsewhere

Our major goal should be to prevent extension of the fighting, while working to keep the Soviets out of the picture.

Our tactics will depend partly on previous activity:

—If the UK is still out front and U.S. bargaining leverage is still intact, the United States can more effectively urge restraint on both Greeks and Turks.

—If a Karamanlis/Ecevit meeting and/or a Sisco trip, designed to gain time and get the parties talking again, have not taken place, they may still be available, although this is uncertain.

To prevent extension of the conflict, we should take four immediate steps:

—make high-level representations to both sides: this will involve a more forward U.S. public posture.
—warn both sides, as in July, that they cannot indulge in warfare with an open military pipeline to us.
—interject Waldheim and Luns (and possibly SACEUR on a personal basis), to counterbalance our more forward role.

—move U.S. naval elements into position to evacuate American citizens from Greece and Turkey (and to apply pressure).

To inhibit Soviet interference, we should:

—renew our public and private warnings against outside interference, while assuring the Soviets we are not seeking outcomes which injure their interests;

—renew our commitment to Cyprus independence and press the Turks to do likewise: this deprives the Soviets of a legal basis for interference, and pressure on the Turks could constrain the Greeks from seeking Soviet support;

—advertise our support for the UN role, and bottle the Soviets up in the UN.

We must recognize that the more desperate the Greeks, and the larger the UN and NATO roles, the greater the scope for Soviet meddling. The Soviets are already edging closer to Greece, and the Greeks are sure to be vociferous in the UN; an active NATO role will fire Soviet fears of NATOization of Cyprus. On the one hand, an active Soviet “tilt” towards Greece would isolate the Turks completely and enhance our leverage with them, but on the other hand it could leave Greece open to long-term Soviet influence. The best antidote to Soviet meddling if fighting begins on the Island would therefore be visible U.S. restraint on the Turks. Only you can choose the moment to apply it.

Finally, if all else fails, we should consider promoting a Foreign Ministers’ meeting under NATO auspices.

Contingency 3: War between Greece and Turkey

If Greek-Turkish hostilities break out, the best outcome we can hope for will be a strengthened partition situation on Cyprus, Greek honor saved, and both sides still in NATO and ready to begin talking again. At worst, the Turks will have imposed partition of the Island, the Greeks (whether Karamanlis or his over-thrower) will be humiliated, NATO will be shattered, and the Soviets hopping mad.

Our goal would have to be a ceasefire, with resumption of talks secondary, and it would be essential to exclude the Soviets and keep the UN role to a minimum.

In a war, the Turks have the capacity to “take” Cyprus (although occupation would amount to daytime control of roads in many areas), to take some Greek islands off their coast, and to advance in Thrace after initial losses.

In a war, the Soviets are likely to side diplomatically with the Greeks, who might well announce withdrawal from NATO. This would leave Turkey isolated in the international community.
The immediate steps we would have to take would be:

— evacuation of American citizens;
— [1 line not declassified];
— mobilization of all “friendly” means (NATO and European) to obtain a ceasefire.

In practice, a ceasefire could only be obtained by the exercise of extreme U.S. pressure on Turkey to limit its war aims. While we should also urge restraint on the Greeks, we should above all:

— encourage the Turks to stop at the Kyrenia–Nicosia–Famagusta line on Cyprus;
— encourage them to assume the defensive in other areas, i.e. not to bomb the Greek mainland and not to take Greek islands which will become irredenta; and
— move U.S. naval forces between Greeks and Turks.

131. Minutes of Meeting of the Washington Special Actions Group

Washington, August 14, 1974, 3:10–3:45 p.m.

SUBJECT
Cyprus

PARTICIPANTS
Chairman—Henry A. Kissinger

State
Robert Ingersoll
Joseph Sisco
Wells Stabler
Robert McCloskey

Defense
Robert Ellsworth
Gen. Denis McAuliffe
Amos Jordan

JCS
Gen. George S. Brown
LTG John W. Pauly

1 Source: Ford Library, NSC Institutional Files (H–Files), Box H–18, WSAG Meeting Minutes, 1974. Top Secret; Sensitive. The meeting took place in the Situation Room of the White House.
SUMMARY OF CONCLUSIONS

It was agreed that:

— the F-4s now located at Torrejon, Spain would be held up until Friday, August 16, and that the F-4s now in the U.S. would be held up until Monday, August 19, using technical problems as the excuse;
— the WSAG Working Group would prepare contingency plans in the event of a Greek-Turkish war;
— that CIA would prepare an assessment of the domestic situation in both Greece and Turkey, with emphasis on Greece.

Secretary Kissinger: Bill . . .

Mr. Colby began to brief from the attached text. ²

Secretary Kissinger: That doesn’t seem to be their speciality. (referring to the possibility of a Turkish invasion along the northern coast of Cyprus)

Mr. Colby: No, you’re right, it isn’t. (continued to brief)

Secretary Kissinger: What do you mean the Greeks are hard pressed?

Mr. Colby: That they are being pushed by the Turks in that area between Nicosia and Famagusta. Incidentally, we do have a press report of a ceasefire. It’s from Nicosia, but we are unable to confirm it. (continued to brief)

Secretary Kissinger: What do you mean by a Greek defeat? (referring to the statement in the briefing that Karamanlis might not be able to survive a clear Greek defeat over Cyprus)

Mr. Colby: A Turkish victory in the Cyprus area—Turkish occupation of the whole island. I don’t think that is their intention—to take the whole island—only that part they want.

Secretary Kissinger: (to Mr. Sisco) Have we heard from those recalcitrants at State? I mean the ambassadors abroad—in response to our cables?

² Attached but not printed. The briefing indicated that the Turkish offensive on Cyprus was making progress. While there were no signs of significant changes in Turkish forces on the mainland, the Greek forces had increased their readiness.
Mr. Sisco: No, nothing. They just went out a few hours ago.

Secretary Kissinger: What we are talking about is that we sent messages today to Ecevit, Karamanlis, and Clerides outlining our views on the current situation.3 Haven’t we heard anything from any of them today?

Mr. Sisco: Yes, we did get a message from Karamanlis which said that they were withdrawing their military forces from NATO, but that they were not withdrawing politically.4 It was cautious, gave as the reason, NATO’s inability to stop Turkish intervention.

Secretary Kissinger: I think that it is in our interest now to keep all avenues of negotiation open. Our major strategy now is not to get ourselves in a position that would give vent to righteous indignation on the part of either the Greeks or the Turks. I think this development has its own logic for solution. We don’t want to contribute to the Greek humiliation, and we don’t want the Turks to feel that we have turned against them. The British are out in front on this thing, and as long as the British are out in front, it is better from our point of view. We’re going to take some heat, I’m sure of that, but time will ease that. What we want now is to get a disengagement of forces. In my judgment, it is going to wind up that way—would have anyway if they would have accepted our 48-hour proposal.

Our goal now is to make it possible for the Greeks to accept this. At the end of this meeting I want to establish a firm press line that we all will follow.

(to Mr. Colby) What is your assessment of the Greeks and Turks going to war?

Mr. Colby: We don’t think it’s in the cards, at least at this point.

Mr. Sisco: (to Mr. Colby) What is CIA’s estimate of rising anti-Americanism in Greece?

Secretary Kissinger: We don’t really care at this point about rising anti-Americanism in Greece. We’re not playing 48-hour politics here. Our interest is in what happens three weeks from now.

Mr. Sisco: I understand, but is there really something to it? How broad is anti-Americanism?

Mr. Colby: Well . . .

Secretary Kissinger: I was talking to Callaghan this morning,5 and he was complaining that he is unpopular in Greece. I can understand

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3 Telegrams 177679 to Ankara and 177680 to Athens, both August 14. No telegram to Nicosia was found. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy Files, 1974)

4 Transmitted in telegram 5694 from Athens, August 14. (Ibid.)

5 No record of this conversation has been found.
that. In this business you are paid by your results, and he didn’t deliver a damn thing! I have no doubt that the Greek Left will go after us after the thing is over.

Mr. Colby: They’ll go after us anyway.

Secretary Kissinger: At the least, we can get credit for stopping the Turkish attack. If we play our cards right, and with some skill, we will come out of this thing on the good side, with both governments.

Mr. Colby: One critical area, however, is the Turkish military.

Secretary Kissinger: What do you mean?

Mr. Colby: They are the active force behind the Ecevit government. We’ve got to see that they come out all right.

Secretary Kissinger: I talked with Ecevit the other day, and he said the 36-hour proposal was that of the military. He promised he would do what he could to control them.

Mr. Colby: I think it would help if you could communicate with the Turkish Generals.

Secretary Kissinger: To what end? What do I tell them?

Mr. Colby: At least tell them to stop where they said they would.

Secretary Kissinger: Well, we’ll see what kind of answers we get back from our cables first. (to Mr. Sisco) What is the UN doing?

Mr. Sisco: There is a Security Council meeting scheduled for 5:00 p.m. today.

Secretary Kissinger: What are they going to talk about?

Mr. Sisco: Some resolution—condemnation of Turkey for its actions.

Secretary Kissinger: Let’s make sure we are not out in front on this thing. I agree that we had better wait until we get our answers from Greece, Turkey, and Cyprus, and tomorrow we can make a decision. Nobody here should talk until we get our answers. We just can’t go beyond where we are now at this point.

Amb. Ellsworth: There are two things of concern to us...

Secretary Kissinger: Okay, we’ll support the U.N. efforts to end the trouble, but lay-off on the condemnations. I saw Dobrynin today and told the Soviets to lay off, and they agreed to do nothing. They would agree to do anything at this point. Okay, the military...

Amb. Ellsworth: The first thing is that we have two firm cargoes—a mixture of military grant and aid—enroute to Athens and Ankara. It’s easy to tell them to stay where they are or to go on...

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6 Apparent reference to Kissinger’s telephone conversation with Ecevit on August 12 at 5:26 p.m. (Library of Congress, Manuscript Division, Kissinger Papers, Box 385, Telephone Conversations, Chronological File)
Secretary Kissinger: Where are they now?

Amb. Ellsworth: One is scheduled to offload at Pireus, Athens’ port, on Saturday. It is carrying cargo for both the Greeks and the Turks. What worries me is that the Greeks might pull the same thing they did before, grab the stuff headed for Turkey.

Gen. Brown: What’s the name of that ship?

Amb. Ellsworth: The Lash Espana. We can tell them to proceed on course but to check with us before they go into Pireus.

Secretary Kissinger: Tell them not to stop unless they receive orders from here.

Gen. Brown: I have an outgoing message here that says that under the direction of the Secretary of State, they are not to go into Athens or Ankara, but to be held where they are.

Secretary Kissinger: That is total nonsense. I want them to keep going as if nothing is happening. I don’t want to escalate this thing into a big deal. Our object is to keep NATO together and to keep peace between the two parties.

(to Mr. Sisco) What about General Brown’s information? Who is it in State that told the military not to offload the cargo?

Gen. Brown: My information is from J–4, which is working with your office (to Mr. Ellsworth).

Mr. Jordan: I was told that we were told by State to do this.

Secretary Kissinger: (to Mr. Sisco) Find the guy who did this. I want to know who did this. Tell the Greeks that the ship is coming in, and ask them if we can get their assurance that it will not be tampered with. Can you still split the cargo?

Amb. Ellsworth: Yes, that’s no problem.

Gen. Brown: She’s due in Naples tomorrow. We can split the cargo there.

Amb. Ellsworth: We’ll get that corrected. The next subject concerns the F–4s. We’ve got some going to both Greece and Turkey. We have some in Torrejon, Spain, and some in the U.S., ready to move.

Secretary Kissinger: Hold the ones at Torrejon until the 16th—Friday. Hold the ones in the U.S. until next Monday. Use technical problems as an excuse.

Amb. Ellsworth: Okay. Next subject—[2 lines not declassified]

Secretary Kissinger: [5 lines not declassified]

Amb. Ellsworth: [1½ lines not declassified]

Secretary Kissinger: [1½ lines not declassified]

Gen. Brown: [2 lines not declassified]

Secretary Kissinger: That’s a good idea. We didn’t have a working group during the last crisis, but I think it would be a good idea to get
one together. Dick (Mr. Kennedy), would you take charge of that? What I want you to look at is two things: (1) contingency plans for a Greek-Turkish war; and (2) a CIA estimate of the domestic situation in both countries, particularly in Greece. I think we have sent out all the necessary messages. The President talked to Harold Wilson early today. I’m not going to send any message to the Soviet Union. I have a message from NATO Secretary General Luns that he intends to go to Athens and Ankara. I don’t think he will do any good, but I have no objections to his going.

Amb. Ellsworth: We have no objections, but I don’t think it will do much good.

Gen. Brown: I talked with General Goodpaster this morning, who talked with Luns. It’s Luns’ opinion that we just ought to go slow on this thing for the time being.

Secretary Kissinger: Callaghan told me this morning that he thinks he made a mistake by siding with the Greeks. He also thinks he didn’t move fast enough. He’s right! He now believes that diplomacy will not work. He believes the Turks will occupy only what they want and that the situation will eventually evolve into a federated state of some type. I don’t agree with all of his ideas. I think we can move toward a constructive agreement, but first we must get a ceasefire.

The Press—what did we say at the noon briefing?

Amb. McCloskey: That if there was no ceasefire we would have to withdraw military assistance from both countries, and that if war develops between two NATO allies, they would get no support from the U.S.

Secretary Kissinger: We’ll see what answers we get back. We’ll meet again tomorrow. Do we have anything scheduled tomorrow?

Gen. Scowcroft: An SRG on Australia.

Secretary Kissinger: We’ll scrub Australia and have a WSAG tomorrow at 10:30. Did you brief the congressional people?

Amb. McCloskey: Everybody but Rhodes. He hasn’t called me back.

Secretary Kissinger: Good. We’ll meet again tomorrow at 10:30.

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7 No record of this conversation has been found.
132. Minutes of Meeting of the Washington Special Actions Group

Washington, August 15, 1974, 11:36 a.m.–noon.

SUBJECT
Cyprus

PARTICIPANTS
Chairman—Henry A. Kissinger
State
Robert S. Ingersoll
Joseph Sisco
Wells Stabler
Robert McCloskey
Defense
William Clements
Robert Ellsworth
Gen. Denis McAuliffe
JCS
Gen. George S. Brown
Lt. Gen. John Pauly
CIA
William Colby
George Lauder
NSC Staff
Maj. Gen. Brent Scowcroft
Richard T. Kennedy
A. Denis Clift
James G. Barnum

SUMMARY OF CONCLUSIONS
It was agreed that:
—JCS and Defense will determine, by this afternoon, what is involved if it is decided to offload the MAP and FMS equipment to Turkey first; and
—a determination on the forward movement of the F–4s located at Torrejon, Spain and in the U.S. would be made tomorrow.

Secretary Kissinger: Bill . . .

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1 Source: Ford Library, NSC Institutional Files (H–Files), Box H–18, WSAG Meeting Minutes, 1974. Top Secret; Sensitive. The meeting took place in the Situation Room of the White House.
Mr. Colby began to brief from the attached text. 2

Secretary Kissinger: We’ve called somebody—who was it—about that, and have a direct report from Famagusta that they are not being fired upon. (in reference to an unconfirmed report that Turkish forces were invading the British Sovereign Base Area at Famagusta)

Mr. Colby: We’re checking on that now.

Secretary Kissinger: We have a direct report, by telephone that they (the Turks) are not firing on Famagusta. I think we can trust the British enough to know whether they are being fired upon or not.

Mr. Colby finished his briefing.

Mr. Sisco: When is Papadopoulos due back?3

Mr. Stabler: On the 19th (of August).

Secretary Kissinger: We ought to offer him a ten-year position at Harvard!

Mr. Sisco: Yes, with tenure!

Mr. Ingersoll: Bill, do you have anything on reinforcements from Turkey?

Mr. Colby: We have nothing so far. They have the capability to move reinforcements any time they wish, but we have seen no reflections as yet.

Secretary Kissinger: We have received reassurances from Ecevit that the Turks will not move south of that line they have established. 4 I think that their military operation will run its course by tomorrow.

Mr. Colby: Well, one potential problem is the area to the northwest. They may try to take that too.

Mr. Sisco: They said they were going to keep their military operation going until they get what they want.

Secretary Kissinger: Yes, but they also said that it would end tomorrow.

Mr. Colby: That area to the northwest is not very far. It’s only about 40 miles from the controlled area.

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2 Attached but not printed. Colby briefed on indications that Clerides might be ready to hand over the northern part of Cyprus to the Turks. The Turkish offensive continued on the island, but there were no further reports of a Greek build-up on the mainland. The Cyprus fighting also had domestic political ramifications in Greece and Turkey. In Greece, anti-American sentiment was on the rise, but Karamanlis seemed at least briefly enhanced by the fact that he did not cause the Cyprus coup. In Turkey, Ecevit faced hard-liners on Cyprus, which decreased his ability to negotiate a settlement.

3 Apparently a reference to Andreas Papandreou.

4 See footnote 6, Document 131.
Mr. Clements: Joe, (Mr. Sisco) when we first met at this table—when this Cyprus thing first got started—we talked a lot about that southwest area and what might happen there. As I recall, we were worried about that area and thought they might try to take that also. What is your judgement of what might happen?

Mr. Sisco: That is of some concern.

Mr. Colby: There is quite a concentration of Turks in that southwest area. There could be some further attempts to take it.

Secretary Kissinger: Well, I think that once this Turkish operation runs its course, they won’t go any further. We won’t stand for it. We just can’t stand for any more Turk operations. They have already stretched us to the limit.

Mr. Colby: The Greek Government could be in for a hard time if the Turks move on those Turkish communities in the southwest.

Secretary Kissinger: Why?

Mr. Colby: The shock effect in Athens. This would be looked on as further aggression—could topple the government.

Mr. Ingersoll: That would fill out the line they said earlier that they wanted.

Mr. Colby: Yes, that’s right.

Secretary Kissinger: Well, we haven’t heard from the Greeks yet. What has happened? Has Embassy Athens broken diplomatic relations with me? We should have heard two hours ago, and we haven’t heard anything yet?5

Mr. McCloskey: We haven’t heard yet.

Secretary Kissinger: Let them know that we want to know when they are sending the reply.

Mr. Ellsworth: Is there any authenticity to that press report that (Greek Foreign Minister) Mavros says that they are going to throw the U.S. military out of Greece?

Secretary Kissinger: We have no official report of that.

Mr. Ellsworth: There was also some press report that Mobil Oil personnel were going to be expelled.

Mr. Sisco: We have nothing on that.

Secretary Kissinger: We were told that that cable from Karamanlis would be here at 8:00 this morning and we don’t have it yet?

Mr. Sisco: When we get back, we’ll put a call into Athens and find out when it is coming.

5 Telegram 5713 from Athens, August 15, reported that Karamanlis hoped to respond on August 16. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy Files, 1974)
Mr. Ellsworth: On the F-4s and the ships . . .
Secretary Kissinger: On the ships, we were going to wait until tomorrow to tell them whether to go in or not.
Mr. Clements: Yes. We’re going to have to await word from you then.
Secretary Kissinger: Yes, we should know tomorrow morning. Can they go to Turkey first?
Mr. Ellsworth: Certainly.
Gen. Brown: It would be awkward though, and expensive. The equipment is containerized. It’s loaded according to which part is offloaded first.
Mr. Clements: The stuff that is last on, is first off, making it difficult. But, we can do it if you want to.
Secretary Kissinger: If we decided to offload in Turkey first, we’ll have to tell them by late tonight.
Gen. Brown: I have the list of equipment here. (reads from the list)
Mr. Ellsworth: Are any small arms included?
Gen. Brown: I don’t have anything on small arms. Let’s see, there are some recoilless rifles, torpedoes . . .
Secretary Kissinger: Then it would be possible to unload at Turkey first.
Mr. Clements: Oh, yes, it’s possible. It screws up the handling. But in answer to your question, yes it is possible to offload at Turkey first.
Gen. Brown: We can get an estimate from the ships company about what would be involved in offloading at Turkey.
Secretary Kissinger: Good. Can you get it to me by this afternoon?
Mr. Clements: Henry, I still have this gut feeling that we could still have some trouble in the southwest corner. I think the Greeks might well retaliate against those Turks in the communities down there, and a real fight could develop.
Mr. Colby: I think the chances of a backstage fight are good.
Secretary Kissinger: Well, you know, if this situation leads to double enosis, Makarios will become a Greek politician. There’s no joy in that. Okay, thank you.
133. Memorandum of Conversation

Washington, August 15, 1974, 4:30 p.m.

SUBJECT
Cyprus

PARTICIPANTS
Henry A. Kissinger, Secretary of State
Joseph J. Sisco, Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs
Robert M. McCloskey, Ambassador at Large
Arthur Hartman, Assistant Secretary, EUR
William B. Buffum, Assistant Secretary, IO
Wells Stabler, Deputy Assistant Secretary, EUR
Lawrence S. Eagleburger, Executive Assistant to the Secretary
Edward P. Djerejian, Special Assistant to Mr. Sisco

Kissinger: We should do another letter to Karamanlis. I have a call in to Ecevit to stop the military operations. I want a message out tonight and a Presidential message tomorrow to Karamanlis inviting him to a meeting with Ecevit and me somewhere in Europe. We made a mistake in not telling Karamanlis everything we had done to try to stop the Turks. We ought to do a letter to Karamanlis indicating that we realize his concerns; that we thought it most effective to deal with the Turks without publicity. Refer to the White House statement and my message to Mavros and tell him about my call to Ecevit. We must show him that we have done something. Later we can send a Presidential letter which proposes the meeting.

Sisco: I think it needs delay.

Kissinger: It’s coming out about right. They needed a fall guy.

Sisco: Tomorrow evening is about right, if the military operation goes on as we guessed. The matter has been decided on the ground

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1 Source: National Archives, RG 59, Records of Henry Kissinger, Entry 5403, Box 9, Nodis Memoranda of Conversations, August 1974, Folder 5. Secret; Nodis. Drafted by Edward Djerejian. The meeting was held in the Secretary’s office.
2 Regarding the first letter, see footnote 3, Document 131.
3 See Document 134.
4 In the White House statement, the President stated: the “United States disapproves of the Turkish military action on Cyprus and he strongly urges immediate compliance with the relative United Nations cease-fire resolutions.” (Telegram 179118 to Ankara, Nicosia, and Athens, August 15; National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy Files, 1974)
5 Presumably a reference to telegram 178613 to Athens, August 15. (Ibid., P850095–2349)
though there are broader considerations in seeing the Secretary of State.

Kissinger: The Soviets have proposed a joint initiative with the U.S. which involves a joint guarantee of the outcome of the negotiations and joint intervention in the case of war according to the agreement. I told them that if they interpreted the agreement in this manner, we would have to abrogate it.

We don’t have to have a meeting until the end of next week or even the beginning of the following week. Sooner or later the Greeks will have to give up. The best solution would be to have the Turks give up 10 percent of the 30 percent of the territory they have physically occupied.

You (Stabler) should draft a letter to Karamanlis. Make it an account of what we have done before. Include that the situation on Cyprus was lost by the previous Greek Government. Short of military intervention, which our domestic and other factors could not permit, we did what we could. They can count on our good will. Ecevit has assured us they will not move below this southern line. Refer to our public statements. If he gives us an answer by noon, we can decide on a Presidential initiative later on in the day.

Buffum: Concerning the situation at the UN, minimal action will be a reaffirmation of the previous resolutions on the ceasefire. The maximum would be the French draft which is being circulated. It formally disapproves of the Turkish action, affirms the ceasefire and the resumption of the negotiations. This text has been opposed by the representatives from the Moslem countries because of the specific reference to Turkey.

Kissinger: But the Turks can give us trouble in the next Middle East war. We have to be careful not to get too far separated from the Turks. Do the Turks in New York know we are holding back? Do they know we are not leading any crusade?

Sisco: They are abundantly aware of our position.

Buffum: There was a Soviet effort to get peace efforts reconvened under the Secretary General.
Kissinger: How cynical can you get? I told Waldheim that if I can't turn over an island to you and you can't keep it peaceful, what problem can I hand you? (Laughter)

Eagleburger: He doesn't have a sense of humor.

Kissinger: I told him he had the third largest military force in the non-Communist world. He didn't catch the humor of it.

If we can get agreement for a meeting in Washington, then President Ford can join Ecevit, Karamanlis and myself. At this meeting we can establish guidelines for a reconvened Geneva conference. I am persuaded that Callaghan does not know how to do these things himself. He should have taken a more neutral position and put concrete proposals on the table.

Hartman: I told him to have the proposals put forward.

Kissinger: In all of our Middle East negotiations our proposals were always put forward at the right time to have the parties focus on something. Callaghan should have sent someone around to the capitals—a senior representative. The Greeks went to Geneva with the idea of the British backing them and with the idea that they could depend on the British. To reach a stalemate in 48 hours after the conference is convened is a sign of incompetence. If Callaghan had gotten Clerides to put something forward, then he could have built on this.

Hartman: Clerides had a deal with Karamanlis that once Clerides told him what his minimum position was, Karamanlis would support him.

Kissinger: Why didn’t he do it?

Buffum: He has no experience. He was dealing in these negotiations like it was a trade union meeting.

Kissinger: Time and again I called him and he didn’t know what he was going to put forward, like the 5 kilometer proposal. He should have seen himself as the agent of the Greeks and had them face the facts of life. Karamanlis is seen as selling out Greek interests against the British. That sort of strategy he never discussed with us. Callaghan was pushing for a meeting on the 8th of August. The Turks wanted the 12th or 14th. If he had any sense, the later the better. He focused on minor ceasefire violations.

Hartman: He is the head of the party and had electoral factors in mind. He had only two days before the elections.

Kissinger: If he had sent a senior British representative to the interested parties who could put forward proposals . . . I was naive in thinking that when he didn’t want a senior officer there, he had a plan for a strategy and a position of his own with some agreement of both the sides. We will not be that quiet any more. Anytime it blows up, we get the blame. He doesn’t have the fire power to control this situation. When the Soviets propose joint action, we are running against time because
they will be raising this the next time again. Dobrynin told me that he stopped the note on Monday but you can frustrate this thing only so long.

Stabler: I would like to raise the problem of the *Lash Espana* and *Lash Italia*. The information DOD gave you at the WSAG this morning\(^9\) on their control over the ship is not correct. The ship is controlled by its owner who wants the ship to pass Piraeus and then go on to Turkey. If the ship goes by, then it will put us in a difficult position with the Greeks.

Kissinger: What is your solution?

Stabler: If the ship can be sent to Brindisi in Italy and offload the military equipment there, it would help matters.

Kissinger: I agree.

\(^9\) See Document 132.

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134. Transcript of Telephone Conversation Between Secretary of State Kissinger and Turkish Prime Minister Ecevit\(^1\)

August 15, 1974, 6:25 p.m.

K: Hello.
E: Hello.
K: How are you?
E: Secretary Kissinger this is Ecevit. Well I can give you an exact time for tomorrow for the end of our operation 12:00 noon New York time latest.
K: 12:00 noon. Ok. Mr. Prime Minister can we inform the Secretary General of the UN of this?
E: Yes and we shall be available for talks at that time if necessary.
K: Ok.
E: Thank you very much.
K: Now Mr. Prime Minister may we inform the Greek Government and the Secretary General of the UN?
E: If you want we can also directly inform the Secretary General of the UN.

\(^1\) Source: Library of Congress, Manuscript Division, Kissinger Papers, Box 385, Telephone Conversations, Chronological File. No classification marking. Kissinger was in Washington; Ecevit was in Ankara.
K: Give us a few hours and we will inform them then you can inform them.

E: Ok. Inform them before morning Turkish time. I suppose you know about the resolution at the Security Council.²

K: Well I will try to avoid a vote on it.

E: Thank you very much Mr. Secretary.

K: Thank you.

² See footnote 8, Document 133.

135. Transcript of Telephone Conversation Between Secretary of State Kissinger and Greek Prime Minister Karamanlis¹

August 15, 1974, 7:22 p.m.

K: I am sorry to disturb you in the night, Mr. Prime Minister. I first of all wanted to tell you I am sending you a message but I have just had one of many conversations with the Turkish Prime Minister² and he has told me they are going to stop military operations tomorrow at 12:00 noon Washington time and I wanted to tell you that we will hold them to this promise.

C [Caramanlis]: They will complete it at 12:00 tomorrow?

K: They will have completed it.

C: They will complete until tomorrow their plans [change?].

K: Well this I cannot judge. But we will in any event take an active role in the negotiations from now on.

C: I am going to think about this but I am afraid that after this fait accompli it will be a little difficult.

K: We have issued another strong statement today condemning the Turkish action . . .³

C: I have heard.

K: . . . from the White House and I just wanted to tell you, Mr. Prime Minister, we will do everything to strengthen your position and show our friendship for Greece.

¹ Source: Library of Congress, Manuscript Division, Kissinger Papers, Box 385, Telephone Conversations, Chronological File. No classification marking. Kissinger was in Washington; Karamanlis was in Athens.

² See Document 134.

³ See footnote 4, Document 133.
C: I appreciate it but I am afraid it is a little late. As I said the Turks have created a fait accompli.

K: Well this...we have to see what can be done now.

C: Unintelligible...to avoid this you know...inaudible...under the threats and...inaudible.

K: I understand this and we are opposed to it.

C: I beg your pardon?

K: We are opposed to a policy of military pressure.

C: Why? As you know, Turkey doesn’t understand the advice in Europe and in your opinion what are they going to do?

K: Well, they have offered to negotiate.

C: After the fait accompli they want to talk. But it is difficult for us to.

K: Well, let me see whether I can think of a procedure. Would you be prepared to pay a visit to the United States?

C: Who?

K: You.

C: I don’t think because you know it is difficult for me to leave the country. We have many problems. The people are very bitter, angry, the armies are upset. It is difficult to leave the country. Maybe a little later, but just now it is impossible.

K: Well, I am sure that maybe our President will be in touch with you tomorrow by cable.

C: Who?

K: President Ford. And let us see perhaps what can be done.

C: Mr. Secretary, I believe you have to get out Turks. The Turks...If they don’t get rid of this obsession it is difficult to get agreement.

K: We will consider it very seriously. I didn’t quite understand what you said.

C: I said the Turks...inaudible...if they don’t get rid of this obsession, it is very difficult to get an agreement.

K: With that I agree. There can be no further pressures.

C: But in spite of that the Turks have broken everything. The Greek people think...inaudible...bit late. Without giving instructions to the public it is very, very difficult for me to begin again talks.

K: Yes, I understand.

C: Mr. Secretary there is a climate very difficult.

K: Let me report this to the President and we will be in touch with you tomorrow.

C: Yes. I will be here. Yes, thank you.
K: Mr. Prime Minister if you have any proposal we would look at it very seriously as to what should be done.

C: In my opinion you have to do something more than give advice to the Turks.

K: If you have any concrete suggestion, we would be prepared to look at it very seriously.

C: I am going to answer your message today.¹

K: Good. I look forward to hearing from you Mr. Prime Minister.

Good night.

C: Good night.

¹ No record of a response has been found.

136. Memorandum of Conversation¹

Washington, August 16, 1974, 6:50 p.m.

SUBJECT
Cyprus

PARTICIPANTS
Henry A. Kissinger, Secretary of State
Robert S. Ingersoll, Deputy Secretary of State
Joseph J. Sisco, Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs
Robert J. McCloskey, Ambassador at Large
Arthur Hartman, Assistant Secretary, EUR
William B. Buffum, Assistant Secretary, IO
Lawrence S. Eagleburger, Executive Assistant to the Secretary
Wells Stabler, Deputy Assistant Secretary, EUR
Edward P. Djerejian, Special Assistant to Mr. Sisco

Kissinger: Where do we stand?

Sisco: The principal focus is the situation in Greece. We have to let the situation settle down a bit. I can’t see suggesting something concrete for the moment. At some point we have to remind the Greeks that there is a mutuality of interests between Greece and the U.S. Of course, they have a public opinion problem.
Kissinger: Have you seen the intelligence report that the French are trying to replace us in Greece?2

Buffum: The French are also taking the lead at the UN Security Council. We should vote for the French resolution which asks that negotiations be reconvened, the outcome of which should not be prejudiced by military gains. Of course, the Turks are kicking in New York about that.

Kissinger: The French resolution is alright. It could mean there shouldn’t be future military operations. We can vote for it.

Buffum: The Soviet position is unclear.

Sisco: I spoke to Archbishop Iakovos who is leaving for Greece. He will be getting in touch with Larry when he comes back and wants to see you.

Kissinger: He is even more cynical than Makarios.

Stabler: We have a report that one of our NATO aircraft went into Athens Airport without prior clearance as usual but that the Greek Air Force said that there are no bilateral agreements valid any longer and that we would need prior clearance.

Kissinger: We must not show excessive eagerness and not now tilt toward Greece and lose the Turks.

Hartman: I think this is a conscious policy on the part of Karamanlis to try to avoid coming to the conference table.

Sisco: He is going to (a) put the bee on the back of the junta for what has happened and (b) push us around but he can’t do too much.

Kissinger: Karamanlis is kicking us to preempt the left. If we had someone in Athens we could trust, we could contact him to say we understand the situation but he should not push us too far.

Hartman: We are looking at other things we might do outside of the Cyprus context.

Stabler: We can speed up aircraft deliveries such as the A–7s to Greece.

Hartman: Another thing that might help Karamanlis and the situation in Cyprus is to suggest negotiations with the Turks to beef up the Greek military presence on Cyprus.

Kissinger: Do you think the Turks will reduce their forces on the island?

McCloskey: Also, will they give up territory?

Kissinger: If we can define the negotiations, it would be to give up some territory. Ecevit is subtle enough to do it, but can he get the military on board?

2 Not found.
Hartman: I don’t see it in the early negotiations.
Kissinger: The British are playing electoral politics. There may be some symbolic pieces of territory the Turks could give up. They went further south on the road to Famagusta, but all that is high land.
Hartman: They have taken the best land on the island.
Stabler: It is hard to see them giving it up.
Kissinger: They’ve got to give something up if there are to be negotiations. We will see by Monday if we can get some talking points for Tasca stressing it is in our interest to strengthen that government. There is a mutuality of interests and they must realize that if they lose the American connection, they will play into Papandreou’s hands. Who else can they depend on? We are willing to listen to concrete suggestions. On Cyprus, the balance of powers was destroyed by their predecessors. Your view, Art, is that they would kick us around regardless of whether or not we could have stopped the Turks. An important question is can they negotiate? As to the anti-Americanism in Greece, to what extent is it genuine and to what extent is it to rally the leftists who wanted to go to war?
Hartman: The parties did agree to autonomy.
Kissinger: I got that from everyone. There were cables that greater autonomy had been conceded. We didn’t get ahead of anyone on this.
Hartman: Athens was behind Clerides.
Kissinger: I didn’t think we were breaking new ground.
Sisco: We knew that Clerides was alright, but we didn’t know the position of the Greeks and if Clerides could carry it.
Buffum: Scali wants to talk to you about the UN.
(The Secretary received a call from Ambassador Scali.)
Kissinger: Scali tells me that the Russians are going to abstain. Callaghan is mad because of Gwertzmann’s article. We should explain the Reuters story.
137. Memorandum of Conversation

Washington, August 17, 1974, 12:30 p.m.

SUBJECT
Cyprus

PARTICIPANTS
Henry A. Kissinger, Secretary of State
Robert S. Ingersoll, Deputy Secretary of State
Joseph J. Sisco, Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs
Robert J. McCloskey, Ambassador at Large
Arthur Hartman, Assistant Secretary, EUR
William B. Buffum, Assistant Secretary, IO
Lawrence S. Eagleburger, Executive Assistant to the Secretary
Edward P. Djerejian, Special Assistant to Mr. Sisco

Kissinger: We have to placate the Greeks but I do not want to give the impression that the more they can kick us around, the more they can get. Karamanlis should not attack the President his first week in office. If they take an irreversible anti-U.S. line, we can take it better than they can. We tried to prevent military actions. The paragraph in the cable has to be strong. If this continues, the U.S. will have to reconsider its policies. We have no interest in supporting a country which follows a professional anti-U.S. position.

Joe (Sisco), tell the Cypriot Ambassador that he is Clerides’ Ambassador and not Makarios’ Ambassador or we will not continue to see him.

McCloskey: Dimitriou is in a difficult situation.

Kissinger: The word has gone forth that the U.S. will not be pushed around. This campaign must stop. We made our record. Karamanlis can rely on our support. The Greeks must realize that the outcome

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1 Source: National Archives, RG 59, Records of Henry Kissinger, Box 9, Nodis Memoranda of Conversations, August 1974, Folder 5. Secret; Nodis. Drafted by Djerejian. The meeting was held in the Secretary’s office and it followed up on a meeting held one hour earlier. (Memorandum of conversation, August 17, 11:30 a.m.; ibid.)

2 An apparent reference to telegram 181127 to Athens, August 17, which discussed Turkish military action: “It is totally unjustified for the blame to be laid on the U.S.; nor do we believe it is in the interest of Greece to do so. As close and friendly allies, we believe it is important for both of us to remember that this crisis was not of our making or of the Karamanlis government. Both Greece and the U.S. were put in the situation in which we now find ourselves by the irresponsible and unwise actions of the Greek junta in upsetting the balance of forces on Cyprus.” (Ford Library, National Security Adviser, Presidential Country Files for Middle East and South Asia, Box 10, Greece, Nodis from Secretary of State 1)
cannot be one which is very pleasant. If they get in a state of mind that we will push the Turks back . . .

Sisco: The psychology that is evolving with this new government is like the one the Greek junta had, namely, that we have greater interest in Greece than they have in us.

Kissinger: I have no confidence Tasca can carry this message.

Sisco: Henry, we have to take a chance. I don’t think we have any alternative. We can supplement this with a telephone call to Monty Stearns.

Ingersoll: You can call Tasca back and have Monty Stearns do it.

Kissinger: I don’t want Tasca running around town at this time.

Buffum: You can leave a piece of paper.

Sisco: You will have a problem there. If you want, I’ll call Tasca and underline your concern and tell him that you are to read the following to Karamanlis.

Kissinger: If we send a representative, they may not let him in the country. We should also send a message to Ecevit and let him know that what we need is now needed. They must make a generous gesture, giving up some territory as a prelude to negotiations and in the negotiations they should be willing to give further concessions. I would like to have Ecevit’s ideas.

Eagleburger: Do you want to tell Ecevit about the last Soviet proposal?

Kissinger: The Soviets have now proposed a joint guarantee which we will also refuse. We understand Greece’s concerns and frustrations. On the other hand, we consider it unjust. We have made a major effort to moderate the Turks. We have gotten several delays. We do not use U.S. military forces against a NATO ally especially in terms of our domestic and international situation. We have our own considerations. Greece is in NATO not for U.S. interests but for Greece’s own interests. If Greece wants to follow an anti-U.S. policy, we want to know how.

Buffum: Even the UK as a Guarantor Power did not use force.

Kissinger: Callaghan’s strategy was a disaster.

Up to this point we have understood the anti-U.S. position of Greece. There were domestic considerations. From the foreign policy view, this could become irretrievable. We want to strengthen the Greek Government. If Karamanlis is willing, we are prepared to support him.

Buffum: We should protest against the demonstrations against U.S. installations in Greece.

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3 See Document 138.
Kissinger: I don’t think we are going to get anywhere by being too soft or gentle. Anyway, our motto is if Sisco can’t go, no one can go. (Laughter)

I didn’t understand how precarious the second round of negotiations was. I thought that it would lead to a technical round of discussions. Where I miscalculated is that it became the prelude to military hostilities. I didn’t know by Tuesday that no negotiations were in flux and that the Greeks had not made an offer. Why was not the 5 1/2 kilometer zone proposed?

Hartman: Gunes had one talk with Callaghan and then it got lost.

Kissinger: Callaghan told me it was a non-starter.

Sisco: Because the Turks had in mind breaking out of the zone.

Kissinger: But it was the Turks who proposed it.

Hartman: That was a means of making it hard for the National Guard to resist.

Kissinger: It was a combination of all circumstances. Geneva wasn’t played to bring all factors into the negotiations.

McCloskey: On Monday the Turks were talking about a 20-kilometer buffer zone.

Kissinger: By Tuesday Callaghan and Ecevit told me of the 5 1/2 kilometer proposition. Whether it was serious or not I don’t know. (To Hartman) Did you know about it?

Hartman: The British never mentioned it to me.

Kissinger: I have not yet understood the paralysis in Geneva.

Hartman: Callaghan concentrated on ceasefire violations for the first four days. Gunes found a reason why a session on Friday could not be held. Then, over the weekend the Greeks took the position that the Guarantor Powers could not discuss a settlement. Gunes then said, “Why are we here?”

Kissinger: When it became clear there was the likelihood of a military move, we or the British should have gotten a proposal interjected.

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4 August 13.
5 August 12.
Washington, August 17, 1974, 2022Z.

181115. Subject: Cyprus. For the Ambassador from the Secretary.

1. You should see Ecevit at earliest possible time and give him the following message from me (but do not leave any paper with him):

2. We have received disturbing reports that despite your assurances Turkish forces are continuing to occupy more territory and that fighting is still in progress. I cannot emphasize strongly enough my earlier warning that the domestic situation in the United States has now reached a point where further Turkish military operations will put the USG in an impossible position. If they continue, we will be obliged to take public steps which would threaten our ability to work together toward a just solution on Cyprus and result in a further deterioration of the Western security position in the area. I therefore ask that the GOT take all steps necessary to see that the ceasefire is strictly observed.

3. As to the longer range problem of bringing about a situation in which the Cyprus crisis can be brought to a conclusion acceptable to all sides, I see little chance of bringing the Greek Government to the negotiating table without some generous prior gesture from the Turkish Government. I would not presume at this point to suggest what that gesture might be; but that one is necessary I am convinced. Further, I believe that, given the strong position the GOT now finds itself in on Cyprus, such a gesture is feasible.

4. I am equally convinced that, once the negotiations have resumed, it will be necessary for the GOT to show further flexibility—probably in terms of territorial concessions—if there is to be a reasonable final outcome.

5. I hasten to add that I do not believe that it is only the GOT which must demonstrate flexibility and a spirit of compromise; so must the GOG. Indeed, I recognize that it was in part Greek unwillingness to come forward with concrete proposals that led to the breakdown in the Geneva talks.

6. The Prime Minister should know that the Soviets continue to press us for some form of joint action. They have now told us that they have no views on what the final outcome of the Cyprus dispute should

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1 Source: Ford Library, National Security Adviser, Presidential Country Files for Middle East and South Asia, 1974–77, Box 34, Turkey, Nodis from Secretary of State 1. Secret; Flash; Exdis Distribute as Nodis. Drafted by Eagleburger and cleared by Kissinger.
be, so long as that outcome—whatever it is—is guaranteed by the Soviet Union and the United States. I assure the Prime Minister that this proposal, too, we shall reject. But the Prime Minister must understand that so long as the Cyprus dispute continues unresolved, and with no apparent progress toward resolution in sight, the USSR will continue to agitate—and I expect with growing insistence—for a role in the settlement. That is something that cannot be in the interests of either of our governments.

7. I want the Prime Minister to know that the United States has not changed its position with regard to Cyprus nor its sympathy for an acceptable and lasting resolution of the problems the Turkish Cypriots have so long faced. What I have said today has been said in the spirit of frankness and friendship that has marked our relationship throughout these difficult days. It is because I want that relationship to continue that I have spoken to him of our domestic limitations and the need for a generous gesture from the Turkish Government to bring the disputing parties back to the negotiating table. I would welcome the Prime Minister’s views.

Kissinger

139. Transcript of Telephone Conversation Between Secretary of State Kissinger and Acting Cypriot President Clerides

August 19, 1974, 8:21 a.m.

K: Hello.
C: Hello, Excellency, this is Clerides speaking.
K: How are you?
C: I’m terribly sorry, Your Excellency, that our first conversation has to be under such circumstances, and there has been an attack on the United States Embassy.
K: Yes, I know about it.
C: And Rodger Davies lost his life.2

1 Source: Library of Congress, Manuscript Division, Kissinger Papers, Box 385, Telephone Conversations, Chronological File. No classification marking. Kissinger was in Washington; Clerides was in Nicosia.

2 As reported in telegram 181216, August 19, Davies was shot during a demonstration at the U.S. Embassy in Nicosia on August 19. Clerides took the injured Ambassador to the hospital, where he died. (Ford Library, National Security Adviser, Presidential Country Files for Middle East and South Asia, Box 2, Cyprus 1)
K: I know.

C: I cannot but express my bitter sorrow and to [about?] him I have already issued a public statement to that effect. Rodger Davies took all necessary measures to protect the United States Embassy in Cyprus and the American citizens there in the Republic. I am grieved because not only the United States has lost an Ambassador, but I have lost a precious friend.

K: Well, Mr. President, we understand that this was out of your control, and you are quite correct, Rodger Davies was a friend and the United States thinks of itself as a friend of yourself and of what you are trying to do.

C: I rushed as soon as the news reached me. I entered the Embassy under fire and bring out . . .

K: Well, I understand, Mr. President. But the only thing I would ask is that the deliberate effort to blame the United States for what has happened is one of the contributing causes to this situation, and if we are to play a useful role, which we are eager to do, we cannot do it under this sort of pressure. And so we are asking all responsible Greek leaders to stop the anti-American agitation or we will withdraw completely from the negotiations, and leave it to be settled directly between Greeks and Turks.

C: That’s what . . .

K: Well, in that case there has to be an end to this agitation.

C: I will do my utmost to press upon the people that there is no reason to show hostility whatsoever against the United States. Today I had a press conference for everything that happened and I stated the United States had exerted a lot of pressure to prevent the Turkish Army from attacking.

K: Exactly.

C: And I will continue bringing all I can to prevent any anti-American feelings or any anti-American demonstrations in Cyprus.

K: We are prepared, as Mr. Davies must have told you yesterday, to use our influence to produce the most favorable outcome and to use our influence to bring about a change in the present disposition of forces. But we cannot do this under the pressure of anti-Americanism.

C: I only appreciate the position you have just explained. Rodger spoke to me last night about the points you have mentioned and I was today going to elaborate. But unfortunately for him it is too late.

K: Well, Mr. President, no one can blame you for this horrible tragedy. And we have supported you from the beginning and we will continue to support you.

C: Thank you.

K: But there are certain realities which you also must take into account which I have outlined to you.
C: Yes, I know.
K: And we will say the same thing in Athens.
C: Well, I am completely aware of the reality of the situation, and I feel because I was aware of the realities that I was fine . . . I will continue doing my best so that together we can work a reasonable solution to the Cyprus problem.
K: Right. And Mr. President we will do the same and I may send out a replacement in the next day or two so that we have a senior diplomat on the spot.3
C: I will be very grateful if this is done. First of all it will help us all to have a senior diplomat here, and also because if . . .
K: Yes, but there can be no question about the fact, and I’m not saying this to you, that if these attitudes continue in Athens and Cyprus, then we will just wash our hands of the whole thing.
C: I fully realize and you can rest assured that I will do everything, even publicly, to prevent any anti-Americanism in Cyprus.
K: Good. Thank you very much for calling, Mr. President, and I hope we will have the opportunity to meet very soon.
C: I look forward to our meeting in America.
K: And you can count on me as a friend.
C: Well, you can count that in Cyprus you have both a friend and admirer.
K: Thank you, Mr. President.
C: Thank you. Good-bye.
K: Good-bye.

3 Kissinger sent L. Dean Brown, Deputy Under Secretary of State for Management and former Ambassador to Jordan, to take charge of the Embassy pending the appointment of a new Ambassador. (Ibid.) On August 23 William R. Crawford, Jr., was appointed Ambassador to Cyprus.
140. Transcript of Telephone Conversation Between Secretary of State Kissinger and Turkish Prime Minister Ecevit

August 19, 1974, 10:15 a.m.

E: Mr. Kissinger, this is Ecevit.
K: Mr. Prime Minister how are you?
E: I feel very sorry. Please accept my condolences.
K: This is one of those unfortunate events. I have to make a statement at noon today and I want to make a fairly strong statement along a number of lines, that we’re not going to be pressured. I would like to say we favor an immediate negotiation in which we are in favor of a reduction of Turkish forces on the Island and we have been assured by the Turks of it. I think it would help us greatly. We are having demonstrations of 30,000 people here in Washington. What do you think?
E: Let me get you straight. You are going to make a strong statement . . .
K: What I would say in my statement is, here is what we’ve done.
E: That you are not going to be pressured by . . .
K: And we believe negotiations should be started immediately. We believe that in these negotiations we would use their influence that some of the territories that have been occupied recently, that Turkey should show flexibility in respect to the territory it now holds and the . . .
E: You know my idea about ______ to relinquish some of it with regard to the reduction of forces. Under the present circumstances, it would be difficult to commit ourselves. You can explain it in this way. Negotiations are established so that a final settlement could be reached immediately or without delay so the Turks could be expected to start reduction of their forces.
K: Can I say I have been assured by the Turkish Prime Minister that he would be prepared to consider this?
E: As soon as a final settlement is reached and reasonable security is reached on the Island this is a great ______ atrocity_______ we found killed. It would be very difficult for us to commit ourselves to a reduction of forces. We are bound by the Geneva agreement ______ that the Turks are committed to it.

1 Source: Library of Congress, Manuscript Division, Kissinger Papers, Box 385, Telephone Conversations, Chronological File. No classification marking. Kissinger was in Washington; Ecevit was in Ankara.
2 The text was sent in telegram 181676 to multiple NATO posts, August 19. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy Files, 1974)
3 This and other omissions are in the original.
K: Can I say you have reaffirmed that?
E: Yes, we reaffirm our ______ to the Geneva declaration.
K: I think it would help here greatly. I will send you a message
Mr. Prime Minister. You know that this ______ move we’re encourag-
ing and we shouldn’t discuss it on the telephone. I will send you a fur-
ther message about this.4
E: Can I ring you back and tell you after consultations with our
foreign ministers about how much we can commit ourselves?
K: Could you do it within the next hour?
E: Shall I reach you at the State Department or the White House?
K: At the State Department.
E: I’ll do that.
K: The statement I’m making will have the support of President
Ford and its purpose is to get negotiations started.
E: I understand. I’ll give you a ring within the next hour. My con-
dolences again.
K: Thank you, Mr. Prime Minister.

4 Not found; see Document 141.

141. Transcript of Telephone Conversation Between Secretary of
State Kissinger and Turkish Prime Minister Ecevit1

August 19, 1974, 12:10 p.m.

E: We have prepared for your consideration a text. May I dictate
it to someone?
K: The text I am going to read? Go ahead.
E: The Turkish Government is reaffirming their commitment to the
principle of timely and phased reduction of forces as stipulated in the
Geneva Conference on July 30 . . . when conditions allow . . . (inaudi-
ble) the Turkish Prime Minister has declared publicly August 17 that
the Turkish Government would be prepared to negotiate the demar-
cation line of the area that should remain under Turkish rule and he

1 Source: Library of Congress, Manuscript Division, Kissinger Papers, Box 385, Tele-
phone Conversations, Chronological File. No classification marking; Kissinger was in
Washington; Ecevit was in Ankara.
hopes that Turkey would not be... (inaudible) about retaining all of
the territory but it should be (inaudible) in an atmosphere conducive
to developing and securing for all on the Island and negotiate for a fi-
nal solution in a constructive spirit without delay. This should be a
framework, if acceptable to you.

K: May I make a suggestion? What I am going to say is not a diplo-
matic document. It is an attempt to get control of events here. I think,
for present purposes, it is enough if I can say that part of what you say
about [omission in the source text] to hope.

E: Excuse me, I couldn’t understand.

K: I should not refer to your public statement. I should put it on the
basis that you have confirmed this to me. Secondly, I can say the gist of
this but I think we should leave out all this about terrorism. The major
point is to give people a face-saving excuse to get them back to the Con-
ference. I should say that I have been given to understand that you will
not insist on holding all the territory for Turkish autonomous rule.

E: I should tell you that . . .

K: The details I think we should leave to the negotiations.

E: What I am after is . . .

K: You shouldn’t be asked to go beyond what you have given us
before the Turkish operation began . . . not beyond that border that you
gave before the operation started.

E: I have shown the line to Macomber.

K: What you said about the reduction . . . I can say . . . according
to the Geneva Conference.

E: Timely and phased.

K: What I would like to say about the terrorism is that we do not
believe, that is, I would say we do not believe that the territory not be-
ing held by Turkey should be put in the Turkish autonomous zone and
we have been given to understand that in a negotiation Turkey would
not insist on that.

E: Say the Turkish Government would be prepared to negotiate
the final demarcation.

K: I may put it that way, but I think for our public opinion it would
be helpful to make you appear conciliatory.

E: I understand, but after the terrorist acts here, the public opin-
ion has become fierce also.

K: I will say that the Turkish Government has assured me that they
consider the demarcation line negotiable.

E: That’s right. To a certain extent; to a reasonable extent.

K: Ok.

E: Alright, thank you and my condolences again.
142. Memorandum of Conversation\(^1\)

Washington, August 20, 1974, 8:30 a.m.

PARTICIPANTS

President Ford
Bipartisan Congressional Leadership
Dr. Henry A. Kissinger, Secretary of State and Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs
Lt. Gen. Brent Scowcroft, Deputy Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs

President: It is important that we have continuity.

[After some discussion of other subjects the President asked Dr. Kissinger to brief.\(^2\)]

Kissinger: Briefly about the development of the Cyprus situation and where we are. It started when the Greek junta used the Greek officers in Cyprus to overthrow Makarios and put in a government with support of the EOKA, as an attempt to bring about enosis.

In 1960 the Constitution was set up; in 1964 Makarios overthrew it. In 1967 there was another one and since then the Turkish people had been living in ghettos and the Turks thought the U.S. had kept them from getting their rights. The Makarios overthrow and the junta’s unpopularity gave the Turks an opportunity to rectify the situation. They moved in. Initially we were under heavy pressure to overthrow the Greek government. We tried to keep the crisis from being internationalized and to prevent the change of the constitutional government in Cyprus. The junta fell, Karamanlis came in, and the British got the talks started. We kept in the background so as not to look like we were the policemen for every civil war.

Clerides we think is a good man.

We support the Greek government, but since it had replaced the junta it didn’t feel it could make concessions. It was afraid of being caught between the left and the right. The Greek Cypriots are willing to make concessions. Also the British got mad at the Turks and put pressure on them, thus relieving the pressure on the Turks for concessions.

The solution was to be greater autonomy for the Turkish Cypriots and restoration of the 1960 Constitution. But the negotiations stalemated.

\(^1\) Source: Library of Congress, Manuscript Division, Kissinger Papers, Box CL 123, Geopolitical File, Cyprus, Chronological File. Confidential. The meeting was held in the Cabinet Room of the White House.

\(^2\) Brackets are in the original.
The Turks then attacked and now hold 55 percent of the good land and the best part.

Greek emotions are high, but the U.S. could have prevented it only by putting forces around the island sufficient to balance the Turkish forces.

The cut-off of aid would not have affected the battle and would have forced the Turks either to the Soviet Union or to a Qaddafi-type regime. It also would have gotten us embroiled in all the details of the negotiations.

We threatened if they went to war with each other that it would be a very serious move.

We now must get them to the conference table. We said yesterday that we insist that Turkey maintain the ceasefire line and negotiation is essential. I made a statement on this. I read this position to Ecevit and he agreed, and he agreed also to give up some territory and reduce his forces.

The reaction to our statement has been positive. The Greek tempers seem to be cooling. Clerides gave a good statement—he is willing to negotiate without severe preconditions. We have encouraged the British to put forward a federal solution giving more autonomy. After it is discussed more, we will offer to play a more active role.

So: A war was stopped; the Turks will give up some of their gains; and the Turks will reduce some of their forces.

The pressures on the Greek government were severe. They couldn’t go to war and so they kicked at us a bit.

President: We have dismissed our duty. Our position is the right one. We can’t go into every hot operation. We were working with all the parties.

Remember, the situation was precipitated by the Greek government, and one that was disapproved of by the U.S. and the world. When they did it, they couldn’t take advantage of it—but the Turks could and did. Now we are assured there will be some moderation in the negotiation.

My relations with the Greek community have always been excellent. They don’t think so much of me right now but I think they will come around as things go forth.

Kissinger: Even the Greeks will eventually see it was our influence which made for Turkish moderation.
Memorandum From the Director of the Bureau of Intelligence and Research (Hyland) to Secretary of State Kissinger


SOME THOUGHTS ON CYPRUS

Hopefully the initiative Callaghan is launching will succeed, but judging by Tasca’s latest talks with the Greeks and Macomber’s conversations in Ankara, it is doubtful that it will.

Moreover, it seems faulty in the sense that forcing all the participants to confront, at the outset, the ultimate solution, risks their rejection of it or at least causes each to attach so many conditions that genuine talks will founder. (It is analogous to forcing Israel and Syria to agree on the disposition of the Golan Heights before discussing military disengagement.) Asking Karamanlis and Clerides to accept, even in principle, the political partition of the island is not really different from asking them to accept the Attila line, which they claim cannot even be the basis for negotiation.

The obstacles to negotiations are not so much the final terms which in the end will reflect reality but the impact the process has on the domestic political position of each of the participants.

The status quo is dangerous: (1) it will ensure Karamanlis’ drift into a permanent anti-American, Gaullist posture; (2) it risks a resumption of Turkish military action, in the face of Greek stonewalling and Cypriot terrorism; (3) it freezes all concerned into increasingly rigid and intransigent positions.

Yet each side seems to prefer the status quo to the painful decisions and concessions required by negotiations, because both the Greeks and Turks have shaky political positions at home.

1 Source: Library of Congress, Manuscript Division, Kissinger Papers, Box CL 124, Geopolitical File, Cyprus, Chronological File. Secret; Sensitive. Kissinger wrote at the top, “Excellent paper.”
2 Callaghan proposed a bi-regional federal solution.
3 Reported in telegram 5962 from Athens, August 21. (Ford Library, National Security Adviser, Kissinger–Scowcroft West Wing Office Files, Box 9, Cyprus 44)
4 Reported in telegram 5734 from Ankara, August 21. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy Files, 1974, P850076–2031)
5 The Attila line marked the Turkish military advance on Cyprus.
Greece

—Neither Karamanlis nor Clerides can stand to lose face by acquiescing in the Turkish conquest, even if they privately concede that it is a hard reality that will have to be faced eventually.

—Karamanlis’ position must be stronger now than two days ago because he has reached some modus vivendi with the army; whatever deal he has made with the army must touch on the question of how to handle Papandreou; a plausible assumption is that the army will support Karamanlis’ efforts to resist the certain pressures that Papandreou will now mount on the government.

—However, Karamanlis cannot guarantee military support if he makes concessions to the Turks; his hope to stay in power rests on a nationalistic position that satisfies the army and defuses the left.

—At the same time the professionals in the Greek armed forces will want to do something about their weak military position; at a minimum they will look for alternative sources of equipment to free themselves from the US; France is the most logical source, and politically this will shore up Karamanlis’ willingness to play the French role in NATO.

Turkey

—There are no moral, diplomatic-political pressures that will induce Ecevit suddenly to give up the gains the Turks have made.

—Indeed, the more real danger is that the Turks, with their appetite whetted by their success, will be tempted to force a “final solution” of all their problems with Greece; they could take such drastic steps as moving on the Greek islands; there is the danger that in the course of negotiations Turkey will broaden the scope of territorial bargaining to include questions of the Agean Islands, oil rights, etc.

—In any case, talk of significant troop reductions or territorial concessions is simply more Turkish eyewash. The Turkish army, according to latest reports, is digging in for the “winter”; it plans some very minor withdrawals to adjust the lines, but no major withdrawals before next spring; moreover, “mopping up” operations will begin on August 21 (Wednesday)—and this will raise new charges of a breakdown in the ceasefire.

—The Turks still have not given up the option of new operations on Cyprus, as hinted by Ecevit (Tab A: some disturbing intelligence reports on Turkish intentions).6 We can expect that the Turkish position

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6 Not attached; examples of such intelligence are in CIA Intelligence Information Cables TDFIR 314/05514–74, August 21, and TDFIR 314/05540–74, August 22 (Ford Library, National Security Adviser, Presidential Country Files for the Middle East and South Asia, Box 2, Cyprus 1) and in telegram 2542 from Nicosia, August 22 (ibid., Box 3, Nodis to Secretary of State 1).
in Cyprus will remain volatile, if only because terrorist incidents are almost certain.

Obviously, the negotiating process should begin urgently, as you have said publicly.

The question is how?

1. A case can be made for circumventing both Athens and Ankara and using Clerides and Denktash as the vehicles to start the process.

   —The subject for their discussion should be narrow—refugees and relief; under this rubric, an arrangement might be discussed for opening Nicosia airport under UN supervision, with some sort of Turkish observer; then perhaps they could move to questions of the plight of Greek and Turkish minorities on both sides of the line; and Clerides can raise the question of some adjustments in the situation in Famagusta to meet one of his conditions.

2. If such contacts can start, without having to confront the major question of whether Clerides accepts the status quo, then it might be possible for us to continue discussions with Ecevit on his “whole carrot”.

   —Ecevit’s willingness to withdraw from the area around the British base is an opening wedge (the Turks apparently occupied more territory than called for in the General Staff plan.

   —One possibility worth some thought is whether we could use this wedge to suggest a differentiation between the zone occupied by the Turks at the start of the Geneva talks on August 9—to which Karmanlis demands the Turks return—and the present Attila line. For example, could the Turks “thin out” the areas that they have occupied in the past week—if only as a gesture? This would at least acknowledge Karmanlis’ condition.

   —And we might go further and suggest an adjustment of the territory between Myrtou and Lefka: this area was not part of the original Turkish proposal but they now hold it; it has some valuable agricultural land and is not purely Turkish in character. If the Turks would withdraw from it, while holding only the road to Lefka, as compensation they might extend their western line to Point Samos, taking in Kokkina and Limnits which they had hoped to grab in the last operation but did not quite make, or make some arrangements concerning the Turkish communities in those coastal cities.

3. Finally, we should give some serious thought to helping the Greeks put a token military force on the island with, of course, Turkish acquiescence; it might only be a regiment of infantry to show the flag, and could be brought over under UK auspices, with the US sponsoring it in Ankara; the rationale would be that some Greek regulars would be needed to help with relief and to maintain order; they would not be in Nicosia.
In sum, the US could adopt the following scenario:

1. Support immediate talks on local emergency matters between Denktash and Clerides with no preconditions and no complications of what the legal or political ramifications of such talks would imply.

2. Propose to the Turks that as a gesture of good will, they agree that they will “thin out” their forces in the area between the present line and the August 9 enclave; leaving the actual thinning out terms of numbers, etc., rather ambiguous.

On this basis, we could suggest to Karamanlis that his position has at least been reflected and a basis for negotiating a territorial settlement exists which would then be embodied in some new constitutional framework, the last rather than the first step.

Meanwhile, we continue to explore a more precise Turkish definition of their “main canton” and whether they could give up the area between the August 9 position and the area after Lefka.

As an option, we could explore with Ankara whether the Turks could acquiesce in the transport to Cyprus of a small contingent of Greek regulars on the understanding that they will not advance up to the Turkish line.

**144. Message From Secretary of State Kissinger to British Foreign Secretary Callaghan**


Please convey the following message to Foreign Secretary Callaghan from Secretary of State Kissinger:

Dear Jim:

I understand that you are increasingly concerned about the lack of movement in the Cyprus situation and the increased efforts the Soviets are making to stake out a more active role for themselves. I share your concern.

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1 Source: Library of Congress, Manuscript Division, Kissinger Papers, Box CL 124, Geopolitical File, Chronological File, Cyprus. Secret. A handwritten note at the top of the message reads, “delivered to UK Embassy, 8/24, 5 p.m.”
The latest Soviet move is decidedly unhelpful. Should this proposal be accepted, the Soviet Union will have succeeded in gaining a voice in an area in which up to now it has had little influence. This in turn would undermine further our basic security interests in the eastern Mediterranean.

In informing us of their proposal, the Soviets have once again proposed that we join with them in some form of joint guarantee. This is a proposal which we could not under any circumstances contemplate.

It may well be that the Greek Government will consider accepting the Soviet proposal for the effects this will have domestically and because it wishes to avoid the distasteful choices which more direct negotiations among the Guarantor Powers would force upon them. I think we should all impress upon our Greek friends the dangers of such acceptance in the longer term, not only for themselves, but for all of us.

Your proposal for a bi-regional federal system is a good one and we completely support your suggestion to reconvene the Geneva talks in order to explore that proposal. I believe the Greek Government must be brought to realize that it can rely on the friendly support of all of us but that it must take an active part in negotiations and must support a weak Clerides Government in its effort to reach an understanding with the Turkish-Cypriot community. A long period of stalemate would only be an advantage to the Soviets. Certainly it will not be an advantage to the Greeks, since the only hope they have for improving the present state of affairs is to return to the negotiating table. If we are to use our influence on the Turks in an effort to obtain some of the concessions which will be needed for a negotiated solution, this could only be done within the context of a negotiation. A prolonged stalemate would diminish our capability of exercising a positive influence on the Turks.

I am troubled by the encouragement which the Greek Government is giving to anti-American and anti-NATO opinion in Greece. If this anti-American and anti-NATO sentiment is not curtailed soon, it may get out of hand and provide yet another opening for Soviet meddling. I would hope that you, the French, and the FRG—and I am writing to Genscher in this same vein—will do what you can to moderate these tendencies.

I am equally concerned that the efforts of some of our European friends to engage in entirely worthwhile efforts to support the Karamanlis

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2 The Soviet Government’s statement, received at the White House on August 23, expressed dissatisfaction with the lack of implementation of UN Security Council resolutions, the NATO-centered approach to settlement talks, and the ongoing interference with Cyprus’ sovereignty. The Soviets proposed an international conference within the UN framework, consisting of Cyprus, Greece, Turkey, and all Security Council member countries, and probably other countries including those in the non-aligned movement. (Ford Library, National Security Adviser, Kissinger–Scowcroft West Wing Office Files, 1969–1977, Box 27, USSR, “D” File)
Government may be misconstrued by that Government as evidence of European support for Greece as a counterweight to American support for Turkey. The end result could be a further polarization of the situation and the strengthening in Greece of the extreme left.

It is my view that the first order of business, after turning aside the Soviet proposal, is to get the negotiations underway again. Certainly Clerides should be encouraged to talk directly with Denktash. The first item on the agenda may relate to humanitarian questions but it is possible that these discussions could eventually be broadened to cover political questions. These could include taking a look at your proposal for bi-regional federalism.

I should be most grateful for any ideas which you might have as to how we could be helpful at this stage in moving the Cyprus question back to the negotiating table.

145. Telegram From the Embassy in Cyprus to the Department of State

Nicosia, August 25, 1974, 1300Z.

2622. Subj: Turkish Intentions on Cyprus.

1. Turkish actions on ground, and statements by officials both here and in Ankara, have reinforced our initial impression that Turkish Army intervened to protect the security of mainland and not assist local community, except insofar as this relates to primary purpose. Best indication this regard is total write off of enclaves located in southern half of island. Despite repeated radio requests for aid, so far as we aware, Turks made no effort reinforce or resupply these areas. Turk mainland Commander in Larnaca, who exfiltrated in civilian dress via Dhekelia, reportedly told British that his instructions were to offer token resistance before surrendering. Said he had ample ammo and weapons to have continued fight for extended period. (This info, which contradicts accounts put out by Turk Cypriot leaders, largely confirmed by UNFICYP observation.)

2. Thus, while Turks had force to occupy entire island, and divide it up as they wished, they carefully limited operation to grabbing...
sufficient territory to insure that they would be in predominant position to dictate future status of an independent Cyprus. As we read their intentions, Turkey wants a federal (confederal) state and has little or no interest in creation of an independent Turk Cypriot mini-state or move towards double enosis.

3. Either of latter two courses would run contrary to basic reason for intervention since, by implication, they would open the door to introduction of substantial Greek mainland forces onto island. This would place Turkey in position of having southern ports (and heartland cities) again endangered or of going to war to take entire island, destroying island’s quasi-independence, and facing prospect of protracted guerilla struggle.

4. Once negotiations get underway, we expect Turkey to push for two canton confederal system, trading territory (of which it has excess) for transfer of populations. Believe also that Turkey will make every effort hold on to Famagusta port or at minimum, insisting on Turkish community’s right to import freely from mainland, with no hindrance from central govt. (Agreement on this may be key to getting Famagusta’s Greek Cypriot civilian population back to their houses.) This likely also be Turkish position on airport. During bargaining sessions, Turks may raise specter of independent Turk Cypriot state or float prospect double enosis, but we expect this will be largely bluff. What will not be bluff will be Turk demand maintain superior military force on island.

5. Danger is that goals frequently escalate following initial success of military actions. To extent possible, we should force Turks concentrate on their real security needs and long term interests in lieu immediate tactical gains. Further military moves at this time, rather than forcing Greeks to bargaining table, would probably preclude meaningful negotiations for foreseeable future. (Fortunately, atrocity rhetoric, which had been running at high pitch—with attendant danger of possible rescue operation—cooled noticeably today, Aug. 26. Odds on Turks mounting such move remain, however, high.)

6. By now, Turks have consolidated hold on occupied territory and internal security appears solid. Question remains how to get negotiating process underway in shortest possible time. Believe we should continue to support British effort convene Geneva III, while encouraging Denktash and Clerides to resume talks here (septel). Earlier consultations begin, less likely will be prospect of renewed fighting and further destabilization this area.

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2 In telegram 2611 from Nicosia, August 25, Brown reported that he told Clerides: “What was needed was genuine negotiations, not sterile UN debate; and that it was in the context of negotiations, probably along the British-suggested line, that US could help its friends.” (Ibid., Nodis to Secretary of State 1)
7. Believe we should encourage two sides to focus on refugee problem and need to facilitate free movement populations. While we have no illusions that many Greeks will move into Turkish area, much of problem would be met if they could move into border areas (and particularly if they could return to Greek section of Famagusta). If Turk Cypriots in south could choose between return to villages or removal to Turk Cypriot enclave, explosive danger of further Turk military moves would be reduced substantially.

Brown

146. Memorandum of Conversation

Washington, August 27, 1974, 11:30 a.m.

SUBJECT
Cyprus

PARTICIPANTS
Sir John Killick, Deputy Under Secretary, British Foreign Office
Mr. Richard Sykes, British Chargé d’Affaires
Mr. Michael Alexander, Private Secretary to the British Foreign Secretary
Mr. James Cornish, British Embassy
The Secretary
The Deputy Secretary
Ambassador Buffum, Assistant Secretary, IO
Mr. Wells Stabler, Acting Assistant Secretary for European Affairs
Mr. Lawrence Eagleburger, Executive Assistant to the Secretary
Ambassador William Crawford, Nicosia
Ambassador Jack Kubisch, Athens

Killick: I bring you best wishes from Foreign Secretary Callaghan and his appreciation that you agreed to receive us.

The Secretary: Thank you. It goes without saying that I would be happy to see you.

Killick: Our visit here is, in effect, a reply to the last message you sent over the weekend to Callaghan. He is out in the country on

1 Source: Library of Congress, Manuscript Division, Kissinger Papers, Box CL 124, Geopolitical File, Chronological File, Cyprus. Secret; Nodis. Drafted by Stabler. The meeting was held in the Secretary’s office.

2 Apparent reference to Document 144.
holiday for a rest. He does not want to go back to the Geneva forum at this time, there is no basis for it.

The Secretary: I seem to be the villain of your negotiations and I wonder how I got there.

Killick: Callaghan wants to look down the road a bit and he does not like what he sees ahead. He would like to have a discussion with you in greater depth, but this is not feasible at the present time. He, therefore, asked us to come over to have an exchange with you because this is rather better than telephone calls and diplomatic exchanges. I have a full sheaf of notes here that I would like to go over if you agree. May I proceed?

The Secretary: Yes, go ahead, and when you have finished, I will give you my thoughts. Where is Buffum?

Eagleburger: I did not know you wanted him. I will get him.

Killick: When Joe Sisco came over in July, there were some conversations with us which envisaged a package solution for Cyprus. On paper we have identified the solution as being biregional federalism.

The Secretary: The question seems to be whether the region can be extracted from the Greeks, by you or by the Turks.

Killick: There is already a de facto movement of population, and there should be some form of self-releasing guarantee as far as we are concerned. I might add that all the parties have been disenchanted with the failure by us to use military force in their interest.

The Secretary: The Turks were not unhappy that you did not use force.

Killick: That is past history and it is all highly theoretical. Nobody can impose a solution and anything that is imposed would not be a solution.

The Secretary: You mean the Greeks will not accept? How did you ever get me on the firing line in this matter?

Killick: We were not conscious that there was any act on our part which produced that result.

The Secretary: Well, it makes no difference because our actions would have been the same in any event. The Greeks have leaked what we said to them about the Soviet proposal.

Killick: The Greek insistence that a return to the August 9 line is a precondition to the resumption of negotiations is impossible. Our assessment is that the Government in Athens is weak and divided. We do not think that the Greek note of rejection of our proposal should be taken too tragically. As a matter of fact, some of the points we made are ones which Clerides would find acceptable.

The Secretary: Did we receive the text of Greek note of rejection?

Stabler: Yes we did—from the British.
The Secretary: Well, I did not see it, but I did see the summary. I am not being critical, I just wanted to know if we received it.

Killick: The following are the points on which there would have to be movement by the Turks: (1) a reasonable adjustment in the territory now held by the Turks; (2) not just a reduction of Turkish forces, but a commitment to total withdrawal; and (3) a return of the refugees to their homes since it would be hard to accept a forcible transfer of population. If we could get something from the Turks along these lines, it would be helpful. Incidentally, the Turkish emissary, Ulman, did mention in London yesterday that the Turks would be satisfied with 28 per cent of the territory.

The Secretary: I think it is stupid that Ulman said this publicly at the present time.

Cornish: I have just talked to London and they said that Ulman has backed away from this percentage.

The Secretary: Good, it is better they start at 35 per cent and then come down.

Cornish: It appears that Ulman is now speaking about the need to have a certain percentage to correspond to Turkish land holdings in Cyprus and then an additional amount for security purposes.

Killick: We should get movement from the Turks on this, and you will recall that in your letter to Callaghan, you mentioned that if you are to use your influence on the Turks to obtain some concessions, it would have to be done in the context of negotiations. You also mentioned your view that the Greek government must be brought to realize that it can rely on the friendly support of all of us, but that it must take an active part in negotiations.

The Secretary: The attitude of the Greeks toward NATO and toward our bases is most unrealistic and makes no sense.

Killick: If Turkey should make some concession as a result of the exercise of U.S. diplomacy, you would be well on your way to solving the anti-U.S. feeling in Greece. Perhaps there is some Soviet pressure building up on the Greeks, but it is difficult to read the Soviet attitude.

The Secretary: The Soviets are not moving strongly and they have taken no measures on the Turkish or Greek borders. They are doing just enough to stimulate the left in Greece. Every three days, Dobrynin comes in to suggest a joint U.S.-Soviet guarantee. When I asked Dobrynin what his view was on this proposal, he said he had warned Moscow that we would run them ragged with this proposal. I have now asked Dobrynin to get for me Soviet ideas on what a solution should be. What, in effect, can the Soviets do? If the Soviets support a bizonal solution, then they could present it in Athens. In any event, we would oppose any joint guarantee in Cyprus.

(Mr. Buffum enters the room.)
Killick: Well, we would be grateful if you would keep us filled in on what the Soviets are doing.

The Secretary: Yes, we will. The Soviet moves do not seem to be anything from Brezhnev, but rather seem to reflect Gromyko’s phobia.

Killick: In your letter, you spoke of a period of stalemate and the dangers of a prolonged stalemate. Do you think that a shorter period would be any more desirable? In Callaghan’s view, time is of the essence.

The Secretary: A stalemate would certainly work against the Greeks. We would welcome UK efforts to move forward now. Movement is desirable, but a proposal by the U.S. to Greece would provoke a complicated reaction.

Killick: We cannot stand still. There is a problem, for example, of the Turkish Cypriot communities surrounded by Greek Cypriots. I want to thank you for your successful effort last week to deter the Turks from their action to relieve those areas. Your influence was decisive. Unfortunately, the Turkish minds still seem to be moving in this direction. Denktash himself has just made certain declarations about what the Turks might do if guerilla warfare broke out. Maybe these press statements are for the purpose of flesh-creeping, but they are nevertheless worrying.

The Secretary: I do not think the Greeks would really undertake guerilla warfare against the Turks. This is quite a different matter and I do not think it is feasible.

Killick: There are a number of difficult points such as the movement of Greeks from Turkish zones and the settlement of certain Turkish mainlanders in former Greek zones. On the Greek side, there is evidence of military readiness in Crete, and some days ago, Karamanlis told our Ambassador that beyond a period of some fifteen days, he would find it very difficult to control the situation.

The Secretary: Will the Turks accept partition?

Killick: The Turks say they will not, but we do not exclude this.

The Secretary: They would probably say we had arranged it.

Killick: Callaghan is not available to take a personal hand in this negotiation because of the forthcoming elections. From the announcement which we think will be made on September 4, he will be campaigning until the elections which we think will take place on October 3.

The Secretary: In other words, Callaghan would not be available for another Geneva effort. I have had this impression for some time.

Killick: Callaghan is worried about the public image of a Foreign Secretary constantly remaining available for negotiations which may never take place. He is in an exposed position and is made to look ridiculous.
The Secretary: Callaghan should not be too worried about this point.

Killick: Callaghan does worry though about maintaining his position.

The Secretary: I believe that UK initiative would be useful to keep the ball in play and also to have something that we could support.

Killick: You should know, and this is important, that if the Turks embark on another aggressive act, Callaghan might well throw in his hand with respect to the UK’s diplomatic role. Callaghan’s present thinking is to make “one more heave” possibly this week to follow up his efforts to get the ball rolling last week. All our Ambassadors in the area share our assessment of the short-term threats. They key lies in Ankara and long-range diplomatic messages will not do the trick. We are thinking of despatching as our emissary, Minister of State Roy Hattersley. He would go to Ankara—and Nicosia if necessary—and then to Athens. He would see what he could extract from the Turks. To borrow a phrase, we would engage in shuttle diplomacy. Our decision as to whether to follow this road will be taken only in light of your comments. We are also talking to Waldheim and to several Turks in London. I should make the point that Callaghan is not prepared to put the UK in an exposed position in this sense without the U.S. making a major effort to persuade the Turks to make concessions. It will depend on your leverage and how you would go about it. We would also enlist the support of the Nine and other members of NATO in our dealings with Athens. We have noted your concern in your letter to Callaghan that the efforts of the Europeans to support Karamanlis might be construed by Karamanlis as evidence of European support for Greece as a counterweight to American support for Turkey. The UK would never lend itself to such polarization.

The Secretary: There is a danger of the exploitation of anti-Americanism. This would tend to stiffen the Greek backs just when flexibility is essential. One could write a script which the left in Greece would exploit. Anti-Americanism is synonymous with withdrawal from NATO.

Killick: We do not believe that in cultivating Athens, there is any intention on the part of Europeans to encourage anti-Americanism.

The Secretary: This is all right up to a point, but it can be very dangerous.

Killick: We must all help Karamanlis in the consolidation of democracy in Greece.

The Secretary: Shouldn’t Crawford and Kubisch be here?

We support this view, although we are worried about the stance assumed by Karamanlis. I do not think this stance reflects dissatisfaction with the Cyprus policy, but rather is a reflection of the Greek
domestic situation. The army is nationalistic and radicalized. The left is becoming disproportionately strong, while the center is not.

Killick: Our Ambassador in Athens recently constructed a scenario of the military returning to the fore to insist upon war with Turkey, a Greek defeat, the fall of Karamanlis and all this would bring about.

(Ambassadors Crawford and Kubisch enter.)

The Secretary: If Karamanlis signed an agreement, he then would be destroyed as having sold out Greek national honor.

Killick: That is why we are opposed to a meeting between Ecevit and Karamanlis.

The Secretary: If the Greeks blame us for our actions in Cyprus, we should be more comfortable since the Cyprus problem is basically soluble. There is nothing which has been done by the Europeans so far in Greece to which we could object. However, we have intelligence reports that the French plan to replace us. What does this mean and is it true? Is there any crisis that NATO can withstand? If not, this raises some very serious questions.

Killick: Originally we were more relaxed regarding the Soviet proposal, as the Greeks were really rather negative.

The Secretary: We saw the press reports regarding Mavros’ attitude and that is why we sent word to Karamanlis.

Killick: The Turkish aims in Cyprus must be repugnant to the Soviets; therefore, it should be possible for you to exercise your influence on the Turks since Turkey would not move toward the Soviets. The situation in Athens would be different.

The Secretary: The Turks could either turn to the Soviet Union or to Qadhafi nationalism. While they might not turn to the Soviets in this crisis, if they were humiliated, they could go in this direction in two or three years time. The seeds for this could be sown now.

Killick: The likelihood of Turkish humiliation is small indeed. Turkey has it made.

The Secretary: The outcome will still be that the position of the Greeks in Cyprus will be much worse than what it was on July 15. I blame myself to some extent for what happened in the second round in Geneva. I do not understand, and no one has been able to explain to me, why no proposals were put forward by anybody. The only way to stop the Turkish attack would have been to flood the table with proposals. The essential ingredient, even it if was morally wrong, was to pressure the Greeks to make some concessions. The more the Greeks were outraged by the Turks, the more their backs were stiffened and the more excuses there were for the Turks to attack. I am reluctant for the U.S. to be put in the position that it was at that time. Nothing probably could have stopped the Turks in Geneva. I wonder what happened
to the suggestion that was made about security zones in some areas of five kilometers and in other areas of eight kilometers. This seems to have disappeared and was never put forward. It would not have changed the outcome in any event. My concern now is that the outcome be such that it not cause the Greeks to dance in the streets. The Turks have gained and the Greeks have lost, but in the negotiations the Greeks will have to gain something and the Turks will have to lose something.

Killick: Callaghan is not overly optimistic, but feels he must make another try.

The Secretary: You want a U.S. “heave”. I am not at all eager for us to be in a position where it can be alleged that the UK failed because we did not do enough. Failure would, therefore, be the U.S. fault.

Killick: Callaghan does not want to land you with the baby.

The Secretary: Well, if it came to that, it would certainly be a close decision.

Killick: There are, of course, risks in what Callaghan is proposing.

The Secretary: I am not blaming anybody for what happened at Geneva II. I tried to get the Turks to come up with a proposal we could move forward. I never knew what happened to these proposals. They were not put forward.

Killick: The Turks were determined to move unilaterally.

The Secretary: We might have gained 36 hours, but I suppose the outcome would have been the same. Mavros would never have obtained approval to accept a cantonal arrangement.

Killick: We must be careful to have no failure of communication.

Alexander: I do not think there was any failure of communication in Geneva. Callaghan, I believe, regrets that he did not float proposals earlier, but there is an important dimension here. The situation was most complex and we were arguing with the Turks on irrelevancies such as place cards. On Sunday, the Turks wouldn’t meet because their Cabinet was meeting. The other dimension was that Callaghan wanted to remain on speaking terms with the Greeks and, therefore, had to be careful.

The Secretary: The elements of negotiation really did not exist. The only thing that made sense was the biregional federalism and the only question was the size of the regions. I suggested a cantonal plan only to get the principle established. My concern now is with the forthcoming UK elections. It has been my experience as a mediator that one must be less eager than the parties. Let the parties exhaust themselves so that they are then ready to negotiate. There should be no time pressure.

Killick: You suggest that this should be a more deliberate operation. I think the opportunities for consultation are good.
The Secretary: I think there are two out of three chances that the idea will fail.

Killick: The matter is not that urgent as far as we are concerned, but it is a question of how long we shall remain available to undertake the process.

The Secretary: If the UK wants to do this on its own, that is all right. But it is another matter if we are to be a participant.

Killick: The U.S. role is essential.

The Secretary: Well, then we are in trouble. If Turkey makes no concessions, we will get stuck with the consequences. We will be accused of either being incompetent or lacking in good will. It is a question of timing with respect to Turkey. A tremendous heave at the right time and with the right framework might do it. But to support a junior minister... Wells, what do you think?

Stabler: I do not think the Turks will agree to any concessions at this time. They really have nothing to gain at the moment.

Killick: We will not go forward with this idea without a major heave and an effort of major persuasion by you.

The Secretary: What movement would be required?

Killick: We would not expect detailed concessions, but there would have to be the objective of complete Turkish withdrawal and agreement not forcibly to remove Greek Cypriots from Turkish areas. We would have to have forward movement to take something to the Greeks.

The Secretary: If you want a message from the President to Ecevit—I am not sure that would be the way to do it—if this goes forward as a U.S.–U.K. initiative, then we would be the fall guy. You should not be confused by shuttle diplomacy. It is not something that can be done overnight. It takes months to prepare the ground. I started on Egypt long before I went there, and when I finally got there, both parties paled with me to go even faster. I am obviously influenced by my experience. I do not sense readiness by either party to make a major move. If we could find that there is flexibility, then we could get behind it. It would be dangerous for Callaghan to commit himself at this time to a last-ditch effort. I am very worried that if the Turks do not play, then the UK will announce that the beastly Turks had thwarted their efforts. This would then force us into a position which would make it more difficult for us to do something later. The final heave will have to be a UK effort in Athens, but the Greeks would still be dissatisfied by the small concessions that would be made.

Alexander: The UK elections will not play a role in this, and I am sure if the project moves into negotiations, Callaghan will make sure that domestic considerations do not play a part.
The Secretary: If the Turks made a major proposal, then it would be better not to conclude prior to the elections since it would be certain that one of the parties would complain. The negotiations should continue during the election period. In any event, the Greeks will blame somebody. Moreover, the Turks will probably be beastly and Ecevit tricky. I can assure you that it took me a very long time to get a proposal in the Syrian negotiation and at any time I could have blown this up. However, it was essential to take the time necessary to move forward. If Hattersley goes this week, it would take a week or more to know whether there would be real progress. The Turks will not yield at this time—if they yield to the UK at all.

Killick: We are under no illusions as to what the UK can achieve alone, but we do not want to demonstrate this publicly.

Alexander: We must be seen to be making a major effort to shift the ground in favor of the Greeks in order to get a negotiation going.

The Secretary: There is no doubt that major pressure must be placed in Ankara and the United States must do it. I agree as to the optimum outcome, but I am concerned how to get there. The Turks do not react to public pressure. We have built up considerable capital with the Turks and we must determine how to spend it usefully. Is this the right time and right context for the U.S. to make a massive effort? We have a firm rule—we do not act under pressure. Until the Greeks stop picking on us, we will do nothing to help them. But we are not anti-Greek. It makes no sense to stop aid to Turkey since it would produce nothing, and if we had to stop it for any length of time, it would be extremely complicated to get it going again.

Killick: May I ask if Congress will force your hand with regard to aid to Turkey?

The Secretary: This is possible. I do think that the scenario suggested by Callaghan should be played out at some time, and we would prefer to have the UK do it. Our concern is that the time is not yet right for an all-out effort.

Buffum: What heave can we give with the Turks in addition to the many things we have already been doing with them? The Secretary has sent many messages.

The Secretary: There is really no sign of flexibility in the Turkish position and nobody can promise Greek flexibility. The real problem is the behavior of the Greek Government.

Sykes: From my experience in Greece, the Greek Government might well go off the deep end in spite of its recognition that this would not be in its best interest.

The Secretary: It is desirable that the UK make an effort and we are prepared to give considerable support. But the time factor
would produce a deadlock. Under the best of circumstances, the mediator would have to take several weeks before getting a break. If the elections were announced in the meantime, this would create a pressure.

Alexander: The implication is then that you think we should do nothing until after October 3.

The Secretary: You might send Hattersley around to see what flexibility there is. This we could back. However, if this is a do-or-die effort, then this would radicalize the situation. It is all right to send Hattersley on an exploratory mission to keep the Turks in play and to hold the Greek hands, but a do-or-die effort would be most difficult. The Turks would be the fall guys. Cutting off aid will not only be bad, but will not move the negotiations forward. The Turks would then not withdraw their forces for a long time and we would not be able to provide aid for a long time. Other arrangements would be needed.

Alexander: The Hattersley mission is exploratory.

The Secretary: My impression is that what would help the most would be serious negotiations under UK auspices. There would be distinct foreign policy advantages as well as domestic political advantages for the UK. Once the negotiations were started, one would not push unduly. But the problem is to get over the present hurdle and start the negotiations.

Alexander: This proposal is not to be presented as a do-or-die effort.

The Secretary: If Hattersley goes the end of the month and the elections are called next week, he has only a week in which to produce something. This seems most doubtful.

Alexander: I do not think the domestic political angle looms large here.

Buffum: The communal talks in Cyprus are a major step forward and are a measure of hope for the situation on the ground.

Killick: If the Turks make another rash move, will the U.S. try to restrain them?

The Secretary: I would prefer to have the negotiations started and it should be a U.S.–UK effort. Can you stay overnight so I can talk with the President and meet with you again tomorrow?

Killick: That is all right with me, but I am not sure about you, Michael. You may have to get back.

Alexander: Mr. Secretary, how do you think the situation will improve if we hold up our initiative for a time?

The Secretary: The Greeks must learn two things: they cannot kick us around, and we will not yield to pressure. The Greeks may prefer the status quo to any action on their part to legitimatize the territorial
change. We have made many efforts with Karamanlis and with Mavros to get a dialogue started. Each time, the Greeks have kicked us in the teeth. The Greeks have never proposed anything which we could do something about. The last reply of Karamanlis was irrational. He said that the Turks would have to return to the August 9 line or there could be no negotiation. We do not believe that the Greeks are yet willing and there is no basis for U.S. mediation until the Greeks are ready. The settlement will have to be based on a partial withdrawal from present areas and something on refugees. The troop withdrawal question will be very tough. How do we get into this with the Greeks? The Greeks will say that they were giving us another chance to show our support using the UK as agents. Then we will be in a very false position and this before we had prepared the Turks’ position. I have really no idea as to the elements of flexibility in the Greek position. The question is how to bring the parties together and we would like the UK to do this. My strong preference is for the U.S. not to do it. Basically, I think your idea of an emissary is about two weeks premature. There is some evidence that the Greeks are moving in the right direction, but the domestic structure in Greece today is such that the U.S. is still the fall guy. The army blames us, the left does not need anything—it almost won in 1967. The army is destroyed as a counterweight and is radicalized. Karamanlis is on a dangerous ledge and at some point will be driven to produce something. He certainly doesn’t want to do anything for Papandreou. Karamanlis may be more reasonable later.

I will talk with the President about your proposal. I agree with your concept. It has to go this way. The solution is realistic and must go via Ankara. I am not clear where we are going to be when the UK launches its initiative in a period which we consider slightly premature and in a situation in which we cannot operate very well. We have not had a rational communication from Karamanlis, and the Greeks have given us nothing on which we can get a handle. I had no conception prior to Geneva II just what Karamanlis wanted. I am worried about the UK elections. You can send Hattersley, but can you guarantee that there will not be a break-up?

Alexander: Would you like us to get some view from London as to what the effect of the election might have on this initiative?

The Secretary: I would like to have a sense of Callaghan’s timing. Is he moving toward a break-up or what?

Alexander: It is important that we stay closely in touch on all of this.

The Secretary: Callaghan will get mad at some point and the thing will stalemate. I would consider it a diplomatic achievement if there were a stalemate for four weeks without a break-up. But what would
happen then in Athens? Let’s meet tomorrow.\(^3\) We will give you a time. In the meantime, I will talk with the President.\(^4\)

\(^3\) No record of this conversation has been found.
\(^4\) When Kissinger met with Ford, the President agreed that the British should take the initiative. (Memorandum of conversation, August 28; Ford Library, National Security Adviser, Memoranda of Conversations, Box 5, 8/28/74)

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147. **Telegram From the Embassy in Greece to the Department of State**

Athens, September 9, 1974, 1915Z.

6541. Subj: Cyprus: First Caramanlis–Tyler Meeting. Ref: Athens 6507.\(^2\)

1. The meeting opened promptly at ten in the morning on Monday, September 9. Present, in addition to the Prime Minister and Ambassador Tyler,\(^3\) were Deputy Foreign Minister Bitsios and DCM Stearns. After welcoming Ambassador Tyler, PM Caramanlis asked what news he brought from Washington.

2. Ambassador Tyler extended to the Prime Minister greetings of the President and the Secretary and conveyed to him their admiration for Caramanlis and his government. Ambassador Tyler said that the U.S. wishes to be helpful to the PM and his government and the Secretary believes that the opportunity to exchange views afforded by Ambassador Tyler’s visit is crucial to determine how this can be done. The Secretary wishes to establish close and cordial relations with the PM on a confidential basis and would welcome the PM’s ideas on how to achieve this. Ambassador Kubisch will be arriving in Athens on September 19 and will bring with him the Secretary’s response to any proposals that Caramanlis cares to make on this or other points.

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\(^1\) Source: Library of Congress, Manuscript Division, Kissinger Papers, Box CL 124, Geopolitical File, Chronological File, Cyprus. Secret; Flash; Nodis; Cherokee.

\(^2\) Telegram 6507, September 9, briefly summarized this meeting. (Ibid., Box CL 284, Memoranda of Conversations/Staff and Others, 1974).

\(^3\) Kissinger sent retired Ambassador William Tyler to Athens and Wells Stabler to Ankara on informal missions in the aftermath of the second Turkish invasion. According to *Years of Renewal*, p. 235: “They were instructed to put forward a concept for a bi-zonal federation of Cyprus and a significant reduction of the Turkish-controlled areas, as well as a phased withdrawal of Turkish forces.”
3. Ambassador Tyler said that he was instructed to stress the importance that U.S. attaches to close relations with the PM and his government. Greece is a respected friend and valiant ally. We warmly welcome the return of democracy to Greece and believe that our mutual interests can only be served if there is no misunderstanding between us.

4. In this spirit and for these reasons Ambassador Tyler said that he would speak with complete frankness. (To which the PM interjected, “I like that.”) In doing so Ambassador Tyler was fulfilling the wish of the Secretary that Caramanlis be made fully aware of the motives, attitudes and reactions of the U.S. Government.

5. PM then asked “What is the position of your government on the Cyprus question?”

6. Ambassador Tyler replied that we wished to be helpful although the PM should realize that our ability to be helpful requires a constructive attitude on the part of the Greek Government. The US, like Greece, has its own self-respect and we do not react well to pressure tactics.

7. The PM asked what sort of pressure Ambassador Tyler had in mind.

8. Ambassador Tyler replied that our role is made more difficult if either party to the Cyprus dispute takes an anti-American stand. “If the atmosphere is poisoned by anti-Americanism,” he said, “then we will have no choice but to stand aside until another opportunity arises, if it ever does.” In this connection the Secretary believes that no alternative solution could be provided by the Soviet Union, a point of view which we understand Caramanlis shares.

9. Ambassador Tyler went on to say that the Secretary has always stressed the need for careful preparation before negotiations are launched. This was true of both the Indochina and Middle East negotiations. The Secretary will not act as a lawyer or advocate for any of the parties of a dispute that we are helping to resolve. Nor is he in the habit of making statements to the grandstand or of making empty promises that the U.S. cannot fulfill.

10. “How do we move from words to actions?” asked Ambassador Tyler. We must find the parameters of a solution to the Cyprus problem allowing a certain margin for negotiation. We must know the ultimate objectives of the parties before we can try to harmonize them.

11. The Prime Minister at this point observed with a smile that there were many conditions and prerequisites affecting the American role. Nevertheless, speaking seriously, he appreciated the Secretary’s desire to be helpful. He asked how long Ambassador Tyler planned to remain in Athens.

12. Ambassador Tyler said that his tentative plan was to depart on Thursday, September 12, but that he could, of course, remain longer in Athens if the PM wished him to do so.
13. The PM indicated that this time frame was probably satisfactory and that he would wish to meet with Ambassador Tyler again on Tuesday, September 10. He then asked Ambassador Tyler to proceed with his presentation.

14. Ambassador Tyler said that at the Secretary’s request he wished to give Caramanlis the U.S. view of events since July 15. The Secretary considered that it was important to do this because he was concerned about press reports in Athens and statements by Greek political figures that falsely alleged that the U.S. had taken an anti-Greek position in the Cyprus dispute. The Secretary understands that domestic considerations may lead a government to neutralize attacks from the left or right by preemptive statements of its own. We have, however, been stunned by some of the anti-American statements and charges emanating from Athens. The PM must realize that major decisions possibly involving the use of force could not be seriously contemplated at a time of a Presidential changeover in the U.S. “What would the Greek Government have had us do?” asked Ambassador Tyler. We refrained from taking an anti-Greek position at the time of the coup against Makarios because to have done so would have constituted an open invitation for the Turks to take military action. The PM should realize that U.S. military intervention against the Turks, with the consequences that would have ensued, was “unthinkable”.

15. The PM noted that following the putsch against Makarios, world press had reported that the Secretary had expressed satisfaction because “a Mediterranean Castro” had been eliminated. Tyler denied that Secretary had said anything of the kind.

16. Ambassador Tyler observed that many of the Secretary’s advisers had urged him to take an anti-Greek stand when the Junta made its move against Makarios. The Secretary rejected this advice not only because he believed such a stand would have encouraged Turkish military intervention, but also because the injection of anti-Greek bias into our policy would have destroyed our ability to be helpful later. Contrary to suggestions made inaccurately and tendentiously in the press we had no illusions about the character of the Sampson government and had not favored him. Results of the anti-Makarios coup were in any case bound to be unfavorable to Greek interests leaving behind at least temporarily no government in Cyprus and a discredited military regime in Athens. To sum up, the US did not tilt toward the Turks—the balance of forces had tilted in favor of the Turks.

17. Caramanlis laughed and said that he appreciated this exposition of the American point of view but still believed that we could have been more helpful.

18. Ambassador Tyler said that we tried to be as helpful as possible during both the first and second Geneva conferences. We were not,
however, conducting the negotiations and thus were operating in difficult circumstances. We are in fact “puzzled” by the course taken in the second Geneva conference. There was an almost exclusive concentration on the ceasefire issue without any long term proposals being put forward. Preparation for the conference had been totally inadequate with the predictable consequence that the conference was deadlocked after two days. The success of any future issues and the putting forward of specific, substantive proposals. [sic]

19. At this point Deputy Foreign Minister Bitsios said that the latter comment was worth translating verbatim for the PM and he did so.

20. Ambassador Tyler said that the Secretary attempted during the course of the second Geneva conference to get the Turks to make specific proposals concerning possible cantonal arrangements in order to gain time. It was of course possible that the Turks had been prepared to move militarily on the island from the beginning of the conference. With this possibility in mind, the State Department issued its public statement regarding the need for greater autonomy for the Turkish community on Cyprus.4 This statement was made to demonstrate that there was no justification for the Turks to move militarily. The statement was not, as it was incorrectly depicted in some quarters, a tilt toward the Turks.

21. PM said that this impression was created by Turkish PM Ecevit who greeted the statement warmly and thanked the US for its “understanding”. Caramanlis commented that Ecevit made too many public declarations: “He speaks fifteen times a day—I speak once every fifteen days.”

22. Ambassador Tyler said that this was of course past history. Admitted we had not been successful in deterring the Turks. Caramanlis should accept, however, that we had not connived with them and had done our best to be even handed and helpful. More recently we have warned them that they could not make future military moves without causing public and active opposition by the US to the Turkish position with all that this implied. We do not wish events to move in this direction. We recognize that legitimate Turkish complaints exist about the treatment of the Turkish minority on Cyprus and the stupid acts of the Greek Junta. The US does not favor public condemnation of Turkey and does not believe that such condemnation would contribute to achieving a settlement of the Cyprus conflict that is both enduring and consistent with the honor and dignity of Greece.

23. Having reviewed the past, we must consider the future, Ambassador Tyler continued. We want to be helpful and we believe that our help can only be effective in the context of negotiations. We are

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4 See footnote 2, Document 140.
prepared to use our influence in Ankara to create a climate favorable to the resumption of negotiations. The Secretary has studied very carefully the points made by the PM in his letter of August 22. He said on several occasions to Ambassador Tyler that the only solution in Cyprus that we want is one compatible with the honor and dignity of Greece and in the interests of the people of Cyprus.

24. Nevertheless, the Greeks must realize that no solution to the Cyprus problem can produce a situation which existed before July 15. (Caramanlis nodded his agreement with this point.) What the Secretary hopes will come out of our conversations in Athens is a negotiating framework within which we can plan a useful role; the Secretary wants to work out with the Greeks a common approach which can help bring about a satisfactory solution. This common approach must of course reflect the realities of the situation and not wishful thinking.

24. The Secretary wants to know what Caramanlis and his government envisage as a general outline of a solution that they can live with. The US has husbanded its influence with the Turks and is ready to use it at the appropriate time. But to use our influence effectively we must know what Greek goals are and what they regard as the outlines of a realistic settlement. If Caramanlis and his government wish to live with the status quo, that is their decision to make, but if they wish to move toward a solution we must know his position within fairly broad limits.

25. Such an outline must include at least three principal components: (A) the size of the Turkish-held area in Cyprus; (B) the size of Turkish forces and their rate of withdrawal; and (C) the refugee question.

26. Caramanlis said that a fourth component was the form of the future Cypriot Government.

27. Ambassador Tyler said that we would also be interested in Greek views on this point. Would the Greek Government accept a bizonal federal system for example? The Secretary would welcome their views.

28. Regarding procedures, the Secretary was ready to play a much more active role if this would be helpful. We would like to have Greek views on procedural questions. One approach would be direct talks between the Secretary and Caramanlis and Ecevit in Europe or in the U.S., or with Mavros and Gunes.

29. At this point in the meeting the PM asked Bitsios to telephone to the PM’s office in the Parliament building to say that he would be late for his next appointment. When Bitsios had left the room, Caramanlis
turned to Ambassador Tyler and said that he attached great importance to the current discussions.

30. When Bitsios returned, Ambassador Tyler continued with his discussion of procedures. The first phase was to begin the process of seeking a framework for a Cyprus solution. The second phase was to obtain the blessing of this framework by the guarantor powers. (At this point Caramanlis interrupted to say that the guarantor powers had ceased to exist since in addition to the parties to the conflict there were only the British who “sat back with folded arms.”) Ambassador Tyler did not comment on this interdiction by Caramanlis but said that the third procedural phase would be for the details of a settlement to be worked out in talks between the communal leaders.

31. Caramanlis then said that he could suggest an alternative negotiating procedure. Instead of direct talks with the Turks, it would be possible to have indirect negotiations through intermediaries.

32. Ambassador Tyler said that he thought we would be receptive to any approach that would lead to a practical solution. There would certainly be a need for rapid and flexible communication of confidential information, if we were to play an intermediary role of the kind suggested by the Prime Minister. We would not wish to see the mistakes of Geneva repeated. Ambassador Tyler informed Caramanlis that the Secretary planned to ask David Bruce to play a role at an appropriate time. The overall timing of negotiations was, of course, up to Caramanlis but in our view it would be easier to find a lasting solution sooner rather than later when positions had hardened.

33. Ambassador Tyler suggested that Caramanlis consider the possible advantages of broadening the scope of the negotiations. If the Aegean question were included, a package settlement might be achieved in which Greece would obtain compensations to offset whatever concessions the Greeks might have to make on Cyprus.

34. At this time the meeting concluded. The PM said that he wished to meet again with Ambassador Tyler on Tuesday, September 10, at seven in the evening.6

Tasca

6 See Document 149.
148. Memorandum From the Director of the Bureau of Intelligence and Research (Hyland) to Secretary of State Kissinger


CYPRUS COUP POST MORTEM

Attached is the chronology you requested of significant intelligence reporting and events leading up to the anti-Makarios coup. The conclusions seem to be:

1. Between about mid-May and mid-June, there was growing concern in Washington within the State Department (at the desk level) and in Embassy Nicosia that a confrontation between Makarios and Athens was becoming a dangerous risk; before any significant CIA reporting was received on a possible Ioannides-sponsored coup, the Department recommended to Ambassador Tasca that a démarche be made in Athens.

   —In this period, for some reason, Embassy Athens resisted any approaches to the Greek Government, despite the fact that on May 29 CIA reported that Ioannides was thinking about removing Makarios.

   —Apparently the Embassy made a low-key intervention on June 17 to the Cyprus desk officer in the Greek Foreign Ministry (the Department had by then acquiesced in a low-key approach).

   In light of this record, it is reasonable to question whether Ioannides, who was speculating freely about his various plans, [less than 1 line not declassified] received what he might have construed to be a weak US response.

2. Nevertheless, the intelligence in the subsequent period through early July was erratic and probably included some deliberate misinformation from Ioannides.

   —On June 19 CIA reported [less than 1 line not declassified] that Ioannides had not made up his mind.

   —On June 28 CIA reported Ioannides was working up “contingency plans” should Makarios force a showdown.

   —On July 3 CIA, [less than 1 line not declassified], claimed that Ioannides had decided against action to remove Makarios (sic).

Meanwhile:

   —On June 29 the Department instructed Athens to inform Ioannides that the US would be strongly opposed to any effort to remove Makarios.

1 Source: Library of Congress, Manuscript Division, Kissinger Papers, Box CL 124, Geopolitical File, Chronological File, Cyprus. Secret; Nodis.
—On July 1 Tasca objected to this démarche.
—Tasca did, however, talk to the Greek President Ghizikis and expressed his satisfaction with Ghizikis’ reiteration of Greece’s attachment to the inter communal talks.

3. In the immediate pre-coup period the intelligence continued to be ambiguous; [less than 1 line not declassified] CIA [less than 1 line not declassified] on July 12 reported that Ioannides felt that the removal of Makarios would lead to ramifications too explosive to ensure success (this was not received until July 15).

4. On the other hand, there was sufficient concern in the Department and in Nicosia which led to Ambassador Davies’ conversations with Makarios on July 12 in which he told the Archbishop that (1) we had informed the Greek government that resort to violence would exacerbate Cyprus’ problems, and (2) that the Greek government was aware of US opposition to activities that tended to threaten stability in the eastern Mediterranean. (Comment: One can only speculate whether this information conveyed to Makarios on July 12 was too reassuring, since in fact we had made only limited and lower level interventions in Athens.)

One cannot conclude from the attached survey that we had what could be called “warning” of an impending coup. What we did have were sufficient storm signals to warrant some diplomatic action—which, in retrospect, seems to have been weak and indecisive. Thus, it is possible that in Athens our policy was interpreted as seeming acquiescence in Ioannides’ plans, especially since the Greek junta could not know of the various pulling and hauling between the Department and the Embassy.

[2 paragraphs (13 lines) not declassified]

Attachment

THE CYPRUS CRISIS UP TO JULY 15

Rising Tension

Longstanding differences between Athens and Makarios became acute following Ioannides’ seizure of power in November 1973. Ioannides regarded Makarios as overdependent on the support of the Cypriot Communist Party and dangerously beholden to the USSR. He was, moreover, frustrated by Makarios’ independence from Athens’ influence and by his inability to affect Nicosia’s policies, particularly in the context of the intercommunal problem.
Following the death of General Grivas in January, Ioannides launched a campaign to gain control of EOKA–B, Grivas’ terrorist organization, using the Cyprus National Guard led by officers seconded from the Greek army.

For his part Makarios had long regarded the National Guard as a hotbed of subversion completely subservient to Athens and a force to be feared. He had formed the Tactical Reserve Unit as a palace guard loyal to his person. As EOKA–B violence increased, he was busy expanding and arming the TRU, but he must have been aware that it could never hope to stand up to the 10,000-man National Guard.

Tension came to a head in early May when EOKA–B guerrillas stole arms from a National Guard armory with the probable connivance of NG officers. In a letter to Greek Foreign Minister Tetenes, Makarios protested anti-Makarios activities by the NG. By mid-May the collision course had been set.

**Consideration of US Démarche**

On May 17 the Department proposed (103030) that Athens approach Greek leaders, including Ioannides, to convey US disquiet over the course of events in Cyprus. Athens (3121) on May 24 recommended against such a démarche on grounds that

—Foreign Minister Tetenes had denounced the arms theft;

—As a staunch anti-Communist who viewed Makarios as too relaxed toward Communist activities on the island, Ioannides would react negatively;

—The GOG could not be expected to take action against NG or EOKA–B activities unless the GOC distanced itself from leftist support and disbanded its armed groups;

—The démarche would be untimely because the GOG appeared to be reviewing the NG’s role in Cyprus;

—A direct approach to Ioannides carried risks that could adversely affect US security interests in Greece.

On the other hand, Embassy Nicosia (1002) on May 29 endorsed an early US approach to both the military and civilian Greek leadership, arguing that NG involvement in an EOKA–B move to overthrow Makarios would prompt a forceful Turkish reaction.

On May 29 Ioannides [less than 1 line not declassified] CIA [less than 1 line not declassified] that

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3 Telegram 103030 to Athens, May 17. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy Files, 1974)
4 Telegram 3121 from Athens, May 24. (Ibid.)
5 Telegram 1002 from Nicosia, May 29. (Ibid.)
—Greece was capable of removing Makarios with little bloodshed and he felt that Turkey would quietly acquiesce to such a coup.

—Nevertheless, he believed Makarios’ continuation in office at least in the short run was in Greece’s national interest. He said that he had not made a decision on Greece’s policy toward Cyprus, but added that in the long run Makarios would not serve Greece’s interests because he was irrevocably leading Cyprus into Soviet arms.

—He could either pull Greek troops out of Cyprus and let Makarios fend for himself or remove him, but both options were distasteful and extremely dangerous.

On May 31 Embassy Athens (3289) repeated its reservations to a US démarche, asserting that other matters in US-Greek relations and the Aegean dispute argued against US involvement in the Athens–Nicosia tension. Athens estimated that the GOG was not so important as to risk action in Cyprus that could escalate dangerously. It said that, in any event, the initiatives should rest with the parties to the London–Zurich accords.

On June 8 the Department responded (121776) to the views of Embassies Athens and Nicosia by informing Athens that it continued “to feel that some expression of US concern in low key to GOG is desirable, but we leave this matter to your discretion.”

On June 13 Embassy Athens reported that it raised the concerns contained in the Department’s May 17 telegram with the Cyprus desk officer in the Greek Foreign Ministry.

Makarios Prepares

By the end of May we began receiving information of Makarios’ plans for the drastic reduction of the NG and the expulsion of mainland Greek officers. During June Makarios intensified his public attacks on the NG and promised to purge the force. Meanwhile, violence on the island continued unabated and Embassy Nicosia reported that Makarios’ campaign against the NG had not received widespread popular support. Many Cypriots felt that the NG was a necessary counterweight to the ambitions of the left and indispensable in a confrontation with the Turks.

On June 17 Embassy Nicosia (1153) suggested that, without furthering Makarios’ efforts to establish control over the National Guard, the US should continue efforts to convince Athens that toppling Makarios would generate instability.

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6 Telegram 3289 from Athens, May 31. (Ibid.)
7 Telegram 121776 to Athens and Nicosia, June 8. (Ibid.)
8 Telegram 1153 from Nicosia, June 17. (Ibid.)
On June 19 Ioannides [less than 1 line not declassified] CIA [less than 1 line not declassified] that
— He had not made up his mind on whether to pull out of Cyprus completely or remove Makarios and then deal directly with Turkey over the future of the island.
— He believed Makarios had chosen this period of Greek-Turkish tension over the Aegean to consolidate his power and destroy Greek influence in Cyprus.
— "The Turks would agree to the removal of their archfoe, Makarios," but if not, he would propose an all-encompassing agreement to settle all outstanding problems between Greece and Turkey. His terms amounted to Turkish capitulation in Cyprus and the Aegean.
— He felt the only major obstacle to an agreement along those lines would be the uncertain reaction of the USSR.
— He suspected that the US would favor a Greek-Turkish agreement that would remove all points of friction.

On June 24 Tasca (Athens 3936)9 expressed increasing concern over the developing crisis in Cyprus. He thought it probable that the initial stage of a head-on collision between Makarios and Ioannides had begun. He continued to oppose a US démarche to Athens, noting that this would appear to question the announced Greek policy of support for the intercommunal talks and opposition to all violence on Cyprus. Instead Tasca recommended US approaches to the UN and NATO Secretaries General to encourage them to work directly with the London–Zurich signatories. On June 25 Embassy Ankara (5012)10 concurred wholeheartedly with Tasca’s recommendation.

Agreeing with the gravity of the situation as posed by Tasca and that a formal US démarche was not desirable at that time, Embassy Nicosia (1224)11 stated on June 27 that Makarios’ confrontation was with Ioannides and the NG, not with EOKA-B. Nicosia felt that Ankara was likely to react quickly against an “enosist coup.” The Embassy proposed that Ambassador Davies warn Makarios of the dangers of confrontation in his initial interview and stressed that Ioannides “should be reached,” adding that “Any help NATO can provide is fine, but we wonder if Luns has all the arguments at his fingertips.”

The CIA reported June 28 [less than 1 line not declassified] that Ioannides [less than 1 line not declassified] he would continue taking action to thwart Makarios’ tactical moves while developing with his advisers

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9 Telegram 3936 from Athens, June 24. (Ibid.)
10 Document 76.
11 Telegram 1224 from Nicosia, June 27. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy Files, 1974)
a contingency plan should Makarios force Greece into a showdown situation. In its NID of June 29 the CIA noted that Ioannides had speculated the previous week on the possibility of removing Makarios and entering into an “all-encompassing” agreement with Ankara, but that he considered such a move dangerous and was unlikely to attempt it soon unless Makarios pressed the NG issue too far.

On June 29, against a background of increasingly sharp démarches between Nicosia and Athens over the National Guard, the Department (141500)\(^{12}\) instructed Ambassador Tasca to inform Ioannides that the US would be strongly opposed to any effort to remove Makarios from power by violent means. Tasca in his reply July 1 (4179)\(^{13}\) objected to such a démarche and recommended waiting until Ambassador Davies could provide an assessment following his initial contacts with Makarios and other Cypriot personalities. He contended that

---the GOG was fully aware of the US opposition to any resort to violence and support for a peaceful solution to the Cyprus problem through intercommunal talks;
---he had expressed this US position the previous week to Archbishop Seraphim, who is close to President Ghizikis and Ioannides;
---he would “again refer to our interest in a peaceful settlement” when he would see Ghizikis the following day.

Subsequently Ambassador Tasca reported (4254)\(^{14}\) that in his July 2 conversation with Ghizikis he expressed his satisfaction at the reiteration of Greece’s attachment to the intercommunal talks and opposition to violence. He felt that his conversation would be reported to Ioannides.

No additional cabled instructions were sent to Athens, but in the following days Department officers were in telephone communication with Embassy Athens for specific information on how the US position had been conveyed to Greek leaders. In its cable of July 11 (4378)\(^{15}\) Embassy Athens stated that in addition to Tasca’s approaches, noted above, other Embassy elements had “used their own channels to convey the US position against any resort to violence on Cyprus.” The Embassy added CIA information that upon learning of Tasca’s meeting with Ghizikis, Ioannides said that Tasca’s “policy line with regard to Cyprus and the Aegean controversy was particularly pleasing.”

\(^{12}\) Document 77.
\(^{13}\) Telegram 4179 from Athens, July 1. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy Files, 1974)
\(^{14}\) Telegram 4254 from Athens, July 3. (Ibid.)
\(^{15}\) Telegram 4378 from Athens, July 11. (Ibid.)
[less than 1 line not declassified] CIA [less than 1 line not declassified] stated on July 3 that Ioannides had decided, for the time being, against action to remove Makarios because of

—the uncertainty of Soviet reaction and
—fear that Turkey might misinterpret the move.

On July 2 Makarios wrote to Ghizikis formally announcing his plan to reduce the National Guard drastically and demanding the recall of the mainland Greek officers. Makarios released the contents to the public. On that day INR commented in the Secretary’s Summary that Makarios’ decision to expel over 90 percent of the mainland officers would precipitate a confrontation with the Ioannides regime.

On July 5 [less than 1 line not declassified] CIA [less than 1 line not declassified] reported that Prime Minister Androutsopoulous confided that Athens would attempt to persuade Makarios to postpone his plans. Androutsopoulous’ tone was conciliatory. In its NID of July 8 CIA estimated that the GOG would try to stall attempts by Makarios to reduce the number of mainland officers and thus buy time. In the Secretary’s Summary of July 7 INR thought that Makarios was likely to feel that Athens’ argument for not immediately complying with his request to remove the officers was only a ruse to keep Greek forces on the island. According to the INR comment, his suspicions would be heightened by Athens claim that it could not control anti-Makarios activities by Greek nationals.

On July 5 Tetenes and the two next highest officials of the Foreign Ministry resigned. The CIA had reported on June 21 [document number not declassified]16 that Tetenes had urged an accommodating stance toward Makarios, and the resignation may have been over his failure to dissuade Ioannides from action.

In a conversation with Deputy Assistant Secretary Stabler on July 9 (150100)17 Cyprus Ambassador Dimitriou referred to Makarios’ letter and opined that Greece “won’t take this lying down.” He speculated that Athens might withdraw the NG completely and recall its ambassador.

[less than 1 line not declassified] CIA [less than 1 line not declassified] reported on July 11 that Makarios’ response to Androutsopoulous’ request for a delay in the implementation of the Archbishop’s NG plans was negative. Androutsopoulous said that extremes should be avoided and a compromise sought. In its NID of July 11 the CIA stated that an attempt by the Greek junta to remove Makarios could not be ruled out.

16 Not found.
17 Telegram 150100 to Nicosia, July 11. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy Files, 1974)
On July 11, reacting to Nicosia’s proposal of June 27, the Department instructed Ambassador Davies to comment as follows in a scheduled meeting with Makarios if he should raise the subject of Greece–Cyprus relations:

— the US has informed the GOG that resort to violence would exacerbate Cyprus’ problems;
— the GOG is aware of US opposition to activities that tend to threaten stability in the eastern Mediterranean, peaceful relations among our allies, and the single, sovereign, and independent status of Cyprus;
— the US hopes that issues between Cyprus and Greece can be resolved in a manner consistent with Cyprus’ sovereignty, independence, and security and with the interests of stability in the region.

Davies conveyed this information to Makarios on July 12.

On the same day CIA reported the statement of a Soviet diplomat in Athens that a strong Soviet démarche would be sent to the GOG warning against interference in Cyprus.

On July 13 in the Secretary’s Summary INR said that since receiving Makarios’ letter demanding the recall of most of the mainland officers, Athens had reacted moderately, but the Ioannides regime was capable of an attempt to remove Makarios.

Information obtained by CIA on July 12, received by the Department on July 15, purported that Ioannides felt removal of Makarios at this time would lead to ramifications too explosive to ensure success. Ioannides added that on July 12 a reduction of 100 mainland officers from the NG would be ordered.

As the record shows, there was ample intelligence prior to the July 15 coup of the heightening tension developing between the Greek and Cypriot governments. Although much of it was conflicting, and even intentionally misleading, the weight of evidence pointed to an impending direct move against Makarios by Ioannides.

Ioannides may well have read into the US warnings that reached him primary concern over intercommunal violence. (According to a CIA [TDFIBDB–315/06765–74], when asked immediately after the coup about foreign reaction, Ioannides replied, “the Americans are okay.”) He could have concluded that he had a free hand, insofar as the United States was concerned, as long as his gambit was intra-Greek. Indeed, immediately following the coup on July 15, the Sampson government was at pains to reassure the Turkish Cypriot community.

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18 Telegram 150449 to Nicosia, July 11. (Ibid.)
19 Not found. Brackets in the original.
It may be relevant to point out that during the months of spring and early summer our attention was fixed on the Aegean dispute as the arena that would most readily ignite into Greek-Turkish hostilities. Although we felt that Cyprus would inevitably be dragged into such a conflict, we were less certain that Cyprus would be the flash point. Perhaps as a consequence, our sensitivities to Cyprus-related events were less sharp than they should have been. Be it noted, however, that our reasoning was shared by Makarios. He undoubtedly decided to use the opportunity of what he thought would be Ioannides’ preoccupation with Turkey to assert control over the NG. He miscalculated only in that he greatly overestimated Ioannides’ understanding of Turkish imperatives.

149. Telegram From the Embassy in Greece to the Department of State

Athens, September 11, 1974, 0040Z.

6587. Subject: Cyprus: Second Caramanlis–Tyler Meeting.

1. The second meeting began at seven in the evening on Tuesday, September 10. It lasted one hour and forty minutes. Present in addition to Prime Minister Caramanlis and Ambassador Tyler were Deputy Foreign Minister Bitsios and DCM Stearns.

2. Following preliminary discussion of press inquiries on the Tyler visit (septel), Ambassador Tyler opened the discussion by saying that he wished to clarify his remarks at the first meeting on the subject of negotiating procedures. He wished to emphasize that Secretary Kissinger did not envisage direct Caramanlis–Ecevit or Mavros–Gunes talks in the initial stages of negotiations. What the Secretary had in mind were indirect talks. These could be conducted through the Secretary himself or another intermediary in whom both sides had confidence. Ambassador Tyler said that the Secretary did not insist that he be personally involved. Although he was ready to be involved if the

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1 Source: Library of Congress, Manuscript Division, Kissinger Papers, Box CL 284, Memoranda of Conversations, Staff and Others, 1974. Secret; Flash; Nodis; Cherokee.
2 Telegram 6586 from Athens, September 10. (Ibid., Box CL 124, Geopolitical File, Chronological File, Cyprus)
3 Kissinger sent Tyler instructions on this issue in telegram 197320 to Athens, September 9. (Ibid.)
parties thought this would be helpful. The Secretary would welcome Greek views on this point.

3. Caramanlis responded by saying that he agreed that indirect talks were advisable. He could not participate in a summit meeting unless the way were prepared in advance through indirect negotiations.

4. Ambassador Tyler said that indirect talks could be conducted in various ways. The Secretary could, for example, meet with Caramanlis and Ecevit separately on successive days in the same city. Rome or Vienna might be appropriate locations but there were of course other possibilities. Alternatively, if it were impractical for Caramanlis and Ecevit to be present in the same city, the Secretary might meet with Caramanlis in Corfu and then proceed to Ankara to see Ecevit.

5. Caramanlis repeated that advance preparation was essential from his point of view. Some preliminary progress would have to be made and a more favorable climate created before he, Ecevit and the Secretary began to tackle the problem.

6. Ambassador Tasca observed that a third, perhaps less desirable way, of conducting indirect talks would be in New York with Mavros and Gunes during the UN General Assembly session. If indirect talks at the Foreign Minister level were to take place, however, the Secretary believed that the two Foreign Ministers would have to be authorized to conduct the same kind of discussions that would have taken place at the Prime Minister level.

7. Caramanlis repeated that he could not engage in substantive negotiations, whether direct or indirect, without advance preparation. He then commented that he would like to describe to Ambassador Tyler the Greek Government’s perspective on the present crisis and the events which led up to it.

8. Caramanlis began by saying that he appreciated the Secretary’s initiative and was grateful to Ambassador Tyler for undertaking the current mission to which Caramanlis attached great importance. Ambassador Tyler had been frank in his exposition of American views—the Prime Minister would be equally candid.

9. Tyler had spoken of “pressure tactics” and anti-Americanism in Greece. The Prime Minister did not engage in blackmail. He was guided solely by Greek national interests. When he expressed disappointment with American policy, this was not a maneuver. His statements reflected genuine Greek conviction that there was a lack of understanding in Washington of the Greek position and of Greek interests. Caramanlis had deliberately refused to inflame Greek public opinion against the U.S. He was a man of moderation and had proved this by the tone of his statements. He had repeatedly advised the Greek people to remain calm. He had warned the press against irresponsible rumor-mongering. Under the circumstances, his criticism of American
policy had been the least he could do and was a sincere expression of
his feelings and those of the Greek people.

10. Caramanlis said, “When I returned to Greece, I found anti-American sentiments here: I did not create them.” These sentiments
were generated both by popular disappointment with American pol-
icy on Cyprus and by a general feeling that the U.S. Government had
supported the Greek military regime. Popular bitterness increased as
the Turks continued their military operations on Cyprus and there was
still no effective American reaction.

11. “I am a friend of the U.S. by conviction,” said Caramanlis, “and
I am the first to regret anti-Americanism. I believe that in their hearts
the Greek people still think that the U.S. will help them.” The Prime
Minister added that he would try to maintain the moderate tone of his
popular pronouncements. However, if the Turks were to remain in-
flexible, his tone would have to change.

12. “You know the recent history of the Cyprus conflict,” Cara-
manlis continued. “The junta made a stupid mistake in trying to purge
Makarios and they later claimed to have been encouraged by Wash-
ington.” The PM believed that the attempted coup could have been
prevented by Washington and London. The British had both the right
and the duty under the London–Zurich accords to act to protect the in-
dependence and legitimacy of Cyprus. They failed to do so. The Turks
took advantage of the junta’s stupidity to execute a plan that had been
prepared beforehand. Caramanlis believed that the Americans and
British could have prevented both the junta’s coup against Makarios
and the Turkish landings in Cyprus. If the U.S. was genuinely con-
cerned about anti-Americanism in Greece, Washington should admit
that it had followed the wrong policy and help find a solution to the
Cyprus crisis which the Greek Government and the Greek people could
accept. If this were done, the bitterness of Greeks toward the U.S. would
gradually fade.

13. Continuing with his presentation the PM said that even if the
initial Turkish landing on Cyprus were construed to have been justi-
ified by the junta’s coup against Makarios—a contention Caramanlis
did not accept—the second phase of the Turkish military actions was
totally inexcusable and clearly expansionist. The Turkish beachhead af-
after their initial landings was roughly four to five percent of the land
area of Cyprus. The Turks accepted a ceasefire and negotiations in
Geneva. Their action in establishing the Atilla line was a “premeditated
crime.”

14. The Prime Minister then proceeded to review the course of
events at the second Geneva conference. He said that the Turks had
proposed a plan which was unacceptable to the Greek Government.
Nevertheless, the Greek Government requested a delay of twenty-four
hours to study the Turkish proposal because of the lack of a Turkish response to the Greek request. The twenty-four hours became thirty-six hours. Secretary Kissinger had called the PM at two in the morning asking him to keep Mavros and the Greek delegation in Geneva. The PM had done so and had then found himself faced with a Turkish ultimatum. The Turks launched their attack at five in the morning. Thus, summarized Caramanlis, there was no shred of a pretext for their second military offensive. He said, “It was an attempt to kill my government and they did it under the eyes of the Americans.” For these reasons the PM believed that the U.S. had made mistakes both of omission and commission. We must begin to take the initiatives necessary to remedy the situation. Faced with the threat of Turkish military action in Cyprus, the U.S. might have reacted as it had in 1964. The U.S. had ways and means of stopping the Turks without intervening militarily. Not only had we failed to act along the lines of our 1964 policy, we did not even give moral satisfaction to the Greeks by condemning publicly what the Turks had done.

15. Greece had shown moderation in its Cyprus policy since 1960, Caramanlis said. He personally had taken the lead in this by signing the London–Zurich accords. He had formally relinquished the goal of enosis which had great popular appeal in Greece. As PM he had signed these accords in 1960 despite Greek public opinion and in order to preserve Greek-Turkish friendship. He had been similarly moderate in the present crisis when he told the Greek people frankly that Greece could not fight the Turks on Cyprus. It was not a question of winning or losing. Greek military action against Turkey would have been extremely popular even if the Greeks were unable to defeat the Turks in the field. Instead of calling for military action against Turkey the PM had shown moderation and had called for a peaceful effort to achieve a just settlement of the Cyprus problem.

16. But, said Caramanlis, this Greek restraint could not continue indefinitely in the face of Turkish provocations. Cyprus would become a “volcano” if nothing was done to redress the situation. The peace of the area would be endangered and the Soviet Union would seize the opportunity to involve itself in the crisis and increase its influence in the region. Caramanlis said he was not making a threat. This was his realistic appraisal of the dangers. If Greece continued to be humiliated by the Turks, Greece would have to go to war. “I would have to go to war or leave the country. I was welcomed back to Greece as a savior. I could not let my own people down.” War, of course, would be a catastrophe but there would be no other choice. And if war occurred, others would inevitably be involved. These were not empty words or blustering threats. If an honorable solution to the Cyprus problem was not found, the PM saw these as the inevitable consequences of a problem that would continue to fester. This was the way the Greek Government
saw the Cyprus situation and Caramanlis wanted the U.S. to understand its point of view.

17. Ambassador Tyler said that he would faithfully report to Secretary Kissinger what the PM had said. He would, however, like to comment on some of the allegations made by Caramanlis. The PM should not deceive himself into believing that the U.S. was laboring under a sense of guilt. The President and the Secretary believed that we had done everything that we could do to avert the crisis. We had no intention of admitting “mistakes” because we did not accept that we had made mistakes. At this point in the meeting Defense Minister Averoff called the PM and, at the request of Caramanlis, Bitsios left the room to take the call. In his absence Caramanlis remarked, “We really have different viewpoints on this particular issue. I sincerely believe that you could have done more.” Ambassador Tyler replied that the PM must believe that the President and the Secretary were convinced that we had done all we could. If Caramanlis really believed that we had encouraged the junta, as Ambassador Tyler had understood him to say, then the PM was wrong. Washington accepted no responsibility for the stupidity of the junta.

18. When Bitsios reappeared, Ambassador Tyler repeated to the Prime Minister that our desire to be helpful in resolving the Cyprus crisis in a way that would be consistent with Greece’s honor and dignity was not just rhetoric. The U.S. was sincerely and deeply desirous of being helpful, not to expiate “guilt” but because peace in the area and the interests of our friends were important to us. Ambassador Tyler would not wish the PM to think that he was coming to him as a supplicant.

19. Caramanlis laughed at this and said, “I don’t ask that you come as a supplicant. I understand that you do not accept any imputation of guilt. There is a difference of viewpoint between our two countries. That is all.”

20. Ambassador Tyler said that the Cyprus dispute involved high stakes. He had noted the PM’s remarks about the dangers that would result if no satisfactory solution were found. He had noted the PM’s remarks about exploitation of the Cyprus problem and finally, he had noted that Caramanlis was not making threats but giving his honest appreciation of the situation. He would report these things to the Secretary. Meanwhile, he hoped that the PM understood that Tyler’s mission reflected the serious interest of the U.S. and our desire to help the parties to the Cyprus dispute move toward a settlement that both could live with.

21. The PM said that Bitsios would outline the Greek position on a Cyprus solution. Before he did so Caramanlis wanted to make two preliminary points. The Turks must stop presenting Greece with faits
accomplis and cease their provocations. Greek refugees were arriving in Greece who had been forced out of Turkish-controlled Cyprus and elsewhere. There were 130,000 Turks in Western Thrace. Greek public opinion would favor forcing them to return to Turkey. Caramanlis would resist this pressure but could not do so indefinitely without clear signs of Turkish flexibility.

22. Bitsios then read aloud the text of what he and Caramanlis characterized as an “unofficial” statement of the Greek position on a possible Cyprus solution (text was subsequently handed to us and is being transmitted by septel).4

23. When Bitsios had completed reading the paper, Caramanlis asked Tyler whether he wished to comment on the substance of the Greek position. The PM emphasized that Greece accepted the Turkish claim of federation but that it had to be on a reasonable basis.

24. Ambassador Tyler replied that he would refrain from commenting on the Greek position but, if the Prime Minister was interested, would outline Washington’s preliminary estimate of what a settlement might look like. He would of course fully report the Greek position as given in the informal document which Bitsios had read.

25. Caramanlis then said that during the first meeting Ambassador Tyler had mentioned a possible package deal. The US should realize that, as far as Greece was concerned, Cyprus was the outstanding problem. In the Greek view any other problems were covered by existing treaties. It was the Turks who complained about “other problems”, not Greeks. Nevertheless, if progress were made toward a Cyprus settlement, the Greek Government would have no objection to discussing other subjects with the Turks.

26. Bitsios then amplified Greek views on the problem of the minorities in Greece and Turkey. He said that at the time of the Treaty of Lausanne in 1924 there were roughly 100,000 Greeks in Istanbul and 100,000 Turks in western Thrace. Today there were – [less than] 30,000 Turks in western Thrace and only ten to fifteen thousand Greeks in Istanbul. The Turkish Government must stop agitating this issue just as they must stop agitating the Cyprus issue.

27. Caramanlis repeated that if the Turks were not persuaded to control their actions in Cyprus a “catastrophe” would not be easy to avert. Turkish military actions had given them a superiority complex. They had become arrogant. If they did not adopt a more reasonable attitude the joint efforts of Greece and the US would be in vain.

28. The group then discussed the question of press interest in the Tyler visit. This part of the discussion has been reported in septel.

4 Document 150.
29. Caramanlis then turned to Ambassador Tyler and said again that he hoped that the initiative being taken by the US would bring results. Secretary Kissinger had enjoyed spectacular success in reconciling enemies. It ought to be easier to reconcile allies. He requested Tyler to convey his greeting to the Secretary and said that the Greek Government looked forward with keen interest to Washington’s reaction to current discussions and to the Greek point of view.

30. Ambassador Tyler observed that Ambassador Kubisch, a close friend of the Secretary who had worked with him for three years, would be arriving in Athens on September 19 and could at that time provide Washington reaction. Tyler asked whether the Greek Government wished to be advised of Washington’s reaction before September 19.

31. Caramanlis said that he would appreciate receiving word from Washington as soon as possible. This was particularly important in view of the fact that debate on the Cyprus problem was imminent in the UN General Assembly and this would almost certainly lead to exchanges of recriminations and worsening of climate for negotiations. If the Secretary’s reaction to the Greek position on Cyprus as set forth in the PM’s talks with Ambassador Tyler led the Greek Government to believe that progress was possible, Caramanlis could ask the Cypriots to delay General Assembly debate on the Cyprus issue.

32. Ambassador Tyler asked whether Caramanlis wished to meet with him again. Caramanlis smiled and said that personally he would be glad to but that in view of the apparent leak about the Tyler mission he thought it would be difficult to have another meeting. Furthermore, it appeared to the PM that all of the main ground had been covered in the first two meetings.

33. Ambassador Tyler said that since this would be the final meeting, he would like, with the PM’s permission, to outline the Secretary’s preliminary estimate of a possible Cyprus settlement. In the Secretary’s view, some kind of bizonal federal arrangement seemed the most practical framework. (Caramanlis remarked that, “we accept this idea, although the Greek Cypriots do not.”) Ambassador Tyler continued by saying that we envisaged some reduction in the area of Turkish control and important reductions in the size of the Turkish forces. (Bitsios said that if we envisaged Turkish troops remaining on Cyprus after a final settlement was achieved, this would not be compatible with Cypriot sovereignty.) Ambassador Tyler said that as far as the refugee problem was concerned we believed that there would be the return of some refugees to their homes but probably a fairly sizeable exchange of populations as well.

34. The PM asked whether these were Secretary Kissinger’s views on a final settlement.
35. Ambassador Tyler said that they were his preliminary estimates at this time. Of course, any bizonal federal solution would have to be accepted by the two communities on the island if it were to work. Two final points that Ambassador Tyler wished to make on behalf of the Secretary were that a successful U.S. mediatory role would require careful preparation and the confidence of the parties involved in the dispute.

36. Bitsios said that the Turks had accepted a solution based on the independence of Cyprus. A bizonal solution would verge on partition. It would amount to de facto rather than de jure partition. How would it work in practice? Would a Greek Cypriot need a passport to cross the “frontier” between the two zones?

37. The PM observed that the Turks had claimed that they had landed troops in Cyprus to protect its independence and sovereignty. Bizonal arrangements seemed to qualify Cypriot sovereignty and he wondered whether the Turks had further expansionist aims. If the outline of an eventual settlement provided by Ambassador Tyler represented Secretary Kissinger’s point of departure as a mediator, Caramanlis was not particularly optimistic about the chances of success. Bitsios commented that bizonal arrangements would raise qualitative as well as quantitative questions. The northern part of the island presently occupied by the Turks represented eighty per cent or more of the productive capacity and wealth of Cyprus. Tyler repeated that he had given only a preliminary appraisal.

38. In conclusion Caramanlis said that Greek Government was aware that it would have to make concessions, but, “we will not let the Turks have everything they want.” In 1960 the Greeks had abandoned enosis and accepted the independence of Cyprus. In 1974, the Greeks were prepared to accept modifications of the 1960 structure and the creation of a federal system of government in Cyprus. It was not realistic to expect the Greek Government to go further than that. If a “solution” was arrived at which humiliated the Greek Government or proved impossible for Greek Cypriots to live with, it would not last.

39. The meeting ended with a friendly exchange of greetings and farewells at 8:45 p.m.

Tasca
150. Telegram From the Embassy in Greece to the Department of State\textsuperscript{1}

Athens, September 11, 1974, 0045Z.

6588. Subject: Cyprus. Ref: Athens 6587.\textsuperscript{2}

1. Following text of unofficial statement of Greek position on possible Cyprus solution handed Tyler by Caramanlis during second meeting, Tuesday, September 9. (See Athens 6587 numbered paragraph 22):

“1. Having occupied 40 per cent of Cyprus territory by force of arms Turkey demanded the resumption of negotiations. Having behind them the bitter experience of the Turkish Foreign Minister’s behavior in Geneva, the Greek Government requested that Turkey, in order to prove her good faith and her willingness to negotiate in a conciliatory spirit, make certain gestures before any direct negotiations are initiated.

These pre-conditions were:

A. That the Turkish forces withdraw to the line drawn on August 9, 1974, or, at least, north of the Piroi area and of the old Nicosia–Famagusta road;
B. That the masses of refugees who have fled to southern Cyprus be allowed to return to their homes in safety.

If Turkey continues to ask for direct negotiations, the request regarding fulfillment of the said pre-conditions is maintained.

2. If, on the other hand, Turkey accepted the initiation of a dialogue through a third power, substantive issues could be tackled at once. The basis for such an exchange of views could be the federative organization of the Cypriot state under the following conditions:

A. The Turkish area would correspond approximately to the percentage of the Turkish Cypriot population;
B. No exchange of populations would take place;
C. Refugees would return to their homes where they would be allowed to reside in safety;
D. The federal government would have substantive powers effectively ensuring the independence, sovereignty and territorial integrity of the Republic of Cyprus.

The Republic of Cyprus would be demilitarized following the conclusion of a final agreement. An effective system of international guarantees would be set up to preclude a repetition of the invasion of the island by Turkish forces.

\textsuperscript{1} Source: Library of Congress, Manuscript Division, Kissinger Papers, Box CL 124, Geopolitical File, Chronological File, Cyprus. Secret; Flash; Nodis; Cherokee.

\textsuperscript{2} Document 149.
3. Should a convergence of views occur on the fundamental points mentioned above, Greece would have no objection, if such were Turkey’s wish, for talks to be held in Nicosia between Messrs. Clerides and Denktash, under the auspices of the Secretary General of the United Nations and in the presence of the Ambassadors of Greece and Turkey, to draft in detail the text of the new constitution of Cyprus.

4. The future of Cyprus is only one of the difficulties created by Turkey in her relations with Greece. A separate agreement on Cyprus would not by itself substantially improve Greek-Turkish relations. Turkey has of late followed an aggressive foreign policy aimed at expanding her influence over the Aegean and over western Thrace. There have been several indications that these explosive issues, although momentarily overshadowed by developments in Cyprus, are very much alive and are likely to be raised by Turkey as soon as the question of Cyprus has been settled. Therefore, the Greek Government takes the view that if durable peace and stability are to return to the area, the Greek-Turkish relationship ought to be reconsidered in its entirety now, with a view to eliminating all points of friction between the two countries.”

Tasca

151. Telegram From the Embassy in Cyprus to the Department of State

Nicosia, September 12, 1974, 1800Z.


1. Sensitive UNFICYP source (existence of which must be fully protected) has given us in strictest confidence advance read-out on private Denktash–Clerides meeting which followed Sept 11 “humanitarian talks” (reftel). Dept requested give this information fullest Nodis/ Noforn protection, preferably with no lateral dissemination.

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1 Source: Ford Library, National Security Adviser, Presidential Country Files for Middle East and South Asia, 1974–1977, Box 3, Cyprus to Secretary of State, Nodis 2. Secret; Immediate; Nodis; Noforn.

2 In telegram 3052 from Nicosia, September 12, the Embassy reported on the Clerides–Denktash “humanitarian talks” of September 11 that concentrated on prisoner/detainee releases by both sides. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy Files, 1974)
2. Source said both Clerides and Denktash sense imperative need to move ASAP toward political agreement. At Clerides’ suggestion, they agreed to bring maps with proposed demarcation lines to Sept 13 meeting, in effort agree on extent of Turkish zone, or possibly of cantons. They will also review powers of future federal GOCyprus over Turkish areas.

3. Source said both men continue to talk as Cypriots interested primarily in welfare of whole island. They spoke in terms of allowing some minorities to remain in/return to emergent zones. Denktash strongly hinted that demarcation line would (1) run north of Morphou, thus giving back large part of valuable plantation area to Greek Cypriots, and (2) allow Greeks return to new Famagusta. Clerides implied willingness allow Turk Cypriots move north freely to enclave, once this happens. Denktash further suggested Turk Army not on island to stay. Throughout, he showed great sensitivity for Clerides’ delicate position vis-à-vis Greek/Greek Cypriot elements.

4. According source, both men acknowledged mutual interest in keeping Makarios off island. They agreed that their efforts to find Cyprus solution would suffer greatly if Makarios returned to island politicking, or made foray to UNGA. (Source said that discussion had addressed latter contingency as probable, not definite.)

5. Comment: If accurate (and source generally impeccable), above account suggests that Nicosia talks are moving quickly into key substantive issues. End comment.

6. From UNFICYP agenda for Sept 13 meeting, it looks as if “humanitarian talks” continue gather momentum. Meeting will consider: educational facilities for both communities; ICRC’s general plan for release prisoners/detainees; special case of over-50 group (which raises prospect of large northward trek by Turk Cypriots if family heads allowed to go there); family reunification; agricultural matters (such as feeding of abandoned livestock); date for implementing points agreed Sept 11 (reftel), and use of Nicosia airport for relief operations purposes.

Crawford
152. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Cyprus

Washington, September 28, 1974, 1848Z.

214632. Subject: Secretary’s Message for Clerides. Ref: Nicosia 3361. From the Secretary for the Ambassador. Deliver to Ambassador 8 am September 29.

1. Please see Clerides as soon as possible and give him the following oral message from me.

Begin message: The Secretary wants Clerides to know that the President and he have been following with great interest and admiration his efforts over the past week to promote a peaceful settlement in Cyprus. The Secretary has been informed by Ambassador Crawford of Clerides’ belief that his discussions with Denktash on humanitarian issues can be enlarged to encompass negotiations on the basic political issues which are of interest to the two communities in Cyprus. The United States fully supports the negotiations between Clerides and Denktash. We believe these negotiations provide the best prospect for a just and lasting solution to the Cyprus problem and hope that Clerides will continue to play the active and constructive role which has already earned him such a measure of respect. The Secretary met with the Foreign Ministers of Greece and Turkey in New York last week and he will be seeing them again early next week. The Secretary was gratified to find that they too support the efforts that Clerides and Denktash have been making and agree with us that the talks in Nicosia should be encouraged to move ahead on substantive issues.

When the Secretary meets again with the Foreign Ministers of Greece and Turkey he will reaffirm to them our strong support for Clerides’ efforts. At that time he will restate our view that nothing should be done at the UN or elsewhere that would weaken Clerides’ leadership of the Cyprus Government or diminish prospects for the success of his negotiations. In particular the Secretary will stress again

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1 Source: Ford Library, National Security Adviser, Presidential Country Files for Middle East and South Asia, 1974–1977, Box 2, Cyprus, Nodis 1. Secret; Flash; Nodis. Drafted by Eagleton and Stabler, cleared by Hartman, and approved by the Secretary. Repeated Immediate to Athens, Ankara, and London.

2 Dated September 28. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy Files, 1974)

3 Kissinger met with Mavros on September 24. (Memorandum of conversation; Library of Congress, Manuscript Division, Kissinger Papers, Box CL 343, Department of State, Memoranda of Conversations, External) For Kissinger’s meeting with Gunes, see Document 210.
to the Greek Foreign Minister the need to urge Archbishop Makarios
to take no action that could prejudice the continuing efforts in Nicosia.
Finally the Secretary wants Clerides to know that he remains in close
direct touch with Athens and Ankara in his search for flexibility and
progress in the Cyprus issue. Warm regards, Henry A. Kissinger. End
message.

Kissinger

153. Memorandum of Conversation\(^1\)

New York, September 29, 1974, 7 p.m.

SUBJECT
Secretary’s Meeting with Foreign Minister George Mavros

GREEK PARTICIPANTS
Foreign Minister George Mavros
UN Permanent Representative Karayiannis
Ambassador to the U.S. Alexandrakis
Ambassador Tzounis, Director
Mr. C. Yerocostopoulos, Attaché, MFA

U.S. PARTICIPANTS
The Secretary
Under Secretary Joseph J. Sisco
Assistant Secretary Arthur A. Hartman
Mr. William Eagleton, EUR/SE (Notetaker)

Mavros: I have talked with Makarios. In his UNGA speech he will
talk about Turkish aggression. He will oppose single geographic di-
visions, which would mean an exchange of populations and would lead
to partition and double enosis and the end of Cyprus independence.
There is a possibility of a geographic federation not with one but with
several cantons and without much exchange of population. The ma-
majority of the Turks would be in five, sex, seven or eight cantons.

The Secretary: How did the Turks and Greeks get together on the
same island?

Mavros: They must live together on the island. The division of the
island into two might be an impossibility. Makarios believes the solu-
tion could be found in a larger body, but not necessarily the Soviet pro-
posal. Still, it could be a wider body within the framework of the UN.

The Secretary has told us he is going to Ankara on the 14th.

\(^1\) Source: Library of Congress, Manuscript Division, Kissinger Papers, Box CI 343,
Memoranda of Conversations, External. Secret; Nodis. Drafted by Eagleton on Septem-
ber 30. The meeting was held in the Secretary’s suite at the Waldorf Towers.
The Secretary: That depends on the situation in Turkey.

Mavros: The first thing in Ankara should be the refugee problem and the possibility of sending 50,000 of them to Famagusta.

The Secretary: I have not had any exchanges with the Turks yet. The tragedy is that the Turks’ proposal to us on August 8 would only have had them take the Turkish part of Famagusta and they only wanted two-thirds of what they have now. Was it ever presented in Geneva? If you had been willing to give them their northern canton they would have held off.

Mavros: My impression from Callaghan was that the Turks had already decided on military action.

The Secretary: This proposal was not taken to the conference?

Mavros: No. Gunes was proceeding on the basis of an ultimatum. We had the impression a military move was imminent.

The Secretary: I would be amazed if they would let 50,000 back to Famagusta before negotiations began. When I suggest is we get some troop withdrawal, some return of refugees, and I don’t know what else.

Mavros: And what in exchange? If they want their people to go to occupy the homes of the Greeks it would be accepting a mass exchange and it would cause a terrible refugee problem.

The Secretary: I don’t have details in mind but I have the impression they want an exchange of population.

Mavros: But with many small cantons they would not need such an exchange.

The Secretary: This is not likely though.

Mavros: Makarios knows how a number of cantons could encompass the Turkish population. No Greek Government could accept anything except something near the percentage of the Turkish population, and with a number of cantons. The way the problem should be put to the Turks is this: Do you want a just and fair solution? Ambassador Tzounis feels from talking to Makarios that he thinks this multi-cantonal solution is fair.

Tzounis: He thinks this is fair.

The Secretary: It is impossible. If Makarios wants a big conference we will do as the others do. It will lead to a stalemate and no results.

When I saw Makarios in July he did not want any cantons. If he had wanted them we might have proposed it. He wanted the Constitution of 1960 which is unworkable. I believe the outcome will be a
federal solution with one Turkish canton in the north. The size could be negotiated as well as the nature of the federal system. But cantons of small size do not seem practical.

Mavros: Gunes proposed five cantons in Geneva.

Tzounis: The main canton was 17% of the island.

The Secretary: He wanted that one at once. Maybe the others would not have come into being. Ecevit told us if you (the Greeks) would agree to let the Turks occupy 17% there would be time to negotiate about the remainder. He gave us a map.

Mavros: Gunes produced a scheme for 34%.

Tzounis: The large area with 17% and the smaller cantons would total another 17%.

The Secretary: My impression is we could have negotiated at that time and kept them with the northern canton and little else.

Mavros: What do you think his position is today?

The Secretary: I have avoided pressing them on this without knowing your position. I don’t want to be the whipping boy. If I make a proposal the Greek politicians will object. My impression is the Turks want a bizonal system.

Karayiannis: Is it your impression that what you could eventually work out would be less or more than the Turks proposed in July?

The Secretary: That is a good question. If I had been in good communication with your government in August I could have assured you an outcome less than they offered. Now I think it is hard to resurrect the proposal of August. Now we have the present zone but it can be reduced.

Karayiannis: But do you think we would be asked to give more than we were asked to give in Geneva?

The Secretary: I don’t yet have a judgment. I would try to get the best terms possible. It might be possible to get less than 34%, but that would probably be one area. I have not yet had a serious discussion with the Turks.

Mavros: If Makarios says this is a betrayal it will cause a problem.

The Secretary: I agree. We should try to find an acceptable solution.

Mavros: We hope not to make Cyprus a political issue in the elections.

The Secretary: Sending 50,000 Greeks to Famagusta is not possible. If I have to say he does that before negotiations it is impossible. I don’t exclude that by the end 50,000 will return but it is next to impossible at the beginning.

Mavros: In the present state of affairs with elections we will want at least to prevent a deterioration of the situation.
The Secretary: Yes. We can prevent deterioration and I can in Ankara bring some symbolic gesture, some refugees to return and some troop withdrawal.

Mavros: They will ask something in exchange.

The Secretary: My recommendation to Ecevit will be the gestures should be made without reciprocity. But I do not want every Greek politician to attack me for not doing enough. Why should we exert ourselves to be the whipping boy of Greek politics?

Sisco: It is important in connection with your trip that our Greek friends understand what is realistically possible so that there will be no misunderstanding.

The Secretary: I think it is possible to get symbolic gestures.

Mavros: You don’t think 50,000 to Famagusta is symbolic?

The Secretary: For the Turks that is a major substantive concession. They might give it at the end but not at the beginning. I reminded Ecevit in the cable to that his original suggestion did not include Greek Famagusta. He did not give a forthcoming reply.

What could happen is the Turks make symbolic concessions, show their recognition of certain problems, then the two communities could get to the main problems. We could agree on some principles.

Mavros: We do not want the Greek press to be anti-American. We have talked to them and they promised. But I don’t think they could take the action of August 8 in silence. I don’t think we should give them big expectations for your trip.

The Secretary: I agree. We probably will announce my visit to Ankara while I am on the trip.

Mavros: We will say he is not going to get a solution or act as a mediator.

The Secretary: The question will be asked why I did not visit Athens.

Mavros: We will say the problem is in Ankara so that it would not be considered unusual.

Hartman: But it does not help us to say the problem is in Ankara. Why can’t you welcome the trip as a contribution?

The Secretary: As an encouraging sign?

Mavros: Yes, we could. Still some of the press might write that it should have come sooner.

The Secretary: Suppose the Turks make concessions. What will you say? Will it be greeted as a contribution, or will they say those bastards are doing it to us again?

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An apparent reference to telegram 213247 to Ankara, September 27. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy Files, 1974, P850104–1798)
Mavros: We can say that it is all right but it is for the Cypriots to make the decision.

The Secretary: I understand, but you must decide how far you are going to carry anti-Americanism. Up to a point it cuts the ground from under Papandreou but at some point we will lose our interest.

Mavros: There is a stage if the communities reach agreement.

The Secretary: We could study some general principles which Clerides and Denktash could adopt.

Karayiannis: If the Turks make a gesture could you (Mavros) say in Athens that these would facilitate the communal talks?

Mavros: It would cause a problem if the gesture is just a withdrawal from 40 to 38% or of the forces from 40 to 35,000. This is all the same to me. We cannot make a public statement giving much importance to this.

The Secretary: Suppose 5,000 refugees return, 5,000 troops withdraw, and there is a small pullback as a beginning.

Mavros: Makarios pointed out that there are hotels in Famagusta that can take 1,000 people. That would help solve the refugee problem.

The Secretary: But the Turks won’t do this for nothing.

Mavros: These refugees are a large proportion of the Cyprus population.

The Secretary: There are now 2 million Arab refugees. This is a U.S. electoral period but after the election the Greek Congressmen won’t excite public opinion. If after your election anti-Americanism continues I will talk back. You should have no illusion that this will go on in the U.S. press, except for the *New York Times* and the *Washington Post* which will bring up the issue every two weeks.

We can agree to the Russian proposal and have an international conference. Then the press can say let the conference settle it. I just want to be realistic.

Congress might cut off military aid and aid might slow down to Greece. We want to be realistic.

Mavros: We too. Makarios is realistic. He told me that a solution would come from pressure from Washington.

The Secretary: You can’t have this pressure if you put pressure on us. We won’t go on the barricade on the UN resolution, unless it was too obnoxious. If there is a big conference we will do what others do—speeches and nothing will happen. We will not cooperate with the Soviet Union on the Cyprus solution. We cannot allow the Soviets to decide on a question between two allies and to have an effect on the situation in the Middle East. In a big conference we will join in the rhetoric. I don’t want to be cynical but what has world opinion done for anybody? I don’t object to your having a resolution. What can we realistically do?
Before your elections we won’t embarrass you, but afterward we must have a new situation of confidence. What we did for the Arabs was difficult. We can’t carry pressure beyond a certain point. But we will bring the pressure to the greatest degree, we can within a realistic framework. I will have to give the Turks some idea of your position.

Mavros: Will you try with the zonal idea?

The Secretary: I will try but my judgment is they won’t accept. I don’t think they can accept less than their offer before the military move.

Karyiannis: I am speaking of your relations with Greece. They can’t be repaired unless you can get a situation better than was offered in Geneva.

The Secretary: I think that basic assumption is ridiculous. Why should we have to repair a situation that was started by the Greek Government? I don’t accept the proposition we have done anything against Greece. I understand domestic reasons for your anti-Americanism. We too want you to succeed in the elections.

Mavros: I would like to put aside Cyprus. What about the continental shelf, air space and minorities?

The Secretary: We will not permit another military move on these issues—unless Greece opposes us, and then we would not support such a move. I have not studied the question of the continental shelf, but we are prepared to make a major effort and to try to understand the position of both sides. I must talk to Ecevit. I have not studied these other questions yet. Basically, concessions must be made by Turkey. We are prepared to use pressure up to the point of not ruining our position with Turkey. We have already used pressure in preventing a Turkish action against Larnaca. Makarios can come and propose cantonal arrangements. If he had made a realistic proposal we might have been helpful, but Makarios asked for the 1960 Constitution.

For four years the Arabs beat us to death with demands. When Sadat and I sat down his first scheme was impossible but we finally got the Israelis back farther than we thought we could. But there is a point beyond our efforts cannot succeed. My view is the following: The best way to proceed is I get what I can in Ankara and we use this to get a joint declaration of principles between Denktash and Clerides. After the elections we try to solve all the problems together.

Mavros: For us when you get to Ankara we could say it was a useful initiative and we could welcome it. But we don’t want that to be used as proof that we agree that military aid to an aggressor should be continued.

The Secretary: You have to look at our position. (1) We want Turkey in the Alliance too. (2) We want to prevent a Qadhafi-type regime. (3) We want to keep the Turks from lining up with the radical Arabs.
If we cut aid, the Turks will not be able to make concessions. If the Turks make a concession, what should I offer to restore military aid? If we restore and they will have what they want and they will not give another concession. I have sent an emissary to explain to the Turks the legal position on aid. It is more effective this way than by cutting off aid. I want to keep the Turks worried, but not cut it off. There is a danger that if aid to Turkey is cut, one way or the other it will be cut off to Greece. Suppose aid to Turkey is cut off? That can mean no new aid but there are two years of aid, $180 million in the pipeline. Then you can turn to the pipeline, but at that time the President would turn against Greece. I do not expect you to back aid to Turkey. I do not care about military aid one way or the other. I only look at it for what it can do to help solve problems. The Turkish position on Cyprus does not depend on it. If I go to Ankara and aid is cut what do I tell Ecevit?

Mavros: Tell him to end the Turkish stay on the island.

The Secretary: I agree. We want to get the Turks off the island though there may eventually be Greek and Turkish contingents.

I will make a flat prediction: when we cut military aid to Turkey the Soviet Union will move toward Turkey. I can show you our intelligence report. It was the Soviet Union that urged Turkey to invade Cyprus. We opposed it. I would ask you to read *The New York Times* editorials in early July. They were inciting the Turks to attack. No American officials dealt with Sampson. But I felt if we made a public statement Turkey would have an excuse to attack the island. From the first day of the coup the Turks intended to go in. There was no government in Greece with international standing, nor was there a legitimate government in Cyprus. This is a reality. The newspapers said I was pro-Sampson. Sisco went out to prevent the Turks from attacking.

Sisco: When I got to Greece I found the regime unrealistic. Ecevit had told me the situation was intolerable.

The Secretary: He was supposed to get concessions from Ioannides, and take them to Ankara to stop the invasion. But they gave nothing worthwhile. On the day before the invasion I called Callaghan and told him I expected an invasion. He did not think there would be one. I called Sauvagnargues. I shared my opinion that there would be an invasion, but said that public opinion in his country was against doing anything for Greece. On the Sunday after the invasion the senior officers in the Department wanted to throw Greece out of NATO but I prevented such action. Nevertheless there was a news article that the U.S. would cut aid to Greece.

Sisco: There is no doubt in Greece about who started events in Cyprus.

Mavros: Yes, but then there was August.
The Secretary: Mr. Tzounis was going to come to Washington. Could he and Sisco get together tomorrow with Eagleton; and you and I can get together after I see Gunes. We can discuss the general idea of where things might go. We can meet at your suite in the Plaza after by dinner at 10:30 or 11:00 p.m.4

Mavros: I agree. I am leaving Tuesday for Washington.

Tzounis: Tomorrow I can meet with Sisco to discuss all the problems between Greece and Turkey.

The Secretary: That would be useful and Hartman could be there too.

I wish you to know that I consider Greece a natural friend of the U.S. with ties of strategic importance. On the other hand, I consider the Turks important too. They are more unpredictable than Greece. I do not want to drive Turkey in a direction unfavorable to all of us. I want to establish relations of confidence with you. I want to come to an understanding. If I go to Ankara we could announce the trip on the 10th and say I am going to explore things and that I am not going to Athens because the first problem is to see what there is in Ankara. But I could send Sisco to Athens. I will try to get some concrete gestures, then Denktash and Clerides can agree on some principles. That will get us to your elections. After that we will use influence to bring about a comprehensive settlement but you can not make demands on us that cause problems with the public.

Mavros: Tzounis could meet with Sisco here and later in Washington.

Sisco: We could meet tomorrow in my suite at 11 o’clock.

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4 Kissinger met Mavros at 10:40 p.m. on September 30. (Memorandum of Conversation; ibid., Records of Henry Kissinger, 1973–1977, Entry 5403, Box 21, Classified External Memoranda of Conversations, May–November 1974)
154. Memorandum of Conversation

New York, October 2, 1974, 11:25 a.m.–12:45 p.m.

PARTICIPANTS

Archbishop Makarios
Dr. Henry A. Kissinger, Secretary of State and Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs
Peter W. Rodman, NSC Staff

Kissinger: These records will stay only in the White House. I’ve been praising you all along. I told Mavros that I like men without illusions.

Makarios: I thank you very much.

Kissinger: Men who are practical and realistic. Contrary to what you read in the papers, there are no anti-Makarios tendencies here.

Makarios: If you and I agree on a solution, it will contribute to a solution.

Kissinger: If events here continue as they are doing, I will not be able to contribute. If these amendments pass, I cannot continue. This doesn’t affect you directly.

A threat to cut off aid is a weapon; an actual cut-off is not. It will be impossible to conduct the negotiations under these circumstances. Suppose we get the Turks to withdraw 10 kilometers and release 10,000 refugees, and then we restore aid? What do we do two months from now? Cut it off again? It will be on and off like a yo-yo. It can’t be done with fixed deadlines.

My skill is to get the other party to do what needs to be done. It can’t be done with threats. My ability is to get them to do it. So this is violently against Cypriot interests. The art is to get the process started. The process is more important than the conclusions. The art is to get the Turks thinking of withdrawal, and this is easier without precision about final solutions. If I withdraw from this, you will get double enosis.

The Turks won’t yield to visible pressure. The Turks will yield to pressure with a silk glove that looks like they are yielding on their own initiative.

Your Beatitude knows the Turks better.

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1 Source: Library of Congress, Manuscript Division, Kissinger Papers, Box CL 272, Memoranda of Conversations, Chronological File. Secret; Nodis. The meeting was held in the Secretary’s suite at the Waldorf Towers.

2 Reference is to bills in the House and Senate cutting off aid to Turkey because both chambers viewed the Turkish invasion of Cyprus as a violation of the Foreign Assistance Act, which allowed for such measures to be taken only in self-defense. Congress did not consider the Turkish military action to fall into that category.
Makarios: You are going to Ankara.
Kissinger: I was going to Ankara. But I won’t go under these circumstances.
Makarios: What do you think will happen?
Kissinger: I will withdraw from the negotiations. I will still be American Secretary of State and will be willing to be helpful. But I think the result will be double enosis. Your Beatitude will be a Greek political leader! [Laughter] They have reason to be afraid of you.
Makarios: As you notice from my yesterday’s speech... 4
Kissinger: Which was reasonable.
Makarios: I don’t want any solution that allows a mass transfer of the population. The Turks are insisting on a separate jurisdiction, because they want to safeguard Turkish autonomy. We are prepared to consider ways to do this, this autonomy, but not with transfer of populations. The Turks won’t allow our people back to their homes—perhaps only a limited number. The problem is a serious problem for us. 200,000 Cypriots, or more than half the Greek population of the island.
Kissinger: I thought there were 600,000 Greeks.
Makarios: No, 650,000 altogether. 200,000 Turks. The area occupied by the Turks is the most productive area. We accept federation, but on a communal basis. I don’t care whether you call them cantons, but these areas don’t entail the transfer of many thousands. If there are only two big areas, one under Turkish Cypriot and one under the Greek Cypriot administration, this solution would pave, in my view, the way to partition. Even now, there are Cypriots who say federation is better than double enosis. I think for Turkey to say they are not in favor of double enosis, it is sincere.
Kissinger: I’m not so sure.
Makarios: We will see; Turkey is not so eager for this but some Cypriots say it is better. Many areas are better than two big areas.
Kissinger: In August, five were proposed.
Makarios: I would prefer more than five. Say ten.
Kissinger: The negotiations in Geneva were totally mismanaged.
Makarios: Because I wasn’t there. [Laughter]
Kissinger: I think it is true. The Greeks mismanaged it. They could have had a delay, which would have averted these operations. But the British got morally outraged at the Turks—which one can never afford in a negotiation—and the Greeks were afraid of Papandreou.
My feeling is this solution is unobtainable.

3 All brackets are in the original.
4 Makarios delivered a speech at the United Nations on October 1.
Makarios: If Turkey insists on two areas, the question is why didn’t we accept this at Geneva? Before the second invasion of the Turkish troops.

Kissinger: At Geneva, you could have gotten a settlement on 70% and negotiations later on the rest. It would be better than now.

Makarios: Turkey occupies now 40%.

Kissinger: That is too much.

Makarios: Say Turkey agrees to reduce up to 28%. So the question is what is better for us: To legalize a defacto situation or not legalize it and insist on 28%?

Kissinger: What is your view?

Makarios: My personal view is not to accept it.

Kissinger: Your Beatitude’s view occasionally prevails in Cyprus.

Makarios: Then there is the problem of refugees; it is related. If the area is reduced to 28 percent, then the people will go back to the areas given back to us. But most of the refugees will not go back to their homes. We will have lost a lot. I don’t know if it’s better to legalize getting back ten or twelve percent.

Kissinger: Then Turkey will annex the part and make it a Turkish province.

Makarios: I can’t exclude this. But there are hopes that one day, after many years, we will come to an agreement which is better for the future of Cyprus. What is your advice?

Kissinger: I so far have not actively participated in the negotiations. Because I understand the useful role I’m playing now in Greek domestic politics by being the focal point for criticism. At some point I’ll turn and resist.

My preference was a cantonal solution. How many, I don’t know.

I’ve never seen so mismanaged a negotiation. The British wanted to resume August 8; the Greeks wanted August 14. I don’t understand the crucial difference. We should have got agreement on a cantonal solution.

Now I think there will be either no solution, as Your Beatitude proposes, or a bizonal solution. The question now is how to arrange it so a bizonal solution doesn’t became a facade for double enosis. So my feeling is that the federal government should be given substantial powers, say over emigration, and the Turkish portion should be considerably reduced.

I’ve no objection to asking the Turks to go back to five cantons.

But if the Greeks are going out on the streets of America calling me a killer, I have no interest.

Makarios: Whether you have interest or not, you’re the Secretary of State of the United States. Peace in the area is important to you.
Kissinger: The interests of the United States are its relations with Greece, with Cyprus, and with Turkey. There is also the problem of peace. But the peace of the world will not be threatened. Who would threaten it? The Soviet Union? We will not allow it, for other reasons, including our whole Middle East position. But our relations with Greece, and with Cyprus—and because we believe Turkey acted excessively—for all these reasons we have an interest.

There are a lot of heroes who don’t know how to get one percent of their territory back. Maybe it will become like the Arab refugee problem. Maybe Turkey will leave NATO; maybe it will become an issue here. So our reward is somehow in our relations with Greece and with Cyprus. And of course our interest in maintaining good relations with Turkey. And this is also in the interest of a final solution. Because if Turkey feels it’s been violated, it will look for ways to undo it. Then we are back where we started.

So as you told me last time, American influence is important. Then it depends on our ability and our willingness to do it. Peace will be maintained anyway; a just one, not necessarily. You excuse me for being frank. But you can count on my word.

The realistic objectives—with tremendous effort, and my active personal participation—would be: a reduction of the area, a solution of the refugee problem. But we can’t have these interviews in Le Monde calling me a killer.

I’ve said to you that your abilities were too great for the island you governed. You were the best solution to the island. If you think in June or July, when we had a President being forced out, we would intervene against you…We’ve had reports of coups every three months. What was Your Beatitude doing against us? We had no conceivable objection to what was happening. The first I heard of a coup was Monday morning after it was carried out. We were the only government that knew the Turks would come in. We said nothing about Sampson—because the worse we said about Sampson, the more certain it was that the Turks would invade. The Europeans were encouraging the Turks to invade, for stupid sentimental reasons. Sampson I knew couldn’t possibly survive. Read our newspapers: we were accused of being pro-Greek.

Once the Turks were on the island, Your Beatitude understood it better than I. You urged me to get the Turks off. I expected the next negotiation to succeed. If I knew it would fail I would have done it differently. The British were sure it would work. I was heavily preoccupied with the President.

For the future: My view is that Your Beatitude is the only one who can make a realistic solution. I believe that. We are not anti-Makarios. If we become the villain of your story, we’ll be forced to turn against you. Clerides we have to support now but we’ve done nothing final.
Your Beatitude is essential for a final solution. But we have to support Clerides now; otherwise there will be a total deadlock.

I don’t mind proposing cantons initially, to see what happens. But I don’t want to mislead you. But I didn’t know what I would do. I can do nothing with these restrictive amendments.

It is easy to get concessions at the beginning. It is easy to get from 40 to 35 percent. Then to get from 35 to 20, that’s when you need the actuality.

We’re definitely not anti-Makarios. Nor do we insist that you be pro-American. We were perfectly happy with the situation before the coup. The best solution was to leave Cyprus alone. Had I known of the coup, I would have stopped it. We had a good talk when we met in Cyprus in May.5 We had no conceivable American interest. We had nothing against Makarios.

So we’d appreciate it if Your Beatitud could do what he could do to strengthen Clerides for these negotiations. For the ultimate disposition of power, that isn’t our affair. I’d never heard the name of Clerides until the coup.

And if Your Beatitud’s attitude toward the United States is not hostile, this is a concern to us. We can survive it [laughter], but it affects the attitude we can take.

Makarios: I don’t know if I can do something significant.
Kissinger: But we can’t be seen to act under pressure.

We’re prepared to act in a way that it’s clear that Turkey has to make some major concessions.

Makarios: First, I have to make it clear I never shared the view that the United States or the CIA was ever involved in the coup against me.
Kissinger: I give you my word.

Makarios: And what Le Monde said didn’t correspond to what I said. I didn’t have an interview with Mr. Eric Rouleau, just a talk. He asked me not whether the CIA was involved, but whether the CIA knew in advance. I said I didn’t know whether they knew in advance about a coup on that particular day. You had information that the possibility of a coup could not be excluded.
Kissinger: I was told Your Beatitud was told about this.

Makarios: There were public reports that at the last moment the CIA got information but there was not enough time to approach anyone in Greece to stop the coup. But this is much different from what

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5 Kissinger visited Nicosia on May 7, 1974 to discuss U.S.-Soviet relations and the Middle East with Soviet Foreign Minister Gromyko. No record of his discussion with Makarios has been found.
was published, that the CIA made the coup. That was not in the interests of the United States.

Kissinger: That’s ridiculous.

Makarios: So the interview in Le Monde was not true.

As for the solution, my personal view is: As for federation on a geographic basis, it should be more than five areas. And in my judgment, in my view, the United States and particularly you personally can influence the Turkish Government and in the end they will accept this solution. There is no strong reason for them not to accept this solution. They occupy forty percent, and they say they will give 10 to 15 percent back. If they had fifty percent, they’d appear more generous and give 20 percent back.

If you personally agree with this, I’m under the impression you will succeed. You’re a very capable person. [They both smile.]

Kissinger: I’m flattered. My capability consists in seeing what is possible and operating in that framework.

I will make an effort. I may make an effort—if I’m permitted domestically.

Makarios: We can’t say to Turkey that we accept a federation on a geographic basis.

Kissinger: That I understand.

Makarios: If from the beginning we gave up the principle, we’d be in a difficult position. If they insist on two areas—and on the transfer of population, which is most difficult—we won’t accept it. Of course I care about the consequences but I personally can’t accept. If there are more areas, it reduces the danger of partition and double enosis.

Of course you’ll be in a position to do more and know more when you visit Ankara.

Kissinger: I may not visit Ankara.

Makarios: In case you don’t succeed in the first attempt, try to convince the Turkish Government to return the Greek city of Famagusta. From a military point of view, they have nothing to lose. And we’ll accommodate 50,000 refugees. It will be something for us. It will not be very difficult.

Kissinger: No, no, no, it’s going to be very difficult.

Makarios: It is just pressure on us. [Makarios takes out a cigarette case.]

Kissinger: There are two problems: How to get any concession at any one point, and second, how to get the process started. The problem now is to get it started. I don’t know how I could get Famagusta without any idea of what they get in return. I haven’t studied it.

Makarios: I would emphasize that Mr. Clerides has my full backing, and if he resigns it will be a big problem for Cyprus. Yesterday I
talked with him on the phone. I said I hoped he would not insist on resignation. We have different views on some things but I say he has my full backing. I am not there on Cyprus. We don’t have any real differences. He has my confidence and he will have my full backing. I told him that if I withdraw my backing I’ll let him know in advance. [Laughter]

But he’s disturbed at the demonstrations, thinking I’m coming back. There are people blocking me. I can’t say to my people I don’t want to go back. [He lights up a cigarette.]

If Mr. Clerides says he agrees on a certain solution like this, I don’t think it will be accepted.

Kissinger: Unless Your Beatitude backs it.

Makarios: I’m not very strong.

Kissinger: You overestimate my ability and perhaps I overestimate yours. Maybe we’re both right.

How should we leave this conversation?

Makarios: If Turkey insists on only two areas, we won’t accept it. I don’t know if Mr. Clerides will accept it or the Greek Government. If they think it’s the only solution, I won’t create difficulties for the Greek Government. But they shouldn’t expect me to say I agree.

Kissinger: I can see the villain of the piece will certainly be an American! The question is: I or some other person?

If I go to Ankara I’ll discuss it. I’ll study it. There is no reason on my own side.

Your Beatitude is going to London?

Makarios: I will be here two more weeks.

Kissinger: It depends on our legislative situation. I doubt seriously that I’ll get to Ankara if they [the restrictive amendments] pass. If I go we’ll meet after I return.

Makarios: President Sadat said to me, “You’ll have the support of my country. But the key is in Washington; it is in the hands of Dr. Kissinger.”

Kissinger: The Egyptians dealt with us on the basis of cooperation. The Greeks are dealing with us on the basis of blackmail.

Makarios: It’s helping me.

Kissinger: It’s helping me if it’s directed against Turkey.

Makarios: My speech helped you.

Kissinger: Your speech is no problem. Your speech was helpful. For me to do anything, I need authority. I can’t just do it by flitting around the world.

Your Beatitude, what will we tell the press?

Makarios: That we had a useful exchange of views. Nothing more.
Kissinger: All right. If you want to say the United States can play a helpful role... Well, you have said that.
Makarios: Can I bring in the others who accompanied me? [The Secretary agrees, and Rodman goes out to summon the others in the party, and returns.]
Kissinger: I think the Greeks are now the ones who should do something for Greek-US relations. Since they are the ones who broke it.
[The other members of Archbishop Makarios’ party⁶ and the American side arrive.]
Makarios: We had a good talk with the Secretary of State. As usual, he was very convincing.
Kissinger: I had a good talk with the Archbishop—the President. I discussed what was possible and realistic. I pointed out what could be done in the framework of good relations between Greece and Cyprus and the United States; that is the only basis. This was in the context of Greek-American relations.
Makarios: If the Secretary and I agree, it can be solved.
Kissinger: I was going to say that we saw that it was in everyone’s interest to find a solution to the Cyprus situation, that is just to the people, and consistent with the international situation, and realistic. We had a good initial discussion.
Foreign Minister: It was good for peace.
Kissinger: I explained to His Beatitude that what has happened now in Congress will make it very difficult. I have to point that out as an existing fact. It will remove a threat and impose an actuality which will have to be changed every few weeks.
We were moving towards an active American role.
It is clear that Turkey is the one who has to make the major concessions.
If I understand the President, he did not reveal all his thinking.
[Laughter]
This is not needed now. But we need an understanding of principles.
This is not the time for ultimatums.
Anyway, it is always a pleasure for us to meet. We’ll stay in close touch. We’ll consider seriously playing a very active role.
[The meeting ended at 12:45 p.m.]

⁶ Christofides, Rossides, Kyprianou, and Dimitriou joined the meeting; reported in telegram 3658 from USUN, October 3. (Library of Congress, Manuscript Division, Kissinger Papers, Box CL 272, Memoranda of Conversations, Chronological File)
3454. Subject: Conversation with Denktash.

1. I saw Turkish Cypriot leader Denktash October 3 a few days after his return from Council of Europe and consultation in Ankara. Bulk of our conversation dealt with problems of Turkish travel restrictions, consular access, protection of property, etc. (septel).2

2. We then turned to the Cyprus topic of the day: Clerides’ threat to announce resignation in next day or two unless he receives clear public mandate from Greek Cypriots, from Greece and from Makarios, with some assurance from latter that he will not return to Cyprus soon and will call off the disruptive public clamor he has instigated.

3. I said that in my view Clerides was right to insist that latent support for his role, in Cyprus and internationally, be made tangible and public to maximum extent possible. Denktash had been right, too, in posing the stark questions on September 20 as to whether Clerides could stay in the negotiations and, if so, whether he could sign. It was my impression that Clerides doing well. Karamanlis had come out on September 30 with a gratifying message of support even though he had disappointingly let it be watered down the following day. In New York, there was a lot of responsible thinking and activity designed to support the existing Cyprus negotiation and dissuade Makarios from early return. Secretary Kissinger is engaged in energetic diplomacy directed at support of Clerides–Denktash negotiation and introduction of flexibility on substance. Clerides had unequivocal statement of US support. Even Makarios had belatedly expressed his support for Clerides following October 2 meeting with Secretary.3 On island, Greek Cypriot factions from left to right were beginning to wake up to what Clerides’ departure would mean and were asking that he not resign.

4. I said that while things seemed to be moving in the right direction, I was not sure whether Clerides would yet feel he had carried

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1 Source: Ford Library, National Security Adviser, Presidential Country Files for the Middle East and South Asia, Box 3, Cyprus, Nodis to Secretary of State 3. Secret; Immediate; Nodis.

2 Telegram 3453 from Nicosia, October 3. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy Files, 1974)

3 See Document 154.
his threat far enough and received sufficient mandate to continue in face of Archbishop’s undercutting which reflected through his supporters and in the substance of his UNGA statement. My personal guess was that Clerides would judge that he had to move further on his threat and perhaps even go through with it, until he received more. I hoped this would be forthcoming today and over coming weekend, especially from Cyprus House of Representatives which scheduled to meet in rump session later today and again with full membership, including members recalled from abroad, on October 6 or 7.

5. Denktash said with obvious sincerity that he wished Clerides well. Turkey was prepared to make concessions to help him if we could get over this hurdle.

Crawford

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4 See footnote 4, Document 154.

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156. Minutes of Secretary of State Kissinger’s Staff Meeting

Washington, October 22, 1974, 9–10:10 a.m.

[Omitted here is discussion unrelated to Cyprus.]

Mr. Hartman: On the UN debate on Cyprus, we now have three points of view. The Turks are still very anxious to get a postponement, think it would be better to have a meeting after your visit. Also they have been further delayed I think in forming their government.

Secretary Kissinger: What happened to Demirel?

Mr. Hartman: We haven’t a report yet. They are still holding their conference as of today.

We have talked to Bitsios, whose view is that it is better to get it over before your visit and come out with a moderate conclusion, because he is afraid that if they do something—if the Turks give some con-

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1 Source: National Archives, RG 59, Transcripts of Henry Kissinger’s Staff Meetings, Entry 5177, Box 5, Secretary’s Staff Conference. Secret.

2 Bitsios replaced Mavros as Foreign Minister after Mavros resigned on October 16 to focus on the November election campaign. According to telegram 7528 from Athens, October 16, Kubisch was scheduled to have lunch with Bitsios on October 17; no record of this meeting has been found. (Ibid., Central Foreign Policy Files, 1974)
cession when you go there, and then there is a debate, that that might be used, some statements during the debate might be used by the Turks to say that they can no longer go ahead with those concessions.

There is a third problem in that Bouteflika\(^3\) says he has already had one postponement and he is very anxious to schedule debate. And he has given no support at all to the Turkish approaches. And our people I think need some further instruction about whether they should go directly to Bouteflika, to try and get this thing postponed until the 11th of November.

It was mentioned again by Ecevit yesterday, in his talk with Bill Macomber.\(^4\)

Mr. Sisco: Since the Turks were having some confusion. Late last night Scali called me. The Turkish Ambassador in New York is not on the same wicket as his own government, so we have to straighten that out. He thought a delay from October 21 to the 28 was all the Turks were talking about. I explained to John that was not the case.

Secretary Kissinger: But there are some governments where Ambassadors do what the Prime Ministers want. And if the Prime Minister wanted November 11, I am inclined to go with the Prime Minister.

Mr. Sisco: I am, too. Except he didn’t seem to be aware of it. That is the point I am making.

Mr. Hartman: Bitsios says there have been some talks about what the resolution should say, and thinks they can come out with a moderate one that the Turks could abstain on. I am not so sure that the situation is that controllable, once it gets started up there, and the Greeks can actually come through with a moderate resolution.

We can discuss that.

Secretary Kissinger: Well, the idea seems to have gotten into people’s heads that, one, we overthrew Makarios, two, that we are doing it to establish a NATO base, and therefore we are going to get all the non-aligned against us, and the Turks are going to be isolated.

Mr. Hartman: But there seems to be some pulling of punches by the Arabs. I think a moderate resolution can get through. But it is the debate that will have some elements in it that will be unhelpful.

Secretary Kissinger: Well, I don’t suppose we can be the leaders in getting it delayed.

\(^3\) Abdelaziz Bouteflika, Algerian Foreign Minister and representative of the Non-Aligned Movement, was President of the 29th Session of the UN General Assembly.

\(^4\) The meeting was reported in telegram 8270 from Ankara, October 21. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy Files, 1974, P850095–2143)
Mr. Hartman: They have taken the initiative, and we have to be sure that they have taken the initiative with this November 11 date in mind.

Mr. Sisco: Mr. Secretary, I think we have pretty well done what we can do. I myself feel that this October 28 date is not going to get turned off. We have made our position clear. Bouteflika is absolutely adamant on this. At the most, I would suggest a low, low key approach to Bouteflika. John could call him and say what about all this. But I don’t think we are going to be able to pull this thing off, because the Greek view is very strong on this. Bitsios said we really want this on the 28th. My advice is not to expend too much energy and capital on this, because it is a losing fight. We have done what the Turks have asked us to do. They realize that the cards are stacked against us.

Secretary Kissinger: What?

Mr. Sisco: Namely, we have indicated our support for a delay.

Secretary Kissinger: To whom?

Mr. Sisco: To, I think, the Secretary General. Bill—I think we told it to someone there.

Mr. Buffum: The Secretary General.

Secretary Kissinger: In what form have we told it to the Secretary General?

Mr. Buffum: Scali has been talking to him. But Bouteflika is the key on this.

Secretary Kissinger: When you say Scali has been talking to him, what exactly has Scali said? Has he said we recommend a delay, or has he sort of said wouldn’t it be nice if you could think up a delay?

Mr. Sisco: My understanding is that he has said that we support the Turks in a desire for a delay.

Mr. Buffum: That is my understanding. We do not have a written report. Just based on a phone call to Joe last night.

Mr. Sisco: We have got to call him again this morning. As I say, the Turkish Ambassador is quite confused.

Mr. Buffum: I agree with Joe. The chances of delaying it further are very slim, because of the heavy Greek pressure to go ahead and Bitsios’ departure this weekend for New York, plus a very heavy plenary schedule that Bouteflika has to manage.

Mr. Sisco: I might add something else, Mr. Secretary. In the cable that came in yesterday,5 reporting our latest conversation with Ecevit, Ecevit I think has pretty well concluded that he is now faced with an even more delicate situation. First, the congressional action. Secondly,
what I found interesting is that I think he does assume that some kind of a resolution is going to be adopted before any trip on your part.

Secretary Kissinger: Let’s forget about the trip.

Mr. Sisco: Let me just make this point. He nevertheless said that he would try to do—try to be as helpful as possible—

Secretary Kissinger: We are going to drive the Turks into rapid nationalist neutralism by our stupid diddling around. That is what we are going to do. And by our cowardly behavior in every respect. That is what the end result of it is. And three years from now no one needs to claim any responsibility, because you will never be able to pinpoint what happened. This is my concern.

Mr. Sisco: Yes. And Ecevit in effect said this.

Secretary Kissinger: There is no way you can read the Ecevit cable—it is like ’56 with the British. We were all congratulating ourselves, I am sure, in this building on the heroic thing we did with the British and French, and how we got world opinion on our side, and all the other great platitudes, and 70 percent of the troubles we have had with them since have been caused by our brutality in ’56.

Mr. Sisco: But this is a totally different situation.

Secretary Kissinger: This is not at all a totally different situation, because the end result, that the Turks can only conclude, is that, sure, I’m a nice guy, the President is a nice guy—and we cannot manage our domestic situation. Foreign governments deal with foreign governments. Secondly, whenever we step up to a problem, we just sort of—we say the right things, we want to do the right things. But somehow we just cannot deliver. You combine that with the reports we get from the Middle East. Everybody thinks I’m a great guy, the President means well—it’s just a great pity that this damned government cannot do anything. And if you think a great power can conduct its foreign policy this way, then you are on the wavelength of my former colleagues at Harvard.

Mr. Sisco: I think the practical result may be the same. When I said that the situation is different, you had there in Suez a specific executive branch policy. Now the situation with respect to the executive policy is distinctly different from the Congress. They understand this. I am not saying that they can discount this.

Secretary Kissinger: The fact is that the Turks looking at this have to conclude they must make themselves independent of the United States. When Ecevit said yesterday—he said it absolutely correctly. He said “Usually it is said that people get along and governments do not; this is a case where governments get along and the people are determined to do this to us, first on poppies and now on this.” What conclusion can a Turkish Prime Minister draw from that? “I will take it now, I will grit my teeth and take it. But this is not a reed on which I can lean, and I must work and move heaven and earth never again to get into this
position.” That is the conclusion. It has nothing to do with whether he
likes you, whether he likes me. I am undoubtedly extremely popular
with the Turkish Government. They will do as much for me as they can
possibly do. If we want to get the foreign policy of the United States,
with all the nonsense of institutionalization, if you want to gear it to one
man, by saying everyone else is irresponsible in the country, then we are
doing fine. But that is no basis for the foreign policy of a great country.

And now to me, this vote, it doesn’t make any difference, but
we are sort of ineffectually bumbling around in New York. I am not
sure that Scali has even said anything that means anything. Are you?
Honestly.

Mr. Buffum: I don’t know, Mr. Secretary.

Secretary Kissinger: You know damned well that Scali wants the
debate. At any rate, that Scali is not going to fight with Bouteflika and
Waldheim on this.

Mr. Buffum: I think it is a matter of confusion in part because of
the Turkish delegation. They really—

Secretary Kissinger: I wanted us to be on record that we support
a delay. Have we done that?

Mr. Sisco: Yes.

Secretary Kissinger: In a way that everybody understands?

Mr. Sisco: You mean if you are talking about the whole General
Assembly, no.

Secretary Kissinger: Not the whole General Assembly. I want the
Turks to have at least the feeling that we responded to them in some-
thing other than bureaucratic talk. Have we done that? Well, have we
done it? You ought to know that. It is your department.

Mr. Buffum: We have to clarify the picture this morning with Scali.

Secretary Kissinger: We have been talking about this for a week.
Has he done anything in the week?

Mr. Buffum: He just got the cable yesterday with the final in-
structions on delay.6

Secretary Kissinger: The objective reality is that when you have a
problem for a week, do nothing with it, that then the momentum be-
comes irreversible. Well, I don’t give much of a damn. You can make
many arguments why the debate would be one way or the other. I am
impressed by some of these arguments. But—

Mr. Sisco: Well—

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6 Not found.
Secretary Kissinger: Have we ever told the Greeks clearly that we think it would be better to have a delay?

Mr. Buffum: Categorically, and why.

Secretary Kissinger: And do the Turks know what we have done—which is where we have got our historic problem?

Mr. Sisco: I think they do.

Secretary Kissinger: Has anyone in this building considered what will happen if there is an Israeli-Syrian war next summer and the Russians try to intervene, how we can operate in the Eastern Mediterranean, without the Turks?

Mr. Brown: Or the Portuguese.

Secretary Kissinger: Or the Portuguese.

Mr. Sisco: We will make doubly certain the Turks know.

Mr. Hartman: I talked to Esenbel yesterday.

Mr. Sisco: I think, Mr. Secretary, you can be reassured on that.

Mr. Hartman: He told me actually that he thought his colleague in New York did not understand his instructions.

Mr. Sisco: That’s right.

Secretary Kissinger: Do the Turks know that we have tried to do something?

Well, let Scali in a low-key way talk to Bouteflika on the ground that I may be going there. I know Bitsios’ concern—he won’t get his concessions after a debate, which is another way of saying if he has Turkish concessions, he may have to be restrained in the debate. He can avoid his fear by arranging an unrestrained debate. What the Greeks want is an unrestrained debate and Turkish concessions. And even better—make it look as if the Turks were beaten into the concessions by a combination of the UN and the American Congress, depriving the U.S. of any capability of claiming any leadership role. That is what the Greeks really want.

Mr. Buffum: By setting up a resolution—

Secretary Kissinger: And you saw Ecevit’s great concern already in his cable saying “If I make concessions, please make sure that you say I had already agreed to them before the congressional vote.”

So now we are arranging a UN vote on top of it. I mean not we. But that seems to me to be the great strategy, to try to humiliate the Turks.

Mr. Buffum: It is their compensation for the military debate. They have political support, particularly for the withdrawal issue, which is going to be the most sensitive, I believe.

Secretary Kissinger: Three years from now, when the Greeks have a communist government, and the Turks have been forced off Cyprus, and there is a communist outfit sitting on Cyprus, we are all going to
scream that Kissinger should have said something against Sampson, and then all of this would have been avoided—or some other profound thing that goes by the name of foreign policy.

I am not saying the Greeks would have a communist government. But the fact that in Greece things will be as in Portugal is at least 40–60. And I think the result will be if there is a very tough resolution, it will make it harder to get Turkish concessions. If Turkish concessions occur anyway, they will be conceived by the Turks as a humiliation. In time, we will be seen as having objectively colluded with all these forces, and the end result of all of this is going to be a wild Turkish nationalism that decides above all to be free of the United States—"Whatever else you do, get the Russians, you can get anybody you can rely on, but not the United States."

That will be the sequence that will be unleashed. It won’t be visible for a year—but that is the certain result of what is happening. And a UN resolution after the Turks have offered some concessions is totally different from a UN resolution which the Greeks will then claim was the chief factor in bringing about Turkish concessions. Between the combination of the Congress and the UN, it will be claimed that the U.S. Government did nothing.

Mr. Buffum: It is also going to require you to choose up sides, Mr. Secretary, at the time when that will be the most awkward of all. We will have to vote. And probably it will be for a resolution that the Turks cannot support and that the Greeks are pushing.

Mr. Sisco: It is very likely that is the situation, because I think most of the elements are going to be okay. I am not quite as optimistic as Hartman is. I think we are going to have great trouble with the withdrawal paragraph. Notice the way we put those principles. Even the mention of the word, and he came back with Paragraph 4 of the Geneva Declaration.

Secretary Kissinger: But even if the Greeks get all the principles we have been talking about into the UN resolution, we will be deprived of every American credit for it, and therefore we will not have any impact in Greece. And the main reason why we are doing it, which is to ameliorate the situation in Greece, will be totally destroyed.

Mr. Sisco: Well, I think that the Greeks have some interest, Mr. Secretary, assuming we can get these concessions from the Turks—I think the Karamanlis Government has some interest in giving the United States Government some credit. Obviously this is our line. Because they are going to play it both ways.

Secretary Kissinger: The Karamanlis Government has obviously turned on the AHEPA group. This was perfectly plain in talking to the AHEPA group. Now they are doing it in the UN. At the same time they want total support from us. It is impossible. We cannot operate that way.
Mr. Hartman: The AHEPA group was much more extreme than the Greek Government.

Mr. Sisco: Very extreme.

Mr. Hartman: Can I raise our other favorite country?

Secretary Kissinger: You better tell Scali to make it clear—and you better make clear to Bitsios, it is going to be very hard for me to go to Ankara if they insist on a debate before. I just don’t see—just tell them they can go ahead, we will not make an open fight against it, but it is going to be difficult.

Mr. Buffum: It is also going to raise a very sensitive question, Mr. Secretary, what we say during the debate during that period when you will be out of the country. People will be looking for us for full public exposé of our position in the Assembly.

Secretary Kissinger: If I am going to Ankara, we are not going to also publicly beat up on the Turks. For what? Can somebody explain to me what for? For what United States interest? To make Brademas happy? What is the United States interest? In what respect is my analysis wrong? If my analysis is wrong, let somebody put it forward and we will change our policy. What are we gaining in Greece compared to what we are losing in Turkey?

Mr. Sisco: I did not interpret what Bill said, Mr. Secretary, that any statement that we would make would be intended to beat up on the Turks. I think we ought to by very, very careful, indeed.

Mr. Buffum: That was not my intention.

Secretary Kissinger: I am not blaming Bill. I am saying if we are forced to take a stand, we will either get into again massive trouble domestically here, or we will get into massive trouble internationally. On the withdrawal issue, what are we going to say?

Mr. Buffum: I think we just have to stick to the formulation we got in the first round in Geneva.

Secretary Kissinger: Which is no longer acceptable to the Turks.

Mr. Sisco: But that is the maximum we can go at this point.

Mr. Buffum: Reduction rather than withdrawal.

Secretary Kissinger: But that may force us to vote against the resolution.

Mr. Buffum: Again, that puts us in a highly partisan position at just the wrong time.

Secretary Kissinger: That is right. And hard to explain. Very hard to explain. We will have a murderous time with Congress, and with the AHEPA group, if we don’t vote for withdrawal. But if we do vote for withdrawal, anything that is done in Ankara will not redound to our credit. I don’t mean to our personal credit. What we have to do is
to show the Greeks that only by working with the United States can they get something. But they are having it all ways.\footnote{The General Assembly met from October 28 to November 1, at which time it adopted Resolution 3212 by a vote of 117–0. Resolution 3212 called for respect for Cyprus’ sovereignty, removal of foreign troops, return of refugees, cooperation with UNFICYP, and the involvement of the Secretary General in a solution. (Yearbook of the United Nations, 1974, pp. 284–288, 295)}

\[\text{[Omitted here is discussion unrelated to Cyprus.]}\]

\footnote{1}{Source: Library of Congress, Manuscript Division, Henry Kissinger Papers, Box CL 125, Geopolitical File, Cyprus, Chronological File. Secret; Nodis. Drafted by Hartman. The breakfast meeting was held at the Hotel Excelsior in Rome while Kissinger was on a visit to meet with President Leone and Foreign Minister Moro and address the World Food Conference.}

\section*{157. Memorandum of Conversation\footnote{1}}}

Rome, November 5, 1974, 8 a.m.

\textbf{SUBJECT}

Cyprus

\textbf{PARTICIPANTS}

\textbf{Greek}

H.E. Dimitri Bitsios, Greek Foreign Minister

E. F. Phimios Stoforopoulos, Greek Chef de Cabinet

\textbf{US}

The Secretary of State

Arthur A. Hartman, Assistant Secretary for European Affairs

Secretary: It’s good to have you here. I understand that you don’t like meetings this early in the morning and I very much appreciate your coming at this hour. I was very anxious to have this opportunity to talk to you prior to my next talks with the Turkish authorities.

Bitsios: I do not mind at all coming although I must say that I do prefer to do my work later in the day. In fact, I prefer the evenings for serious work. I met Gunes in New York and to break the ice I put a question to him—Are you going to be statesmanlike? He did not give a direct answer but I have the impression that he is a reasonable man.
Secretary: I think you are right and, of course, we have advised Gunes to be as reasonable as possible.

Bitsios: He is not very experienced and we had the impression that he was under great stress in Geneva.

Secretary: I consider the second Geneva meeting to be the most incompetently handled negotiation I have ever witnessed. The British thought that they could achieve a settlement there. In fact, we had encouraged the Turks to make a proposal so that there would be something on which to negotiate but Callaghan was so mad at the Turks that he could not get the process moving.

Bitsios: On the whole I think that Gunes’ answer was satisfactory. He and Ecevit have their troubles with this extremist party but I think that your visit can be helpful in getting the Clerides–Denktash talks going although I think Denktash is really quite reluctant to proceed. Denktash seems to be holding back and unwilling to come forward with specific proposals. We didn’t want to get Clerides to press him on the eve of your visit.

Secretary: It would be useful for me to know whether Athens can acknowledge any Turkish gestures or seem to be in agreement with them.

Bitsios: Our approach is quite different. Caramanlis’ position is well known and in this period before the elections he would like to see some movement on the Clerides–Denktash talks. There is the question of the form of a federal government. What kind will it be? There is the Gunes’ plan for a large area in the north and several cantons in the south and then there is the Denktash plan for two large zones. We can accept a cantonal arrangement but not a bizonal one. We also would not like to see a large movement of people from the south to the north and vice versa.

Secretary: Clerides seems to be willing to accept a bizonal arrangement.

Bitsios: But after the Geneva meetings and the discussions with Makarios I think he now thinks that the best solution would be a cantonal arrangement.

Secretary: Makarios is now talking about ten to twenty cantons.

Bitsios: The Turks have proposed a large canton in the north and about five cantons in the south. Our position is that the area should be roughly equivalent to the percent of population.

Secretary: That was the kind of thinking that the Turks were willing to discuss in Geneva but no one else would talk about it. Let me describe the situation we face. We have been trying to obtain some concessions from the Turks which would help start the negotiating process.
The actions of our Congress, however, have complicated the situation for Ecevit but he wants to do something. We have been thinking about getting agreement on some principles and some gestures which would enable the negotiations to go forward. Now what do the Turks want? They seem to want to have two autonomous areas and they wish to describe these areas geographically. With respect to gestures we believe we can get the Turks to consider opening the airport and allow some Greeks to return to the Nicosia Industrial Estate. We also might get some minor withdrawals in Turkish forces. The Turks want several things: first, some acknowledgment of the geographic basis for the negotiations; second, some statement on the future which they will interpret as bizonal and, third, having some Turks leave the SBA areas to go north. They would be prepared to go ahead with negotiations on this basis but without some counter concessions they will be tough. (At this point the Secretary showed Bitsios our November 4 draft and a little later on he showed Bitsios the tough Turkish counter draft on the principles.)

Bitsios: What do you think the Turks really want?

Secretary: I think the Turks do not want me to leave without some concrete progress.

Bitsios: If the question of gestures was dropped, would it be a question of not getting any principles? You see, it is difficult for Clerides because Makarios is pressing very strongly for a cantonal arrangement and he cannot do anything which would seem to approve a bizonal solution. Anything that is done now to clarify this situation will complicate the negotiation and not help solve the problem.

Secretary: It is not absolutely necessary—we could just announce the beginning of political talks.

Bitsios: Just starting the talks could be difficult. If we could just manage to get Denktash to obtain some guidelines through secret diplomatic efforts—something that would direct Denktash to begin the talks.

Secretary: We would probably then have the same deadlock. If we could get an agreement that there would be discussions on the basis of geographic zones but not specify that this meant two areas. I think the best procedure would be, first, to get the negotiations started; second, I will make an approach to the Turks and then, third, we will discuss how to proceed. We are prepared to keep engaged and, perhaps, I could designate someone to help in this process. I had thought, for example, of David Bruce but now that he is going to NATO, perhaps I could find someone else.

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2 This is a reference to the Congressional vote to cut off military aid to Turkey on October 17.

3 Not attached and not found.
Bitsios: It is important that there be some voluntary move from the other side—some gesture. Then there could be something reciprocated. We are the party that has been hurt.

Secretary: There are several ways to get maximum gesture and then some reciprocity. You could leave open the possibility for you to suggest a cantonal system and for them to come back and suggest two zones.

Bitsios: What we need is a maximum gesture and, quite frankly, a withdrawal of 5 to 10,000 is not much of a gesture to us when there are 40 or perhaps 35,000 Turks on the island. We will throw all our weight on a cantonal plan. Caramanlis cannot accept a settlement which does not appear to be fair. He cannot take anything approaching partition. There is a deep psychological feeling on this.

Secretary: Our experience in getting a negotiation started is that you can’t use your maximum weight at first. Therefore, we think that in the first meeting the attempt should be made to get the two proposals on the table—bizonal vs. cantons. How many cantons are you going to ask for? Twenty?

Bitsios: No, we would be prepared to start from the Gunes plan but not from 35 percent of the island. We also do not want to have an exchange of population.

Secretary: You also want half of Famagusta.

Bitsios: Famagusta could be, at least in part, in a more modest northern zone. We can accept a larger area around the Turkish areas. This might help reduce the population problem. But we also have the question of the powers of the central government. We are looking to you to help.

Secretary: It is very difficult for me to help if anti-American positions are being taken by the Greek Government. I cannot perform miracles. There are no American proposals. What, I wonder, is whether or not it would be possible to have a general discussion and leave out the gestures.

Bitsios: You should be more optimistic.

Secretary: The only thing you want is acceptance of the cantonal system and that is out of the question to begin with.

Bitsios: There are other questions we should discuss, for example, bilateral Greek-Turkish relations but it is not wise for you to enter into those details. Perhaps, eventually, you could. Why don’t you ask them what their intent is after achieving a Cyprus settlement? If they say the rest can be put off into the future, that would be all right with us. If they enumerate other areas you should say that you don’t believe the Greeks will make serious concessions since they will have already done so on Cyprus. If the negotiations achieve some success, then perhaps these other issues can be discussed later.
Secretary: First, we ought to consider putting these issues off for a number of years. Second, if there is some success, then perhaps we could link the two. Which would you prefer?

Bitsios: Obviously, it is better to settle all that can be settled.

Secretary: I don’t know what the balance should be. Perhaps we could link if there is a potential advantage to Greece.

Bitsios: Of course.

Secretary: We will try for separation however.

Bitsios: On the continental shelf, we have always wanted to negotiate on the basis of the 1958 treaty. Then we could negotiate as other countries have on the basis of law and not guns. Second, there is the question of the islands and their remilitarization and, third there is the question of the minorities problem dealt with on the basis of the Lausanne Treaty of 1923. There are a hundred thousand Turks remaining in Thrace while most of the Greeks have been displaced. Those Greeks who remain must be protected and perhaps the Turks should be exchanged.

Secretary: You mean exchange populations?

Bitsios: Yes, that perhaps would be easier but it would present a moral problem. It would also undermine Makarios’ view that there should be no exchange of population on Cyprus.

Secretary: Yes, if you are going to exchange populations, then the principle could be applied to Cyprus and the argument that the population should be separated there.

Bitsios: It would be very cynical of us to sacrifice this principle at the expense of Cyprus.

Secretary: What do you think we can get out of political talks?

Bitsios: Perhaps we could discuss some of these issues. The Turks want two zones. There is a question of how large the area will be. It must be below 30 percent. Denktash wants to be head of an autonomous Turkish administration. We think Denktash speaks more authoritatively than Gunes.

Secretary: We think Denktash follows Ankara. There are two roads we can take—either move to reduce the Turkish zone or try to get a cantonal solution but I must tell you that I do not believe a cantonal arrangement is now acceptable. It is a great pity that we could not have gotten this matter discussed seriously last August. The trouble was that Callaghan wanted to move too quickly because he thought a success would help them in their election. I have one worry in this situation and that is that every time I take a step I will become the

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4 See footnote 5, Document 67.
whipping boy of the Greek Government. You have got Demetracopoulou working with Papandreou. By the way, the Soviet strategy is clear. First, they want to internationalize the whole problem. Second, they would not mind seeing a disaffection by Turkey from the West if the Turks break with us and that is what will happen if the Greek-Americans succeed.

Bitsios: The danger is always there but why will the Turks turn to the Soviets? We cannot accept gestures as a price for a bizonal solution.

Secretary: Can’t we talk of a federal solution—not bizonal and leave open whether there are two or five cantons?

Bitsios: But the Turks must learn that we won’t accept a bizonal arrangement.

Secretary: Should I tell this to the Turks that you won’t accept?

Bitsios: We accept a federal solution on a geographic basis. They should also open Famagusta and allow refugees to return there. We have given $20 million since July for the refugees.

Secretary: I don’t think they will take 40,000 back. I have been urging some gestures and you say that you can only talk about a cantonal solution.

Bitsios: Yes, but we are prepared to negotiate. Provided you make it clear to the other side that we don’t accept a bizonal solution, we are prepared to discuss the number of cantons and we feel the Gunes plan offers a good basis.

Secretary: Let us find a formula that both sides can understand. First, the Turks get some kind of federal solution. Second, the Greeks get some symbolic gesture and a process of negotiation. Let me emphasize to you that there is no law of nature that we have to be involved in this situation.

Bitsios: We all belong to the same family. In any case, this is not just one visit. If you fail to get agreement on a cantonal solution, we must try again.

Secretary: Well, we can try first to get some small gesture moving; second, to get agreement to start political talks; and, third, to discuss a federal solution on a geographic basis. While we have a benevolent attitude toward the cantonal plan I am not sure it will be accepted.

Bitsios: They will make public the fact of Greece yielding. They will say we have accepted the principle.

Secretary: You want us to argue in favor of the cantonal solution but there has to be some outcome—some movement.

Bitsios: If the Greeks have accepted a geographic basis before the elections, that’s as far as we can move.

Secretary: We support Caramanlis very strongly and want him to succeed.
Bitsios: The best thing from our point of view would be a silent visit with the contacts continuing. We don’t want the Turks to announce anything.

Secretary: For the first ten days after the first attack everyone in the United States wanted us to attack Sampson and the junta but we did not wish to encourage the Turks to move.

Bitsios: No, but you have assets to use with the Turks.

Secretary: But these must be played in the negotiations.

Bitsios: You can tell the Turks that you have seen Bitsios and that you can confirm that the Greeks are prepared to envisage a process that will lead to geographic federation. Second, that you can’t go as far as saying bizonal for fear of it being taken as partition. Third, that they are looking at the bizonal problems and the enlargement of the areas and are prepared to start discussing on the basis of the Gunes plan but they cannot accept 35 percent of the island.

Secretary: But not 17 percent either. I don’t think we should ask for many gestures at this time. After we hear their view we can then consult again with you. What should we announce?

Bitsios: After you have had your meeting, perhaps you could send Hartman to tell us what the results were, particularly if you have succeeded in getting acceptance for a cantonal solution.

Secretary: The Turks negotiate like Israel. They sell every inch. Suppose the Turks accept not to have one large zone but rather something like the Gunes plan?

Bitsios: We could accept to have ______ ⁵ number of cantons and one could be fairly big.

Secretary: What is the difference between the first and second points? A geographic basis is in the first point and the second deals with the bizonal question. Why do we have to say that? On the general question of the visit, this can be a quiet visit. Maybe we should suggest that political talks start without preconditions. Would you be willing to come to the States?

Bitsios: Yes.

Secretary: American pressure can produce a settlement but there is going to be a massive fight on the aid restriction with respect to Turkey because that will mean that our pressure will do no good. You should know, however, that we will use our capital to help Greece. We know that a settlement will involve concessions but we will try to find a solution acceptable to Greece.

⁵ Omission in the original.
Bitsios: The Greeks will understand your position but they must have some sign of sympathy, some impression that they will not be let down.

Secretary: I will be in touch with you through Kubisch. This will be a brief meeting with the Turks so that we should not expect too much. I will try to help move along the cantonal solution and to get political talks started and we may discuss some gestures.

158. Telegram From the Embassy in Cyprus to the Department of State

Nicosia, November 6, 1974, 1410Z.

3905. For the Secretary from Ambassador. Subject: Turkey’s Partitionist Moves in Cyprus.

1. Before your arrival in Ankara, we will be sending you for background current, detailed information on Turkish actions within its zone of occupation in Cyprus. From our vantage—and this will perhaps be relevant to your discussions—Turkey is moving in a direction contrary to its public statements which favor a Cyprus that is independent, sovereign, with a federal structure and territorial integrity.

2. What we see happening ever more clearly day by day is a forced division of the island: military, ethnic, economic, and administrative. We are witnessing the creation of a mainland, not a Turkish Cypriot Government, as the Turkish Cypriots increasingly complain.

3. I feel this bodes ill for future stability between Greece and Turkey and in the Eastern Mediterranean. The situation on Cyprus itself is already quite tense enough and will remain so for a long time to come because of the passions engendered by past summer’s events and reciprocal cruelties. If in addition there is focused on the line of rigid division and confrontation which the Turks are bringing into being on the island the inheritance of millenia of Greco-Turkish hostilities, I fear no Cyprus solution or stabilized relationship between Greece and Turkey will be durable.

1 Source: Ford Library, National Security Adviser, Presidential Country Files for Middle East and South Asia, 1974–1977, Box 3, Cyprus Nodis to Secretary of State 4. Secret; Immediate; Nodis.

2 Kissinger did not go to Ankara because of the October 17 Congressional vote to cut off military aid to Turkey.
4. The contradiction between Turkish words and Turkish deeds leads us to feel that to a degree at least we are being trifled with. We wonder anew whether it is not the Turkish General Staff rather than civilian leadership which has the greater influence on Turkey’s action in Cyprus. Ambassador Macomber would be in the better position to comment on this.

Crawford

159. Memorandum of Conversation\(^1\)

Washington, November 13, 1974, 12:15 p.m.

SUBJECT
Secretary’s Meeting with Archbishop Makarios

PARTICIPANTS

U.S.
The Secretary
Under Secretary Sisco
Deputy Assistant Secretary Stabler
Mr. William L. Eagleton, EUR/SE (Notetaker)

Cyprus
Archbishop Makarios
Ambassador Dimitriou
Mr. Angelides

(The first 25 minutes of the conversation were tête-à-tête between the Secretary and the Archbishop.)\(^2\)

The Secretary (to Stabler): Do we now have a Turkish Government?
Stabler: No. A Prime Minister has been designated but he has not yet formed a government.

The Secretary: Then there is no Foreign Minister?
Stabler: No, not yet.

\(^1\) Source: Library of Congress, Manuscript Division, Kissinger Papers, Box CL 272, Memoranda of Conversations, Chronological File. Secret; Nodis. Drafted by Eagleton and approved in S/S on November 16. The meeting was held in the Secretary’s office.

\(^2\) No record of this portion of the conversation has been found.
The Secretary: Will the government have the support of the parties?

Stabler: Supposedly it will, but it would be to some extent a caretaker government.

The Secretary: Would it be able to negotiate?

Stabler: If it is merely to prepare for elections it is doubtful.

The Secretary: When are the elections?

Stabler: Probably next spring.

Makarios: This is very unfortunate.

I get the impression from the Secretary of State that we have agreed on a solution because we have agreed on certain views I have presented.

The Secretary: I have explained to the Archbishop the missed opportunity for a solution last August.

Makarios: The Secretary indicated that a solution would be postponed until after the Greek elections.

The Secretary: No, that was not the point. Since October we have been involved and have obtained gestures but our Congress intervened³ and caused the postponing of my visit to Ankara. This delayed negotiations. By the time things were ready here the Ecevit government was not in a position to receive me. We are prepared to continue the course I outlined. We want a settlement that meets the needs of the parties. I cannot claim that there has been any progress until we have talked with the Turkish Government.

We have not foreclosed the kind of solution proposed by His Beatitude. I pointed out that the possibilities for progress in negotiations on behalf of various other parties who have sought our help were on the basis of good faith. After the Greek elections we will not accept any more pressures of the type we have had. This comment is not directed at the Archbishop.

There is now a difficulty in that until we talk to the Turks we do not know the dimensions of the problems. In any case, U.S. influence will be needed for any solution even if it is to reduce the size of the Turkish zone in a bizonal solution. We know that negotiations will involve an active U.S. role in which concessions will be substantially on the Turkish side.

(Chanting is audible from the street.)

Are those some of my students?

In the course of negotiations, I will be able to see better the terms of the solution that we might support.

Do you have anything to add, Joe?

³ Reference is to the Congressional vote on October 17 to cut off military aid to Turkey.
Sisco: I have just been explaining to Ambassador Dimitriou our regret that your visit to Ankara was not possible since there had been prospects for some movement forward at that time.

Makarios: I forgot to say that a reduction of Turkish troops on the island would not necessarily be considered to be in our interest since it might be better to have a large number of troops remain there to increase the Turkish economic problem.

The Secretary: Will you be saying that on TV?

Makarios: No.

The Secretary: There are two phases that will be necessary: one would be the movement in the direction of negotiations, and, two, would be political talks in which we can see the possible outcome. Without such talks we are only dealing with theory. To get talks going there have to be developments in Turkey. I told the Archbishop that in connection with the NATO meeting I would perhaps be prepared to go to Ankara to continue our efforts or, if not that, to meet with the Greek and Turkish Foreign Ministers who will be at the NATO meeting.

160. Memorandum of Conversation


SUBJECT

(1) Cyprus; (2) Potential Points of Misunderstanding between the EC and the US; (3) Energy Conservation; (4) Consultations in the Event of a New Mid-East War; (5) Trade Bill; (6) Cargo Preference Bill

PARTICIPANTS

Great Britain
Sir Peter Ramsbotham, The Ambassador of Great Britain
Mr. Jeremy Q. Greenstock, First Secretary, Embassy of Great Britain

United States
The Secretary
Mr. Wells Stabler, The Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for European Affairs
Miss Anne Pinkney, Country Desk Officer for Norway and Iceland (Notetaker)

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1 Source: Library of Congress, Manuscript Division, Kissinger Papers, Box CL 272, Memoranda of Conversations, Chronological File. Secret; Nodis. Drafted by Pinkney and approved in S on December 9. The meeting was held in the Secretary’s office.
(1) Cyprus

Sir Peter: Callaghan knows that you will be away from Washington for two weeks and wanted me to get your views on various matters, especially as there will be a meeting of the Nine in Paris this week. For this meeting, it will be helpful to have your views. By the way, Callaghan has sent you a message on Cyprus which you have probably not had time to see yet.2

The Secretary: The system in the Department is designed so that I shall never see it. Could you tell me, in essence, what it says?

Sir Peter: There are actually several matters that I would like to deal with. First, a brief word on Cyprus. Second, I want to go over some concerns that Callaghan has, and I share, about emerging situations that could potentially lead to misunderstandings between the US and the EC. The first has to do with the debate in the UN, the second with the Europe/Arab dialogue . . .

The Secretary: I am glad that it is not to be a political dialogue . . .

Sir Peter: . . . and the third with the Yamani-French proposal.

The Secretary: What did Callaghan’s message on Cyprus have to say?

Mr. Stabler: It gives Callaghan’s views on what may happen when Makarios goes to Greece toward the end of the month and refers to what Makarios has been saying about his talks with us.

Sir Peter: In the message, Callaghan says that, in view of the political situation in Greece, it is probably best to let things rest for the time being. In Callaghan’s view, the Turks will insist that the solution be a bi-regional geographical division. We have heard from Bitsios that discussions are going well. We believe the Turks will probably not settle for any solution other than the bi-regional one. We realize that this will be extremely difficult for the Greeks to accept publicly, but, as we read the situation, it would appear that if the Greeks indicated privately to the Turks that a solution along these lines could be discussed, it would be o.k. We are, however, concerned because the Cypriot Foreign Minister has told Callaghan that Makarios believes that the US is holding out some hope that a cantonal or multi-regional approach might still be feasible.

The Secretary: My one desire when Makarios is here is to keep him from going downstairs and blasting what we are trying to do—to get him out of the country in peace. He has at least improved his position to the extent of reducing his demands from twenty cantons to five.

2 Ramsbotham transmitted a letter from Callaghan to Kissinger on November 15. (Ibid., Box CL 125, Geopolitical File, Cyprus, Chronological File)
Mr. Stabler: In the last proposal I thought he also used the figure of ten.

The Secretary: He asked me to back five. I told him I would have no objection if such a solution were obtainable but I made it clear that, in my judgment, it was not, and that a settlement along the lines of a bi-zonal arrangement would prove to be the only acceptable one. Makarios then said that the U.S. can make the Turks accept anything we want them to; this is simply not true.

Sir Peter: The best solution, of course, would be to prevent Makarios from going back.

The Secretary: I agree, but this will never be. His efforts to get me to support his five cantonal plan have no chance, but I did not come out flatly and say this. In this way he could not say that I had insisted on a bi-zonal arrangement. Makarios is trying to turn us around by saying what he has. It is better for me to give my opinion after I have talked to the Turks—if I ever talk to them. But, in any case, you can assure Callaghan we are in total agreement on this matter.

Sir Peter: If Karamanlis gets 50% of the vote today, the meeting of Clerides, Makarios and Karamanlis will take place on November 24. It is important to get Karamanlis to say that the Greek Government privately accepts the bi-regional solution. Clerides, showing much courage I think, has already stated publicly that this solution is not impossible. This is the solution that Callaghan will be supporting at the tri-partite meeting.

The Secretary (addressed to Mr. Stabler): It seems to me that I should send a message to Karamanlis in connection with that meeting, pointing out that I do not believe that he will want Cyprus around his neck forever. Tell him that I am willing to help, but that there must be a realistic objective which would have to be a bi-zonal federation. We would work to reduce the size of the Turkish zone and seek a strengthened federal government. We are prepared to help to achieve this either through the Clerides–Denktash talks or as part of a more general settlement of Greek-Turkish issues.

Sir Peter: We do not think that this weak Turkish Government would be willing to start negotiations unless it received a private assurance, rather than a public one, that the Greek Government was willing to discuss a bi-regional federation.

The Secretary (addressed to Mr. Stabler): See to it that such a message is prepared and sent to me on the plane. 3 Wells is one of the few who will write a message for me just as instructed—most in the

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3 The message was sent in telegrams 15174 and 15182 to Athens, November 20. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy Files, 1974, P850023–2542 and P850023–2540)
Department think that my instructions are only an interruption to what they were in the process of doing!

Sir Peter: Also on Cyprus, we are concerned about the prospect of opening the Nicosia Airport and the possibility that the Russians might try to get in on that. This problem is also mentioned in Callaghan's message to you. We are prepared to pull out all the stops to prevent this from happening.

The Secretary (addressed to Mr. Stabler): Aren't we acting on that?

Mr. Stabler: Yes, we are. We have asked Macomber to do something about this matter. You know that the Cypriots have sent a delegation to Moscow.

The Secretary: In spite of what we have been doing, might the Cypriots do it anyway?

Sir Peter: We have a plan . . .

The Secretary: The Greeks seem to take great pleasure in seeing the Turks get hit—they liked our Congressional resolution even though it was against them too.

Mr. Stabler: We are trying to get some movement on the airport situation.

The Secretary: Do we know the Soviets will be kept out if the Nicosia Airport is opened?

Sir Peter: The Turks have opened a small airfield in their zone and the Soviets have established service there with a Yak plane. The British think that the service which they are offering the Cypriots is as good.

The Secretary: Would that mean the end of the Yak service?

Sir Peter: The Turks are telling us that they want to settle this issue as part of the overall political solution. I think that we must sit down and talk straight to them as NATO allies, asking them if they really want to establish a Soviet base on Cyprus.

The Secretary: If we can be sure that the Soviets cannot use the Nicosia Airport if it is opened . . .

Mr. Stabler: We have made our point of view clear to the Cypriots.

The Secretary: Be very sure that they understand it. Tell them again.

Sir Peter: We will do anything to keep the Soviets out. The general problem now is how we move from the present stalemate; how we stop people from making statements which just make things more difficult.

The Secretary: How about bringing the whole matter up in the upcoming NATO meetings?

Sir Peter: Yes. That is an excellent suggestion. That would give Karamanlis time to think. Callaghan will probably be talking to the Nine about this.

[Omitted here is discussion unrelated to Cyprus.]
161. Telegram From the Embassy in Cyprus to the Department of State

Nicosia, November 19, 1974, 1800Z.

161. Telegram From the Embassy in Cyprus to the Department of State

Nicosia, November 19, 1974, 1800Z.

4109. For Secretary from Ambassador. Department pass Athens and Ankara. Subj: Secretary’s Message to Clerides. Ref: State 253547.2

1. Summary: Clerides welcomed your message on March [November] 13 meeting with Makarios3 and your encouragement of his role. His preference is that Karamanlis press Makarios not to return and that Denktash be given greater latitude by Turkey, in which case he feels a realistic solution can be quickly reached. Failing this, he insists that at minimum Makarios [garble] Athens should be committed in writing on the nature of a solution to be pursued and his signature of it. He says we need not worry about a Soviet air service in Cyprus. He leaves November 20 for London to brief Makarios at latter’s request, and to brief Callaghan. His discussion with Denktash on Nicosia airport re-opening looks mildly promising. End summary.

2. I delivered your oral message to Clerides evening November 19. Clerides asked me to convey to you the following reply.

3. “Please tell Dr. Kissinger that I express sincere thanks for everything he has done and for encouragement he has given me. I fully agree with his evaluation. Although a number of solutions may be tried premised on a geographical federation, my belief is also that Turks will not agree to anything unless there is a bizonal federation or a cohesive Turkish area in the north with a substantial opening to the sea. Just cantons will not satisfy them. Perhaps they could accept something like Gunes’ proposal in Geneva provided there are two basic zones, possibly one sub-zone in the north, a few cantons elsewhere. The total Turkish areas may not be the 34 percent Gunes proposed but will certainly have to be somewhere between 23 and 25 percent.

4. With regard to Makarios’ return, my feeling is that his presence here will not help the situation. His public statements would not be constructive. If he returns, it will be with exactly the same entourage.

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1 Source: Ford Library, National Security Adviser, Presidential Country Files for Middle East and South Asia, 1974–1977, Box 3, Cyprus, Nodis to Secretary of State 4. Secret; Immediate; Nodis.

2 In telegram 253547 to Nicosia, November 17, Kissinger summarized a discussion with Makarios in which he told the Archbishop that his return to Cyprus in the next few weeks might set back progress toward a negotiated settlement. Kissinger also emphasized the U.S. belief that only a bizonal arrangement seemed realistic and practical. (Ibid., Box 2, Cyprus, Nodis 2)

3 See Document 159.
as before. There is the risk of his militant opponents being persecuted by his supporters who have substantial quantities of arms. Certainly his opponents will react violently.

5. My problem is that I cannot publicly take a position on his return because his supporters may then start trouble. This again will lead to a clash with anti-Makarios elements. The only possibility is for Karamanlis to exercise maximum pressure to dissuade him from coming.

6. There is of course the possibility that the Archbishop may ignore advice from Karamanlis and then I do not see how he could stop him. Then what I see as a problem that could be solved realistically, in a short time, particularly if Denktash had more authority from Ankara, may become extremely difficult because my authority will also be diminished. The happiest development would have been to have Makarios stay away and Denktash be given greater freedom of action. With both of us operating with limited authority, there is a real danger of stalemate.

7. If Makarios’ return cannot be stopped, at least I hope that in our coming Athens meetings Karamanlis will insist that the Archbishop sign a memorandum on the policy to be followed. I have already told the GOG that if the Archbishop returns without a signed memorandum authorizing me on behalf of the GOG and himself to negotiate on the basis of a biregional geographic federation, after trying for a short time the cantonal theory, I would not accept a continuing role as negotiator. From the Athens meetings there must be at least an agreement on procedure and objectives and a firm commitment from the Archbishop that he will sign a solution. I have told the GOG that I would not accept a situation in which the Archbishop returns, I negotiate a solution and then he refuses to sign it. I assume he would accompany his refusal to sign by resignation. This would throw the country into an election. Public controversy would hinge on signing the solution and in the end no Greek Cypriot could sign. In my view, either the Archbishop should decide now to resign or agree to enter into firm commitments with the GOG on policy and the signing of a solution.

8. As to the final paragraph of your message regarding introduction of a Soviet air service in Cyprus, Clerides said to tell you “don’t worry”.

9. Clerides spoke with deep gratification of Karamanlis’ election victory. He is confident that his earlier understandings with Karamanlis on the nature of a solution (para 5, Nicosia 3910)\(^4\) hold firm. In his view,
Karamanlis will try to get the Cyprus problem resolved as quickly as possible so that he can go on to the matters of major concern to him: the consolidation of the new democracy in Greece, the development of a good relationship with Turkey, and a careful return to NATO. Clerides sees starting point on all these as early progress in the Cyprus negotiation.

10. Clerides confirmed to me that he will leave tomorrow for London for meetings with Makarios and Callaghan. Trip was at repeated insistence of Makarios who is asking to be briefed in person on situation in Cyprus.

11. Clerides asked again for our evaluation of report emanating from Soviet/Czech sources that Turks would stage a land/sea commando operation to “rescue” Turks in south before end November. I said we had nothing that pointed to this. Clerides replied that he, too, tended discount report but was a little concerned because of information that Turkish forces in Cyprus had been placed on alert which not scheduled to end until November 29.

12. On Nicosia airport reopening, Clerides said that in reply to his earlier suggestion for a joint Greek Cypriot-Turk Cypriot civil aviation board to assist a UN/ICAO interim management team, Denktash at negotiating session November 18 had come up with a constructive thought. Denktash had noted near-collisions thanks to current confusion between non-cooperating Turkish and Cypriot FIR centers. Subject to Ankara’s approval he had suggested that as first step in cooperation looking toward implementation of Clerides’ proposal for airport reopening, Greek and Turkish control centers be relocated and amalgamated at Nicosia airport. Clerides had said he would be quite willing to talk on this basis as soon as green light received from Ankara.
162. Defense Intelligence Agency Intelligence Appraisal


MAKARIOS’ RETURN TO CYPRUS

Summary

President Makarios has announced that he will return to Cyprus on 7 December. Greek and Greek-Cypriot leaders have reportedly reached a common negotiating position on Cyprus, but Makarios has yet to give his written endorsement and is apparently allowing himself maximum maneuvering room. The Cypriot Police and National Guard will provide the Archbishop’s security. Although anti-Makarios factions will not now forcibly oppose Makarios’ return for the sake of unity, dissident elements could attempt to assassinate him. EOKA-B and the Cypriot National Guard (CNG) will respond to Athens, which has backed the Archbishop’s return. Athens will withdraw its support, however, if Makarios reneges on agreements made to assure his return. Turkey believes Makarios’ return will lead to hostilities in the Greek sector and are prepared to initiate a military operation to liberate Turkish Cypriots in the south. Turkish forces on Cyprus and some air and Jandarma elements on the mainland have been placed on alert. No Turkish offensive will be undertaken unless Turkish-Cypriot safety in the Greek sector is threatened, or they are not allowed to migrate north.

Background

Recent events made it necessary for Greek and Greek-Cypriot leaders to reach a common position on Cyprus so there would be no misinterpretation by the Turks as to who had responsibility for actions on the island. Agreement on a Cyprus negotiating position with Makarios returning as President, and Clerides as the negotiator was reached at a 30 November Athens meeting between Makarios, Acting Cypriot President Clerides, and Greek Prime Minister Karamanlis. Although previously calling for a multi-cantonal federation, Makarios reportedly agreed to a geographic federation based on one major Turkish zone and possibly one or two cantons. However, he deferred formalizing the agreement at that time and reportedly will not sign the agreement until after his arrival on the island. Believing biregional federation to be the only viable solution, the Turks are adamantly opposed to a
cantonal system. Makarios has recently been publicly noncommittal, allowing himself maximum maneuvering room for the negotiation. There is no guarantee that he will honor any final negotiated settlement achieved by Clerides.

Massive crowds of Greek Cypriots are expected to greet Archbishop Makarios upon his 7 December arrival on Cyprus. They see him as the only leader capable of restoring their rights. Makarios realizes the difficulties that face him upon his return to Cyprus but feels confident. Due to his unpredictability, it is impossible to gauge accurately the course of events that will take place.

Greek Reaction to Makarios’ Return

The Cypriot Police (CYPOL) and the CNG have been charged with the Archbishop’s personal security and the island’s internal security, respectively. They are believed capable of performing their missions, and Makarios’ Tactical Reserve Force (TRU), a special unit used before the coup to combat EOKA–B, has not been activated.

While most Greek officers in the CNG believe that Makarios is dangerous and therefore do not support his return at this time, they will respond to orders from Athens. Athens has backed the Archbishop’s return since to do otherwise would evoke an unfavorable response from the populace on the mainland. However, Athens will probably withdraw its support of Makarios if he reneges on agreements made to assure his return. Makarios fears the Turks, and the threat of such a loss will influence any decision he makes.

Although the anti-Makarios factions of which EOKA–B is the best organized and most feared do not approve of his return, they will not interfere for the sake of unity. The enosist movement—union of Cyprus with Greece—reportedly will take a wait-and-see approach and will follow instructions received from the Greek Government. The possibility remains, however, that dissident elements within the organization could attempt to assassinate him, triggering widespread Greek-Cypriot civil disorders and probably leading to renewed Turkish military actions.

[less than 1 line not declassified] expects some minimal anti-Makarios activity after his arrival. The pro-Makarios factions—Lyssarides’ para-military force and the Communist Party (AKEL)—will gain sufficient strength and confidence after Makarios’ return. This could lead to a confrontation between them and EOKA–B. Makarios must control his supporters if internecine fighting is to be prevented.

Turkish Reaction To Makarios’ Return

Makarios’ poor treatment of Turkish Cypriots and his obstructionism during six years of intercommunal talks aimed at giving the Turkish Cypriots civil rights are the primary reasons for Turkey’s opposition to him. Turkey has attempted to pressure the Greek Government into
obstructing his return, warning that Ankara will not negotiate with Clerides if they believe that he is a front for Makarios.

The safety of Turkish Cypriots in the south will be the main factor influencing a decision for a renewed Turkish offensive. Clerides and Denktash have made progress on the refugee issue and several thousand Turks have been quietly allowed to migrate to the north. If Makarios tries to stop this or if his return leads to disorders among Greek Cypriots, which threaten Turkish Cypriot safety, Turkey will initiate a new “peace offensive” aimed at liberating “once and for all” Turkish Cypriots in the Greek-controlled area.

Turkish forces are on alert, and military exercises, from which their forces could launch an attack with little or no warning, are planned. Other precautionary measures include alerting selected mainland air force units and a 5,000-man Jandarma contingent for movement to Cyprus should hostilities resume.

Turkey will accept no delaying tactics by Makarios and will proclaim an independent Turkish-Cypriot Republic if necessary. Turkey hopes to avoid this, however, since it would preclude any Turkish influence in Greek Cypriot affairs and would institutionalize Greek military presence on the island.

163. Memorandum of Conversation

Brussels, December 11, 1974, 11 a.m.

PARTICIPANTS

US
The Secretary
Arthur Hartman, Assistant Secretary for European Affairs
Ambassador Kubisch
Nelson Ledsky (notetaker)

Greek
Foreign Minister Bitsios
Mr. E. Stoforopoulos, Chef du Cabinet to Foreign Minister Bitsios

SUBJECT
Memorandum of Conversation: The Secretary’s Meeting with Greek Foreign Minister Bitsios

1 Source: Library of Congress, Manuscript Division, Kissinger Papers, Box CL 343, Department of State Memoranda of Conversations, External 12/74-4/75. Secret; Nodis. Drafted by Ledsky. The meeting was held in the Secretary’s suite at the Brussels Hilton.
Meeting began with a five minute picture taking session with newsmen.

The Secretary: Having your picture taken with me may ruin you in Greece.

Bitsios: That’s all right. I am very glad to see you again. I am also glad to see Ambassador Kubisch. We are looking forward to having him back in Athens and I want you to know we have very much appreciated his courtesy and abilities in dealing with our problems. (Smiling) Perhaps you should let him remain in Greece and not call him back to Washington where some misunderstanding has arisen.

The Secretary: We have sent you one of our very best. He has my total confidence and in addition is a personal friend. I understand, however, that you need 2,000 police to protect him there.

Bitsios: Oh, no. There was some kind of big demonstration . . .

The Secretary: Do you think I would draw a crowd if I arrived in Athens now?

Bitsios: I would hope you would draw a cheering crowd when you come. We want to find a formula that would enable that to happen. I don’t regard that as an impossibility, or even overly difficult task. In the last several weeks we have settled a great number of our previous political problems.

The Secretary: I want to say at the outset that we were delighted by the outcome of the recent Greek elections. The results have given your Prime Minister a relatively free hand.

Bitsios: You must understand, of course, that the new Government has inherited a great number of problems from the previous regime.

The Secretary: I hope it is understood in Athens that I am a great admirer of Caramanlis. I am really delighted with recent developments in Athens. We want Caramanlis to succeed very much in the important work he has undertaken.

Bitsios: I appreciate those remarks, but I want you to understand that we not only have pressing political problems, but great economic difficulties as well.

The Secretary: We are prepared to be of any help that we can in this area.

Bitsios: Thank you very much.

The Secretary: I am not sure what we can do in the economic area, but in principle we are prepared to be helpful. I am sure we can get congressional support.

Bitsios: Within the past year we have, like most countries, suffered from the marked increase in petroleum prices. This has cost us some $400 million already. Then came the coup in Cyprus last summer, which
absolutely wrecked our tourist season, and cost us countless millions in revenue.

The Secretary: Have we had any detailed discussions with you on economic questions?

Hartman: No.

The Secretary: What I want you to know is that we want Caramanlis to succeed very much. We are disposed to be helpful. Any program undertaken in the economic field should in my judgment be on a substantial enough scale to succeed. You can, if you wish, make an approach through Ambassador Kubisch at any time.

Bitsios: Thank you very much for these remarks. I shall pass them to the Prime Minister.

What is really encouraging is that we are beginning to see the outlines of our political questions in clearer focus. We settled our main domestic problems with the elections. We have now met with the Cypriots, and have obtained their full views. These are not, I might add, very much different from the description I gave you in Rome in early November. Roughly speaking, there is now agreement on common lines for a Cyprus solution. There must be a federal system which provides for a main Turkish area around Kyrenia and a smaller number of Turkish cantons.

The Secretary: Let me halt you here, so that we can be somewhat more precise. All of the Turkish areas would be in the north?

Bitsios: Yes, the main area would be in the north as would the smaller Turkish cantons. (Bitsios then produced a map with the proposed Turkish areas marked on it.)

The Secretary: Has Makarios accepted this kind of a geographic division.

Bitsios: Yes, he is prepared to accept it. The Turks would get a federated system on a geographic basis. That is what they have been requesting.

The Secretary: It is, of course, not decisive what it is called.

Bitsios: There are a number of advantages to this kind of solution. The number of displaced persons would be relatively small. The Turks would have concentrations of their population in the areas they desire. The lines could be negotiated, but the Turkish territory would have to be closer to the general population percentage on the island. That means closer to a 80–20 split. There is also the fact, which I didn’t appreciate in Rome, about the management problems the Turks have had in running their area of Cyprus. With this kind of division, they should

be able to manage their territory without jeopardizing the general economic life of the island.

The Prime Minister wanted me to tell you that we are ready to move for a breakthrough now. We want to start negotiations in Nicosia as soon as possible. This is the time to act—this moment must not be lost.

The Secretary: I agree completely.

Bitsios: Secondly, the Prime Minister wanted me to assure you that there is broad acceptance in the Greek community of a federated solution. The Prime Minister also wanted me to indicate to you that if you did not get good results from your discussions with Esenbel here in Brussels, he would welcome your traveling to Ankara in the very nearest future. It is our view that you could have some personal success as well out of such a visit. We have confided to you and only to you on this matter. We are convinced that if the negotiations can be started, many of the problems in other political areas can be quickly solved.

The Secretary: Before commenting in detail on your presentation, let me explain some of my own problems. First on the domestic side. The question of an aid cut off does not primarily involve Turkey, but goes to the question of executive authority over the conduct of foreign relations. If we permit Congress to dictate the tactics to be employed in foreign policy, we will lose control. It is for this reason we cannot yield. In our negotiations with the Soviets for example, we are exchanging aide-mémoires every day. We cannot have a situation, however, where congressional committees call up our bureaucrats and demand to know what our negotiating tactics are. I know that no Greek Government can support us on the question of aid to Turkey, and I would not ask for such support. As for a possible visit to Ankara, you will appreciate that I cannot go following these NATO meetings. There are scheduled meetings with the French in Martinique. I could perhaps, if the situation warrants, go to Ankara in early January.

Bitsios: Do you think there is any prospect of making a breakthrough here?

The Secretary: Let's define that a little more clearly. I tried out with the Turks the idea of a large Turkish area in the north and some smaller Turkish cantons in the south. The Turks were adamantly opposed. It is my impression that this is a weak Turkish Government, and a relatively unimaginative foreign minister who is not empowered to make decisions here in Brussels.

At some future point it may therefore be necessary to go to Ankara. At that moment, the threat of an aid cut off could be helpful to my negotiating position. My intention is to talk to Congress about this next week when I return. My objective would not be to get an obligatory aid cut off, but to have the flexibility to use such a cut off as a threat.
I am very pleased to hear your position as you outlined it. Your feeling that the negotiations should start quickly and that you can accept some form of geographic federation are positive elements.

Bitsios: Okay. We should of course avoid getting involved in semantics over what an acceptable geographic federation is.

The Secretary: I agree, but I got the impression this morning from my talks with the Turks\(^3\) that they might be willing to pay something in concrete terms for some acceptable language on geographic federalism.

Where is Stabler?

Hartman: In view of the numbers here, Wells stayed back.

The Secretary: I have discovered it always takes five Americans to conduct these conversations. (To Bitsios)—That reminds me have you read the novel called *The Greeks*? It presents a scary picture.

Bitsios: I hope you have read more about Greece than that single book. If not, I’m going to start sending you a whole collection of reading material.

The Secretary: No, I have read much more. As you know, I have been interested primarily in two periods. Classical Greece, and the period around the war for independence. Those are the periods on which I have focused my interest.

Let’s go back to the negotiating process. I think the idea of Turkish gesture which we talked about in October and November is no longer important. What we need now is to get the negotiating process started.

Bitsios: Once negotiations start, they will have a momentum of their own.

(Humming noise heard in room.)

The Secretary: What was that?

Hartman: The wind.

The Secretary: I can assure you that we have no recording system here. If there is one, it’s strictly Belgian.

Let’s go back to the question of how we get the negotiations started. When I saw Mavros in New York in October,\(^4\) he was concerned about the powers of the federal state. Perhaps the negotiations could begin by discussing two basic issues: (A) alleviation of the conditions of suffering on the island (B) the nature of the federal governmental structure. It seems to me that the stronger the federal structure

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\(^3\) A report of the breakfast meeting is in the National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy Files, 1974, P860133–2646.

\(^4\) See Document 154.
can be, the less fear your side will have of partition as an eventual solution. There is, of course, the question of who should conduct the negotiations. The Turkish side says it doesn’t know whom to negotiate with.

Bitsios: That should be obvious. It’s Clerides. Clerides was so designated in the communiqué.

The Secretary: Good. We strongly prefer him. There is also a second question. I have no desire to become the fall guy for this entire operation. You know the outcome on Cyprus will not be brilliant. I have never been eager to get in the middle of the negotiations.

Bitsios: I see no reason why you should get yourself in the middle. Once the talks begin between the two sides, they will have a momentum of their own.

The Secretary: What should I do now?

Bitsios: What we need to know is whether the Turks want to negotiate or not.

The Secretary: I can get you an answer on that. One thing I can assure you, the U.S. will use its influence to produce negotiations.

Bitsios: But that is not the real question. The real question is do the Turks wish to negotiate or are they simply playing for time? We have studied the recent statements by Esenbel, and were amused by suggestions that Ankara is leaving a decision about negotiation to Denktash. Everyone knows Denktash decides nothing. Why would they wish to delay? Either to solidify their position on the island, or simply to mark time to see what happens with Makarios.

The Secretary: Probably both.

Bitsios: We have been encouraged by a report we saw from Nicosia in which Ambassador Crawford indicated that the Turks may eventually be preparing to accept some kind of cantonal solution.

The Secretary: I think there is no basis for this. I’ve seen no such report. It could happen, of course. I don’t exclude anything, but I see no basis for any such conclusion.

Bitsios: Knowing the Turks had such a thought in the back of their mind would help us in moving forward.

The Secretary: I can tell you from today’s conversations, that the Turks are absolutely firm. They may have been a shade, but only a shade, less passionate in describing their position than previously. The

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5 In telegram 4400 from Nicosia, December 9, Crawford reported on Denktash’s prepared statement in response to Makarios’ return and speech: “In question period Denktash reiterated Turk position that possibility cantonal system no longer acceptable because Greek Cypriots themselves have proven that these do not safeguard security of life and property.” (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy Files, 1974)
Foreign Minister I saw today seemed weak and not excessively imaginative. My own view is we should not get bogged down in discussing cantonal solutions or bi-zonalism, but move to complete as much of the negotiations as we can and then the geographic arrangement may fall more naturally into place. I can assure you of this: that we will bring pressure to bear on Turkey for a solution better than the present status quo. We are also strongly in favor of early talks.

The real question is how to get negotiations started. We had talked earlier of Turkish gestures. Whatever these gestures would have been, you would have had to say they were unsatisfactory. So I am prepared to turn away from this approach. Let’s get the talks started. We can talk about the airport, ports, and perhaps a few other things such as troop withdrawals, perhaps in return for stating the principle of geographic federation. Turkey has indicated it wishes to wait for December 24 to see if Makarios provides a signed mandate to Clerides. As for the United States, I see no reason to press for an announcement here in Brussels.

I intend to see Esenbel this afternoon and I could put the following points to him: (1) The Greek Government wishes these negotiations conducted through Clerides, who it will back against Makarios. If a disagreement arises between Makarios and Clerides, both the United States and the Greek Government will support the latter. The first subjects to be discussed in a negotiation would be (a) the powers of the Federal Government and (b) relief for the civilian population on the island. Once agreement is reached on these subjects, the negotiations can proceed to other issues.

If I cannot bring about an agreement along these lines here in Brussels, I would be prepared to go to Ankara soon.

Bitsios: I agree. We can discuss the powers of the Federal Government. This is a point where we could begin, but I think you must understand that fairly soon we would have to come to a discussion of territorial arrangements.

The Secretary: It is a pity that Ecevit is still not in power in Turkey. Esenbel is simply not of the same caliber. He is too rigid and unimaginative.

Hartman: The Turks, you must understand, however, have a natural aversion to Makarios.

Bitsios: Turkey holds the key to US/Greek relations. It also holds the key to Greek/NATO relations. You may say that you are giving aid to Turkey for alliance purposes, but the Greek public reads these statements and notes that Turkey uses United States equipment on Cyprus.

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6 A memorandum of conversation is ibid., P860140–1465.
and may be prepared to use it at a later date against Greece itself. We understand the positions you have taken publicly. We appreciate your need to maintain this line, and if you can get a negotiation process started on Cyprus, we will work for Greece/Turkey détente in other areas.

The Secretary: I have to say that Prime Minister Caramanlis has handled anti-Americanism in Greece magnificently. He has maneuvered with great skill. It is clearly in his interests to have the Cyprus problem settled as quickly as possible so it does not hang over his head. We will support an early solution.

We must at the same time say frankly that these threats to withdraw from NATO or to undermine the United States/Greek bilateral relationship cannot be accepted quietly. We must state our opposition openly.

Bitsios: The actions we have taken in these areas have been forced upon us by public opinion. There are no threats involved, and we have carefully refrained from being provocative or moving precipitously.

The Secretary: All right. To return to Cyprus. Let me see what we can do. You are no longer haggling about gestures. That is very helpful. Let me talk to Esenbel this afternoon. Then, Art, I am afraid, you may have to go to Ankara.

Hartman to Bitsios: Do you think Clerides can work out a satisfactory working arrangement with Makarios?

Bitsios: I think so. They will get along. I don’t believe they will have a falling out.

The Secretary: The attitude of Caramanlis which you have outlined this morning is most statesman-like. Frankly I was going to tell you this morning that I would do nothing more and that I saw no basis for making progress here in Brussels. This was based also on the position you have taken on NATO and bilateral issues.

Bitsios: Surely Ambassador Kubisch here has told you how we are considering NATO and other bilateral security issues. Yesterday we delivered a new letter about US bases. I can assure you there is no pressure intended. We have issued no threats. We spent hours, in fact, in formulating the note delivered yesterday in Washington, and we would not have spent the time if we did not recognize the importance of proceeding in a manner so as to preserve the US/Greek relationship.

The Secretary: You must understand our problem. In the United States we have a threat to the central authority which we must resist.

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7 While no letter has been found, according to telegram 8808 from Athens, December 11, Karamanlis delivered a policy speech to Parliament in which he said that the Government of Greece was reviewing the status of U.S. bases in Greece but did not intend to interrupt political, cultural, and other relations with the Western world. (Ibid.)
It happens that the Turkish aid question has come up first. We have decided to take on the Congress whenever it wishes to intrude on the issue of foreign policy tactics. This has importance for Greece, for the Middle East, and indeed for the entire future conduct of United States foreign policy. Congressional action on Turkish aid will be completed next week.\footnote{On December 18 Congress passed the fiscal year 1975 Foreign Assistance Act (S. 3394). A provision in the bill suspended military aid to Turkey until progress was made on the Cyprus issue, but authorized President Ford to delay the cutoff until February 5, 1975. (\textit{Congress and the Nation}, Vol. IV, 1973–1976, p. 858)} My original intention was to do very little here in Brussels. But I will now talk to Esenbel again and then I would like very much to talk to you.

A subsequent meeting was arranged to begin between 10:30–10:45 P.M. this evening.\footnote{The meeting took place at 11 p.m. Kissinger and Bitsios discussed further particulars for trying to move Greek-Turkish negotiations on Cyprus substantively forward. Kissinger sought support for the emerging idea of the two sides supporting a Clerides–Denktash negotiating framework. (Memorandum of conversation; Library of Congress, Manuscript Division, Kissinger Papers, Box 343, Department of State Memoranda of Conversations, External 12/74–4/75)}

Bitsios: I have one or two more items I would like to mention. But on the first point you will not tell Esenbel about our interest in early negotiations, will you?

The Secretary: Let me put this matter to Esenbel in my own devi-ous way. I certainly will not give him the impression that you are anxious for negotiations.

Bitsios: Can you tell me anything about the possibilities which we read about of further Turkish military moves?

The Secretary: We simply won’t tolerate any, and frankly I don’t believe the Turkish Government is strong enough at the present time to undertake any such activity.

Bitsios: I also want to inform you that with respect to the Aegean, we intend to put this matter before the International Court of Justice.

The Secretary: I want you to know that I have sent General Haig to Turkey to warn against any further military moves. I have made the same point to Esenbel today in the strongest terms.

Bitsios: Concerning the NATO meeting, my Government would find it extremely difficult to have it take place in Ankara. Would there be any possibility of your offering Washington as a site?

Hartman: We should perhaps talk to Luns about it.

The Secretary: I will. (To Hartman:) Could you call the Turks and tell them not to talk to Luns about the Cyprus situation at all, because if they do so it will be all over town before the end of the day.
Bitsios: One last point that concerns Ambassador Kubisch and his statement on the Hill.\(^\text{10}\) I want the Ambassador to return to Athens in the best possible circumstances. Could there be a further statement that the United States understands the concerns of the Greek Government on Cyprus and with respect to aid to Turkey?

The Secretary: Something along those lines might be possible, but I want you to know that Ambassador Kubisch said nothing on the Hill with respect to aid to Turkey on my direct instructions.

Bitsios: What about the Humphrey statement implying that based on a statement by a high US official, he could state that the Greek Government would not oppose a continuation of aid to Turkey.

Ambassador Kubisch: I never spoke to Humphrey or, indeed, to any other Senator.

The Secretary: What do we say to the press?

Bitsios: I shall say after the meeting that your interest in a Cyprus settlement is well known, and that you have briefed me in our meeting today on your continuing efforts on this subject.

The Secretary: What should I say?

Bitsios: Anything you wish.

(The Secretary then showed Bitsios the statement made by Turkish Foreign Minister Esenbel following the Turkish-US bilateral this morning.)\(^\text{11}\)

The Secretary: The Turkish statement is very bad, but don’t worry, we can overcome this by events through the course of the next day or so. You might wish to say that we will meet again later today. I will say that we had a good talk; that we are both agreed that a solution based on conciliation, and on the interests of all parties is highly desirable; that we are aware of the great concern of the Greek Govern-

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\(^{10}\) An apparent reference to remarks Kubisch allegedly made that Greece would not object to continued military aid to Turkey. According to telegram 269679 to Athens, December 9, a prepared response for the day’s briefing, which was not used, stated: “Ambassadors Kubisch and Macomber met informally with members of the House subcommittee on Europe on December 5. Concerning allegations that Ambassador Kubisch stated before a subcommittee of the House of Representatives or before other members of the Congress that the Greek Government did not object to the continuation of military aid for Turkey, I [Kissinger] can assure you that such allegations are totally without foundation.” (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy Files, 1974)

\(^{11}\) According to telegram 9722 from Brussels, December 11, the statement reads: “Turkey and the United States decided on a course of action in October on Cyprus. But unfortunately the action taken by the United States Congress since then had hampered the progress we could make. We are inclined to look forward rather than backward. But I must say the course of action that Turkey had decided to follow might not change and should not change whatever action is taken back in the United States as far as the aid situation is concerned. We are hopeful that we will get to some positive results in the foreseeable future.” (Ibid.)
ment for an early settlement which will relieve the human suffering now going on in the island.

About later this evening, I want you to know that if our meeting starts a little late it is because I must attend the Quadripartite Dinner. Since we have nothing to discuss, the meeting may never end.

Bitsios: That is all right. We will meet between 10:30 and 10:45 this evening.

The Secretary: Thank you.

164. Memorandum From the President's Deputy Assistant for National Security Affairs (Scowcroft) to President Ford


Secretary Kissinger asked me to pass the following report to you from Brussels.

"Cyprus: I spent most of today in a series of meetings with the Turkish and Greek Foreign Ministers and will meet with each of them again later tonight. My meetings so far have, I think, made progress in moving both the Greeks and the Turks toward the opening of substantive negotiations between the Greek and Turkish Cypriot communities. The Greeks, in particular, have come a long way since last September and have dropped virtually all of their previous prior conditions for the commencement of the substantive negotiations.

"Greek Foreign Minister Bitsios, who spent many years in the Greek Foreign Service, is intelligent, suave and well prepared. He works very closely with Prime Minister Caramanlis and clearly has his full confidence. From what Bitsios said it is very evident that Caramanlis would like to rid himself of the Cyprus problem rapidly and is prepared to have a confrontation with Makarios if that is necessary. Bitsios told me that Greece will back Clerides as the Greek Cypriot negotiator and will support any agreement which Clerides may reach

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1 Source: Ford Library, National Security Adviser, Trip Briefing Books and Cables for Henry Kissinger, 1974–1976, Box 4, HAK to President, 12/10–12/13/74. Secret; Sensitive; Exclusively Eyes Only. The President initialed the memorandum.

2 On December 12, Kissinger met with Bitsios at 5:30 p.m. at NATO headquarters (Library of Congress, Manuscript Division, Kissinger Papers, Box CL 343, Department of State Memoranda of Conversations, External December 1974–April 1975) and with Esenbel (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy Files, 1974, P860140–1512). For the follow-up meetings with Esenbel, see Document 165, and with Bitsios, see Document 166.
with the Turkish Cypriot negotiator Denktash. Bitsios stressed that if Makarios should disavow an agreement reached by Clerides, Greece will not tolerate this maneuvering. Bitsios said that Greece could not accept the Turkish demand for a bizonal federal solution at this time.

“I had seen Foreign Minister Esenbel before my meeting with Bitsios. Esenbel is also a career diplomat, but he is infinitely less intelligent. As Foreign Minister in a caretaker government with an uncertain future, he does not have the authority, the precision or the decisiveness which was displayed by Bitsios. Esenbel is still accredited as Ambassador to Washington where he has served for almost ten years and where he hopes to return when he is no longer Foreign Minister. In my first meeting with Esenbel I went over with him the continuing determination of the Administration to provide military assistance to Turkey in the mutual interest of both countries. It was clear that Esenbel was not prepared to offer any gestures in light of Congressional actions. This is a position I find understandable, even as I found that the Turkish position was quite rigid with respect to the ultimate outcome of the constitutional structure of the island. They say that they can accept nothing short of a two-zone arrangement, with the Turkish zone in the north being populated by the island’s 135,000 Turkish Cypriots.

“Following the rather encouraging meeting with Bitsios, I again saw Esenbel and put to him the Greek view on the opening of substantive negotiations between Clerides and Denktash. I urged Esenbel to obtain the agreement of his government before we leave Brussels on Friday to some announcement that the Greek and Turkish Governments are prepared to have substantive negotiations started on the island. I pointed out that this was an opportunity that Turkey should not miss, particularly since no concessions would be asked of Turkey to agree to this. I also said it would be helpful to our domestic situation. Esenbel was hesitant because he said his government did not trust Archbishop Makarios and was afraid that the Archbishop would pull the rug out from under Clerides. I told Esenbel that if the Greek Government was prepared to support Clerides and he knew that the United States also supported the Clerides–Denktash talks, the position of Makarios was irrelevant. I offered to give him a letter that we would back the outcome of these talks. If things go as planned we may see the beginning of political talks next week.

“This makes the outcome of the Congressional vote very decisive. If aid remains cut off either the negotiations will fail or they will quickly stalemate. On the other hand, we have a chance now to get things moving and I have the impression that Caramanlis is eager for a rapid settlement.

\[3\] December 13.
“These facts cannot be used but I would urge a rapid solution. 

Esenbel is to discuss this matter urgently with Ankara and let me know tomorrow.

“French Attitude on European Security Conference Summit: I have found a very negative attitude here among the allies toward the decision of President Giscard to agree in the communiqué with the Russians to accept a summit meeting of the European Security Conference.

“Giscard has gone further than any other allied country in agreeing to the summit without the condition, that we have always placed, that the results would have to justify that level. Many of the allies, and particularly the Germans, feel that the French have badly compromised the western position for purely domestic reasons. In addition, Giscard has totally aligned the French with the Soviet position on the Middle East and on Cyprus. In both cases we may well have damaged prospects in delicate diplomatic negotiations. It is clear that Giscard’s communiqué, as well as his position on energy, are largely an appeal to the left-wing and old Gaullist constituencies in France.

“The result is a policy that differs little, if at all, from Pompidou and Jobert even if his tone is less hostile and his own instincts are not anti-American. I believe that in light of this situation and the strong view here that France has ignored the wider interests of its allies, we should not permit the meetings in Martinique to be portrayed as a great success for Giscard. If the allies should gain the impression that we are rewarding France for its lack of regard for allied interests and indeed treat is as Europe’s spokesman, this would be contrary to our basic instincts. I would like to discuss this in much greater detail with you before the Martinique meetings.”

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165. Memorandum of Conversation

Brussels, December 12, 1974, 10:45 p.m.

PARTICIPANTS

US
The Secretary

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1 Source: Library of Congress, Manuscript Division, Kissinger Papers, Box CL 125, Geopolitical File, Cyprus, Chronological File. Secret; Nodis. The meeting was held in the Secretary’s suite at the Brussels Hilton.
SUBJECT
US-Turkish Bilateral Meeting, December 12, 1974

The Secretary: (Speaking into the telephone) Get me the White House. (Turning to Esenbel) I want to get an up-to-date reading on what happened in Congress.

Esenbel: I have known and worked with Bitsios before. We were together at the Zurich Conference. He came over to see me today during the NATO lunch. He said that after all we had started together on the Cyprus problem at Zurich and why not go on together now. I said I was ready to talk with him and tomorrow we shall get together without any publicity and alone at some point during the NATO meetings.

The Secretary: That’s a good idea.

Esenbel: Yes. I want to test him on the Greek position.

The Secretary: My reading is that Caramanlis wants to get rid of the Cyprus problem as quickly as he can. The Greeks are ready to make major concessions and it is my feeling that they will settle for a bizonal arrangement. They need some face-saving device in the form of a few little cantons near the big one. This is really a bizonal arrangement but one they could accept.

Hartman: The cantons would all be in the north.

The Secretary: Yes. That is true they would be in the north. As a friend of Turkey, I would like to say that if you can organize yourselves to show any flexibility, progress can be made. As I see it, there are two options. The one is a long drawn out political warfare between Greece and Turkey and involving considerable trouble with Makarios. This would of course cause difficulties with US public opinion. In this event you would have to be ready eventually to pay a substantial price. It is important to know when to move. If you can get organized swiftly, then the question can be settled quickly. When I came to Brussels and during my flight over it was my assessment that this process would be a long one. I did not want to get involved because if I were, I would then be blamed for the situation. It is important to test the situation with Clerides and I am willing to help in this regard.

Esenbel: We want you to play a role.

The Secretary: I am not eager for a role.

Esenbel: We want your help.

The Secretary: The more you do, the better we like it. If, on the other hand, you reach a crucial point and we can help, we shall be glad to.
Esenbel: I was not ready for a dialogue with Bitsios but I would not turn one down.

Hartman: It is my feeling that discussions in New York between Gunes and Bitsios were helpful.

Esenbel: Regarding your suggestion that we talked about this morning and yesterday, I have checked with Ankara. I want you to know how we generally feel about the situation in Cyprus. The return of Makarios made a very bad impression.²

(The telephone rings. The Secretary answers a call from the White House and inquires whether our people were lining up the House and Senate conferees. The Secretary completes call and returns to his chair.)

Esenbel: During the past week public opinion in Turkey was very sensitive to Cyprus developments. I was asked why we had not been able to stop Makarios in some way. I was also asked how he had come back and I said he had come back the way he had left; that is, via the UK base. I have to tell you that his return has represented a big problem for us. However, I was able to convince Ankara that even if Makarios came back, we should let Denktash negotiate. Ankara told me that if Dr. Kissinger gave his assurances, and I told them about the letter, then the thing to do was to try the Clerides–Denktash talks and ignore Makarios.

The Secretary: Well, you will get a letter from me.

Esenbel: That is why I was able to convince Ankara and that is why there can be talks.

The Secretary: You are a tough negotiator. What do you want me to do?

Esenbel: No.

The Secretary: I will be glad to give you a letter and I think it will be helpful to you. The practical problem is that you must negotiate with Makarios and why is it not better to do it under these circumstances. When we had breakfast yesterday morning I had no intention of letting anything happen here because there seemed to be no prospect.

Esenbel: The principle of negotiation is okay. However the offer for negotiations should come from Clerides to Denktash.

The Secretary: We can arrange that.

Esenbel: Clerides should tell Denktash that he is empowered to negotiate.

The Secretary: When?

Esenbel: I think in about two or three days time. We shall warn Denktash to expect a call from Clerides.

² Makarios returned to Cyprus on December 7.
The Secretary: Shall we say next Tuesday?\(^3\)

Esenbel: That’s all right.

The Secretary: Yes. Tuesday. (turning to Hartman) Why is it that our Ambassador in Nicosia feels he must leave?

Hartman: We told him he could come home for Christmas to see his family.

The Secretary: What a tough Service! Tell him he can stay a few days longer and we will get instructions to him.

Esenbel: What should Clerides and Denktash discuss? It is our view that he should discuss humanitarian questions plus political matters. However, we are not too inclined to define exactly what all these points should be. Ankara would agree to start with the airport, about which Callaghan is very anxious. I promised him we would start on this.

The Secretary: Callaghan knows nothing about our conversations. When UNDOF was extended Waldheim got all the credit. I suppose when the airport opens, Callaghan will get all the credit. There must be political talks. If Caramanlis wants a settlement, then there must be political talks and not just talks about such matters as the airport. The domestic situation also requires this. When the political talks start then we can draw back from the matter. From the domestic political viewpoint it is important to have political talks. Also Turkey is in a good position. Turkey makes no concessions and yet there will be talks. Before, Turkey was ready to offer concessions, then there was a Congressional action and now Turkey will offer no concessions.

Esenbel: All of this will give Denktash an opportunity to test the good faith of Clerides. We should start with pragmatic matters such as the airport plus Farmagusta port. You have mentioned discussing the powers of the central government. I do not exclude this, but it should not be the first item. Everybody is much more worried about the economic situation.

The Secretary: This should perhaps not be the first item, but it should be an early item.

Esenbel: Okay. Pragmatic questions first plus political matters. But I will not tell Bitsios about Ankara’s position because we want to be sure that the Greeks will accept the bizonal solution. What is the sense of discussing the central government’s powers and let other practical questions fall behind? Ankara is not sure how all this will work out. It wants to be sure that Clerides is negotiating in good faith and has the authority to do so. The powers of the federal government can be discussed later.

\(^3\) December 17.
The Secretary: You should keep in mind the overall strategic considerations. You cannot find out about the good will of Clerides until there are political discussions. Moreover Caramanlis cannot move until the political talks are underway. I have seen a recent British report which suggests that it would be desirable to move fast so Makarios has no excuse for delay. I know what you want. If Makarios approves, then this makes agreement inevitable. If he does not approve and fights a guerrilla political warfare, then this would make matters difficult. But it is senseless to argue over these points—let’s put these aside.

Esenbel: Let us start on humanitarian matters and then go on to political matters, but let us not try to define precisely what comes under this heading.

The Secretary: I wonder if I should see Bitsios tonight. (Turning to Macomber) Why don’t you get someone to call him to see if he is available?

(Macomber leaves the room.)

Esenbel: The only way to settle the Cyprus problem is by agreement on a bizonal structure.

The Secretary: It is essential to separate tactics from the end result. I am sure you know my viewpoint if you have seen my correspondence with Ecevit. What do the Greeks have in mind? It is too early to determine if the Greeks have some possibility for face-saving on the geographic federation. If there is agreement to have political talks, this would be important. How shall we announce the agreement?

Esenbel: In Nicosia.

The Secretary: After its announcement, do you have any problem about using the announcement?

Esenbel: You should handle it as you like. After the announcement in Nicosia you can say anything that would be helpful.

The Secretary: I may be asked how my talks went. I should like to reply either at my press conference or on the plane going back that I explored the respective positions and that I looked for ways to bring the parties together. I would also say that I was moderately hopeful.

Esenbel: I hope that when you get back, Clerides will make his move.

The Secretary: Is there any reason to hold up?

Macomber: If the conference report is turned down by the House, then this may affect progress.

Esenbel: I understand that Clerides will call on Tuesday and I understand that matters in Congress should be settled by Monday.

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4 December 16. See footnote 8, Document 163.
tell Bitsios that Clerides should move on Tuesday and that Denktash will be receptive. I am not excluding anything.

The Secretary: Tell Denktash to be open-minded. Please keep in close contact with Macomber about what is happening so that I can pass to you any ideas I might have.

Esenbel: He can always reach me privately at home.

The Secretary: When shall I give you the letter—tomorrow?

(The Secretary rises and gets the letter\(^5\) from his desk.)

This is what I would like to give you.

(He hands the letter to Esenbel.)

The Secretary: (Turning to Macomber) I may have to pull you out because you are so good in handling Congress—no, I am really joking. I need you in Ankara, but I have been impressed by the way you handle members of the Congress.

Macomber: I had the job twice.

The Secretary: No.

Esenbel: (Handing the letter back to the Secretary)

This looks alright to me.

The Secretary: I think it provides a good assurance. Do you mind if I give it confidentially to the Senate Foreign Relations Committee?

Esenbel: I told you that when the talks start you can do what you want.

The Secretary: It would help. The Senate has a good record on leaks. Perhaps I should also give it to the House.

Esenbel: Perhaps you could give it to them in Executive Session.

The Secretary: We have given confidential documents to the Senate and there have been no leaks. In this case there would be no harm if there was a leak.

Esenbel: There is only one trouble. In the assumption that the Aid Bill is passed, it would help. If it is not passed, the letter could work against us.

The Secretary: How? Why don’t you write a letter to me saying that if aid is cut off, there would be no progress on the talks.

Esenbel: I have already spoken to the press twice along this line.

The Secretary: That was helpful.

Esenbel: In a sense such a letter would be contradictory, because we have already said that we should keep aid separate from the Cyprus question.

\(^5\) Printed as Document 168.
The Secretary: As you know we are fighting on the aid question. We are prepared to make it a public issue. The letter will not be a liability. By Monday\textsuperscript{6} we should know what will happen in Congress. If signals change, we shall be in touch with you. What Congress is doing to the Turks is a symbol of what they are doing to US foreign policy. What weakens Turkey weakens the U.S. This letter shows the Greeks have taken the initiative.

Esenbel: In principle the letter is alright.

Macomber: We should get a good conference report.

The Secretary: There may be a fight on the floor.

Esenbel: If there is a successful conclusion in Congress, then the situation is good. Otherwise, there will be problems.

(Telephone rings. The Secretary gets up and answers it. He is told that Bitsios has gone to bed. The Secretary asks if it would be possible to come up even if Bitsios is in his pajamas.)

The Secretary: You must not capitulate. If you do, it would cause problems for us. The letter shows that the initiative comes from the Greeks. If matters go right and we have a good conference report, there will be time for maneuver through Monday. If Congress rejects the conference report, I may recommend that you not proceed. However, we will still have the letter and agreement in principle.

Esenbel: We do not want to take no action, but we may be forced to do so.

The Secretary: If aid is cut off, I will understand if you cannot proceed. It is your independent decision to make.

Esenbel: This is the first time you have had such a quick settlement. I am not the tough bargainer that you say I am.

The Secretary: My view previously was that the Greek position was aimed at making me the guilty party if we failed in getting the negotiations. Now I think that they want to make Makarios the fall guy. If this doesn’t work, then they can return to me. I asked Bitsios if he wanted a quick settlement and he did not contradict me.

Esenbel: The Greeks could have stopped Makarios, but they didn’t. Perhaps they thought it would be more useful to have Makarios on the island where they could use him as an ingredient, not a threat. They must deal with Makarios and any agreement must have his support. This gives them another option.

The Secretary: I agree. Outside of Cyprus he becomes a Greek politician. The Greek leadership would prefer that he be in Cyprus dealing with Clerides rather than in Greece dealing with Papandreou.

\textsuperscript{6} December 16.
Esenbel: I told people yesterday . . .

The Secretary: Do you trust Caramanlis now? Do you think I can? Esenbel: I don’t know. I am not so sure. The Greeks are very sentimental. I am not sure . . .

The Secretary: Are the Turks sentimental Esenbel: We are less Mediterranean than the Greeks. I knew Caramanlis when he was cooperating with the late Menderes. He showed that he was able to deal with Makarios before on Cyprus and that he could dominate him.

The Secretary: I think we have good assurances and I went over the letter with Bitsios. He cannot say that he did not know what was in it. I shall tell Bitsios that there is an agreement in principle to begin the talks, that they should include political aspects, but that they should begin with the airport and Farmagusta, Denktash will be instructed to talk about political subjects, although they may not be precisely defined. Clerides should get in touch with Denktash on Tuesday, Denktash will be receptive; and if the Aid Bill is negative to Turkey, we may not be able to carry out the plan.

Esenbel: What should I tell Bitsios?

(The Telephone rings. The Secretary gets up and answers. He is told Bitsios is not feeling well and would prefer, if possible, to talk to the Secretary in the morning. The Secretary asks that Bitsios be told that he would like to see him at the beginning of the session tomorrow morning about 9:30. He hangs up and returns to his chair.)

The Secretary: You should tell him . . .

Esenbel: What should I tell . . .

The Secretary: Tell him exactly what I said. Tell him that you were acting on my strong advice and that the letter is a big factor in your decision. Tell him Clerides should call Denktash and that they should be prepared for political talks. Tell him that you have instructed Denktash to deal open-handedly. You may be sure that we will only tell the Greeks what we tell you and vice versa.

Esenbel: Well, I will do the same. Incidentally, I have said nothing to Callaghan.

The Secretary: What shall I tell Callaghan?

Esenbel: I told him nothing.

The Secretary: Can I tell him of our talks?

Esenbel: No, I rather you would not.

The Secretary: Well, anything we say to the other side we will tell you. It is essential that everybody knows what everybody else is doing. My experience with Makarios is that when I told him that I thought the bizonal arrangement was the only practical one, he went out and said that I had said I favored a multi-regional one.
Esenbel: You can be sure that we will speak with the same frankness to you.

The Secretary: Good night. I think we have made good progress and I will see you tomorrow.

166. Memorandum of Conversation


PARTICIPANTS

US
Secretary Kissinger
Assistant Secretary Hartman
Ambassador Kubisch, (notetaker)

Greece
Foreign Minister Bitsios

The Secretary: I saw Foreign Minister Esenbel last night and he has agreed in principle to the letter and to the prompt opening of negotiations between Clerides and Denktash on substantive political issues.

Bitsios: Did the letter include the changes I suggested?

The Secretary: Yes, your changes were incorporated. The plan is for Clerides to call Denktash on Tuesday to make the arrangements for the meeting. Denktash will be instructed to accept. Initially the talks and negotiations will be about the Nicosia Airport, the Port of Famagusta, refugees and similar matters. However, it is expected that the negotiations will move quickly to political issues and to questions on the federal system. I am preparing to do all I can to keep this moving and I have told the Turks that I believe that Prime Minister Caramanlis is prepared to go to a rapid solution and settlement on the island. Therefore I said to the Turks that they must show flexibility so that an agreement can be reached promptly. Is that a fair statement?

Bitsios: Yes, Prime Minister Caramanlis wants a speedy solution. However, the negotiations and approach to it must not be done in an inelegant way.

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1 Source: Library of Congress, Manuscript Division, Kissinger Papers, Box CL 343, Department of State Memoranda of Conversations, External 12/74-4/75. Secret; Nodis. The meeting was held at NATO headquarters.
2 See Document 165.
3 December 17.
The Secretary: I understand. I want you to know that I proposed to the Turks your thoughts about a cantonal agreement on the island. While they did not accept it, I think it is important that they did not reject it either.

Bitsios: Will they insist on starting the negotiations with insistence on a bizonal arrangement for the island?

The Secretary: No, they will not do that. I will see to that. I want you to know however, that they remain quite concerned about the cut off in military assistance. We don’t know how the Congress will deal with the legislation over the next few days. I am hopeful this matter can be fully resolved by Tuesday and that I can send you the word to have Clerides call Denktash. However, you should understand that there could be a delay.

Bitsios: Would it be possible for you to give me a memorandum summarizing the points you have just been making to me?

The Secretary: Would you rather have a letter?

Bitsios: No, I think just a memorandum on these points would be alright.

The Secretary: Okay, I don’t mind. (to Kubisch) Jack will you prepare a summary of these points? (Kubisch indicated that he would.)

The Secretary: (Showing Bitsios a copy of the December 13 letter to Esenbel) Here’s the letter that I am giving to Esenbel. (Bitsios studies the letter.) You notice we have made the changes you wanted. This is exactly what you saw yesterday.

Bitsios: Are there any implications in this letter about Greece or anyone else being a future guarantor of the settlement.

The Secretary: No.

Bitsios: Callaghan asked me about this point and I told him it was too early to consider at this stage.

The Secretary: That’s right, but in any case, it cannot be the Soviets.

Bitsios: Not necessarily, and there can be other forms of guarantees.

(As the conversation was breaking up there was a brief exchange of remarks about Israel and humorously, about possibly distracting Israel from some of its present activities and pre-occupations by making Israel one of the guarantor powers.)

The Secretary: (to Bitsios and Kubisch) Jack, will prepare the summary of the points and I will see that you get them later this morning.4

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4 Printed as Document 168.
5 See Document 167.
167. Memorandum From the President’s Deputy Assistant for National Security Affairs (Scowcroft) to President Ford


Secretary Kissinger asked that I pass the following report to you:

“When I saw Greek Foreign Minister Bitsios this morning he fully confirmed the understanding I had reached last night with Turkish Foreign Minister Esenbel with respect to the Clerides–Denktash talks. He told me it would be useful to him to have a memorandum from me which he could take back to Athens. Accordingly, I gave him the following:

‘Memorandum for Foreign Minister Bitsios:

‘Confirming our conversation this morning the Foreign Minister of Turkey has informed me that he agrees in principle to the prompt opening of negotiations between Mr. Clerides and Mr. Denktash on substantive political issues. The agenda will include the reopening of the Nicosia International Airport, matters related to the Port of Famagusta, and such other questions whose prompt resolution would contribute to the timely achievement of a settlement. The powers of the Central Government in the future federated state will also be included as an early agenda item. It is my understanding that other political subjects can also be discussed.

‘In accordance with our mutual understandings, it is expected that Mr. Clerides will call Mr. Denktash next Tuesday, December 17, to make the specific and final arrangements for the meetings to take up these topics. I shall be in touch with you again on my return to Washington to reconfirm this point and the timing of this contact.

‘Henry A. Kissinger.’

‘Bitsios was very pleased with the understandings which we worked out.

‘I handed my letter to Turkish Foreign Minister Esenbel this morning and also gave him a copy of the memorandum to Bitsios. Esenbel expressed his satisfaction with the outcome of the discussions here. However, he made clear once again that if Congress adopts legislation cutting off aid, then all bets are off at this time.

‘I believe we have made good progress here to unblock the negotiating situation on Cyprus. I am convinced that if we lose this opportunity due to congressional action, we may not have another chance.”

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2 See Document 166.
Letter From Secretary of State Kissinger to Turkish Foreign Minister Esenbel


Dear Mr. Minister:

I have been informed by the Government of Greece that it fully supports the immediate continuation of the Clerides–Denktash negotiations and their expansion to encompass substantive political issues. I am further informed by the Government of Greece that it considers that the initial agenda of these expanded negotiations should include the reopening of the Nicosia International Airport, matters relative to the port of Famagusta, and such other questions, the prompt resolution of which would contribute to the timely achievement of a settlement. The powers of the Central Government in the future federated state will also be included as an early agenda.

The Government of Greece has also informed me that it will make every effort to promote a successful outcome to the Clerides–Denktash negotiations and that it will do all it appropriately can to assure that if an agreement is reached it will be fully implemented.

The United States Government for its part makes a parallel commitment to the Clerides–Denktash negotiations as the proper forum for the resolution of outstanding issues and for the conclusion as soon as possible of a peace of conciliation between the parties directly concerned. The United States Government undertakes to use its full influence to the end that agreements reached in these negotiations are fairly and fully implemented.

Warm regards,

Henry A. Kissinger

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1 Source: Library of Congress, Manuscript Division, Kissinger Papers, Box CL 239, Geopolitical File, Turkey, October 1974 to July 1975. No classification marking.

2 Printed from a copy that bears this typed signature.
MEMORANDUM FROM THE PRESIDENT’S ASSISTANT FOR NATIONAL SECURITY AFFAIRS (KISSINGER) TO PRESIDENT FORD


SUBJECT

Cyprus Negotiations

Background

The following is a brief report on recent developments in the Cyprus negotiations. During my bilateral consultations with both the Greek and Turkish Foreign Ministers at Brussels, December 11–13, both parties agreed that substantive negotiations should resume promptly between Rauf Denktash (leader of the Turkish Cypriots) and Glafcos Clerides (leader of the Greek Cypriots and former Acting President of Cyprus during Archbishop Makarios’ absence) on Cyprus. The new round of talks between the two leaders were to include political matters as well as the humanitarian issues discussed in the past.

After some initial false starts, Clerides and Denktash finally met in plenary session on December 19 and 20. At the plenary meetings the two parties agreed on the following points:

—All constitutional issues will be discussed. Denktash has finally accepted Clerides as the “full empowered representative of the Greek Cypriot community and its negotiator.”

—The sequence of negotiations will first deal with the powers and authority of the federal government, then define the nature of the federation (bizonal or multiregional). With these matters settled, the two sides would discuss economic and humanitarian issues. In this regard, I have been suggesting that both sides take the opposite approach to the negotiations: that is, to reach agreement quickly on the less contentious issues, thus creating an atmosphere of accomplishment which will lead toward solution of the more complex problems.

A major point of contention has surfaced: Denktash quite unexpectedly raised the question of international guarantees (possibly Five Powers—Turkey, Greece, the United Kingdom and the two Cypriot communities) for any agreement reached during the negotiations between the two leaders. This matter

1 Source: Ford Library, National Security Adviser, Kissinger-Scowcroft West Wing Office Files, Box A4, Cyprus 3. Secret. Sent for information. Ford initialed the memorandum. Another notation on the memorandum indicates the President saw it.

2 A summary of the discussion is in telegram 4551 from Nicosia, December 21, (Ibid., Presidential Country Files for Middle East and South Asia, 1974–1977, Box 3, Cyprus, Nodis to Secretary of State 6)
was not discussed at Brussels and Clerides had no instructions. Clerides has requested guidance from Athens which has been slow in coming. In the meantime, official announcement of resumption in the talks is being delayed until Clerides receives instructions and the two leaders can work out compromise language on the guarantees.

It should be noted that Archbishop Makarios has shown a preference for expanding the number of guarantors, possibly to include some or all of the permanent representatives to the UN Security Council, or some non-aligned nations. The Greeks, with an eye to the Archbishop’s preferences and the pressure of aid cut-off on the Turks, are moving slowly. The U.S. position is plain to all sides: that substantive talks must begin immediately without prejudging ultimate issues such as international guarantees. In any event, we are exploring various options to break the apparent impasse if some sort of compromise cannot be reached between the parties.

**Outlook**

Substantive meetings between Denktash and Clerides are tentatively scheduled to resume on January 6, provided that the question of international guarantees can be quickly resolved. In the meantime, I plan to meet in Washington with our ambassadors to Nicosia, Athens and Ankara during the week of January 6 to review the current situation and coordinate the next step in our strategy. The objective will be to take advantage of the present momentum and sense of urgency in order to reach an early agreement. Clerides and Denktash know each other well and can be expected to bargain seriously. The basic problem will be to make their respective sponsors in both Athens and Ankara live up to the spirit of the Brussels agreements and remain within reasonable bounds. At the same time, we must insure that Makarios continues to maintain the relatively low profile he assumed upon returning to Cyprus in early December, for he has the potential for mischief and could upset any agreement reached. In this regard, I believe that he is slowly becoming aware of the realities of the situation on Cyprus and will not present a serious obstacle to success.
170. Memorandum of Conversation

Washington, January 7, 1975, 4:35–5:15 p.m.

PARTICIPANTS
President Gerald R. Ford
Dr. Henry A. Kissinger, Secretary of State and Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs
Joseph J. Sisco, Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs
Amb. William Crawford, U.S. Ambassador to Cyprus
Amb. Jack Kubisch, U.S. Ambassador to Greece
Amb. William B. Macomber, Jr., U.S. Ambassador to Turkey
Lt. General Brent Scowcroft, Deputy Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs

SUBJECT
Cyprus

Kissinger: Macomber tries to stay out of town so I don’t stick him with the Congressional Liaison job.

The President: You wore out a lot of shoe leather.

Macomber: I had two tours.

Kissinger: Mr. President, these people have been carrying a lot of the burden.

Let me sum up where we are. At Brussels, the outline of the talks was agreed to. At that time the question of guarantees was raised. I told you I called Esenbel and he agreed to start the talks tomorrow. He asked for one wrinkle—that everyone agree to submit the final results to a meeting of five powers—which is not the same as a guarantee.

For concessions, we will aim for the opening of the airport, the port of Famagusta, the withdrawal of some troops, and the return of some refugees. We won’t get all these, but with two or three we could move the Congress. We have to get a longer extension this time.

The President: If we get three or four of them, isn’t that substantial progress?

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1 Source: Library of Congress, Manuscript Division, Kissinger Papers, Box CL 281, Memoranda of Conversations, Presidential File, January 1975. Secret; Nodis. The meeting was held in the Oval Office.
2 See Documents 163–168.
3 A preview and an account of these talks are in a memorandum of conversation, January 7, 3:40 p.m. (National Archives, RG 59, Records of Henry Kissinger, 1973–1977, Entry 5403, Box 10, Nodis Memcons, January 1975) and telegram 77 from Nicosia, January 8. (Ford Library, National Security Adviser, Presidential Country Files for Middle East and South Asia, Box 3, Cyprus Nodis to Secretary of State 7)
Kissinger: This package would alleviate most of the conditions, but we can’t get it all in the few weeks available. We also hope to step up the pace of talks to three or four per week. The Greeks have given up most of their earlier demands. The major issues now are the extent of the Turkish area, the powers of the central government, and the refugees.

The President: Will other issues, like Law of the Sea in the Aegean, be thrown in?

Kissinger: The Greeks are willing, but it would complicate it.

Macomber: It could follow the Cyprus talks.

Kubisch: The situation in Greece has improved greatly, and the American position has improved from the bad position of last summer. Karamanlis has done a great job in the country. He understands the need for close U.S. ties and he supports it, but he can’t move fast publicly. He has the Greek side all held together for now, but he can’t hold them for long. He wants a quick settlement and is willing to concede much. He is willing to follow with talks on the Aegean, on overflights, and so on—and more to a real détente. We are on a good trend in Greece.

The President: How did Wayne Hays do?

Kubisch: He talked Turkey, but they know he is a friend and he has credibility. He gave a press conference and did a great job.

Macomber: He was good in Turkey, too. The Turks want to be European and oriented toward us. They don’t work democracy very well. They had bad luck in the last election but Ecevit’s government was good. If there is an election, Ecevit will win big and the other parties don’t want that. The military are getting impatient. They will agree to elections at some point, but it will be a weak government until it is over.

The President: Will the military agree to a reasonable settlement?

Macomber: Yes. They are tough. They are incredulous that the United States could do what was done—but they are deeply grateful to you and Secretary Kissinger.

The President: It was really tough last October and in December. We had this Demetracopolous who really incited the Greek community here.

Macomber: Their problem is they see this little island so close to their shores, with their countrymen being screwed for such a long time by nine million Greeks far away. They like Karamanlis but they are determined it won’t happen again. They are very offended that the United

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4 Representative Wayne Hays (D–OH) led a congressional delegation to Turkey and Greece in late December and early January.
States turned on them. If it wasn’t for you two, Turkey would be down the drain.

Kissinger: We will pay for this for years to come.

Macomber: If there is an aid cutoff, our influence will be almost zero. We have many installations there. With their fine Army and the Straits, they are really an asset.

The President: Do they control Denktash?

Macomber: Yes. But it is a weak caretaker government.

Crawford: Cyprus is a tragedy, from the paradise it used to be. It is now a divided island. There are only 12,000 Greeks in the Turkish zone and 18,000 Turks in the Greek zone. The Turks move into the big villages but there are no jobs. There is a political division and economic division now—which doesn’t make sense. Even the Turkish Cypriots say “Turkey didn’t come in to save us, but for their own purposes.” The Greek Cypriots are now becoming disillusioned with Greece. So both of them are disillusioned. Now there is a sort of a Cypriot nationality coming out of this. Denktash and Clerides are old friends and were raised together. But looking over Clerides’ shoulder is Makarios and Greece; over Denktash’s shoulder is the Turks. But still their relationship is the best possible for negotiations.

Kissinger: Karamanlis is playing Makarios skillfully. If Makarios blesses the agreement, he is off the hook; if Makarios rejects it, Karamanlis can say he tried and can stick Makarios with it. If the Turks could give up a little, they could get a lot. Makarios won’t stay quiet for long. He wants a stalemate so he can maneuver and get the Soviet Union in.

Macomber: I agree.

Kissinger: Few Greeks will go back to the Turkish zone.

Macomber: But the Greeks and Turks hate each other. They have trouble getting together.

The President: Henry and I have been talking this subject since my first day. Keep it moving and we will try to take care of the Congress. We need enough progress to get us over the hump, and Bill [Macomber], you can use my name to get the Turks to move.

Crawford: I hope we can get aid money for Cyprus, too.

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5 Brackets are in the original.
171. Study Prepared by the Intelligence Community Staff for Director of Central Intelligence Colby

USIB–D–15.2/127

Principal Findings

The Record of Performance

1. Like most international crises, the Cyprus crisis of 1974 consisted of a series of interlocking events, each, in sequence, presenting new problems for U.S. policy makers and posing new challenges to the U.S. intelligence community. Seen, as it is here, as a test of both the sagacity of intelligence analysts and the ingenuity of intelligence collectors, the record of the community’s performance during the Cyprus affair must be adjudged a mixture of strengths and weaknesses:

—There were a number of exemplary successes [2½ lines not declassified] and some prescient calls by analysts (including their forewarning of the Turkish invasion of Cyprus).

—But there were some notable shortcomings as well. On the basis of a single [less than 1 line not declassified] the analysts in early July, notwithstanding their earlier concern, conveyed the impression to the policy makers that the world had been granted a reprieve: Ioannidis, they suggested, had now decided not to move against Makarios, at least for the time being. And, later, after the Turkish landing, the analysts misjudged Ankara’s ambitions on the island, were persuaded that the crisis was about over, and thus gave scant attention to the possibility that Turkish forces might soon be on the move once more.

—There was one “peripheral” analytical success which should receive explicit mention: an assessment of the role the Soviets were likely to play in the crisis which subsequently proved to be wholly sound. Quiet and undramatic as it was, this particular accomplishment was important and impressive none the less.

The Analytical Aspect

2. Ultimately, intelligence will be judged in the context of its ability to provide the consumer with premonitory assessments. The ability of the community to provide its consumers with the news after a crisis has erupted is widely recognized (and is pretty much taken for granted); it is the ability of the community to provide warnings of crises to come which is so often questioned. And it was here, again, in re
Cyprus, where the community’s analytical performance fell quite short of the mark, specifically its failure in July to estimate the likelihood of a Greek-sponsored coup against Archbishop Makarios (the incident which precipitated the entire crisis).

3. As was the case in the period before the Arabs’ attack on Israel in October 1973, this inability to foresee critical events—in the face of mounting evidence to the contrary—seems to rest in part on an old and familiar analytical bias: the perhaps subconscious conviction (and hope) that, ultimately, reason and rationality will prevail, that apparently irrational moves (the Arab attack, the Greek-sponsored coup) will not be made by essentially rational men.

4. If this bias does in fact unduly influence the mind of the analyst, there is obviously no pat solution. But identification of the problem is a necessary beginning; the further development of training techniques (including those which help the novice analyst to perceive his own prejudices) is another; and, finally, the establishment of a regular system of devil’s advocacy—which is currently under investigation by the IC Staff—is yet another.

The Collection Effort

5. The bulk of information on the Cyprus crisis, especially in its early stages, was supplied by human sources.

—With one notable exception [2½ lines not declassified] contributed significantly to the intelligence effort during the pre-coup period. Clandestine reporting [less than 1 line not declassified] concerning the possibility of a Turkish invasion of Cyprus was also very good.

—The quality of reporting from U.S. diplomatic missions was uneven. Thoughtful, accurate assessments were prepared in the weeks preceding the coup by the embassy in Nicosia, and strong reporting on the possibility of a Turkish landing on Cyprus was dispatched by both the embassy and the DAO in Ankara.

—But reporting from the embassy in Athens, especially in the pre-coup period, was weak; it fairly consistently downplayed the likelihood of serious trouble over Cyprus, even in the face of repeated expressions of great concern from Nicosia and Washington.

6. Analysis of the crisis may also have suffered as the result of the nonavailability of certain key categories of information, specifically those associated with private conversations between U.S. policy makers and their representatives on the scene and between these policy makers and certain principals in the dispute. Because ignorance of such matters could substantially damage the ability to analyze events as they unfold, in this or in any future crisis, the problem is serious and one which should be addressed by the community and by policy makers as well.

7. [1 paragraph (8 lines) not declassified]
Consumer Reactions

8. Interviews with a number of consumers of intelligence on the Cyprus crisis indicate a degree of displeasure with both the performance and the procedures of the intelligence community. There were, surprisingly, few complaints about the failure to provide forewarning of the Cypriot coup, perhaps because the concern of policy makers and their staffs over the possibility of a coup did not seem to abate very much during the first half of July, despite some reassurances from the community.

9. But there were specific complaints (some legitimate, some not) from officers on the NSC Staff and in the Department of State about a variety of other matters: the alleged failure of the community to alert policy makers to the impending Turkish invasion of Cyprus (a notion which seems to rest on the complainants’ failure to get the word); the plethora of CRITIC messages received during the crisis [less than 1 line not declassified] the significance of many of which was obscure; [1½ lines not declassified] the purported failure of the community to highlight significant items (there may be some substance to this) and to keep the reader abreast of military developments (a highly puzzling assertion which, on the face of it, seems contrary to the facts); and the redundancy of the CIA and DIA Situation Reports and the confusion occasionally engendered when these reports seemed to disagree.

10. Some of these problems are correctable, some not. Those which probably reflect in the main the inability of harried consumers to keep abreast of fast-breaking developments—indeed, to read all the relevant reports issued by the community—can be addressed but not solved. But others, such as the failure to call quick attention to highlights, can be remedied by improvements in the formats of the situation reports and by the issuance of Alert Memoranda by the DCI. And the problem of redundancy and confusion could be eliminated by the issuance of a single community situation report during major crises (a proposal now under development by the IC Staff).

The Impact of Intelligence on Policy Decisions and Actions

11. We note, finally, that the Cyprus crisis provided excellent examples of the role intelligence plays in helping to shape (and to inhibit) policy decisions and actions. In five of the six key developments prior to and during the crisis, State Department initiatives (or lack thereof) were clearly consistent with, and were presumably based at least in part on, intelligence.

—When intelligence warned of dire developments (Ioannidis’ June threats against Makarios, Greek threats to attack the Turks in Thrace), the State Department acted to prevent them. When, on the other hand, intelligence failed to provide explicit warning (Ioannidis’ coup against Makarios, Turkey’s Phase II offensive on Cyprus), the State Department failed to act. And the State Department’s relatively sanguine
attitude towards possible Soviet reaction to Cyprus developments was clearly consistent with intelligence on that subject.

—The only occasion when there appeared to have been an inconsistency between intelligence and policy action was with respect to the Turkish invasion. The intelligence warning of that event appears to have been explicit, but the State Department apparently did not act on it.

—The following table summarizes these correlations:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Date</th>
<th>Event</th>
<th>Intelligence</th>
<th>Policy initiative</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>June 1974</td>
<td>Ioannidis threatens action against Makarios.</td>
<td>Intelligence provides explicit warning of growing confrontation.</td>
<td>Embassy passes message to Ioannidis seeking to discourage action against Makarios.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3–15 July</td>
<td>Ioannidis plans coup against Makarios; passes reassuring message to USG.</td>
<td>Intelligence reassures consumers; provides no warning.</td>
<td>No preventive action; USG clearly caught off guard.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>15–20 July</td>
<td>Turks plan Cyprus invasion.</td>
<td>Intelligence provides explicit warning, including date.</td>
<td>State Department takes little, if any, preventive action; claims it did not get the message.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>20–25 July</td>
<td>Greeks threaten Thrace offensive.</td>
<td>Intelligence provides strong warning.</td>
<td>[3 lines not declassified]</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>20–30 July</td>
<td>Soviets react benignly.</td>
<td>Intelligence provides reassuring appraisal.</td>
<td>State Department accepts intelligence appraisal and remains relaxed about possible Soviet initiatives.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1–15 Aug.</td>
<td>Turks plan Phase II offensive.</td>
<td>Intelligence warning is confused and unconvincing.</td>
<td>State Department takes no action to dissuade; is clearly caught off guard.</td>
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[Omitted here is the body of the study.]
172. Memorandum of Conversation

Washington, February 1, 1975, noon.

PARTICIPANTS
Senator Thomas F. Eagleton
Congressman Benjamin S. Rosenthal
Congressman John Brademas
Congressman Paul S. Sarbanes
The Secretary
Ambassador McCloskey
Arthur A. Hartman, Assistant Secretary for European Affairs

Rosenthal: (Hands Secretary an article from the morning New York Times on Cyprus—Secretary reads but does not comment.)

Secretary: I thought it would be a good idea to explain where we stand. I will give you our view and I want to assure you that we understand each of us will have to do what is necessary. I’ll try to be brief. First, where do the negotiations stand? There has not been much progress.

We have tried to move the negotiations along as quickly as possible but up to now the progress that has been made has really been of minor nature. I could, therefore, not recommend that the President find that substantial progress has been achieved. It is not surprising that this process does take time. After all, the negotiations in this new form only began on January 14.

On the Nicosia airport, both sides apparently want to place conditions on the management of the airport which will prejudge the management of the whole island in the later negotiations. Thus the Turks want to have equal representation on the Board which would make the eventual solution look like a bizonal concept. The Greeks on the other hand want UN, Greek and Turkish representation and they have talked about weighting the membership according to population numbers. We have tried to move the negotiators toward a proposal of a joint Greek-Turkish Board with a neutral running the airport operation. I am sure that the airport matter will be settled but it is going to take more time.

On troop withdraw, there is a paradoxical situation. The Turks have announced that 1,000 troops have been withdrawn. They also tell us confidentially that there are only 25,000 troops on the island. The

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1 Source: Library of Congress, Manuscript Division, Kissinger Papers, CL 273, Memoranda of Conversations, Chronological File. Secret; Nodis. Drafted by Hartman and approved in S on February 20. The meeting was held in the Secretary’s office.
question is did they ever have 40,000 and are they understating the
number of troops they have there now? There is probably a better story
to be told here but the Turks will not allow us to know exactly how
many people they have—they say because of security considerations.

The Turks have announced that all shipping may now use the Fam-
agusta harbor. This has some optical advantage but it does not really
affect the situation one way or another.

The Turks have also announced that they will permit 8,000 Greek
refugees to reenter the Atheniou area in territory which, while they do
not occupy it, they do exercise control.

I would like to stress that in recounting these events I am not in
any way trying to build the case for significant progress—I am merely
giving you my assessment of the situation. Now let me analyze this
for you. My understanding of the position taken by the Greek Gov-
ernment is that they are very anxious to settle the Cyprus problem as
rapidly as possible. I have this from communications and talks with
both Bitsios and Caramanlis. By the way, I consider Caramanlis to be
very constructive. He has done everything he can to keep Greek pub-
lic opinion calm so there is a minimum obstacle to progress. Our rela-
tions with the Greek Government are very close.

As far as Cyprus is concerned, Makarios seems to be up to play-
ing his old game. Unlike Caramanlis he is not as interested in fast
progress. His strategy is to allow the situation to worsen so that he can
take advantage of it. He also does not wish to become an appendage
to Athens but, instead, he wishes to be a force in his own right. He is
anxious to create conditions that will lead to the building of interna-
tional pressures and that is why he wants aid to Turkey cut off.

The Greek Government feels that the aid question is too hot to
handle and does not wish in any way to be caught appearing to be
against an aid cut-off even though they may realize that it will not help
with negotiations. Makarios, on the other hand, wants the aid cut-off
to bring maximum pressure to bear on Turkey.

Now, as far as the situation in Turkey is concerned, they have a weak
government and there is no doubt that they have not wanted to produce
real progress because that will look as though they are giving in to pres-
ure. (The Secretary looks at transcript of Bob Anderson’s remarks which
could be taken as implying that Greece is indifferent on the aid issue—
he says in an aside that this should be corrected.) Now, as I said, the Turks
find it difficult to move because they have a weak government.

The Prime Minister barely exists in this situation and Esenbel, as
you all know, is not strong and terribly cautious. Also from their point
of view an aid cut-off makes Makarios even more intransigent and then,
of course, the Turks become more intransigent. I have asked Macomber
to see some of the political leaders as well. Ecevit is taking the posi-
tion that aid will be cut off in any case and he goes back to the difficulties we had over poppies and he thinks that Turkey should adjust to this and that it can no longer count on the U.S. Esenbel took the position that giving any concessions prior to the aid cut-off would lead Makarios just to pocket those concessions and, therefore, I don’t really expect very much in the talks that will take place on Monday.2

What is the situation we face? There was some chance in October that we could have made some progress with Ecevit. There was more of a chance then than there is today. The use of an aid cut-off as a weapon or lever is much more effective as a threat and I have always felt that that particular weapon would be needed at the end of the negotiation and not now when we are essentially discussing only procedural matters.3 Our estimate is that the Turks are becoming reconciled to this possibility. They are making some approaches to Iraq and Libya at a faster rate. They may also put some pressure on our bases. Over the longer term my fear is that the Left in Turkey led by Ecevit will move into an anti-American posture and that our influence on the negotiations will diminish. Today our influence in Ankara is certainly less than it was in October. The Turks are incredulous about our actions. They cannot believe that we would jeopardize our long-term security relations with an ally.

Saying all this, I want to emphasize that I am not in any way criticizing the honorable convictions of those who favor a cut-off of assistance to Turkey but I must say to you in all seriousness that I consider it to be a foreign policy disaster. It hurts the chances of a Cyprus negotiation. It will not in any way help us with the Greeks. It will be looked upon by others in the area as calling into question the good sense of the United States in taking care of our long term interests. At the same time, I can’t recommend to you that we make a finding that the terms of the legislation have been met. So, in a sense, we are all trapped.

Let me also tell you that I have tentatively made arrangements to see Esenbel and Bitsios in Brussels on the 9th and 10th but I cannot be sure that these meetings will go forward. In addition, we have tried to be helpful on the Aegean issue. We have supported the Greek suggestion that the matter be referred to the International Court of Justice. The fact of the possibility of our meetings has leaked and I am very much afraid that either Bitsios or Esenbel may now cancel.

This is where we are and I am honor bound to tell you that we must as an Administration make an effort to get this situation reversed. We will invite the leaders and explain what the situation is but I again must stress that I consider this situation to be a tragedy. I don’t know

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2 February 3.
3 See Document 216.
what you may wish to suggest and I do wish to emphasize that I consider that all of you have behaved with great fairness.

Brademas: Let me say that we appreciate your talking to us and also Paul and I want to thank you for all you did to help us with our trip. You undoubtedly have noticed that we have not made any public comment on the trip.

Secretary: Yes, I very much appreciate that.

Brademas: We share your analysis in many respects. We too see that there has been no serious progress and it looks to us as though the Turks are taking even more of a hard line. But we cannot share your view that this has been a disaster. You must see this in the context that American arms have been used in violation of the law and, therefore, from our point of view, it would be a disaster not to react. We believe that the law must be enforced and that, therefore, aid must be cut off. We think that the Turkish policies have been aggressive.

Secretary: On the point about a violation—no new commitments have been made and we have gone beyond what traditionally has been done in saying that this applies as well to the pipeline. In the past when assistance was cut off, it was usual to allow pipeline aid to continue. We told the leadership what the situation was and the leadership did not object but the trouble is that the leadership is not in control of the rank and file. The Administration applied the law delicately with the approval of the leadership.

Brademas: We disagreed with this and we told Mansfield so. We tried to be helpful and certainly if there had been any hard evidence of progress we would have worked for an extension, especially if there had been any movement on refugees.

Secretary: The refugee issue is going to be extremely difficult. Makarios is talking very tough. Caramanlis is strong but cannot take hard decisions by himself. On the Turkish side they seem to lack the flexibility to move in a politically sensitive situation. As a sign of how weak he is, Esenbel has not even resigned his position as Ambassador in Washington. The politicians in Turkey cannot agree to form a government. Macomber has tried to influence both Ecevit and Demirel to be helpful. The main key is between the Greeks and the Turks and quite frankly the differences are not all that great.

The Greeks are now prepared to accept a cantonal arrangement and they have reduced the number of cantonal areas and they are all in the north. The tragedy is that the situation is soluble through patient negotiation. But the aid cut-off forces us to be impatient. Our tactic in a negotiation like this is not to get engaged too early. If the U.S. comes in and is impatient it tends to freeze the situation. With the aid cut-off, I am not sure that the U.S. should involve itself any more in this negotiation but I will meet with Bitsios and Esenbel and decide after that.
Sarbanes: We came back from our meetings cautiously optimistic. We met with all the parties involved. I recognize the problem of the time frame but the main problem here is how to get a sizable number of refugees back in some area controlled by the Turks. After all, the Turks got their people off the British sovereign base area.

Secretary: We had nothing to do with that negotiation. There was a minor Turkish concession in that they agreed to look for missing Greek Cypriots in return but Callaghan gave away his position on that in mid January.

Sarbanes: What is needed now is a substantial concession by the Turks. They should permit 60 to 80,000 Greek Cypriots to return and then, I think, we could get the deadline for the aid cut-off extended. Otherwise, there is no rational argument to change the date and we need something to justify this. It is not advisable for us to seek to press Congress to change when there is no basis. You must decide what your relations with Congress are going to be. I have read your interview with Bill Moyers and your speech in Los Angeles4 (quotes from Los Angeles speech on moral basis of policy). We have been reasonable and have not taken any cheap shots.

Secretary: I have no complaint with your conduct.

Brademas: What has been the Turkish reaction, particularly of the Armed Forces?

Secretary: They have been hoping that the Administration would get a change in policy. If we don’t they will take the stance that they can never again depend on the United States. They will also approach Libya and Iraq for help in buying European equipment. They do not see any reason to move.

Sarbanes: We must not forget what the origins of this situation were. The Turks invaded Cyprus. That is the origin of the problem.

Secretary: Perhaps we didn’t move correctly to begin with. The President could have waived the original action with respect to MAP. He could have found compliance in the beginning but we did not wish to play games. We did not wish to be accused of flouting the law. The history of this whole situation is that events have transpired in early October to prevent significant progress. The Ecevit government fell and then the whole situation disintegrated.

Rosenthal: I have to differ with the optimistic view. If this is a disaster then the law should be changed. If the cut-off stays and the Turks

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4 Kissinger’s interview with Bill Moyers is printed in Department of State Bulletin, Vol. LXXII, No. 1859, February 10, 1975, pp. 165–178. Background information for his January 25 speech is in telegram 16936 to Los Angeles, January 24. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy Files, 1975)
turn to Libya and become Europe oriented, then that will just have to happen. But if we wipe out this action, there will be a reaction in the American Congress because there is a deep-seated principle involved and it does not favor a pragmatic solution. I can tell you that if we here in this room don’t agree you will not get Congressional action.

Brademas: This is going to come out with no extension of the deadline. At the end of two weeks we can see what the situation is.

Secretary: I can understand your taking that position but I still think it is misguided.

Brademas: This is a whole new ballgame in Congress. If you try to get this overturned, you will be clobbered and it will not contribute to a Cyprus solution and it could worsen your relations with the Congress.

Secretary: This is what people tell me every day. The position we are taking on Vietnam will envenom our relations with Congress. The Jackson–Vanik Amendment pushed us over the cliff. Each action creates its own situation and each of us must take a personal position. I am deeply convinced that this is very bad for foreign policy. Eighty percent of this problem may be blamed on the Executive. We did not stand up and oppose the OPEC amendment in the Trade Bill. We went along with the Jackson–Vanik approach until it was too late. We did not stand up and say what was needed for Vietnam. We now have a Turkish aid cut-off because of Cyprus pressures. We are running into difficulty in getting an energy conservation program out of the Congress. The total pattern of all these actions is a massive weakness in foreign policy. I can tell you that I have never been so worried by a situation. There are no victors in this situation. Who are we going to put together to build a new consensus? The cumulative impact of all of this is tragic. Even the Chinese are beginning to wonder whether we have lost our senses and they may now try to change their weight in the balance and shift it to the third world. I am about to go to the Middle East and I am sure this is not going to make my task there any easier. In the case of the Turkish aid cut-off, we must oppose this.

Sarbanes: The only way to do that is to change the law.

Rosenthal: We want to be conciliatory but we have to reach an understanding.

Secretary: In the case of the energy conservation program, we must have a reduction of one million barrels per day. We don’t have any preference about how it should be done but we do have a concern that some program be enacted. In the Middle East look at the position we are going to be in if we separate ourselves from Turkey.

Sarbanes: But we enacted a provision which bought some time but when February 5 comes, the law must be applied.

Secretary: But the net result is going to be a worsening of U.S.-Turkish relations and also I must tell you quite frankly of
Greek-Turkish relations. We also have the problem of the perception of others who will see this as an irrational act by the U.S.

Brademas: Suppose we gave you more time, there would be a bad Greek reaction.

Secretary: Yes, it is very difficult to get out of this situation.

Rosenthal: Why can't the President make a determination?

Secretary: He would have to find compliance and substantial progress but if he did people would question the basis on which that determination was made.

What should we say about our talks?

Eagleton: You can say that we had an amicable discussion but that we are in basic disagreement.

Secretary: Actually we have made some progress. Since October we have managed to get the talks started. The Greek Government has made some progress in coming forward with more reasonable proposals. We think that with some time progress could be made but up to now only minor progress has been registered.

Brademas: Esenbel has in fact hardened the position in his recent public statements.

Rosenthal: The fact is that the aid cut will stand until there is meaningful progress.

Sarbanes: The aid cut will go into effect on February 5. You could extend or change the date if 70,000 refugees were allowed back into Famagusta. You could then have some time to negotiate a final settlement.

Rosenthal: Perhaps we could extend the date six months.

Sarbanes: That might be too long. Maybe just until April.

Secretary: The bad thing about this whole procedure is that we are made to appear more anxious for a settlement than the parties themselves. We are going to attempt to get the deadline extended. You should avoid any victory claim.

Rosenthal: Nothing is going to happen so that is not possible.

Sarbanes: The basis is just not there.

Secretary: Since the basis is not there, we could say that you are willing to move if some progress is made in the coming weeks.

Brademas: I want you to understand that this is not an ethnic issue. I am not anti-Turk.

Secretary: I must express my conviction that this whole procedure is wrong but I will not be aggressive in stating my view.

Eagleton: We will have to state what the law is.

Secretary: I would appreciate it very much if you didn't say anything about my coming meetings. I am not looking for an epic confrontation. Let us keep in touch and see if any possibilities develop.
On February 5, 1975, in accordance with the requirements of the 1974 Foreign Assistance Act, a total ban on U.S. military aid and arms shipments to Turkey went into effect. In response, President Ford issued the following statement:

“Legislation enacted by Congress requires that arms deliveries to Turkey must be suspended February 5. The Administration will comply fully with the law. However, it should be made clear that military aid to Turkey is not given in the context of the Cyprus issue, nor has it been granted as a favor to Turkey. Rather, it is based on our common conclusions that the security of Turkey is vital to the security of the Eastern Mediterranean and to the security of the United States and its allies.

“A suspension of military aid to Turkey is likely to impede the negotiation of a just Cyprus settlement. Furthermore, it could have far-reaching and damaging effects on the security and hence the political stability of all the countries in the region. It will affect adversely not only Western security but the strategic situation in the Middle East. It cannot be in the interest of the United States to take action that will jeopardize the system on which our relations in the Eastern Mediterranean have been based for 28 years.

“When it is seen that the United States is taking action which is clearly incompatible with its own interests, this will raise grave doubts about the conduct of American foreign relations even among countries that are not directly involved in that area.

“The Administration judges these adverse effects of a suspension of aid to Turkey to be so serious that it urges the Congress to reconsider its action and authorize the resumption of our assistance relationship with Turkey.” (Library of Congress, Manuscript Division, Kissinger Papers, CL 281, Memoranda of Conversations, Presidential File, February 1975)
Minutes of Secretary of State Kissinger’s Staff Meeting

Washington, February 7, 1975, 8:11–9:04 a.m.

[Omitted here is discussion unrelated to Cyprus.]

Secretary Kissinger: Joe?

Mr. Sisco: What would you like to have me tell the Cypriot Ambassador this morning? He’s coming in at 10:30.²

Secretary Kissinger: From now on he’ll be seen by the Country Director! (Laughter.)

No—seriously. Wayne Hays has been telling me he’s been throwing him out of his office because he was up there.

Mr. Sisco: Recently?

Secretary Kissinger: Within the last week.

Mr. Sisco: Because he insists that he’s being very, very circumspect.

Secretary Kissinger: Wayne Hays said he threw him out of his office when he was simply threatening him. Do you believe that?

Mr. Jenkins: He’s capable of exaggerating.

Secretary Kissinger: What?

Mr. Jenkins: He’s capable of exaggerating.

Mr. Hartman: Dimitriou couldn’t threaten anybody. He’s so mild you hardly know what he’s talking about.

Mr. Sisco: Well, Bob and I talked about this. I think that we should take the posture with him that the situation is not at an impasse and that if—

Secretary Kissinger: Well, is it at an impasse?

Mr. Sisco: —and if they’re going to put anything forward, they ought to put it forward seriously.

Mr. Hartman: No. If they are going to put their proposal down, they shouldn’t go around to announce it to the world and deposit it at the Security Council.³ They ought to put it on the table.

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¹ Source: National Archives, RG 59, Transcripts of Henry Kissinger’s Staff Meetings, 1973–1977, Entry 5177, Box 6, Secretary’s Staff Conference 1/10/75 to Secretary’s Staff Meeting 4/16/75. Secret.

² See Document 175.

³ Apparent reference to a series of letters in late January and early February, in which the Cypriot (Greek) representative to the UN leveled accusations against the British, the Turkish Cypriots, and the Turks. (Yearbook of the United Nations, 1975, pp. 274–275)
Secretary Kissinger: No. Makarios has absolutely no intention of being capable. We’re beating the Turks over the head before we have received a proposal. It’s to reject something, the contents of which we don’t even know.

I mean, our unlimited busy-bodies—

Mr. Hartman: No. But we have an interest in keeping them.

Secretary Kissinger: We have an interest. Let Nature take its course now. Besides, Makarios pays no attention to Dimitriou—or whatever his name is. But what are we going to say to Esenbel. If Makarios had wanted to be reasonable, he would have pushed.

I think there’s something undignified about the United States pleading with all these maniacs to be reasonable when we have absolutely nothing to gain from it, and when a pressure group—an ethnic pressure group—is pushing this country in a direction that is totally against its interests.

Mr. Hartman: But I think that’s a separable issue.

Secretary Kissinger: It’s not a separable issue if, after that, we go around crying all over the place, saying: “Please be reasonable.” They’ve been unreasonable all along. We’re not going to plead with anybody any more. We’re going to say, “You’ve made this mess. See what happens?”

Mr. Hartman: They got the communal talks started. I think they want to keep that in play.

Secretary Kissinger: I just don’t want us to go plead. I do not want the United States to be in a position where we give the impression that these talks are more important to us than they are to the parties.

Mr. Hartman: All along—

Secretary Kissinger: Let them go to an international conference. What the hell is going to happen at an international conference? But I don’t know why we should get blackmailed by people committing—if they want the Island partitioned, if they want to maneuver in a way that partitions the Island, that’s their problem. We are prepared to assist, and that’s it. And we’re not going to beg these guys, and I want to have a tough and aloof line.

Mr. Hartman: It’s more likely not to be just an international conference but the talks will break down. There will be movement by the Turks somewhere along the line, and then it will be in the Security Council.

Secretary Kissinger: And then it will be in the Security Council; and then we will disengage, step by step. As it internationalizes, we will become another international party and we will keep in exact step with the Security Council.

Why is that so much against the national interest?
Mr. Sisco: I think it’s contrary to the American interest because I think, (a), the Soviets get the maximum opportunity; and, secondly, it’s going to contribute to the process of deterioration in Ankara and Athens even more rapidly than we fear.

Secretary Kissinger: That’s what I had predicted all along, but we are not going to stop that now by our running around—you know, I approved the cable;4 so I can’t complain. But when I thought about it, I thought it was a rather unworthy cable to send.

Mr. Hartman: It’s not pleading. It’s saying: “You’ve got something in place. Keep it there.”

Secretary Kissinger: If they see that, do they need a lecture from us?

Mr. Hartman: But up to now they have not acted in a very bright fashion.

Secretary Kissinger: The Secretary of State will be begging, pleading, maneuvering, working harder than they for six weeks; and they frivolously blew the thing up. Now we’re going to tell them—they were all set to have riots this week if this thing continued. They had riots while the talks were going on. They played with the Soviets while this thing was going on. And if they don’t want to do this, you tell them we’re willing to help.

It’s entirely up to him to decide—we believe the communal talks should continue. Whether they do or not is entirely up to him. But once they make irrevocable decisions, “Don’t come crying back to us with the”—

Mr. Sisco: That’s all right.

Mr. Hartman: That’s all right. In fact, that will have the effect of keeping control.

Secretary Kissinger: 15 minutes in, and then you can send him out.

Mr. Sisco: 10 minutes after he sees me! (Laughter.) Really—I’ve got three appointments. I’m serious.

Secretary Kissinger: Our cable is abject: “Please let us help you.”

Mr. Sisco: I think that’s an unfair characterization of the cable.

Secretary Kissinger: I approved it.

Mr. Sisco: I know you did.

Secretary Kissinger: For all we know, the Greeks are going to ask to go back to the August 8th line.

Mr. Hartman: We’re asking them to keep those talks going. We’re also trying to do something here. The last thing we want is for those talks to break down right now when there is, at least, still the possibility of turning the situation around.

4 Not further identified.
Secretary Kissinger: Then what we want and how we act is an entirely different proposition. We have gotten ourselves too involved in these talks, to begin with.

Mr. Hartman: Well, I don’t mind—I mean, what you’re saying I think will have this effect. It puts it the other way around and tells him that he’s got nothing from us—particularly, if these things do break down.

Secretary Kissinger: You tell him if he internationalizes it, we will be in exact step with the international community. We will be doing exactly what everyone else is doing. We’ll play no special role. If that’s what he wants, he can internationalize it. If he does, we are willing to help, but it’s entirely up to them. And we’re sick and tired of them playing around in our domestic politics.

I don’t want to hear that he is doing it and then his boys aren’t doing it. And if that doesn’t stop, we’ll withdraw.

If you have any hesitation to saying it, I’ll be glad to see him.

Mr. Hartman: He’d love to see you, by the way! (Laughter.)

Secretary Kissinger: That’s the posture we’re going to take with the Greeks, and Turks as well.

[Omitted here is discussion unrelated to Cyprus.]

175. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Cyprus

Washington, February 8, 1975, 1852Z.

29536. Subject: Sisco Meeting with Cyprus Ambassador.

1. Cyprus Ambassador Dimitriou called on Under Secretary Sisco under instructions on February 7 to bring to our attention Denktash’s recent remarks on possible declaration of independent Turk Cypriot state. He also expressed view that opening and operation of airport in Turkish zone was illegal as well as dangerous. Sisco replied that no comment on this was really necessary by US. Cyprus Government knew our policy regarding provocative public statements, our efforts to promote negotiated settlement, and our opposition to partition.

1 Source: National Archives, RG 59, Records of Joseph Sisco, 1951–1976, Entry 5405, Box 21, Cyprus 1974/1975. Secret; Immediate; Exdis; Distribute as Nodis. Drafted by Erdman and approved by Sisco. Repeated Immediate to Ankara, Athens, and USUN.
2. Sisco said aid cutoff is complicating the situation and our ability to be helpful. Dimitriou, speaking personally, said he felt President’s statement about the adverse effects of the cutoff\(^2\) had gone too far and had unwittingly encouraged Turkish intransigence. Sisco replied that this was a unjustified characterization. US has no interest in increased intransigence on any side. Talks got started as a result of our efforts in Brussels and we could have no possible interest in encouraging intransigence. Plain fact is that the cutoff has complicated our role and made it more rather than less difficult for Ankara, where the political situation is already working against Turkish flexibility, to make the necessary concessions. Dimitriou backed off and reiterated he had not been instructed to make the aforementioned statement, but this was a personal observation.

3. Sisco said the Clerides–Denktash talks continue to be the most realistic and desirable manner in which to proceed. We have offered our help and remain available but we do not have a greater interest in these talks than any of the other three parties. If there is a move to internationalize the question, there will obviously be an impact on the role US can play. Internationalization has failed in the past to produce realistic and practical progress toward a Cyprus settlement and in the present situation will only make matters more difficult than they already are; but of course, if this is route Cyprus wanted to go, it was its decision to make.

4. Dimitriou said that Clerides would be presenting official proposals at next Monday’s\(^3\) scheduled session of the talks. If nothing transpires by the end of February, question will unavoidably come before the Security Council. When it does, Cyprus hopes US will play leading role to “take the wind out of Soviet sails.” Sisco replied that the US will cross that bridge when it gets there. It was up to Cyprus to choose what course to follow; the history of UN consideration of Cyprus contains a lesson, and that is that UN discussions of Cyprus solution have not been practical steps toward real progress. On the contrary, internationalization of the issue has been complicating. Sisco said again we were not making any pleas here; this was a decision for Cyprus to make and that US interests in continuation and success of ongoing talks not greater than parties in area. Dimitriou asked if there were any plans for a new meeting with the Greek and Turkish Foreign Ministers. Sisco said there was nothing definite but the possibility remained.

Kissinger

\(^{2}\) See Document 173.
\(^{3}\) February 10.
176. Memorandum From the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger) to President Ford


SUBJECT

Declaration of Independent Turkish Cypriot State

Establishment of Turkish Cypriot state pending agreement on Federated Republic of Cyprus will have little practical effect on the ground since there is already almost complete separation of populations and administrations. However, the impact on the negotiations and the prospects for progress on a Cyprus settlement will be far-reaching and serious. There will be an impact on five major areas.

Clerides–Denktash talks: The Greeks will be under pressure to break off the talks. Once broken off, the talks will be difficult to reactivate. The Turks may insist, as a condition for continuing the talks, on Greek recognition of the full legal and political equality of the Turkish community. Prospects for negotiations at the Clerides–Denktash level in the next several months are poor.

Military Aid to Turkey: Proponents of the aid cutoff will argue that this step is another indication of Turkish bad faith, and another reason why the aid cutoff is necessary to bring the Turks around. While we will take the opposite tack and suggest the Turkish action is a natural consequence of Congressional action, the Turkish move could tend to freeze the situation in Congress.

Internationalization: Makarios will seek to internationalize the Cyprus question, by involving the Soviet Union more directly and appealing to the Security Council to condemn this Turkish action. (We have received word that Greece and Cyprus have jointly called for special Security Council session to consider recent developments on Cyprus.)

US Embassy Security: The US could again become a target of inflamed Greek-Cypriot opinion. This could lead to renewed demonstrations and violence directed against embassy property and personnel in Nicosia.

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1 Source: Ford Library, National Security Adviser, President Country Files for Middle East and South Asia, Box 2, Cyprus 4. Secret. Sent for information. Scowcroft initialed for Kissinger. Ford initialed the memorandum.

2 Turkish Cypriot officials made this announcement on February 13, as reported in telegram 606 from Nicosia. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy Files, 1975)
Embassy Operations: Our ability to carry out normal diplomatic and consular responsibilities in the Turkish zone of Cyprus could be substantially reduced. The Greeks may seal off the border and deny access to the Turkish area from the Greek side. The Turk Cypriots may also insist on foreign missions dealing with them directly and not through the legal facade of the Office of the Vice President or Minister of Defense (positions recognized in the 1960 Constitution).

177. Telegram From the Embassy in Greece to the Department of State

Athens, February 17, 1975, 0945Z.

1306. Subject: Possible New Initiative by the Secretary on Cyprus. Department please pass this highly sensitive message “personal for the Secretary from Kubisch.”

1. Over the weekend I have had very private discussions—separately—with three of the four ministers who together with Caramanlis make up the real inner power structure of the Greek Government: Defense Minister Averoff, Economic Coordination Minister Papaligouras and Foreign Minister Bitsios. (The fourth, George Rallis, who is Minister to the Prime Minister, works primarily on internal political and press matters.)

2. I get the strong impression that with the exception of Bitsios, who has made almost a diplomatic and writing career out of Cyprus, Caramanlis and his inner circle want very much to have done with the Cyprus problem. They simply have too many other major problems to address and solve in Greece. The “Priest,” as they call Makarios, gives them a pain; and somehow a more stable and tranquil modus vivendi with Turkey must be found to give them the breathing space they need to proceed with the internal rehabilitation this country still requires.

3. Bitsios, on the other hand, still seems mesmerized by the Cyprus problem and appears still to be advocating the kind of rear-guard holding action on Cyprus and the too-little too-late piecemeal concessions to the Turks that have characterized Greek policy for years with such dismal results.

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1 Source: Ford Library, National Security Adviser, Presidential Country Files for Middle East and South Asia, Box 11, Greece, Nodis to Secretary of State 8. Secret; Nodis; Cherokee.
4. In any case, it has been suggested to me that you consider making a new and major move now to break the deadlock on a Cyprus settlement. Averoff (his name must protected in this) told me that he is confident that Greece will accept a bi-zonal federated system on Cyprus if the Turks will reduce their zone to 25 percent of the island (which would still comprise approximately 35 percent of the economic activity and resources on Cyprus). He also told me that he had information from a reliable Turkish informant that Turkey was prepared to reduce to 25 percent in exchange for a Greek acceptance and international endorsement of the two-zone arrangement. As for Makarios, Averoff said he would resist mightily but that Greece could “make” him go along.

5. The specific suggestion is as follows: you send a very private personal message to the GOT saying you are prepared to try and get the Greeks to accept the bi-zonal system but you need to hold out a really major Turk concession to them in order to have any chance of success. You suggest that the Turks agree to draw back to 22 percent of the island, which is still more than their population ratio, and you would be prepared to give it a try, the Turks will say no, counter with 25 percent, and then—if the scenario plays out—the Greeks accept and other things fall into place.

6. I am not recommending that you do this at this stage, but I do believe it deserves your careful consideration. There are obvious pitfalls: if you try and fail, it will surely leak, and the “Kissinger Plan” to sacrifice Cyprus for NATO bases, Congressional strategy or whatever, will be denounced on all sides. At the same time, if you succeed, many Greeks and Greek supporters will attack you for selling out Cyprus and the Greek Cypriots for the sake of some nefarious scheme or strategy of yours. Still, if it works, it could help greatly in repairing our relationship with Turkey, get Congressional restrictions lifted, allow Greece to attend to its internal problems, preserve the main bonds of the alliance flank, and soothe a major world trouble spot—all without the intrusion of undesirable third parties.

7. Perhaps you can feel your way into this somewhat tentatively with the Turks, and if it leads to something worthwhile and specific, then send me in to see Caramanlis directly and privately—bypassing Bitsios. Bitsios would not like it, and you and I would both pay a price with him for doing it, but it may be the only way. It would not have to be billed as a “Kissinger proposal” but simply as one more effort on your part to try and assist two allies to get together.

8. One final note of caution: you have no doubt seen [less than 1 line not declassified] reports—and my comments thereon—about coup plotting in Greece, possibly involving Averoff. While I continue to believe these reports should be substantially discounted, they cannot be dismissed altogether. Averoff, in his Defense Ministry post, is in a key
position. I have no reason to doubt his solidarity with and loyalty to Caramanlis, but one can never be sure. He may be playing his own game and trying to pave the way both for a Cyprus settlement and our support in the event he decides to ally himself with others. This is one more reason to feel your way carefully into the terrain indicated above, should you decide to go ahead.

Kubisch

178. Memorandum of Conversation

Washington, February 24, 1975, noon.

PARTICIPANTS

US
The Secretary
Under Secretary Sisco
Ambassador Buffum
Deputy Assistant Secretary Laingen
Mr. William Eagleton (Notetaker)

Cyprus
Mr. Glafcos Clerides
Foreign Minister Christophides
Ambassador Nicos Dimitriou
Mr. Angelides

(This portion of the conversation was preceded by a meeting between the Secretary and Clerides, with Ambassador Macomber present during part of that meeting.)

Clerides: This is not the Ambassador in New York (pointing to Dimitriou and referring to Rossides).

Christophides: I asked Rossides why he had written the letter to The New York Times regarding Turkish aid. His reply was that he was not accredited to Washington.

Secretary: If he had been accredited to Washington he would have been out of the country by now.

Sisco: We have already discussed this matter with Mr. Clerides.

Christophides: I understand the point perfectly.
Secretary: Well, we have settled everything. It is alright as long as you realize that every crisis occurs in Joe Sisco’s area. We tried to take Cyprus out of his area but were too late.

Secretary: When I was in Syria, Asad said we had arranged the coup against Makarios in Cyprus so as to have a NATO base from which to attack Syria. Now he asks why we are helping Makarios since we will not get a base that way.

I have told Mr. Clerides that I believe what was started in Brussels could have led to a solution. It would have been slow since the Turks hardly have a government. In my contact with the Greek side I found a willingness to make progress. We could then have put pressure on the Turks. However, the Congressional action has produced a tragedy. The first victims are the Greek Cypriots and Greeks. I don’t think a solution can be put together except by the U.S. using its influence with Turkey. The Turkish Government is weak but we can work on Demirel and Ecevit. The Greeks must decide whether they want progress. If the aid cut continues the Turks will continue to take steps which will make it difficult for the U.S. to play a role. It is a case wherein action produces the opposite effect.

Mr. Clerides and I talked about what to do—talks could be moved to another city or they could be enlarged. I have doubts that the Turks will accept enlargement. What do you think Joe?

Sisco: Yes, enlargement would lead to an impasse.

Secretary: I understand that you need something new to get the talks going again.

Christophides: Above all we want effective progress.

Secretary: There is only one way. That is for the Greek Government, the Cyprus Government and ourselves to agree and then I sell the agreement in Ankara. What do you think Joe?

Sisco: I agree.

Secretary: You see I have the Under Secretary’s support. Mr. Clerides, you will read that the Department is completely terrorized, but look at this.

Sisco: Don’t worry, he holds his own.

Christophides: Yes, I have seen that in his talks with me this morning. There is one point—the question of cutting the aid is not in the hands of Greece and Cyprus but in that of Congress. If Congress does not reverse the cut you say you will have no leverage. Therefore, should we not find another way?

Secretary: There is no other way. If you bring in the Soviets we will oppose it. When I was in Europe the Europeans asked whether they should become involved.
I told them that if they could find a way to be helpful we would support them. I don’t know what leverage they would have in Ankara.

Clerides: I go along with what you say. Only the U.S. can guide the Turks. It is necessary to regain that leverage. The help you need would be to say that the Turks will do something if Congress removes the cutoff. But it is extremely difficult for us to go to our friends in Congress or make statements until there is something positive. Where you have failed to persuade them I would have no chances either.

Secretary: They got off to a wrong start last summer in the wake of Watergate. They did not understand our strategy which was very similar to yours. The problem now is to get results. This is the first test of political action by the American/Greek community and they do not know how to handle it.

If we can remove the aid cut, then we get the British, French and Germans to support us on the plan that we agree on. Then we can go to Ankara.

And on my trip to the Middle East I will talk to Ecevit.

If you turn to Guyana it will be pure eye wash and no progress.

You, Caramanlis, along with Makarios and I, should agree on a program.

One good thing about the cutoff is that both sides now seem to be worried about a freezing of the situation, although I don’t really know about Turkey since we have not had substantive contacts with them since February 5.

Buffum: One kind of expansion of the talks would be a greater role for Weckmann plus observers from Greece and Turkey.

Clerides: In the past when we have brought others into the talks, for instance on the constitutional issue, things have become more complicated.

Secretary: Suppose—this is just a personal idea—two neutrals, one chosen by Greece and one by Turkey—act as advisers to Weckmann. Do you think the Turks would agree?

Buffum: Waldheim is thinking of three nonaligned representatives as advisers to him.

Secretary: Will the Turks accept?

Sisco: I don’t think so but I would think that if each country designated one adviser it would be less objectionable to them. We are trying to meet the problem and get a consensus of the UN. You will need agreement of the Turks for any negotiations to be effective.

Secretary: If this goes on for another month it will be completely out of control and the Cypriots will be the losers.
Clerides: Suppose we concede that talks continue, then will the Turks be willing to accept an enlargement of the peacekeeping forces and the return of some refugees?

Secretary: My instinct is that the Turks will agree to nothing while aid is cut off.

Sisco: There is that and also the problem of getting unilateral concessions from them.

Secretary: We would explore the return of some but how many refugees are you referring to?

Clerides: The first problem is 9,000 Greeks who are still in the north and are being badly treated. If the Turks could withdraw, and these Greek villages were placed under UN control, that would ease the situation. Then if some refugees could be let back to Famagusta.

Secretary: We have tried that many times before without success.

Christophides: And that was before the aid cutoff.

Secretary: Yes, the aid cut was hanging over us. The aid cut was a tragedy. Negotiations always begin slowly. I believe we had better than a 50–50 chance.

Sisco: Yes, there was a good possibility in November.

Dimitriou: But then there was the problem of the fall of the Turkish Government.

Secretary: We can explore with the Turks what we can get from them if the aid cut is removed but I don’t believe these things made any difference. What is worthwhile is a rapid conclusion. We ought to reach an understanding—Clerides, Makarios, Caramanlis and I. I will take this understanding to Ankara where I can sell it. Otherwise we will be in for a long guerrilla war.

Esenbel will dig himself into a foxhole. I would have a better chance than Esenbel to sell the plan to Ecevit, Demirel and Sancar.

I have now come to the opposite conclusion from what I had believed previously. I had thought in December that proposals then could lead gradually to a solution.

It seems difficult for the Turks to decide even on some small concessions now. If we three can agree on a package I can take it to Ankara and sell it. If I have to get concessions from the Turks first and negotiate it with Brademas it will lead to an endless nightmare.

An expanded forum may allow you to return to the talks. However, if aid is resumed it won’t be important to go to the talks immediately.

Clerides: That is why it is necessary to get from the Security Council the right impression that a forum has been created, and meanwhile we can work on the package.

Secretary: Where are you going now?
The Security Council met in February and March and adopted without vote Resolution 367 on March 12, which called for continued negotiation on the Cyprus issue and regretted the Turkish Cypriot declaration of February 13. (Yearbook of the United Nations, 1975, pp. 297–298)

Clerides: Back to New York and we will stay until the end of the Security Council session. We could stay several days later.

Secretary: We will support a reasonable solution at the UN. We can explore it with the Turks. I am going to the Middle East in March. If we can get aid lifted I can go to Ankara. I can meet first with you and Bitsios. If we don’t lift the cutoff I fear the Turks will make it impossible for me to go.

Dimitriou: Do you think you can get the Turks to hold in abeyance implementation of the Turkish Cypriot state?

Secretary: I don’t think I can get anything from the Turks right now.

Christophides: Will you be able to go to Ankara before the end of the cutoff?

Secretary: Esenbel says he won’t see me before resumption of aid. I told Congress I wanted the threat of a cutoff—and that would have been useful—but not the cutoff itself.

Dimitriou: If you have a meeting with the Greeks and Cypriots that would help in lifting the cutoff. It might be a question of prestige for Congress.

Secretary: But that would delay progress. The President is determined to fight this issue on the basis of executive authority. I leave on March 6 and while I am gone the whole matter will be delayed.

Clerides: There is one possibility. If the Secretary meets with the Greeks and Cypriots and reaches a common line to take to the Turks, this movement would help lift the ban and then he could go to Turkey.

Secretary: That is alright with me. Perhaps Clerides could meet me in London. I will be there on the 7th.

There could be problems in London but that might be the most practical place.

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3 The Security Council met in February and March and adopted without vote Resolution 367 on March 12, which called for continued negotiation on the Cyprus issue and regretted the Turkish Cypriot declaration of February 13. (Yearbook of the United Nations, 1975, pp. 297–298)
Memorandum From the President’s Deputy Assistant for National Security Affairs (Scowcroft) to President Ford


Secretary Kissinger asked that the following report of his meeting with Foreign Minister Bitsios be passed to you:

“I have just concluded a three-hour discussion with Greek Foreign Minister Bitsios in Brussels in which we reviewed in some detail the current aspects of the Cyprus problem. The overall impression which I have is that Greece is ready to find ways to restart the Clerides–Denktash negotiations in a serious way. This reflects Caramanlis’s judgment that the longer the impasse continues on the Cyprus issue—as distasteful as any solution might be—the more vulnerable Caramanlis becomes politically at home. For this reason Bitsios reaffirmed today Greece’s willingness to consider a Bizonal solution, which of course would represent the major concessions which the Turks have been looking for. In return the Greeks want to reduce the area which would go to them. Bitsios, who is considerably more cautious than Caramanlis, made clear that the area around Morphu in the northwest and the area in the southeastern portion of the present Turkish zone are the keys to a solution which gives economic viability to the Greek Cypriots. It is principally within this context that my efforts will be concentrated over the next two weeks.

“I am sending Hartman to Ankara to give Esenbel, Ecevit and Demirel a report of my talk with Bitsios. Hartman will also explore what the possibilities are and in particular how much a reduction in their zone the Turks would be willing to consider as part of a settlement. We are all convinced that as well disposed as Esenbel is, the views of Ecevit and Demirel are even more important and more influential. Bitsios wanted me to go to Ankara promptly, so that I could talk directly to Ecevit and Demirel. While I agreed to explore this possibility once again, I made clear to the Greek Foreign Minister that because of the aid cutoff it was unlikely that the present Turk Government would be willing to receive me. I have left it up to the Turks as to whether they would be willing to meet with me early next week in Ankara; if not, I am suggesting to Esenbel that we meet in Brussels about the 16th.

1 Source: Library of Congress, Manuscript Division, Kissinger Papers, Box CL 273, Memoranda of Conversations, Chronological File. Secret; Sensitive. Sent for information. A notation on the memorandum indicates the President saw it.

“If I go to Ankara the issue of spare parts may become acute. Haig tells me that the Turk military are desperate and will go to war with Greece rather than permit their military establishment to run down for lack of spare parts. If I find it necessary to get negotiations started, I would appreciate your authority to explore the waiver route—warning Turkey that it may delay the actual total lifting of embargo. I have asked Brent to look into the legal position.”

[Omitted here are two paragraphs unrelated to Cyprus.]

180. Editorial Note

Henry Kissinger visited Ankara March 10–11, 1975, as part of a trip to the Middle East March 8–19. He met with the principal Turkish leaders and discussed Cyprus and the Congressional ban on U.S. military aid to Turkey. See Documents 218–220 for his reports to President Ford on his meetings.

181. Telegram From the Embassy in Cyprus to the Department of State

Nicosia, June 10, 1975, 1920Z.

1882. For the Secretary From Ambassador. Department pass Athens, Ankara, USUN as desired. Subject: Oral Message From the Secretary to Makarios. Ref: State 132961.2

1. Summary. Makarios considers Vienna II3 failure and is deeply angered by Clerides’ performance there, perhaps to the point of trying

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1 Source: Ford Library, National Security Adviser, President Country Files for Middle East and South Asia, Box 3, Cyprus Nodis to Secretary of State 10. Secret; Immediate; Nodis.
2 Telegram 132961 to Nicosia, June 6, relayed the text of an oral message from Kissinger to Makarios. Kissinger shared his impression that both the Greek and Turkish leaders wanted to move ahead on a Cyprus settlement. He thought that positions could be clarified during the intercommunal talks. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy Files, 1975)
3 The first set of intercommunal talks under UN auspices, Vienna I, began in the summer of 1972 and adjourned April 2, 1974. See Document 74. The first round of Vienna II lasted from April 28 to May 3. (Telegram 3803 from Vienna, May 3; National Archives, Central Foreign Policy Files, 1975)
to replace him as negotiator. He asserts, however, that he is not trying to substitute internationalization for this negotiating track. He acknowledges constructive role being played by President Ford and Secretary Kissinger and welcomes reduction in Greek-Turkish tensions resulting from Brussels. Says visits to Arab states imply no intention change form or content of good relations with Israel. Statement’s regarding “long struggle” do not portend building toward guerilla warfare. Makarios remains interested in availability of US AID funds for rehousing refugees. End summary.

2. I called on Makarios morning June 10 to deliver your oral message. He listened attentively and said to thank you.

3. Without introduction, Makarios then launched into a diatribe against Vienna II and Clerides. Vienna, he said, had been a “fraud and a failure covered over with nice words”. GOC position had suffered as a result. He could not fault Waldheim for trying to convey an appearance of optimism and progress, but he himself was completely pessimistic. He could and would take Clerides to task for having made several serious mistakes.

4. Enumerating Clerides’ errors, Makarios said that, first, he had without guidance stated before departure that he would leave Vienna if Turkish Cypriots proceeded with June 8 constitutional referendum. In Vienna, Clerides had been obliged to climb down from this. Second, in final communiqué, he had accepted language referring to possibility of a transitional federal government. He had done so without instructions and transitional government was unacceptable to GOC. Third, in press questions and answers following announcement of communiqué, Clerides had alluded to a Turkish proposal on refugee return when no such proposal existed.

5. Makarios said Clerides would be briefing Council of Ministers and National Council about Vienna on June 11 and intimated that he would be chastised both in that session and publicly.

6. I replied that just before our meeting I had been ruminating about the prodigious amount of diplomatic energy it has taken to get a Cyprus negotiation going and keep it alive. I cited the recent principal and visible manifestations of the effort: visits to Ankara by Secretary Kissinger and Assistant Secretary Hartman, visits to Athens by latter, Bitsios–Caglayangil meeting, President Ford’s sessions with Greek and Turkish Prime Ministers in Brussels and supporting Foreign

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4 Transmitted in telegram 3800 from Vienna, May 3. (Ibid.)
5 Hartman met with Caglayangil on April 21 (telegram 3136 from Ankara; ibid.), Demirel on April 22 (telegram 3184 from Ankara; ibid.), and Bitsios on April 24 (telegram 3176 from Athens, April 24; ibid.).
6 For Ford’s meeting with Karamanlis, see Document 50. For Ford’s meeting with Demirel, see Document 227.
Minister-level discussions, Demirel–Karamanlis bilateral, and Waldheim’s admirable labors against odds in Vienna. I pointed out that the objective of these several efforts was to create the framework and atmosphere in which a Cyprus solution fair to Greek Cypriots could be reached. We were well aware of Archbishop’s interest in internationalizing the Cyprus problem. We believe this was his decision to make, but frankly we would not see it paying off. While we understand that Turkish unreadiness to talk about specifics in Vienna was a disappointment to GOC, we felt strongly that continued negotiation along present line was the only path with any promise. Others obviously felt the same. Actions of Waldheim and Clerides in Vienna should, I believed, be read in this positive light. With admittedly very little to go on, prospects for a continued negotiation had been salvaged.

7. Makarios backed off somewhat. He said he recognized and appreciated the great efforts of President Ford and Secretary Kissinger to keep negotiation and hope for progress alive, even though these efforts were “late”. Similarly, although nothing positive had resulted for Cyprus itself, Karamanlis–Demirel meeting had undoubtedly been beneficial in terms of easing tension between Greece and Turkey. That easing of tension in turn, might eventually help a Cyprus solution. Nevertheless, Vienna II had ill-served GOC interests. In addition to the annoying reference to a transitional government, which was a clear effort to erode the GOC’s international position, language of communiqué put Greek and Turkish sides on an equal plane. In fact, Clerides had gone with positive attitude and flexible instructions that empowered him to discuss all aspects whereas Turkey had reneged on Denktash commitment of Vienna I and come up with nothing. As a result of communiqué language, GOC’s international position had suffered. The basis for any useful debate in coming SC meeting on Cyprus had been destroyed. Waldheim’s report would be anodyne and a resolution on the negotiation, if any, would be inconsequential. (In reply to my interjected question, Makarios said it would now be pointless to send special representation to New York for the debate. GOC position would be handled by Rossides.)

8. Makarios said that despite his criticisms of Vienna, Waldheim and Clerides, he fully supported continued negotiation. He was not seeking internationalization as a substitute. He had little to gain from an international conference. Rather, he was afraid that lulled by a series of communiqués along the lines of Vienna I and Vienna II, the world would forget about the unsolved Cyprus problem and condone continued faits accomplis by the Turks, such as their referendum, elections, possible unilateral declaration of independence, and their adamant refusal to discuss the real issues. Therefore, he considered it essential to use meetings of the UNSC and UNGA, and his own travels, to keep the Cyprus problem before the world.
9. I replied that I could understand Archbishop’s desire to keep international attention alive, if that was as it was. I cautioned, however, that this variety of internationalization, if pushed too far in certain directions, would cut across the other negotiating track.

10. I asked the Archbishop whether he viewed his recent visits to Gulf states and forthcoming visits to other Arab states in terms of maintaining international interest and, further, whether his efforts to win greater Arab support had implications for GOC relations with Israel. Was he, for example, considering any downgrading in GOC diplomatic relations with Israel as a gesture to the Arabs? Makarios replied that he valued GOC’s good relations with Israel and intended no change whatsoever. In visits to the Arab states, while showing sympathy for Arab concerns, he had been and would continue to be careful to hew a delicate line between sympathy and underwriting all their positions. In general, he had found the safest way was to refer to UN resolutions. He repeated that he was not prepared to consider any change in the nature of his relationship with Israel. I suggested that, this being the case, he have FonMin Christophides say something reassuring to the Israelis before he left on his next swing through the Arab world. Makarios said he would do so. He indicated that his present plan is to leave June 16 for Cairo, then go to Damascus and Beirut if situation there was stabilized by then, and thereafter to Baghdad, Libya and possibly Algeria although Algerian arrangements not yet firm.

11. On another aspect, I asked Makarios whether his frequent use of the term “long struggle” implied a military component as well as the economic revivification he had previously mentioned to me and which, I noted he now had under discussion with GOC. I referred in the former sense to creation of various new self-styled “resistance fronts” and GOC promulgation of a law on compulsory reserve training for all Greek males up to age 60. Makarios replied blandly that he was a man of peace and did not believe in force to solve problems. He did not approve creation of resistance fronts (although he acknowledged at least one group was comprised of his own supporters).

12. Concluding, I recalled question Makarios had put to me in Washington concerning use of a portion of potential FY–76 $25 million in supporting assistance for construction of houses for refugees now in tents. I said that despite what Archbishop had been told by Congressmen, this money might be some distance from appropriation. If it was voted, USG would want to continue to donate a substantial portion to UNHCR for its valuable relief work. Nevertheless, question of supporting GOC in some way on refugee housing was discussable and in fact, pursuant to Archbishop’s interest, was already under review by Embassy with appropriate GOC officials. One thought was to relieve GOC of some of the burden of its subsidies to refugees through their activity in this field, thus freeing GOC funds for housing. On
basis of personal experience with Palestine refugee problem, I ex-
pressed concern that US funds not be used to create permanent camps
which would become a breeding ground for an immutable refugee
mentality and fanatacism which was not in GOC interest. Makarios
agreed and said his purpose was to construct housing to integrate
refugees into existing urban communities.

13. Comment: Makarios’ anger with Clerides as evidenced in this
conversation is supported by a well-sourced [less than 1 line not declass-
sified] report being transmitted simultaneously.7 Latter states that
Makarios is actually thinking of ways in which he can unload Clerides
in favor of a more compliant Greek Cypriot negotiator.

Crawford

7 Not found.

182. Telegram From the Embassy in Cyprus to the Department of
State1

Nicosia, June 27, 1975, 1700Z.

2069. For the Secretary from Ambassador. Department pass Athens
and Ankara as desired. Subject: Conversation with Clerides. Ref:
Nicosia 1882.2

1. Summary. Clerides has asked that I convey his current think-
ing to you on a confidential basis pursuant your suggestion. He be-
lieves Makarios is trying to weaken his position out of suspicion that
there may be an evolving axis between him and Karamanlis, and a de-
sire to see present negotiation fail quickly. Clerides reiterated criticism
of pro-Makarios role of Greek Ambassador here. He stressed urgent
need for centrist political movement, led by him, to counter increasingly
successful Communist activity encouraged by Makarios. End summary.

2. I saw Clerides June 27—our first meeting since Vienna II and
UNSC Cyprus debate.

1 Source: Ford Library, National Security Adviser, Presidential Country Files for
Middle East and South Asia, Box 3, Cyprus Nodis to Secretary of State 10. Secret; Im-
mediate; Nodis; Noforn.

2 Document 181.
3. At the outset, I told Clerides that Makarios had sharply criticized him in conversation with me just after Vienna II (refel). I asked if there were an explanation for this display of calculated anger other than reasons given by Archbishop, i.e. Clerides’ acceptance of an appearance of progress and reference to transitional government in final communiqué. Karamanlis had given strong support Clerides in Vienna. Was Makarios perhaps worried that Karamanlis and Clerides had developed a mutuality of interest and understanding from which he being excluded? Was Makarios seeking to demean him in eyes of Greek Cypriots in order to break up this “axis”? I noted the private conversations which had taken place between Karamanlis and Clerides and asked about the state of their relationship.

4. Clerides prefaced his reply by recalling that in your last conversation with him you had said he could communicate with you confidentially through me. He asked that his following remarks be treated in this sense.

5. Clerides said he believed Makarios was actively seeking to undermine his position because (A) he had wanted Vienna II to fail and (B) he was suspicious of the very good relationship which had evolved with Karamanlis. Re (A) Makarios wished to be free to pursue his preferred path of building Arab, non-aligned and Soviet support looking toward UNGA and its advocacy of a broader international negotiation. As evidence of this, Clerides said he had informed Makarios that substantive progress might well not be possible by July 24 date for reconvening Vienna discussion and that a postponement might therefore be desirable. Makarios had replied that, regardless, they wanted the next round to take place as scheduled. Makarios, Clerides thought, wanted to precipitate a failure of this negotiation as quickly as possible lest Turks come up with something quasi-reasonable. Unfortunately, Turkey playing directly into his hands by its unwillingness/inability to table positions on territory and refugees. Given the situation in Ankara and Makarios’ attitude, the prospects for sustained negotiation were poor. Clerides said he was relying on your assurance that you would do what you could with Turkey, but he appreciated the difficulties in this.

6. Returning to my question of his relationship with Karamanlis, Clerides said everything was fine when the two could meet face to face. When he was in Nicosia, however, all communications had to run through (Greek Ambassador) Dountas who put everything through the optic of his total personal commitment to Makarios. I asked if this had come up in Clerides’ private conversations with Karamanlis and Clerides nodded. He thought Karamanlis had come to realize how much of a problem he had on this score. Karamanlis had looked “creased” after their discussion. Comment: Undoubtedly, because Dountas is a strong partisan of Mavros, he would be difficult to transfer without stimulating politically
motivated criticism from latter. End comment. Clerides cautioned me against confiding in Dountas. I said that from long experience with him I had learned the wisdom of being quite uncommunicative.

7. Clerides then broached what he said was the main concern he wished to convey at this time: the interrelationship of developments on the Greek Cypriot political scene and the negotiation under Waldheim.

8. Clerides remarked that, as I undoubtedly aware, Makarios was discreetly encouraging activity by AKEL (the official Cyprus Communist Party) and Lyssarides (unofficial Communist) as part of his effort to attract non-aligned and leftist support internationally. Building on economic dislocation and political frustration, both were making dangerous headway. The situation urgently required the creation of a broad political movement aimed at pulling together political factions from the genuinely progressive left-of-center to the right but excluding on the far right those tainted by active association with last summer’s coup. This movement would not be opposed to Makarios and would indeed draw in many of his supporters who currently discomfited by his reliance on the left. A counterweight to the latter was increasingly essential and Clerides said he knew only he could lead it. Problem for him was that he felt himself intellectually and morally committed to continuing the present Cyprus negotiation. If, having brought a center movement into being, the negotiation failed and discredited him it would also seriously and perhaps irrevocably damage the chances of a successful center coalition. Clerides said he had to weigh this against the danger of letting non-Communist forces remain leaderless. His decision was to defer for at least another two or three months the announcement of a center movement to allow some more time for progress in the negotiation. In the interim, time would not be completely wasted as lists of movement leaders, structure, and program could be developed. To counter AKEL, which subsidized by Russia, and Lyssarides who generously supported by Syria and Libya, and successful opposition movement would have to have resources which would be hard to come by given straitened economic circumstances of politically sympathetic potential backers.

9. My conversation with Clerides was three times interrupted from calls from UNSYG Special Representative Weckmann to the effect that Denktash has gone back on agreement reached June 25 to swap some Turkish students in the south for permission for ten Greek Cypriot teachers to be allowed to go to Greek enclaves in Karpass (Nicosia 2059). Denktash, Weckmann told Clerides, wanted his Turks but was temporarily unable make arrangements for the Greek teach-

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3 Dated June 26. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy Files, 1975)
ers. Clerides said then there could be no deal and by telephone ordered transfer of Turkish students halted, commenting to me that matters were back to square one. Clerides also noted with dismay Denktash’s admission to foreign journalists that Greek personal property and merchandise in Famagusta being removed and transferred to Nicosia for sale and other disposition. Greeks, he said, read this as indicating Turkish intention to repopulate New Famagusta in the near future.

10. Comment: Unless you wish, I do not think a reply from you to Clerides is required by the nature of his comment. End comment.

Crawford

183. Memorandum of Conversation¹

Helsinki, July 31, 1975, 4:15 p.m.

SUBJECT
Cyprus Negotiations

PARTICIPANTS
Greece
Foreign Minister Bitsios
U.S.
The Secretary of State
Arthur Hartman, Assistant Secretary for European Affairs

(After a discussion which has been reported by cable on the ammunition theft at Souda Bay,² the following exchange took place.)

Bitsios: I saw Caglayangil this afternoon and he told me that the President had asked if it was possible to have a statement on the Turkish position with respect to Cyprus. He said that Demirel had replied that his Government could not discuss these matters with the U.S. because it does not accept that there is a link between the American embargo and the Cyprus negotiations. I said why don’t you speak to

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¹ Source: Library of Congress, Manuscript Division, Kissinger Papers, CL 273, Memoranda of Conversations, Chronological File. Secret; Nodis. Drafted by Hartman and approved in S on August 9. The meeting took place in Finlandia Hall. Kissinger was in Helsinki for CSCE talks.

² Reported in telegrams 5781 from Athens and Secto 8088, both July 31. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy Files, 1975)
me—we are ready to negotiate. Caglayangil replied that Turks could not speak about Cyprus as long as the embargo is still on. You see, they are continuing to make their excuses. First, it was their internal political troubles. Now it is the embargo. Where do you think we can go from here? We want with all seriousness to have these negotiations. We approach this problem with an open heart.

The Secretary: That is what I have been telling the Turks.

Bitsios: Caramanlis told me that he was the only one who was trying to fight to get talks going in spite of the embargo and all the other things. He said that they don’t like what Caramanlis had to say. But what are we waiting for?

The Secretary: Your negotiation is the only one that I have failed to move forward. I am not saying this in any way to complain—we both know how to solve this problem. The only criticism I would have of your negotiating tactics is that you don’t take a position and stick with it. You give a little every three months and that just causes the other side to delay. The basic problem was last August. We decided that military action by us was impossible and, of course, there were other factors. If we made a mistake it was in Geneva.

Bitsios: If Mavros had known that you were behind the Turkish proposal he might have considered it more closely.

The Secretary: The mistake is that we should have taken over the negotiations from Callaghan but you will recall it was the week of the transition. If it was not for that I might have gone to Geneva myself. We could have tried to use Turkish gratitude for our attitude in order to get concessions for you but, frankly, I must tell you I am getting very tired of your supporters in the United States. I am called a murderer and a liar by all kinds of Greek Americans and I can tell you that that kind of thing does not hurt me, it hurts you. If I am going to be able to help, I can’t constantly have my prestige attacked.

Bitsios: But they are all just playing internal politics.

The Secretary: But I can tell you that the people that have attacked me usually end up being mortally damaged themselves. Jackson tried it and he got nowhere. In the end Brademas will be discredited. He has just done a stupid thing. Above all, this presents the Turks with a beautiful excuse not to negotiate. If we had won the vote, the Turks would

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3 On July 24 the House voted 206–223 to reject an amended version of S. 846, which would have allowed resumption of most military aid to Turkey. The following day Turkey ordered the United States to cease operations at its 27 bases in Turkey, including 4 intelligence-gathering facilities. On July 31 the Senate voted 47–46 to pass a new bill, S. 2230, which contained the language in the rejected House bill. The House was unable to vote on the new bill before its month-long summer recess because of parliamentary obstacles. (Congress and the Nation, Vol. IV, 1973–1976, pp. 866–867)
have been morally obliged to do something. I know that your Government probably did the minimum although your Ambassador was probably a little overenthusiastic. This was mainly the actions of the Greek-American community. We have talked to Caglayangil and told him that something must happen. We have said that it is our belief that Caramanlis wants to settle this matter on generous terms but, of course, within his domestic limitations. We have said that you can get what you want if you act now. They told us they would try to come up with something. We also have encouraged the Europeans to take an initiative and we will support it.

Bitsios: I hope they are not thinking just of a démarche. That will not help us very much and that is not a good way to approach Turkey. Also Turkey might interpret it as weakness. They should have an honest feeling that we want to settle.

The Secretary: Yes, for you Cyprus is a disaster. The opposition will attack any settlement because it will not be as good a situation as before July. You know that the quicker you get a solution the better but no one knows how to move. We are effectively out of the act. Congressmen are even talking about getting a new man and taking me out but I can tell you this would lead to stalemate. They said to us at first there ought to be a discussion of the central government. What do you think we could do, Art?

Hartman: Is there any chance that we could be helpful in bringing together Caramanlis and Demirel here in Helsinki?

The Secretary: What is your impression?

Bitsios: I don’t think Demirel wants to meet with us.

The Secretary: Perhaps you are right. Can we think of anything else?

Bitsios: One thing you said strikes me. You said that we always put forward a position and then change it. I can tell you that the position that Caramanlis gave you is our minimum position. We do not want any further delay.

The Secretary: The history of the last year has been one of constant change on your part. First you wanted to go back to the 1960 agreements.

Bitsios: That was Mavros, not me.

The Secretary: Then you finally accepted a cantonal solution and you moved from 20 to 14 to 5 and finally to a bizonal arrangement. On territory you moved from 18 percent to 21 percent and now Makarios tells us he can accept 25 percent and a bizonal solution. By the way, the President told him he did not think that was enough. I think the Turks will settle for around 30. But the percentages are really not important. If we could go the route of specifying the territory—X, Y or Z that would be better. After all, it is more important if it is Famagusta and Morphu—then no one would care what percentage it was.
Perhaps at some point tactically someone else can put forward the idea so that you won’t have to back it.

Bitsios: But I can tell you that what Caramanlis said is our final position.

The Secretary: But he did not specify a specific percentage.

Bitsios: Do you see any role for the EC-Nine?

The Secretary: Italy, of course, is not exactly the best intermediary. The Germans would have more influence in Turkey. Maybe I should talk to Genscher.

Bitsios: The Nine seem to be willing to get in the picture. Turkey is in a real mess and they need help and we would want others to help them.

The Secretary: How can we help?

Bitsios: Everything would be settled automatically if we could move this negotiation along. You have talked to the Nine but I think you should talk to Genscher again and then I will explain our general position. It is difficult for me to talk to the Germans before the Italians who are in the chair but maybe the Germans could go separately to the Turks.

The Secretary: If the vote should pass this week and I am not asking for your help because I think the situation in Washington is too chaotic for anyone to be of important help—the Turks will have a moral obligation to make progress but I will ask the Germans to help you. And even if we fail, we will see if the Germans can support something. One of the tragedies of the present situation is that we are now going to have to pay to get our bases reopened—and what we pay we might have used to help produce a Cyprus solution. But if you have any ideas please tell us because regardless of what Congress does we want to support your Government and we know that in the end Turkey will have to make significant concessions. We don’t want Greece to go the way of Portugal and, in my view, that is not impossible. I think five years from now your military may turn to the left too.

Bitsios: I don’t think that will happen but we are in a serious situation now and we need economic help.

The Secretary: Aren’t we moving that along?

Hartman: Yes, it is in the Foreign Assistance Act.

Bitsios: That may be too late. We need it now. If we can get our economic situation straightened out, then Caramanlis can build a strong democratic regime.

The Secretary: We really want to help but the Greek Americans have got to get off our back.

Bitsios: Some day I will be free to tell you something about our Greek-American friends. This has been a very difficult period.

The Secretary: I recognize that. They were either Junta supporters before or they will attack Caramanlis to support the left-Papandreou.
184. Memorandum of Conversation

Helsinki, August 1, 1975, 1:30–2:35 p.m.

PARTICIPANTS
The President
Valery Giscard d’Estaing, President of the French Republic
Jean Sauvagnargues, Minister of Foreign Affairs
Claude Pierre-Brossolette, Secretary General of the Presidency of the Republic
Dr. Henry A. Kissinger, Secretary of State and Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs
Lt. General Brent Scowcroft, Deputy Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs

SUBJECTS
Economic Policy/Cyprus; French Nuclear Programs; Energy

[Omitted here is discussion unrelated to Cyprus.]

Giscard: I had breakfast with Karamanlis today. We are open to any suggestion for a European move which would help with the embargo. If there is no change I think it will be impossible to start any negotiation. The Greeks fear having the embargo lifted without any movement from the Turks.

President: Let me bring you up to date.
[Described the Congressional action to lift the embargo.] 2

The Senate passed it again yesterday, but it is difficult to get it through the House because of the rules. We can’t get anything until September. So we are in limbo.

Kissinger: No House move is possible until September 9. If the European appeal comes too soon, it will be dissipated. It would be the end of any appeal to both parties and to the U.S. to lift the embargo. Turkey might be able to respond to an appeal from you that they wouldn’t to us. We have a list of concessions.

Giscard: Are they significant?

Kissinger: Not now. The airport opening, some refugee return, etc. They could be made to look so if Greece cooperates. Greece will accept a bizonal arrangement and 25 percent of the territory to the Turks. Turkey has said they need 32 percent. So the difference comes down to 7 percent on territory. I think Greece will accept just short of 30 percent.

Giscard: They are Greek. It will be 27.8 percent or nothing.

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1 Source: Ford Library, National Security Adviser, Memoranda of Conversations, Box 14. Secret; Nodis. The luncheon meeting was held at the U.S. Embassy Residence.
2 Brackets are in the original.
Kissinger: I think we shouldn’t talk percentage, but what specific areas they want. The Greek portion of Famagusta, Morphou, etc.

Sauvagnargues: Yes. It is a question of what kind of territory.

Giscard: Yes. Like Morphou with an outlet to the sea.

Kissinger: If Ecevit were in, it would be settled quickly. He wants to use it now to break up the coalition.

Giscard: If Demirel is clever enough he can show it as a success.

Kissinger: But he can’t look weak.

The President: He can move more easily in response to a European appeal, rather than an American one.

Sauvagnargues: But how are we to make the position of the Nine more precise, to carry the weight with the Congress? It will be seen as implying the kind of settlement which would appeal to the parties. It is difficult.

Giscard: We would have to say it is a settlement according to certain principles, with vague wording. Then we could say we will help the parties to cooperate and call on the U.S. to lift the embargo as its contribution.

Sauvagnargues: Giscard said to Karamanlis that lifting the embargo would not necessarily resume arms deliveries.

Kissinger: But it would.

The President: [Describes the embargo and the types of aid. Also discusses the waiver authority.]

Giscard: If we were Metternich we could use another tactic. Turkey wants us to sell large amounts of arms. We said no, because we wouldn’t want to interfere vis-à-vis the Greeks, etc.

Kissinger: It would help with the Congress, if there were at least rumors.

The President: If the stories come from Europe it would help with the Congress—for aircraft, tank areas, etc.

Sauvagnargues: It would be delicate to manage, but it might be done.

Giscard: We will see what we can do. [Omitted here is discussion unrelated to Cyprus.]

3 Brackets are in the original.
New York, September 24, 1975, 4 p.m.

SUBJECT
Secretary’s Meeting with Greek Foreign Minister Bitsios

PARTICIPANTS
Greece
Foreign Minister Bitsios
Ambassador Carayannis, Greek Foreign Ministry
Mr. Vlassopoules, Notetaker

United States
The Secretary
Arthur A. Hartman, Assistant Secretary for European Affairs
William L. Eagleton, Notetaker

(Photographers take pictures.)
The Secretary: You might have to run for office in Greece.
(Laughter)
Bitsios: After your speech in the General Assembly yesterday,\(^2\) I can afford that (proximity to the Secretary).
The Secretary: You were pleased?
Bitsios: Yes.
The Secretary: That was our basic policy.
Bitsios: It gives the Turks an idea that others understand the basic elements of the Cyprus problem and are willing to declare them publicly. We are facing immobility from Ankara.
The Secretary: I had a talk yesterday with Caglayangil.\(^3\) (Hartman leaves room to pick up piece of paper.) They have me on a schedule where I can’t talk to my associates. The bureaucracy is gaining on me.
Bitsios: You have been in New York several days?

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1 Source: Library of Congress, Manuscript Division, Kissinger Papers, Box CL 274, Memoranda of Conversations, Chronological File. Secret; Nodis. Drafted by Eagleton and cleared in S on October 3. The meeting was held in the Secretary's suite at the Waldorf Astoria while he attended the UN General Assembly.

2 Kissinger delivered his speech on September 22. On Cyprus, Kissinger stated that the status quo must not be permanent and an equitable solution was imperative. For text, see Department of State Bulletin, Vol. LXXIII, No. 1894, October 13, 1975, pp. 545–553.

3 See Document 236.
The Secretary: Yes, since Monday. It is my impression from my talk with Caglayangil yesterday that he was more forthcoming than at any time I have seen him. Not that he gave me any formulas. I did not ask for any percentages, but I thought his attitude more forthcoming—but he conditioned it on the October 12 elections and on our Congressional vote. For the first time he specifically mentioned New Famagusta and Morphou as something to talk about if the constitutional arrangements are satisfactory. At first he proposed constitutional issues be decided first, but then in the course of our conversation he accepted that simultaneity could be applied. This is provided the arms embargo is lifted and the elections don’t represent a gain for Ecevit.

He said that if Denktash puts forward a territorial position, Ankara will not object.

We don’t expect your help on the arms embargo vote. I am merely explaining it to you. If it is lifted, we will make a major effort. If it is not lifted, I think the Turks will make life very difficult for us. I am not talking to Greek Congressmen this time so that there will not be any misunderstanding as there was before.

We will have a domestic mess if the embargo is lifted and there is no progress on Cyprus.

Bitsios: Prime Minister Caramanlis asked me to talk to you about the embargo. First of all, you are aware that we shall not be pleased with the lifting because we have no guarantee that the arms will not be used against us. Secondly, we will not take a public position or be active in Washington.

The Secretary: Your Embassy will not be active?

Bitsios: Our Embassy will remain neutral. Caramanlis told you and President Ford he is concerned that the Turks might get arms without a previous commitment.

A third question is how you envision making a gesture to Greece.

The Secretary: I have discussed with Jack Kubisch the possibility of sending a mission to Athens. The President and I were talking about sending a team to study your economic and military needs. We will then put it to Congress.

Bitsios: Is there a timetable?

The Secretary: No, we can discuss that. I did not want to give you a formal proposal that might have complicated things for you.

Bitsios: Re Cyprus, I don’t know what to tell you. It is clear that the reasons the Turks give for nothing happening are not convincing. On the election, if he loses, what will happen? If he wins, there might

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4 September 22.
be general elections. However, Caglayangil has given commitments to you and to the Nine.

The Secretary: As a practical matter, if the embargo is lifted and the Turks don’t do anything, we have to—but we have to consider what is meant by lifting the embargo. The present bill is only for the pipeline and not for grant or credit aid. Some items will not be on the list. The next thing would be to lift the ban on credits and grant aid in the foreign aid bill. If there is no progress by November, those restrictions will remain. I don’t want a situation where the Greeks don’t want progress so as not to help the Turks and the Turks are unable to move. But if nothing happens we will have to take a public position.

We are working closely with the Nine. They don’t have the firepower, but they have good will. But the Turks do want to belong to the European area. Genscher and Sauvagnargues told me they will talk to you.

I have made it clear to Caglayangil that if the embargo is lifted, something must happen. I have also agreed to try with the Greek community here. I feel the situation could force us to say something.

(To Hartman): What is your view?

Hartman: Someone on the Turkish side must screw up the courage to make proposals. Ecevit’s statements have been helpful. He talks of negotiations.

Bitsios: It is a question of what forum for negotiations. I am not sure under the Secretary General is the best forum for all things.

The Secretary: I believe you should begin with him.

Bitsios: This holds back the Nine. At first they had the elements of a solution.

The Secretary: What is your idea?

Bitsios: The Nine could have done it. I asked Rumor why they did not, and he said they did not want to embarrass Waldheim. The Nine can put forward things that Waldheim cannot. And this could lead to a breakthrough.

The Secretary: If Waldheim doesn’t do it, the Europeans could do it, or we could do it, or the two of us could together. But doing it together can work only if only two or three are designated. It cannot work with nine. In my mediations in the Middle East, the practice has been—I would as soon not do it. A settlement will not be wildly popular in Greece, and I am not volunteering. Our strategy has been to get the parties to state their positions and then we narrow the positions. This must be a continuing progress.

I believe this is easier than the Middle East. We know that it will be a bi-zonal system. We know something of the powers of the central government. Re territory, you have indicated three areas of importance:
New Famagusta, the Morphou area, and something below the Nicosia–Famagusta road.

Bitsios: Our position on percentage is that it should be proportional to the population.

The Secretary: That is your formal position, but I have been told on the Greek side 25 per cent and by the Turks 34 percent. I think it is best not to talk percentages at first. Instead, one can talk areas.

Bitsios: You can combine the two.

The Secretary: If we start with areas, the percentages might appear differently. The differences don’t seem unbridgeable.

Bitsios: No, unless they want to keep what they have.

The Secretary: Yes, if the Turks want an agreement, they can go beyond their wildest dreams of a year ago.

Bitsios: The present situation doesn’t make it easy for the Turks.

The Secretary: Caglayangil talked yesterday of withdrawal of forces. However, nothing was said with precision that could be put on paper. He has always been more forthcoming than Demirel. Demirel is very cautious. He is afraid of being accused of selling out by Ecevit.

Bitsios: Mr. Hartman says Ecevit is encouraging negotiations.

Hartman: He is pressing Demirel to give him his position.

The Secretary: Ecevit wants to use the negotiating issue to force early elections. He said first the government must take a position. Then he can attack Demirel on it. He knows that I know his previous position. He wants Erbakan out, and elections. If Ecevit were Prime Minister, we could settle Cyprus in a month. He screwed it up, though. All our calculations went down the drain. What is your idea? Should we and the Europeans both designate someone?

Bitsios: You went to Ankara and then your position weakened, so we went to the Europeans.

The Secretary: We have no objections that the Europeans designate someone—and we can also designate someone.

Hartman: It is important that this not look like international pressure on the Turks.

The Secretary: Can we keep the UN debate in low key?

Bitsios: I have discussed this this morning with the Cypriots. The Cypriots will wait until Turkish elections to see if the Turks are more forthcoming. In which case the debate would take another turn.

The Secretary: I think Waldheim should call a meeting of Clerides and Denktash within two to three weeks after the elections.

Bitsios: We must know first that Denktash will come forward with proposals.

The Secretary: I would be prepared to send someone to Ankara.
Bitsios: When is the Congressional vote?
The Secretary: Tuesday.⁵ Art, what is the Rules Committee decision?
Hartman: We haven’t heard yet.
The Secretary: I don’t understand what the Greek Congressmen are doing. If Brademas wins in the Rules Committee, things will blow up in Turkey and sooner or later the embargo will be lifted, but it won’t do anything for the Greeks. It is beyond my ability to reason with them. I respect Brademas, but he will lose in the end, like Jackson did.

Bitsios: What is next?
The Secretary: It may be over today. If they don’t rule on it, then Demirel may move to kick us out. (The Secretary asked to be connected by phone to Scowcroft.) The Greeks on the Rules Committee might prevent a vote this week, but if it goes to the House we will probably win by a narrow margin. What will happen is that many people are becoming isolationists. I don’t want to give the impression we want you to help. That is not possible. If the bill doesn’t pass, the Turks might do something irreversible. If it does pass, let’s discuss what we can do. (Secretary speaks with Washington by phone.) They have reported the bill out of the Rules Committee nine to six and there will be a vote next week.

I think Hartman should see Caglayan to make sure he understands that if we win the vote and nothing happens, it would make our position impossible. We should tell him this before the vote. Then we wait until October 12. I should send Arthur (Hartman) to Ankara to talk to them—maybe a European should go with him. Maybe he should go to Athens also.

Are you prepared to talk about equal representation in the government?
Bitsios: That is a Cypriot problem.
The Secretary: What do they think?
Bitsios: It is difficult for them to swallow.
The Secretary: (To Hartman): What do you think?
Hartman: It is more a question of the Head of State. If that is settled, there could be agreement.

Bitsios: They will need Makarios for some time. The central government should not have too much power, so that serious divisions will not occur.

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⁵ September 29. The House voted 237–176 on October 2 to partially lift the embargo per S. 2230 but with an amendment requesting the President to open talks with Turkey on preventing the diversion of Turkish opium into illicit channels. Ford signed S. 2230 into law on October 6. (Congress and the Nation, Vol. IV, 1973–1976, p. 867)
The Secretary: You are willing to discuss loose powers?

Bitsios: Yes.

The Secretary: That is perhaps the way to approach it. I don’t want personally to get involved until I see the parameters.

Bitsios: You will see this with the Europeans. You can then undertake the main bargaining.

The Secretary: There is no question of pride involved between us and the Europeans. Let them designate someone and we will be in touch.

Hartman, do you think it will work?

Hartman: It will be difficult for the Europeans to get a position together.

The Secretary: Later we will need someone to drive it home. We will cooperate with the Europeans.

Hartman: It should begin under Waldheim.

The Secretary: The purpose of your trip would be to get the Turks to put something forward at the next meeting. We won’t do all the work for Greece and Turkey.

Bitsios: If you get a breakthrough we can continue the negotiations.

The Secretary: Yes. If you get an agreement on territory.

Bitsios: Before I leave, I would like to know what is the linkage of aid to Greece and your dealings with Turkey? You asked about the timing of a mission to Greece. I can see the Prime Minister and tell him. We would like to have the two issues separate. We are not twins with the Turks.

The Secretary: Caglayangil said to me yesterday he wanted an official call in Turkey. I said in that case I would have to go to Greece, and he said: “We are not twins.” (Laughter)

Bitsios: We have discussed assistance to Greece in Rome. You said it should be on a grand scale. Our Minister of Finance came over here and came back with an encouraging report. We are not underdeveloped any more, but we have specific needs after seven years of military government. There are the problems of expense for petroleum and defense.

The Secretary: It is easier to do things for Greece under the condition of lifting of the Turkish embargo. To make a massive program for Greece when the Turks feel we are discriminating against them is difficult. This does not mean we need an aid program for Turkey now.

(To Hartman): How are they linked?

Hartman: Grant aid on military supplies would be difficult if there was no aid to Turkey. There is no link on economic aid. We may put a provision in the bill and then hold up implementation on the military side.
The Secretary: I would prefer a package of aid to Israel, Egypt, Bangladesh, Greece, Turkey and Portugal rather than individual bills. I don’t see any advantage of a Greek-Turkish package. I would rather have items that have a constituency be put in the same bill with others. Then the Jews and the Greeks will help us get aid through.

Bitsios: When will this be?

The Secretary: Within a month.

Bitsios: Is the assistance to Israel from your last agreement?

The Secretary: We have a demoralized and cynical country. Before, seventy-six Senators called for aid to Israel. Now Congress is in the position to blame me for what they would have done anyway. The agreement doesn’t affect what Congress would have done. There is something for Egypt.

Do you prefer a totally separate bill?

Hartman: What we are thinking of is in terms of a loan going in with the package.

Bitsios: Our concern is that with the passing of the embargo bill, we have a feeling in Athens—first, what has Turkey done?—nothing. Second, the arms can be used against Greece. So something must be done to show it is not inimical.

We are doing things to explain to public opinion that the US position on the embargo is based on strategic considerations. This attempts to explain it, but there will be things you can do to sweeten it.

The Secretary: We are willing to send a team to look at economic and military needs. I would be willing to submit to Congress a one-time loan and grant and credit military package. That (the loan) can be announced when you want it.

Bitsios: Can I send you a message on that?

The Secretary: Yes. It would be better to announce it after the Turkish vote. Any time after the following Monday. Then we would send Hartman within a few days of the Turkish vote to Ankara and Athens. I believe the UN debate should be muted. You wouldn’t think of negotiating until after the debate?

Bitsios: No.

Hartman: Will Makarios remain here?

Bitsios: No, only for a few days.

The Secretary: We have to find out from the Turks after the elections what they can do. Then you can decide how to play the Assembly. Then get the debate over quickly.

(The group stands to leave)

The Secretary: What should we say to the press?

Bitsios: That we had a long and interesting conversation and a further exchange of views on a variety of subjects.
Washington, October 1, 1975, 1613Z.

233620. Subject: Secretary’s September 29 Bilateral with Makarios.2

1. The Secretary, accompanied by Undersecretary Sisco and EUR/SE Eagleton, met with President Makarios, Foreign Minister Christophides, Ambassador to the UN Rossides and Ambassador to the US Dimitriou on September 29 in New York.

2. Makarios expressed appreciation for the proposals made by the Secretary in his UNGA speech3 and indicated that he continued to believe the Secretary had a key role to play in reaching a Cyprus settlement. The Secretary said the United States was prepared to play a role, but he could not be usefully involved if he were constantly harassed by Congress and the Greek-American community. He observed that the Turkish arms embargo might have been useful as a threat, but not as a reality.

3. When the Secretary asked for Makarios’ idea of a reasonable settlement, the Archbishop replied that the basis could be bizonal, with a Turkish area less than 25 per cent and a central government in which Turks did not participate on a fifty-fifty basis. He said the powers of the central government were not of major importance. The Secretary replied that he had no precise idea regarding the percentage basis of a final settlement, though he felt it unrealistic to expect a Turkish zone of less than 25 per cent. He suggested that a more practical approach would be to consider a return of territory on the basis of regions: for example something in Famagusta, Morphou and the area south of the Nicosia–Famagusta Road.

4. Re next steps, the Secretary said that once the arms embargo was lifted and the Turkish Senate election had taken place, he would be prepared to make a major effort to obtain a Turkish territorial position as a basis for renewed negotiations. He did not specify what form that effort would take. He warned that the negotiating process would be slow and would have its difficult moments, particularly toward the end. He counseled moderation in the UNGA debate, noting that if there

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2 A September 29 memorandum of conversation of the meeting, which was held at the Waldorf Astoria in New York City, is in the Library of Congress, Manuscript Division, Kissinger Papers, Box CL 274, Memoranda of Conversations, Chronological File.

3 See footnote 2, Document 185.
was no progress in two or three months, the issue could be raised again in the General Assembly.

5. Makarios expressed concern over the weakness of the Turkish Government and its inability to move on Cyprus. The Secretary acknowledged that this was a problem but reiterated that he would make a major personal effort. The Turks, he said, had been told that if the embargo was lifted, the US-Turkish relationship would depend on movement on Cyprus. This would place maximum pressure on the Turks, and if a period free from Congressional harassment could be obtained, there was a chance for progress.

6. After the meeting Makarios made some remarks to the press to the effect that he had discussed various aspects of the Cyprus problem with the Secretary and they had made assessments on further developments and repercussions if no solution is found. Makarios added that he believed the Secretary could play an important role in achieving a peaceful and just settlement. Christophides told us later that Makarios was relieved that he was able to get into the elevator and away before the reporters asked his views on the Turkish arms embargo.

Ingersoll

187. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Cyprus

Washington, November 21, 1975, 2002Z.

276244. Subject: Secretary’s Meeting with Denktash.2

1. Rauf Denktash came to Washington from New York morning November 20, met with the Secretary, and returned immediately to New York where UNGA debate was still in progress. Denktash’s presentation of Turkish-Cypriot case contained much bitterness toward Makarios and frustration over unequal status of Turkish Cypriots at the UN. He said that purpose of trip to Moslem countries and to New York was to undo damage that Makarios had caused. He had wanted

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1 Source: Ford Library, National Security Adviser, President Country Files for Middle East and South Asia, Box 2, Cyprus Exdis. Secret; Immediate; Exdis. Drafted by Eagleton and approved by Hartman and in S. Repeated Immediate to Athens, Ankara, and USUN.

2 A November 20 memorandum of conversation of this meeting is in the National Archives, RG 59, Records of Joseph Sisco, 1951–1976, Entry 5405, Box 21, Cyprus 1974/1975.
to show Greek Cypriots that Makarios could not get away with it and thereby turn Greeks toward a more realistic approach to negotiations.

2. The Secretary acknowledged that the Cypriot problem did not begin in July 1974. He observed, however, that there was now a stalemate and that if nothing happens, Congress will pass additional restrictive measures which will further damage US-Turkish relations and hurt Turkish-Cypriot position as well. He observed that Turkish side could now have far more than was thought possible two years ago, under bizonal system and central government with limited powers. With a weak central government the participation issue would not be so important. Question now was whether Turkish side would be able to put forward territorial proposals. If not, we would be in difficult position, having obtained lifting of arms embargo on basis that progress would be made on Cyprus.

3. Denktash argued that a show of too much eagerness to negotiate was a bad tactic, and would only make Makarios more difficult. He had suggested to Waldheim that he should leave Makarios alone for a while and the latter would come to him with renewed interest in intercommunal talks. He complained that Makarios had never renounced enosis and would have to do so.

4. The Secretary suggested that renunciation of enosis could be part of a package. Denktash agreed there could be a package settlement. He emphasized, however, that while Greeks look at economic gains, Turks look at territorial problem from point of view of future security of Turkish sector. Turkish military believe that cession of New Famagusta would cause security problem. Denktash suggested, but did not insist, that there should be an interim government which could negotiate territorial aspects.

5. With regard to renewal of intercommunal talks, Denktash said that because of developments at the UN, he must save face and continue to make negative noises for a while. He felt then Waldheim would approach the two sides and “at a certain stage,” they would agree on talks. He thought, however, that talks should be prepared beforehand in Nicosia, possibly with Waldheim’s representatives shuttling between him and Clerides.

6. In closing, the Secretary again warned that if the Turks do not put something forward, Congressional pressures would weaken US-Turkish relations and the position of the Turkish-Cypriot community as well.

7. After the meeting Denktash met briefly with the press. He denounced Makarios and Greek-Cypriot activities at the UN. In answer to a question re resumption of intercommunal talks, he said he must reserve his position pending the outcome of the UNGA vote on Cyprus resolution.

Kissinger
277353. Subject: Cyprus Ambassador’s Call on Under Secretary Sisco.

1. Cyprus Ambassador Dimitriou called on Under Secretary on Friday, November 21. Dimitriou stated he was interested in Rauf Denktash’s call yesterday on the Secretary but that he first wished to get into the more important question of Cyprus’ future. With the arms embargo lifted, the Turkish elections concluded and the UN debate over, Dimitriou wondered what would be the next step by the US.

2. Sisco said that we have been engaged in a major effort to get resumption of the talks and that the effort would continue. It had to be acknowledged that to date this effort has not been as fruitful as we both would have wished. Sisco stated that he was convinced all parties wanted the talks to resume, but if they were to be meaningful—they had to start on a meaningful basis. The thrust of our discussions with the Turks has been that the time is propitious for talks to start. We have indicated that to the degree that Turkey can be specific on territory the better are the prospects for successful negotiations. We have made it clear to the Turks that Congress expects movement and that the administration is committed to get meaningful talks started.

3. Sisco turned to the Cyprus resolution, which he termed unhelpful. Dimitriou asked why we abstained. Sisco said that we had made it clear we could not accept a resolution that was not acceptable to both sides. Replying to Dimitriou’s comment that we had voted against allowing Denktash to address the plenary, Sisco said that had been a matter of a constitutional principle. It had had nothing to do with the merits of the issues involved.


2 See Document 187.

3 Regarding the lifting of the arms embargo, see footnote 5, Document 185; Turkish Senatorial elections were held October 22; and the UN debate concluded with the adoption on UN General Assembly Resolution on November 20 by a vote of 117–1 (Turkey) with 9 abstentions, including the United States. The resolution demanded the withdrawal of foreign troops and called for the voluntary return of refugees and the immediate resumption of negotiations. (Yearbook of the United Nations, 1975, p. 300–301)
4. Dimitriou asked Sisco if he thought Denktash would resort to UDI in the aftermath of UN consideration of Cyprus. Sisco expressed the hope that they would not, and said he felt this particular action was not foremost in their minds at the moment.

Kissinger

189. Memorandum From A. Denis Clift of the National Security Council Staff to the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (Scowcroft)


SUBJECT
U.S. Emissary to Break Greek/Turkish/Cyprus Impasse

I. Report on Haig Mission

In reporting on his meeting last Friday with General Sancar, General Haig has noted (Tab A) that the Turkish General Staff is presently maintaining the same tough line as Prime Minister Demirel:

— the United States must lift its arms embargo before Turkey will open U.S. installations,
— the United States must provide greater grant support to Turkey,
— there can be no linkage between the US-Turkish issue and the Cyprus crisis,
— the United States must stop favoring Greece,
— despite Turkey’s good intentions, efforts toward a Cyprus settlement are destined to failure because of the perfidy of Archbishop Makarios and the inability of the Greeks to control him.

Based on his conversation with General Sancar, General Haig believes:
— it should be possible to reduce the Turkish grant aid demand from $700 million over five years to $300–$400 million, if the latter amount is front-loaded.

1 Source: Ford Library, National Security Adviser, Presidential Country Files for Middle East and South Asia, Box 33, Turkey 14. Secret; Sensitive; Eyes Only; Outside the System. Sent for action. Scowcroft wrote “Thanks” on the memorandum.

2 February 13.

3 Not attached and not found; summarized below.
—concerning Cyprus, the fundamental problem is the mistrust between Greece and Turkey.

Accordingly, General Haig recommends that:
—consideration be given to naming a special emissary to give the Turks greater confidence in the good faith of the Greek side and its ability to deliver on the terms of acceptable details of a compromise Cyprus solution,
—that the Cagliyargent visit be re-scheduled as soon as possible,
—that we work out a formula with Cagliyargent that enables us to compromise with the Turks on the reopening of the bases in Turkey—i.e., that we be in position to tell Congress that “almost all” the bases are operating while the Turks are still in position to say that the “key” bases are closed.

II. Overview of Current Situation

General Sancar’s unbending reception of General Haig again underscores the current impasses we face in the Greek/Turkish/Cyprus problem:
—the Greeks and Turks do not trust each other;
—the Turks do not trust the United States because of the actions of our Congress;
—the Congress does not trust the U.S. Executive enough to give the President the latitude and the tools he requires to move the parties toward agreement.

At the same time, no matter what may be said publicly, I believe that each of the parties is counting on the United States to produce the forward movement required for a settlement.

At present, Secretary of State Kissinger is directing our diplomatic efforts toward Greece, Turkey and Cyprus. With the intercommunal talks about to resume on February 17, with the likelihood of renewed Congressional criticism if the President—by the time of his April report—is unable to report progress on Cyprus and if the U.S. bases in Turkey are still closed, with the probability that a carefully structured Presidential initiative would be interpreted by all concerned—Greece, Turkey, Cyprus, the U.N. Secretary General and our NATO and EC friends—as a very important opportunity for progress that must be seized, the President may wish to consider naming a Special Emissary to

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4 Public Law 94–104, signed by the President on October 5, required the President to submit at 60-day intervals reports to Congress on progress made toward solution of the Cyprus problem.
represent the United States with the parties and to move them closer together and toward a settlement.

What are the pros and cons of naming a Special Emissary:

Pros:

— a fresh initiative by the President lifting everyone’s sights above the current stalemate, demonstrating his leadership and galvanizing all parties to work toward a settlement;

— the entry of a new U.S. negotiator able to devote full time to the task and unencumbered by the Secretary of State’s past involvement in the issue. This latter point is important:

— The Secretary of State is mistrusted by many Greeks because of the Nixon Administration’s support for the former Greek junta government, and because of allegations concerning his role in the 1974 Cyprus crisis. It would, in fact, be difficult for the Secretary even to visit Athens announced without generating a riot;

— The Secretary of State does not have the confidence of the pro-Greek elements in the U.S. Congress because of the reasons just cited;

— The Secretary of State does not have Prime Minister Demirel’s full trust because of the Secretary’s former professor-student relationship with Ecevit and Demirel’s current political rivalry with Ecevit;

— The Secretary of State cannot afford the time that would be required for such a Presidential initiative—Turks and Greeks have reacted somewhat cynically in the past to the Secretary’s treating their problems as a mere appendage to his Middle Eastern shuttle diplomacy.

— Knowing as we do that the Caramanlis Government is willing to make the major concessions required for a settlement, the U.S. Emissary would have the tools required to move the parties toward a settlement.

— The U.S. Emissary could move between capitals—allowing the Greeks, Turks and both Cypriot representatives to avoid the risk of losing face—during delicate stages of the negotiations. We presently do not have this latitude, as Ambassadors Macomber, Kubisch and Crawford are each too compartmentalized to be effective in this regard.

— If there is progress on Cyprus—even signalled by the naming of the Emissary—there is the real opportunity for progress on the US-Turkish front.

Cons:

— there is the risk of false expectations on the part of all concerned, and the Presidential initiative would have to be couched in terms of our renewed willingness to be of help—with the main burden still on the shoulders of the Parties directly involved;

— the Secretary of State might prefer to keep direct responsibility to the President on this issue.
III. Next Steps

I am in favor of the naming of a new U.S. Emissary. I think the timing is right; we have the opportunity to get moving and it may be more difficult to do so if many more months pass. The Emissary should be an individual of known stature and ability not linked in any way to the personalities or current framework of our Cyprus efforts. In my opinion, Herbert Brownell, former Attorney General, successful negotiator of the US-Mexican Boundary Agreement (and a Republican well-known to the President) would be a very strong candidate for this role.

Recalling your comments about the need for crisp, forward looking language in the President’s State of the World speech, I believe this speech to the Congress, if delivered within the next few weeks, would offer the right occasion for announcement of the Brownell mission. These would not be speechwriter’s words, they would be Presidential action.

I recommend that you discuss the possibility of naming a U.S. Emissary with the President and the Secretary of State. If all concerned agree that it is a move warranting approval and early action—and if the emissary selected agrees to take on the task—discreet, advance consultations with the parties involved will be required prior to the President’s public announcement of the mission.

Recommendation

That you discuss with the President the naming of a special U.S. Emissary—possibly Herbert Brownell—to head U.S. diplomatic effects in the Greece/Turkey/Cyprus problems.5

5 No action is indicated.

190. Memorandum of Conversation1

Washington, June 16, 1976, 11:45 a.m.

SUBJECT

Cyprus Negotiations

1 Source: Library of Congress, Manuscript Division, Kissinger Papers, Box CL 276, Memoranda of Conversations, Chronological File. Secret; Nodis. Drafted by Eagleton on June 17 and approved in S on July 9. The meeting was held in the Secretary’s office.
Christophides: Thank you for giving me your time. I know that you are very busy right now. There have been unpleasant developments.

The Secretary: Usually when these things happen, there is nothing you can do.

Christophides: Do you know who is responsible?

The Secretary: No, we do not know who or what is behind this. There is nothing you can do until you know who has him.

Christophides: It is difficult when there are so many factions.

The Secretary: Maybe the Greeks are behind it.

(Laughter)

Christophides: (smiling) I don’t think so. Don’t put this in the record.

The Secretary: (smiling) If you were behind it, it would be much more complicated.

Christophides: Dr. Kissinger, the last time we met was in New York in October, 1975. During that meeting you told us that in order for the Turks to move and for you to have leverage on them, you needed two things: 1) lifting of the embargo and 2) the Turkish Senate elections which would give strength to the Turkish Government. You said you could then try to get the Turks to produce some progress on Cyprus. On October 1 the embargo was lifted. On October 22 there was a strengthening of the Turkish Government. I remember that I put the question to you: How can there be a strengthening of the Turkish Government with these partial elections? Your answer was: We can’t take these domestic developments as an excuse for no movement on Turkey’s part regarding Cyprus.

Then there is the question of pressure on Turkey. I remember that when we met last time Sisco repeated what he had said before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee to the effect that if the Turks are intransigent, it would go to the heart of US-Turkish relations.

2 See Document 186.
Eight months have unfortunately passed and there is no movement. The situation is worsening. There have been expulsions from the north, there have been no refugees returned, there has been Turkish colonization, and there has been a recent development which was reported by the “Economist.” This involves looting in New Famagusta.

The Secretary: What do you mean?

Christophides: Famagusta was a ghost town guarded by the Turkish army. Now there is systematic looting of hotels, shops, banks and so on.

I have been wondering what happened that there has been no effective pressure on the Turks. Second, I would like to know how you envisage a process toward the solution of the problem.

The Secretary: We have spoken before, and you know my views. I have never negotiated in a situation where the government of one side was vilifying us in the press, also the Greek community, and then privately comes to us as the party from which they expect to obtain solutions. When I meet Greeks and Greek Cypriots, we have warm relations, but then the press treats us quite differently. You have also used Congressional pressures. We have never had anything like it. In other negotiations the parties worked with us. So all of this creates serious problems.

This morning we were discussing some of the unilateral concessions the Turks were willing to make in 1974. There was a whole list. This is to indicate that with a slightly accusatory tone you can’t put us in an impossible position on the one hand and ask help on the other. In fact we have talked often to the Turks about Cyprus and we have gone to the Germans and the French and the British to get them to do likewise. This has developed into a difficult situation. We are now trying to get talks started again. If your side put forward a map at the next meeting and the Turks replied with a map or with specific territorial formulations, then there could be a subcommittee in Nicosia. I don’t see the problem with Nicosia subcommittees.

Christophides: You refer to “a slightly accusatory tone.”

(The Secretary is called out of the room.)

The Secretary: What can be done? It is hard for us to bring pressures on the Turks when there is no negotiation going on. I discussed this with Waldheim\(^3\) and suggested that the Greek side could put forward a map showing 20% for the Turks, then let the Turks put forward a map or precise criteria. Then you could move to a subcommittee.

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\(^3\) According to a May 3 briefing memorandum, Kissinger met with Waldheim on May 4 in Nairobi, Kenya, while attending the May 3–6 United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD) conference. (Telegram 107038 to the Secretary’s Delegation; National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy Files, 1976) No memorandum of this conversation has been found.
you agree, we would urge this on the Turks. Even if two useless and preposterous maps are put out at first, we will have something on which to work.

Christophides: Our position is that: 1) the negotiating process is the best way to seek a solution; 2) there was the agreement in Vienna on 22 February; 3) the Vienna communiqué makes two main points: a) each side should submit concrete proposals. We have done so and the Turks have not; b) for the parties to go to the subcommittees, there must be a common basis.

We have submitted proposals. We would be prepared to come forward with a map provided the Turks also come forward with a map (later it was clarified that he meant simultaneously) but we can’t refer them to subcommittees unless a common basis is developed. Otherwise there will be a protracted delay and nothing will be accomplished.

The Secretary: What common basis do you need?

Christophides: I told Waldheim that I was not at Vienna and that he should tell us what this common basis is.

The Secretary: How do you have that when you will say 20% and they will say 38%?

Christophides: Wouldn’t it be a good thing to have 20% and 38%? That is the time when someone else, Dr. Kissinger or Waldheim, could come in with an idea.

The Secretary: The problem is that a gap of 18% is one thing and 4% another. Both sides would like to hold someone else responsible. We could say 27%, but then we would see riots in Athens and Nicosia if the US put forward a proposition. We want you to come closer before we make proposals. Everyone knows more or less where it will come out.

Christophides: We don’t.

The Secretary: I have talked about this to Makarios5 and know where he would be willing to go. He thinks he has more of a margin. The Turks have mumbled some things to us about percentages, and the two sides are not that far apart. Privately the two sides are within range of each other. If you said to the Turks what you have said privately, and the Turks say to you what Caglayangil has said to others, you would have something.

I am sorry, I must go to the White House. I will leave this for the afternoon.

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4 See footnote 2, Document 186.
Cyprus 637

(Secretary leaves the room.)

Christophides: The Secretary says that he has had some territorial indications from Caglayangil. How does one get that?

Hartman: You don’t seem to take seriously the Turkish desire for a military presence at the talks. The Turkish argument is that they need a military man there.

Christophides: They can bring one then.

Hartman: They want this in the subcommittee. It would change the basic pattern if they brought him to Vienna. This is what the Greek and Turkish Ministers discussed at the NATO meeting in Brussels.

Christophides: At Brussels it was agreed that only details would go to the subcommittees. That is the problem.

(Secretary returns briefly.)

The Secretary: After you have had lunch, come back and we will meet for fifteen minutes or so at 2:30.

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191. Memorandum of Conversation

Washington, June 16, 1976, 2:30 p.m.

SUBJECT
Cyprus Negotiations

PARTICIPANTS

Cyprus
Foreign Minister John Christophides
Ambassador Dimitriou
Minister-Counselor Angelides
Mr. Pasharkis, Aide to Christophides

US
The Secretary
Ambassador William Crawford
William L. Eagleton, EUR/SE

Christophides: Do you have news regarding your Ambassador in Beirut?

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1Source: Library of Congress, Manuscript Division, Kissinger Papers, Box CL 276, Memoranda of Conversations, Chronological File. Secret; Nodis. Drafted by Eagleton on June 17 and cleared in S on July 9. The meeting was held in the Secretary’s office.
The Secretary: Yes, he and his Deputy have been killed.
Christophides: Do you know who did it?
The Secretary: No, we do not know yet. This is not one of our better days.
Christophides: I very much regret it.
The Secretary: Back to our discussion. You feel there has to be a common basis before you can go to subcommittees, but the Turks argue that there must be a military expert present. Secondly, the Turks say that in Vienna everything becomes public.
Christophides: My question is regarding the second point. Why must it be more public there than in the subcommittee? It would be better if they find a way to discuss this in Vienna in secrecy with only two persons there.
The Secretary: What is your objection to subcommittees? I do not understand it.
Christophides: What will the subcommittee do?
The Secretary: Narrow the differences.
Christophides: The subcommittee level cannot make political decisions. They cannot say what would be the extent of territory. Second, we know from our own sources that the plan of Denktash is to send the problem to the subcommittee so as to kill it as an issue, to show the world that he is negotiating. Third, there has been an agreement in Vienna which they want to go back on. This is that there must be a “common basis.” I admit that I do not know what is meant by common basis. Perhaps Waldheim knows.
The Secretary: He hasn’t told me. The idea I have had is that if you put forward a map then they will put forward a map or exact criteria. I suspect, however, that prior to our elections they will not listen to our pressures. The tragedy is that we did not settle this in 1974. Even as late as January, 1975, there was a Turkish package. Then the embargo came. Another possibility was during the Geneva talks in 1974 when the Turks put forward the Gunes plan. This was that if you gave them immediately the northern district or 19% or 20%, they would relax and negotiate the other areas with you. These would not have been given back. It was our fault not to have pressed, but there would have been riots in Athens and in Nicosia if we had supported this plan. The dilemma at that time was that we could not consider imposing it.
Christophides: I understand that.
The Secretary: Demirel is scared of his elections which must occur before October 1977. At one time I thought of sending an emissary to the parties, but with a 20% difference in the positions, an American emissary would antagonize everyone. Now if the difference were between 26 and 34 per cent, it would be manageable. In the Middle East
negotiations I stayed on for weeks until there was a narrow difference and then put forward an American plan which I thought could be accepted by both parties. Makarios talked reasonably to me. What he said had possibilities.

Christophides: He also talked to Schmidt.

Suppose we were to give you a map and say these are our territorial positions?

The Secretary: A realistic map?

Christophides: Yes, but you hold back one or two per cent and the Turks do the same and give us a map.

The Secretary: That is an interesting idea. I assume the map is not what you have already proposed. It is better to put that proposal first and then we can say to the Turks that we will go to the Cypriots and get a realistic map and that they might answer it with a map. Then you give us a map minus 2 per cent. This is an ingenious idea. We can certainly try it, but you would have to go to another Vienna round.

Christophides: I emphasize that this is my personal idea and has to be checked out with the government.

The Secretary: I might also ask some Western Europeans to join us and perhaps Waldheim. Or would you prefer we do it alone?

Christophides: I have not studied this in detail. I was just thinking aloud.

The Secretary: I like the principle of it.

I am sorry that our meeting has been interrupted so often.

Christophides: I appreciate your attention to our problems.

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192. Memorandum of Conversation

Washington, June 23, 1976, 10:04–11:01 a.m.

PARTICIPANTS

President Ford
Donald Rumsfeld, Secretary of Defense
Brent Scowcroft, Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs

[Omitted here is discussion unrelated to Cyprus.]

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1 Source: Ford Library, National Security Adviser, Memoranda of Conversations, Box 20. Secret; Nodis. The meeting was held in the Oval Office.
[Rumsfeld:] Carter has a group working on the Cyprus issue, including Brzezinski etc. Their people are saying the Republicans screwed up with the Greek colonels and didn’t keep them from going into Cyprus. Then Carter meets with the Greeks, makes friends with them, and tells them he has to give the appearance of evenhandedness to solve the problem. Then he says the key to everything is a Cyprus solution. Therefore, the base deals should be scrapped. Instead we should negotiate a 1–2-year base deal and then go after Cyprus.

[Omitted here is discussion unrelated to Cyprus.]

193. Memorandum of Conversation

Washington, October 2, 1976, 1 p.m.

SUBJECT
Southern Africa, North/South Relations, The Middle East, Nuclear Non-Proliferation, Cyprus, The Aegean, MBFR

PARTICIPANTS
Netherlands
Foreign Minister van der Stoel
Ambassador Tammenoms Bakker
M.J.H.C. Rutten, Director General, Ministry of Foreign Affairs
Lodewijk van Gorkom, Director General for International Cooperation
Maxime De Jonge, Political Counselor, Embassy of the Netherlands

United States
The Secretary
The Deputy Secretary
Ambassador McCloskey
Counselor Sonnenfeldt
Assistant Secretary Hartman
Katherine Shirley, EUR/NE (notetaker)

[Omitted here is discussion unrelated to Cyprus.]

van der Stoel: I’d like to turn to Cyprus.
The Secretary: That’s a problem I’d like to turn over to the EC-Nine.

van der Stoel: You have formulated principles about which we have informed the others. I have a question about what is called frontier rectification. You say that territory should be reduced.

The Secretary: Do we need the words “boundary rectification?”

van der Stoel: Rectification sounds minor.

The Secretary: And I don’t like the word boundary. Why not say territorial adjustments.

van der Stoel: That would be more acceptable to the Greeks. The French think that the principles are too vague.

Rutten: Yes, they say it’s all old hat, and has no new elements. They think it should be more specific and should say what the adjustments would be and what the constitutional arrangements should be.

The Secretary: That is stage two.

van der Stoel: I agree with you.

The Secretary: Right now the Turks have, what? 38%? The Greeks are willing to go towards 30%. But if we push them they may use it as an excuse to beat us to death. Let them negotiate. Let the Turks go to 34% and the Greeks to 26%, and then they can move to 30%. That is not possible now because neither side wants to settle right now for domestic reasons. They should negotiate first.

van der Stoel: The present Turkish government cannot make major decisions. That situation may last until October 1977.

Rutten: Caglayangil said they were willing to negotiate on territorial issues.

The Secretary: They always say that in the abstract but quickly get bogged down in procedural disputes.

Mr. Hartman: They want the other side to put its proposals down.

van der Stoel: It’s true. They hide behind procedural difficulties.

The Secretary: I would support anything leading to negotiations.

Mr. Hartman: The main thing is to get the process going and to get both sides involved in it.

The Secretary: Caglyangil and Bitsios both said my speech at the UN was especially fruitful—and I said nothing.\(^2\)

van der Stoel: So you will suggest principles in the near future?

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\(^2\) Kissinger addressed the General Assembly on September 30. He reiterated the need for a Cyprus settlement negotiated by the Cypriot communities and the U.S. readiness to assist in restoring the momentum. For text, see Department of State Bulletin, Vol. LXXV, No. 1948, October 25, 1976, pp. 497–510.
The Secretary: We’d like to do it with someone else.
van der Stoel: We would be willing although the doubt is about the French.
Rutten: They might go along.
The Secretary: This doesn’t preclude more detailed proposals later on.
van der Stoel: We will be having a ministerial-level meeting on October 18.
Rutten: The question is whether we should have a combined proposal or a parallel one.
The Secretary: I think parallel.
van der Stoel: It would be easier for the French if it were parallel.
The most dangerous problem there is not Cyprus but the Aegean.
The Secretary: That’s right. One of the French—De Laboulaye—says that there is Greek willingness to settle.
Mr. Hartman: They said they have concessions.
The Secretary: They can’t make concessions on delimitation. Their claim goes all the way to Turkey. The Turks only want a median line. But if the Turks accept delimitation, the Greeks can claim sovereignty permanently and undo the joint ventures.
Mr. Hartman: They’d be better to leave another area for joint exploitation.
The Secretary: The Greeks have to give up something on delimitation.
van der Stoel: Turkey must be prevented from further unilateral action—not just Sismik but something like drilling.
The Secretary: The Greeks and Turks are beyond my comprehension. At the Security Council debate we had a resolution which was better for the Greeks. But it would have been a consensus resolution instead of a voted one and they didn’t want that. At the end of ten days, the Greeks happily accepted less than they could have had earlier. It permitted the deepest voyage yet of Sismik. But I agree, we must use our influence to prevent Turkish unilateral action.
[Omitted here is discussion unrelated to Cyprus.]
194. Action Memorandum From the Assistant Secretary of State for European Affairs (Hartman) to Secretary of State Kissinger


FUTURE CYPRUS POLICY

I. The Problem

The situation in the Eastern Mediterranean remains highly volatile. Greece and Turkey eye each other in the Aegean and over Cyprus as adversaries rather than as NATO allies. Cyprus itself remains divided, with both ethnic communities leery of real negotiations. Since all parties have looked to the United States with expectation in this election year, the question now is whether we can use this to generate the kind of forward movement which has thus far eluded us. The paper that follows analyzes our current problems on Cyprus and in the Eastern Mediterranean generally, and suggests possible approaches which might be undertaken in the months ahead.

II. The Current Situation

A. Cyprus: There has been no significant movement toward a settlement of the Cyprus problem since the coup against Makarios and the Turkish seizure of the northern forty per cent of the island in July–August 1974. Neither community seems willing to accept the risks it perceives as flowing from a serious negotiation. The Greek Cypriots know that any negotiated settlement will mean a permanent division of their island, possession by the Greeks of a far smaller land area than they held before mid-1974, and reduced power and prestige for the central government. Rather than accept such a result, the Greek Cypriots would rather stand pat and hope to mobilize the considerable international support they still enjoy to force a solution on Turkey.

In contrast, the Turkish Cypriots, content with the current status of the island, are reluctant to begin a negotiating process from which they will emerge with less than they now hold. The Turkish Cypriots know they will have to give up some territory, and they fear that whatever the constitutional solution, their physical safety and prosperity will once again become dependent on the good will of the numerically larger Greek-Cypriot community.

Under these circumstances, imaginative proposals or great flexibility will not be forthcoming from either community, though both will publicly acknowledge that the present situation is unstable and that further fighting could erupt at any time.

B. Role of the United Nations: The United Nations maintains a peacekeeping force on Cyprus and, through the Secretary General, has provided a forum since April 1975 for intermittent discussion between the two Cypriot Communities. Secretary General Waldheim has used his “good offices” mandate in an effort to stimulate proposals and discussions of the most critical substantive issues. His success thus far has been meager. No serious intercommunal negotiating session has been held since February 1976; even Waldheim would admit that the prospects for fruitful talks between the two communities are dim unless a way can be found to sustain the process with support and ideas from the outside.

C. Greece: The events of 1974 pointed up Greece’s inability to protect Cyprus. This fact, together with the growth of tension in the Aegean, has tended to shift Greek political attention away from Cyprus to domestic concerns and the threat perceived to come from Turkey. Although the Caramanlis Government would prefer to have a satisfactory Cyprus solution, Athens is clearly prepared to live with the status quo rather than to give its blessing to an unpopular settlement—the only kind it thinks conceivable under present circumstances. Moreover, with most Greeks fully supportive of Makarios’ hard line, Caramanlis is not inclined to do anything very visible or imaginative with respect to the Cyprus issue.

This same trend toward inactivity manifests itself in Greek attitudes toward its security relationship with Western partners. In August 1974, the Caramanlis Government withdrew from the NATO military structure and imposed restrictions on US bases in Greece. Over the past two years, Caramanlis has told us repeatedly that he wants to return to the NATO fold, and have US military facilities remain in his country. For more than eighteen months we have been negotiating agreements designed to modernize and stabilize that presence. But the Greek Government has dragged its feet and not completed the negotiations, seemingly unable or unwilling to decide what course it wants to set for itself.

D. Turkey: The Turks would like to pretend the Cyprus problem no longer exists. They are pleased with how the events of 1974 turned out, and while they occasionally concede that some minor territorial adjustments on Cyprus may be possible, they are clearly in no hurry to make them. The Turks view their own current problems with Greece, the European Community and the United States as more serious—and entirely separate—from the Cyprus issue. Thus, the Turkish Government
has rejected any linkage between Cyprus and Turkey’s security relationship with the United States. In July 1975, the Turks closed down US intelligence collection operations in Turkey and insisted on the negotiation of a new four-year Defense Cooperation Agreement. They now look to prompt Congressional passage of that Agreement in early 1977 as the test of US interest in maintaining a close and enduring security relationship with Turkey, without which, they contend, no movement on Cyprus is possible.

As a further reason and excuse for inaction on Cyprus, the Turks also point to their own shaky domestic situation. The country is governed by a weak four-party coalition, which contains two small but vocal ultra-nationalist parties. National elections will be held some time between the late spring and early fall of 1977, and most Turkish politicians insist that until they are over, nothing can or should be done to resolve the Cyprus issue.

E. Congress: Congress has been impatient with the lack of movement toward a Cyprus settlement. It acknowledges the importance of maintaining close security ties with Turkey and Greece, but is inclined to treat this as of lesser importance than righting the wrongs of Turkish actions on Cyprus in 1974.

F. Western Europe: Our Western European Allies remain deeply concerned about the Cyprus issue, the growing estrangement between Turkey and Greece, and the problem of keeping both in the Western Alliance System. They would like to see both Greece and Turkey stay in NATO, and maintain and re-cement close bilateral defense arrangements with the United States.

The European Community, and especially the British, who still retain two sovereign base areas in Cyprus, have worked closely with the United States this past year in seeking to stimulate negotiations on Cyprus. They are anxious to continue this cooperation, particularly in the first six months of 1977 when the British will rotate into the position as President of the EC Council of Ministers.

G. The Aegean Issue: Although the location of Greek islands a few miles from the Turkish mainland has long been a source of Greek-Turkish friction, Turkey did not seriously challenge the primary Greek position in the Aegean until the Greeks discovered oil in the northern Aegean in 1973. Since that date, the Turks have demanded an equal role in the Aegean in general and exploration of the seabed in particular. The Aegean problem heated up in the spring of 1974—before the Cyprus crisis—and again in the summer of 1976. A UN Security Council resolution in August 1976, which both the Greeks and Turks ac-

cepted, has helped create a framework under which the two sides are now negotiating. Greek and Turkish negotiators will meet in Paris and Bern during November and possibly December. Neither side has expressed an interest in US mediation or assistance, though such action at some future time—perhaps in conjunction with the Cyprus issue—should not be excluded. The Aegean problem remains potentially more explosive than Cyprus, but for now and probably till the spring of 1977, US action would not seem called for or desirable.

III. Working Assumptions

The objective conditions and attitudes in the area, as described above, point to certain conclusions which we would suggest be taken into account as future policies are formulated:

1. A Cyprus settlement will take a long time to achieve. The problem is old, difficult, and many-faceted. Meaningful negotiations, even if started now, are likely to continue for a year or more.

2. The longer it takes to begin real movement, the harder it will be to reach a settlement. The Turks and Greeks both admit that opportunities for a solution were missed in 1974 and earlier, and that with each month that passes, attitudes on the ground harden and make it more difficult for either side to make concessions.

3. There is no reason to believe domestic developments in either Greece or Turkey will help us start or sustain a Cyprus negotiating process. The Greeks are likely to be less willing in 1977 than before to play an active role on Cyprus; only a wild optimist would bet on the emergence of a stable, one-party government after the 1977 Turkish elections.

4. No settlement on Cyprus will be achieved unless outsiders stimulate and, at some point, push the parties immediately involved into concluding an agreement. The parties privately would welcome such outside stimulation and pressure, since they know they are not in a position to change a situation themselves which they know needs changing.

5. Those who help bring about a settlement can expect to be blamed by the parties, who will use outsiders as scapegoats to sell the resultant compromise to their own people.

6. Our friends in Western Europe have their own reasons to seek solutions and ease tensions on the southeastern flank of NATO. But the European Community mechanism is cumbersome and incapable of devising quick decisions or initiatives. Thus, we will doubtless have to formulate the new ideas and take the lead, while encouraging continued close EC support. Such a posture will help ensure that any solution has a better chance of acceptance, as well as permit the blame to be more widely shared.
IV. What Do We Do Next?

The election of Carter has unleashed exaggerated expectations in Greece, Cyprus and Turkey. The Governments in Athens and Nicosia expect enlarged political and material support for Greece and Greek interests, and clear evidence of the new Administration’s support for a Cyprus settlement close to that preferred by President Makarios and reflected in UN resolutions. The Turks fear that the new Administration, intent on fulfilling promises to Greek Americans, will adopt positions which could force Turkey out of the Western alliance system.

If unchanged by anything the US says or does between now and January, these differing expectations could in themselves foster further—and perhaps serious—deterioration in relations between Greece and Turkey. This in turn could hamper a new President’s opportunities for policy initiatives after January.

Under these circumstances, it would seem highly desirable for those who will take office in January to look at the problems in the Eastern Mediterranean very quickly, to decide in general terms what courses of action they would like to pursue, and then communicate these decisions rapidly to the parties in a manner most clearly calculated to win their understanding and cooperation. These steps should ideally be accomplished—or at least be well underway—before January 20. There follows a set of recommended procedures which would make this possible.

A. Phase One—Fact-Finding (late November)

Despatch a small, high-level, fact-finding team to Ankara, Athens and Nicosia led by someone who enjoys the President-elect’s confidence. This team, which might have Congressional representation, would aim at reassuring Demirel, Caramanlis and Makarios of the President-elect’s strong interest in maintaining close and friendly relations and of his intention to undertake a detailed review of our policies in the Eastern Mediterranean. The team would solicit suggestions as to how new policies might be formulated, and would seek answers to the following critical questions:

a. **Greece:** How does Greece, with whom we have been negotiating a Defense Cooperation Agreement since early 1975, wish to arrange its security relationship with the US and NATO? Does the present draft document provide an acceptable basis for that new relationship? Is Greece prepared to play an active role in the search for a Cyprus settlement? What, if anything, can be done to help Greece and Turkey achieve an Aegean settlement over the longer term?

b. **Turkey:** Will the Turkish Government accept that a linkage, which it has long resisted, exists between the Cyprus issue and the US-Turkish security relationship? Would the Turks prefer that we
proceed with the Turkish-US Defense Cooperation Agreement in its present form, on condition that an acceptable Cyprus settlement follows? Or would they be prepared to be flexible on Cyprus now, before the Congress acts on the US-Turkish Defense Cooperation Agreement? Will the Turks be willing to sit still and allow action to be undertaken by the US or perhaps others with respect to Cyprus between now and the Turkish elections in 1977? Do the Turks want us to do anything on the Aegean? If so, what?

c. **Cyprus**: What role does Makarios wish us to play in seeking a Cyprus settlement? What are his minimum requirements and what timetable does he have in mind? These same questions can be put to the Turkish-Cypriot leadership.

**B. Phase Two—Additional Consultations (December)**

1. Ask the three US Ambassadors in the area to return to the US for a detailed briefing session involving the President-elect or his designated representative. These sessions would focus on a review of recent and future domestic developments in Turkey and Greece, the Aegean situation, the two-year record of the Cyprus negotiations, and prospects for relations with all three countries.

2. Arrange a series of talks with our principal European allies on the Cyprus issue and the security situation in the Eastern Mediterranean, aimed at determining what policies our allies would like us to adopt with respect to Turkey, Greece and Cyprus and what roles they wish—or can be induced—to play with us in the months ahead.

3. Discuss these same issues with the leadership of the new Congress, particularly with respect to passage through Congress of the US-Turkish Defense Cooperation Agreement, and the companion agreement still under negotiation with Greece.

**C. Phase Three—Implementation (January)**

1. **Greece**: Once a consensus is reached in Washington on how to proceed with the US-Greek security relationship, this should be communicated immediately by the outgoing Administration to the Athens Government. If the decision is to proceed with DCA negotiations, the US team should be despatched to Athens at once in an effort to complete talks in time to submit the DCA to Congress by late January. If the US decision is to proceed in some other fashion, the Department should be tasked to develop a new framework agreement for US-Greek defense cooperation which can be communicated to the Athens Government as soon as it is developed. Any conclusion with respect to the US-Turkey security relationship and our policy toward Cyprus should also be communicated to the Greek Government at the same time in an effort to enlist maximum possible understanding and cooperation from Athens.
2. **Turkey:** If the new Administration agrees to support the Turkish-US Defense Cooperation Agreement in Congress in its present form, this should be communicated promptly to the Turkish Government (the Greeks should be told as well in accordance with 1 above) in a manner most likely to win their active support for any Cyprus initiatives we might take in early 1977. If any other decision is reached by the new Administration, this too should be communicated promptly to Ankara, almost certainly by a high-level envoy who would explain the basis for the new Administration’s concerns, solicit Turkish understanding and outline a scenario for the remainder of 1977 covering defense cooperation, Cyprus and other matters which the Turkish Government should be urged to accept and support. A major selling job will clearly be required, since the prospect of Turkish elections will make that Government reluctant to underwrite any changes in the US-Turkish security relationship or imaginative moves on Cyprus which can be portrayed domestically as signs of Turkish weakness or capitulation.

3. **Cyprus:** An envoy should be despatched to Cyprus to see President Makarios and Denktash to outline what policy we intend to follow with respect to Cyprus in 1977. A timetable and strategy should be sketched, and Makarios and Denktash should be told what role we would like them to play in ensuing developments.

4. **European Allies:** We will want to talk directly with our key European allies about our new policies. If these are consistent with what, from our earlier consultations we know our European allies will actively support, then the consultations should be broadened to develop the specific programs to pursue together. On Cyprus, for example, we could discuss the possible expansion of our previously expressed principles, consider whether one or more mediators might be named, discuss the possibility of making a joint territorial proposal, joint constitutional proposals, etc.

All of our decisions with respect to Greece, Turkey and Cyprus can then be incorporated in a policy statement by the new Administration to be issued in Washington in late January or February, soon after the inauguration of the new President. Nothing in it will come as a surprise to our allies, and everything in it will have been the subject of consultations with the Congress and with all the parties involved. This is the best formula for getting off to a smooth start in what will almost certainly be a difficult foreign policy area for 1977.
Turkey

195. Letter From Acting Secretary of State Rush to Secretary of Defense Schlesinger


Dear Jim:

Our longstanding problem with Turkey over providing their armed forces with an electronic warfare capability has now come to a head. If it is not resolved there will probably be a direct impact on the operation of our important intelligence installations in Turkey. If allowed to fester, I am concerned that this problem could have a harmful effect on the overall climate of our complex security relationship, inevitably affecting other of our important assets such as the present relatively free access to Turkish air space. I know that the details of this problem are familiar to some members of your staff, but I believe the matter is urgent enough to warrant your personal attention.

In 1957 in connection with our obtaining Turkish acceptance of an Electronics and Communications agreement governing both intelligence activities and certain operational communications, we agreed to provide the Turkish armed forces with an electronic warfare capability. This was reaffirmed by a 1962 Memorandum of Understanding, and a 1963 protocol to that MOU provided that this assistance be made available outside of the regular Military Assistance Program.

In accordance with this commitment, the U.S. Department of Defense in the early and mid-1960’s provided equipment, training, and logistical support to develop an EW commitment for the Turkish First and Third Armies. The equipment provided at that time is now obsolete and Turkish authorities have requested that we provide additional equipment to modernize the EW elements of those two armies and provide an EW capability to the Second Army. The Turks have also indicated interest in obtaining assistance in upgrading the EW capability of the Air Force and Navy, though the nature of our commitment to these services is more ambiguous than in the case of the ground forces.

One of the more troublesome aspects of our undertaking to the Turks has been its open-ended nature both as to time and dollar amounts. Ear-

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1 Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970–73, DEF 12–5 TUR. Secret. Drafted by Nicholas Murphy (NEA/TUR) on July 13; cleared by Robert Dillon (NEA/TUR), Rodger Davies (NEA), Ray Cline (INR), and Thomas Pickering (PM). Rush’s handwritten signature is at the bottom of the first page of the letter.
lier this year, in an attempt to close off this commitment, the Department of Defense put together a $2 million equipment package which was offered to the Turks. It is now clear that that amount is far less than the Turks consider the minimum which would constitute fulfillment of our obligation, and through the Foreign Ministry they have told our Embassy in Ankara that they regard our offer as constituting unilateral abrogation of an agreement. Though the Turks have held off from making a formal démarche on the subject, they have told us quite clearly that our insistence that our EW commitment under the 1962 MOU has ended with the $2 million equipment offer would have an unpredictable impact on [1 line not declassified] the operation of which is sanctioned by same 1962 MOU.

While we have not committed ourselves to modify our earlier offer, we have told the Turkish Foreign Ministry that the whole matter would be reviewed once again by the U.S. Government.

In indicating its intention firmly to reject our $2 million offer, the Turks have shown understanding of the problems we have with an open-ended commitment and have proposed that military officials of our two governments get together to work out a new package which would be mutually acceptable. Until we actually enter into such discussions, it will be impossible to know the price of the minimum package that will satisfy the Turks. It is probably realistic to assume that, at a minimum, $8 million in addition to the already offered $2 million will be required.

We have requested [less than 1 line not declassified] an evaluation of the value of our intelligence facilities in Turkey including an assessment of the impact of their being curtailed or closed down. Without awaiting the results of such a study, however, I think it safe to say that our intelligence facilities in Turkey, as well as the other security-related privileges we enjoy there, are of such value that we should attempt to reach a satisfactory agreement with the Turks on this issue.

While I am fully aware of the Department of Defense’s budgetary difficulties, I believe that given the military importance of certain of our facilities in Turkey and the importance of the intelligence derived from others, it would be appropriate if funds could be allocated to solving this problem both from Department of Defense resources and those of the intelligence community. I would appreciate your having this matter reviewed once more to see if we cannot find some way out of this troublesome situation.

I am sending a copy of this letter to the Director of Central Intelligence as this subject, while having broad policy implications, concerns in the first instance our intelligence activities in Turkey.

With warm regards,

Sincerely,

Ken
196. Research Study Prepared in the Bureau of Intelligence and Research


TURKEY’S PRESIDENTIAL ELECTION

Turkey has emerged from a prolonged constitutional crisis with a new president and prime minister. The dynamics of the changeover was a vindication and reinforcement of Turkey’s parliamentary system. This paper discusses the role of the military establishment in the political structure, as reflected in the election crisis, and the significance of that role for the forthcoming general elections.

Abstract

On April 6 a constitutional crisis was resolved with the election by Parliament of a compromise candidate to the Presidency. In the three weeks ofballoting that preceded Fahri Koruturk’s election, former Chief of the General Staff Gen. Faruk Gurler consistently ran a poor second to a civilian candidate backed by the Justice Party (JP). Uncertainty existed as to how far the military would go on behalf of Gurler’s candidacy.

Gurler had previously resigned from his top position in the armed forces and was appointed to the Senate, thus making him eligible for the Presidency. His election seemed assured but he ran into stiff opposition from the two largest political parties, the JP and the Republican People’s Party (RPP).

Koruturk is not a member of any political party and as a political moderate he conforms to the model of an ideal Turkish President. Although he is not viewed by the military as one of their own, he commanded the Navy until the 1960 coup that overthrew the regime of Adnan Menderes, and the military can, therefore, take some satisfaction in his election.

As the leader of the fight against Gurler’s candidacy, former Prime Minister Suleyman Demirel was the chief beneficiary of the crisis. His antipathy to a military-sponsored nominee in general, and to Gurler in particular, is understandable. Demirel’s JP is the spiritual descendant of the Democrat Party which was ousted by the 1960 coup. More
recently, Gurler was deeply involved in the March 1971 “coup by memorandum” which led to Demirel’s resignation as Prime Minister. The memorandum demanded restoration of law and order, then under attack by leftist terrorists, and enactment of reforms long advocated by the military.

Demirel, however, might not have been so zealous in his opposition to Gurler’s candidacy had he not perceived a lack of enthusiasm and unanimity among the generals in their support of Gurler. Demirel seized this opportunity to reassert parliamentary supremacy and to call a halt to the practice of reserving the Presidency for the Chief of the General Staff.

With one exception, all of Turkey’s six Presidents have been generals. The founder of the Republic, Kemal Ataturk, bestowed on the military the twin roles of protector of the revolution he had launched and guardian of his reforms. The military was, consequently, disturbed when they perceived during the 1950s that Menderes was appealing to the “reactionary” sentiments of the peasant masses and undercutting Ataturk’s vision of a modern Turkey.

In the short run, the military coup that toppled Menderes in 1960 benefitted the RPP. As Ataturk’s party and as the purveyor of his reformist ideology, the RPP enjoyed a special relationship with the military. Over the past year or so, this relationship dissolved as Bulent Ecevit achieved leadership of the party. Ecevit headed a doctrinaire faction of the RPP that had pressed the party to adopt a “left of center” orientation. Moreover, he opposes continuation of martial law which was instituted following the “coup by memorandum” and he is regarded by the generals as being soft toward the radical left.

The new Prime Minister, Naim Talu, heads a caretaker coalition government charged with leading the nation through parliamentary elections in October 1973 and securing passage of a program of reforms deemed “essential” by the military. He could not count on much help from Koruturk to carry out his mandate since the new President, unlike his predecessors, is without a constituency.

With Demirel’s energetic backing, Parliament in the last days of June passed with uncharacteristic speed several key reform bills. Demirel’s new-found interest in reform legislation apparently is part of his strategy to forestall possible military interference with the JP’s expected triumph at the polls in October, and it is questionable how effectively he might implement the reform measures if he is elected.

A Demirel victory in October following Gurler’s defeat in April could be regarded as a fresh rebuff to the military. Even with the reform legislation on the books, the military would face the dilemma of allowing the man they brought down in 1971, because he had failed to secure reforms, to reassume the premiership, or to intervene once again
in the democratic process. However, with most of the activists involved
in the “coup by memorandum” now in retirement, such intervention
appears to be only a remote possibility.

[Omitted here is the body of the study.]

197. Information Memorandum From the Officer-in-Charge of
Turkish Affairs in the Bureau of Near Eastern and South
Asian Affairs (Dillon) to the Assistant Secretary of State for
Near Eastern and South Asian Affairs (Sisco)


SUBJECT

Turkish Election Upset Gives Plurality to Left-of-Center Party

In a stunning election upset the left-of-center Republican Peoples
Party (RPP) has won a plurality of about 190 of the 450 National As-
ssembly seats in Turkey’s October 14 general elections (official vote tally
and distribution of parliamentary seats has yet to be announced). The
Justice Party (JP), senior partner in the present coalition government
which won majorities in the 1965 and 1969 elections, got about 100 seats
less than it did the last time at the polls. Two smaller parties—the re-
goriously oriented National Salvation Party (NSP) and the Democratic
Party (DP), both well to the right of the JP, between them gained about
80 seats, largely carved out of the JP’s traditional constituency. Repre-
sentation of the Republican Reliance Party (RRP), the junior coalition
partner, was sharply reduced to about ten seats.

Factors in the election outcome included (a) the effective campaign
waged by RPP leader Bulent Ecevit; (b) the lackluster campaigning of
former Prime Minister and JP leader Demirel; (c) initial JP overconfi-
dence resulting in a slow-starting campaign which never got up to
speed; (d) serious voter concern over spiralling inflation for which the
JP, as a government party, was forced to shoulder some blame.

Coalition or Minority Government Necessary

The results presage a minority or a coalition government, either
likely to be quite unstable. In line with traditional practice RPP leader

1 Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970–73, POL 14 TUR. Confiden-
tial. Drafted by Nicholas Murphy and sent through Rodger Davies.
Ecevit will probably be asked to form a government. It will not be an easy task. The RPP would be ideologically uncomfortable with either of the two smaller right wing parties, and JP leader Demirel (whose leadership position may now be shaky), has announced his intention to take the party into opposition. If a minority RPP government were to come into power, it would remain there only at the suffrance of parties with which it has sharp policy differences.

Significance for the US

We expect that the USG will be able to continue close and friendly relations with whatever government comes to power. However, the possibility of instability and resultant loss of effectiveness in government might make these relations somewhat more difficult. Moreover, the RPP rank and file and particularly its left wing, has not always been as friendly towards the US as has the JP; and the RPP might therefore be inclined to give a hard look at some aspects of US-Turkish relations, especially in the security field.

198. Telegram From the Embassy in Turkey to the Department of State

Ankara, November 3, 1973, 0932Z.

8681. Subj: Continued Soviet Overflights of Turkey. Ref: A) Ankara 8619; B) State 216995. 2

1. Summary: In meeting morning November 3, and after I raised points outlined refelts, Bayulken told me that in view of U.S. NATO-oriented concerns re overflights and in view of fact that numbers had exceeded figure he had given me, GOT would promptly re-examine situation and he would report back to me as soon as he could. End summary.

2. I met Saturday morning with Foreign Minister Bayulken pursuant to refelts. I said that I had sought appointment at Dept’s request to reiterate USG concern over imbalance GOT treatment of USG and

1 Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 633, Country Files, Middle East, Turkey, Vol. III. Secret; Priority; Exdis.

2 Telegrams 8619 from Ankara, November 2, and 216995 to Ankara, November 3, discussed the number of Soviet overflights, which were twice what Turkey had estimated, and sent instructions for Ambassador Macomber’s next meeting with Turkish officials. (Ibid.)
Soviet Government during present Middle East crisis. I specifically con- 
trasted GOT unwillingness for Incirlik to be used in connection with 
crisis while at same time permitting Soviet overflights. I added that 
USG was concerned by failure on part of allies fully to comprehend 
the danger to NATO itself of divisive shift in strategic balance in Mid-
dle East and that we were therefore surprised by Turkish actions in fa-
cilitating these Soviet shipments. I noted that the number of overflights 
had exceeded by over one hundred percent the figures he had con-
vveyed to me in our last meeting. I also noted that Turk Ambassador in 
Washington, Esenbel, had told Dept that he understood flights had 
ended whereas our information was that they were continuing. I re-
ferred to Article 3 of the Chicago Convention and said that in the light 
of this and of past practices there was no way that USG could be con-
vinced that GOT did not control who used its air space. I said that quite 
apart from concerns I had earlier noted we were troubled by precedent 
which GOT was establishing vis-à-vis Soviet overflights in the situation. 

3. I then referred to USIS Wireless File 209 (date Nov 2)\(^3\) and read 
to him background statement by senior unidentified Defense official re 
Turkey overflight situation, noting that in public we were in effect de-
fending Turkey’s actions because we did not believe that U.S.-Turkish 
relations would be served by speaking publicly with the same candor 
I was employing privately and directly with him. 

4. I ended presentation by saying that, in view of foregoing con-
cerns, USG would like to know what GOT’s intentions were re con-
tinuing Soviet overflights. 

5. Bayulken was clearly uncomfortable during the presentation. 
He first attempted to say that if Turkey had understood it was NATO 
problem they would have taken different attitude, but that they had 
considered matter simply domestic Middle East struggle in which So-
viets were helping their friends and U.S. were helping their friends, 
and Turkey thought it best to stay out of dispute. 

6. I pointed out that in beginning our discussions I had noted that 
problem was larger than simple Middle East dispute and that if power 
balance in this area changed as result of Soviet intervention this would 
clearly have adverse consequences elsewhere. (I reminded him that, in 
our earlier conversations, he had agreed with this point.) I also referred 
to the concerns Ambassador Rumsfeld had expressed in NATO coun-
cils. Finally, I said that, of all NATO partners, Turkey instinctively 
should be in best position to recognize threat to shift of power balance 
in its own back yard. 

\(^3\) Not found.
7. Bayulken then inquired: “What about all those KC–135 flights at Incirlik.” I reiterated that if there were any materials at Incirlik which we needed in connection with Middle East situation these were being moved from Incirlik to another country and deployed from there. I noted that this being done at very great inconvenience to USG in deference to GOT wishes, and this transfer of resources was what the C–135 flights were concerned with.

8. Bayulken said he was sure USG understood the delicate position that Turkey was in. He expressed the belief that we did not really want to see a Turkish crisis with the Soviets. If such a crisis took place, he noted, it would directly involve USG as well, for U.S. was Turkey’s “NATO partner and closest friend”. In response, I said that USG did not believe that way to get along with Soviets was to have appeasement policy toward their demands, that in the long run it was better to stand up to them right from the start.

9. Conversation then concluded with Bayulken making two points: first, he expressed great appreciation for the public posture that we were taking and which I had reported to him; second, that he was not aware of how many overflights there had been and that on the basis of my belief that they were over double what he had indicated to me, and in view of USG conviction that these flights were carrying war materials and were continuing, GOT would undertake, as a NATO partner, to look into the matter right away and that he would report back to me as soon as he could.

Macomber

199. Memorandum From Harold Saunders and Henry Applebaum of the National Security Council Staff to Secretary of State Kissinger


SUBJECT
Turkish Opium

1Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 634, Country Files, Middle East, Turkey, Vol. IV. Secret. Sent for information. Concurred in by Horan and Froebe of the NSC staff.
The purpose of this memo is to call your attention to the question of opium production in Turkey, an issue that may come to a head both within the USG and with the Turks during the next few weeks.

The new Turkish government has indicated to Ambassador Macomber its interest in joining with the USG to reexamine Turkey’s ban on opium production. You will recall that the Turks imposed the ban in 1971 as a result of considerable USG pressure. The US agreed to grant Turkey $35.7 million to compensate and assist the roughly 70,000 farmers who had been earning all or part of their livelihood from opium cultivation.

The ban has never been popular in Turkey, either among the farmers themselves or among Turkish nationalists who feel that the ban was imposed by the USG and that it serves US rather than Turkish interests. During Turkey’s election campaign last fall all political parties expressed dissatisfaction with the ban.

It is not clear yet just what the new government—a coalition of moderate leftists and right-wing nationalists—is going to do with regard to the ban. There is a good chance that they will ask us for more financial support as a condition for the ban’s continuation. If this happens, the issue for us will be whether we should (a) refuse either to give more financial assistance or to acquiesce in resumption of production, (b) agree to give more financial assistance, or (c) agree to the resumption of production but with comprehensive controls to prevent leakage into the illicit worldwide heroin trade. What the latter course of action could mean is cultivation of opium straw (as opposed to the less controllable opium gum) on carefully supervised state farms.

An additional factor which may help bring the issue to a head soon is this month’s international narcotics conference in Geneva. The USG positions that have been developed for this conference include the view that a worldwide opium shortage may be developing which (1) would have to be met through expanded Indian production and (2) necessitates USG domestic research and testing of opium straw production, in the hope of finding methods that will bring higher yields while also being susceptible to better controls than those that are possible under present opium-growing practices. The Turks have already informed us that these US positions will inevitably stimulate increased pressure within Turkey for resumption of opium production there.

Of the three USG options mentioned above, the first one—a completely negative response to the Turks—would substantially strain our overall relations with the new Turkish government and could lead them simply to resume opium production unilaterally, with or without controls. The second option—agreeing to pay further compensation—could lead us into what the Turks would view as an open-ended commitment to keep paying them off indefinitely for maintaining the ban.
Moreover, it is not clear that they could put more aid money to good use. A substantial part of the $35.7 million we granted them in 1971 still has not been used.

The third option—agreeing to their resuming production under carefully controlled conditions—has some pros and cons. We do not know yet whether they could in fact set up a well-controlled production system, although they believe they could. Moreover, this type of production, which presumably would have to be on state farms, would not really take care of the peasant farmers who before 1971 were earning money by growing opium on their own private plots along with their other crops. On the other hand, controlled state production would at least partially assuage the demands of nationalists who oppose the ban. Resuming Turkish production with controls would also be more consistent with our belief in a probable worldwide shortage than would a continued Turkish ban. Finally, resuming production with controls would free us from an endless chain of Turkish demands for financial compensation.

On the other hand, it might be advisable to start off with a tough stance that we could soften later on. Ambassador Macomber advocates such an approach.

This problem will probably be thrashed out in greater detail by various interested USG agencies in the weeks ahead. Related to the Turkish problem are (a) Ambassador (to Thailand) Kintner’s belief that US domestic testing of opium straw production will cause us considerable difficulty with the Thais, and (b) Indian unhappiness over US advocacy at Geneva of a worldwide shift from opium gum to opium straw production; the Indians are skeptical about our contention that such a shift would in fact lead to higher yields and better controls. This memo has focused on the Turkish problem because that is the one that carries the greatest danger of seriously hurting our overall relations with an important ally. We do not seek any decisions from you at this point but simply want to call these developing issues to your attention.
Begin summary: Following are our views of the Turkish attitudes in the Greek-Turkish dispute over the Aegean. Although it is challenging the Greek position, Turkey’s official position is ostensibly conciliatory; the Turks say they want a bilateral agreement to delineate the continental shelf (probably on principle of equidistance), thus disposing of related issues. At present it appears doubtful that active Turkish or Turk-contracted oil exploration or drilling activities will take place in the disputed areas in the near future, but other steps cannot be ruled out. An always present danger is that Turkish emotions could be ignited by irresponsible press play of the dispute, as well as by Greek sabre-rattling. End summary.

1. By septel 4 we are reporting results our latest discussions with Turk officials in the dispute between Greece and Turkey over the Aegean continental shelf demarcation issue as well as the oil exploration problem. Our info indicates that the Aegean issues have high level military and civilian attention, including that of Pres Koruturk himself, a former fleet commander.

2. An authoritative MFA official (Soylemez, head of International Organizations Dept) indicated to us that the Turks were well aware of what he described as longstanding Greek aspirations to extend their territorial sea limits to twelve miles; however, according to this official, the Turks at present doubt that the Greeks would take such action in near future.

3. The official Turkish posture, as disclosed to us by this MFA official, is that a bilateral agreement between the two govts should be negotiated ASAP on the division of the continental shelf, which would thus also dispose of the oil exploration issue. Turks would prefer a division taking into account so-called special circumstances (proximity

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1 Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 634, Country Files, Middle East, Turkey, Vol. IV. Secret; Exdis. Repeated to Athens.
2 Dated March 13. (Ibid., Box 594, Country Files, Middle East, Greece, Vol. IV)
3 Not found.
4 Telegram 1974 from Ankara, March 18, reiterated the Turkish belief that a bilateral agreement regarding the division of the continental shelf and related issues should and could be negotiated as soon as possible. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy Files, 1974)
of Greek islands to Turk mainland) but would fall back to principle of equidistance (or median line).

4. Turk MFA official also claimed the Turkish position was one of moderation. Turks were prepared to compromise and did not object in principle to sharing resources of whole of Aegean. No polemical comments have yet been uttered to us directly, although General Sancar came close (Ankara 1472). Still, there is no denying the fact that the Turkish action in opening up disputed areas to oil exploration was in effect a challenge to the Greek position.

5. A high official of the Turkish Ministry of Energy and Natural Resources has also confirmed to us that at present the GOT is not physically involved in any type of exploratory activity in the disputed areas nor is any Turkish-contracted firm engaged in such activity. It is a fact, however, regularly repeated to us, that the Turks want to interest American and foreign companies in exploration activities.

6. In a TV interview on March 13, FonMin Gunes took a fairly even-handed approach to problem but insisted there must not be a Greek wall stopping Turk access to the Aegean. He said Turkey claimed the continental shelf up to a depth of two hundred meters, in accord with the latest concepts in international law.

7. Our view is that the ostensibly moderate position of the GOT at present could easily change, depending on Greek moves and on the actions of the frequently irresponsible Turkish press. Among other factors contributing to historic Turkish suspicions and dislike of Greece is the fear that the Greeks want to make of the Aegean a Greek lake, to further the old “megali” idea. In addition, many Turks who in other respects accept most of Ataturk’s dictums still believe that Turkey got a raw deal in allowing Greece to obtain unimpeded sovereignty over a chain of islands nesting against the Turkish mainland. It also must be taken into account that although this govt, like all recent govt, appears committed to achieving a good relationship with Greece, it is probably the most nationalistic in spirit of any Turkish Govt since 1965.

8. Our interim judgment is that we are not likely to see in the near future some oil exploration or drilling activity in the disputed areas. The Turks first will want to determine whether the Greeks are willing to negotiate a bilateral agreement. (One Turk newspaper on March 14, citing news agency sources in Athens, claimed that Athens was prepared to negotiate a bilateral agreement.) If progress is not made, however, we would not be surprised to see the Turks step up the nature of their challenge to the Greek position by, for example, flying special mil-

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5 Dated February 27. (Ibid.)
6 A concept in Greek political thought for uniting with Greece proper all territories in which a large number of Greeks lived.
itary air sorties over the Aegean, as they did in the days leading up to the 1967 Cyprus crisis. (Department may want to review the records as regards that period, since the Emb files are no longer available.)

9. In our opinion, Turkish attitude so far does not warrant a formal démarche counseling moderation, although I am prepared to do so if our monitoring of the issue suggests that Turk tempers are rising.

Macomber

201. Memorandum of Conversation

New York, April 15, 1974, 5:30–6 p.m.

PARTICIPANTS

U.S.
The Secretary
Assistant Secretary-designate Atherton
Assistant Secretary Hartman
Mr. Dillon, Director, NEA/TUR (Notetaker)
Mr. Katzen, French-English Interpreter

Turkey
Foreign Minister Turan Gunes
Turkish Ambassador to the U.S. Melih Esenbel
Mr. Ozceri, Chief Aide to Foreign Minister Gunes, Interpreter
Mr. Gunden, Turkish Mission to the UN (Notetaker)

SUBJECT

Turkey: Secretary’s Meeting with Foreign Minister Gunes

The Secretary: You can speak French to me. I understand it but I don’t like to use it with civilized people. (Laughter)

Your Prime Minister is an old student of mine. There’ll be no need to talk to him. We can just tell him what we have decided. He was a very tractable student but slightly revolutionary.

Foreign Minister Gunes: He was also my student.

The Secretary: We Foreign Ministers must stick together. If we don’t, our superiors will think we are fallible—we can’t have that.

1 Source: Library of Congress, Manuscript Division, Kissinger Papers, Box CI 272, Memoranda of Conversations, Chronological File. Confidential; Nodis. Drafted by Robert Dillon on April 16 and concurred in by Atherton. The meeting was held in the Waldorf Towers. Kissinger was in New York for a special session of the UN General Assembly.
Have you met Mr. Hartman? You know that Turkey is moving to the European Bureau.

Foreign Minister Gunes: Yes. I have met both of these gentlemen (indicating Atherton and Hartman). One Assistant Secretary will be acting for Thrace and one for Anatolia.

The Secretary: You will have to talk to Hartman in Istanbul, not Ankara. (Laughter)

Foreign Minister Gunes: Yes.

I appreciate that the Secretary is busy preparing recommendations for the President, but I am a new Minister and also need to prepare recommendations for my Prime Minister. I know you have been visiting my neighbors and I am sorry you have not been able to stop in Turkey. I would like to hear more about your conversations with my neighbors.

The Secretary: You should still have your old possessions.

Foreign Minister Gunes: I would like to make you happy but we have no intention nor desire to take over those old countries. At the Islamic Summit Conference at Lahore many ministers said the same thing to me. I told them we had no territorial designs.

The Secretary: I would like to stop in Turkey on an early trip to Europe or the Middle East.

Foreign Minister Gunes: Thank you.

The Secretary: With great pleasure.

Foreign Minister Gunes: We have a good friendship with Mr. Macomber in Ankara. He is doing good things for your country there.

The Secretary: That’s the impression we have gotten.

Foreign Minister Gunes: At the 25th Anniversary of NATO, we made many congratulatory statements but maybe we should have waited for more unity of views.2

The Secretary: We wanted to have a declaration not as the French thought for American hegemony in Europe but to prevent isolationism in America. Before the decade is out, our West European friends will regret having made so much trouble for the most pro-Atlantic administration you will see for a long time. If we don’t symbolize our Atlantic relationship for the American people, you will see changes. We still think that at the NATO Ministerial meeting we should have a declaration. We are not so eager any more for one with the European Community.

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2 NATO members marked the 25th anniversary of the organization at the June Ministerial Meeting in Ottawa.
Foreign Minister Gunes: As I have said before, we don’t desire differences between America and Europe. We want divergencies removed as soon as possible. Our ties are such that dissolution will not benefit any of us. We have strong ties to Western Europe through NATO. Also, we will become members of the European Economic Community. We do not want to see developments separating Europe and America. We don’t like artificial labels like “Nine”. We want to see the western world as an entity. That’s why I made the joke about waiting for more unity of views before making our statements praising NATO.

The Secretary: Yes, we agree. The western world should be looked at as a unit. We don’t want to see it consumed in internal squabbles.

Foreign Minister Gunes: We have the same views.

The Secretary: Now on other problems. What are your views on Cyprus? I just want it to go away.

Foreign Minister Gunes: I have the same view. It is not just the Cyprus problem but it is a question of our ties with Greece. I don’t want to go into detail on Cyprus. We are trying to have good relations with Greece but right now they are not at their best level. If something happens, don’t be alarmed.

The Secretary: Who is alarmed? What is this?

Foreign Minister Gunes: There may be a big argument.

The Secretary: If I hear about Turkish troops in Salonika, I will be alarmed.

Foreign Minister Gunes: No, it won’t be like that. There is going to be a bit of a brawl but there is no need for the Secretary to be alarmed.

The Secretary: I have plenty of courage but I am not going to get in between Turks and Greeks when they are fighting. I have a principle not to interfere in national sports. But where is this taking place?

Foreign Minister Gunes: Perhaps in the Aegean Sea. But don’t worry, I have made clear to my Greek colleagues that our argument must be at the conference table.

The Secretary to Hartman: Do you want the area or should we give it back to NEA?

The Secretary to Foreign Minister Gunes: Seriously, it would be unfortunate if there were a deterioration of relations between Greece and Turkey. There are many countries which would wish to take advantage of the situation.

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Footnote: The word being used in Turkish, “kavga,” means fight, quarrel, disagreement. The Turkish interpreter used several English words, but in each case Gunes said “kavga.” [Footnote is in the original.]
Foreign Minister Gunes: Let me say a few words about Cyprus. Our relations with Greece are based on a delicate political economic and military balance. This balance is necessary. We Turks are trying hard to maintain the balance. We want a solution for Cyprus and neighborly relations between Greece and Turkey. This delicate balance has an old history. When it is upset, there are problems between Greece and Turkey.

The Secretary: I don’t know about this situation. I will get a report on the Aegean Sea.

Foreign Minister Gunes: The situation is that we think there is oil under the Aegean. There are Greek islands in the Sea very close to Turkey. The Greeks claim that the continental shelf belongs to them. We both want to explore for oil. The Greeks say that the Sea belongs to them and we say that we should negotiate this question.

The Secretary: Give me 48 hours to look into this problem and I will give you my views.⁴

The Secretary to Atherton: Did you know about this?

Mr. Atherton: Yes. But we didn’t know it had gotten this serious.

Foreign Minister Gunes: Thank you, but we regard the problem as legal. There will be no clash of armies.

The Secretary: I will give you my views. Our concern is that nothing happen to break the unity of the western world.

Now don’t tow those island out to sea. As a student of Turkish history I know you are given to drastic solutions.

Foreign Minister Gunes: No, no, do not worry. The right is on our side but we are acting with restraint.

The Secretary: On Cyprus, our view is that negotiations should go on.

Foreign Minister Gunes: When our government came to power we went ahead with the negotiations from the spot at which they had arrived.

The Secretary: We believe there should be no preconditions. There should be no preconceived ideas about a unitary or a federal state.

Foreign Minister Gunes: Perfect. We are in agreement.

The Secretary (Referring again to the Aegean Sea): My colleagues never tell me anything because they think I will screw it up.

Foreign Minister Gunes: I see similarities between your colleagues and mine.

The Secretary: Foreign Ministers must stick together.

Foreign Minister Gunes: That’s right. Therefore, I would like to ask you to stop in Turkey.

⁴ No formal follow-up was found.
The Secretary: I will plan to stop soon on a trip to Europe or the Middle East.

Foreign Minister Gunes: President Nixon saw Prime Minister Ecevit in Paris at President Pompidou’s funeral and expressed hope that he would be able to visit Turkey. Of course such a visit would be a great feather for American-Turkish relations but a visit by you would be an opportunity to talk business.

I want to mention an important problem. Affection between America and Turkey grows every day. But friendly relations are important not just between governments but between peoples. We as a government are trying to foster growth of this affection. Before 12 March 1971, in Turkey some sources said the USA was imperialist and was imposing its will on Turkey. They said that our military cooperation was to Turkey’s disadvantage. Some people began to accept this view. Now we as a government don’t want those things said and we are working against it. That is all I want to say.

The Secretary: The Indian Foreign Minister is waiting and I will have to leave in just a minute. I just want to say that we appreciate a government which defends its national interest because we know those governments have the support of their people. In that situation we have confidence that their basic policies will be in the right direction. The U.S. should have done more for Turkey in the military field but Congress has limited what we have been able to do.

Before you go, I want to say a word about opium. I don’t want to go into detail, but in considering this problem you must look at it in terms of American public opinion. There must be a solution which is acceptable to both sides.

Foreign Minister Gunes: I fully appreciate what you have said. I am fully aware of the implications of the opium problem for American public opinion. We need a solution which will offend neither American nor Turkish public opinion.

The Secretary: Exactly.

Foreign Minister Gunes: I cannot say categorically that we are not going to grow opium poppies but I can say that we are not going to do anything to poison anybody. We are preparing plans which call for the fullest control possible.

The Secretary: I think we both want the same thing. I can tell you that in recent weeks I have learned more than I want to know about opium. I may go into the business myself.

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5 On March 12, 1971, the Turkish military took over the government and forced the resignation of Suleyman Demirel.

SUBJECT
Turkish Opium Ban

In response to a State Department query on the subject, our Ambassador to Turkey, William Macomber, has recommended (Tab B) that he be authorized to deliver an oral message from President Nixon to Turkish Prime Minister Ecevit expressing the President’s concern about the possible lifting of the Turkish opium ban. Macomber has an appointment with Ecevit Monday, May 6 (at 11 a.m. Washington time), and he would like to have this authorization in time for that meeting.

The reason for the short notice on this is that Macomber had asked for an appointment with Ecevit sometime before May 15, expecting to be granted an appointment a day or two before that date. Instead, the Turks have just informed him that the appointment is to be May 6. He expects this to be his last opportunity to see Ecevit before his May 15 departure for a CENTO meeting in Washington. Macomber believes that a Presidential message needs to be delivered to Ecevit before his departure if it is to have the best possible chance of being delivered before the Turks make their final decision to ease the ban.

You may want to approve this yourself, but we have set it up as a memo to the President (Tab A) in case you want to handle it that way. The memo at Tab A outlines the reasons for having a Presidential message, and for doing it as an oral rather than a written message. An additional reason for not having a written message is that the Turks appear likely to resume opium production in any case. In light of this, Ken Cole’s office says it would prefer not to see the President identified in writing with what is likely to be an unsuccessful effort at dissuasion. Cole’s office (Geoff Shepard) has no objection to a Presidential message to the Turks as long as it is oral and private.

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1 Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 634, Country Files, Middle East, Turkey, Vol. IV. Secret. Sent for action.
2 Tab B is telegram 3274 from Ankara, April 30; attached but not printed.
3 Attached but not printed.
4 Domestic Council, Drug Enforcement Agency, Department of Justice.
An advance copy of a State Department memo on this matter is at Tab C\textsuperscript{5} for your information.

\textit{Recommendation:} That you authorize Macomber to convey the oral Presidential message recommended in the memo at Tab A, in time for a cable to go out to Ankara no later than Sunday, May 5.\textsuperscript{6}

\textit{Alternate Recommendation:} That the memo at Tab A be forwarded to the President.

\textsuperscript{5} Tab C is a memorandum from Rush to Nixon, May 3; attached but not printed.

\textsuperscript{6} Scowcroft circled the recommendation, wrote “OK,” and initialed. In telegram 92323 to Ankara, May 4, the Department instructed Macomber to tell Ecevit: “The President has asked me to communicate to you his serious concern, which is shared by the American Congress and public, over the possibility that the Turkish Government may rescind the opium ban. A resumption of opium production by Turkey would carry a very grave risk of resumed illicit traffic with serious adverse consequences for the international effort to end narcotics smuggling. Instead, the President hopes that our two governments, along with concerned international agencies, can pursue efforts to improve the economic condition of those individuals affected by the ban.” (National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 634, Country Files, Middle East, Turkey, Vol. IV)

\section*{203. Editorial Note}

An Interagency Intelligence Memorandum, June 21, 1974, entitled “The Likelihood of Conflict Between Greece and Turkey” examined the two nations’ conflicting claims to rights over possible oil reserves in the Aegean Sea and the resulting increased tensions. See Document 15.
204. **Telegram From the Embassy in Turkey to the Department of State**

Ankara, July 2, 1974, 1235Z.

5213. Subject: Meeting With PriMin on Ending of Poppy Ban. Ref: Ankara 5210 (notal); Moscow 10340 (notal).  

1. I met for one hour, commencing at midnight July 1st, with PriMin Ecevit. Acting FonMin Isik and DCM Spain also present.  

2. Ecevit confirmed that Council of Ministers earlier in evening had approved decree for resumption opium poppy production in six provinces and part of Konya. He said he would be explaining details to Parliament afternoon July 2nd. He added that he was going “to ask the United Nations to give advice and technical assistance, and that all the control measures advised would be taken, and that the Turkish nation will act with full consciousness of its responsibility to the world”.

3. I said that I must ask, on behalf of my government, that he reconsider this decision. It carried the gravest risks of setting back our battle against heroin and of doing enormous damage to the US-Turkish security relationship. I then emphasized that as result of tonight’s announcement we were already in crisis relationship, and that his government’s proposed action would, in my judgement, bring the US-Turkish relationship to its lowest point since World War II. I also said that while I hoped very much I was wrong, the odds tonight were very strong that US military assistance to Turkey was finished. The US Executive branch, while deeply dismayed, would not, I thought, initiate such a cut off. The Congress, however, would take decision into its own hands.

4. Isik, supported by Prime Minister, said that reconsideration was politically out of question. “It would result in no government, and no relationship with U.S.” Ecevit added that he “would have thought Turk-American relations ran deeper” than I had suggested. I expressed equal surprise that GOT would take such an action against a friend, and moreover that we should learn of it through a public broadcast. I then let it be known that active consideration was being given in Washington to my being immediately recalled for consultation, remarking

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1 Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 634, Country Files, Middle East, Turkey, Vol. IV. Confidential; Flash; Exdis. Sent also Niact Immediate to Moscow for Saunders and Hartman. Repeated Immediate to New Delhi, Bangkok, Islamabad, Kabul, Adana, Istanbul, Izmir, the U.S. Mission in Geneva, and USUN.

2 Telegrams 5210 from Ankara, July 1, reported that Turkey had rescinded the poppy ban. In telegram 10340 from Moscow, July 1, the Secretary’s party requested confirmation and consultation from the Embassy in Ankara. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy Files, 1974)
that my departure just before hosting 4th of July party would inevitably be widely noted.

5. Ecevit turned conversation back to sincerity of GOT re developing fool-proof surveillance system. I stressed that if poppies grown at all, Congress likely have little faith in effectiveness of any proposed controls. Ecevit said again that irrevocable government decision taken that poppies would be grown, but he would welcome all advice on controls and asked what I would suggest.

6. I reiterated that even smallest amount of poppy growing likely to have most serious consequences in US-Turk relationship. Obviously, however, if he were prepared to grow only a very small amount at start, surround it with massive surveillance, and expand only after soundness of controls had been proven to satisfaction of international community—this might possibly make Congressional problem slightly more manageable. I added that if the poppy growing area at start was so minute as to obviously present almost no danger of significant diversion into illicit channels, I personally would urge USG to continue subsidy for the much larger proportion of those former poppy farmers not being permitted to resume cultivation. I said that by growing even a small amount he would have made good on his election pledge. At same time severe limitation of the kind I was suggesting might make problem somewhat more manageable at our end. I then added that if GOT absolutely determined to resume cultivation, an even better alternative would be to wait the three years necessary to develop a brachtiatum program, and maintain the ban until then.

7. Ecevit responded that my suggestions (especially the first one) merited serious consideration and he would take them to his government in the morning. He added that in both his explanation to Parliament and in a major television appearance on Eurovision evening July 2nd he would seek to reassure Congress by emphasizing his government’s intention to limit and control production. I said I appreciated effort but doubtful of its success.

8. At conclusion of conversation Isik, supported by Prime Minister, expressed hope that official USG spokesman, while regretting GOT decision, would add expression of confidence that a proven ally would act responsibly re surveillance effort. I said latter would not be possible.

9. Comment: Decision comes as bitter disappointment, especially as we convinced that in past few weeks, for first time, US position was gaining adherents within Turkish Government.

10. During my recent Washington consultations\(^3\) there was, I believe, general agreement that every effort should be made to

\(^3\) Macomber returned to Washington on May 15 for a CENTO meeting.
“stonewall” this decision as long as this offered any possibility of success. If in the end this failed, however, strategy was to shift to damage limiting operation, i.e., seeking to ensure minimum growing under maximum security. While we are not faced with final faits accomplis until President has actually signed decree, it is obvious that we must now turn our attention to strategy’s second phase.

Macomber

205. Memorandum From Harold E. Horan of the National Security Council Staff to the President’s Deputy Assistant for National Security Affairs (Scowcroft)


SUBJECT
Turkish Opium

Bud McFarlane told me last night that according to Tom Korologos, the Mondale Amendment cutting off aid to Turkey, which will be offered in connection with the authorization bill for the Drug Enforcement Agency budget (S. 3355), is now due to come up on the Senate Floor tomorrow, July 11. I have confirmed this with Mr. Weiss, Chief of the Congressional Relations Section of DEA.

In Korologos’ view, and others agree, Secretary Kissinger needs to get involved in this one on an urgent basis. One suggestion is that the Secretary contact the Senate Foreign Relations and the Military Affairs

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1 Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 634, Country Files, Middle East, Turkey, Vol. IV. Secret. Sent for urgent action. A notation in Scowcroft’s handwriting on the memorandum indicates that Kissinger saw it.
2 Thomas Korologos was Deputy Assistant to the President for Legislative Affairs.
3 According to the President’s Evening Report of July 11: “A wide range of efforts from several sources converged successfully on Senator Mondale this morning; the net result being that he revised his original amendment which would have cut off aid to Turkey immediately. The new amendment, co-sponsored by Senators Humphrey, Buckley and several others, passed the Senate 81 to 8. It would require suspension of aid after January 1975 unless the President can certify that the Turks have taken effective safeguard measures to prevent the diversion of opium into illicit markets.” (National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 61, President’s Daily Briefs, July 1–15, 1974)
Committees to urge against precipitate action in view of the damage such action could create not only for our bilateral relations, but in the NATO context. We might urge that on an issue as important as this, the Senate Committees should have an opportunity to hold hearings (I understand, by the way, that the House will hold hearings next week on the Wolff Resolution calling on the President to suspend aid to Turkey.) Also, cutting off aid now would weaken seriously our ability to cooperate with the Turks in preventing Turkish heroin from being smuggled into the US.

Attached at Tab A is a draft copy of an options paper for Presidential decision which State is circulating to members of the European/IG and the Combined Committee on International Narcotics Control. The Secretary has been provided an advance copy as well. The recommended option involves working with the Turks on controls, but with a clear warning that Section 481 of the Foreign Assistance Act is being considered and would be invoked if we were not convinced their control system is adequate. The credibility of this threat would be increased by applying pressure at several points by “(a) denying a recent GOT request of transfer to Turkey of two excess US naval vessels,” and “(b) informing the GOT that we will not for the present grant Turkey any military assistance under our current continuing resolution authority and will not make any disbursements under FY 1975 Foreign Assistance until we are convinced that the GOT has an adequate plan to prevent smuggling.” An element of this scenario is that we must persuade Congress to withhold punitive action against Turkey.

Recommendation

That you urge Secretary Kissinger to contact the appropriate Committees to request delay on action of the type proposed by Mondale. 

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4 Attached but not printed.

5 No approval or disapproval is indicated.
TURKISH OPIUM POPPY BAN

The Problem: Turkey has revoked its June 1971 opium ban. This threatens a resumption of smuggling of illicit opium from Turkey and a resultant worsening of the heroin problem in the U.S. There is also a danger of serious damage to our interests in Turkey as sentiment develops in the Congress to take punitive measures against Turkey.

Background/Analysis

Prime Minister Bulent Ecevit’s government decided on July 1 to end the opium poppy ban. Despite numerous promises to notify us in advance, our Embassy in Ankara received the final news through the radio announcement that the ban had been lifted. Ambassador Macomber met with Prime Minister Ecevit at midnight to protest the Turkish action and warn him of the possible consequences for Turkish-American relations. Ecevit confirmed that the decision was irreversible and reiterated his determination to impose a foolproof control system that would prevent smuggling and said he would welcome advice.

The government’s decree indicates that the GOT plans to allow farmers in seven provinces to apply for planting licenses. Each farmer would be limited to 1¼ acres of poppies. Thus there is posed a serious problem in terms of control: the probability of many small plots planted by individual farmers spread across a six-and-a-half province area.

Section 481 of the Foreign Assistance Act requires the President to suspend all assistance when he determines that a country’s government has failed to take adequate steps to prevent narcotic drugs produced in that country from entering the U.S. unlawfully. While this section does not require a production ban, the breach of the agreement does constitute a prima facie case for questioning the adequacy of Turkey’s performance.

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1 Source: Ford Library, NSC Institutional Files (H–Files), Box H–54, NSDM 267, Secret. Concurred in by John McDonald (IO/CMD), James Michel (L/PM), Mark Feldman (L), Cyrus Vance (S/NM), [name not declassified] (CIA), Kenneth Towery (USIA), and Robert Mantel and E. Johnson (OMB). Not concurred in by DOD/ISA, Treasury, AID, and JCS. Nonresponse by DEA. Transmitted by Jeanne Davis of the NSC staff to the Departments of State, Defense, and Treasury, CIA, JCS, USIA, AID, and DEA. (Ibid.)

2 See Document 204.
Examination of possible courses of action is based on the following assumptions:

a. The decision to lift the ban is irreversible barring an overthrow of the Ecevit government. We are not considering promoting an overthrow.

b. There are many within and without the Turkish Government who are genuinely concerned at the possible impact of the poppy decision on Turkish-American relationships, and particularly its impact on the security relationship. (The opposite side of this coin is that there are some who welcome the decision as an opportunity to weaken or destroy that relationship.)

Objectives:

We are looking for ways to:

a. Minimize the adverse impact of the Turkish decision on our increasingly successful battle against heroin addiction in the United States;

b. Maintain our credibility with foreign governments, the Congress and the American people regarding our seriousness in combating international narcotics trafficking;

c. Accomplish the above with the least damage to our important security relationship with Turkey.

The Options

1. Enter into discussion with the GOT on ways to prevent opium smuggling (see Annex A) while attempting to maintain business as usual on all other aspects of the Turkish-American relationship.

Pros:

—As the Turkish decision to resume growing is irrevocable, the next best chance we have for avoiding a serious setback to our narcotics efforts is the establishment of an adequate control system in Turkey. This is technically feasible. The issue is whether the GOT is willing to bear the domestic political costs of a truly effective system. We have indications that the GOT is seriously concerned over the potential damage to its relations with the U.S. We should be able to translate this concern into a firm willingness to employ whatever methods are necessary to prevent smuggling. We will be able to enlist international support in this effort.

—By maintaining business as usual throughout the rest of the wide range of relationships, we would try to divorce the opium issue from our other interests, which are important to us, especially in the area of

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3 Annexes A, B, and C were not attached and not found.
security, thereby minimizing the damage to these other interests from the heat which has developed on opium.

Cons:

—There is substantial Congressional pressure to take a tougher line.
—The Administration will be accused of being soft on narcotics.
—Internationally, we may weaken the credibility of our anti-narcotics efforts in a number of other countries, if we do not react to the Turkish setback.

2. Enter into discussion with the GOT and the UN agencies concerned on ways to prevent opium smuggling (see Annex A), while applying pressure at several points, but attempting to maintain most other aspects of the Turkish-American relationship.

Pros:

—By taking several actions on the military side, we can increase the pressure on the GOT to establish an effective control system. The Turkish military establishment is sympathetic to our position on opium as it has the most to lose from a rupture. These actions may well encourage the military to increase its pressure on the GOT to accommodate the U.S.
—By bringing the UN into the control issue at an early stage, we can multilateralize the discussions and pursue them regardless of any deterioration of our bilateral relations with Turkey.
—This will also partially assuage Congressional hardliners.

Cons:

—Applying pressure will add another irritant to U.S.-Turkish relations, already strained over the opium issue.
—More importantly, the mutually beneficial nature of our relationship with Turkey provides just as many points at which the GOT can retaliate by applying the same sort of pressure on us. (See Annex B.)
—Furthermore, we would have to move very carefully or we would risk totally alienating the Turkish military.

3. Recommend to the President that he suspend economic and military assistance to Turkey. Apply pressure at all points. Refuse to discuss the subject of control with the GOT.

Pros:

—This would demonstrate very clearly that the U.S. Government attaches the highest priority to its efforts against narcotics. Our credibility would be enhanced elsewhere in the world.
—The action would be popular with Congress and the press.
Cons:

—This would not succeed in persuading the GOT to reverse its decision.

—It would, moreover, remove whatever leverage we have by changing the threat into reality. We would be unable to persuade the Turks to impose better controls if our relations so deteriorate that we cannot carry on discussions.

—The Turkish Government would probably force us to remove the drug enforcement agents who are presently cooperating with the Turkish police in enforcement activities.

—The military establishment, which we rely on to exercise pressure on the GOT in our favor, would be alienated. The Turkish military tend to be nationalistic and suspicious of foreigners. They have until now, however, appreciated the value of American military assistance to Turkey. A complete suspension of this assistance (more than $150 million per year) would cause a serious reaction in Turkey which could lead to a significant and probably rapid deterioration in our security relations.

Recommendation:

We recommend Option 2. We should approach the GOT with minimum criteria for the establishment of system to prevent smuggling. We should discuss with them the advantages of switching to papaver bracteatum, a virtually risk-free form of poppy. We should also insist, if opium poppies are grown, that incising be prohibited in Turkey and a straw process be used.

These discussions should be accompanied by a clear warning on our side that Section 481 is being considered and will be invoked if we are not convinced that their system is adequate. The credibility of this threat will be increased by applying pressure at several points, specifically by (a) denying a recent GOT request to transfer to Turkey two excess U.S. Naval vessels, (b) informing the GOT that the U.S. will not program any grant military assistance in FY 75 until we are convinced that the GOT has an adequate plan to prevent smuggling. We must expect counter pressure and be prepared to accept this in the interest of furthering the narcotics program. This involves a decision that it will be necessary to risk some of our security interests in Turkey in the interest of our narcotics program. On the other hand, a complete breach would serve neither objective. Concurrently, we should immediately consult with the international narcotics control organizations in Geneva to inspire and assist them to make a maximum contribution to improve controls in Turkey.

We must persuade Congress to withhold punitive action against Turkey pending these discussions. This will require the personal in-
tervention of the Secretary of State, who should advise the Congress that we will insist on effective Turkish controls and will not program grant military assistance in FY 75 until we are convinced that the GOT has an adequate plan.

207. Telegram From the Embassy in Turkey to the Department of State

Ankara, July 17, 1974, 1251Z.

5630. Subject: Future of Greek-Turkish Cooperation in NATO.

1. In course of Prime Minister’s July 17 appraisal of current Cyprus situation and statement of Turkish requirements with respect to it (septel), he raised question of future of Turkish-Greek cooperation in NATO. He said that this was a subject that they had been hoping for some weeks to find time to talk directly with Secretary Kissinger about.

2. Sometime before the current Cyprus situation developed, GOT had reached conclusion that Turk-Greek cooperation in NATO had lost its meaning. He said we sincerely want NATO to remain strong and effective in this area but GOT has to face facts. GOT relations with all its neighbors are good today, except with the one neighbor which is a NATO ally. We must, therefore, he said, think about new shape that has to be given to NATO in this region. It totally unacceptable for Greek officers in Izmir to be free to observe Turkish activities and this must end. PriMin said he recognized that if NATO were not to be badly damaged, something had to be developed in lieu of Greek-Turkish cooperation. He said he did not understand military matters as well as Dr. Kissinger and he did not specifically understand what Turkish military had in mind as compensatory measures but he believed these involved giving additional common defense installations to the US “along the coast.”

3. I said that just the thought of a formal break-off of cooperation between these two key southeastern NATO countries was “chilling” and that I hoped very much he would not overreact as a result of the performance of most recent Greek Government. I said I thought it would be the height of folly to move precipitously in this direction and that it important to keep overall area-security interests in mind, despite

1 Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 634, Country Files, Middle East, Turkey, Vol. IV. Secret; Exdis. Repeated to Athens and USNATO.

2 See Document 90. On July 15 the Cypriot National Guard led by Greek officers overthrew Makarios and Nicos Sampson assumed the Presidency.
anger over current Greek-Turkish problems. PriMin repeated that serious consideration being given to this problem but agreed that precipitous action would be unwise. He said an alternative solution, which would go in exactly the opposite direction, would be to find ways to restore Greek-Turkish cooperation and carry it to further degrees. For example, if increased Greek military activity on Dodecanese were intended to strengthen NATO, there should be Turkish cooperative presence on islands. He said he would prefer a solution which involved greater, not lesser, Greek-Turkish cooperation but that as of now, GOT would probably opt for formal break-off of cooperation.

Macomber

208. Memorandum From the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger) to President Ford


SUBJECT

Turkish Opium

The announcement on July 1 by the Turkish Government that it is lifting its three-year-old ban on opium cultivation requires your decision as to the proper US Government response.

Background

Turkey’s ban on opium cultivation was decreed in June 1971 at the strong urging of the United States Government and through President Nixon’s personal efforts. Up to that time, Turkish opium had been the major source of heroin smuggled into the United States. Since the imposition of the Turkish ban, there has been a dramatic decline in heroin addiction in the United States.

In the months preceding the July announcement, it was clear that there was strong popular sentiment in Turkey in favor of the repeal of

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1 Source: Ford Library, NSC Institutional Files (H-Files), Box H-54, NSDM 267. Secret. Sent for action. An earlier draft was distributed on July 16 and summarized in an NSC memorandum for Kissinger on July 29. (Ibid.) Kissinger disagreed with the recommended option which included threatening sanctions against the Turks. Scowcroft submitted this revised paper, which reflected Kissinger’s concerns, to Kissinger on August 17. (Library of Congress, Manuscript Division, Kissinger Papers, Box 315, National Security Council, NSDM 7/74–11/76)
the ban. Despite US grants of $35.7 million to compensate and assist Turkish farmers in affected areas, the ban was highly unpopular among these farmers and others in Turkey; they insisted that the US assistance was inadequate and that the ban served US interests at Turkey’s expense. US officials, aware in recent months that the Turkish Government was moving toward lifting the ban, strongly and repeatedly urged Turkish authorities at all levels not to take such a step. We emphasized to them that the ban had played a key role in combatting a major US problem, and that US public and Congressional reaction to a revocation of the ban could seriously harm US-Turkish relations.

Since the announcement repealing the ban, there has been considerable adverse US public and Congressional reaction. On July 11 the Senate passed an amendment requiring suspension of all US military and economic aid to Turkey after January 1975 unless Turkey has by then taken effective steps to control opium smuggling. The House on August 5 passed and sent to the Senate a somewhat different resolution which would require that we enter into talks with the Turks on establishing controls and that we suspend assistance under existing legislation if these talks prove unfruitful.

The existing legislation—Section 481 of the Foreign Assistance Act—requires that you suspend all US assistance to a country if you determine that its government has failed to take adequate steps to prevent narcotics produced there from illegally entering the US. US military assistance to Turkey has been running at $150–200 million annually in recent years. Economic aid has been much smaller; our request to Congress for fiscal 1975 economic aid to Turkey is for $23 million, and the final figure is expected to be much lower.

The US Response

The Turkish decision to lift the opium ban appears irreversible. That being the case, I believe that the US response should aim at achieving the following objectives:

—To minimize the adverse impact of the Turkish decision on our battle against domestic heroin addiction;
—To make clear to the Congress, the American people, and foreign governments your commitment to combatting international narcotics trafficking;
—To accomplish the above with the least possible damage to our important security relationship with Turkey.

Prime Minister Ecevit and his government have assured us that they would welcome the cooperation of the US, the UN, and others in developing an effective control system. US Government and UN agencies have already developed a number of ideas and plans as to how an effective control system might be established in Turkey.
I believe we have three broad types of response to Turkey’s lifting of the ban:

1. **Soft-line approach:**
   
   We could enter into discussion with Turkey on ways to establish an effective control system, while maintaining business as usual in all other aspects of US-Turkish relations.

2. **Middle-ground approach (recommended option):**

   We could enter into discussions as in option #1, while pointing out to the Turks that the Foreign Assistance Act requires suspension of our military and economic assistance to them if they fail to take adequate steps to prevent smuggling into the US. This would underscore our concern and show responsiveness to the concerns of Congress and others.

3. **Harder-line approach:**

   We could enter into discussions as in options #1 and #2, while also applying pressure on Turkey in several key areas at the outset of the negotiating process.

   The first, soft-line approach, would please the Turks and minimize damage to US-Turkish cooperation. However, it would convey the implication that the Administration’s previously expressed concerns about a lifting of the ban were overstated. Also, it would not satisfy the Congress and would weaken the credibility of our narcotics control efforts in other countries. Congress is likely to mandate an early aid cut-off if it is not satisfied that we are moving positively. No US Government agency advocates this soft-line approach.

   The third, or harder-line approach, has been endorsed by several agencies. OMB, the Domestic Council, Treasury, and AID all favor applying sanctions against the Turks at the outset of the negotiations. They believe this is necessary to demonstrate that the US will not tolerate a renewal of illegal opium trafficking. They recommend that virtually the whole range of US assistance to Turkey—FY 1975 development assistance ($23 million), FY 1975 military grant assistance and military sales credits ($170–180 million), and deliveries from the current military assistance pipeline—be suspended, pending agreement on establishment of an adequate control system. These agencies believe that this tougher approach would be more convincing to the Turks and the Congress but would not irrevocably terminate any programs if the Turks respond satisfactorily.

   This harder-line posture might be popular with Congress and the press and would make clear the firmness of our commitment against illicit narcotics traffic. But it could also jeopardize our mutual security relationship with Turkey, threatening such US security interests as our use of military bases and intelligence installations there, our Sixth Fleet’s ability to operate in the Black Sea and use Turkish ports, and our extensive use of Turkish air space to fly from Europe into the Mid-
Of course, an important NATO ally and its control over the Turkish Straits gives NATO an ability to cut off Soviet access to the Mediterranean if necessary. Most importantly, there is no assurance that these costs would be offset by any gains in the effort to control illegal drug traffic into the US; indeed, the hard-line approach, by seriously damaging our relations with Turkey, could greatly diminish our ability to limit that traffic.

Serious thought has been also given within the US Government to a modified version of this harder-line posture, in which we would suspend just one or two categories of our assistance at the outset of talks. No US agency now endorses this approach, however, and I believe—given Turkish pride and nationalism—that such an approach would probably do as much damage to US-Turkish relations and cooperation as would the broader suspension advocated by OMB and the other three agencies.

While we may eventually want to impose all or some of the sanctions envisaged in the harder-line approach if Turkey proves obdurate in the negotiations, I believe that to do so at the outset would produce a negative Turkish reaction that could defeat our efforts to get good controls. Under the more moderate approach we would retain the option to get tougher if the situation demands but leave the Turks some room to work out their own domestic problems while meeting our needs.

Therefore, I recommend the moderate approach of option 2. The Departments of State and Defense, CIA, and USIA all support this approach. I believe it offers the best chance of obtaining an adequate control system. Moreover, it would at least partially assuage Congressional and public demands for a firm US response to Turkey’s action, while holding open the prospects for Turkish cooperation both on opium and mutual security matters.

The memorandum at Tab A\(^2\) would establish option #2 as US policy. (State, Defense, CIA and USIA concur).

**Recommendation:** That you approve my signing the memorandum at Tab A.

**Approve\(^3\)**

Disapprove (prefer option #3 harder line, suspending aid now pending agreement on establishment of an adequate control system. OMB, Domestic Council, Treasury, and AID favor).

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\(^2\) Printed as Document 209.

\(^3\) Ford initialed this option.
682 Foreign Relations, 1969–1976, Volume XXX

Disapprove (prefer modified version of harder line, suspending one or two categories of aid now. No agencies favor).
Disapprove (prefer very soft line described in option #1. No agencies favor).

209. National Security Decision Memorandum 267


TO
The Secretary of The Treasury
The Secretary of Defense
The Attorney General
The Deputy Secretary of State
The Administrator, Agency for International Development

SUBJECT
Turkish Opium Production

The President has reviewed the Interdepartmental Group memorandum of July 13, 1974, as well as the agency views submitted separately. He has instructed that the United States take the following steps in response to the recent decision by the Government of Turkey to lift its ban on opium production:

1. Enter into discussions with the Government of Turkey and relevant United Nations agencies on specific measures to prevent opium smuggling. Our major objectives in these discussions will be that the Turkish Government:

   —severely restrict acreage in the first year and expand only as controls are proven to be effective;
   —immediately experiment with, and ultimately shift to, more controllable agricultural and technological processes for the production of opium;
   —design, install and implement a stringent control system.

1 Source: Library of Congress, Manuscript Division, Kissinger Papers, Box CL 315, National Security Council, NSDM 7/74–11/76. Secret. Copies were sent to the Director of the Office of Management and Budget, the Director of Central Intelligence, the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, the Director of the Domestic Council, and the Director of the United States Information Agency.

2 Document 206. The separate agency views are summarized in Document 208.
2. Make clear to the Turkish Government that suspension of all US economic and military assistance to Turkey is required under Section 481 of the Foreign Assistance Act if it is determined that the Turkish Government has failed to take adequate steps to prevent narcotic drugs produced in Turkey from unlawfully entering the United States.

Henry A. Kissinger

210. Memorandum of Conversation

New York, September 24, 1974, noon.

SUBJECT
The Secretary’s Meeting with Turkish Minister Gunes

PARTICIPANTS

Turkish Participants:
Foreign Minister Gunes
Ambassador Olcay, Permanent Representative
Ambassador Esembe (to US)
Mr. Omer Akbel, Chef de Cabinet to Foreign Minister

U.S. Participants:
The Secretary
Under Secretary Joseph Sisco
Assistant Secretary Arthur A. Hartman
Mr. Denis Clift, NSC
Mr. William Eagleton, EUR/SE (Notetaker)
Mrs. Sophia Porson (Interpreter)

Prior to the meeting with the Secretary, Mr. Sisco and Foreign Minister Gunes exchanged some remarks. In answer to a question, Gunes said that elections in Turkey would probably not take place before June 1975 since the Republican People’s Party’s new partner in the coalition would want some time to build up its prestige. It any case, he said, the timing of the elections would not affect foreign policy.

1 Source: Library of Congress, Manuscript Division, Kissinger Papers, Box CL 272, Memoranda of Conversations, Chronological File. Confidential; Nodis. Drafted by Eagleton and cleared in S on September 30. The meeting was held in the Secretary’s suite at the Waldorf Hotel.
The Secretary: Which problems should we discuss first? For my part it would be helpful if we had the immigration of one million Turks to the U.S. Until we have some Turkish manifestations, I am in trouble.

Gunes: Like their Minister, the Turks here don’t want to demonstrate.

The Secretary: This is because of the gentle character of the Turks which has been manifested through the centuries.

Gunes: Yes, we are some times too gentle—until we are completely overcome then we must resist.

The Secretary: I used to be fascinated by the Turkish way of administration and expansion before the 19th Century, particularly their ability of getting occupied people to do the work for themselves.

Gunes: We want to continue with the administrative ability without occupying anyone.

The Secretary: Let’s talk of the existing situation. I am in favor of the closest relations between Turkey and the U.S. Your Ambassador can confirm that I am under enormous pressure in Washington because of this.

How do we envisage the next stage in the relations of Greece, Turkey and Cyprus?

Gunes: As I have already expressed to you before I feel strongly the need for friendship between Turkey and the U.S. not because of passing events but because of the world situation. Domestic political problems can only be a passing phase.

Turkey wants friendship also between Greece and Turkey. This has been the platform of our government, to settle outstanding differences, but the Greek Junta did not have responsible leaders with whom to talk. After there was the Cyprus crisis; but our intention is to liquidate disputes with Greece as quickly as possible.

Before getting to concrete issues I want to mention the political situation in Greece. The policies of Greece seem disoriented. They don’t seem to know what they want to do. The situation is fragile and dangerous. Greece has taken the decision to quit NATO. I would have understood if they wanted to change the basis of their foreign policy to have the sympathy of the Soviets or the nonaligned, but they seem not to have reflected seriously on the question. They want to stay in the political side of NATO, but the military organization is of great importance for their defense and for the defense of the west.

They support the Soviet position for the enlargement of the Cyprus conference. They have also adopted nuanced policies toward the Common Market. They seem to have a confused policy.

The Secretary: One has to recognize that the Greek Government took over in very difficult circumstances. It is never easy to handle a military question, but particularly so at the beginning of a government.
The Greek Government is being attacked from the left and right. They wish to steal enough anti-Americanism from the left and right to pursue a pro-American policy. They would like to get credit for leaving NATO and, at the same time, have the protection of NATO.

If I had been able to talk with your Prime Minister before you went into Cyprus I would have said that it was foreseeable that a non-Junta government would have these problems.

The situation in Greece is unstable. It is our intention to support the Karamanlis Government.

Recognizing the instability, the question is what can be done in the near future on a number of points. First, we have to show some movement to prevent Congressional action. You know we are stretching the law to the outer limits of its interpretation. You are a lawyer and if you analyze the situation you will find it very complex. We don’t do this out of personal affection for my ex-student. We do it because we think the defense of Turkey is in our own interest. But we are now in a disintegrating state of U.S. domestic politics. We have to face realities.

The second problem is in Greece. I understand that it is probable that there will be elections in November. I think what is needed before elections is a sign of progress but not a conclusion because a conclusion would leave Greece in a less favorable situation than in July or August. But progress could leave them better off than today.

So, we have to begin thinking between us about (1) what could be the final outcome, and (2) what can be done between now and the Greek election to show some movement but not a final settlement.

I have talked with Mavros—he speaks well of you.²

Seriously, I thought he was calmer and more reasonable than I had expected—I know the Turks can keep secrets but I am not so sure of my colleagues. I have the impression certain principles can evolve. This would include a federal solution with geographic separation. I think on the whole the Greek attitude is more realistic than it was previously.

As I told your Prime Minister, I am not prepared to ask for Turkish concessions in a vacuum. I know it is difficult for you to restrain your natural impulse to make concessions. But, if you can restrain until you can get progress, I would recommend it that way. You have a choice of mediators—almost as many as for Vietnam. I think that during the month of October a gesture from you might be a good thing. I think it would be best that it be made through us though we do not insist on this. We should begin to think about what that gesture should be. I have no proposition now.

² See Document 153.
I will tell you what I told Mavros this morning since it is useful that we be frank in these matters. I told him we can’t be asked to produce miracles. On territory, he said it should be in proportion to the Turkish population. I told him that in my view this was unrealistic—that the territory would have to be more than the proportion of population but less than what is now occupied. This, of course, was my own view.

Gunes: It is mine too.

The Secretary: Before history, I don’t want to be the one to dislodge the Turkish army since it usually takes three centuries to do that.

On refugees I told him the return of some would be possible but not all. This was my opinion.

Gunes: Mine too.

The Secretary: I said the central government should be federal in nature. If the Greeks were willing to accept some principles, then I or the USG would be prepared to talk to Turkey. (A colleague said I should in my speech announce that I would “talk turkey” about Cyprus.)

In that framework we are willing to be helpful. It is also in Turkey’s interest that this not be isolated from other factors. If we are forced to cut aid to Turkey the Greeks will not have the basis for making concessions and we will be in a terrible stalemate.

The present situation is that Mavros said he would have to discuss my approach with Karamanlis. I have made another appointment with Mavros for Sunday. There is nothing for Turkey to do now, since we do not yet know if the Greeks are ready to collaborate.

Gunes: I am almost completely in accord with Dr. Kissinger.

I am here in New York to do something useful. I could have an exchange with Mavros but he should be realistic. We are ready to help Karamanlis with his public opinion. We could set up things to satisfy public opinion in both countries but I wonder if now we can have anything from Mavros. He has made things difficult at the UNGA. I could respond in the same way in my speech today.

The Secretary: But that would be against your nature.

I also said to Mavros (1) if they want a big conference we will do nothing. We do not want the USSR to be seen to have influence in reaching a settlement. Even if we eventually participated in a conference we would do nothing to help it along; (2) we do not want a violent debate on Cyprus in the UNGA. I think Mavros will settle for a resolution to ask the Security Council to look at the problem again. This is the direction in which we are moving but this does not change realities. We will see many unreasonable declarations from the Greek Government.

But I think one of the steps to take by October would be to give the communal talks more political substance. You should not give away concessions for nothing. It would be easier for Athens to agree to something that the Cypriots have first accepted.
Gunes: I don’t have the intention to make concessions but I know that everyone is beginning to get mixed into the act. Our friends in the Common Market are beginning to get involved too much in political questions. We try to say no to their pressures nicely.

We have put together a collection of little gestures.

The Secretary: I understand. I do not need to know them now. We can talk about what they are later.

Gunes: I want you to understand our methods.

The Secretary: What about some progress before the Greek elections? At the right moment we could give the communal talks more political character. I also told Mavros that they should see to it that Makarios behaves himself in New York—we will see about that. What do you think about giving more political content to the communal talks?

Gunes: They have already begun to discuss political matters in private.

The Secretary: But it could be more visible—not right now.

Gunes: In private they seem to be exchanging maps showing two zones.

To give a résumé: I agree with you that, given the fact that we foresee finding a solution, we must find a way to reach that solution without shocking public opinion in the two countries.

We should not get the issue before too many international bodies.

The Secretary: That is why we must get control of the process. It is important that something real should happen in one of the forums.

Gunes: Yes.

The Secretary: But if there is nothing real the other forums will dominate.

Will you be here next week?

Gunes: I might have to go home to see about my job. I could come back.

The Secretary: I will see Mavros on Sunday. It would be useful if I could see you Monday.

Gunes: I think I will still be in New York. Regarding the forum, if Mavros agrees on the major forum it is all right, but if he wants to use all forums it will not be useful. If the Greeks say they want the Soviet proposition and then make eyes at the French to get French support that will not make an important difference as long as they recognize the main forum.

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3 September 29. They met on September 30; see footnote 4, Document 153.
The Secretary: Can I suggest breakfast on Monday? Do you observe Ramadan?

Gunes: No, in Islam it is not observed when one is at war.

The Secretary: King Faisal prays for me five times a day which is more than he prays for you.

Gunes: You are right.

The Secretary: Is 8 a.m. too early?

Gunes: That is fine. Dr. Kissinger knows that the French press says I am a peasant so I am an early riser.

The Secretary: You should see what the French press says about me!

Gunes: Another problem is the military aid question. The Senate has had a vote which is not binding. This should not influence relations between the U.S. and Turkey. These are too important to be influenced by passing things.

The Secretary: The problem is if we can get something moving we can control Congress. If not they will eventually pass something binding. Your Ambassador understands.

Esenbel: Yes.

The Secretary: I don't believe in this kind of pressure. It is not a good principle. We give military assistance in our own interest. We will meet with Congressional leaders on Friday\(^4\) but it is to some extent out of my control. It is being used against me politically.

Gunes: We should have mutual assistance among politicians. I will do what I can.

The Secretary: I think it is in our common interest. If we can get control, you know how it will go because I have kept you informed of my thinking.

You might also give some thought to the possibility that if we get a big negotiation perhaps it would be best to have a package deal on all issues between Greece and Turkey.

Gunes: I mentioned the Common Market countries, our allies. The British usually see things in a realistic way, but they seem a little disoriented now.

The Secretary: We have had some influence with the British. They have refused to join common pressures on you.

Gunes: I wonder if the Common Market wishes to follow France.

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\(^4\) See Document 211.
The Secretary: The British have been quite responsible and I believe they will follow our course. If you and we agree we can get the Federal Republic of Germany to support it.

Gunes: We can do something to help the Greek Government before November but we also have Turkish opinion. I am talking about the Turkish Cypriots who are unable to leave the British bases.

The Secretary: Can we talk about this on Monday? 5

5 September 30. No record of this meeting has been found.

211. Memorandum of Conversation 1

Washington, September 26, 1974.

PARTICIPANTS

The President
Secretary Henry A. Kissinger
Senator Mike Mansfield
Senator Hugh Scott
Senator William Fulbright
Senator George Aiken
Senator Hubert Humphrey
Congressman Thomas O’Neill
Congressman John Rhodes
Congressman Thomas Morgan
Congressman Peter Frelinghuysen
L/General Brent Scowcroft
Mr. William Timmons

SUBJECT

Bipartisan Leadership Breakfast with the President

1 Source: Library of Congress, Manuscript Division, Kissinger Papers, Box CL 124, Geopolitical File, Cyprus, Chronological File. Secret. The meeting was held in the family dining room of the White House residence. According to the President’s Daily Diary, the breakfast meeting was held 7:55–10:08 a.m. (Ford Library, President’s Daily Diary) Ford and Kissinger previously met with a bipartisan congressional leadership delegation to talk about foreign aid, including aid for Turkey, on September 12. (Ibid., National Security Advisor, Memoranda of Conversations, Box 5) Kissinger discusses the aid cutoff in Years of Renewal, pp. 235–236.
The President: I appreciate Mike’s holding the Foreign Assistance Bill so we could talk over Turkish aid, the Foreign Assistance Bill and the Trade Bill.

Doc, you approved the modified Turkish language.

Congressman Morgan: It passed by a vote of 19 to 11.

The President: I hope we can make it stick on the floor. Then, Mike helped get the same into the Senate aid bill. Henry, would you explain the situation we are in.

Secretary Kissinger: Let me do two things—explain the diplomacy and then the legal situation.

The Greek domestic situation is extremely complex. Karamanlis is caught between anti-US forces on the left and right. There is Papadopoulos on the left (who was strong enough in ’67 to stimulate a coup); and on the right are the military types from the junta.

Karamanlis and Mavros are personally pro-US. They talk differently, however, for public consumption.

Congressman O’Neill: How did the junta judge so wrong on Cyprus?

Secretary Kissinger: We got no high-level warning of the coup. Neither did Makarios. We earlier had had some rumors which we passed to him.

The junta made a basic wrong judgment. They thought in terms of the 1964 situation. But in 1964 there was a strong Cyprus government and a popular Greek government. And as a result of ’64, the Turks vowed never would they let it happen again. The junta was living in a dream world—in the early days after the coup it wouldn’t give concessions to keep the Turks from invading.

Karamanlis is trying to steal support from the left and the right before the November elections. Take his actions with respect to NATO—Karamanlis is trying to steal the thunder from the left. He has really done a minimum. Mavros was upset because he was the only foreign minister called on in New York. He thought it wouldn’t look good back home.

The Greeks know the outcome will be worse than on July 15. Any conceivable outcome before the elections would have to be of a character which would hurt them. They hope in a negotiation to wrap in other issues with Turkey. It was our judgment that there was nothing we could have done which would have stopped the second Turkish offensive.

Immediately after the second attack began, we invited both Prime Ministers here or offered to send Ambassador Bruce to meet with them. These were all rejected.

We told Karamanlis that we understood the need for some anti-US propaganda, but there was danger it would prevent us from helping
them. He quieted it down thereafter. Then Karamanlis asked for a private emissary. We sent Tyler. Karamanlis told him that in direct negotiations, he would have to ask far too much. He gave us a list of what he would need in direct negotiations and then gave us a smaller list of demands which he said he could get by with in direct negotiations. Then he said he would rather not be involved at all—so he wouldn’t have to accept the responsibility. He could accept a communal talks outcome which he couldn’t accept if he were directly involved.

At the same time, we took the foreign assistance legal interpretation to the Turks and told them we would have to implement it if there were no progress in the negotiations and on poppies. (They have now agreed on the straw process.) The Turks have now agreed that when the Greeks give the signal, they will make some concessions. That would be used to elicit a statement of principles and would permit communal talks, plus some refugee returns. This would be in October. Then, after the November elections, the talks would be broadened.

The Greek problem is presentational. Mavros was very friendly with me and asked for economic and military aid—but publicly he has had to make some troublesome statements. He told me he would get Makarios under control. He asked privately that I go to Turkey to bring back a concession, but they are reluctant to ask me publicly. But all this is tactics. Both the Greeks and Turks substantially agree on this general process.

In Turkey, Ecevit has a government problem because his coalition wanted annexation in Cyprus. He is looking for a partner who would be willing to negotiate with Greece.

Greece is willing to give Turkey 20% of the island, and the Turks are willing to reduce their holding to 33%. Somewhere in between will work.

We are ready to use leverage on Turkey (whatever you think of our policy), but if we cut off aid ahead of time we will lose that leverage. If we are tough beforehand, the Greeks—who will be tough negotiators anyway—would have leverage over us. With an aid cutoff, the Greeks would expect concessions no one could get them. These restrictions would lose us the Turks without helping the Greeks and destroy this process I have been describing. It is going pretty well really—but it will move in fits and starts. Cutting off aid doesn’t help the Greek moderates because it cuts their maneuvering room—they can’t point to objective necessities for compromise.

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2 Retired Ambassador William R. Tyler. See Documents 147, 149, and 150.
The legal provisions are such that we can and probably should cut off aid. We could avoid the cutoff by the following (read from talking paper):  

—Find the Turks not in substantial violation  
—Self-defense  
—Treaty of 1960 creates doubt  
—Law applies to future, not past action  

The President felt we should not make a strained legal interpretation without talking with you. Even if we cut off, does it apply to pipeline, and how about the $50 million grant exception? A cutoff without the pipeline cutoff would infuriate the Turks without leaving any effect for a year. 

The negotiations timetable can’t be speeded. All of this represents the nature of our problem and why we don’t want an automatic cutoff but rather to use the threat of it for leverage. 

The President: This is why the amendment of yesterday is good. 
Senator Fulbright: What is it? 
Secretary Kissinger: The CR Amendment required “substantial progress.” This gives the Greeks the opportunity to say at any time there isn’t any. The language in yesterday’s amendments call for “good faith efforts by the Turks.” 

Congressman Morgan: You saw the Post editorial? 
Secretary Kissinger: Yes. It is not accurate. I haven’t done anything about the legal opinions. 
Senator Aiken: How do we respond to our Greek friends? 
Secretary Kissinger: I spoke with AHEPA a while back and while they were good in private, they went right out to lobby for a cutoff. 

Congressman Frelinghuysen: The fight isn’t over. Brademas will continue to fight. His argument is the amendment was designed to get some troops moved off Cyprus. 

Secretary Kissinger: We could make a shyster interpretation—pull out 5,000 troops and declare substantial progress. We don’t want to do it that way. 

Congressman Frelinghuysen: The whole thing is a PR move to pacify feelings.

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3 Memorandum from Kissinger to Ford, September 10; Library of Congress, Manuscript Division, Kissinger Papers, Box CL 124, Geopolitical File, Cyprus, Chronological File. 

4 Kissinger met with Greek-American AHEPA leaders on August 23. (Memorandum of conversation, August 23; ibid., Box CL 272, Memoranda of Conversations, Chronological File)
Secretary Kissinger: Once the Turks know we are playing games like pulling out a few troops, we will lose our leverage with them.

Congressman Frelinghuysen: How do we get out of complying with the act?

Secretary Kissinger: The minimum compliance would be to cut off credit and all grants above $50 million, and have the pipeline alone. But this would force the Turks to a nationalistic posture in which no Turk could give concessions—and the Greeks wouldn’t want to make concessions in such a situation because they would want to wait to see what effect the cutoff was having.

Congressman Frelinghuysen: But we don’t have an ideal solution and the House vote shows clearly what the sentiment is.

Congressman Rhodes: Brademas told me not to make him roll us again—because he can and will. What we need is a Senate action on CR first so we can bring something in conference.

Secretary Kissinger: Our lawyers say the House Committee action would override the language in the Foreign Assistance Act.

We should have some action going by the time the recess is over.

Congressman O’Neill: Could you talk with the Greek Congressmen?

Senator Mansfield: We have the amendment now and will try to hold it as is for conference.

Congressman Rhodes: That is what we need.

Secretary Kissinger: If we had the House language on the CRA there would be daily arguments about what was “substantial” progress and the Greeks would gain great leverage.

Congressman Rhodes: How about stressing the effect on NATO. We need both Greece and Turkey.

President Ford: Sure. Turkey could take the same NATO action as the Greeks.

Secretary Kissinger: The potential for the Turks getting out of NATO is greater than Greece. There is no sympathy with Americans in Turkey and there is always the possibility of a Qaddafi-type coup. If the Turks should throw in with the Arabs, we would be in trouble.

Senator Humphrey: We have a problem of cosmetics: There must be some action showing something is going on that we can point to. We can make a case if we have something to point to. Remember, there is a US election in November, too.

Secretary Kissinger: Our dilemma is that the Turks are willing to grant some concessions, but the Greeks have asked that we don’t do it now because they want it close to their election and not so far in front they have to deliver something else by November.

Senator Humphrey: Can we say within 30 days?
Secretary Kissinger: If the Greeks think we are under pressure, they may back off.

Congressman Rhodes: But the Turks are mad now about the Congressional action. If they make concessions now, it looks like they are caving under pressure.

Senator Humphrey: We have already gone through a period in this country where we have ignored the law. It just won’t work. We need something.

Senator Mansfield: I would be prepared to go with the Brooke Amendment.

Senator Fulbright: I prefer to put the amendment on the authorization rather than the CRA. Of course I am opposed to the whole bill. This Cyprus negotiation is a British problem. These amendments would get us into another dispute where we don’t belong. Let the UN handle it. They can’t do any worse than we.

Senator Humphrey: It’s not a UN problem. It’s a NATO problem.

Senator Fulbright: The problem is we are using foreign aid to get us involved in every dispute around the world.

Senator Mansfield: Our policy in Cyprus has been good. There are all sorts of dangerous possibilities in this situation. I oppose aid but I want to support our diplomacy.

Senator Fulbright: I oppose doing it through the CRA. After all, the bill has more money, but it does have a number of restrictive amendments.

Congressman Rhodes: Hubert has identified the immediate problem. Can we tell the Turks the law is such, and that we will have to comply by a certain time.

Congressman Frelinghuysen: I don’t think the Brooke–Hamilton approach will be accepted unless we do something with the Turks.

Secretary Kissinger: Our dilemma is the Greeks don’t want it now.

Senator Scott: It will be as much trouble after the election as now.

The President: There are two bills: the authorization tomorrow and the CRA Monday.

Senator Fulbright: Why not take it to the UN. Then we wouldn’t have all of the responsibility.

The President: The Greeks and the Turks both trust us.

Secretary Kissinger: Giving it to the UN is a pro-Turk move because the UN can’t do anything and the situation would freeze as it is. If we move away from the Turks, the Soviet Union will probably move toward them. Turkey is more important to the Soviet Union than Greece.

Senator Fulbright: Turkey has always been afraid of the Soviet Union. They wouldn’t turn to them.
Senator Mansfield: No, you are wrong. They would turn to the Soviet Union and the Arabs.

The President: The Greek government won’t publicly acknowledge to the US Greeks they don’t want movement now. We both have elections and they must understand if they don’t call off the US Greeks, it will hurt the Greek position.

Senator Mansfield: How about a token Turk reduction of 2,000–3,000 now and another nearer election?

Senator Humphrey: Maybe we could dump all the bad stuff on the Authorization to let people vent their spleen and then negotiate it out of the CRA.

Senator Mansfield: We will probably take up the Authorization Tuesday.\(^5\)

Senator Humphrey: The House has a mild amendment on the Authorization and if the Senate puts a tough amendment on the Authorization, but not on the CRA, then we can negotiate a good CRA.

The President: Then, by the time the recess is over, there may be some progress and we could take care of it in the Authorization.

Senator Aiken: To summarize—all this maneuvering must be kept from the public.

Congressman Rhodes: How is the US Greek Community divided?

Secretary Kissinger: The responsible ones are for Karamanlis and the demonstrators are for Papadopoulos.

Congressman Rhodes: Suppose Iakovos\(^6\) met with the President and then made a good statement.

Congressman O’Neill: Before the coup the Greek Congressmen were out of touch with the US-Greeks—who supported the junta. Now they want to get back in touch with their constituents by being tough.

The President: We will put tough language in the Senate Authorization and keep the Senate CRA with the Brooke Amendment. Then after the recess, progress would get us off the hook.

So it’s crucial to get to Iakovos.

Congressman Rhodes: I think it would add to our problems to put a tough amendment on the Senate bill.

[Omitted here is unrelated discussion.]

\(^{5}\) October 1.

\(^{6}\) Archbishop Iakovos, highest ranking Greek Orthodox official in the United States.
Moscow, October 24, 1974, 1621Z.

Hakto 2. 1. I would like you to show the President the letter from Prime Minister Ecevit² contained in Tosec 60 and give him the following message from me:

2. “As we feared, the reaction to the irresponsible actions of Congress are now beginning to set in. As was bound to happen, the Turkish Prime Minister is questioning whether or not the United States can be depended upon as an ally. All that we had hoped to achieve now is in jeopardy because the Turks do not wish to make concessions under pressure. We are faced with a hopeless situation unless we can reverse these irresponsible decisions.

3. Specifically, the Prime Minister has told us that, despite our efforts to obtain an improved resolution from the Congress, the final wording will ‘cause serious difficulties’ going far beyond the field of military assistance. He predicts that there will be a strong Turkish public reaction and that he will have great difficulty in controlling the situation. He states flatly that the resolution complicates rather than facilitates the solution of the Cyprus problem. Ecevit asks why our Congress was not equally concerned when American-supplied arms to Greece were used in the 1960’s against the Turkish population of Cyprus. He feels that the congressional action calls into question the common understanding of our mutual security relationship. He thinks that Turkish opinion will conclude that the American Congress has a different approach and they will wonder whether they should continue to support such a one-sided alliance.

4. Despite the friendly but concerned tone of this letter, I fear that the whole basis for our approach and indeed the basis for my visit to Ankara, may have been undermined by the congressional action.

5. It is clear to me that our first priority after the congressional recess must be to reverse this action by the Congress. Not only will its continuance prevent us from achieving any solution to the Cyprus problem but it will most certainly have its effects on our ability to conduct an effective foreign policy.”

6. Warm regards.

¹ Source: Ford Library, National Security Adviser, Presidential Trip Files, Box 4, November 1974—Japan, Korea, and USSR, Hakto 1. Secret; Sensitive; Immediate. Kissinger was in Moscow to talk to Brezhnev about SALT and the Middle East.

² Dated October 22. (Ibid., Trip Briefing Books, Box 2, 10/20–11/9/74, HAK to President 1)
213. Memorandum From Director of Central Intelligence Colby to the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger)


SUBJECT

The Intelligence Stake in Turkey and the Eagleton Resolution

1. There are recent indications that the Turkish military have assessed the possible consequences of a cutoff of US military supplies and want badly to avoid any such cutoff. Nonetheless, the political stalemate makes decisions difficult for the Turkish government, and the chances of an adverse turn in US-Turkish relations cannot be discounted. Speaking for the Intelligence Community, I should note that, in addition to the obvious consequences for US and NATO political and military interests of such a development, it could jeopardize a number of intelligence facilities located in Turkey and [1 line not declassified] which would be difficult if not impossible to replace. We do not know that any of these would be terminated, but they might become involved if Turkish retaliation for a cutoff of US aid went far enough. Without being unduly alarmist, I wish to bring this to your attention as an additional reason which may be of use to you in dealing with the resolution.

2. I attach a list of the facilities in question for your personal information only.  

Bill

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2 Attached but not printed.
214. Backchannel Message From the President’s Deputy Assistant for National Security Affairs (Scowcroft) to the Supreme Allied Commander in Europe (Haig) in Ankara

Washington, December 5, 1974, 1531Z.

WH43529. AmEmbassy Ankara: deliver immediately to Gen Haig. Henry sends the following for your consideration in connection with your talks with Turk military leaders.

1. You are aware of intensive efforts we made with Congress prior to its pre-election recess to prevent restrictive legislation on aid to Turkey. I had expected that during the period between mid-October and December 10 (when by presidential certification restrictive features of CRA were suspended) we would have been able to obtain unilateral Turkish gestures of sufficient importance to provide a visible sign of progress in negotiating process that would permit US to continue aid to Turkey. However, continuing Turkish Government crisis and reluctance of caretaker government to come forward with meaningful unilateral gestures has blocked hoped-for progress. We are now facing the real prospect that those in Congress who backed restrictions on CRA bill will now succeed in placing even more restrictive language in foreign aid authorization bill which will result in termination of military aid and sales to Turkey. While recognizing that your visit to Turkey will come at a time of uncertainty and sensitivity regarding status of caretaker Turkish Government, I would nevertheless appreciate your making following points to senior Turkish military leaders with whom you have discussions:

A. U.S. administration, including President, engaged its full efforts in October to resist congressional pressures to end military sales and assistance to Turkey and was successful in preventing totally restrictive legislation. The administration had been able to do this because we had reached an understanding with Turkish Government that, at time of my then projected visit to Ankara, Turkey would arrange a series of meaningful gestures which would constitute a visible sign of progress in negotiating process.

B. Because of continuing Turkish governmental crisis this carefully arranged plan was aborted and although the administration deplores the prospect, there is now real danger that administration will

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1 Source: Ford Library, National Security Adviser, Backchannel Messages, 1974–1977, Box 1, Europe, 12/74 Outgoing; Secret; Sensitive; Flash; Eyes Only.

2 Ecevit had resigned in September and was replaced as Prime Minister by Demirel.
not be able to resist pressures in Congress for early restrictive action on military assistance to Turkey.

C. Recent contacts in Ankara indicate that Turkish Government has not yet been able to reach a decision on gestures of sufficient importance to represent sign of progress needed to help the administration resist congressional pressures.

D. We believe that it is important for Turkish military leaders to be aware of gravity of situation since it is in our common interest to prevent harm to the basic security relationship between the U.S. and Turkey. Turkey's military position on Cyprus and in the area is sufficiently strong for her to make significant gestures without sacrificing her basic security requirements or the interest of Turkish Cypriots.

Warm regards.

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215. Intelligence Note Prepared in the Bureau of Intelligence and Research


THE TURKISH POLITICAL SITUATION

President Koruturk and the party leaders are searching for a way out of the impasse that began five months ago when Prime Minister Ecevit resigned.

They have endeavored to put together another coalition government that could win a vote of confidence in Parliament or, failing that, to obtain agreement among party leaders on early elections. Neither effort has yet produced results.

*Attitude of the Armed Forces.* Koruturk and the military leadership have shown increasing impatience with the inability of the politicians to resolve their differences. Although reports are surfacing that junior officers are becoming impatient with the passiveness of the High

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1 Source: Ford Library, National Security Adviser, NSC Staff for Europe, Canada, and Ocean Affairs: Convenience Files, 1974–1977, Box 26, Turkey 1975, NSC. Secret; No Foreign Dissem; Controlled Dissem. Prepared by Charles Hartley and Philip Stoddard. A note at the bottom of the first page reads: “Aside from normal substantive exchange with other agencies at the working level, it has not been coordinated elsewhere.”
Command, the political situation probably will have to get worse before the military steps up the pressure on the civilians.

—The military establishment supports early elections to establish a more stable parliamentary base.
—The military favor Ecevit, who also wants early elections, as Prime Minister.
—Alternatively, the military probably would support a national coalition, or even a reconstituted Irmak, government in the pre-election period.
—On the other hand, the senior officers continue to dislike Justice Party Leader Suleyman Demirel and might seek to delay a move by Koruturk to ask Demirel to try to assemble a rightist coalition.

What Are the Alternatives? The conservative Democratic Party, with 41 of the 450 seats in the National Assembly, holds the key to either of the two parliamentary solutions under consideration: support for a Demirel-led “Nationalist Front” or a coalition with Ecevit’s Republican People’s Party.

—The “Nationalist Front”—the Justice Party and three smaller rightist parties, including the National Salvation Party—can muster 218 votes. Koruturk apparently is unwilling to ask the “Nationalist Front” to form a government until it is assured of an absolute majority in the National Assembly (226 votes).
—The Republican People’s Party (184 seats) and the Democratic Party (41 seats), despite the latter’s internal division, are continuing their efforts to form a majority coalition. (A few independents would probably lend their support.)

The Democratic Party has been unable to reach a decision, however, because one faction of it dislikes Demirel and the other refuses to work with Ecevit.

The Republican People’s Party also has proposed a meeting of party leaders to decide on an early election date. Demirel has expressed his opposition to such a meeting, insisting that the matter should be discussed in Parliament first. Meanwhile, the caretaker Irmak government continues as best it can to avoid controversial issues.

Impact of the Political Crisis on the Cyprus Issue. The Irmak government has hesitated to take any positive initiatives on Cyprus. Its inclination, under Foreign Minister Esenbel, is to adhere to a cautious line. As a result, it is drifting aimlessly toward the February 5 Congressional deadline on military assistance.

In our view, however, the Irmak government probably can make some concessionary gestures and probably can accept some limited agreement in the Clerides/Denktash forum. Whether it does so, and the extent to which it does, depends in large part on the attitudes of the military leadership, which is increasingly apprehensive about the effect of a cutoff of US assistance on Turkish military capabilities.
—The threatened cutoff is likely to provide the catalyst for a more active military role in pressing the politicians to fix an early date for elections. A final settlement of the Cyprus problem may depend on the formation of a majority government after new elections, with Ecevit again prime minister. In any case, it may be several months—well after February 5—before this impasse is broken.

—The aid cutoff may also lead the armed forces to pressure the Ir- mak government to announce certain concessions before February 5. Embassy Ankara believes that military pressure for Turkey to deal on Cyprus appears to be growing. Furthermore, reporting during the past three weeks suggests that over the longer term the military establishment is prepared for substantial concessions to achieve a Cyprus settlement, as long as these concessions lie within the framework of a reasonable negotiating process.

—Not to be ruled out is a move by the military leadership and the National Security Council (which has taken over from the cabinet the effective direction of Cyprus policy) to make various gestures, such as the withdrawal of units from Cyprus. We have no evidence, however, that the armed forces are as yet prepared to move in this fashion.

216. Memorandum From A. Denis Clift of the National Security Council Staff to Secretary of State Kissinger


SUBJECT
Military Assistance to Turkey

The White House and State Congressional liaison staffs are preparing a coordinated Administration approach to the Congress on the issue of military assistance to Turkey.

The Foreign Assistance Act of 1975 states that the President must determine and certify to the Congress that “substantial progress toward agreement has been made regarding military forces in Cyprus” if the normal flow of U.S. military assistance to Turkey is to continue after February 5.

If Turkey makes the necessary gestures before the cut-off date, the President can so certify. However, even without the necessary gestures,
it remains of fundamental importance to U.S. interests to continue military assistance to Turkey, and the Administration’s approach to the Congress should be tailored accordingly.

This issue between Executive and Legislative comes close on the heels of the adverse US–USSR trade developments, and the President’s State of the Union warning to the Congress\(^2\)—that if our foreign policy is to be successful we cannot rigidly restrict in legislation the ability of the President to act—takes on added significance.

The principal arguments in favor of continuing U.S. military assistance to Turkey can be summarized as follows:

1. The United States provides Turkey with military assistance because it is in the United States’ and US/NATO security interests to do so. Turkey is a NATO ally, and a cut-off in military assistance would weaken NATO’s Southern Flank.

2. Our efforts to assist in solving the Cyprus crisis reflect our interest in finding a solution that will permit Greece to preserve her prestige and dignity. A cut-off of assistance to Turkey will work against Greek and Greek-Cypriot interests:
   —The United States will lose negotiating leverage with the Turks, leverage which will be retained if our military assistance continues.
   —Turkish attitudes will harden and the Turks will seek—and probably find—military assistance elsewhere.
   —If the United States “turns against” Turkey and toward Greece by cutting off assistance, the Turkish military may be increasingly tempted to again resort to force and take more territory on Cyprus.
   —If such events were to unfold, the Cyprus crisis would deepen, Greece would be unable to act and her position would worsen.

3. Substantive political discussions have begun in earnest between the leaders of the two Cypriot communities. These discussions will collapse if the United States takes the step of cutting off assistance to Turkey.

4. Turkish domestic politics have left Turkey with a caretaker government for more than four months. This has restricted Turkish negotiating flexibility, and U.S. patience is required.

5. The negotiating issues are complex and involve coordination with several interested parties to the dispute—Turkey, Greece, and the two Cypriot communities. The process of achieving agreement among the various parties is slow and complex and cannot be constrained by arbitrary deadlines for results.

217. Interagency Intelligence Memorandum


[Omitted here is a table of contents.]

TURKEY AFTER THE US ARMS CUTOFF

**Note**

It is too early to predict with much confidence precisely how Turkey will behave in reaction to the cutoff of US military aid. Indeed, it seems clear that the Turks themselves are just beginning to address the problem, largely because—until now—the prospect of such a cutoff has been for them unthinkable.

As Turkey searches for a way out of the dilemma, however, we can identify some of the factors that will weigh heavily in Turkish calculations. These factors may provide clues with respect to the options open to Ankara and to how these impinge on US interests. The degree of Turkish dependence on US arms aid, the likely outcome of the inevitable search for alternate sources of military equipment, and the durability of Turkey’s present orientation toward the West are some of the issues this paper addresses.

For purposes of this paper, an indefinite cutoff of US military assistance is assumed. We try to look at least several months into the future.

**Principal Conclusions**

The Turks have no satisfactory alternative to US supply of arms, at least over the near term. Hence, the effectiveness of the Turkish armed forces and their ability to perform their key role in NATO will steadily deteriorate. The strategic implications of a protracted US cutoff could be profound, particularly in view of Turkey’s geographic position anchoring NATO’s southern flank and controlling Soviet access to the Mediterranean.

Although the Turks are shocked and appalled at the termination of US arms aid, their reaction thus far has been measured and they will

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1 Source: Central Intelligence Agency, NIC Files, Job 79–R01012A. Secret; No Foreign Dissem; Background Use Only; Controlled Dissem. A note on the first page reads: “This memorandum was prepared under the auspices of the Acting National Intelligence Officer for Western Europe. It was drafted by CIA and DIA and has been reviewed and endorsed by representatives of State/INR as well as CIA and DIA.”

2 The ban on Turkish military aid took effect on February 5, in accordance with the 1975 Foreign Assistance Act, which the Senate passed on December 4 and the House on December 11, 1974. (*Congress and the Nation*, Vol. IV, 1973–1976, pp. 858–860, 866) For the President’s statement, see Document 173.
probably avoid any rash response. If the arms cutoff continues, it is highly likely that the Turks will retaliate against the US in stages, including steps to curtail US use of facilities in Turkey. This could seriously weaken the ability of US forces—primarily naval and air—to operate in the area as well as jeopardize key intelligence collection programs.

Turkey’s ties with NATO will also be damaged, but probably not as seriously as Turkish relations with the US. For at least the short term, much will depend on whether Turkey is successful in obtaining military equipment from other NATO countries to help compensate for the loss of US supply. If those countries are able to help Ankara in this way, moderate forces in Turkey will be strengthened and the country’s ties to Western Europe will probably remain strong.

If, on the other hand, the Turks conclude that their basic military needs cannot be met by their European allies, they are likely to read this as de facto isolation from NATO and will react much more strongly. In these circumstances, Turkey is likely to explore alternative sources of support abroad—from Arab states, for example—but will probably not be able to satisfy its needs in this way. The results might be an inward-turning isolation and a reversion to domestic conservatism which could spell trouble for Turkey’s economic health and its role in southern Europe.

I. Turkey’s Dependence on US Military Equipment

1. The degree of Turkish military dependence upon the US is difficult to overstate. All told, the US has supplied over 90 percent of Turkey’s military equipment. Since 1950, over $3 billion of military equipment has been provided through the US Military Assistance Program (MAP); an additional $1 billion was programmed for the next five years. The US has supplied the Turkish Army with over 95 percent of its medium tank inventory, all of its personnel carriers, and all of its post-World War II field artillery. About 85 percent of Turkey’s aircraft have come from the US. Almost all major naval combatants are former US vessels supplied through the MAP or built in Turkey under a cost-sharing program. More than 18,500 Turkish military personnel have been trained over the past 25 years with US assistance, nearly all in the US.

2. With this US assistance, Turkey has been able to maintain the second largest army and the third largest overall armed forces in NATO. The Turks have accepted an important mission—defense of NATO’s southeastern flank and the Turkish Straits.

Impact of US Aid Cutoff

3. The termination of US military assistance will affect the Turkish armed forces in two key respects: first, the loss of new supplies of space parts will severely compound maintenance problems; and, second, the force modernization program will be stifled.
Spare Parts

4. Nearly 30 percent of the undelivered balance of MAP assistance was intended for spare parts, overhaul, repair, and rehabilitation. The large amount of aid needed simply to keep existing equipment in working condition underscores Turkey’s heavy dependence on the US.

5. Turkey’s stocks of spare parts have been low for some time. A three-week cutoff of spare parts in December caused a drawdown of stocks, rescheduling of maintenance, and even some cannibalization. Making a virtue of necessity, the Turks have displayed unusual adeptness in keeping aging equipment operable. This kind of maintenance, however, can be only a temporary expedient, and eventually results in serious degrading of equipment and capabilities.

6. The cutoff of the flow of spare parts will be felt immediately. The pace of deterioration in the combat readiness of the Turkish armed forces, however, will vary from service to service. The Air Force is the most vulnerable to the US arms cutoff and will begin to feel a serious impact in about three months, if it cannot get spare parts elsewhere. It will take somewhat longer for the other services to be seriously hampered. (These projections assume normal peacetime conditions.)

7. The lack of spare parts will also have an immediate impact on training, which will probably now be cut to a bare minimum in all three services. This will adversely affect the proficiency of pilots and also of small unit commanders and troops.

8. The impact of the cutoff would be much more serious if the Turks came to blows with Greece over conflicting claims to rights to the Aegean seabed, or if serious fighting were to resume on Cyprus. According to one recent report, senior Turkish officers believe that, with the limited amount of spare parts on hand, Turkish forces would run short after only seven to ten days of fighting with Greece.

Force Modernization Program

9. The impact of the US arms cutoff on the modernization program will not be as quickly felt as in the case of spare parts, but it is likely to be as severe over the longer run. The ground forces will be particularly hard hit. The Army will probably not be able to proceed, for example, with plans to modernize some 800 tanks to make them a better match for the Soviet T–62. The Air Force too will be hurt badly; Turkey has received only 16 of the 40 F–4E fighter-bombers purchased through the foreign military sales program. Plans for improvements in the Navy will also be set back.

II. Other Sources of Supply

10. Until early this month, the Turks felt that some way would be found to avoid a cutoff of US arms. Hence, they have just begun to
make a serious effort to identify other sources of supply. Ankara is now weighing the prospects for:

—greater reliance on domestic production.
—purchasing arms from other NATO countries, especially West Germany and Italy.
—getting help from wealthy Middle Eastern states, such as Iran and Libya.

There seems to be a general consensus already among the Turks that there are no sources, or combinations of sources, that can be tapped in the near future to enable the Turkish armed forces to maintain their current capability.

11. Turkey has long spent a higher percentage of its GNP on defense than most other NATO members and is taking steps to increase its defense spending still more in the light of the US aid cutoff. The Turks would like to devote additional funds to domestic arms production and to buying weapons abroad. They are handicapped, however, by a high rate of inflation, a large trade deficit, and a sharp drop recently in foreign exchange reserves. These problems do not altogether prevent Ankara from attempting to use its own resources to help compensate for the loss of US aid, but the Turks realize that such efforts could hamper their economic development.

Reliance on Domestic Production

12. Turkey lacks the basic industrial capacity, investable funds, and skilled manpower needed to produce major military equipment. Hence, the Turks will not be able to satisfy their major military requirements in this way for many years, if ever.

13. [less than 1 line not declassified] a thorough study of Turkey’s capability to produce military equipment. A detailed inventory of Turkish industry is being drawn up in order to determine what kinds of equipment can be produced in-country and to identify areas that should be the target of military R&D programs.

14. Turkey now produces small arms, ammunition, and some naval vessels. In addition, the Turks have the capability to modernize some of their more important military equipment. They would still be dependent, however, on outside suppliers for major subassemblies. The Turks are completely dependent on foreign sources for aircraft, tanks, submarines, and other more complex systems, and [less than 1 line not declassified] indicate an awareness that Turkey will remain so for a long time to come.

Arms From Other NATO Members

15. Prime Minister Irmak has said publicly that Turkey will begin shopping for arms “first from NATO countries, and, failing that, wherever it can buy them.” The Defense Minister has spoken of attempts to
negotiate new arms deals in five NATO countries. In the past, other NATO members have provided most of the equipment that has not come from the US. Some of this equipment, however, such as the M–48 tanks supplied by West Germany, is US-built and requires US permission for transfer to Turkey.

16. US legal restrictions now appear to prevent the transfer of US-built equipment to Turkey, but the Turks can continue to obtain non-US equipment from Western Europe. West Germany, which has been Turkey’s major non-US source, has its own program of military assistance and sales to Turkey and has provided aircraft, submarines, patrol boats, and other equipment. Italy has sold the Turks fighter aircraft, helicopters, and trucks. Sales and assistance from other NATO countries, however, cannot match in quantity, quality, or financial benefit, what Turkey expected from the US.

17. The Turks are afraid that they will be unable to obtain, from other NATO states or elsewhere, military equipment produced in third countries under licensing agreements with the US. Many of the spare parts Turkey badly needs are manufactured under such licensing agreements, as are the F–104/S aircraft which the Turks recently bought from Italy.

18. The rising cost of foreign sales is another factor that will weigh heavily in the Turks’ calculations. They had to pay almost $4 million for each of the F–104/S aircraft purchased from Italy.

Help From Middle Eastern States

19. Middle Eastern countries may assist the Turks, particularly in financing arms purchases. Relations between Turkey and Libya, for example, have improved considerably since the outbreak of fighting in Cyprus last year. The Libyans apparently provided spare parts or other material assistance for the Turkish forces at that time. Since then, ties between the two countries have continued to improve, with the Turks trying—with some success—to tap Libyan financial resources for military assistance. Tripoli apparently financed the purchase of Italian F–104s, for example, and a new Turkish-Libyan agreement provides for some unspecified form of cooperation in the production of military equipment.

20. The Turks will also seek to improve relations with other wealthy states in the Middle East. Iran, for example, shares with Turkey a historical hostility toward the mutual neighbors to the north, and the Shah is a possible source of support. The Turks know, however, that maintaining the strength of their forces is a question not only of money, but also of access to the proper kinds of weapons and equipment. Even if Middle Eastern countries were willing to spend as much as the US was spending for military assistance to Turkey, the Turks could not obtain all the spare parts needed to maintain their current inventory of US-built equipment. Nor are they likely to get sophisticated items like the F–4s and electronic warfare equipment which they were counting on to upgrade their forces.
21. Substantial financial assistance from wealthy benefactors would make it theoretically possible for the Turks eventually to re-equip their forces with non-US equipment, such as French Mirage aircraft, West German Leopard tanks, and British naval vessels, if the producer countries were willing to sell them to Ankara. (The French, West Germans, and British would have to weigh carefully, inter alia, the repercussions of such sales on their respective relations with Greece.) The Turks realize, however, that in the best of circumstances, a massive re-equipment program would take several years to complete. In the interim there would be no way to avoid a confused and cumbersome supply system which would weaken the preparedness of Turkey’s armed forces.

22. One way of speeding a re-equipment program would be for friendly states to transfer equipment directly from their inventories to Turkey. This would be possible for Libya, which currently has more modern aircraft and tanks than its forces are capable of using efficiently. Libya and other Arab states, however, would probably be reluctant to part with any major weapons at a time when they believe another war with Israel is possible.

23. The Turks are doubtless aware that re-equipment of their forces with non-US weapons would carry risks and would substitute dependence on other foreign states for dependence on the US. Nevertheless, Ankara will probably take some steps in this direction, even if US aid is later resumed, since the danger of relying on a single source of supply has been made abundantly clear.

From Russia?

24. We do not believe that the Turks are now seriously considering turning to the Soviet Union or any other Warsaw Pact country for military supplies. Although the USSR has the capability to re-equip Turkish forces, the Turks would probably see little value in becoming dependent on the Soviets. Ankara nonetheless may try to use the specter of a turn to the USSR as leverage to induce Western states to provide military equipment.

III. When the Turks React

25. Turkey’s reaction in the initial period following the cutoff of US arms aid has followed predictable lines. Believing, as the Turks did, that some way would be found to avoid the cutoff despite the lack of progress on Cyprus, they were surprised, dismayed, and angry. There is no sign that they drew up contingency plans in the event the aid was actually stopped. Even now, Turkish leaders continue to harbor hopes that the arms tap can soon be turned on again. In these circumstances, Ankara’s relatively restrained response thus far is probably not a reliable gauge of what is to come.
26. Turkish confidence in the mutual security relationship with the US has already been seriously shaken. If US aid is not reinstated soon—the end of February has been cited as the outer limit of Turkish patience—retaliatory moves by the Turks against the US are inevitable. Ankara has already let it be known that all defense agreements with the US will be subject to re-examination unless military deliveries are resumed. In the paragraphs that follow we assume for purposes of analysis that the US arms cutoff continues indefinitely and we offer preliminary judgements as to how the Turks may respond.

**Impact on US-Turkish Relations**

27. The Turks’ measured reaction thus far strongly suggests a determination not to let matters get out of hand either in the diplomatic arena or with respect to public opinion in Turkey. As the weeks go by, Ankara is likely first to restrict or eliminate privileges enjoyed by the US in Turkey under informal agreements. Next, the Turks will probably curtail US use of facilities in Turkey for military operations and intelligence collection. Those facilities most conspicuous to the public would probably be among those most vulnerable. Installations that do not directly contribute to the defense of Turkey but are extremely valuable to the US—for example, certain intelligence collection facilities—would also be fair game. We believe it likely that Turkey will eventually demand that some, if not all, of these installations be closed down. Turkey’s leaders could demand a high price for continued use of facilities permitted to remain. They would probably not shrink from these steps even though they realize that such actions will do nothing to help them out of their present dilemma.

28. The venom injected into US-Turkish relations by the controversy over military aid is likely to poison other important bilateral dealings as well. It will be difficult, for example, to conduct fruitful discussions on sensitive issues like the opium problem.

**Domestic Repercussions**

29. There are some tentative signs that the halt in US military aid may create sufficient pressure to break the political stalemate in Ankara, now in its fifth month. The armed forces’ disenchantment with squabbling politicians has become increasingly evident in recent weeks, and the military may now seize the occasion to apply more pressure on political leaders to resolve their differences. This could bring stronger efforts to form a coalition or a move toward elections. The Turkish press has recently carried reports that new elections will be held some time in June.

30. If an election is held, the aid cutoff will undoubtedly be one of the major issues, and extreme nationalists will find a much more receptive audience for anti-US rhetoric. An election will conceivably result in a government committed to ending all cooperation with the US,
but the possibility of intervention by the Turkish military would increase in this event.

**Turkey, Europe, and NATO**

31. Turkey has now been forced to re-examine its role in NATO since—until now—the Turks have looked on membership in the Alliance as synonymous with very close military ties to the US. Ankara’s relationship with NATO has thus been shaken and it is too early to predict the eventual outcome. Over the short run at least, Turkish ties with the Alliance are not likely to suffer as much as bilateral relations with the US. Turkey’s modern leaders have pointed the nation toward Europe and this direction will not change overnight.

32. Turkey is an associate of the EC, looking toward full membership by 1995, and a member of several other European regional organizations. NATO, however, is Turkey’s most important tie to the West and the Turks have taken great pride in the active role they have played in the organization.

33. The Turks have already said that the cutoff of US military assistance will weaken their capability to meet their NATO commitments, and they are likely to reduce their military participation in NATO, at least temporarily. The Turkish government has stressed, however, that it has no present intention to withdraw from the Alliance. Indeed, Ankara is not likely to step out of NATO without an in-depth review of Turkey’s entire foreign policy, and a basic decision to change it radically. The military especially—still the final arbiter of power in Turkey—would be most reluctant to sever all ties with the Western Alliance.

34. Turkey’s eventual course will be greatly influenced by the results of its search for alternative sources of military equipment—and that search will take time. If other NATO countries are willing and able to step into and fill some of the breach, this will buy time and help strengthen forces for moderation in Ankara, especially those in the military who want to hold losses to a minimum. If, however, the Turks are cut off from these alternative sources, they are likely to read this as de facto isolation from NATO, and they will react much more strongly.

**Relations Between Turkey and Greece**

35. The Turks, of course, blame Greece for the US arms cutoff, and they are particularly incensed at continued US military deliveries to the Greeks. Moreover, tensions remain high over Cyprus. It is possible that the arms cutoff may add a constraint on Turkey to avoid provoking the Greeks in such a way as to risk getting drawn into a protracted military conflict. This consideration may have played some part in Ankara’s recent decision to respond favorably to Athens’ proposal to take the dispute over the Aegean seabed to the International Court of Justice.
36. On the other hand, if Turkey should feel seriously threatened by the Greeks, it would retain various options not yet foreclosed by the arms cutoff. If, for example, Ankara were to conclude that war with Greece is inevitable, the Turks might opt for a surprise attack aimed at inflicting serious damage on Greek forces before the Turks’ supply problem becomes more acute.

Turkey and Cyprus

37. Turkey’s recent actions with respect to Cyprus are meant to underscore Turkish determination to deal from a position of strength and to prove that Ankara is immune to outside pressure on the Cyprus issue. There is no chance that this tough stance will weaken any time soon. The Turks may retain, however, some flexibility with regard to the size of the Turkish Cypriot sector, the number of Greek Cypriots permitted to live there, and the powers granted to any central government eventually created on the island.

38. Recent Turkish reinforcement on Cyprus indicates that Ankara does not intend to pull out forces any time soon. In time, however, the drain on scarce military resources would argue for withdrawal of a significant portion of Turkish forces on the island. The Turks would have additional incentive to pull out military units if their efforts to obtain arms and spare parts are unsuccessful, and if they believe that such a withdrawal would bring a resumption of US arms deliveries.

Looking Around for Friends . . .

39. If the halt in arms aid continues, the Turks are likely to weigh more far-reaching steps, particularly if they find that their basic military needs cannot be met by their European allies. Closer relations with Middle Eastern states and an improvement in relations with the USSR and Eastern Europe are options that would probably be examined. All would have serious drawbacks for the Turks.

40. As mentioned above, the Turks have already made some attempts to improve relations with the Arabs, and Libya has been especially active in courting Turkey. A major shift toward Arab countries, however, would be a difficult one for the Turks who would not wish to depend on Arab governments, and particularly not one led by so mercurial a leader as Qadhafi. [7 lines not declassified]

41. A substantial shift toward the USSR would seem even less likely than one toward the Arabs. Shortly after the US aid cutoff, there were unconfirmed reports that the Turks would consider a nonaggression pact with the Soviet Union. There is no sign that a serious initiative of this kind is in the cards, but something like it may come to be seen as an alternative, if Turkey eventually concludes that it has been deserted by its allies and left relatively defenseless.
42. Since Turkey controls the Soviets’ access to the Mediterranean through the Bosphorus and Dardanelles and their direct air routes to the Middle East, the Turks would have some strong bargaining chips if they decided to cultivate closer ties with the Soviet Union. The two nations have been rivals for centuries, however, and the Turks retain a deep-seated fear and suspicion of Russian intentions, despite the modest improvement in relations in recent years. There have been unconfirmed reports that Moscow has recently offered some limited arms assistance, but the Soviets probably have no illusions about their chances of replacing the US as Ankara’s principal arms supplier.

. . . or Turning Inward

43. There is no sign yet of any fundamental reorientation of Turkish foreign policy. Indeed, it would seem equally likely that Turkey’s current troubles could result in growing isolationist feeling and a return to domestic conservatism. This could spell trouble for Turkey’s economic prospects and for its role in southern Europe.

218. Memorandum From the President’s Deputy Assistant for National Security Affairs (Scowcroft) to President Ford


Secretary Kissinger asked that the following message be passed to you:  

“I have just completed six hours of conversations with the principal Turkish leaders including Foreign Minister Esenbel, Prime Minis-

1 Source: Library of Congress, Manuscript Division, Kissinger Papers, Box CL 273, Memoranda of Conversations, Chronological File, March 1975. Secret; Sensitive; Exclusively Eyes Only. Ford initialed the memorandum.

2 This message was transmitted to Scowcroft in telegram Hakto 22 from Ankara, March 10. (Ford Library, National Security Adviser, Trip Briefing Books and Cables for Henry Kissinger, 1974–1976, Box 6, 3/5–22/75, HAKTO 1) Kissinger was in Ankara as part of a Middle East trip.

3 On March 10 Kissinger met with Esenbel (Memorandum of conversation, 5:20–6:30 p.m.; National Archives, RG 59, Records of Henry Kissinger, 1973–1977, Entry 5403, Box 10, Nodis Memcons, March 1975); Sancar (Memorandum of conversation, 6:40–7:40 p.m.; Library of Congress, Manuscript Division, Kissinger Papers, Box CL 273, Memoranda of Conversations, Chronological File); Irmak, Sancar, and Esenbel (Memorandum of conversations, 7:50–8:30 p.m.; National Archives, RG 59, Records of Henry Kissinger, 1973–1977, Entry 5403, Box 10, Nodis Memcons, March 1975); and Ecevit (Memorandum of conversation, 8:30–9:50 p.m.; Library of Congress, Manuscript Division, Kissinger Papers, Box CL 273, Memoranda of Conversations, Chronological File).
ter İrmak, Chief of the Turkish military, General Sancar and the key political leader, and former Prime Minister Ecevit. It is clear from the results of these discussions, which I will continue tomorrow morning, that the achievement of the beginning of serious substantive negotiations will be difficult as well as the negotiations themselves for two principal reasons: (a) there is strong feeling against the aid cutoff and the political leaders do not want to appear to be making concessions in the face of Congressional action; and (b) the political uncertainty in Ankara in which the present technocrat government while well disposed is unable to act in any decisive or conclusive way.

“I exposed all leaders to our assessment of the aid cutoff and said that there were three possible ways to deal with it: (a) a waiver; (b) the beginning of a serious negotiation which would allow us to report to the Congress that ‘substantial progress’ had been made; or (c) repeal of the law, which would likely require some substantive progress between the parties in order to convince at least the House members of our Congress to reverse themselves. I found no interest in the waiver option other than an outright repeal. It is clear from my talks that the posture that we have adopted in the Executive Branch has helped keep the lead on the situation here and has helped avert more serious decisions which would have a more critical effect on our overall relations with Turkey.

“I probed whether the Turkish Government would agree to reduce substantially the zone of its present occupation if we could get a commitment from the Greek Government for a bizonal federation. While all the Turk leaders obviously are interested in the bizonal arrangement, no one felt in a position to commit themselves to any kind of specificity as to how much of a reduction in the zone of occupation might prove feasible. Foreign Minister Esenbel, who is a competent and open-minded professional, has to touch many bases before any decision can be taken, and he told us this evening that while he can manage the military, the Prime Minister and the President, his greatest difficulty in getting decisions made is getting the acquiescence of the two principal political leaders Ecevit and Demirel, each of whom tends to view each issue from the point of view of what advantage can be derived from it.

“In this regard I was struck in particular by Ecevit’s approach to my probes regarding a bizonal federation. All of us came away with the distinct impression that he was attached to the idea of a bizonal arrangement—as all the main Turkish leaders are—but he left the impression that he wants to reserve this kind of solution for himself rather than to have any technocrat government undertake it. The difficulty with Ecevit’s approach is that it is likely to be months before a reasonably strong Turkish Government can be put together, and my concern is that there will be a progressive deterioration both in Greece and in Cyprus unless we can get a serious negotiating process started in the near future.
“On the whole, however, I believe this trip was very useful. We exposed the Turks to our analysis that all concerned would benefit from the bizonal solution, and all would be hurt by a prolonged impasse. We have talked to all political leaders in a way the Turkish Government finds it difficult to do. We were able to reflect to the Turks Karamanlis’ desire for an early solution, and by probing the bizonal solution, we have begun to sow some seeds for future evolution.”

219. Memorandum From the President’s Deputy Assistant for National Security Affairs (Scowcroft) to President Ford


The Secretary asked that I pass you the following report on his talks with the Turkish leaders.1

“I have just completed another series of talks with Turkish leaders,2 including President Koruturk as well as each leader of every principal political party in Turkey. I want to share with you in particular my conclusions regarding the impact of the aid cutoff.

“First, it is clear that the embargo has deeply hurt the national pride of the Turks. These words spoken by former Prime Minister Ecevit to me were repeated in different ways time and again by every leader that I spoke to. What has Turkey done to the United States? We are and have been a loyal ally. How can this cutoff possibly do any-
thing but be harmful to Turkish-American relations and in particular the common interests we share? What is the prospect for an early repeal?

"It is clear that the present government as well as the principal political leaders have been carefully avoiding unleashing strong anti-American feeling among the populace for all of them seem to be dedicated to the fundamental proposition that Turkey and America are friends whose mutual interests would be irrevocably damaged if things get out of hand. In this connection, the statements you have been making against the aid cutoff and the position that you have insisted upon that we cannot accept this as a matter of principle have helped decisively in keeping a lid on the situation here. At the same time, however, I am deeply concerned—even more so than before I arrived—that if the cutoff is maintained it will be only a matter of time before the constraints being maintained by all the political leaders will be put under unbearable pressure.

"A second factor in the situation, of course, is the weak technocrat government—which, while competent within the limited political parameters in which it can operate, is not in a position to take the kind of decisions which are required in order to move negotiations at a rapid pace. Nevertheless, I believe I made good headway with a number of political leaders in convincing them that Turkey must grasp the nettle soon, that this is a propitious opportunity which could be lost, and that a bizonal solution which the Greek Government seems prepared to accept now is not likely to be available two or three months from now. I painted the picture of the results from a continued impasse: a weakened Karamanlis; internationalization of the Cyprus problem; the Soviets being given an opportunity to become directly involved in an injurious way; Makarios in a better position to be even more troublesome than he is now; and, finally, a continued deterioration in Turkish-US relations, even though it is not the desire of either of us. The key to the Turk internal political situation seems to be Ecevit, and my concern is that he wants to reserve the Cyprus solution for when he comes to power some months from now. The trouble is that the situation will not hold—politically speaking—until he gets to power. I intend to continue to maintain contact with him in order to underscore the importance of his support for a prompt seizing of the opportunity by the Turks which exists today. If they are willing in time to consider how large a zone of occupation they would settle for in return for a bizonal federation, there is hope in the situation.

"Ecevit, in explaining the reasons why the outburst in Turkey has not been even stronger regarding the aid cutoff, not only attributed this to hurt national pride and a weak Turkish Government, but also to the fact that the leftist intellectuals would just as soon see the aid cutoff lead to a weakening of Turkey’s ties to the United States and NATO.
“It is really tragic to see what this aid cutoff is doing to a very close and loyal ally of the United States. I feel even stronger than when I arrived that we have no alternative but to continue to make an all-out effort to get the cutoff repealed. The Turks have no real interest in a waiver on spare parts, and this is understandable since they want no link whatsoever between our relations, aid, and the Cyprus problem. Since we are now working on a package deal, it is unlikely that you will be able to make a determination that ‘substantial progress’ had been made. Therefore, the only realistic choice is an outright repeal, and I believe it is essential that we make every feasible effort to achieve this result. In the meantime, of course, we should continue our efforts to get a serious negotiating process started, but the repeal of the cutoff cannot await this negotiating process which at best will be slow and deliberate.

“In a separate message, I am planning on giving Brademas a very brief picture of the situation as I see it. In the meantime, I believe we should continue to press for the adoption of the Senate resolution.”

4 No record of this message has been found, but Ford and Scowcroft met with Brademas, Sarbanes, and Rosenthal on March 21; see Document 221.

220. Memorandum From the President’s Deputy Assistant for National Security Affairs (Scowcroft) to President Ford


Secretary Kissinger asked that I pass you the following report...

“I have sent you two detailed reports of my 24 hours in Ankara, and I want to outline very briefly in this message the principal highlights and where matters stand.

My overall principal observation is clear: The congressional aid cut-off has had a shattering effect on the Turks, but the position taken


2 This message was transmitted to Scowcroft in telegram Hakto 31 from Ankara, March 12. (Ibid., 3/75–12/75, HAKTO 2)

3 Documents 218 and 219.
by you against the cut-off has kept the lid on the situation here in Turkey. All of the principal political leaders will try to continue to hold the line against anti-Americanism for at least a few weeks more.

Secondly, I believe we have made real headway with the present government and the outside political leaders in convincing them that a total settlement has to be achieved in the next two or three months or the situation could deteriorate significantly: Karamanlis would be weakened; Makarios would increase his troublemaking; the problem would be internationalized; and the Soviets would be able to exploit the situation.

Third, I believe we have also made headway with key leaders in getting them to examine seriously Greece’s willingness to accept the principle of a bizonal federation if the Turks are willing to consider as a matter of principle the reduction of the size of its zone of occupation. This would be the starting negotiating framework.

Fourth, the problem can no longer be approached piecemeal looking for independent gestures on one side or the other. The negotiations, which would be conducted by Clerides and Denktash, would have to have as its objective a total settlement. Because the aim would be to get a total settlement, we are not able to point to certain interim evidences of progress as a way of convincing the Congress to lift the cut-off. In other words, either in a couple of months a total settlement will have been achieved, or there will be a sharp deterioration in the situation—no interim step-by-step progress can be expected.

In these circumstances, therefore, there is only one answer for us as it relates to the congressional problem; there must be a total repeal of the aid cut-off, nothing more or less. My hope is that if we can get the parties in the next few weeks to agree on the principles of bizonal federation and some reduction of territory, that this will be the real starter of the negotiations. I am aiming to achieve this with or without an aid cut-off, though obviously if we could achieve the actual or potential repeal of the aid cut-off it would not only be a stimulus in starting the process of the negotiation but it would help carry it through to a successful conclusion. But the reversal of the cut-off cannot wait for the negotiations. We have, at most, till the end of April to get it changed before reprisals will occur.”

Warm Regards
221. Memorandum of Conversation\(^1\)

Washington, March 21, 1975, 10 a.m.

PARTICIPANTS
- Representative John Brademas (D–Ind)
- Representative Paul S. Sarbanes (D–MD)
- Representative Benjamin S. Rosenthal (D–NY)
- President Gerald Ford
- Lt. General Brent Scowcroft, Deputy Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs

SUBJECT
- Turkish Aid Cutoff

President: I appreciate your suggestion for the meeting. No one is happy with the present situation. There is a stalemate, and unless something is done, there is no hope for progress.

Henry has met with you.\(^2\) Late action was the Turkish Cypriot declaration of an autonomous state.\(^3\) The Greek Cypriot went to UN.

Henry saw Bitsios on March 7.\(^4\) Then he went to Ankara on March 10.\(^5\) He met there with all the Government people and the political leaders. You know about the Turkish political stalemate. All the key leaders are outside the Government. Everyone seems to want to negotiate, even Makarios’s stalemate is sound, but we are on dead center. I am willing to listen, but we can’t let this drift. It is very harmful. With the problem with Portugal we don’t need any in the East Mediterranean, and in the Middle East.

Brademas: Thank you for seeing us, Mr. President. We all want a solution. I told the Greeks we want to support aid to Turkey. We have been restrained—we have made no statements since January. We only put the legislation in when the United States didn’t condemn the occupation. We think it is a fundamental principle that arms shouldn’t be used against the purposes of the Act. We think Kissinger has focused more attention to turning Congress around than to turning Turkey around.

\(^1\) Source: Library of Congress, Manuscript Division, Kissinger Papers, Box CL 281, Memoranda of Conversations, Presidential File, January–May 1975. No classification marking. The meeting was held in the Oval Office.

\(^2\) See Document 172.

\(^3\) See Document 176.

\(^4\) See Document 179.

\(^5\) See Documents 218–220.
We would give 24 hour service if we got some Turkish concessions. We react at pressure on Congress to turn around without movement by Turkey. A self-fulfilling prophesy isn’t intransigence. What concessions have they made? Look at the displaced persons; there are 200,000; their plight is terrible. We want to see free passage between Nicosia and Famagusta. We want to see refugees return to Famagusta. If there is an attempt to restore the aid without any progress, there would be bad results in your relations with Congress. Also with the Greeks.

The Secretary of Defense came up with the waiver approach. We are not saying this is the right way, but it lets the Turks save face. If we knew in advance there was movement, we would agree to keep quiet and let you go ahead. We wouldn’t agree to this as an ice-breaker, but there would be no public move after a pre-agreed agreement.

Sarbanes: The principle of not making arms available for aggressive purposes is fundamental. To scrap it would have very basic implications not only for Greece but for all the other countries. It would be a turning point. I am thinking especially of the second Turk move, although the first could be considered a provocation. We told Kissinger that if Turkey would make some substantial moves—to let 40–50% of the refugees return home—that would at least be a gesture to let things go forward. We have stayed very quiet and haven’t demagogued, but the Turks couldn’t get anything before 5 February, and what they proposed wouldn’t have been enough. Schlesinger brought up the waiver bit; we don’t know if this is the thing, but it shows constructive thought.

There are fundamental differences in conception between the State Department’s view of the pressure we put on Turkey and ours. We looked at the cables; we talked to Macomber, etc., and Macomber has acted as an agent for Turkey. The United States has said the Congressional act wasn’t wise—that is understandable, but to say we are trying to get it reversed is to encourage intransigence. We object to reversing the decision—it is a matter of principle.

We recognize the Turks hold the cards and they have to get much of what they want. They clearly hold more than they intend to keep—particularly in Famagusta.

If they had let 25,000 refugees go back before February, we could have lifted it for 4 to 6 weeks.

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If we could get some agreed movement which we could then use for the waiver, then there would be movement and then we would lift it.

Rosenthal: Everyone wants a settlement. The Greeks do. The Turks do. They don’t want to rupture NATO for Cyprus. They are closer than anyone realizes. They own 40 percent—I think they would go to 35 percent right away. The Greeks would go to 25 percent, so someone has to put it together at 29 percent. So how do we get a move? Kissinger says Turkey won’t move under pressure. But if they could be brought together and agree to a first step, if we could lay out a scenario for a concession in two months, we could keep quiet for the 614 waiver. Then if there is more progress, then we would lift the cutoff.

President: I have tried to play square with the Congress. I couldn’t say adequate progress has been made, because it wasn’t right. There was a point where we were fairly certain on Famagusta, the airport, but with the cutoff close the Turks wouldn’t do it. They have a tough problem. Anyone who makes a major agreement there just before an election would be facing that in an election. There is 614, but the cutoff supersedes it. A lawyer would argue it supersedes 614 and I would be on shaky ground.

Brademas: I am not sure of it. We have looked into it. Some say yes and some say no.

Sarbanes: I think it can be argued either way. What we feel is that if it were being done as part of a package to get a concession, we wouldn’t challenge it and you can make a reasonable case.

President: Everyone is getting by on principle but me. You want explaining.

Sarbanes: But you have publicly asked for a reversal.

President: But we have abided by the law.

All: And we appreciate it.

President: But you are putting me in this weak position.

Sarbanes: Only for a week.

Rosenthal: Then we would propose lifting the act.

President: But it does put me in a bad situation. I discussed it with Kissinger. They have a bad situation. They can’t form a government. They have high national pride. They will come off better than last July, but there must be a better way than for me to make a dubious legal decision. You know I had the leaders down to see if there was a way out. Scott and we came up with this waiver provision. They had hearings and have held it up—you talked with them.

Rosenthal: We want to cooperate with you and not embarrass you. Any other way is OK.

President: I just don’t think I can go that legal route.
Sarbanes: [Gets out a map] If the Turks lifted this red line, that would take care of 40 to 50 percent of the refugees. They clearly don’t intend to hold it. That would be a gesture.

President: I don’t think the settlement is the real problem. It is getting it started.

Here is the waiver. Is it completely unacceptable?

Rosenthal: It wipes out 8 votes in the House and 7 in the Senate.

Brademas: The basic one is this: Do you give priority to a Cyprus settlement or to your premise that Congress was wrong and should reverse itself? If it’s the former, we will help; if it’s the latter, we will fight. But all the pressure has been on the Congress. If a waiver isn’t the right way, we will work with you.

President: Let me be frank. We have made tremendous pressure. But they have a domestic situation.

Rosenthal: Right, and they don’t want to be blamed in an election.

Scowcroft: How about getting it through the Senate first and using that with the Turks? Would that be acceptable?

[Much discussion]

Sarbanes: This could put the Senate on the spot.

[More discussion]

President: Let me summarize. We do this as part of a package. As a consequence of the Senate acting, Turkey would have to make concessions, then the House would act.

Rosenthal: If there is some agreement with the Turks that this would happen.

Sarbanes: The bill would have to be modified; right now it is total reversal.

President: If they are moving to an agreement there is no sense not to. Both sides want a settlement and I don’t think we need to worry.

Brademas: We would have to bring the Senate in.

Rosenthal: I think keeping the pressure on is a good idea.

President: I think you would have to have some faith in us. We will push—we don’t want this problem to fester.

Sarbanes: I think we must know what concessions the Turks will be willing to make.

President: I think Brent’s suggestion is a starting point. I will consult with Kissinger.
Rosenthal: You are going to have to lean on Macomber.
Brademas: Kissinger is a little impatient with us right now.
President: We will go to work on it and Brent will keep you informed.

222. Briefing Memorandum From the Director of the Bureau of Intelligence and Research (Hyland) to Secretary of State Kissinger

Washington, April 17, 1975.

PROSPECTS FOR THE DEMIREL GOVERNMENT

Demirel’s winning of a narrow vote of confidence (without an absolute majority) has not ended his problems. He himself had previously judged that he needed an edge of about 50 deputies for effective government, and he got only four. It will be hard for Demirel to concert his narrow majority of disparate elements to pass contentious legislation, but it will also be even harder for the opposition soon to get the 226 votes needed for a vote of no-confidence.

Demirel’s coalition partners are committed to (and may pass) an election law change that would benefit them at the expense of the Republican Peoples Party. In general, however, Demirel will probably be inclined to bypass Parliament and rule through executive decrees of the Cabinet as far as possible. Even this route depends on keeping his coalition in line and is not suited to longer-range actions. It is in fact that method that Demirel preferred when he headed the government before 1971.

The present coalition has little room for flexibility on the Cyprus issue. Deputy Prime Ministers Erbakan and Turkes have both advocated extreme policies toward the Greek Cypriots. Their presence in the government will not be reassuring to Athens or Nicosia but probably will not prevent the resumption of humanitarian talks between Clerides and Denktash later this month. Efforts at an overall solution, however, will be even more difficult.

1 Source: Library of Congress, Manuscript Division, Kissinger Papers, Box 239, Geopolitical File, Turkey. Confidential. Drafted by George Harris (INR/RNA).
Demirel’s government will try to limit damage in relations with the US. He and Foreign Minister Caglayangil are personally well-disposed toward Washington and are convinced of Turkey’s need to remain in the Western alliance. They may feel forced to retaliate against the US, however, by Turkes and perhaps others in the Cabinet who are less committed to cooperation. The government also is likely to be pressed more intensely by the opposition parties whose hopes of regaining power had moderated their criticism of the US over the aid cut. In a free-wheeling political debate in Turkey, the US can only come out the loser.

Demirel’s most troublesome problem will be dealing with the aroused and frustrated opposition. Ecevit has played a powerful role in keeping the left wing in Turkey reasonably quiet to avoid disrupting his chances to return to office. These elements consider Turkes a fascist and, either in reaction to acts of his followers or on their own initiative, are likely to contribute to increasing student and labor unrest. Demirel will thus find it considerably more difficult to govern than Ecevit did last year.

Threats to law and order would greatly disturb important elements in the military. The generals ousted Demirel in 1971 on these grounds. They will be watching closely to see how well his government does this time. Should he be faced with continuing disturbances, sentiment within the military to intervene would grow, although given their strong non-political inclination, it would take very powerful impetus to set the leadership of the armed forces in motion.

Despite these many problems, Demirel does not consider his government a short-term expedient to prepare for elections. He would like to remain in office long enough to show that he can govern, thus removing the taint of his removal in 1971. His coalition partners also want the prestige of participating in the Cabinet to improve their standing in the next elections. Few of the members of the smaller parties want early elections—in which their chances of being returned to Parliament are questionable.

Thus, for all its difficulties, this coalition could stay in office for some time. If it did encounter continuing threats to law and order, however, Demirel might choose to proceed to elections in hopes of being able to form a more manageable and acceptable government.
Washington, May 16, 1975, 2 p.m.

PARTICIPANTS

President Gerald Ford
Senator Mile Mansfield
Senator John J. Sparkman
Senator Clifford P. Case
Dr. Henry A. Kissinger, Secretary of State and Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs
Ambassador Donald Rumsfeld, Assistant to the President
John Marsh, Counsellor to the President
Lt. General Brent Scowcroft, Deputy Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs

All: Congratulations [on the Mayaguez incident]!  

The President: I think it created a good climate and provides protection against miscalculation. I thought we should meet to see what we can do about the Cyprus situation.

Secretary Kissinger is meeting in Ankara next week. I am meeting both the Greek and the Turkish Prime Ministers at NATO. I asked you to come here to see if some progress is possible in the Senate; then the Turks might move, and then we could move in the House shortly thereafter.

The choices, as I understand, are the Mansfield–Scott Bill,  a waiver, and to lift the ban on sales.

Kissinger: A lift on sales makes more sense than a waiver.

Mansfield: We did a head count. Scott has twenty-seven yeas. We will get some of the doubtfuls. It is coming up next Monday. We think we can finish in one day.

Sparkman: Eagleton told me he had the votes—he would fight, but not viciously.

Mansfield: We have a time limit on the debate.

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1 Source: Ford Library, National Security Adviser, Memoranda of Conversations, Box 11, 5/16/75. Confidential. The meeting was held in the Oval Office.

2 All brackets are in the original.

3 As reported in a May 13 memorandum from Springsteen to Scowcroft: “The Scott/Mansfield Bill (S–846) would restore grant assistance and credit and commercial sales to Turkey as long as the Turks observe the Cyprus ceasefire, and provided the President reported monthly to Congress on progress in the Cyprus negotiations.” (National Archives, RG 59, Records of Joseph Sisco, 1951–1976, Entry 5405, Box 21, Cyprus Negotiations)

4 May 19.
Kissinger: If we could get your bill passed, maybe by June there would be progress that the House could see.

Sparkman: When will you be in Brussels?

President: May 28–30 I will be in Brussels. Then I will be in Spain a day, then two days in Salzburg with Sadat, then a day in Rome.

Kissinger: We should have Macomber telephone some key people.

[General Scowcroft briefed on the map.]

Sparkman: Send your people up and ask if there are any questions.

Marsh: If we could have a list of the Committees we should hit.

President: The time is right.

Rumsfield: I think the margin of the vote is important.

Case: I agree. If it is by one vote, it would be better not to have the vote.

President: Can we include in the fact sheet that Henry and I will be meeting with them?

Mansfield: I think last night’s results will carry over.

224. Memorandum of Conversation

Ankara, May 22, 1975, 3:35–5:12 p.m.

PARTICIPANTS

Ihsan Sabri Caglayangil, Minister of Foreign Affairs of Turkey
Dr. Henry A. Kissinger, Secretary of State and Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs
Ambassador William Macomber, U.S. Ambassador to Turkey
Joseph J. Sisco, Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs
Arthur A. Hartman, Assistant Secretary of State for European Affairs
Peter W. Rodman, NSC Staff

[The conversation began in the Minister’s sitting room. Photographers were admitted.]

Caglayangil: We are very pleased to have you here in our country, particularly at a time when we have taken the new initiative of

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1 Source: National Archives, RG 59, Records of Henry Kissinger, 1973–1977, Entry 5403, Box 23, Classified External Memcons, 5–12/75. Secret; Nodis. The meeting was held in the Foreign Minister’s office. Kissinger was in Ankara to attend a CENTO meeting.

2 All brackets are in the original.
meeting with my Greek colleague in Rome. During the negotiations I found him to be understanding, realistic, and of the intent to reach an agreement. We are a coalition of four parties and opposed by a powerful opposition. Before leaving for Rome I had not had an opportunity to meet with the four coalition partners and the opposition, to see what the possibilities were to make concessions. Therefore, we had not the means to record progress in Rome.

Kissinger: Because the coalition partners didn’t agree?
Interpreter: He didn’t have an opportunity to meet with them.
Kissinger: Oh, he didn’t.

Caglayangil: To start with, we didn’t know that the Greeks wanted. Part of the purpose of Rome was to find out what the Greeks wanted, to take to my coalition partners. I had difficulty explaining to my colleague, but he understood and agreed to bring a “picture” to that effect the next morning. However, the next morning he apologized for not having a detailed picture because he said it was a one-sided dialogue and we—the Turks—had nothing to offer. He demanded that since the line was negotiable, the two sides of the island should have economic viability, and since there was a humanitarian aspect, the refugee problem should be solved. Of course, what he said about economic viability and appropriation of enough land to each side would have no meaning since we didn’t talk about the area.

Now I want to raise something which I don’t want to expound on in the meeting room. One thing I don’t understand is whether we are in fact partitioning the island or whether the Greeks have something in mind. We are ready to establish a federal state, with two zones, but the territory would in fact belong to the federal state. I think if I proposed now that the question of whether the line would pass in this area or that area was left to a later stage and we talked now about the powers of the federal state, I think we could progress, because the line is a secondary matter. Yes, indeed, there exists a distance between the two communities, but the problems we talk about would be no problem in two or three years time. If the military tension is lessened and the present problems overcome, there would not then even be a recognition of the line—the people wouldn’t even be aware of the line between them.

Kissinger: Are you saying you think at any stage the people would be able to move freely between the two parts of the island?
Caglayangil: Naturally. If the political tension of today is removed, of course. They for centuries lived together, and the great majority wouldn’t be drawing pistols against each other.

Kissinger: Are you suggesting that the Greeks who left could just return?
Caglayangil: Now there is a point of interesting concern to them, too. The Turks are not willing to live among the Greek majority because in the past they suffered. This requisite of the majority is being kept in mind. Of course, there would be exchange of visits, trade, etc.; of course there are grave sites in the two sides. All these could be talked about, negotiated, and solutions could be found. However, the Greek party isn’t willing to talk and they want to find out where the line is.

The biggest difficulty regarding the drawing of the line is from the opposition parties. After assuming the powers of Government, I asked Mr. Ecevit what he meant by his saying “the line is negotiable.” Now that we’re in Government. He said that on the existing line there are certain extensions, and those could be rectified. I don’t think such a solution would satisfy the Greek party as a final solution. I don’t think that’s what they want.

Kissinger: Nor is it what Mr. Ecevit had in mind when he said it. [Laughter] Because I was in correspondence with him when he said it.

Caglayangil: Nevertheless, I had the impression the dialogue I had could lead us somewhere. For 5–6 years, I negotiated with them; I can tell when there is a possibility. My impression is they are bent on giving thought to finding a solution. I don’t think there is freedom of action on our part in light of the domestic situation and the governmental situation. We’ll meet in Brussels again [at the NATO Summit May 28–29]. There is the possibility the two Prime Ministers may meet. Maybe a more auspicious situation might arise.

Kissinger: For the Prime Ministers?

Caglayangil: I don’t think the Prime Ministers would take up this situation because the situation isn’t ripe if they try to take up the method. If they met, it could be unsettled. The Prime Ministers could discuss general principles; the Foreign Ministers should deal with detailed methods.

Kissinger: The Union of Foreign Ministers should keep the heads of government out of foreign policy. [Laughter] Let me ask one concrete question. First procedurally, you had in mind that first the Prime Ministers meet and then the Foreign Ministers meet again?

Caglayangil: In Rome when I talked with Bitsios, he told me it was a very good start and we should continue the dialogue and proceed in these lines. I don’t know how they evaluate the Rome meeting in Athens. If they evaluate it as good, we should continue to meet again on the Foreign Minister level. If they evaluate it as negative, a meeting of the two Prime Ministers would be only a courtesy. No time and place have been set yet for the two Prime Ministers to meet. Either in Brussels I’ll talk to Mr. Bitsios to set the time and place, or he will take the initiative.
Kissinger: If neither of you takes the initiative, should I propose it to the two of you?

Caglayangil: I asked him at Rome. He said, “Naturally our Prime Ministers should meet but I don’t want to speak for my Prime Minister.”

Hartman: Could I ask just one question? You said governmental and domestic problems. By “domestic” I assume you mean the opposition. Is that more serious than the coalition problem?

Caglayangil: Regarding the situation with the opposition as well as the coalition, that’s where the dilemma lies. We are not in a position to go to either the coalition or the opposition to ask what concession we should make to the Greeks. This is the way we can present the situation to the opposition as well as to the coalition: “We have talked to the Greeks; they are agreed to a bizonal solution; in return they want this and that. In this way we can find a solution. We as the main proponent of the coalition find this to be in the high interest of the state. Are you willing?” They might say they are ready and willing and want a little retouching here and there, and they might say no, it’s non-negotiable.

Kissinger: One thing they won’t say is yes!

Caglayangil: It depends on the proposal!

Kissinger: For all of Cyprus, they’ll say yes.

Caglayangil: I’m not in complete agreement with Dr. Kissinger, because in private talks they say they’re prepared for a settlement but can’t do a big thing.

Kissinger: Should we now join your colleagues?

Caglayangil: All right.

Kissinger: Why should I be the only one at a disadvantage?

[Laughter]

[Kissinger]

[At 4:04, the group moved to the Cabinet room. Caglayangil was joined by Ambassador Esenbel, Tezel, Yavuzalp and four others. More photographs were taken.]

Caglayangil: Your Excellency, I’m very happy to see you here in Turkey again. I have just summed up to you our dialogue in Rome. The general lines of the Rome talks are this: I have found out that my Greek colleague is a realist who wants to get some results. I have not learned clearly what his conditions are. “In general, the economic viability of both sides must improve; the question of the refugees must be settled. We have to find a durable solution; a modus vivendi isn’t good enough.” This is what they said. I’ve told him I can’t discuss conditions or concessions but if he has an offer that would be acceptable to Turkish public opinion, I’d consider it. They said, “You’re placing us in a position where it’s impossible for us to say.”]
We are meeting again in Brussels. While I was discussing this with my Greek colleague, experts on both sides were also discussing all the problems on the two sides, and they have decided they should meet again at the experts level. The question of the continental shelf, the question of the Aegean,3 Cyprus, air space over the Aegean, and minority questions were subjects of the experts meeting. Working committees were created and these will continue. The door has been opened toward a solution. If the parties can move, results can be achieved.

About the questions of continental shelf, we've told them this is a rather complicated issue, bearing in mind the 3,000 or so Greek isles, so we proposed a joint exploration of minerals. We will discuss with them.

A subject just as important for us is Turkish-U.S. relations. If I could hear Mr. Secretary's comment about this, I'd be much obliged.

Kissinger: Mr. Foreign Minister, first I'd like to thank you for your courtesy, and at the risk of offending your Ambassador in Washington, I'd like to congratulate you on assuming your new responsibilities. [Laughter]

On the American domestic situation, and I'm sure your excellent Ambassador, whom we all admire, can give you a good account—first, on the positive side, I think the narrow vote in the Senate4 is somewhat deceptive. According to our estimate, we could have had a margin of between 10 and 15. On the other hand, the Greek community in America is so well organized and so vindictive towards those who vote against their wishes, that many Senators decided that, as long as it was going to pass anyway, why should they risk alienating the community needlessly? So we didn’t press for all of them. Just one example: Senator Kennedy voted for restoration, then switched when he saw it wasn’t necessary. He would have voted for restoration if it had been necessary.

Now, in the House, there is no question, and your Ambassador can confirm: in the House the situation is more difficult. Because the election results last November produced an almost uncontrollable group of young Congressmen. Nevertheless, we will make a major effort when the Congress reconvenes starting the 1st of June. But I have to tell you honestly, nothing would help so much as to show the negotiations were moving forward. I am not asking for unilateral Turkish concessions, but if we could make a plausible case that, based on my discussions here and the President’s conversations with Demirel, the negotiations were moving forward, then I believe we’d have a good chance.

3 For a DIA intelligence appraisal of the Aegean seabed dispute, see Document 34.
4 On May 19 the Senate passed S.846, which permitted resumption of most military aid, by a 41–40 vote. (Congress and the Nation, Vol. IV, 1973–1976, p. 866)
What the House people say is that they’re willing to do a waiver for the grant aid. I discussed it with your Ambassador. Now there is a new Foreign Minister, may I ask whether you’re interested in our exercising that authority? Then I’ll get into the substance. But first I wanted to ask about the procedural.

Caglayangil: Mr. Secretary, may I be allowed to listen to your comments about the substance before I give an answer to your question about a waiver?

But a waiver by itself isn’t sufficient.

Kissinger: While you’re thinking about it, my impression is the Greek Congressmen will insist on conditions on the waiver. They won’t just let us put a waiver unconditionally.

Caglayangil: Yes, Mr. Secretary, we are all ready to hear your comments.

Kissinger: On the substance, on the subject of your conversations with the Greeks, there are two aspects: one is procedure; one is substance. As I understand it, you feel you can’t go to your Cabinet and ask for concessions without being able to tell them what the Greeks are going to do.

Caglayangil: Yes.

Kissinger: On the other hand, from my conversation with Bitsios, my impression is that he has exactly the same problem. He can’t go before his Cabinet and utter the words “bizonal federation” without knowing what you will do.

Caglayangil: That’s the dilemma.

Kissinger: I have an idea on this, but let me say first on the substance. As your Ambassador knows, I have from the beginning said the solution had to be some kind of bizonal solution, and I said so publicly, and I also very early said it should be a federal solution.

Caglayangil: Yes.

Kissinger: That’s why I’m so popular in Greece today. [Laughter] My name is a household word, but not a word people can use in polite society.

I have the impression that Greece is prepared to accept a bizonal solution, and that Greece is prepared to accept a federal solution in which both zones have a considerable degree of authority, and that Greece is prepared not to let Makarios stand in the way of a solution. And it’s my impression that Greek Government finds it very difficult to make these concessions and have them rejected by Turkey. That way they would lose twice—once domestically in making the concession

5 Not further identified.
and once internationally when it’s rejected. This is the impression, based on my conversation with Bitsios and Karamanlis.

Why is Karamanlis ready to make this sort of agreement? I’m just giving my assessment, not speaking for him.

Caglayangil: I know.

Kissinger: He’s ready for this because he knows that any solution you’ll accept is much worse than the situation before July. That’s axiomatic. Therefore he’d like to get it behind him as quickly as possible. He’s afraid if negotiations get too protracted, you could see events like in Portugal: where the military, disaffected with the United States, could combine with Papandreou and the left-oriented military. And they’d have a chance of getting much more Soviet support. And that’s my worry, too.

So my view is this: If Karamanlis can get a quick agreement he’ll pay a considerable price for it, but if he can’t get a quick agreement he’s better off being a demagogue about it and acting more like Makarios. He’ll fight Makarios if he can get a quick agreement. But why have the army, Makarios and Papandreou against him if he can’t get an agreement anyway?

Therefore, I totally disagree with your opposition, who want you to let them do it, or wait a year to get something better than what you can get now. In fact, it may well be that in a year you can’t possibly get the terms you can get now.

Caglayangil: Mr. Secretary, in order to clarify the situation, when you say you disagree with the opposition, can you state it again so I can put it more clearly to them?

Kissinger: I’ll say it to Ecevit tomorrow. When I was here last time, Ecevit said there is no hurry; he could do it in a year, or after elections, or anyway you don’t need a quick settlement. My view is what you have going for you now is Karamanlis’s desire to get it behind him. Then a year from now when Karamanlis goes for another election, he’ll have other issues. Otherwise he has no reason not to take a radical position. In any case, I regard Karamanlis as a transitional figure in Greece. By age alone, he’s not of the new generation.

And I will say exactly this to Mr. Ecevit tomorrow morning, so it’s not something I’m doing behind his back.

All I’m saying is, as a friend, in my judgment this is the best time for a settlement for Turkey. And I’ll explain my views on the substance in a minute.

What are the Turkish interests as I understand them in Cyprus?
One, to get autonomy for the Turkish population.
Second, to get an amount of territory for the Turkish people to live.
And third, to get a Constitution in which the central government can’t turn against the Turkish people again or get a foreign policy that could turn against Turkey.

Those are the positive goals. The negative goals should be to prevent Cyprus from being an international issue on which Turkey will be constantly embarrassed and constantly threatened, and your position will depend on military force alone. What you need is international acceptance of your legitimate position.

I believe Turkey has already practically achieved all its objectives, if it can only make them legitimate. I believe Greece is ready to accept a bizonal solution, a federal solution, and powers for the central government that will give the Turkish part adequate protection. And my instinct is they even won’t let Makarios stand in the way.

This is my instinct; I have not discussed with them.

What will Turkey have to pay for it? Some territory you’ve occupied and some return of refugees. Some refugees will go with the territory. But others can come. So I believe if you let some refugees go back into the Turkish area, just so the principle is maintained . . . Right now you’re in the best position.

Another element: Right now the Soviet Union is quiet. In a year, Karamanlis or whoever else will be there, will be closer to the Soviets, and the Soviets will be more active.

So if you go for a quick solution, you’ll be better off. I believe you can get it.

I really believe you can get a solution that is 95% of the Turkey position. And what you get by waiting longer is whatever you get domestically, which I can’t judge, but internationally, maybe 2–3%, which is peripheral.

Procedurally, to break this deadlock where each side waits for the other, to be able to put something before the Cabinet—and this is just an idea, and not a proposal: If you and Bitsios continue to meet and if the communal talks continue, and if you feel you’re fairly close, and if you want, we could put forward something as an American proposal, if neither side wants to put something forward as your own proposal. We don’t want to put something forward alone; it would be agreed to ahead of time. If domestically you didn’t want to put something forward without knowing what the other side would do. But the talks with Bitsios would have to go forward to narrow the gap more than it is now. We would not put forward a proposal unless we know you would accept it. We will not inject ourselves into the negotiations.

Whatever the procedural formula, my strong impression is the immediate future, leaving aside all the domestic considerations, is the best time to make a settlement.
Caglayangil: I thank you, Mr. Secretary. I’ve clearly understood, and I’m much obliged for those thoughts. I’d like to give my view. The domestic political situation in the United States has become rather complicated . . .

Kissinger: In the United States.

Caglayangil: Yes. To what extent it’s explicable, this situation in the United States is not clear to me, but I’m sure Dr. Kissinger can analyze the situation in Turkey. Mr. Ecevit is saying, “I intervened in Cyprus; I have the upper hand in Cyprus. Why should I come with formulas? Let the Greeks do that. Instead of going after formulas, the thing to be done is to improve the economic lot of the Turkish part in Cyprus. And sooner or later the Greeks will come to us.” Inside our own government, there are those whose appetite was whetted by the 40% and who calculate, “How can I improve my gains in Cyprus?” Under these circumstances, Mr. Secretary, I find myself rather limited in my movement. How can I ask these people to make a concession? That is why I’ve conducted my negotiations with my Greek colleague alone and in person. No minutes were kept. I asked him if he could make a proposal I could bring to my government, and I said, “Afterward, if you want to deny it, you can.” I told him, “Both you and I are trying to serve our national interests. Give me a picture I can show my countrymen, to say ‘this is what the Greeks will do.’”

Mr. Secretary, I’ve just told you exactly what Mr. Bitsios said: “Let’s improve the territorial adjustments.” Mr. Secretary, what I’ve been told is, “Make some territorial adjustments, make some territorial concessions. You’re holding now 38% of Cyprus territory. Tell me, ‘give me 35%.’ This is a figure I can take back. On the refugees there is the figure of 200,000. The UN estimate is 185,000, our estimate is 150,000. We also know the Turkish Cypriots have emigrated to the north and left their homes and their fields and their gardens. We also know that 60,000 left. So the number of displaced persons isn’t 185,000 or 200,000 but 25–30,000. Give me this figure.”

Kissinger: No, but I understand his problem. When he gives you a figure, he’s locked in. He’s accepted a bizonal federation.

I have experienced at home a complicated domestic situation, and I have experienced that in those situations appeals to the national interest aren’t always convincing. Because there is ambition.

But I don’t think it is such a Turkish concession. First, I don’t think you intended to keep that territory. In fact, that’s what Ecevit told us when he was Prime Minister. He said you didn’t need it at all. You could keep it by force, but then you’re totally dependent on the accident of Greek domestic politics. If you get a Portugal-type government, the Soviet Union will be on your back, the non-aligned will be on your back, and for what? For more than you need.
Caglayangil: You, yourself, with your experience of the Middle East, a complicated situation, know that conquering land is easier than surrendering land. [Laughter] This is the case in the Middle East where you’re trying so hard. I keep telling them, “Give me a picture I can take back to my own government.” I will never be in a position to go to the Greeks and tell them “For this we are prepared to do this and that.” I tell you frankly, I’m not the man to go there and tell them that.

Kissinger: For domestic reasons.

Caglayangil: For domestic reasons, many reasons.

Kissinger: Maybe it would be better to start with a discussion of the powers of the federal government, as I suggested.

Caglayangil: But they ask me, what are they going to give us?

Kissinger: We went through much of this—if you hadn’t mentioned the Middle East—I think Israel made the wrong choice, too. Instead of giving up 8 kilometers, they’ll be under great international pressure. I told them the exact location doesn’t make all that difference; the key is international recognition of the line.

Speaking as a professor, I think the hardest thing is to make peace when you don’t have to. The key is to be moderate before it’s under pressure.

Caglayangil: Mr. Secretary, I’d like to show you—although I know your view of this—the position of Turkey was interpreted in the United States and blamed for using American arms against Greeks. Here are photos of American arms in the hands of Greek Cypriot nationalist forces—and no embargo was imposed. [He passes to the Secretary a book of glossy photos.]

Yavuzalp: These are all Americans arms used by Greek Cypriots.

Kissinger: Of course, our Congressmen would say it’s not the same thing. They’d say the Turkish army has no right to be there, but the Greek Cypriots do have the right to be there. This is what they’d say; you know I oppose what they are trying to do.

Caglayangil: Mr. Secretary, the gist of the Congressional objection wasn’t that the Turkish army was in Cyprus, but that American arms were used—and those arms were supplied by the Greek government.

Kissinger: That’s different. But I oppose the embargo because it’s against our interest. You can’t conduct foreign policy as charity. You give us facilities. I think it’s a tragedy.

Caglayangil: Turkey intervened in Cyprus when Cyprus became a Cuba for Turkey. Mr. Secretary, is Turkey going to stand to all threats because Turkey has NATO arms? The same game is being played today on the Aegean Isles. The Islands are being armed to the teeth, Mr. Secretary, and in violation of signed treaties. Can you tolerate an island near your coastline to be an ammunition dump?
Kissinger: There is no question the treaties of Lausanne and Paris prohibit arming of the islands.

Caglayangil: They say we’re violating.

I believe we have laid the foundation for the discussion Mr. Secretary will be having tomorrow with the Prime Minister.

Kissinger: All right.

When you discuss among yourselves: Many of your arguments have great merit, and the injustice of our position I totally agree with you. I’m looking for practical ways for a solution because I believe the best conditions for a solution are in the next six months, whoever is in power. I know from my experience—before it happens it’s impossible to convince people; after it happens, it’s too late.

Caglayangil: The structure of my mentality is such that you can’t find a person more situated than myself to implement such a solution.

Kissinger: I agree. That’s our problem.

Caglayangil: There is a Turkish proverb: You can’t clap with one hand only.

Kissinger: We will speak with the same energy to the Greek side.

[The meeting ended.]

225. Memorandum From the President’s Deputy Assistant for National Security Affairs (Scowcroft) to President Ford


Secretary Kissinger asked that I pass you the following report on the opening session of CENTO.

“I spoke today at the opening session of CENTO along with the Ministers of Iran, Turkey, Pakistan and the United Kingdom. My principal theme was to reaffirm that we will stand by our friends and allies; this was welcomed by the participants as timely. As you know, this area has become even more important to us strategically than

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1 Source: Ford Library, National Security Adviser, Trip Briefing Books and Cables for Henry Kissinger, 1974–1976, Box 8, 5/18–23/75, HAK to President. Secret; Sensitive; Eyes Only. Sent for information. Ford initialed the memorandum indicating that he had seen it.

2 This report was transmitted to Scowcroft in telegram Hakto 26 from Ankara, May 22. (Ibid.)
in the past. The session was opened by a message from the Turkish President followed by a short speech by Prime Minister Demirel in which he underscored the importance of CENTO in this part of the world.

“The US is not a formal member of CENTO but as an ‘observer’ we participate fully in its activities. Our link is based on individual bilateral agreements we have with the principal regional partners—Iran, Turkey and Pakistan. We are committed ‘to consult’ our CENTO partners in the event of a Communist aggression against them. As détente has supplanted cold war, the work of the organization has shifted to economic activities, although this past year an important joint military exercise was successfully undertaken. CENTO’s principal utility is that it provides us with an instrumentality for close consultations with Iran and Turkey. For several years Pakistan’s participation was minimal, but in the aftermath of the Indo-Pak war, Bhutto has made his country a more active participant. Your decision to lift the arms embargo against Pakistan has been an added stimulus to the Paks.

“The most important part of the day centered on my bilateral discussions with the Turks. I had a rather full discussion with Prime Minister Demirel at lunch and a two-hour session with Foreign Minister Caglayangil. It is clear that the Demirel Government would like to find a Cyprus solution; it is equally clear that he is in a most difficult position domestically to take an initiative which could break the impasse with Greece on this issue. The Turkish and Greek Foreign Ministers met just a few days ago to explore possibilities, but made no substantial progress on this key problem. They have, however, agreed to continue the dialogue on this as well as differences over the Aegean.

“The curious situation is that Demirel would like to move ahead on a solution but he is stymied because Ecevit, the former Prime Minister, is not willing to agree to any settlement at this time. Ecevit is stalling because he knows the settlement would be good for Turkey and thus to Ecevit’s electoral advantage. The continuance of the aid cutoff continues to complicate matters for the Turk Government and our bilateral relations. There was disappointment here with the one-vote margin by which the Senate took action,3 and the Turks are pessimistic regarding the possibilities in the House. I assured them that we would continue our efforts to get the House to take action similar to the Senate; they are going to send a delegation to bring their case to the Congress.

“The Greek and Turkish Foreign Ministers will meet again in Brussels prior to your meeting with Caramanlis and Demirel, but we must not expect any breakthrough on the Cyprus issue at that meeting. The

3 See footnote 4, Document 224.
Turks fully agree with our analysis that a quick solution would serve their interest, but the political environment is against a weak Demirel Government taking the requisite decisions. Since the gap will still be wide, I believe it will be important for you to restate to Caramanlis and to Demirel our general views on the need for early progress on the Cyprus question, but it would not be desirable, in my judgment, for us to get into a mediating posture. I believe the most we can hope to achieve in the discussions with Caramanlis and Demirel is some added momentum for them to continue their own efforts to close the gap.

“It was also clear from my discussions here that regardless of the arms embargo, there is tremendous good will for us and that the Turks would like to try to find a way to avoid taking any retaliatory action which would be contrary to our mutual interests. However, the government is under increasing pressure to take some countermeasures.

“I also had a talk with Minister of State Aziz Ahmed of Pakistan whose principal concern is that within two years India may again attack Pakistan. Since the decision to lift the embargo, the Paks have not made any specific request for sales of arms from us. They are carefully trying to determine their priorities since they do not have the money to purchase the sophisticated weapons they want within the next two-year timeframe. Aziz asked that we talk to both the Iranians and the Saudis to encourage them to help the Pakistanis financially. I told them we had already talked to the Shah, and we would continue to encourage both Iran and Saudi Arabia to be helpful.”

226. Memorandum From the President’s Deputy Assistant for National Security Affairs (Scowcroft) to President Ford


Secretary Kissinger has asked that I pass you the following report on the completion of the CENTO proceedings and further discussions with Prime Minister Demirel and former Prime Minister Ecevit.2

1 Source: Ford Library, National Security Adviser, Trip Briefing Books and Cables for Henry Kissinger, 1974–1976, Box 8, 5/18–23/75, HAK to President. Secret; Sensitive; Eyes Only. Sent for information. Ford initialed the memorandum indicating that he had seen it.

2 This report was transmitted to Scowcroft in telegram Hakto 28 from Ankara, May 23. (Ibid.)
“I have just completed the CENTO proceedings and a further round of talks with Prime Minister Demirel and Former Foreign Minister Ecevit.³

“As to CENTO, we spent the morning with each Minister giving his assessment of the principal developments that have occurred in this area over the past year. The main theme was that the efforts of détente should be continued; at the same time CENTO members should maintain their vigilance since the threat of Soviet expansionism, in their judgment, remains, though in a less direct form. In my comments before the Council, I reviewed our current relations with the Soviets and the Peoples Republic of China, assured them of our unwillingness to accept stagnation in the Middle East, explained our approach to oil and commodity questions, and stressed the need for all Alliance members to do what is required in defense of their freedom. In this regard, I spent considerable time in assuring each member of our resolve to remain engaged in a constructive way on the key problems of the world and to stand by our commitments and friends.

“A more important part of the day was spent on talks with Ecevit and Demirel. As I reported to you yesterday,⁴ the internal political situation here in Turkey is very complicated, with Ecevit as the Former Prime Minister out of power, being reluctant to commit himself to support the government in any meaningful initiative to break the present impasse on Cyprus, because he does not want to strengthen their position. While Foreign Minister Caglayangil seems willing to try to get agreement within the government coalition on a Cyprus proposal based on a bizonal arrangement, Demirel gave no such indication. Demirel did speak feelingly and with a good deal of understanding and support for America as he reviewed the difficult situation he is in as a result of the continued embargo. He wants to give us a little more time. He expressed the strong hope that we will do everything possible to get the House to take the same action as the Senate and I assured him of our determination in this regard. Demirel is continuing to keep a lid on anti-Americanism, but he left me with a distinct impression that the time is running out. He may very well give you some indication of the kind of retaliatory measures he will feel impelled to take if the embargo is not lifted.

“However, on the Cyprus issue he is reluctant to move. He is fearful that any initiative he might take will be exploited by Ecevit. It is

³ A memorandum of Kissinger’s conversation with Ecevit is in Library of Congress, Manuscript Division, Kissinger Papers, Box CL 273, Memoranda of Conversations, Chronological File, May 1975. No record of the conversation with Demirel has been found.

⁴ See Document 225.
only problematical as to whether he will chance speaking to you in concrete terms on the Cyprus issue. We are trying to get across to him and the Foreign Minister that Turkish views expressed to you will be measured against the background of a Caramanlis stated desire to achieve a quick settlement. I pointed out frequently to the Prime Minister and the Foreign Minister that by making a concrete proposal now they can in effect get 95 percent of what they want; that they can get international approval of a permanent settlement favorable to them; and above all, what is available today is unlikely to be available a year from now.

“I believe my talks here have set a useful background for your discussions with Demirel and Caramanlis, but my assessment remains the same as that I conveyed to you yesterday—that we must not expect early dramatic results and that your talk should be helpful in getting us a little more time to work on our Congressional problem, but nothing new or decisive is likely to emanate on the Cyprus issue.”

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227. Memorandum of Conversation

Brussels, May 29, 1975, 11:30 a.m.

PARTICIPANTS

Turkey:
Prime Minister Demirel
Foreign Minister Caglayangil
Ambassador Esenbel
Ambassador Yavuzalp

U.S.:
The President
Secretary Kissinger
Lieutenant General Scowcroft
Assistant Secretary Hartman

President: We certainly have beautiful weather here.
Demirel: Yes, we have had a lovely spring in Turkey too, fortunately with lots of rain.

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1 Source: National Archives, RG 59, Records of Henry Kissinger, 1973–1977, Entry 5403, Box 11, Nodis Memcons, May 1975. Secret; Nodis. The meeting was held at Ambassador Firestone’s residence. Kissinger and Ford were in Brussels for a North Atlantic Council meeting. They had met with Caramanlis and Bitsios earlier; see Document 50.
Secretary: I have the impression that the climate in Turkey is better since your reforestation program.

Demirel: Yes and, of course, we already had a lot of forests. I know your country fairly well in particular Colorado.

President: Yes, I know Colorado too. You seem to speak English very well.

Secretary: Yes, I am getting a little disturbed when I find that foreign statesmen have less of an accent than the Secretary of State.

President: It is a great pleasure for me to meet you personally. The Secretary has had many good things to say about his conversations in Turkey. I know that you are dedicated to NATO and to the West. What I will be saying this afternoon is that the United States has complete dedication to the Alliance. We have had difficulties, particularly in the attitude of Congress, and we have had a difficult time in Vietnam but we are determined to strengthen NATO and solve the problems like the one that I know concerns you. I would be very grateful for your observations and particularly any thoughts you have on how we can be helpful in solving the Cyprus problem. I want to stress, however, how unwise I consider the action of our Congress in cutting off aid to Turkey. We totally opposed this action and, as you can see, we got the Senate to change its vote by working with a group of bipartisan leaders. The vote was disappointing to us but there were only 81 votes cast. If all the Senators had been there, we might have had a margin of 7 or 8 instead of one. We have taken a step and when I return I will do my utmost to get the House of Representatives to act. In the House there is more vocal opposition but maybe out of our conversations in Brussels I will be able to go back with something to convince the House to change its mind. I wish to assure you that I am personally dedicated to eliminating the embargo.

Demirel: Thank you very much for your words of welcome. I too have been very pleased to see you and to have this opportunity for a frank talk. I have discussed these problems with the Secretary of State. But I would like to add a couple of things talking as friend to friend. As far as Turkey is concerned we appreciate your efforts. We have been a friend of the United States for thirty years and we believe that this mutual friendship is based on great understanding and on the basis that there are mutual benefits in our relations. Turkey has chosen the democratic way in the Free World. Turkey is also trying to show that development is possible in a democracy. There are two systems struggling in this world—the Free Democracies against Communism. Communism has made lots of progress over the years and we feel we are in the front line in opposing Communism. We are a loyal friend of the United States. Many of our people died for freedom in Korea.
Secretary: Yes, Turkey sent a Brigade to Korea and their prisoners never broke under the strains of captivity—just like their negotiators never break.

Demirel: We believe in defending freedom. In the meantime we have a direct neighbor to the north—the Soviet Union. We cut our relations with them by taking certain actions which made us the target for the Soviets. We have never hesitated in this policy. I was six years as Prime Minister and I always defended the value of the U.S.-Turkish relationship. If there were a conflict between Turkey and the United States I would be better able to explain to my people what the problem is but we have no conflict. Cyprus is not our conflict. U.S.-Turkish relations would be easier to handle if we could talk about a specific problem between us.

Secretary: We have been impressed by your understanding. You know, Mr. President, that the Prime Minister has come under violent attack for being pro-American.

Demirel: I also have strongly opposed Communism. What I am trying to say is that Turkish-American relations are in a fix. Is it fair? We appreciate what the Administration has done. But the arms embargo puts us in a difficult position. It puts U.S.-Turkish relations in a difficult position. What harm have we done to the United States? My countrymen will ask this question. Did we violate some understanding or commitment? No. I can’t complain about the United States Congress because that is not a body of my government. The United States sells arms to 90 countries but not to Turkey—loyal friend. We took risks. We became a prime target of Soviet arms because we made available missile bases for your Atlas missile. We also allowed intelligence facilities and thus continue to be a prime target. How can I explain to my people what harm we have done to the United States? Even Yugoslavia receives arms from the United States but not Turkey. We are anti-Communist, we believe in NATO and we are a democracy. How can we be treated this way?

I know how you feel. I am just pointing out the difficulties we are in. I wish we had a conflict because then we could find a solution but we don’t have a conflict. We bought 40 F-4’s. Sixteen have been delivered and the rest were due to be delivered by August 1975 but they have not been. We are paying installments, we are paying interest and we are asked to pay storage fees. But these have not been delivered. We have 100,000 tons of military materiel in New York and Houston. We are asked to pay warehouse charges for these goods that have not been shipped. How can I explain these things? They are small matters but they could easily spoil our friendship. Once spoiled it will be hard to rebuild.

President: I agree with you about the harmful results for both of our countries. There is absolutely no excuse for this action taken by
our Congress. It is counterproductive. There are some in Congress who forget which Party was responsible for overthrowing Makarios, installing Sampson and sending military materiel into the National Guard. Many Congressional friends forget this. But I can assure you that I will use my maximum effort to eliminate this injustice. There has been some progress and we will work on the House. Should there be a change this will give discretion to the President. But I don’t want to mislead you. There are still potential problems because of the emotion of our Greeks. They have an abnormal impact. But I don’t dispute your statements.

Demirel: I wish you did. Then I could explain our policy. Let me add a couple of more things. We have some C–130 planes that need repair. We have a contract with Lockheed to repair these planes in the United States but if we send them there they will not send them back because of the embargo. If we don’t send them we have to pay a penalty to Lockheed.

Secretary: That is an absurd application of the law. It is bad enough already without our lawyers making it worse. There could have been no intention on the part of Congress to confiscate material already in the hands of Turkey.

President: We will straighten this out.

Demirel: That is but one example of what damage is being done. If you confiscate our planes, hostility will certainly grow. Turn to Cyprus, and ask why that should be a source of trouble in the U.S.-Turkish relationship. The United States was not party to the agreements that established Cyprus. Therefore, why do you penalize us? We have had troubles with the Greeks for many years and these issues have a long historical background. They are complex and they cause a malaise in our relations. But why inject these complex matters into the Turkish-U.S. relationship? Already the Greek-Turkish relationship is complicated enough. Cyprus as a problem is hard, sensational, and a national issue in Turkey. We see you lined up with Greece because of the Congressional action.

Secretary: Caramanlis says we are lined up with Turkey.

Demirel: We have had 25 years of history with this problem. Between 1950 and 1960 we struggled to reach an agreement on Cyprus. With great difficulty Menderes and Caramanlis solved the problem—we thought. But then from these agreements there emerged Makarios. If it had not been for the London and Zurich agreements he would not have become President of a Cyprus. There would not have been a Cyprus. The Turkish invasion was not a violation. We told Makarios—don’t do it. We told him constantly. But he armed his people and they killed Turkish women and children. We are a nation of 40 million just 40 miles from Cyprus. It this a just situation? The welfare of these peo-
ple had been guaranteed by Turkey. And yet unarmed Turks were killed. President Inonu in 1964 and I in 1967 were faced with this problem. All of our people wanted intervention but we were patient. In 1967 the Greeks brought 15,000 men on to the island. In one village they killed and then burned the bodies of 49 people. It was inhuman. We made up our minds to intervene. But the next morning through the persuasion of our friends we got what we wanted. The Greeks sent those people out. If we do not live up to the guarantees we give in treaties, how can people take us seriously in other important matters? We got out the 15,000 and Grivas and we got out the arms they secretly had brought in. In 1974 the Greeks had an illegal National Guard of 20,000 plus arms. None should have been there. In July Sampson declared a “Hellenic Republic of Cyprus” and was prepared to commit genocide. Then there are the islands in the Aegean. They all became Greek in 1924 and 1947. Some of them were not theirs. All of them had been part of the Ottoman Empire before 1914. Cyprus is the last island and they wanted that one too. They wanted enosis. All of these things were done against treaties signed and approved. The Greeks never stopped trying to get Cyprus. The Turks have never started anything. It was the Greeks who overthrew Makarios, who committed genocide. We were forced to act. We had no choice. What should we have done? The intervention was caused by Greece. Why did the Greeks put 1,000 Greek officers in charge of 20,000 men in the National Guard? Cyprus today is a consequence of all these actions—it is not a beginning. We have been pushed. Why should we be penalized?

President: I agree with much of the substance of what you say. But we need to undo the damage. This is a personal opportunity for me to hear your point of view and it will fortify me in my vigor to change our Congressional action. It is incomprehensible to me why Congress does not see this. The consequences of their action will not be to make a solution to Cyprus easier. That can only come when the aid cut-off is removed. We must re-establish good U.S.-Turk relations. Nothing will have a higher priority with me than to remove the embargo.

Secretary: May I add one thing—if you, Mr. President, succeed in lifting the embargo and then there is no progress on Cyprus (even though we shouldn’t be involved—any more than Ecevit or Erbakan should be involved), there will be severe damage to the President. This is something I can say more easily than he can. If we win this struggle with the Congress and nothing happens, they will really hate us. This is the time for real progress in the negotiations. The situation has not been internationalized by the Soviets. The Europeans are not involved. If we succeed without conditions and a stalemate develops, it will be a very difficult situation.

Demirel: I am trying to explain our difficulties and then state our position. Let me add a couple of more things. Our people have developed
a great trust in the people of the United States. The embargo is shaking that trust. It is creating suspicion about the credibility of your commitment. Our arms supply is only a hundred million dollars and that is not the real question—we could pay for our own weapons. It is not a question of aid. The embargo represents hostility. You give arms to Tito but not to Turkey. You penalize loyalty. To get a change will take time. But I can tell you that pressure will not help to settle this problem. It will only lead to further difficulties. We have domestic problems among our 40 million people. I want to deal with these problems. Our population is increasing by one million a year. There are 400,000 each year looking for new jobs. I must educate 6 million kids. We have 2 million unemployed. I don’t need additional problems. I want to show that democracy works. From the Adriatic to Japan there are only two countries defending the Free World—Turkey and Japan. We have rising expectations and we must give something. If we are pressured I can definitely tell you it will not work. We will try to settle these matters peacefully but we have waited 11 years. We said don’t do it to Makarios. We have problems with Greece and with Syria too. How can our friend tell us that either you settle this problem or we will not be your friend any longer? I cannot explain this to my people. Now let me add a couple of more things. We have common defense cooperation. But the embargo continues and we must take measures of our own. People ask for what do we continue defense cooperation if the United States sends us no planes, no spare parts and asks us to pay charges? Why should we cooperate in the common defense? I would like to say for my Government that we attach great importance to our common defense.

Secretary: You have certainly proved this, Mr. Prime Minister.

Demirel: Twenty-five years ago my party helped Turkey enter NATO in 1952. I have always defended NATO but in 1975 I am penalized. I was the first Turkish engineer to be sent to the United States by ECA. The Truman Doctrine sent me to the United States in 1949. In 1954 I was the first Eisenhower Fellow. I went to study Federal-State relations in Washington and how to handle the problem of natural resources. I visited Chicago, Knoxville, San Francisco, and Boston. I attach great value to the ties between Turkey and the United States. I defend these from heavy attacks by the Left. I cannot say now to my opponents that you are right. Anti-Americanism is an arm of the Communists. They use this as a source of their strength. I don’t want them to succeed.

President: We are most fortunate, Mr. Prime Minister, to have someone who has lived in the United States and understands our system and particularly the Constitution that gives some equality to the Branches of our Government. Too many people do not understand. Unfortunately, the system sometimes creates problems (although it gives
us benefits as well). It is impossible to explain why this disturbed Congress impedes the Executive in the foreign policy area. Our Constitution was not intended to give this kind of power to the Congress. Congress was anxious to cooperate in the post-war period but serious doubts arose during the Vietnam war. They wanted to make themselves partners but they went beyond the Constitution. In the process they eliminated restrictions and now we must fight further encroachments. We are now living within the War Powers Act. During the Cambodian boat affair the Act called for us to consult before using the Armed Forces but we chose to interpret that Act as merely requiring notification. I voted against the Act when I was in Congress but I am an optimist and I have not lost my faith that if Congress makes a mistake in foreign policy it will not correct it. Nothing will have a higher priority than getting aid restored to Turkey but I have to be realistic. Congress has made a mistake. I am always an optimist and I believe people will see the contribution that Turkey is making. Too few remember in the Congress the contribution you made in Korea. I know what Turkey did. I remember and it fortifies my feelings. But Congress is wrong. I will do all I can to change that situation. If we are successful and it means that I have to put my personal reputation on the line, I hope that there will be movement to solve the problem. There should be no conflict between these two objectives.

Secretary: The trouble with the Turks is that they don’t know how to accept victory. The Greeks—and we now have confirmation of this from Caramanlis—are prepared to accept a bizonal federal system. I told the British to tell the Greeks to put forward the idea of alternating the Presidency between the two communities. With this the Turks will have achieved substantially all your objectives and all you have to do in return is to give up some territory—how much we do not know. We know the difficulty you have. You do not have an absolute majority. If you wait a year the Greeks will become more intransigent, the Soviets will demand an international conference and you will not be able to achieve in a year what you can get today. Leave aside the question of aid, a settlement is worthwhile now. I told your Minister some time ago that I thought a bizonal federal system was the correct solution. From a strictly technical negotiating view, now is the time to settle. If nothing happens now our problems will become impossible. Caramanlis will not be able to accept what he can today one year from now. The Soviets will be doing all kinds of things after the CSCE is finished. They will re-enter the situation. You should seek a solution now. If I can help with Ecevit, you should tell us. We could put him in a difficult position if he changes his position. We have in writing what he told us. We want to help. This is a serious problem. Every time I see Gromyko he says that the United States and the Soviet Union should jointly settle this problem but I stop him and in the pre-CSCE atmosphere this is easy to do
but after the conference is over I am not so sure. I know Ecevit’s game. He wants to break up your coalition. But this is an extremely dangerous game. A year from now what more will you have achieved for a few percentage points more of territory? You have 40 percent now. We are talking only about territory—the refugees can return there. The alternating Presidency should also help and we have asked the British to put it forward. If territory is the only question left, it must be solvable.

Demirel: The case is very complicated. The complexity comes from history.

Secretary: Greeks and Turks have great difficulty with their history.

Demirel: We are not willing to have the aid suspended indefinitely. If it is restored we will do our utmost and in good will to get a settlement but there can be no pre-conditions. There must be a negotiation. All I can say is that we are willing to do our utmost to find a solution.

Secretary: The Turks are very negative. I don’t get the impression that there is danger of the Turks being too flexible—least I will not go sleepless for that flexibility.

228. Memorandum of Conversation

Washington, June 19, 1975, 8:50–10:22 a.m.

PARTICIPANTS

President Ford
Dr. Henry A. Kissinger, Secretary of State and Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs
Congressman Benjamin S. Rosenthal (D–N.Y.)
Congressman Lee H. Hamilton (R–Indiana)
Congressman Charles W. Whalen, Jr. (R–Ohio)
Congressman Dante B. Fascell (D–Florida)
Congressman John Brademas (D–Indiana)
Congressman Paul S. Sarbanes (D–Maryland)
Lt. General Brent Scowcroft, Deputy Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs

1 Source: Library of Congress, Manuscript Division, Kissinger Papers, Box CL 282, Memoranda of Conversations, Presidential File, June 1975. Confidential. The meeting was held in the Oval Office.
President: This meeting is even more appropriate than when we spoke last week, Ben. There have been some developments since then. There is a glimmer of hope—the Clerides/Denktash talks have gone on, even though there has been no progress yet.

I met with Karamanlis and Demirel at Brussels. Both of them talked tough and they both realize something needs to be done. They had a good meeting together.

The Senate vote was close but it was good. Something needs to be done. But before we get into a discussion, I would like Secretary Kissinger to bring you up to date on the discussions and on the internal situation in Turkey.

I see Karamanlis nominated Zatsos as President.

Kissinger: Let me explain where the situation is and what the Turkish domestic situation is. Let me start in February, whatever our views about what happened before.

I met Bitsios in February. He said he would accept a bizonal solution if we could work out the territorial arrangements. Karamanlis wanted a quick solution, to minimize the impact on the Greek domestic situation. I then went on to Turkey, which had a caretaker government. They said they had no power to do anything. But I met with every Turkish leader, urging them to put forth specific proposals to resolve the situation and prevent the development of complex international situation making it more difficult to resolve. They all agreed that they wouldn’t discuss it while the embargo was on. They didn’t promise to move afterwards, but they certainly would not move before; it would look like they were yielding to pressure. The Greek side has been very conciliatory—we couldn’t ask for a better position than they are now willing to take.

Demirel than came in, which complicated the situation. Demirel couldn’t accept the deal we had been working on, for domestic reasons. If Ecevit were in office, I am convinced we would now have a solution. I went to the CENTO meeting in May—not for CENTO but to talk to the Turkish leaders. Ecevit won’t take a position until the coalition does. He basically wants new elections which he feels certain—as do most of the Parliament—that he would win. He took Cyprus and

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2 Possibly a reference to their March 21 meeting; see Document 221.
3 For records of the meetings with Karamanlis and Demirel, see Documents 50 and 227, respectively.
4 See footnote 4, Document 224.
5 Kissinger met with Bitsios on March 9; see Document 179.
6 See Documents 218–220.
7 See Documents 224–226.
he can blame the coalition for giving it away. Demirel was Prime Min-
ister when Turkey didn’t move in ’67.

The President had good talks with Demirel. But Demirel is look-
ing for some way to manage it so he doesn’t get beaten to death
domestically.

[He read from the message from Demirel of June 9, at Tab A] 8

This was followed by an intelligence report we received that our
NATO bases would be closed Monday. It is the non-NATO ones that
we are most concerned about. They are of major importance to us. We
called in the Ambassador and we got a 30-day extension.

Demirel wants to be able to show he stood up to the U.S., or to get
the embargo lifted so he can show he got something back Ecevit had lost.

We expect Turkey to make progress in the Cyprus negotiation re-
gardless of the embargo. I think the negotiation is now mostly a mat-
ter of Greek and Turkish domestic politics. The range of the issues is
reasonably clear. It is not clear whether either side can make the re-
quired movement.

The Turks spent the first 20 minutes with the President talking
about the arms embargo.9 I know there is a difference of opinion about
our strategy. But I assure you we had no other motive than to bring
Turkish concessions. Even if the embargo is lifted, progress on Cyprus
would be tough. But if the embargo is lifted, they would know the
President’s prestige is involved and they couldn’t sit. There is still a
gap, but it is not unbridgeable. There are only two issues: the nature
of the central government and the territorial division. There is also the
issue of refugees. [He describes refugee issues.] If they can break the
logjam, the issues aren’t too difficult. But getting started is the prob-
lem. If Greece made a move and it was turned down by Turkey, it
would be disastrous for them. If Demirel moves in a way which looks
weak, the coalition will break up.

Brent, will you discuss our installations.

General Scowcroft: [Described the bilateral installations.]

Fascell: If we move, won’t we have Greek riots, etc.?

Kissinger: The Greeks asked the President in Brussels to warn
against military action, especially in connection with the Aegean. We did
so. We are preparing military assistance to Greece but we shouldn’t link
them.

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8 At Tab A, attached but not printed, is telegram 4487 from Ankara, June 9, which
reported Demirel’s view that the domestic reaction to the arms embargo limited his abil-
ity to not only make progress on the Cyprus territorial issue but also prevent counter-
action that might hurt U.S.-Turkish relations. All brackets are in the original.

9 See Document 227.
Fascell: But you think there would be no eruption?

Kissinger: Papandreou and Mavros would complain bitterly. But we are convinced Karamanlis wants to get this behind him. If the embargo was lifted and there was no progress, there would be trouble.

Whalen: Let’s get right down to cases. We are concerned and want to do something. Our way is the Hamilton Amendment which passed the Senate 41–40. Let’s face it. You have won some victories which have made the freshmen bitter. We need to resolve it in a way to try to avoid a bitter confrontation. Maybe you have some ideas.

The President: What do you all think?

Brademas: I want to thank you for inviting us, Mr. President. One idea I would like to put forth—we have mentioned it earlier, but maybe we could modify it some. This idea is to employ the waiver authority. We have checked the legality with the GAO. We would want some private assurance that some action was forthcoming acceptable to both sides; then the President could waive the $50 million without Turkey publicly having to say anything. To be sure that there is no reneging on the agreement, you could assure them there would be another $50 million coming—using both FY 75 and 76—that is more than the grant we are now giving.

If you announced a reassessment of US-Turkish relations at the same time, it would be a gentle reminder that we don’t like ultimatums thrown at us. Another idea is to get NATO more involved to soften the US-Turkish aspects of it. As you know, we here are NATO supporters. We voted against NATO cuts. And I tell the Turks I want aid to Turkey. I have 450 voting Greeks. I don’t need it politically.

We know there will be no settlement as good as the Greeks had before the crisis.

President: We discussed the waiver policy before. The lawyers can argue whether the waiver is legal. I think the GAO argument is questionable and I as a lawyer think it is probably not right. Suppose I waive and we either don’t get a settlement or it isn’t satisfactory. Then I am out on a limb. I don’t think that is a satisfactory situation. I talked with Demirel for an hour. He pointed out that there are arms paid for that he can’t get shipped and is even having to pay for storage. They just don’t understand this and the waiver won’t answer it.

Brademas: We are trying to find a way out. I agree, let’s forget last August. But it is virtually impossible for Congress to turn around without something happening. We must save face and I think it is fundamentally wrong. Sure it causes you some problems. But we have the national interest to consider. I am offended by the Turkish ultimatums. I disagree with your waiver interpretation. I agree with Kissinger that the sides aren’t that far apart. If we could get them $50 million, get some movement, another $50 million, more movement and we can end
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definitions and clarifications are necessary. In the face of the Turkish ultimatum, even if we tried to just lift the embargo, we would be hung in effigy.

President: I have spoken with some of the leaders—Tip,\textsuperscript{10} for example. Kissinger has talked to Burton. You know the Democratic freshmen better than I. I have gotten to know some of them, including Hubbard—he seems to want to help. It might be worth a try for Kissinger and me to talk to them. I am not sure they understand the nature of the problem.

Whalen: I understand what you both are saying. I see you out on a limb where you could have a problem. What if we applauded your use of the waiver. That might help.

Sarbanes: I think a starting premise has to be an understanding of some accommodation by the Turks. If we can get that, we can orchestrate to save their face. I don’t think we can approach the problem from the view of just getting the decision changed. I think it was correct. If we just change, we would be in the position of sustaining aggression. If we know certain things will be done, there are arrangements which can be made—commercial sales, military sales, grants, etc.

President: Let me follow up on that point. There are differences in the kinds of military deliveries and they can be legally treated differently—especially when they have bought and paid for things.

Let me throw this out. Is there a possibility of exempting sales?

Sarbanes: There is a fundamental premise though, and that is movement by us without moves by them.

Kissinger: What bugs the Turks is not grant aid—that is within our sovereign rights. It is the sales, where they can’t get things they have bought. So the waiver gets at what bothers them most.

On the negotiations, there isn’t any minor movement on which we could report. It will be done all together, or not at all. If the Turks decide to move, it will be done in six weeks—but I can’t say when they will decide to move.

If Ecevit were in office, we could get a settlement quickly.

Brademas: That is not Clerides’ view. He thinks turning the arms on loses us all our leverage. He thinks that sticking fast will put such a bite on Turkish military that they will force a movement.

There is another group in the House which feels more strongly from a different view—Rangel.

Hamilton: I think there is a trend in the House that the ban should come off. Many who voted for the ban are looking for reasons to change and the trick is to come up with something to help them to change.

\textsuperscript{10} Representative Thomas P. “Tip” O’Neill (D–Massachusetts).
Can’t we explore something other than full restoral? One quirk of the law is that cutoffs are in perpetuity. Maybe we could put on a time limit. Maybe we could permit enough aid to let Turkey fulfill its NATO commitment. I don’t think right now you would get the votes to lift the ban.

President: Have you got some language?

Hamilton: We have been working on some ideas.

President: Why don’t we have our people work with you. I can see the need for a parliamentary maneuver to avoid a head-on collision. The situation is bound to deteriorate otherwise—and it is not only Cyprus. Demirel did mention the Aegean and the Greek buildup on the islands. They are just off the Turkish coast. He didn’t threaten, but it obviously is a concern. If this continues to unravel, with the Middle East situation nearby, we could have a holocaust. I can’t sit here and do nothing.

Brademas: But we can’t just turn the arms back on without some actions by the Turks. That leaves us in an indefensible legal and moral situation. That would put the aid bill in jeopardy if we turned any part of it on without any progress from Turkey. We would in that case have to modify our position on the aid bill.

President: We have to be realistic about the situation in Greece and Turkey. For either to take a public position would create an impossible situation.

Brademas: We agree. That is why we want to do it privately—to let them save face.

Sarbanes: I would like to broaden the discussion to the nature of U.S. foreign policy and providing arms and for what purpose. Aggression has been committed and we can’t back off that principle. People may differ on that principle, and the Secretary and I part company on it. But just as we can divide categories of aid, we can divide categories of Turkish response.

The other concern is Greece. Kissinger seems to assume Greece will always be there.

Kissinger: No.

Sarbanes: I don’t think so and if we move without any justification, I think there would be an explosion. I know it could even be involved with Yugoslavia, with Tito’s departure and a possible crisis involving Greece. So I think we must move in a way which does not antagonize Greece.

President: Can you differentiate between sales and grants?

Sarbanes: Yes, but I can’t turn around on any part of it without anything on which to rest it. Because of the critical nature of our relationship to Greece. We want to restore relations with both Greece and
Turkey. I think Turkey has more than it needs. I think it is in Turkey’s interests to resolve this.

   Kissinger: I think most of them want a resolution—maybe even Makarios. We can’t get Turkish progress by 15 July. We also can’t get it if there is a linkage with aid. But the President told Demirel that if the President sticks his neck out and they don’t act, they are then up against the President also.

   Brademas: Then what?

   Hamilton: There is another aid bill.

   Brademas: We have kept quiet. But it hasn’t helped getting Turkish movement when the Executive keeps making statements trying to get Congress to turn around.

   Whalen: The language is “substantial progress.” I think there has been some.

   Kissinger: We can’t in good conscience say there has been.

   Whalen: Would you rule out John’s suggestion on the waiver?

   President: It is such a marginal question legally. It puts me out on a limb. I am not saying you would cut it off, but let’s be realistic. Statements by you on the floor would be helpful.

   Taking Lee’s idea of making it affirmative action in support of NATO and sales versus grants, let’s see what we can do.

   Rosenthal: Findley has a proposal to give NATO $100 million and let them do it. But the bases problems aren’t NATO, but a bilateral problem.

   Brademas: Would this proposal . . . you are discussing be something different from a waiver?

   President: Right.

   Brademas: But the key part of a waiver was a private assurance from Turkey. If that would be included, I would look at it with an open mind.

   President: I haven’t explored this with Caramanlis and Demirel.

   Brademas: I think that would be crucial.

   Sarbanes: Could we keep a couple of tracks open—the waiver for example? We could also phase down what progress there is in line with what kinds of arms are released. We have intended to look at all this in total packages. Maybe we need to separate things out.

   Whalen: I have concerns of time. It will take time. Second, what would we do about private assurances? If we start to debate on the floor . . .

   Sarbanes: There have been peripheral ones—to Waldheim—for example. Straightening out some lines, maybe. Can we put together enough peripheral items to justify sales? Maybe. If we can work to-
gether . . . Congress is helping Greece as against the Turks and the Executive is helping Turkey as against Greece.

President: I will reexamine the waiver, although I have grave reservations. If you could look at Lee’s ideas . . .

Kissinger: I don’t exclude that we could put something together like Paul says. The best place to do it is at the Greek-Turkish talks at the end of July.

Rosenthal: We also can’t appear to give in to Turkish threats. That would be a sign to others like Portugal.

Sarbanes: Rather than crumble, maybe we should say we should reevaluate our policy.

President: But if I use a waiver, doesn’t that look like buckling?

Whalen: That is right. We would have to help the President.

Rosenthal: We are all in this together. Let’s explore it again.

Sarbanes: The other should be looked at, too. That puts us in the same boat.

President: We have not only the deadline of the Karamanlis-Demirel talks. There is also the August recess, the end of the fiscal year, etc. There are lots of deadlines.

Brademas: If we would put this together I can’t think of anything better for the country right now.

Fascell: I want to table something here about delivering the material already paid for. There is nothing more basic than the sanctity of a contract. We have got to consider resolving that.

229. Memorandum of Conversation


PARTICIPANTS

President Ford
Dr. Henry A. Kissinger, Secretary of State and Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs
Congressman Lee H. Hamilton (D–Indiana)

1 Source: Library of Congress, Manuscript Division, Kissinger Papers, Box CI 282, Memoranda of Conversations, Presidential File, June 1975. Secret; Nodis. The meeting was held in the Cabinet Room at the White House.
Congressman Charles W. Whalen, Jr. (R–Ohio)
Congressman Paul S. Sarbanes (D–Maryland)
Amb. Donald Rumsfeld, Assistant to the President
John O. Marsh, Jr., Counsellor to the President
Max Friedersdorf, Deputy Assistant to the President for Legislative Affairs
Lt. General Brent Scowcroft, Deputy Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs

SUBJECT
Restoration of Aid to Turkey

President: I am sorry that Ben [Rosenthal] and Dante [Fascell][2] couldn’t be here but I thought we had to keep the momentum. Since our last meeting,[3] I have been looking over the alternatives. It is clear to us that the situation in Turkey has deteriorated. Ecevit was assaulted over the weekend. It is indicative of the growing political unrest in Turkey.

We discussed the last time using Section 614, granting a waiver before the end of the fiscal year and initiating again in the new fiscal year. That would be followed by expressions of support from you. There is $16 million in funds available this fiscal year and of course $50 million in new funds. The other alternative we discussed was complete removal as the Senate did, but it appears to me it would be very difficult in the House now, even if we agreed, and some of you indicated you couldn’t support that. One other idea was the lifting of the embargo on cash and credit.

I want to be forthcoming. I could indicate my willingness by saying I would exercise my waiver, either in FY ’75 and ’76, or hold it as an incentive for the Turks when Clerides and Denktash get together on 24 July. That is a question of tactics. But to show my willingness to compromise—but I think it is then fair to ask you—not to go the Senate route, but to lift the embargo on sales and credits. It seems to me that this is give on the part of both and achieves what we want. I have to add that we can’t guarantee there will be an immediate settlement. We would then be in a position to put the kind of pressure on the Turks to get action. If under those circumstances they don’t perform, it is then their problem, not ours. Henry, do you want to add anything?

Kissinger: We could understand among ourselves the nature of this agreement, but publishing it would destroy it.

Brademas: We are talking just in this room. There are three factors: Arms to Turkey; a resolution of the situation in Cyprus; and preserving the fundamental principle that US arms not be used for aggressive

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2 Brackets are in the original.
3 See Document 228.
purposes. Restoring arms to Turkey is not the only objective. Your proposal appears to respond to only one objective. When we mentioned your use of 614, there would have to be a prior assurance from Turkey. We could not accept a quid without a quo. You are now asking for Congress to remove the ban on credits or sales and you use the waiver, with nothing coming back from the Turks. There must be some response from Turkey on the ground in Cyprus or an assurance of that. What you have put forth is something for Turkey but with nothing on the other two points—the other thing and the principle that arms not be used for aggressive purposes.

President: On Cyprus: We can’t be the negotiator on Cyprus. We have to create the climate for progress. Without this climate, nothing will happen and in the meantime we will be losing. [2 lines not declassified]

It seems to me if there is a settlement, whatever U.S. arms are there will be principally withdrawn. That is a matter for negotiations between the two.

Brademas: I think we are back to square one. I am very disappointed.

President: I candidly feel the same about your position.

Sarbanes: I think there must be something that justifies a legislative change of position. Absent that, I am hard put to have some rationale for changing. The waiver was to get around the legislative situation. To give Turkey something publicly while they gave us private assurances and then publicly make waves.

Hamilton: Is there some hope that Turkey would respond to your waiver with some gesture?

Kissinger: No chance. The ban on grants bothers them least because they think we have a right to do it. Morally they object to the sales cutoff. They also refuse to link the embargo with Cyprus.

The President told Demirel that even though we would not insist on written assurances, if we moved we would expect a reciprocal gesture. I think in July they might give the things that were possible in January, but that is my own feeling, not their assurances.

Hamilton: So the waiver is not a real inducement.

Kissinger: No. We have been trying all along.

I hope we are showing by our efforts and our good faith.

Brademas: It looks to me like we are faced with a complete unilateral gesture. No assurance at all—just a one-way street.

President: The other side of the street is that we stand to lose some vitally important installations. Further, we stand to lose any chance to get a Cyprus agreement.

Brademas: So we would be telling the world if we are pressured we will yield to blackmail.
President: No. What would you have us do, use force?
Brademas: No. This is water over the dam. We would have used pressure on Turkey earlier. I do not think we should yield to blackmail.
President: We must remember that the Turks didn’t start this.
Brademas: For years I fought the Greek junta while the Administration supported it.
Sarbanes: I think we must distinguish between the moves of 20 July and the moves of 14 August. I concede you this right of the Turks in July, but not August. But I do not think we can concede on this matter of principle. To get out of this, we proposed this face-saving formula. To move without this, would be to sacrifice principle.
Hamilton: On the partial lifting, you wouldn’t object if we inserted language that equipment would be used to further NATO objectives and not in Cyprus.
President: Can’t you put it positively on the NATO thing?
Brademas: I would be in favor of action provided we know that some action would be forthcoming. That I don’t understand.
Kissinger: I think the President was saying that if we don’t move, we would lose bases and forego any chance to get a solution on Cyprus and the Aegean—where Greece is in violation of treaties—with U.S. arms.
Brademas: I would have no objection to invoking the law against Greece.
Kissinger: It is not aggression, just treaty violation. But our proposition is not just that we open the spigot and nothing happens. Demirel is under no misapprehension that the President expects movement if he acts.
Brademas: That was the situation for seven months until February.
President: I can cut these things off at any time. I would be obligated to insist that the parties get together and resolve the Cyprus dispute. I would feel personally obligated to the Congress. And I think both the Greeks and Turks are anxious to get the problem solved.
Sarbanes: Given the last observation, I am not sure why the scenario where you do the waiver, the Turks make some moves, and the Congress then takes action, won’t work.
Brademas: At no point have we suggested the waiver be used to get the Turks to be forthcoming. It has always been conditioned on prior Turkish assurances. The point of the waiver was to help the Turks save face.
Sarbanes: It was to break the chicken and egg problem with respect to the Turks—not to get around the Executive-Congressional problem.
Whalen: What did you have in mind on simultaneous timing?

President: My scenario is to get results and show we could work together. Congress would pass before the August recess the sales lifting and either in this fiscal year or later, whichever is preferable, I would exercise the waiver. This would show we can work together and open the door to movement.

Supposing there is no action and you think I am negligent about moving. There are legislative devices to cut it off.

Sarbanes: They are also subject to waiver.

Brademas: We are aware of our weakness in this regard. If we could work something out, it would be good for the country. I hope we don’t move at total loggerheads.

I have another thought, which the Secretary may not like. At no point until recently did the Executive use the tools available—an aid ban—to make the Turks move. Even now the Turks are being told that Congress is being pressured to rescind. Why should the Turks move? I wouldn’t. Why not tell them there is no chance for the Congress to move and they better move. Why not put the pressure on Turkey?

President: We have been firm but we don’t hold all the cards. Our bases aren’t bases for their security but for ours. We don’t hold all the chips.

Whalen: Do we hold any?

President: I told Demirel that if we got a lifting, they had to understand we expected action. We believe they will act, but they won’t move under pressure. They will act on the bases and I don’t want that responsibility.

Hamilton: The question is how you get them to move. We have a carrot and a stick. I disagree with Brademas and Sarbanes. I think we are more likely to get movement by a carrot than by a stick.

Kissinger: We have been trying to pressurize the Turks. We can argue forever whether the tactics are right.

Congressman Whalen: What does Turkey lose if we do nothing?

Secretary Kissinger: The Turks will lose spare parts and their Army will run down. They may try to move before that happens—in the Aegean and maybe Cyprus. They may not move to the Soviet Union but they will move toward the radical Arabs to get the funds for arms. Turkey will lose their tie to the United States. They don’t want to. Maybe if we hang tough, the Turkish army will veer off. But I know no one who believes that. We all think they will pay the price and everyone will lose.

Congressman Whalen: If you exercise the waiver while Congress is going through the legislative process, is there any chance of action on Cyprus?
Secretary Kissinger: My instinct is that action would bring some concessions—token ones—in July. Then we can make a massive effort. We can get, after Turkish Senate elections—a settlement that is tolerable to Greece.

Congressman Brademas: You have been fair in describing in restrained terms what could be expected. We have not discussed the impact of this in Greece. In 1971, when I opposed sending arms to Greece because of the dictatorship, Sisco said Greece was vital to NATO. Can we now write off Greece?

The President: Not at all. We have completed two steps toward bases and aid. The new government is a big asset to us and NATO. We want to help. We haven’t finalized it but we are making good progress.

Secretary Kissinger: We have to balance the dangers you describe—which are real, stimulated by the Papandreou forces—and the consequences of a prolonged stalemate with the prospect of confrontation and conflict in the Aegean. Karamanlis wants to get this behind him so he can focus on his other problems.

Congressman Sarbanes: The carrot and stick ignores the principle from which I don’t think we can recede without violating. To recede without some basis that Turkey has receded is really bad.

Congressman Brademas: There is much cynicism in the United States over the last few months. If the Congress were to roll over, the people would say laws and principles mean nothing. Our action would then appear just a “get Kissinger” action, which it wasn’t. We took it based on principle and we would have to recede the same way.

The President: I will give you all the benefits of doubt on that principle you express. But we also have a broad responsibility that in the process we don’t undercut something which involves our national security.

After the last meeting I tried to find a way to compromise. Despite my feelings on the waiver—which you know—I told Secretary Kissinger I would have to show my willingness to work with you. I had language prepared—I have it right here. I respect your views, but it is an understatement to say I am disappointed.

Congressman Brademas: At no point did we suggest using the waiver without private assurances. A simple invocation of a waiver without assurances was never put forward. The waiver was prepared not by us but by Schlesinger.

The President: Maybe, but it was proposed by Congress, not Schlesinger.

Congressman Sarbanes: The waiver was not to make you cave but as a device to get the Turks to move.

Congressman Whalen: I would agree with John that the waiver was contingent on private assurances. But the assurances would in any
case have to remain private, so the cynicism would still remain. The other problem is that the Turks have already rejected a waiver.

Secretary Kissinger: The things we give the Turks free they think we have a right to cut off—while they don’t like it. It is the sales embargo which gets them.

Congressman Brademas: I would hope you wouldn’t press this to a vote. First, I think we can defeat you, and in any case, it would infuriate the Greeks and, if we win, it would infuriate the Turks.

Mr. Rumsfeld: The Turkish army has behaved very responsibly—not like a banana republic. They are proud of their Army and won’t like it running down. When they start closing bases, they are on their way to unravelling a basic relationship. The stakes are very high.

Congressman Sarbanes: True. But it is also basic to ask what are the purposes of our alliances. If members use force to violate the very thing the alliance was designed to prevent, this too is basic. My scenario is to use the waiver, get Turkish concessions in July, and then we see what we can do.

The President: I think we unfortunately have reached an impasse. I think the consequences will be tragic.

Congressman Whalen: To summarize, I think some of us think some action must be taken. It would be facilitated if all the parties could agree. That can’t happen, it appears. So Lee [Hamilton], Dante [Fascell]⁴ and I will have to go back to see what we can do.

The President: We want to work with all of you. We will keep our rhetoric down and hope for movement which can prevent disastrous results.

Congressman Brademas: On the last point, we have been quiet for months. I did say that Executive statements about pressuring Congress are not helpful. I agree about keeping the rhetoric down. We will do our part.

The President: We can’t be oblivious of the deadlines facing us.

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⁴ Brackets are in the original.
230. Memorandum of Conversation

Washington, June 26, 1975, 11:33 a.m.–12:50 p.m.

PARTICIPANTS

The President
Speaker Carl Albert (D.–Oklahoma)
Congressman Thomas P. O'Neill, Jr. (D.–Massachusetts)
Congressman Thomas E. Morgan (D.–Pennsylvania)
Congressman John J. Rhodes (R.–Arizona)
Congressman William S. Broomfield (R.–Michigan)
Congressman Lee H. Hamilton (D.–Indiana)
Congressman Wayne L. Hays (D.–Ohio)
Congressman Clement J. Zablocki (D.–Wisconsin)
Congressman Dante B. Fascell (D.–Florida)
Congressman John B. Anderson (R.–Illinois)
Congressman Robert H. Michel (R.–Illinois)
Congressman John J. McFall (D.–California)
Dr. Henry A. Kissinger, Secretary of State and Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs
Amb. Donald Rumsfeld, Assistant to the President
John O. Marsh, Jr., Counselor to the President
Max Friedersdorf, Assistant to the President for Legislative Affairs
Lt. Gen. Brent Scowcroft, Deputy Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs
Amb. Robert McCloskey, Assistant Secretary of State for Congressional Relations
Robert Wolthuis, Deputy Assistant to the President

SUBJECT

Turkish Aid

The President: I asked you to come here to discuss a very important issue.

[Wayne Hays comes in. Also O'Neill.]2

We have had the Cyprus problem with us for almost a year. It is coming to a head now. The situation is more serious now, since Turkey has indicated its desire to renegotiate its base arrangements with us within 30 days. I met with Demirel and Karamanlis in Brussels and I urged them to cooperate.3
The Senate has passed the Mansfield–Scott Bill. I have talked to Brademas, Sarbanes, Lee [Hamilton] and some others\(^4\) to see what could be done. I am not optimistic.

I have been urged to use my waiver authority, to provide up to $50 million in grant aid. That could provide $50 million this year, though we have only $16 million, and $50 million next year.

I have always been leery of Section 614, despite what some lawyers say. But I have said I would use it if there is no way to get some movement. I realize it is not possible to get a straight lifting of the embargo. Another alternative would be to lift the embargo on credit and sales. What really burns the Turks is that they can’t even get the equipment that they bought and paid for, and they even have to pay warehouse charges. Another alternative, which I understand Bill Broomfield has proposed, would provide sales and grant for Greece and Turkey plus economic aid for Greece. I understand Lee has been working on some other ideas I haven’t heard about.

These installations in Turkey are extremely important intelligence installations.

We have a tough problem. I am willing to use the waiver even though I am against it and it is not what they want. Henry?

Kissinger: Lifting the embargo won’t guarantee a settlement, but without it there won’t be a settlement.

Morgan: It will be enough but there is some softening. I did get a letter with 24 signatures from the minority side saying they will change their position. If we can make this known, Brademas and Sarbanes will compromise if they see their support eroding. I think Rosenthal is looking for a way out.

The President: I think so too. I see his problem. He was an original author.

I am willing to get people down here, 40 to 50 a day, if it would be helpful.

Albert: That may be helpful. I have a letter from Brademas saying what the U.S. will and won’t do. [Reads from letter] He says he wants good relations with both countries, but we must have concessions from Turkey to lift the bans. He says a majority of the House would reject anything else. If the aid is voted—and I don’t think the votes are there—it would offend the Greeks and endanger the new democracy there. We are willing to work something out with the Administration on a quid pro quo basis. The Administration has encouraged Turkey not to make concessions, by attacking the Congress.

\(^4\) See Document 229.
On your question, this letter comes to me flatly, the breaking of a vow, a deal, or whatever, which puts a strong moral issue before us, with the consequences of these essential bases in Turkey. If you could get some movement of some kind, it might help.

Hays: The only thing which would satisfy Brademas would be caving by the Turks. Brademas doesn’t say the Greeks first broke the law by putting weapons on Greece. Brademas’ position is totally inflexible.

I had some of the new members lined up, but these vetoes have undermined that. They almost undermined me. If you worked as hard on this as you did on strip mining, you might get it.

Albert: I agree. If we let the domestic controversy impact on this . . .

Kissinger: It is not true that we didn’t observe the law. We did. It’s true the Congress extended the ban two times. The first time there was no Greek Government. The second time we had no negotiating forum until 14 January. Then Greece rejected the Turkish proposals because it might have prevented the arms ban. Our statements have kept the Turkish bases open this far. Without our statements, they would have closed them by now.

Brademas wants concessions, then he will judge their adequacy and give something. The Turks cannot concede on that basis. It is a basic matter for the Turks not to concede under pressure.

Albert: How useful was Turkey in the October war?

The President: We used the Azores but we may not be able to next year.

Kissinger: They also refused to grant overflight rights and forced Soviet flights to go through Hungary and Yugoslavia; which is about three times as long.

Rhodes: How about freeing the stuff that is frozen now, but nothing goes in the future without further movement?

Zablocki: What if we extended the date to January 26, during which period the sales would be released, and other military assistance to Greece and Turkey and economic aid to Greece? We can’t get any concession from Turkey under the pressure they now are under.

The President: Let me put a variation of it. Supposing I exercised the waiver, with an expression of support for that, you lift the ban on sales and with no specific cutoff. They don’t want the sword of Damocles hanging over them.

Hays: The Greek lobby won’t rest until the Turks have evacuated Cyprus. The Greek dictatorship would have exterminated the Turks on Cyprus if the Turks hadn’t invaded.

I think you should consider the Broomfield proposal and I think if the leaders in this room are behind it we can get it through.
Hamilton: The vote was as high as 3 to 1 against. I think we have the votes in the Committee but not yet on the floor. But the momentum is going our way.

Rhodes: We have 100 votes for lifting it on our side.

Hamilton: The Greek Congressmen won’t go for any lifting. I think the Rhodes route is the best. Slice it as close as you can and get the lobbying effort going. If you require Congress to move first, I don’t think you can get the Greek group off it.

The thought that is prevalent in the House is that the Turks did violate the law, though as Secretary Kissinger said, the U.S. did observe it.

O’Neill: The majority of the House feels we are protecting Turkey but Turkey is not protecting us. They broke the law. What if others do the same thing?

Hamilton: The law is in perpetuity. There is no provision for relief.

Kissinger: It is more obscure than that. Turkey is a guarantor power under the London–Zurich Agreements. Even Brademas and Sarbanes probably agree that the first Turkish invasion was legal, but not the second one. On precedent, this is unique. Further, Greece is fortifying the islands in violation of its treaties with us. Brademas said a lifting of the ban would hurt Karamanlis. What will hurt him more than anything is to get no agreement at all.

One of Brademas and Sarbanes problems is that they have promised the Greek community more than the Greeks are willing to settle for. But the Greeks won’t put anything forward unless they think it will produce an agreement. The Greek community here is more radical than the Greek Government.

Anderson: Why don’t we do what we threaten in the Middle East—propose a U.S. settlement, then provide aid.

Kissinger: The problem is that for Greece it will be a lousy settlement, and if we put it forward they will blame us and use it for anti-American propaganda. I think there is no substantial disagreement between us and the Greeks. The problem is the Turkish domestic situation. Ecevit can claim he took Cyprus and Demirel gave it away—which is especially bad since Demirel didn’t intervene in ’67.

The President: The Turkish population is 18–19%. The Turks now occupy about 40%. The Greeks want them to go back to 18%. But there is now a gap of only about 5% if you can get them to the negotiating table.

Kissinger: There are only two issues, but they are big ones. It is agreed now that there will be only two regions. The issues are the amount of territory that each will hold, the refugees, and the powers
of the central government. The latter is pretty well settled, it is just the other two. This isn’t as complicated as our domestic debate.

Fascell: I am not as sanguine about turning votes around. I think you have got to have some way to let people get off the hook. If you lifted the whole thing you are talking about $300 million. Maybe we should do it in two bites. It is hard to argue that 12 F–4s can be used on Cyprus. They are a pain in the neck to us. Why not release them, start hearings and hope the Turks will move?

Anderson: The Turks have to do something. Your speech was directed at that, wasn’t it? [The Secretary’s speech at Atlanta, June 23, which stated that: “No country should imagine that it is doing us a favor by remaining in an alliance with us.”]5

Kissinger: Yes. But without a significant step on the embargo, I don’t think the Turks will move.

Fascell: AHEPA has already geared up for a fight. The only question is to go on a frontal assault or give a little to let people off the hook.

President: Suppose we go for lifting the sales ban, and either go or don’t go for the waiver as you wish. Then I would participate after the recess in meetings with Congressional groups.

Albert: I think it is important to work out if we can. We need those installations but we can’t do the impossible.

Hays: Lots of people are rethinking. I have been talking to people and so far only got one flat turndown. But the new members, if you get them down, will want a quid pro quo on domestic affairs. They don’t give a damn about foreign affairs. I think if we lose Turkey we have had it in the Mediterranean.

The President: I agree. You work with Henry. I will give whatever time is needed.

Kissinger: We need to understand the clock is moving. We had an intelligence report two or three weeks ago that they would close the bases. We talked to them and got a month, but if we don’t show something soon, we are in trouble.

Hays: I think movement in the Committee by July 15 would hold things. So the Turkish legislators tell me.

Morgan: Aren’t the Israelis worried?

Kissinger: The Israeli Ambassador says he is working on it.

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McFall: I am worried about the Senate if we put through something different.

President: We really had a 6 to 7 vote margin, if we need it.

If we could work with you to work out a bill, I will go to work down here on the members.

231. National Security Study Memorandum 227


TO

The Secretary of Defense
The Deputy Secretary of State
The Director of Central Intelligence

SUBJECT

U.S. Security Policy Toward Turkey

The President has directed that a comprehensive review of U.S. security policy toward Turkey be undertaken on a priority basis. The study should identify U.S. interests, including those interests as they relate to NATO, and offer recommendations for U.S. policy aimed at their protection, particularly in the context of bilateral negotiations that may be requested by Turkey on the status of U.S. installations in that country. The study should take into account such factors as:

—The nature of the U.S. military presence in Turkey, and its relationship to specific U.S. security interests;
—The relative priority of U.S. bases and facilities in terms of their contribution to U.S. and NATO security;
—Turkish objectives regarding the U.S. presence in the country and specific US-Turkish bilateral agreements;
—The presence of nuclear weapons in Turkey;
—Turkey’s needs for economic and military assistance and possible U.S. initiatives to satisfy those needs;
—The impact of restoration of U.S. military aid to Turkey and a resolution of the Cyprus crisis on U.S.-Turkish relations;
—The impact of U.S.-Turkish bases and facilities negotiations on overall Turkish-NATO defense arrangements.

1 Source: Library of Congress, Manuscript Division, Kissinger Papers, Box 316, National Security Council, NSSM. Secret. Copies were sent to the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and the Director of the National Security Agency.
The President has directed that the study be undertaken by an NSC interagency group comprising representatives of the addressees of this memorandum and a representative of the NSC staff and under the chairmanship of the Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs. The study should be forwarded no later than August 1, 1975 for consideration.

Brent Scowcroft

2 Scowcroft signed for Kissinger above Kissinger’s typed name.

232. Memorandum of Conversation

Washington, July 21, 1975, 8–9:45 a.m.

PRESIDENT’S MEETING WITH REPUBLICAN LEADERSHIP

PARTICIPANTS

President Ford
Dr. Henry A. Kissinger, Secretary of State and Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs
Dr. James R. Schlesinger, Secretary of Defense
Lt. General Brent Scowcroft, Deputy Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs

[The meeting began with a discussion of oil decontrol strategy.] 2

President: The next item is the House item—the Turkish aid vote on Wednesday. The need for a victory on this is more evident than ever. I have had two breakfasts here for about 260. 3

Congressman Michel: We don’t have a count yet, but the breakfasts have been tremendously effective.

Kissinger: Let me just comment on a few of the arguments that are being made. The Administration did carry out the law, in the sense that we did stop new commitments. We didn’t announce it because we

1 Source: Library of Congress, Manuscript Division, Kissinger Papers, Box CL 282, Memoranda of Conversations, Presidential File, July 1975. Confidential. The meeting was held in the Cabinet Room at the White House. The List of Participants does not include the names of the congressmen who attended the meeting.
2 Brackets are in the original.
3 The first meeting with the Republican leadership took place on July 10 at 8 a.m. (Memorandum of conversation; Ford Library, National Security Adviser, Memoranda of Conversations, Box 13, 7/10/75) The second meeting with the joint Congressional leadership was held on July 14 at 8 a.m. (Memorandum of conversation; ibid.)
didn’t want to prevent a negotiation. Second, this is not a matter of choosing between Greece and Turkey. Having no progress is more harmful to Greece, because it will prevent a Cyprus settlement, which Karamanlis needs. Then why doesn’t Greece support our action? The fact is that no Greek can publicly support restoring aid to Turkey. Makarios is the chief villain in this respect and his interest is in continued turmoil.

Congressman Cederberg: You keep saying “restoring aid.” This doesn’t restore aid. There are many who never vote for any aid. This lets them get material they paid for.

President: Yes. Plus it allows them to buy things. There is no aid.

Congressman Rhodes: What role does the Greek Church play in all this?

Kissinger: I am not clear on the motives here, but Iakavos has been no help at all. The Greek-American Community is very stirred up without any understanding of the real issues.

President: Jim, how about the military side?

Schlesinger: These installations, Mr. President, are irreplaceable. [2½ lines not declassified]

This is our last chance. Turkey has been willing to wait until the House votes. But if it doesn’t pass, Turkey will go down the irrevocable path of closing us out.

Congressman Rhodes: Kennedy fanned the flames on refugees. Is there anything that can be done there to defuse it?

Kissinger: There is money in the bill for refugees, but agreement really depends on a settlement. We would certainly welcome any refugee relief Congress would vote, but a long-term solution is only possible if there is a settlement. In January, Turkey agreed that 8–12,000 could be resettled in no man’s land. The Greeks stopped that because they were afraid we would claim that substantial progress was made. We might be able to resurrect that.

President: Relief is just a handout. The only way we can solve it is to get a settlement so they can be resettled. Only with a settlement can we be helpful.

Congressman Devine: Aid to Turkey is as helpful to Israel as anyone else. Over the weekend, the Jewish Community has raised more hell over arms to Jordan than Turkey.

Kissinger: The Israeli Embassy swears they are pressuring Rosenthal, but I don’t see the results. The danger of pushing the anchor of the Eastern Mediterranean away from us is obvious—it should be to Israel. Hussein came to us a year ago saying the Syrians had offered him Soviet air defense. We, after a year of talks, agreed to sell them Hawks, with only a few now and the rest spread over several years. It
was a tough choice, but we believed it was better for us to do it than for Syria and Iraq with the result that they would be tied into the Syrian-Iraqi air defense net. The Jewish Community doesn’t realize it is not just a matter of us giving it or them not getting it—it is us or the Soviet Union.

President: This equipment is purely defensive. Since the October war, we have delivered to Israel $800 million of equipment—much of it offensive. And over the two years we’ve given over $2 billion to Israel.

Congressman Broomfield: The ploy behind this is to put pressure for more arms for Israel.

President: Israel has in its budget $2.6 billion in aid from the United States. That they put right in their budget.

Congressman Cederberg: What is the difference between your bill and the Senate bill? Fraser\(^4\) said he would support the bill but he was worried about what would come from the conference.

President: The Senate voted complete removal. The House bill forbids grant aid.

Kissinger: The Fraser Amendment prevents foreign military sales.

Congressman Broomfield: The House conferees will have to hang tough on Fraser. Fraser wants some assurance we will not yield in conference.

President: We would hope the House bill could be improved more toward the Senate bill.

Congressman Broomfield: This is a real problem. Fraser wants assurances.

Schlesinger: Our companies have charged Turkey even for contract violation when they couldn’t take delivery. Some remittance of that would help.

Congressman Rhodes: We could do that maybe in conference or on the aid bill. We shouldn’t do it on the House bill.

Senator Case: Wouldn’t it be harder for the Senate to take a softer line?

President: I would hope you would hang fast.

Congressman Edwards: I changed my position and I think we need to talk to some of these people on the fence. Now that I have converted, I want to win.

[Omitted here is discussion of other items.]

\(^4\) Representative Donald Fraser (D-Minnesota).
233. Memorandum of Conversation

Helsinki, July 31, 1975, 8–9:15 a.m.

PARTICIPANTS

Turkey
Prime Minister Demirel
Foreign Minister Caglayangil
Secretary General Elekdag (Foreign Office)
Mr. Guvendiren, Deputy Director, Cyprus Department, Foreign Office

U.S.
The President
The Secretary of State
Lt. General Scowcroft
Mr. Arthur Hartman, Assistant Secretary for European Affairs

The Secretary: That was certainly a strange seating arrangement at dinner last night. Mr. Prime Minister, I want to know what you had said to Brezhnev that made him leave after the first course.

Demirel: It wasn’t anything I said. He was apparently very tired but you are right, it was a strange seating arrangement. I noticed that you, Mr. President, were next to Makarios.

The Secretary: Yes, we had actually refused to talk to him because of some personal remarks he had made about the President before leaving Nicosia, but I am sure he must have asked to sit next to the President.

Demirel: He is now the “former” President.

The President: What does that mean?

The Secretary: What the Prime Minister is saying is that he is not considered to be President by Turkey.

Demirel: That is right. We don’t think that there is any longer the old state of Cyprus. That is just on paper now.

The President: Is Costa Gomes coming?

The Secretary: Yes, I understand he arrives tonight and will speak tomorrow instead of today. We had some report from Spanish sources that there is some fighting in northern Portugal near the city of Oporto. We have not yet seen a report from our sources.

The President: I think the quality of the speeches here has been quite good.

1Source: Ford Library, National Security Adviser, Memoranda of Conversations, Box 14, Ford Administration. Secret; Nodis. The meeting was held at the Ambassador’s residence. President Ford and Secretary Kissinger were in Helsinki for CSCE talks.
Caglayangil: Yes.

Elekdag: We had prepared a speech with the full intention of not raising difficult issues in keeping with the spirit of this meeting but we understand that both Caramanlis and Makarios have different ideas. You heard Caramanlis yesterday and today Makarios will do the same thing.

Demirel: We did not intend to start a debate here.

Elekdag: That was the understanding of your staff.

Demirel: We don’t want to have any fight here.

Elekdag: Mr. Secretary, when the two Prime Ministers (Greek and Turkish) met in Brussels they agreed to moderate their public statements, and we are trying to live up to that. The Prime Minister was not even going to touch on the Cyprus situation.

The Secretary: It is interesting to me that Makarios is now expressing a great deal more flexibility. When he talked to the President last night he said that he could accept a bizonal federation and even told the President that the territory to be left to the Turks could be as high as 25 percent. Perhaps that is not high enough but it is more than I have heard him say before.

The President: I told him that unless there was more give in the situation I would walk away from the problem. I said that 25 percent was not enough.

Demirel: Makarios is a very shrewd man. He always comes along with a photographer. He did that to me once and then your photograph appears with him in the newspaper with a statement “Mr. Makarios had very warm talks with _____.”

The Secretary: He must have asked the Finns to sit next to the President.

The President: You have a great friend in Wayne Hays.

Demirel: He is not only a great friend of mine but of Turkish-American relations. He is an able man.

The President: He was very helpful and he spoke bluntly in the meetings I had with Congressmen in support of lifting the embargo. He had no hesitancy in speaking but, unfortunately, we did not get enough votes. The Secretary and I have been talking about trying to get some action this week. As you may know, the day after the House vote, Senators Mansfield and Scott condemned the action of the House as ill
advised. The Speaker told me the next day that it was the worst vote in the 28 years he has been in the House.

The Secretary: Where does this leave us?

Demirel: I told the President on May 29 what would happen. It has been very difficult for me to keep public pressure down. As a matter of fact, it has been extremely difficult to explain to Turkish public opinion why Congress did what it did. I have expressed great appreciation for what you, Mr. President, have done but it did not change the result. Our friendly relations have been spoiled. Since February fifth there has been an embargo. What can we do? I have tried not to create any provocations. Such provocations could easily be created. If we had a direct conflict between us it would be easy to define what actions we should take and where we should stop but we have no such conflict. Turk/Greek relations are sensitive. If there had been trouble over the last 30 years between us (US/Turkey) it would be easier to explain. I have always told my people that the U.S. is a friend. Our foreign policy has been based on friendship with the United States. We have no direct conflict. But if there are no spare parts and our armed forces are affected while Greece stays as it is, one day there will be a serious problem in Turk/Greek relations. For years you have supplied arms to the Greeks but not for use against Turks. In this situation the Greeks could become more powerful and they might push us to do “this or that.” We all wish that something could be done.

The President: You have been very helpful in maintaining a moderate and cooperative attitude.

Demirel: This was not easy.

The President: If there is to be blame I would put it on the intransigence of a very vocal group of Greek-American citizens who are extremely ill advised. I can’t seem to get through to them that this embargo is of no help to Cyprus, nor to Greece, nor to Greek-Turkish relations, and it weakens NATO and our own national security. There is nothing good that flows from the embargo.

Elekdag: If I may, Mr. Prime Minister, I would like to repeat what you said that our relations with the U.S. are like an unrequited love affair.

allowed for “1) the shipment of arms contracted for with the United States before the embargo went into effect, 2) cash sales of arms on the commercial market, and 3) future U.S. government sales and credits for NATO-related items.” On July 24 the House voted 206–223 to reject the amended version of S.846 despite intensive lobbying by the White House. The following day Turkey ordered the cessation of operations at the 27 U.S. bases on its territory, including 4 intelligence-gathering facilities. (Congress and the Nation, 1973–1976, Vol. IV, pp. 866–867)

4 See Document 227.
The Secretary: We have been accused of having too much love for Turkey.

Demirel: What is the purpose?

The Secretary: This is the single most senseless act I have seen in my years in Washington.

The President: That is true of the 28 years I have been in Washington.

Demirel: If this somehow would save Greece but it won’t. If it could help Cyprus, but it won’t. If the U.S. wants to see Turks and Greeks live together peacefully, it is not helping by this action. Our policy has never been hostile to Greece. We want friendly relations. We both need to do other things and spend our resources elsewhere. I want to devote my attention to the development of my country. Turkey is the only country in this area that is stable and a democracy. In Iran you have a monarchy. In the Soviet Union and Bulgaria you have Communists. In Syria and Iraq you have Baathists. In Greece until “we brought Caramanlis to power” . . .

The Secretary: That is what Wayne Hays said in our meeting.

Demirel: We are trying to bring democracy to our people. From Japan to Turkey there was only India but it no longer looks very democratic.

The President: What do you think will happen to Papadopoulos?

Demirel: I don’t know why Caramanlis decided to bring them to Court.

The President: Do you think he will send them into exile?

Demirel: Caramanlis probably cannot let them go free but he will neutralize them.

The Secretary: On some island?

Demirel: They have 3,000 islands and they want Cyprus too.

The President: I have a report in this morning that the Senate will try to attach a lifting of the embargo to another bill. If this happens we might be able to get the same bill over to the House tomorrow. We are working on this very hard today and we are trying to make sure that we have the additional necessary votes. Henry, why don’t you explain the problem with Rangel?

The Secretary: Charlie Rangel is a black Congressman who is very interested in seeing that progress is made on the opium problem. We understand that you might be thinking of setting up a unit to coordinate your drug control problem. If we could write a letter that sets out what you intend to do it would help us with Rangel and he says that he could probably get another ten votes for us. I want you to understand, however, that we appreciate very much what you have already done on this problem.
Demirel: Yes. This year we took very strict measures which I think will be effective. Last year we decided to allow the growing of poppies in seven provinces on about 100,000 hectares. Only about 80,000 were actually planted. We have very heavy control by police in the area. Every field has been checked. If more was planted than we had licensed them, we destroyed that part of the field and withdrew the license. Actually in Anatolia they do not measure their land in hectares but in a local measure which is the equivalent of a thousand square meters and, therefore, we had to measure every field and there were many complaints. We have also checked every poppy head to be sure that no incisions were made before the plant was harvested. The Government buys all the plants and we paid 20 Lira which is a very attractive price. It amounts to about 1,000 Lira per hectare to the farmer and we think the program will be very successful. We don’t like to be charged with poisoning your youth like many people have been saying. We only produce 200 tons while India produces a thousand tons. We will take the harvest of the whole plants and ship them abroad because we have no factory yet to extract the opium. Next year we hope to have such a factory.

The Secretary: We could write a letter saying this and that you promise to continue your efforts. What about this coordinating unit?

Demirel: There is a unit already in the Government.

The President: Could we say something positive about it?

Demirel: I have taken this matter up three or four times in my Cabinet to make sure that the Ministers understood the policy. This is something very important for us.

The President: We could say that your Cabinet Committee has been working on this problem and that it has been very helpful.

Demirel: All of the plants used to be bought by the Department of Commerce but I have now put all of this problem in the hands of the Minister of Agriculture and this has been announced. He controls and purchases all of the harvest and I can assure you that we will do everything that is necessary—just the best we can—as we had promised.

The Secretary: We could say that we talked about this problem and are sending a letter to Rangel about it.

Demirel: I feel that this is a very strong duty that I have.

The President: Isn’t there a UN group that has approved his plan? We could say that to Rangel and, in fact, I could call him on the telephone today. I could also tell him that you have put this in the hands of your Minister of Agriculture.

Demirel: We have been advised by the UN and helped by them to pay a good price to the farmers. Many people suggested ten years ago that it was not a good idea to pressure one country but that we should use international controls.
The President: After all, India is allowed to grow poppies.

Demirel: The area where poppies are grown is in the central part of our country. It used to include 20 provinces, four of them are around one place. We do not want to poison your youth and I can tell you that the action I took lost votes for me. I felt that prohibition is wrong because it cannot be controlled and it will not work but I think our system will work.

The President: I think you are right about control rather than prohibition.

The Secretary: We actually need more opiates for medicinal purposes.

Demirel: We have more than a thousand people who are controlling this system.

The Secretary: We should put that effort in our letter. They have now shifted to the process which involves cutting the whole plant and shipping it off to be processed rather than allowing the farmers to draw the opium gum out of the poppy head in the field. It was that opium gum that used to find its way into illicit traffic that went through Marseilles on its way to New York and other centers in the States. We think this new process should control that traffic.

Demirel: The farmers used to cut a line around the poppy heads while it was still green and they allowed the milk to run and they would collect it. Now we allow no cutting by the farmers but the farmers are permitted to keep the poppy seeds while we take the rest of the plant which contains raw opium. This must be processed in a factory and then made into medicine. Next year we will keep it because we will have a factory but this year we will probably sell the straw to Holland where the only plant exists in Europe.

The President: You will be building a plant over the next year.

The Secretary: You could call Rangel at lunch time.

Independent of that problem, can we discuss the Cyprus negotiations? After we had a talk with Caramanlis\(^5\) and I probably should not tell this to you but I definitely had the feeling that they want to settle this problem. The President was very tough—he said that we wanted their support to get aid to Turkey. Caramanlis said that he could control Makarios and that maybe the U.S. should put forward a proposal but we said we would not do that. But what kind of settlement can we obtain? Makarios and Caramanlis now accept a bizonal federation. Makarios is saying 25 percent for territory which is more than he has ever said to us before. Now for your own private information Cara-

\(^5\) See Document 51.
manlis commented to us on the three problems—first on refugees which depends on the eventual territorial settlement. On the second, on the power of the central government, he said that he would accept anything that Turkey proposed. Third, on percentage of territory, he didn’t give us any specific figure but he did say that if it is made too high, it would not be possible for him to live with it in Greece but he didn’t give a figure. I think a negotiation could be attempted. It is in the security interests of everyone. You can achieve everything you want, as we told you in March, if you can show some flexibility now.

Demirel: We will continue to do what we can and do our best to find a solution. I told that to Waldheim yesterday. What is to happen now is that the dialogue between the communities should be maintained—if it is broken we will lose the chance for a settlement. There are three ways to settle the problem of Cyprus. First, the island could be divided with Greeks here and Turks there. Second, the island could be divided and each part could be annexed, one by Greece and one by Turkey...

The Secretary: Then you would get a left wing government in Greece.

Demirel: I am not discussing the merits of these proposals—or, the two states on the island could be independent and run their own affairs. The third possibility is a federation composed of two states. We didn’t want the second alternative but if it is to be the third alternative, it cannot be as it was in the 1960’s. There must be two separate self-governing states plus a federal government.

The Secretary: I think that the Greeks will accept this.

Demirel: You could start from the federal level and agree on the functions and organization of that government. That would be a good step. Then the two states could discuss other questions such as territory.

The Secretary: Yes, but the Greeks argue that if they agree to the bizonal and the central government without reaching agreement on territory at the same time they are giving up an important point and that is not unreasonable. I am very impressed with the eagerness of Caramanlis to settle this issue. The President told Makarios that 25 percent is not enough. Our Greeks in the U.S. are talking of much less, like 14 percent (sic) [I think the Secretary meant 18 percent].6 As I said, I think you can get by negotiation all that you want now.

Demirel: I talked to Caramanlis in May and we agreed to set up committees to study the problem.

The Secretary: Suppose Congress should reverse its action this week and then suppose that no progress is made. The President and I

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6 Brackets in the original.
talked to more than 325 Congressmen and he would be in a really difficult position if no progress were made. Then in the fall we will be driven by the Congress to take some action. This is a moral obligation.

The President: My whole credibility is at stake. I have said that I spoke to you in Brussels and pledged to make a major effort to lift the embargo. I said that you had promised to make your best effort to achieve a settlement. They asked what the terms would be. I told them it was not for us to state the terms but that I had faith that you, Mr. Prime Minister, would make a good effort.

The Secretary: Caramanlis thinks there ought to be a Demirel/Ecevit government.

Demirel: I can tell you that that will not happen. But this is not a matter of different opinions among parties. It is a very complicated case with a long 25-year history. The Congressional action handicaps a solution to the Cyprus problems and harms Turkish-American relations.

The President: That is vitally important. We need good American-Turkish relations. 

Demirel: I think we can solve this problem but there are really three problems: there is Cyprus; there is the embargo; and US-Turkish relations. We could have some movement but we can’t start with Cyprus. If nothing happens there will be many other problems.

The President: The suggestion has been made that I exercise on my own a waiver which would permit me to grant $50 million’s worth of aid to Turkey. Frankly, I have resisted this proposition because I wanted the Congress to act. I can also tell you that there are technical legal arguments that I should not use the waiver. The waiver was put into the law four years ago and the embargo was passed subsequently. Therefore, some say that I am precluded from using the waiver but others say that it is all right. If I were to use the waiver would it be helpful?

Demirel: We are not after getting something. This is not what we want.

The President: But wouldn’t this be an affirmative action and indicate that we want to have good American-Turkish relations which might undercut those who do not wish us to have them.

Demirel: I am not saying whether you should use it or not. But I can say that we are not after grant aid. Our pride is hurt and we do not want to be given aid. We want friendship. We know of your great efforts but the Congress is in doubt and it represents the people. If they are not friendly, my people will ask why.

The President: I am just trying to find a solution.

Demirel: The embargo means that you are hostile toward Turkey. We cannot even receive the planes we have paid for.
Caglayangil: We are the only country in the world subject to an embargo.

The Secretary: You are making all the President’s arguments that he used in three breakfasts with several hundred Congressmen and in 50 odd telephone calls. We have achieved some improvement in the situation because we have moved from two thirds against us to only 17 votes.

The President: I have put my arm around more political enemies in the last couple of weeks.

Demirel: We all do that. I know of your great efforts, Mr. President, but the problem is beyond us. My people have a high honor. They are sensitive and they feel that if the love of a friend is lost, it can hurt and it could develop into hatred. We want your friendship not your aid. We cannot take aid from a hostile country.

The President: But you have a friendly President.

Demirel: We shouldn’t be put in this position. We are not trying to get something. We are only asking the question—are we friends? If yes, then let’s behave that way. How can I explain that friends have put an embargo on us? First we have the embargo, then we have the closing of the bases, and who knows what will come next.

The President: I think we have had a very good discussion and I want to assure you that I will continue to do all that is possible and I will make a maximum effort to get this situation changed.

Demirel: I am sure you have done your best to save our relationship.

The Secretary: When you leave there will be newsmen outside. I think we ought to agree on what each of us is going to say. You, Mr. Prime Minister, ought to make the point you have just made about friendship and also say that Turkey wants a solution. Then the President can say that he opposed the House action and will continue to try to get it reversed.

Demirel: We can say that we reviewed relations and that we are willing to make every effort to keep our relationship.

The President: Why don’t you start and then I can say that our relationship has been seriously jeopardized but that I will continue my efforts to remedy the problem.

The Secretary: It would be helpful if you could say that you are trying to solve all these problems including Cyprus.

Demirel: I don’t want to give the impression that there is any link between our relations with you and Cyprus. I will say that we have reviewed relations and that I have always believed that it was necessary to do everything to solve outstanding problems. We can mention that we discussed Cyprus.
The President: I want to thank you for being such a good friend of the United States.

(Finished at 9:15 a.m.)

234. Paper Prepared in Response to National Security Study Memorandum 227

Washington, August 20, 1975.

U.S. SECURITY POLICY TOWARD TURKEY

[Omitted here is a table of contents.]

Summary

Bilateral security ties which have developed between the United States and Turkey over the past generation have been mutually beneficial. The US has, largely through grant assistance and some recent credit sales aid, provided Turkey more than $3 billion in military equipment. Since Turkish troops are almost entirely equipped with weapons of US origin, Turkish dependence on the US as a source of war material has been almost total. The Turks are currently implementing a long-range armed forces re-organization and modernization program for which they had expected US assistance.

Under a series of agreements negotiated with the Turks during the 1950's and 1960's, the US obtained the right to maintain roughly two dozen facilities throughout Turkey. The major air installation which we jointly maintain with the Turks at Incirlik in southern Turkey has a NATO-assigned role. [2 lines not declassified]. Other US facilities fall under bilateral US-Turkish defense agreements, (the relevant umbrella agreement is the Defense Cooperation Agreement of 1969), although they, too, contribute to the overall defense of the western alliance. Among these are [1 line not declassified] a LORAN-C station, and communications facilities linking all US installations.

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1 Source: National Archives, RG 59, S/S-1 Files: Lot 80 D 212, Box 503, NSSM 227. Secret; FRD. An August 20 memorandum from Jeanne Davis transmitted the paper to the Secretary of Defense, the Deputy Secretary of State, and the Directors of Central Intelligence and the National Security Agency, stating that it had been prepared by an NSC interagency group chaired by the Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs in response to NSSM 27. A copy was also sent to the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. NSSM 27 is printed as Document 231.
Bilateral security cooperation between Turkey and the US was dealt a severe blow by the Turkish military intervention on Cyprus in July–August, 1974, and the subsequent imposition by the US Congress of a total embargo on US arms shipments to Turkey effective February 5, 1975. When the embargo went into effect, Turkey informed the US and NATO that it considered the US to be in violation of Article III of the NATO Treaty and Article XXI of the Defense Cooperation Agreement (the “mutual assistance” provisions of these two documents), and implied that the DCA and companion agreements governing the American presence in Turkey would have to be re-examined.

Amid steadily mounting domestic pressure to retaliate against the US, the Turkish Government informed us on June 17 that in its view the DCA and several related agreements were no longer valid, and requested that negotiations begin within 30 days on the future of US facilities in Turkey. The note also indicated that at some subsequent date Turkey would place US facilities in a “provisional status” pending the outcome of negotiations.

At the opening of negotiations July 17—the only session held to date—both sides stated their respective legal positions: Turkey said the DCA was dead and that a new agreement would have to be negotiated; the US side stated that the US considers the DCA still valid, but that we are willing, nonetheless, to negotiate with the Turks on the future of our facilities. On July 27, the US gave the Turkish Government a note which again stated our legal position that the DCA is still valid. Since the US legal position has thus been registered with Turkey, we have not considered it necessary to address the question of the DCA’s legal validity further in this NSSM.

The Turkish Government, which has not yet asked for a second negotiating session, stated, following the July 24 vote of the House of Representatives turning down a partial lifting of the embargo, that constructive negotiations will be possible only after the arms ban is rescinded. Within 24 hours of the House vote the Turks invoked the “provisional status” for US facilities, to which they had previously alluded. They suspended operations at the LORAN-C station, placed all US facilities under Turkish control, and began cutting back the privileges of US armed forces.

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2 Telegram 4702 from Ankara, June 17. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy Files, 1975)
3 Telegram 5544 from Ankara, July 17. (Ibid.)
4 Telegram 5545 from Ankara, July 17. (Ibid.)
5 Not found.
6 Telegram 5768 from Ankara, July 25. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy Files, 1975)
personnel in order to bring those privileges into strict conformity with
the NATO Status of Forces Agreement. They have not interfered with
primary activities at Incirlik air base, which Turkey considers a NATO
installation.

Not wishing to strike at the heart of Turkey’s relationship with the
United States, the Demirel Government has moved fairly cautiously in
its retaliatory steps to date. To the extent that it is politically possible,
Demirel may still search for measures against the US which will seem
more severe than they actually are. On the other hand, the Turkish lead-
ership probably will be unable to resist pressure to take conclusive ac-
tion if the embargo is not rescinded or substantially modified. The Turk-
ish military establishment, whose views carry heavy weight in Ankara,
has also, on the whole, been generally committed to retaining ties with
the US, although elements within the military were in the forefront of
those demanding strong action against the US.

Turkey attaches great importance to its NATO role, both in terms
of Turkey’s defense and of its political identity as a western European
country. The Turkish military has a strong interest in continuing full
participation in NATO’s military activities. We think Turkey will not
want to call its basic alliance role into question, but will push other al-
lies hard to fill the gap in its arms and equipment inventories. It may
also insist on urgent NATO action on such items on its list of “urgent
requirements” as communications and air defense.

In the longer term, Turkish disillusionment with the US could in-
tensify Turkey’s basic re-appraisal of all its security relationships and
of its general foreign policy orientation. Decisions based on such a re-
appraisal are not likely to be hasty, as Turkey judges whether NATO
can meet what Turkey perceives to be its needs in the absence of a spe-
cial US-Turkish relationship.

US objectives in the forthcoming negotiations with the Turks are
to retain our basic facilities and preserve the fundamentals of the mul-
tilateral security relationship. These aims are intrinsically conserva-
tive. We want to preserve those things we now have which we con-
sider desirable, and relinquish only what we must. Within these goals,
opportunities may arise to realign the US presence in ways which
could make it more efficient while decreasing its size, visibility, and
overall cost.

One of the basic assumptions underlying what we consider to be
the optional approaches to negotiations available to the US is that the
US-Turkish relationship is undergoing some permanent change. Turkey
will no longer trust the US to the same extent as heretofore, no matter
what is done to lift the embargo in the weeks and months ahead. On
the other hand, Turkish leaders will be reluctant to see US-Turkish bi-
lateral security ties disappear entirely.
Four negotiating options, or approaches, deserve examination. They range from trying to accept and accommodate Turkish desires in devising a new security relationship, to abandoning our facilities in Turkey altogether. The options developed here are not mutually exclusive; each option contains a number of elements, some of which can be extracted and used in other options.

The four approaches are as follows:

Option 1—US acquiescence in Turkish demands for a new Defense Cooperation Agreement. We would negotiate a new agreement within parameters established by the Turks, and consult Congress on the result, even though many features of the new agreement would be unpalatable on Capitol Hill.

Option 2—The US would take the initiative in putting together a package which might satisfy the Turks sufficiently to enable us to retain our minimum facilities. Under this option we might utilize the negotiating leverage we have [1 line not declassified], seek to enlist our NATO allies in providing alternative sources of arms, and try to cloak some of our current bilateral facilities with a NATO mantle.

Option 3—Drag our feet on negotiations and play for time in the hope that developments this fall and winter with respect to Cyprus, or Congressional action to lift the arms embargo, would enhance our negotiating position.

Option 4—Reduce US installations in Turkey by deciding internally what facilities we can do without, and then negotiating a new agreement to provide for a much-reduced US presence.

Given present uncertainties regarding Turkish intentions on both the substance and timing of negotiations as the Turks await the outcome of the US effort to rescind the arms embargo, we think the US should for now retain maximum negotiating flexibility by keeping its options completely open. Thus, rather than recommend a specific approach to negotiations at this time, we recommend that the US government study the options presented in this paper, but adopt no specific one during the next few weeks of watchful waiting as the Congressional situation and Turkish intentions clarify.

[Omitted here is the body of the 45-page paper with annexes.]
782 Foreign Relations, 1969–1976, Volume XXX

235. Memorandum From Acting Director of Central Intelligence Walters to the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger)


SUBJECT

NSSM 227 (US Security Policy Toward Turkey)

1. We have reviewed the NSSM paper and have mixed feelings about it. In its description of the security relationship between the US and Turkey and how that relationship got where it is today, the study provides useful background material.

2. The section on US options is one-dimensional; it is based on the premise that the embargo on US arms to Turkey will not be lifted when Congress reconvenes after Labor Day. While we would be remiss were we not to plan for the worst, it is quite another thing to assume, as this paper does, that the worst is inevitable. The NSSM study does not examine policy options over the next few weeks, which are described as a period of “watchful waiting.” In this important respect we find the paper passive and fatalistic.

3. Specifically, we think the following key assumption (on page 36) warrants closer scrutiny:

“Despite continued U.S. requests and pressure on Turkey, there will probably be neither definitive early progress toward a Cyprus solution nor sufficiently visible Turkish flexibility or concessions on Cyprus to persuade those in Congress who have taken the lead in imposing the arms embargo to change their minds.”

Few would argue that it would be possible to change the attitudes of “those in Congress who have taken the lead in imposing the arms embargo.” It seems less far-fetched, however, to suggest that some of the waverers in the House who may have decided at the last minute to vote against the last bill might be persuaded to reverse their votes. (Nine crossovers of this kind could assure a different outcome.)

4. A breakthrough in the negotiations on Cyprus might suffice to change enough minds, and in those talks the ball is now in Turkey’s court. Significant progress will require Turkish territorial concessions in return for the concessions the Greek Cypriots said they were will-

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1 Source: Ford Library, NSC Institutional Files (H-Files), Box H-37, NSSM 227. Secret; No Foreign Dissem. Sent to the attention of Jeanne Davis.
ing to make at the last session between Clerides and Denktash early this month.

5. We endorse Ambassador Macomber’s recommendation that the US government actively urge the Turks to facilitate real progress during the next meeting between Clerides and Denktash on September 8–9 in New York. Certainly at this stage it would be very painful for the Turks to bite this bullet. But we would not rule out the possibility that they can be brought to the conclusion that their interests would be best served by giving a timely boost to the administration’s efforts to change attitudes in Congress.

6. As for the longer term, the NSSM paper’s discussion of US options seems a useful first cut at the general problem. It seems particularly important, in view of the damage already done, to dismiss any notion that it will be possible to return to the status quo ante. Hence, we should certainly continue to try to come up with imaginative alternatives for restructuring the US presence in Turkey in ways that would allow us to derive the maximum possible benefit from a reduced presence.

7. In sum, we concur in the paper’s recommendation that for now the US should avoid adopting any one of the options presented in the response to NSSM 227. In our view, primary attention over the next few weeks should be given to the talks on Cyprus. Ambassador Crawford commented recently that from the Cypriot perspective (both Greek and Turkish) there has never been a more opportune time for a breakthrough, if Turkey is willing to seize the opportunity.

Vernon A. Walters

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2 In memoranda dated August 28 and September 11, respectively, the National Security Agency and the Department of Defense also concurred, with the latter suggesting minor modifications. (Both ibid.)
236. Memorandum of Conversation

New York, September 23, 1975, 4:30 p.m.

SUBJECT
Secretary’s Meeting with Turkish Foreign Minister Caglayangil

PARTICIPANTS

Turkey
Foreign Minister Caglayangil
Ambassador to the UN Turkmen
Ambassador to the US Esenbel
DirGen for Political Affairs Tezel
Mr. Batibay, Interpreter

United States
The Secretary
Helmut Sonnenfeldt, Counselor
Arthur A. Hartman, Assistant Secretary for European Affairs
William L. Eagleton, Notetaker

(While photographs are being taken)

The Secretary: Are we going to settle everything this afternoon?

(Photographers leave)

Caglayangil: Although our efforts to lift the embargo have been futile, we can now say that it has been lifted. Our Prime Minister has ten security guards and we obtained weapons for them in the United States. I told them they could not take them back because of the embargo, but we were informed that they could be taken to Turkey. So, we have lifted the embargo.

(Laughter)

The Secretary: We believe if your ambassador continues his work on the embargo, he will be elected to Congress. He will even get Brademass’ support.

Caglayangil: We have been following with appreciation the efforts of the President and yourself with regard to the embargo. The Turkish people understand this. But this has created other problems.
The Secretary: The Congress does not reflect the view of the American people on this issue. We are expecting to have a vote next Tuesday or Wednesday.2

Caglayangil: The continuation of the embargo has become a domestic issue in the United States. I hope the vote will be positive, and I think it will be. There will then be greater room for maneuver. I discussed this with the Council on Foreign Relations last night. They asked what would happen if the embargo was not lifted. I told them that the embargo directly affects the US defense installations. If it is lifted, our relations with the United States would go on in a friendly way. I told them that if the embargo is not lifted, the closing of installations will cause a danger to the US, to ourselves, and to NATO.

The Secretary: Let us see what happens. I think we will win. Don’t you? (To Esenbel)

Esenbel: Yes.

The Secretary: But if it is lifted, what will happen then?

Caglayangil: We will find ways to promote Turkish-American relations by undertaking negotiations. No matter what the outcome is, Turkish-US cooperation will not be based on aid because aid is based on the decisions of Congress, and the US Government cannot act without the approval of Congress. I believe there could be agreement on a different basis for our relations.

The Secretary: What basis?

Caglayangil: Turkey and the US would base their defensive relationship on a new concept of defense cooperation.

The Secretary: What would that concept be?

Caglayangil: It could involve paying compensation to Turkey for the installations or something else beyond the control of Congress.

Esenbel: A new bilateral relationship would not be subject to aid projects which are subject to Congressional approval. We want to rid Congress of this relationship.

Caglayangil: We want to lift this way from Congress for the sake of your government as well as for ours.

The Secretary: That is for the future, not for the first weeks after lifting the embargo. We can talk about this later—after the Cyprus settlement.

Hartman tells me that you have agreed to 25 percent of the island. (Laughter)

Caglayangil: If we are to decide on territory—

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2 September 30 or October 1.
The Secretary: You will then keep 40 percent. (Laughter)

Caglayangil: A new line which will take into consideration the economic viability of both communities will be considered. It is not very rational to ask for territory as a precondition for negotiations, and particularly when there is a problem for Turkey domestically before the elections.

The Secretary: This I understand. I did not think you would be able to make a move now.

Caglayangil: We have withdrawn a commando unit which participated in the invasion. This is not a political move but a military one.

The Secretary: That is what is driving me crazy.

Caglayangil: Why?

The Secretary: You have not gotten credit for all the troops you have withdrawn. In my judgment, you have withdrawn 10,000.

Tezel: 11,000!

The Secretary: If you had announced it, we could have gone to Congress with it and gotten the vote.

Caglayangil: Do it now.

The Secretary: It is too late.

Caglayangil: Denktash spoke of a declaration of independence for the Turkish-Cypriots, but our Prime Minister made it clear this was not on our government’s program.

The Secretary: In our vote, it would help if you spoke of the economic viability of both communities.

Caglayangil: Because of the Senate elections, I cannot say anything about that.

The Secretary: I understand.

Caglayangil: If we can agree on other aspects, we will then take on the territorial issue.

The Secretary: Simultaneously?

Tezel: He says no.

The Secretary: That is not new, then.

Caglayangil: This is not a package deal. Neither the Greeks nor the Greek-Cypriots have said publicly that they accept a bizonal solution with a weak central government in which the communities would be on an equal basis. Makarios is still talking about cantonal arrangements.

The Secretary: You were the one who insisted on his return.

(Caglayangil makes a gesture of astonishment)

The Secretary: It was Ecevit in London.

Caglayangil: My name is Caglayangil. I never asked for it. (Laughter)
Turkmen: That was before our intervention on Cyprus.

The Secretary: If the embargo is lifted and nothing happens, we will have an impossible mess in this country.

Caglayan: If it lifted and elections are over, we will have a large area to maneuver on Cyprus. None of us can act alone. Caramanlis has control in Greece, and he could settle it if he wanted to.

The Secretary: I believe he does want it settled.

Caglayan: He never stops supporting the Greek lobby in the US.

The Secretary: He can’t appear not to support them, because they would go to Papandreou.

Caglayan: Every country has its Papandreou. I have an Erbakan. (Laughter)

The Secretary: After the embargo is lifted and after the elections, can you make progress on Cyprus?

Caglayan: It depends on the result of the election. If we win more votes than the RPP, a lot will change.

The Secretary: Do you think you will?

Esenbel: Much would change in that case.

The Secretary: What if they win more votes? Would you have to resign?

Caglayan: In fact, there are two parties—Demirel’s and Erbakan’s but Erbakan has only 20 seats. But both the RPP or Erbakan’s party would need Erbakan’s votes to come to power. If the Justice Party wins enough votes, we might go to a general election. I don’t see a possibility of military intervention. They did nothing during 6 months of government crisis.

The Secretary: When will elections be?

Caglayan: If the vote is in our favor, there could be elections in May or June. If Justice wins, we will ask for elections. If the RPP wins, they will press for elections.

The Secretary: Can you get a vote in Parliament for holding elections?

Caglayan: We could even have a coalition with the RPP.

The Secretary: Would Ecevit agree?

Caglayan: He would be for early elections.

The Secretary: Who would be the Prime Minister? You?

Caglayan: Why?

The Secretary: I always like to prove that foreign ministers can take over governments. (Laughter)

Caglayan: I was talking above of a coalition with the RPP after general elections, not after the Senatorial elections. There are several factions in the RPP. We can’t unite with all of them.
The Secretary: Would Ecevit find a position in your coalition? I like to see foreign ministers succeed, but I also like to see former students do well.

Then after the embargo and elections, can you enter into serious negotiations?

Caglayangil: Yes.

The Secretary: What does that mean? That the Greeks agree on a bizonal solution?

Caglayangil: We have conditions. One is bizonal.

The Secretary: They will agree.

Caglayangil: Next is limited power to the central government. Further, we cannot give up an equal status for the two communities. There is one further condition, which we have not been saying anything about. That it must be a secular state.

The Secretary: You mean, no priest could be president? (Laughter) Makarios is one of the most secular people I have met.

At what stage would you be prepared to discuss the territorial issue?

Caglayangil: We have said to the Greeks and to Denktash: Let’s sit down and talk about the future structure of the government. If there are good results, we can take up the territorial issue. But the Greeks want to make territory a precondition.

The Secretary: Why don’t you discuss them simultaneously?

Caglayangil: We are ready to put the whole thing on the table. If we can agree on non-territorial aspects, then the territorial arrangements will be easier.

The Secretary: The Greeks say the same thing about their position and they have some good points.

Caglayangil: It is a matter of approach. Denktash asked Clerides: If I agreed to what you ask on territory—New Famagusta and part of Morphou area—would you sign an agreement on bizonal issue and weakened power of the central government?

The Secretary: What did he say?

Caglayangil: He said: If you agree on territory, we will start negotiating.

The Secretary: I think it is important for them to do it in parallel.

Caglayangil: If the Greeks are forthcoming on other issues, the Turkish-Cypriots would be willing to give up more land. That is the only bargaining point they have.

The Secretary: Except for the 30,000 Turkish troops.

Caglayangil: The Army can’t stay there permanently.
The Secretary: What is your idea regarding the posture after the embargo has been lifted? Will Clerides and Denktash renew their discussions?

Caglayangil: Denktash will sit at the table and say: To the extent that you satisfy other aspects, we will try to satisfy your territorial needs. The Turkish Government will keep silent; but if this were said now, we would have to oppose it.

The Secretary: You mean, you would do that in the framework of the negotiations being conducted under Waldheim?

Caglayangil: Yes. If he is not a mediator but merely lends his good offices.

The Secretary: That is clear enough. If we can be of any help, let us know.

Caglayangil: After your speech at the General Assembly, I was asked by several foreign ministers if there was not a change of style towards Cyprus in it. I want to ask you why? And why you said the present line cannot be maintained.

The Secretary: I was talking of the final settlement. I said it must not become permanent. You have said that, too. This is no change, and it is not different from your position.

Caglayangil: I can see a change. You have told us privately, but this time you spoke from the podium of the United Nations.

The Secretary: In effect, we have come out for a bizonal federation.

Caglayangil: No.

The Secretary: I didn’t use the word.

Caglayangil: I want to interpret this as you do. It is in my interest. But I was told by several ministers that they saw a change of style.

The Secretary: Our position is the same as yours. I can’t say bizonal, but this comes very close.

Caglayangil: The Turkish correspondents in New York have asked for my reaction. I told them I would not express a view until after I saw you.

The Secretary: You can tell them there is no change in US policy.

Caglayangil: Can I say it myself?

The Secretary: You can say I told you there is no change in US policy.

We are for a bizonal federation. We are for reducing the Turkish zone. But we have always said that. We are for the two communities

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3 For the text of the speech, see Department of State Bulletin, Vol. LXXIII, No. 1894, October 13, 1975, pp. 545–553.
having a large voice, which means that the central government would not be dominant. Basically, we agree with you politically and with the Greeks on some of their territorial proposals.

Caglayangil: I am grateful for your explanation. On the 29th of this month there will be a meeting of the Turkish National Security Council, composed of high political leaders. What you have told us now will be of help.

The Secretary: What I have given you is the correct interpretation.

Caglayangil: The lifting of the embargo will permit us to heal the damage in our relations with our united efforts. Perhaps you can be helpful to me. There are various factions in Turkey who want to decrease US-Turkish relations. There are those who want to move closer to the non-aligned. We feel it would be helpful to make joint efforts on this matter.

The Secretary: What can we do?

Caglayangil: We should consult on what to do and what not to do.

The Secretary: What specifically?

Caglayangil: We must reach an understanding as to the new form of cooperation after the embargo is lifted. The military on both sides will exaggerate.

The Secretary: You know, Mr. Foreign Minister, the friendship of Turkey and the US is one of the key elements in our foreign policy.

Caglayangil: We need each other.

The Secretary: All action of the Administration has proven this. We will work closely with you, but frankly, we must move quickly to get Cyprus out of the way.

Caglayangil: This we will try to do, but you and President Ford should visit Turkey to honor Turkey.

The Secretary: I can visit Turkey, and I will discuss this with the President. We can look to many ways to symbolize our relationship. It is a thing of the heart for me. Your Ambassador knows this.

Esenbel: Nixon at one time promised to visit Turkey.

The Secretary: We can discuss this, but he would also have to go to Greece.

Caglayangil: Our President came to the United States.

The Secretary: I will have to stay in Ankara if the President goes to Greece. (Laughter) When I come to Ankara there is no problem because the Greeks don’t want me.

Caglayangil: We have to act together.

The Secretary: After the embargo is lifted and if there is progress on Cyprus, we should both work to heal what has happened and create better US-Turkish relations. We have learned the importance of our relationship.
Caglayangil: There is a second request. Ten years ago it was Greek troops who were on the island and the Turks were refugees. There was no world-wide outcry at that time. We ask that you speak to the Greeks with the same frankness as with us.

The Secretary: We will do this, but the Greeks feel I am pro-Turkish. Do you think I am not?

Caglayangil: I think you are a friend of Turkey.

The Secretary: I unfortunately must leave because I have another meeting.

Caglayangil: Can we agree on what to say to the press?

The Secretary: What do you propose?

Caglayangil: We can say that we discussed all aspects of our bilateral relations and Cyprus. I can say that the Secretary told us there is no change in the American position, and I expressed the hope that there will be new developments that will lead to lifting . . .

The Secretary: That is too dangerous. It will be misunderstood.

Esenbel: Yes.

The Secretary: You can say that he (the Secretary) expressed hope for lifting the embargo.

(Caglayangil and Turkish delegation discussed possible language in Turkish.)

Esenbel: We will stick with the last suggestion that he can say you hope the embargo will be lifted.

The Secretary: We can say that we will remain in close contact.
Washington, September 25, 1975, 8–9:15 a.m.

PARTICIPANTS
President Ford
Vice President Rockefeller
Dr. Henry A. Kissinger, Secretary of State and Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs
Rogers Morton, Secretary of Commerce
Bipartisan Congressional Leadership (list attached)
Leslie A. Janka (note taker)

SUBJECT
Energy, Turkey and the Middle East Agreement

The first 45 minutes of the meeting were taken up with a discussion of the status of energy legislation on the Hill. Discussion centered on the unlikely possibility that acceptable legislation would emerge from the House–Senate Conference. The President committed himself to meeting with the conferees to discuss potential areas for compromise.

Turkey

The President: I appreciate very much the vote yesterday granting the rule for Turkey. I understand the vote is programmed for next Wednesday. We feel that lifting the embargo is critically important, and I want to assure you that the Administration will maximize its efforts in achieving an affirmative vote.

Representative Anderson: We are hearing arguments that the United States would be meddling in the Turkish elections by voting on the embargo now. Some are calling for a delay of 30 days in the vote.

Speaker Albert: I have been presented with a scroll of the names of 150,000 Cypriot refugees. This is just an indication of how active the Greeks are calling on members to press their case. Of course the sad

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1 Source: Ford Library, National Security Adviser, Memoranda of Conversations, Box 15, Ford Administration. Administratively Confidential. The meeting was held in the Cabinet Room of the White House. Attached is a list of additional participants and those who were not able to attend. Ford, Rockefeller, and Morton had met the previous morning with Republican Congressional leaders. (Memorandum of conversation, September 24, 8:05–9:50 a.m.; ibid.)

2 S.2230 was referred to the House Foreign Affairs Committee, which reported it out on September 22. (Congress and the Nation, Vol. IV, 1973–76, p. 867)

3 On October 2 the House reversed its stand and voted 237–176 to partially lift the embargo, with an amendment requesting the President to open talks with Turkey on ways to counter the illicit diversion of opium. The Senate concurred with the amendment on October 3. Ford signed S.2230 on October 6. (Ibid.)
part of the story is that the Turks indeed did force the removal of these refugees.

Representative Anderson: But we can counter that argument by saying that the United States is for a settlement which will permit the refugees to return and that we want to help them recover their homes.

Senator Mansfield: My daughter returned home after hearing John Brademas speak and asked me why I voted to lift the embargo. I told her I did so because I was pro-Greek and I wanted to help the Greek Cypriots.

The President: One of the worrisome indications we have seen is the potential action of the Turkish Cypriots to declare an independent Turkish-Cypriot state. This is especially discouraging since the parties have already agreed to a bizonal federal arrangement. I would think that an independent Turkish Cypriot would be the last thing the Greeks want. They have to recognize that the Turks have 30 to 40,000 troops on the island. Who can stop the Turks if they decided to go independent? The United States certainly won’t go in to prevent that. Therefore, the only way to get the parties together to settle the refugee problem, and even more importantly, to protect our own security interests, is to lift the arms embargo.

Representative O’Neill: Mr. President, you’ve got to think about what happens if you should lose the vote. What would that do to the Turkish election?

The President: I think it is clear that we must take our action based on our own security interests and on the realities we face now. Another defeat of this legislation would deteriorate the situation to an absolutely irretrievable level.

The Vice President: The Turkish election is between the man who put the troops on Cyprus in the first place and the moderate who’s seeking a reasonable solution. If the Congress fails to vote to lift the embargo, they will in fact be helping the radicals in Turkey.

Representative Anderson: NATO Secretary General Luns spoke to several of us on the Hill last week and expressed the concern of our European allies over the situation regarding Turkey. I don’t see a stronger argument than the impact on NATO of the U.S. embargo.

The President: If the Congress takes off the embargo, the negotiations can get started on a Cyprus settlement. We have made it very clear to the Turks that if the embargo is lifted, they have got to make substantial movement. What assurances does the pro-Greek lobby have that a continuing embargo will solve the problem? There are all sorts of vehicles available to Congress to reimpose the embargo if there is no progress on Cyprus. There will be many opportunities to change course if the Turks do not perform but it is absolutely critical that we act now.
The Vice President: Mr. Dean Alfange, the former President of AHEPA, has been talking to a large number of his Greek friends and supporters on the Hill. He supports the Administration’s view and is saying that the only way to get the refugees back to their homes is to achieve a negotiated settlement, which can occur if the embargo is lifted.

General Scowcroft: Mr. President, I think it is important to point out that the U.S. embargo is going to be a factor in the Turkish election whatever we do. Prime Minister Demirel is under great pressure from the former Prime Minister Ecevit, the man who invaded Cyprus in the first place. Demirel can only go two ways. He can try to be as tough as Ecevit on the United States, or he can point to the fact that he got the embargo lifted.

The President: I want to assure you that we will do all that we can. Every element of the Administration will be going all out to achieve an affirmative vote. Our national security is very much involved in this issue.

[Omitted here is discussion unrelated to Turkey.]

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238. Telegram From the Embassy in Turkey to the Department of State

Ankara, November 5, 1975, 1223Z.

8214. Subj: Current Situation in Turkey.

1. Those who have followed recent Embassy reporting are aware current situation here is a discouraging one. This telegram summarizes where matters now stand in the key areas of USG interests.

2. With respect to Cyprus, it is increasingly clear that the GOT’s capacity for maneuver is severely circumscribed. Demirel and Caglayan have found a way to get Turks to the table and in a stance which incorporates willingness to discuss territory adjustments. But it is by a tortured back-door process that this has been achieved. And what must seem to objective observers elsewhere as a notably limited and tentative initiative on the Turkish part is, in effect, presented to us

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1 Source: Ford Library, National Security Adviser, Presidential Country Files for Middle East and South Asia, Box 34, Turkey, Exdis to Secretary of State 2. Confidential; Immediate; Exdis. Repeated to Athens, Nicosia, Istanbul, Adana, and Izmir.
here by Turk officials as a precarious, high-risk effort in view of the
difficult domestic political situation the Demirel–Caglayangil team is
facing. In effect, the Turks have said they will discuss territory if it is
raised at the resumed talks, but Ankara’s political exigencies require
that any initiative on this subject come from the other side. When one
sees how difficult it has been for the GOT to achieve even this posi-
tion, a serious question arises as to whether, once a negotiation begins,
there is any real possibility that the Turks can show even a minimum
of flexibility or spirit of compromise. Demirel and Caglayangil are
adroit maneuverers and they may therefore find a way to do so (es-
pecially if the military supports them behind the scenes)—but our pres-
et assessment is that the odds of the PriMin–FonMin team accom-
plishing this are very long against.

3. Unpromising as these odds are, however, I think we have for
the present made all the approaches we should to the GOT on this sub-
ject. We should now reserve our next round of effort for the period
when the talks are actually about to start. Then, through both diplo-
matic and military channels, we should do all we can to get the Turks
to display at least the necessary minimum of flexibility, on territory
and other issues, as the talks get underway.

4. With respect to a revised US-Turkish defense cooperation rela-
tionship, the situation is equally discouraging. The Turkish opening
position is a source of serious concern. There is a one-sidedness to the
Turk position which radically undercuts the kind of mutuality of sac-
rifice and commitment that is essential for a viable relationship. If I
thought this Turk document was simply an extreme opening position
in a tough bargaining situation, I would not be as concerned as I am.
Unfortunately, however, while the Turks obviously have some “give”
in their initial position, I doubt that there is very much. Moreover, what
little there is, is not likely to be forthcoming very quickly.

5. Here again, therefore, an objective look at the situation brings
disturbing conclusions. We must recognize that the shortsighted re-
quirements of Turkish nationalism and the weakness of the current
government are likely to override a realistic sense of Turkey’s security
needs. This could well mean that either (A) we will not be able to ne-
gotiate an acceptable basis for a security partnership on anything like
the scale we have known here before, or that in any event (B) this
process will take so long that through an inevitable interim attrition
our security position here will have largely disappeared long before a
new modus vivendi is achieved.

6. Things do not have to turn out this badly, of course. I have scant
hope that the Turks will respond affirmatively (they have not yet given
us an answer) to the Secretary’s request for a partial reactivation of
closed Common Defense Installations (CDI’s) as our revised security
relationship negotiations get underway. I think there is some possibility, however, that as the negotiations proceed, we will be able to bridge the gap in some areas of difference in a way that will permit, at some point in the weeks ahead, a resumption of some CDI activities here. I do not think the prospects are particularly good for this, but on the other hand the possibility cannot be ruled out. In the meantime, I urge that Washington adopt the Embassy’s recommendation that we eschew arguments over principle and instead go back to the Elekdag negotiators with a specific counter-proposal as soon as possible. Concerned as I am by a number of the unacceptable principles which underlie the Turk draft, it is a losing game to take these principles on frontally. The Turks, with their weak government, in their current super nationalist phase, and in their post embargo period, will be largely unyielding. We must seek instead to find a practicable and acceptable modus vivendi out of the grey areas lying between the Turkish and American drafts. We should support the basic points of our counter-draft by references to the essential partnership principles which underlie them, but if we are to make any progress we must keep the basic negotiations away from arguments over principles and instead on modus vivendi specifics.

7. Serious as should be the state of our concern over the current US-Turkish relationship, we must carefully avoid for the present escalating this concern in a dramatic or confrontation-type way. The embargo-embroiled US-Turkish relationship is far more bruised than sometimes is realized—and is badly in need of a respite. After eight months of embargo, the October 2 vote has supplied this in part, but whatever respite we now have, it needs to last somewhat longer before we can afford to get into anything like the early rounds of a showdown over the new defense cooperation relationship.

8. To avoid this latter (and also not to undermine whatever influence we have on the Cyprus situation), our counter-position respecting our future relationship on security should be pursued primarily in the ongoing Elekdag level negotiations and should not be escalated in any major way to higher levels of the GOT at this point. If in these negotiations the gap subsequently proves to be as unbridgeable as I fear, then that will be the time to escalate our efforts.

9. This does not mean we should not mention our concerns (as I have done and will do again) in a general way to the FonMin and high government officials here. But the basic point is that despite the very serious nature of the problem we are facing vis-à-vis our future security relationship, we should continue for the present to focus on negotiations (A) in the Elekdag-Macomber channel and (B) while eschewing arguments over principle seek to narrow the gap in very specific areas between the two competing draft agreements.
10. The foregoing are my two major areas of concern, and I will not
lengthen this message further by detailing still others of considerable
importance which have to do—the above problems aside—with the
question of whether Turkey is going to remain capable of being an ef-
fective and useful ally. The weak government situation here is not only
a liability with respect to Cyprus and US security relationships. The
Turkish economy is in a deteriorating condition and no Turkish Gov-
ernment has taken effective measures to deal with it for a dangerously
long period. Reserves are declining; inflation is rampant; unemploy-
ment is staggering. Student violence continues to paralyze major sec-
tions of the university community. And under such circumstances of a
deteriorating Turkish internal and international position, the question
that always lurks in the background is just how much more will the
Turk military take before intervening.

11. Despite the foregoing catalog of problems, however, Turkish
society remains relatively stable and resilient. The Turks remain as one
of the most courageous and patriotic people of any of our Western al-
lies. Turkish geography has not lost its value for the defense of the
West, nor have the Turkish people lost any of their zeal and determi-
nation to protect it from incursions from the North. The game is there-
fore still very much worth the candle. At the same time, it is obvious
that the nature of the relationship which has existed between Turkey
and the U.S. for 30 years is undergoing a serious sea change. Down the
road we should be able to reconstruct a new and viable relationship,
but in today’s circumstances it seems almost inevitable that it will be
a relationship based on less mutual sacrifice, and less mutual confi-
dence and commitment, than that which existed prior to February 5,
1975.

Macomber
KOSYGIN’S VISIT TO TURKEY AND FUTURE
ANKARA–MOSCOW RELATIONS

Soviet Premier Kosygin, responding to a Turkish suggestion that he head the delegation to inaugurate a major USSR-financed steel plant, visited Turkey from December 26 to 29. While the visit was short on substance, one statement in the joint communiqué stood out. The two sides “agreed on the preparation of a political document on the subject of friendly relations and cooperation to be signed at a high-level meeting to take place in the near future.”

Turkish Foreign Minister Caglayangil explained to Ambassador Macomber on December 31 that, at Kosygin’s request, Ankara would consider signing a declaration “during a later visit.” The Turks and Soviets had agreed, according to Caglayangil, that they could “perhaps improve” on the “declaration of principles of good neighborly relations” announced during President Podgornyy’s 1972 visit to Turkey “by adding to it things inspired by the final act of CSCE.” While noting that such a declaration would focus on CSCE, Caglayangil was vague on the actual language that might be incorporated, the nature of the document, and when and at what level it would be signed. He even left some doubt that he would ever agree to such a declaration.

Putting the US on Notice. By stating Turkey’s intention to negotiate a political document with the USSR, while holding back any details, Caglayangil probably is using the threat of a joint declaration as a pressure tactic on the US. According to a [less than 1 line not declassified] report, Prime Minister Demirel told [less than 1 line not declassified] that future American and Western behavior in areas of interest to Ankara will determine the temperature of Turkey’s relations with the USSR. American military assistance, US-Turkish base negotiations, and support on the Cyprus issue are the key determinants in Ankara’s thinking.

Ankara Prefers Ties to the West. For historical and practical reasons, Ankara would much prefer to retain close ties to the West and the US. The Turks continue to fear Soviet expansionism and realize that nei-
ether the USSR nor their Moslem neighbors, including Iran, are dependable security allies. Provided that relations with the West remain good—and especially if US military assistance continues at roughly present levels—Ankara is likely to restrict its medium-term cooperation with the Soviets to:

— the signature of an innocuous declaration pledging friendship and exchanges between the two countries within the framework of the final act of CSCE;
— credit arrangements that will further Turkey’s industrialization plans and relieve its balance-of-payments problems;
— an effort to negotiate bilateral agreements covering consular relations, civil aviation (if a mutually acceptable hijacking provision can be worked out), and an accord on political asylum; and
— the possible purchase of small amounts of unsophisticated Soviet military support equipment.

Cuts in Aid May Change Turkey’s NATO Stance. If the US reduces or terminates its military assistance, the Turks would still be relatively cautious in their dealings with the Soviets as long as they believed such adverse developments to be temporary. In these circumstances, Turkey probably would not undertake to negotiate a political understanding with Moscow that could foreclose the possibility of future Western assistance or permanently damage relations with its NATO allies.

But if the Turks conclude that ties to the US and NATO (which they tend to equate) are permanently damaged, Ankara might well both reconsider its formal NATO membership and seriously contemplate negotiating a political accord with the Soviets. The Turks and Soviets might then look to the 1972 declaration and the 1925 Treaty of Friendship and Neutrality (see Annex)² in drafting an accord designed to significantly improve relations between the two countries.

² Attached but not printed.
240. Memorandum of Conversation

Washington, March 24, 1976, 2:30 p.m.

SUBJECT
Secretary's Meeting with Foreign Minister Caglayangil; Defense Agreement Negotiations

PARTICIPANTS
Turkish
Foreign Minister Ihsan Sabri Caglayangil
Ambassador Melih Esenbel
Ambassador Sukru Elekdag, Secretary General, Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA)
Ambassador Ercument Yavuzalp, Director General, Division of International Security Affairs, MFA
Major General Cemil Cubu, Turkish General Staff
Dr. Mustafa Asula, Deputy Director, Division of International Security Affairs, MFA
Mr. Nurver Nures, Counselor, Turkish Embassy (Interpreter)
Mr. Tugay Ulcevik, Chef de Cabinet to the Foreign Minister (Notetaker)

U.S.
The Secretary
Mr. William Clements, Deputy Secretary of Defense
Mr. Joseph J. Sisco, Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs
Ambassador William Macomber, U.S. Ambassador to Turkey
Mr. Arthur A. Hartman, Assistant Secretary for European Affairs
Mr. Monroe Leigh, Legal Adviser
Mr. William L. Eagleton, Director, EUR/SE
Mr. Harmon E. Kirby, EUR/SE (Notetaker)

Secretary: It is a great personal pleasure to be able to welcome here my old friend, the Turkish Foreign Minister. I am very much looking forward to our discussions. We are not meeting as adversaries or to win points against each other. We are meeting as old friends with a good deal of common ground. We all want to try to solve our current problems in as constructive a manner as we can, with the intention of restoring our countries’ relations to what we would wish them to be. This is the spirit in which I welcome you here, Mr. Minister.

Caglayangil: Mr. Secretary, I want to thank you most sincerely for inviting me here. On every occasion that we have met our personal friendship has grown. Mr. Secretary, I wish that our strong personal

1 Source: Library of Congress, Manuscript Division, Kissinger Papers, Box CL 275, Memoranda of Conversations, Chronological File. Secret; Nodis. Drafted by Harmon Kirby and cleared in S on July 14. The meeting was held in the Secretary’s conference room.
relationship had not developed during an unfortunate period which has beclouded US-Turkish relations. It is my sincere intention to work with you to try to find ways and means of overcoming the impasse. I would like to express my heartfelt thanks for your warm hospitality and for the courtesy you have always shown us. Since our time together will be very limited—we will have only a few hours during the next two days here to discuss several matters—if the Secretary agrees, let's arrange a work program for our delegations.

Secretary: I agree. We'll finish all the outstanding issues in the negotiations in our first fifteen minutes together. Then, tomorrow, we will turn to the Cyprus problem and settle it.

Caglayangil: If you want to settle the Cyprus problem, it looks like I will be staying in the US forever.

Secretary: Well, I agree with your approach. As I see it, there are about six issues relating to the Defense Agreement which we need to discuss. They are:

1. The amount of assistance,
2. The additional things the US can do to assist Turkey to meet its defense obligations,
3. The duration of the Agreement and its relationship to the duration of the assistance obligation,
4. The problem of the relationship of the Agreement to American laws,
5. How we define our bilateral defense relationship in the context of our broader relationship in NATO, and
6. The unilateral use by Turkey of joint facilities in the event of a national emergency.

Those are the issues we shall have to address with respect to the Agreement. While you are here I would also welcome the opportunity to discuss the Cyprus problem. We recognize your sensitivity about any suggestion of a relationship between the Defense Agreement and Cyprus, but Cyprus does affect the general atmosphere and, moreover, the relations between two of our close allies. Thus we would like to be able to understand your current thinking on the Cyprus problem, and then perhaps we could exchange a few words about the Aegean problem as well. It seems to me these are the topics we could discuss.

Caglayangil: I am in full agreement, Mr. Secretary. There are other issues we want to dwell on as well. If you allow, I will take each of the subjects you mentioned and state our views.

Secretary: Which issues first?

Caglayangil: The bilateral issues to be negotiated. Mr. Secretary, before I came here to undertake these discussions, I sought authorization from my Government on each of the issues. You are aware of the complex situation in Turkey. We have a four-party coalition government. Since these subjects we are discussing here are of such great
importance for Turkey, it was necessary to have thorough consultation in the Government. Naturally, I also felt the need to consult the Opposition parties. We have a National Security Council on which is represented the Turkish General Staff, the service chiefs, the Prime Minister and other relevant Ministers. The NSC discussed these issues and made certain recommendations to the Turkish Government on each of them. The Government considered those recommendations and, after a thorough discussion, made some decisions and authorized my approach to these issues. Of course, as I said, I had to contact the main Opposition leader, who is a former student of yours.

Secretary: When he was my student, he was a poet.

Caglayangil: The Opposition leader listened very carefully and said that while he did not wish to raise any great controversy, he did disagree over my Government’s approach. He disagreed with the fundamental basis on which we have been addressing these negotiations.

Secretary: What does he want, Turkish bases in the US?

Caglayangil: He had his own views about Turkish defense policies.

Secretary: What are they?

Caglayangil: He explained them at length—over about an hour’s time. I don’t think it would be appropriate to repeat those views here. In thinking about this Agreement we are discussing, there may be those who would say that there must be an ideal solution for every dispute. I am not trying to find an ideal solution, but rather what is possible. (Caglayangil’s interpreter first said “reasonable” but the Minister intervened to replace that word by “possible”.)

Secretary: I know that asking you to be “reasonable” would be asking too much. The Deputy Secretary of Defense doesn’t understand my making these jokes all the time. My Ambassador is about to have a heart attack. He will certainly goad me after this meeting.

Caglayangil: There may well be differing views on how to approach the question of restoring Turkish-American bilateral relations. I think we should both take a considered look at the circumstances in which Turkey finds itself. Naturally the US side will want to explain frankly the problems it sees as well.

Secretary: I agree. I think I understand the problems you refer to—the problems facing you in the coalition government and the general approach of the former student of mine to whom you referred. I think we agree on how to proceed in these talks. You have to recognize, however, that regardless of whether these negotiations fail or succeed, you will be blamed at home (laughter). In our country also there are pressures, pressures on us that we cannot always control. But I think that if each side tries to understand the difficulties of the other, we can surely resolve together the problems that face us.
Caglayangil: In a sense it would be useful if there were a way in which I could expose you to, or bring to you here, the many different views that Turkish circles express on how to restore our bilateral relationship, particularly given the fact that we are also bound together in the broader fifteen-member NATO context. Most Turks note that of all the NATO allies, Turkey has the longest land and sea frontiers with the Soviet Union. Because of our geographic position, we have been given a special mission. Thus, the responsibilities that Turkey undertakes as a result of these special responsibilities are all the greater. Consequently, the support others give to Turkey in enabling it to fulfill its responsibilities should also be considered special and should be commensurate with those Turkish responsibilities. People (i.e. in Turkey) note that normally in the US there is an all too easy and ready comparison made between Turkey and Greece. Turks point out that Turkey, with a population of 40 million, has a very different mission in the common defense than Greece, with 8 million (sic). In spite of the latter fact (i.e. disparity), the US Government traditionally equates the two countries. In devising assistance programs, you do not exactly equate them, but the aid to Greece is normally about 3/4 that of Turkey. The treatment you give to Turkey often causes public opinion in Turkey to say that the Government of the day is far less successful than the Government of Greece in obtaining support from the US. In these negotiations over past months, we have certainly tried to expose to you our special problems and to bring to your attention the special burdens we have undertaken. It has been brought to my attention that at the technical level in the negotiations you have offered $200 million annual assistance. It seems to me it would be difficult for Turkey to renew its defense cooperation with the United States with defense support set at the $200 million level. But on the other hand, I recognize that this is a complex issue, and I certainly would not consider it a matter for bargaining or haggling.

Esenbel: In short, Mr. Secretary, the Minister has indicated that any Turkish Government is always under criticism when the comparison is made between US aid for Greece and US aid for Turkey. In the past you have given Greece about 3/4 of what you have provided Turkey. Our role is so much heavier that we think this ratio to be unfair.

Caglayangil: I don’t say that I necessarily agree with this complaint, I was just saying that this is the popular belief in Turkey. In approaching this problem, I think we should try to see whether there is any possibility of narrowing our differences. If it appears possible, then we should continue our discussions. If, on the other hand, we conclude that it is impossible to bridge our differences on defense support, we might decide there is no useful purpose in continuing the negotiations.

Secretary: Despite our deep personal friendship, the Foreign Minister has been relaying an ultimatum to me for the past twenty minutes
(laughter). I would like to make the opposite suggestion. Let’s settle all the other issues first and then get down to the assistance figures. I think you will find that we are making so many concessions on the other issues that you will be ready to make some on assistance.

Caglayangil: I am at your disposal.

Secretary: The first issue is the extent of defense cooperation on which you proposed the language “limited to NATO purposes”. We have proposed the language “consistent with NATO purposes”. There is also a sentence providing for “No purposes other than those authorized by the Republic of Turkey.” We would be prepared to accept “limited to” plus that other sentence along with the assurance from you that the Turkish Government would be willing on a case-by-case basis to entertain requests for other uses.

Caglayangil: I understand the idea you have expressed. Provided we agree on other issues, this will not be an impediment. I can agree to make such a statement.

Secretary: (Speaks aside to Mr. Clements) I am up against negotiating with the Deputy Secretary of Defense. That issue is substantially settled. Let me have an easy one now.

Caglayangil: How can I ensure a better impression than what I have done?

Secretary: A second issue is the emergency use of facilities. Here we have the problem that this was in the 1969 Agreement, but it was a secret provision. Our problem is not in the provision, but in a public clause which will produce debate in Congress which will be very serious. I wonder whether we can handle this as in the previous issue on the basis of an understanding and assurance rather than on a formal text.

Caglayangil: I accept that, Mr. Secretary.

Secretary: Good. Now there is a more complicated issue. This is the reference to US legislation.

Caglayangil: What is your proposal?

Secretary: We understand that you do not want something that might include discriminatory legislation against Turkey. But if we have nothing referring to legislation we are inviting the Congress to attack the agreement. In this the Greek lobby would have influence. We propose a sentence which makes it clear that there is no discriminatory legislation: “The provision of defense support hereunder shall not be governed by restrictions of US law other than those generally applicable to recipients of such defense support.” This makes it clear that there are no restrictions that apply only to Turkey.

Caglayangil: I regret that I am not in a position to give you satisfaction on this. I shall explain this. I do not agree that my own coun-
try should be subject to US legislation. I do not understand the reason for it. I could possibly discuss certain conditions in the case of grants, but in the case of cash purchases I cannot.

Secretary: This is a problem. I can understand your refusal to accept restrictions that apply only to Turkey. Under those conditions your answer would be decisive. But the United States Administration is authorized by Congress to sell arms to any country, including the British or others, under certain laws. This applies to the Executive. They say: “You are authorized only under these conditions.” This applies to everyone, NATO and others.

Esenbel: He (Caglayangil) says that on grant aid it is okay but cash purchases are different.

Secretary: You, Mr. Ambassador, are active on the Hill where you control more votes than I do. In principle, you may be right. You may say: “Why should we attach conditions to what we sell?” The fact is that Congress has always attached conditions and this has been accepted by the Turkish Government. The FRG and Israel are subject to the same restrictions. To remove them we would have to go to Congress and change the law. This is not possible. We must one way or another tell Congress that the conditions apply to this Agreement. We do not, however, insist on using the word “restrictions”. Is this right, Monroe?

Leigh: We could say “requirement”.

Secretary: Yes, “requirement” or “regulation”.


Secretary: Yes, if you want to avoid the term “US law” you could say “those legal provisions other than those applicable to other recipients of US defense support.”

Caglayangil: (After consultation with his colleagues) I appreciate your difficulty, Mr. Secretary. I have a formulation which I hope would not disturb certain circles in Turkey: “Defense support provided to Turkey shall be effectuated in accordance with the general practice applicable to all other recipient countries.”

Secretary: Could you substitute “provision” for “practice”?

Caglayangil: You don’t mention American law?

Secretary: Yes, that is right. In paragraph 1 of Article XX, after “paragraphs of this Article” you have “and within the framework of related agreements between the parties”. Can we substitute “provision”? You want “defense support provided to Turkey should be effectuated in accordance with the practice applicable to all other recipient countries.” We can accept that if you can keep the phrase in paragraph 1 of Article XX: “And within the framework of related agreements between the two parties.”
Caglayangil: Both no! We can use our phrase instead. It covers your preoccupation.

Secretary: I am not worried about the difference between “practice” and “provision”. There are many practices, however, and this might be broader than you want. If we reference our agreements, we will have a framework and this would avoid intrusion of the Cyprus problem. If we keep the other phrase we can accept “general practice.”

Elekdag: (After consultation with Caglayangil) He says that if we keep “within the framework, etc.” why add this other phrase.

Secretary: The advantage to you is that it prohibits us from passing discriminatory legislation against Turkey. The kind of legislation passed a year ago would have been contrary to this agreement. That sentence actually adds to your advantage.

Yavuzalp: (After consultation) How about “in accordance with contractual obligations and with the general practices, etc.” and a period after “this article”? “In accordance with contractual obligations and with the general practices applicable to all other recipient countries.”

Secretary: Is this all right? I can go to jail.

Monroe Leigh: Yes. If you prefer “existing agreement” instead it is okay. “Contractual obligations” is rather vague.

Esenbel: Our understanding is “contractual obligations applicable to all other recipients.”

Secretary: One concern that Monroe Leigh raises is that he says: If you say “contractual obligations” without saying “between the parties” someone may find another agreement that would apply.

Caglayangil: We cannot mention “between us.” They will ask in Turkey if there is a secret agreement.

Secretary: We can live with this.

The next problem we have is the duration of the Agreement and of the assistance commitment. Our first idea was to make the duration of the Agreement conform with the duration of our NATO obligations. You proposed that the duration of the Agreement and of the assistance obligation be coequal in length. As for length, I recall that you proposed three years and we, five. Three years is a little short. It throws into a nervous state all of these people who fear they will soon have to be negotiating with you again.

Caglayangil: The duration of the Agreement and of the assistance provision also relates to the amount of assistance to be provided. I am unable to discuss duration at this stage, independently of the amount of assistance.

Secretary: Okay.

Caglayangil: I don’t think we can put an article into the Agreement stipulating that the duration of the Agreement will be the same
as the North Atlantic Treaty, but we could possibly state in the pre-
amble that it is the parties’ express conviction that their security rela-
tionship will last as long as they both adhere to the North Atlantic
Treaty.

Secretary: I think we can live with that. We can agree later on ac-
tual duration. There remains the problem of how mention of extend-
ing the Treaty should be drafted. We would prefer language indicat-
ing that the Treaty will be automatically extended unless one party
gives notice of an intention to terminate. This is stating the problem
somewhat negatively.

Caglayangil: There is already in the Agreement a clause which says
the Treaty will continue unless either party gives a year’s notice of in-
tention to terminate. I don’t see any purpose in further elaborating that
point.

Secretary: Yes, but we would like to have it read that the Treaty
will be extended unless there is a notice of intention to terminate.

Caglayangil: I agree.

Secretary: Then we understand that the Treaty continues unless
one party gives one year’s notice of intention to terminate prior to the
expiration period. There is one more technical point to be taken up be-
fore turning again to the assistance question. In the current text of the
Agreement it is stated that the annexes will be an integral part of the
Agreement. We see some difficulty with this. If we do it, Congress will
say that it cannot approve the Agreement until it sees the annexes. Since
the annexes are highly technical in nature and may take some time to
produce, what I would prefer to do, in order to avoid delay in sub-
mitting and getting the Agreement through Congress, is to eliminate
all references to annexes in the text. Let’s simply agree that within six
months, or three months if you prefer, or whatever is reasonable, we
will negotiate the annexes. I am suggesting this in order not to delay
moving the Agreement through Congress. If we retain the present lan-
guage, it will unquestionably hold the Agreement up. If we agree on
this point among ourselves, we can go ahead and get the Agreement
approved by Congress while we are negotiating the annexes.

Yavuzalp: Could we reflect our understanding on this point in an
exchange of notes?

Secretary: If we gave a note and Congress got wind of it, we would
have to give the note to Congress, and that would arouse their con-
cerns and occasion unnecessary delay.

Caglayangil: We have had an unfortunate experience in the past
with the negotiation of implementing agreements. It took us two and
a half years to negotiate and sign the 1969 Defense Cooperation Agree-
ment. That Agreement noted that there were special circumstances
surrounding certain aspects of our cooperation and that we would
conclude the necessary implementing agreements to handle those questions within six months. That was in 1969. When our Government resigned in 1971 no implementing agreements had been concluded. When we came back to power in 1974 we found that only one agreement had been signed. If these annexes are not concluded in three months, we shall have problems. Perhaps we should insert a clause in the Agreement saying that if the annexes are not concluded, we shall suspend all U.S. activities at the facilities (sic).

Secretary: All I am trying to do is to avoid giving Congress any opportunity to delay approval of the Agreement. This is a purely technical detail that we are addressing.

Caglayanl: I appreciate your point . . .

Secretary: Monroe? (To Mr. Leigh)

Leigh: Maybe we should look at the Minister’s proposal about a clause specifying that if the annexes are not concluded in three months, there would be a suspension of operations.

Secretary: Can we simply say in the Agreement that the necessary implementing agreements or administrative agreements shall be concluded in three months?

Elekdag: The Minister agrees that we don’t necessarily have to mention annexes in the Agreement as such . . .

Secretary: If we had a clause saying that any necessary implementing agreements shall be negotiated in three months, wouldn’t that be all right? That is not the same thing as saying in the Agreement or to Congress that there definitely will be annexes or implementing agreements. It would only say that any necessary annexes will be negotiated in three months.

Macomber: Particularly if we tell Congress the subject matter, which is fairly technical.

Secretary: The Deputy Secretary of Defense says that he will bring pressure on his people to insure that these annexes are negotiated within three months. I think we could live with a phrase like the one I suggested. Then if Congress asks what the additional agreements are about, we could say that they relate to lists of heavy equipment, etc. I would rather do it that way than through a secret exchange of notes. Once Congress got wind of an exchange of notes, they would really get suspicious, but a clause buried here in the Agreement should not cause us any trouble.

Mr. Foreign Minister, my Legal Adviser has another suggestion. We could put a clause in the Agreement saying that you would not allow us to reopen our facilities until there had been an exchange of acceptances of the Agreement. Actually, as I think about this suggestion, though, I don’t really like it. Frankly, if we agree to this, it will give
you total control of the situation. The problem that bothers me, frankly, is that we can’t wait forever to get these facilities opened. You see what would happen if Congress approved the Agreement within a month, but you then said you could not let us resume operations until all the annexes were negotiated. You see the problem that would create for us. Maybe we should go back to my suggestion of a clause saying that any implementing agreements which may be necessary shall be negotiated in three months. If you don’t like the term “implementing agreements,” we could use “technical arrangements.”

Caglayan: I don’t think there should be any great problem about concluding the annexes quickly. In effect, the armed forces of our two countries have already agreed on the language of the Agreement we have before us, which outlines the principles of their cooperation. All the principles and purposes of that cooperation appear in the Agreement. We should not have much difficulty on the annexes.

Secretary: Do you think we should refer to annexes or technical arrangements in the Agreement, or should we say nothing?

Caglayan: It should be stated in the Agreement that the annexes will be completed in three months. It is not foreseen that we could permit reactivation until the annexes are completed.

Secretary: But you will understand that it would be impossible for us to implement our side of the Agreement so long as the installations stay closed. Theoretically, at least, we would have to start implementing our side of the Agreement as soon as we obtained Congressional approval of the Agreement, while you waited for the annex for each installation to be completed before permitting resumption of activities at that facility.

(Lengthy discussion among the Turkish delegation at the table.)

Caglayan: Mr. Secretary, I would like to have clarified exactly what it is we are addressing. I want to try to understand your point. Do you mean to say that the sequence of events will be like this: We will sign an Agreement, then you will submit it to Congress, where it will be ratified. On our side we will ratify at the same time, but what then happens to the installations if at that point the implementing agreements are not concluded? What do we do about resuming U.S. activities? Is that what you are asking? If you are discussing that, I must say that it would not be possible. (i.e. resumption of activities prior to conclusion of the annexes.)

Secretary: No. Let me clarify. There is a Greek lobby in Congress which knows that this Defense Cooperation Agreement will lift all remaining restrictions on arms to Turkey. They will use every device to delay Congressional approval of the Agreement. The more things we put into the Agreement about additional annexes, understandings, etc., the more opportunities we give them to delay. If we put in a clause
saying there are a number of annexes that will be concluded in three months, Ambassador Esenbel’s good friend Mr. Brademas, who is invited to the Turkish Embassy all the time, will simply say “Let’s wait three months to see what is in the annexes. It looks like another secret Agreement by Kissinger. Let the Congress see what the annexes are before we vote our approval.” Actually, I am changing my mind. I think it might be best to go back to Monroe Leigh’s suggestion. We could agree in effect to exchange letters of acceptance. We could put the Agreement to Congress and let it begin looking at the Agreement. If, in the meantime, the annexes have not been concluded, simply don’t send us your letter of acceptance, and you will not be considered to be breaking the Agreement. If the annexes are completed, then send your letter. If we put anything else in the Agreement implying that there are arrangements or agreements still to be concluded, that will give Congress an excuse to await the whole package. Then the thing will be pushed aside because of the Presidential campaign, and Congress will never act. Let us put in language talking about an exchange of acceptances. No one will know exactly what that means.

Caglayangil: What you have said about references to annexes appears in Article XXII. In fact, there are several references to annexes in the Agreement.

Secretary: Then we will have the Working Group take them out.

Caglayangil: I agree.

Secretary: We should have the Working Group organized so as to get to work right away when we finish. Is there anything left to discuss?

(Laughter)

The only question left has to do with assistance levels. We ought to be able to discuss that and also settle the Cyprus problem before going to see the President. Am I wrong? Should we leave the Cyprus problem to settle tomorrow?

Caglayangil: Tomorrow. We have made progress this afternoon in a way conforming to all the requests of the Secretary. Then I take it that tomorrow will be my day and that you will accept whatever I say?

Secretary: Shall we discuss the assistance level today, or do you want to leave that until tomorrow?

Caglayangil: No, today.

Secretary: I want to explain candidly how we have approached the assistance problem. We needed a figure that would have some chance of passing Congress, a figure that would relate in some manner to our historic assistance figures for Turkey. It would, of course, be possible to write any figure one chooses into the Agreement, but it would not get through Congress. That would be a humiliation for both of us. Our approach has been to try to see what the best is that we can do and
then give it to you frankly, rather than make it a matter of long nego-
tiation. That is how we approach the matter now. First, before turning
to the basic assistance figure, we have discussed some additional things
we might do to help Turkey meet its defense responsibilities. As re-
gards military equipment, we have already proposed to make avail-
able T–38’s, F–100’s and one intelligence facility.

Yavuzalp: Karamursel.

Secretary: Yes. There are some other things we could do that we
have not previously mentioned. We could provide 36 helicopters, a sub-
marine rescue ship, two destroyers, the LORAN Navigation Station at
Kargaburum, and give you access to the U.S. satellite communications
system.

Macomber: We have advanced the date on access to the communica-
tions satellite.

Secretary: Yes, that is right. We are advancing that date by two
years. In addition, I think we can get the ExIm Bank to do something
for Turkey—about $50 million per year over five years.

Esenbel: For what purpose will the ExIm loans be? Defense?

Macomber: They will be oriented toward projects designed to help
you with your own balance of payments.

Secretary: That’s right, they will be oriented toward projects of that
kind rather than toward defense. We can offer you a combination pack-
age of grant and FMS of $250 million. That is the best we can do.

Esenbel: Does that include the ExIm figure?

Secretary: No, without ExIm. That is the highest we can go. We
have really made a major effort. I think that your Ambassador, who
knows conditions here, will agree that we have made a major effort.
He won’t say it here, but he can tell you privately. Most of my advis-
ers felt that I should make this offer to you somewhat more slowly, but
I have given it to you directly as the best we can do. Do we already have
a clause in the Agreement establishing annual defense consultations?

Hartman: No.

Caglayangil: I am not a technician. I understand Ambassador Ma-
comber indicated to Mr. Elekdag earlier that the U.S. Government is
prepared to provide F–100’s to replace some of our old F–100’s.

Secretary: Yes, that is right. That is not new, we have mentioned
it before.

Caglayangil: This offer created anxiety and a strong negative re-
action in the Turkish armed forces. They told me the age of the F–100
airplanes, and I was surprised to find they are nearly as old as I.

Secretary: Yes, but these aircraft were on the list the Turkish Air
Force provided us.
Sisco: Yes, it was our understanding that the Turkish Air Force intends to use them for spare parts. These items are from your list. That is why we have offered them.

Caglayan: Of course, everyone tends to compare his military forces with those of neighboring countries. It is well known to you what aircraft are now in the pipeline for Greece. If you could arrange with us an aircraft swap of some sort to permit us to modernize our aircraft, we might be able to make progress.

Secretary: What are you suggesting? That you give us old F-4’s for new F-4’s?

Esenbel: No, he is suggesting that we give you F-100’s for F-4’s. You have something like this with Spain.

Secretary: That is different. F-4’s were supposed to be exchanged for F-4’s. We don’t have any need for F-100’s.

Esenbel: Frankly, why not consider doing something with F-4’s? F-100’s have little life left.

Caglayan: We really can’t discuss F-100’s, because we can’t modernize our Air Force with F-100’s.

Secretary: When you get $250 million FMS you can buy F-4’s.

Caglayan: To modernize our Air Force, we would have to allocate all that money for F-4’s.

Elekdag: We have an obsolete Air Force. All the NATO countries are phasing out their old aircraft and replacing it with new. We propose to give back to you F-100’s and F-84’s in return for Phantoms.

Secretary: The problem is that we have no use for F-100’s and F-84’s. Hence it does not do us any good to get them. Is there any way we could use them?

Clements: No.

Elekdag: Even if the Phantoms were not completely new, they would be acceptable to us.

Caglayan: This issue has very important implications for us because it will be taken in Turkey as an indication of the degree of importance the U.S. attaches to Turkey.

Secretary: Wait a minute. The purpose of providing you the F-100’s would be to allow you to use them for spare parts so that you could make operable the F-100 squadrons you now have. If you had $250 million in FMS you could then purchase the newer aircraft, the F-4’s. The Deputy Secretary of Defense tells me that he would see to it that the delivery priorities on the F-4 were shuffled in such a way that you would get early delivery. Isn’t that right, Bill?

Clements: Yes, we could see that at least a symbolic number of F-4’s are delivered at an early date.
Secretary: Now on the T–38’s . . .
Elekdag: The Turkish Air Force says it doesn’t want T–38’s.
Secretary: You asked for them.
Elekdag: Well, they say they don’t want them.
Macomber: They were on the Turkish Air Force list of requirements.
Caglayangil: Frankly, when we spoke to the Turkish Air Force about T–38’s and F–100’s, they were disillusioned, dismayed and disconcerted. We want to modernize our Air Force. We can’t do it that way. We cannot modernize our Air Force by spending $250 million.
Secretary: You can’t buy modern planes with $250 million?
Elekdag: What the Minister means is that $250 million is not enough for modernizing our Air Force. This is not the solution we expected.
Secretary: But you will have $250 million every year of the Agreement. That is double the assistance being given to you now. You will have the money. In addition you could get two destroyers (sic), 36 helicopters and $50 million from ExIm. We can’t do better than that.
Esenbel: Mr. Secretary, can’t you make an effort to replace our F–100’s? They would not have to be new planes. They could be planes your Air Force is using now.
Secretary: I think we just don’t have them. Isn’t that the problem?
Clements: Yes. But what F–4 program does Turkey want? I have never understood it.
Esenbel: We want used planes, not new ones, to replace our older aircraft.
Clements: Yes, but in any case you would be paying for them under FMS.
Esenbel: We want a trade like the one you have worked out with Spain.
Secretary: But in the Spanish case, it was a swap of aircraft that they had for ours.
Hartman: Yes, we would have been able to use the F–4C’s.
Clements: How many aircraft do you think you need?
Elekdag: I told Ambassador Macomber that we need four squadrons of F–4’s.
Clements: How many aircraft are in your squadrons?
Elekdag: Twenty planes per squadron, a total of eighty.
Clements: You wish to make this change over what period of time?
Elekdag: Four years.
Secretary: You could use the FMS funds. How much is actually involved?
Clements: We would have to calculate. You don’t want eighty used F–4’s, do you?
Esenbel: Yes, used, as in the Spanish case.
Hartman: What the Spanish were prepared to return to us we needed.
Esenbel: The Spanish are shifting to the F–16. Our objective for now is to phase our Air Force into the F–4. We would be able to explain to Turkish public opinion that the U.S. had given us the additional assistance of used aircraft to modernize our Air Force.
Secretary: We have to go to the President now.
Clements: Let me work on the problem. I will see what can be done and report early tomorrow morning.
Secretary: The Deputy Secretary of Defense proposes to work on the problem. We will have an answer first thing in the morning. In the meantime, shouldn’t the working group get started now? I must get the Foreign Minister over to the President.

2 At the follow-up meeting on March 25 at the Turkish Embassy, Kissinger offered 14 planes over the next 4 months: 6 within 90–120 days of signing the agreement, 4 in the subsequent 120 days, and 4 in another subsequent 120 days. (Memorandum of conversation; ibid.)

241. Memorandum of Conversation

Washington, March 24, 1976, 5:03–5:50 p.m.

PARTICIPANTS

*Turkey:*
Ihsan Sabri Caglayangil, Minister of Foreign Affairs  
Amb. Melih Esenbel, Turkish Ambassador  
Sukru Elikdag, Secretary General, Ministry of Foreign Affairs  
Amb. Ercumet Yavuzalp, Director General for International Security Affairs

*U.S.:*
President Ford  
Dr. Henry A. Kissinger, Secretary of State  
Amb. William Macomber, U.S. Ambassador to Turkey  
Brent Scowcroft, Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs

1 Source: Ford Library, National Security Adviser, Memoranda of Conversations, Box 15, Ford Administration. Secret; Nodis. The meeting was held in the Oval Office.
President: I wish to welcome you here, Mr. Foreign Minister. You have been here a number of times.

Caglayangil: Please excuse my English. It is very poor.

President: I am very pleased to have you here. I know that Secretary Kissinger has discussed matters in detail with you. I hope that you will convey to the Prime Minister my best regards.

Since I haven’t had a chance to discuss your talks with Secretary Kissinger, Henry, will you review them for us?

Kissinger: We discussed six issues. We resolved five of them and there is no reason to go into detail on them. The remaining issue is the level of assistance and the type of equipment we could make available. The level of aid we proposed is $250 million a year and perhaps $50 million of Export-Import credits. We can’t frankly do any better, because we couldn’t get it through Congress. We discussed selling equipment at reasonable prices—like F–100’s and ships. They don’t need F–100’s, though, and Clements is looking for ways to loan them more modern ones or something else.

Caglayangil: As Secretary Kissinger says, we have resolved five out of six issues. We have not agreed on the level and scope of assistance to be provided to Turkey. I am sure you know that from the Adriatic to the Sea of Japan, Turkey is the only democratic regime in a sea of authoritarian regimes. Our per capita income now is about $600. We have to maintain a defense budget of about $259 per capita, and improve our economy, and do it while maintaining human freedom. The people at times abuse these freedoms and make it difficult for the government.

Turkish-American relations are going through a crisis and there are those who would take advantage of this crisis. Support for our defense forces is an integral part of our difficulties. The antagonists of NATO or of Turkish-American relations always bring forth the aid that you provide to Greece or places like Egypt or Iran. Dr. Kissinger says you can’t increase aid past $250 million and I am afraid this will not be satisfactory to the Turkish public. I told Secretary Kissinger today that if he had difficulty with the American Congress, we could modernize the Turkish armed forces through a swap deal.

Kissinger: The problem is it won’t work—like trading F–100’s for F–4’s. The problem is we don’t have any F–100’s left in the US Air Force.

President: We would have a terrible logistics problem, since we don’t have any.

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2 See Document 240.
Caglayangil: I appreciate that. We are just trying to find a way out. Let me assure you that whether we come to an agreement or not, we still have great esteem for our relations with the United States. We have not forgotten the assistance from across the Atlantic when the Soviet Union made its demands on the three provinces and the Straits. That is why I do not see any serious implications in the discussions we are having. We will certainly try to develop our alliance relationship.

I bring you very warm greetings from my President and my Prime Minister—who cherishes pleasant memories of meeting with you. When previously I was Foreign Minister, we came to this country and paid a visit to the American President. To greet the American President in Turkey would be a great honor and give us much pleasure. If I could receive acceptance, it would be the greatest gift I could bring back.

President: I greatly appreciate the invitation. It would be a great honor for me to go there. I unfortunately have never been there and I will maximize my efforts to visit. We unfortunately now have some elections coming up, but I assure you that after November 2nd, if things go as I expect, I will certainly make every effort to visit Turkey. I would like very much to have the Prime Minister visit this country. I really enjoyed my meetings and discussions with him and I hope you will convey the invitation to him.

Caglayangil: I will do so.

President: I will leave the negotiating details to you two, but since I have been President, I have made every effort to show how important are our relations with you. I have discussed point six with Dr. Kissinger. We have gone really as high as we can possibly go, and I hope that you will discuss it further with Secretary Kissinger and make every effort to reach agreement. It would greatly facilitate all our proceedings.

Caglayangil: We have followed how consistently you have defended U.S.-Turkish relations, especially with the Congress. We have no complaints whatsoever. If the American Government and Congress don’t see eye to eye, that is an internal American problem. Obviously we can’t explain that to our public. This problem is not peculiar to the American scene. We also have that same problem. The Turkish Constitution grants the right of amnesty only to the Grand National Assembly, but nevertheless, it has been granted by various of our governments to terrorists, etc.

The whole American picture has been evaluated in Turkey as if what has been done has been the act of the government. This is in fact where we find ourselves.

President: We hope that in this election we would get strong support from our people and get some changes in the Congress. Cooper-
ation has gotten somewhat better in the past several months, but the real turn will come in January.

I just want to reiterate that we want to commit ourselves as deeply as possible to improving our relations and we have extended to the utmost our efforts to reach a satisfactory agreement. I wish you well in your discussions with Secretary Kissinger.

Caglayangil: I wish you well in the election. I don’t pretend prophecy, but only wishes. If the Congress can be improved, that is in the best interests of both our countries.

President: What is the status of your discussions with Greece over Cyprus?

Caglayangil: It is like a wound which needs medical attention. It can’t be left the way it is. The important thing is to break the connection of American aid to the solution of that problem. While I accepted most of the Secretary’s proposals on the five issues, my objective was this point.

Turkey and Greece historically must know how to live together. The only way to do that is to sit down and talk. We think we have a good chance with the Karamanlis Government. Cyprus is the key to our relations. Here there are two obstacles—Makarios is one, and this linkage is the other. Makarios is a complicated element—so much that we can’t solve the problem with him or without him. It is hard to get a proposal accepted by the Greek Cypriots which Makarios opposes.

Kissinger: The problem is which side will put forward the territorial proposal. Neither side wants to do it first, for good reasons. Any proposal either one puts forward is likely to become a domestic issue. I will talk to the Foreign Minister about some procedural ways we might attack it.

Caglayangil: The Greek Cypriot negotiator promised his views on territory within six weeks and the Turkish negotiator promised to respond within 10 days. They will meet again in May. Then they will form two subcommittees: one for territory, and one for constitutional questions. I think this is a hopeful procedure.

President: I hope this would move as you indicate. It raises serious questions here when there is no movement, so this would be helpful.

Caglayangil: I have done my best to encourage Denktash and have told him he can say yes, but to tell me only when he plans to say no.
242. Memorandum of Conversation

Washington, March 26, 1976, 1 p.m.

SUBJECT
The Secretary’s Meeting with Turkish Foreign Minister Caglayangil

PARTICIPANTS

Turkey
Foreign Minister Caglayangil
Ambassador Esenbel

U.S.
Secretary of State Kissinger
Ambassador Macomber
Assistant Secretary Hartman

The Secretary: I just wanted to cover in a smaller group\(^2\) two important issues. I wanted you to know that we are going to have a major domestic problem on the Cyprus question in the absence of anything concrete happening. Obviously if there was a prospect of progress that would be best. I was wondering if I should ask David Bruce to visit Ankara, Athens and Nicosia to speak with the parties and see if he could help to bridge the territorial issue.

Foreign Minister: I have a very great problem of presentation. If Ambassador Bruce as a retired NATO Ambassador pays calls in a number of NATO countries this would make it easier for me.

The Secretary: No, he would have to be either a representative of the Secretary of State or the President specifically on this issue to do us any good here domestically.

Foreign Minister: That would certainly cause a reaction in Turkish opinion. If it could be done privately, I think that would be all right.

The Secretary: It must be official or it won’t help us. We need this for our public.

Foreign Minister: Let me see what I can do when I get back to Ankara. I will certainly try.

The Secretary: I can’t tell you how much it would help us. As you know, David Bruce is a good friend.

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\(^1\) Source: Library of Congress, Manuscript Division, Kissinger Papers, Box CL 275, Memoranda of Conversations, Chronological File. Secret; Nodis. Drafted by Hartman and approved in S on April 30. The meeting was held in the Secretary’s office.

\(^2\) Kissinger and Caglayangil had met with a larger group in the Secretary’s conference room at noon. (Memorandum of conversation, March 26; ibid.) Kissinger and Caglayangil signed the U.S.-Turkish Defense Cooperation Agreement on March 26. (Department of State Bulletin, April 19, 1976, pp. 503–504)
Foreign Minister: Yes, I know he is a good friend and I know that you need something like this for your own public relations so that you can show you are active on this issue.

The Secretary: This will be especially important while Congress is considering our new agreement.

Foreign Minister: I will let you know but it would certainly be better if Cyprus is not the only problem he discusses. If he could be sent out to talk about restoring US-Turkish relations.

The Secretary: Maybe I could make him my adviser for conditions in the Eastern Mediterranean.

Esenbel: Maybe you could even send him to Beirut.

The Secretary: Now let me mention the second point. On the Aegean it is of the utmost importance that you show the greatest restraint so that there are no provocations. I do not wish to get into the middle of the debate on the substantive issues.

Foreign Minister: This is a very delicate matter and I hope you will use your influence with the Greeks as well.

The Secretary: I certainly will.

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243. Memorandum of Conversation

Washington, July 29, 1976, 10:40–11:37 a.m.

PARTICIPANTS

President Ford
Dr. Henry A. Kissinger, Secretary of State
Brent Scowcroft, Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs
Bulent Ecevit, Former Turkish Prime Minister, Leader of Republican People’s Party
Amb. Melih Esenbel, Turkish Ambassador to the United States
Amb. Hasan Esat Isik, Republican People’s Party Foreign Affairs Advisor

[The press came in for photos. There was small talk about Ecevit’s being Secretary Kissinger’s student, and the fact that the President had spoken before the Kissinger seminar, too. The press then left].

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1 Source: Library of Congress, Manuscript Division, Kissinger Papers, Box CL 283, Memoranda of Conversations, Presidential File. Secret; Nodis. The meeting was held in the Oval Office.

2 All brackets are in the original.
The President: When did you enter parliament?
Ecevit: 1957. I had to leave here to campaign.

The President: First let me apologize for the incident in New York [the assassination attempt by a Greek Cypriot]. I assure we will do our best to ensure it will not happen again.
Ecevit: Thank you, Mr. President. These things can happen anywhere. The security has been fine and they risked their lives for me—otherwise I might have been killed.

The President: We are delighted to have you here. I would be interested in your comments on our mutual interests, and I'd like to hear your suggestions for how we can improve things.

Ecevit: I would like to thank you for receiving me and for what you and Dr. Kissinger have done to maintain the ties with Turkey against domestic pressure. That has been the major influence in calming the Turkish people over the situation. The Republican People’s Party is doing its best not to inflame the situation.

My general observation is that the Turkish people have always been independent, so they are very proud, and any government which appears too pliant is opposed.

For that reason, when I was in power in 1974, I am sure Dr. Kissinger would tell you we were not an easy ally. But in 1974, the Turkish people developed friendly attitudes toward the United States and NATO. There were no slogans and no anti-American demonstrations.

Kissinger: That is why the tragedy is that we couldn’t move decisively in 1974 soon after the Cyprus crisis.

Ecevit: We had problems which developed within my coalition and I had to leave office in November and cancel Dr. Kissinger’s trip because I couldn’t deliver on my promise.

The President: Tragically, it has been more than two years now. We have irrational elements in this country on Cyprus. But I have done my best to maintain friendly relations without regard to domestic concerns. I just hope we can find a way out.

Ecevit: Yes. I asked to form a minority government because I thought if the problem wasn’t solved right away it would be more difficult. The new Government inherited my coalition so they weren’t able to make many moves. I had been critical of the Government and urged them to make some conciliatory moves. Then, of course, Makarios returned to Cyprus. I have the feeling the Greek Government is losing its interest in a solution to Cyprus, and they can’t influence Makarios. So all of these things conspire to make movement difficult, and the longer it goes the more difficult it becomes. I had a plan in 1974, but it no longer applies. If we win in 1977, we will put forth a plan. Of course, the Greeks are intransient because they think they can get American and Western support.
The West appears to be aware of only the Cyprus problem between Greece and Turkey, whereas the major problem is the Aegean. Greece is laying claim to the whole of the Aegean—she has used NATO missions to reinforce that claim. They have been making seismic exploration in the Aegean without opposition. When I came in, we asked for discussions to solve the problem. The junta said there were no problems because the Aegean is theirs. So we sent a seismic ship out. Greece objected and we said, “So, let’s talk.” They refused. The Greeks have used their public relations skills on the issue to make it appear one-sided in favor of Greece.

The President: Haven’t both sides agreed to submit it to the ICJ?
Ecevit: The Greeks proposed it. My Government thinks it is important to have talks first.

This is a big issue between us. What the West should do is to induce Greece and Turkey to negotiate all our problems simultaneously, but separately. In that way, things could get going. I mentioned it to Waldheim who thought it had merit.

The President: Under the UN, or bilaterally?
Ecevit: Bilaterally. The UN has no role now in the Aegean except to give friendly support for talks. The other point is the West shouldn’t appear as if they support the Greeks against Turkey. Particularly the U.S. should keep equidistant between Greece and Turkey.

If I could, I would like to mention our difficult problems. I spoke yesterday with Congressional Armed Services Committees.

The President: How did it go?
Ecevit: I am not filled with optimism. I didn’t have the impression they were sure the treaty would pass.

The President: We are forthrightly in favor of it.
Kissinger: Did you tell them what the consequences would be?
Ecevit: Yes. But we must be careful. We aren’t volatile like the Greeks, but when we act responsibly we don’t get the publicity.

Demirel makes sour statements which may sound a little dangerous—like leaving NATO or warning of the consequences. I never say anything like that. I say that whatever happens, that is no reason to leave NATO because it is important for many reasons. I have kept my party in line on this issue. I don’t think the Eastern Europeans would be happy if we left NATO. They can’t say it, but we feel it.

The President: Romania or Yugoslavia?
Ecevit: Yes, and even further.

But if the treaty fails we would have to develop a new NATO relationship. We couldn’t go on as in the past. Turkey would crack under it. Our defense expenditures are the highest in NATO. I have given
this explanation to the Congress and told them they have been proven wrong on their predictions about Turkey. On the poppies, for example. The UN has investigated and said there is no opium leakage.

The President: I am dedicated to pushing the Turkish Treaty.

Kissinger: Frankly, I think the Greeks are trying to delay to prevent the Turkish Treaty from passing. I think we must separate them and push the Turkish Treaty.

The President: We will do whatever is needed.

[The Turkish press comes in for photos. Secretary Kissinger leaves. The Turkish press leaves.]

The President: Why don’t you tell me a bit about the Turkish domestic situation?

Ecevit: There is a terrorist campaign from the extreme right, which is protected by some of the Government parties. By one party directly and by the Justice Party indirectly. There is a danger of militant counteraction from the left. We are trying to calm our party, but we have no influence on the extreme left. There have been 50 or so students killed and the terrorists are protected. Now they are penetrating the labor unions. I think all of this is being done because the conservative parties in power are different than those of the West. In the West, all of them are dedicated to the rules of the game. In developing countries, the conservatives fear democracy.

Nevertheless, I am confident of the future of the democracy in Turkey. We have a good constitution, an independent judiciary, a free press, a free labor movement, and a strong opposition party. Our Army has a tradition of intervening—right or wrongly—when it sees the country in trouble, but it has never wanted to rule. Now it is, thankfully, very reluctant to intervene in any way.

May I say frankly that in Turkey, many people suspect indirect CIA involvement in covert actions in Turkey.

The President: They must be approved by me and it is not and will not be done.

Ecevit: I believe whatever you say. As you know, such operations sometimes have a life of their own. I hesitate to mention it, but I thought you should know.

The President: I am glad you mentioned it to give me a chance to go on the record. There is absolutely no truth to the stories.

May I reemphasize the importance we ascribe to good bilateral relations with NATO. This Administration will maximize its efforts to maintain good relations and to contribute to a strong NATO. We must do our share—especially with Congress, with the Treaty and to keep them from taking ill-advised action as they have done in the past. On the other hand, it is important that Turkey do its best to resolve the
Cyprus problem. We understand Makarios’ game. Cyprus is a cancer which is harmful to this Administration or to any U.S. administration. To the degree you can help in opposition, I hope you will work for progress. October, 1977 is a long way away. I hope to win in November.

Ecevit: I hope so.

The President: I plan to, but I have reason to believe Carter might be pro-Greece.

Ecevit: I know. I have seen his statements. I wish you well this fall. We know who our friends are.

The President: Can you have elections earlier than October 1977?

Ecevit: Only by an absolute majority of the Parliament.

244. Memorandum of Conversation

Washington, July 29, 1976, 2:20 p.m.

SUBJECT

Meeting with Former Prime Minister of Turkey, Bulent Ecevit

PARTICIPANTS

US
- The Secretary
- Mr. Hartman
- William L. Eagleton, EUR/SE (notetaker)

Turkish
- Bulent Ecevit
- Ambassador Esenbel, Turkish Ambassador to the US
- Hasan Isik, Republican People’s Party Advisor (RPP)
- Alev Coskun, RPP Advisor
- Orhan Kologlu, RPP Advisor

Secretary: Hartman told me about his conversation with you yesterday when you thought we had given Greece a guarantee on the Aegean. This is not our understanding. We are opposed to provocation from either side. We told the Greeks this is not a guarantee.

1 Source: Library of Congress, Manuscript Division, Kissinger Papers, Box CL 276, Memoranda of Conversations, Chronological File. Secret; Nodis. Drafted by Eagleton and cleared in S on August 27. The meeting was held in the Secretary’s office. This meeting followed a luncheon that took place in the Secretary’s dining room at 1 p.m. (Memorandum of conversation, ibid.)
Ecevit: The statement seems to have created an impact on Greece. The United States wants Turkey to make conciliatory moves. Turkey wants to do research on the Aegean seabed and they hope to find something there. Greece considers this provocative.

Secretary: We would have to take a decision whether or not this is a provocation.

Ecevit: Yes, but the Greeks will interpret it as such.

Secretary: We told the Greeks that the proclamation of a twelve-mile limit would be provocative. I would not want this to be known in public.

Isik: We were puzzled by the exchange of letters with Bitsios.\(^2\)

Secretary: But we would be prepared to exchange letters with Turkey. Right, Art?

Hartman: Yes, but the law is unclear.

Esenbel: When Caglayangil was here, we did not talk about the Aegean.\(^3\)

Ecevit: Would it not be useful if the United States stated that a solution can only be reached through negotiation?

Hartman: There remains the problem of the Court.

Ecevit: The mention of the Court indicates the futility of negotiation.

Secretary: It is natural for your two countries, if negotiations fail, to go to war. I have been reading a book about the Greek struggle for independence.

Ecevit: If we could convince Greece to negotiate, we could get somewhere, but if the Greeks think they have the backing of the West, there will be problems. The two states should come together at a higher political level and then experts could work out details. The first thing is to accept the principle of negotiation. If you could make such a remark... .

Secretary: I think I could do it, but not say only negotiations.

Esenbel: You should not refer to the Court. You can say it should be solved between the two sides but that negotiation does not preclude going to the Court if they fail.

Ecevit: There is a question of timing. The small Turkish ship is about to go out. If in the next few days you could make such a statement, it would help.

Esenbel: When I was in office, the Greek Ambassador said there was nothing to negotiate about because they had all the islands.

\(^2\) See footnote 2, Document 64.

\(^3\) See Documents 240–242.
Hartman: The Court could be a cover for beginning of negotiations.
Ecevit: No, it would indicate no interest in negotiations.
Isik: If after taking the islands Greece demands the seabeds, it is too much.
Ecevit: After the war Turkey made no claim on the former Italian islands. Now the Greeks are using the islands to demand the whole airspace and seabed.
Secretary: Are they willing to put the airspace to the Court?
Hartman: They are settling that through other channels.
Isik: The twelve islands belonged to us. Now they belong to them. When the Soviets acted in Cuba, you reacted to it. We are in the same position.
Hartman: The Greeks realize there must be some kind of negotiations.
Ecevit: But they accept negotiations only to prepare for the Court.
Hartman: They could use that to cover negotiations, to seek a solution.
Esenbel: I got the Greek commitment to talk about it, but Caglayangil saw them and got nowhere.
Ecevit: I don’t think you have to mention the Court. Negotiations are going on all over the world to settle disputes.
Secretary: But there are not so many islands there. It is different when it has to do with the seabed.
Isik: I was impressed by what President Ford said about keeping good relations with all countries. During World War I we tried to find good relations, but the Greeks felt they had the support of the West and that Turkey should be Greek. We don’t mind losing the twelve islands because there was no conflict between us. It is now a political question not a legal one. If we can settle the Aegean questions, relations between Greece and Turkey will be clarified.
Ecevit: Geological and economic zone principles would support our claim.
Secretary: Are the Greeks not interested in negotiations on Cyprus now?
Ecevit: They could be forced to negotiate if they had the right atmosphere. If negotiations on Cyprus and the Aegean were simultaneous, one move would bring another.
Secretary: Never have I seen so many negotiations begun with talk about the right atmosphere and then fail.
Ecevit: You cannot expect much with Makarios back and Clerides out. You cannot expect much between the two communities, but if the two mainland states negotiate, it would lead to a settlement.
Secretary: It is not going to be simple.

Ecevit: Not with the present Government in Turkey. The central thing is to begin a dialogue.

Secretary: If the Turkish elections came now, who would win?
Ecevit: Probably we would. At least we would be the strongest party.

Secretary: Do you think this can be maintained until October?
Ecevit: The present Government has subjected us to provocations from the extreme right. The economy is going bankrupt. Inflation is in two digits. We will certainly have a great change in the future.

Secretary: I am sorry, I must go to the White House and talk to the Republican ladies.

245. Memorandum of Conversation

New York, August 14, 1976, 10 a.m.

PARTICIPANTS

US:
The Secretary
Under Secretary Habib
Ambassador Bennett
Deputy Assistant Secretary Laingen, notetaker

Turkey:
Foreign Minister Caglayangil
Ambassador Esenbel
Under Secretary Tezel
Ambassador Turkmen, Turkish notetaker

SUBJECT

The Aegean Crisis

Kissinger: It is good to see you again Mr. Minister. The last time I saw you you had the flu. I hate to think what you would have gotten out of us at the time on the base negotiations if you hadn’t had the flu.

Caglayangil: Thank you very much. I’m feeling fine now. We are watching your Presidential campaign with a great deal of interest.

1 Source: Library of Congress, Manuscript Division, Kissinger Papers, Box CL 276, Memoranda of Conversations, Chronological File. Confidential; Nodis. The meeting was held at the Waldorf Towers, where Kissinger stayed while attending a UN Security Council session. He met with Greek Foreign Minister Bitsios earlier that morning; see Document 67.
have a Turkish proverb that reads: “when you cross a river, don’t change horses.”

Kissinger: That’s a good proverb and very true. The situation has changed a good deal since around April when the President was clearly running ahead on all accounts. But it was at that time that the internal differences within his party began and that clearly affected the atmosphere.

Caglayangil: It’s always a gamble to change the known for the unknown.

Kissinger: The present problems facing the President, an incumbent President, have happened only once before in this century; that was in 1932. Such a situation normally would not develop. But the combination of circumstances where Ford himself is not an elected President plus the bitter fight taking place within his party have contributed to a situation where he has been unnecessarily weakened.

I believe, except for these circumstances, he would have won the reelection easily. Even as it is, I believe he stands a much better chance than the press suggests. After all, Carter’s primary victories were not that decisive when you analyze them one by one. So that an aggressive campaign could be successful on the President’s part.

Caglayangil: Has there ever been a candidate from the South in US history?

Kissinger: Not really since the Civil War. That of course is an asset for Carter since it means that he has the South pretty much on his side.

Esenbel: What about Lyndon Johnson?

Kissinger: He was not a candidate from the deep South in the usual sense of the word. Johnson was also not a normal situation in the sense that he got his accession to the Presidency by succession as Vice President. Carter clearly has strength in the South, and in the North he has created the impression of being a liberal. This is probably true. I personally believe he is more liberal than Mondale. I don’t consider that a compliment necessarily. But we may never find out what the facts are.

Well, Mr. Minister, we’re here for one of our usual bouts. Couldn’t you have kept the situation quiet for at least a year and saved our nerves a bit? Either that or send us 3 million Turks!

Caglayangil: Your assessment is right but you should have the point that the only reason we are here is because of the Greeks.

Kissinger: I have said substantially the same thing to the Greeks.

Caglayangil: To speak frankly, I am not disturbed at being here in New York. From the outset the Greeks have approached this problem from a different angle. It is a domestic problem for them. Public opinion is exercised because they have exaggerated the case and spoken in a threatening way about Turkey. Under the circumstances, I think that
instead of firing guns in the Aegean it is better that we fight our wars here.

This is due to the wisdom of Caramanlis. The Greeks had to do something; that is, their government did and this is the best way to proceed. I understand this. I understand it but I believe all the members of the Council recognize that the Greek case has no legal basis.

Bitsios came here and told the Council that he did not intend to discuss the juridical aspects of the case. But rather was approaching it on a political basis. But then he proceeded to base his comments on alleged juridical grounds. Now this is the area, this narrow strip of sea along our coast, that the Greeks tell us that they will kindly allow us to have. All the rest of the continental shelf is Greek! And the Foreign Minister tells us that justice and equity is on their side!

Tezel: So you see that if we follow the Greek thesis, this is how the narrow Turkish continental shelf would look like.

Kissinger: We have two problems, at least. The first is to determine the right dividing line of the continental shelf. The second is to establish the best procedure for determining that line.

Turkmen: The Minister would like to speak to those points.

Kissinger: But I'm afraid he will make so many concessions, as always, in the process of doing so that I won't get any credit!

Caglayangil: Yes, as usual.

Kissinger: It's a good thing our Ambassador in Ankara is not here!

Caglayangil: The Greeks say this is our continental shelf. We are quite prepared to say that they have rights in the Aegean but we do too. But our claims do not extend to the whole of the Aegean. We have a much more limited claim than that. But the point is that until now, neither Greece nor Turkey has come to agreement on a delimitation of exactly where the shelf is and to whom it belongs to. Clearly some areas are free of controversy and some of the areas are not. But what the Greeks have done is to say that you are free to conduct research but not in the areas that belong to Greece nor are you allowed to conduct research, you Turks, in areas that are controversial. When we asked why, they Greeks say that the answer lies in a 1958 Convention.\(^2\) We must ask their permission before we undertake any research. Our answer is that we didn't sign that Convention.

But even the 1958 Convention states that areas of the continental shelf must be agreed to by delimitation and rights to use them established.

\(^2\) Reference is to the 1958 Continental Shelf Convention, which established the exclusive right of the coastal country to exercise sovereignty over its continental shelf for the purpose of exploration and exploitation of natural resources.
(Insistent ringing of a telephone in the suite interrupts conversation.)

Kissinger: In case that’s someone calling to offer me the Vice Presidential nomination, I want to be sure I’m available! You know every President hates to have a Vice President around basically because all a Vice President is interested in is succeeding to the Presidency and probably wants nothing more than to see the President drop dead! I would be an excellent candidate, you know, as Vice President because the Constitution provides that a foreign-born citizen may not become the President. The Constitution does not prohibit a foreign-born citizen from being Vice President. So if I were Vice President, that would be ideal because I could not succeed and the President therefore would have no reason to be nervous about me. An ideal situation!

Caglayangil: Through the Greek Ambassador in Ankara I gave the following information to the Greek Government. I said the research that we will conduct will have no prejudicial impact on the legal rights of either country in the Aegean. Therefore, this should not bother Greece. It is clear that under the sea, we have rights to some of the continental shelf; you, the Greeks, do too. But for the present we don’t know where those rights are and there should be no reason why either cannot therefore conduct research. We will not make any drillings from the surface. We shall only sail on the surface and make no physical contact with the shelf. As far as the surface is concerned, there is no Greek/Turkish difference as to the high seas.

You Greeks, I said, have some basis for your arguments that Turkey should not conduct research while we are negotiating. That in itself is a good argument. But we point out that there are 3,054 islands in the Aegean and if we accept the Greek thesis as to these islands each having a continental shelf of its own, then there will be only this narrow strip that I showed you on this map where Turkey would have rights. Turkey cannot accept this. I pointed out too that in the 1958 Convention, the concept of natural elongation out into the sea from the mainland is accepted. If we were to proceed from that thesis, then all of the Greek islands would belong to us.

Clearly, therefore, it is not possible to reach a settlement on purely legal grounds. This is a political matter and a settlement must be found in that context.

So we said that either we explore all of the continental shelf together or we make some kind of political bargain and come to a conclusion as to a delimitation of the shelf. There is no other way. We are prepared therefore to sit around a table for political bargaining. We say to the Greeks that you know the resources of the Aegean already. You have completed your research. But Turkey did not yet conduct its research and is only now doing this.

Kissinger: When did the Greeks do this?
Esenbel: They did it beginning in 1963. Even now they are doing drilling in the Thassos area. They have done nine drillings in that area.

Caglayangil: If the Greeks continue to be apprehensive about the research we are doing and this being a basis for a legal claim, I’m ready to make another announcement that our research will not prejudice anyone’s legal claims or rights.

Esenbel: In other words, our research is not a claim to sovereignty.

Caglayangil: I explained all of this to the Greek Ambassador in Ankara. He replied that this explanation made sense to him and made him feel more comfortable and he would pass it to his government. So I said to the Ambassador, please do so. You can say to your government that the Turkish government gave you these assurances; therefore what Turkey is doing does not harm the claims of either government. If you will let me know if this is acceptable, I will not need to send any escort by the Turkish Navy with the Sismik. The Ambassador replied to me: don’t worry; I will be your advocate.

Kissinger: He behaves like an American Ambassador!

Caglayangil: The next day he came back and said my government agrees to your approach providing two conditions are met. The first is that the full program of research by the Sismik should be conveyed to us in advance in detail, complete with coordinates etc. The second is that you will communicate to us the results of your research. Moreover your statement will indicate publicly what you have conveyed to the Greeks.

The Ambassador went on to say that in response, Greece would not escort or approach our ship but would only shadow it in various places.

I said to him these are not good answers. I said you are mad! I didn’t ask you to get permission from your government.

Kissinger: Greek Ambassadors in Turkey have been killed for far less than that!

Caglayangil: I’m not afraid of Greek reaction and I don’t intend to ask permission to do what we are doing. The Greek government made an important psychological error. I told him we cannot agree on anything with this kind of precondition attached. The Ambassador replied that I misunderstood. He said that he was not putting preconditions on this. He said let me talk to your experts concerning the assurances we seek from you and see if we can agree on them. I said while we would not accept preconditions, we would be prepared to talk about a statement that would be made about the Sismik sailing. So I sent him to see the Under Secretary and they worked six hours on a statement. During this time he was in permanent contact with Athens. But Athens insisted on a number of points that we could not accept. And we told them so.
The Greek Ambassador asked me whether we should consider this as a rupture in the discussions. I said no, that we were always ready to talk. But not with preconditions.

It was therefore clear that there was no possibility of an understanding on a statement regarding the Sismik and so we started our research.

The point is that the Greek claims have no legal basis. The New York Times says so. The State Department’s legal experts say so. The British Government says so. So everyone agrees.

Kissinger: But of course you know the New York Times is always wrong!

Caglayangil: Of course officially you will say that you do not want to get into the middle of this.

Kissinger: That’s because you and the Greeks have such a splendid record of settling problems between the two of you.

Caglayangil: We don’t ask anyone to side with us. We ask only that our case be examined. This case is after all not so different from that between Iceland and the UK. They came here, to the Council, and the result was no resolution adopted by the Council but simply advice by the Council to the parties to try to resolve their problems.

I have seen the draft resolution and I am told that the US agrees with it. When you look at the draft it seems innocent enough.

Kissinger: We have seen it but the point is that we have not taken any formal position on it.

Caglayangil: Yes, so we are told. As I say if you look at the resolution with a magnifying glass you will see the face of Caramanlis and the face of Bitsios. It is not a good idea for a resolution like this. This is the first time that any European question has been discussed in this fashion in the Security Council. I don’t think we Europeans should confront each other in this manner over such a simple matter that should be resolved between the two of us.

Turkey simply cannot accept any resolution.

Kissinger: Any resolution?

How would it be if we simply endorsed your claim? Would you accept that?

Caglayangil: You know me; I’m always giving so many concessions in your office! We did not reject the idea of the Court. We spoke about this and are prepared to consider the Court. Caramanlis said let’s come to some agreement on this. And he went on to say that even if

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3 See footnote 2, Document 67.
we can’t agree among ourselves, let’s get a blessing from the Court that we would use with our public opinion.

We Turks, being nice people, didn’t see this as another Byzantine scheme but now the Greeks claim that we have changed our minds. We have not done so. We are prepared to follow the agreement between us and Brussels of 1975; that is to try to agree among ourselves and then to go to the Court for its blessing. It may well be that we don’t come to a complete agreement on the issue among ourselves. Okay, we will go the Court with those differences that remain. But not with the whole issue.

Now they have come up with another Byzantine scheme. They say let’s go to the Court. We have a problem of public opinion. The Court’s deliberation will take two or three years probably. Meanwhile we will negotiate bilaterally and see what we can do.

Each country regrettably has its Papandreou and its Makarios. We have our Ecevit! You know what he thinks after his visit here probably better than we do.4

Kissinger: No, that shouldn’t be the case. Your Ambassador Esenbel was present during all our conversations.

Caglayangil: I have said something very important. Turkish public opinion believes that we have a very just case. If in such a just case our allies side with the Greeks and help them and the result is a resolution adopted against Turkey, this will be a great blow to Turkish/US relations and also to Turkish-Western European relations.

Kissinger: Let us first see whether this resolution is against Turkey. On first reading it didn’t strike me that way although I have not studied it since I got it this morning.

Caglayangil: Will you allow me to explain our problems with the resolution.

Turkmen: In the first place it recommends a recourse to the ICJ. There is also reference to Greece’s unilateral approach to the ICJ. We think any reference to the ICJ in view of Greece’s unilateral approach is baseless and irrelevant.

Moreover, in the fifth preambular paragraph it qualifies bilateral negotiations in a way partial to Greece. This is not the kind of negotiations we are conducting. We prefer direct negotiations to settle the problem.

Kissinger: These are your major objections to the resolution?

Turkmen: We also have problems with operative paragraph one. This could be interpreted as supporting the Greek view regarding the

4 See Documents 243 and 244.
Sisnik. There is also operative paragraph three where there is a general and sweeping statement about issues being referred to the Court, when in fact this is really a more general, political and even a security problem.

Caglayangil: We don’t want a resolution. We want to proceed as was done in the Iceland/UK case. We have gone into detail on the resolution simply to describe how unilateral it is to us.

Kissinger: We didn’t draft it. Nor did we clear it. Is it clear that we have not endorsed it?

Bennett: We have not endorsed it.

Kissinger: I was told that the Europeans had prepared it and had sent it to certain members. I discussed it with Bitsios and in general he is willing to go along with it.5

Caglayangil: Of course!

Kissinger: Let’s put the resolution aside. If we can find a way out of this in some other way maybe we don’t need a resolution. I talked to Bitsios alone. I told him our legal experts did not share the Greek view. But I don’t want to get into a legal argument. We favor a settlement by political negotiations.

So Bitsios said to me alone that he had a private message from Caramanlis to me. You know what that means. It means that only about 5,000 people will know of it.

Caglayangil: Yes, at a minimum.

Kissinger: He says they are prepared to engage in political negotiations. They do not insist on going to the Court, they are ready to negotiate now.

Turkmens: Are they prepared to withdraw their request to the Council and to the Court?

Kissinger: No, they did not say that. I said I would be talking with you.

What they want is that neither side engage in research in disputed areas while you and they are engaged in political negotiations.

Caglayangil: If they had accepted my original proposal, we would have worked this out and we would have not sent the ship into disputed areas. But I could not say this publicly. And because they behaved so negatively in our discussions, our military people hardened their position and insisted on sending the ship. Now they are harassing our ship. They have harassed it by air within 140 meters and they have harassed it by sea within 20 meters of the ship. However, we have

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5 See Document 67.
given strict orders to the ship and to our Naval vessels that there be no reaction at all to this. Yet they still continue provoking us.

Kissinger: Let us think now how we deal with this problem. Supposing we wrote a letter urging both sides to begin negotiations on the subject of delimitation of the continental shelf. I don’t know if the Greeks would accept. I wanted first to find out if you would. The letter could also urge both sides not to engage in activities in disputed areas that would in any way disturb negotiations. If you were prepared to do this on this basis, you would be in effect not yielding to Greece but yielding to our suggestion. It would be keeping the ship out of disputed waters which after all is what you wanted to do at the outset.

Caglayangil: It is not possible for the Turkish government to accept any clause to stop or precondition this research. We have to continue research activity. But no one knows very well where the disputed areas are, so the Greeks perhaps could give us a map showing where the disputed areas are. I could take it to my government and say look we won’t enter these areas. But another problem is the Greek unilateral approach to the ICJ. So during my conversation with the Greek Ambassador I asked him where are the disputed areas? He declined to do so or to reply.

Kissinger: They won’t give you such a map because it would tend to question their own claim. But they may give us a map on their claims.

Caglayangil: We can’t accept that and I can’t give them a map from the Turkish side. If I do so that means I tend to accept some of their claims.

Kissinger: Can we give you a map showing you where we think the disputed areas are?

Caglayangil: (shrugs his shoulders)

Kissinger: (shrugs his shoulders)

Kissinger: I’m trying to find a solution to this problem.

Caglayangil: I can agree on this much. You go ahead and urge the parties to resume bilateral negotiations. But there can be no resolution from the Council. Meanwhile you indicate to me some disputed areas. Don’t do it in your letter. Put it unofficially to us. I’ll take this to my government and note that these areas are very sensitive.

Kissinger: You mean like the sea of Marmara!

Look we are friends and you know no matter how confidentially we treat this kind of thing, the Greeks will make it public in one way or another. I could agree it shouldn’t be done as a part of the letter. It could be done separately and confidentially. But in practical terms it would still get out. Nonetheless it will get out as something that is not your decision. The point is I have to tell the Greeks something as to how we go about resolving this.
Caglayangil: In that case maybe it's best to not get involved at all. Our relations are already bad and it is not good to do anything to worsen them.

Kissinger: We cannot have another war in the Aegean. We would get involved anyway then but the point is we cannot have another Turkish/Greek conflict.

Caglayangil: We have no intention of going to war. If the Greeks want war, that is another matter. They are the ones that are militarizing all of the islands. No one says anything in response to this. All we are doing is sending a small research ship into the area.

Kissinger: You can take the question of militarization of these islands to the Security Council if you want.

Caglayangil: We are not going to play games with the Security Council for any purpose.

Kissinger: Let me understand where we are before we get too far into this. If the Greeks are ready to start negotiation with provision for ultimate reference to the Court and if we give you some idea of those sensitive disputed areas separately in some fashion then would you be prepared to take this into account in future voyages of the *Sismik*.

Caglayangil: Well, Mr. Secretary, my military people remind me that the Greek Ambassador on the 9th of August when he delivered the second Greek note said that the Greeks were ready to resume high level political negotiations if the Turks were prepared to stop the sailing of the *Sismik*. So your proposal has already been communicated to Turkey. Now we find ourselves talking about the same thing. I said to the Greeks then under instructions from my government that we would be prepared for talks even tomorrow but we would not be prepared on the basis of preconditions. We cannot deviate from the research we have underway.

Kissinger: But then what were you saying earlier to me when you said that if we gave you some idea of particularly sensitive areas for the Greeks that you would be prepared to take this into consideration?

Caglayangil: I said I would try to get my government not to include these areas in their research program.

Kissinger: Fine, I'm not saying you should stop the ship.

(There then ensued intensive discussion in Turkish between Caglayangil and his advisors.)

Kissinger: Let's not fight among ourselves!

Esenbel: Here's our reply.

Kissinger: First I suppose he says to go to hell!

Esenbel: First they should withdraw their request to the ICJ. Secondly, you could write a letter saying that the only solution is through political negotiations and that both sides should take this route. Thirdly,
you could indicate to us in some very informal fashion, perhaps as a piece of paper that was found on the street, those areas particularly sensitive as far as future sailing by the _Sismik_ is concerned. We would then take this into consideration in the future course of the _Sismik_.

The Minister is not committing his Government. You said the Greeks might leak this. If they do that then we would go directly into the areas that were indicated as sensitive. But if they don’t leak it, then I might be able to prevail on my government.

Kissinger: Let me make a point. I’m afraid enough of calm Turks! But angry ones I cannot take! We cannot say there can be only political negotiations. After all you too agreed on the ICJ approach at one time. So if we write a letter we would have to say something about the ICJ. We would have to say that the talks are intended to delimit the area and to find some formulation to have recourse to the ICJ on those points where there is no agreement. You don’t want to bring in the Court at the outset but I can’t send a letter or take a position that focuses only on negotiations.

Caglayangil: We should be prepared to go in good time jointly to the Court.

Kissinger: I don’t know whether this approach would be possible. I will have to talk to Bitsios. I understand your point.

Caglayangil: In essence what we need to do is to save Karamanlis from the impasse he’s gotten into. We are all entering into a big gamble which could have a bad effect on the whole Western relationship.

Kissinger: I understand.

Caglayangil: The situation could result in that that followed an earlier LBJ letter. The Council should simply urge Greece and Turkey to resume negotiations. Then we could go off to Switzerland or to some such place. Perhaps we can agree on a meeting somewhere in Europe.

Kissinger: As a practical matter, I doubt we can have a situation where there is no resolution and no progress of any kind of the Council. It is possible to have progress and no resolution. But I don’t think we can have nothing happen here. Do you agree Tap?

Bennett: Yes I agree.

Kissinger: Nor am I anxious to get in the business of a US letter. It will not in any event be a threatening letter. That’s what the LBJ letter was and that’s why we had trouble with it. If you can meet here with Bitsios and work this out between you that’s fine too.

Caglayangil: Why do we need a resolution?

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Kissinger: Well, we can have a discussion if you want about what should be in the resolution. My view is that you have established the principle of your right to do research in the Aegean in the disputed areas. You have already been in there twice and the principle is well established. Secondly, if the Greeks now would also agree not to go into disputed areas then the definition is already practically established. Thirdly, if you can get negotiations started then you get what you have wanted. It would seem to me that Turkey has not lost under those circumstances.

My concern with the resolution is that even if we get one agreeable to everyone then the problem still remains. We would still have the problem of getting negotiations. So I want to go straight to the issue of talks. I’m not wild about a resolution.

Esenbel: The Minister says there was a similar case between Iceland and the UK. Why does the West have to go out of its way to please the Greeks with some face-saving resolution?

Kissinger: Look, it may be possible for the Council to wrap this up successfully. All I say is that it is not possible to have neither a resolution nor progress. I have not myself had spectacular success in getting Greece and Turkey to agree on anything previously!

(There then ensued a further discussion among the Turks.)

Kissinger: Could I hear what you are talking about?

Esenbel: The problem is that this is a very hard political question for Turkey. The Minister didn’t come here to negotiate with the Greeks or to bargain.

Kissinger: Look, if you can’t say you’re willing to negotiate...

There are only two possible approaches it seems to me. In the first place, if there is no political prospect for talks or for a consensus approach, then there will be a resolution. We will have to take that into account. But remember that you are not the only ones with political problems. We have them too. The President faces a convention next week in Kansas City. He can’t take on all the Greeks in the United States next week. So you should know that we cannot veto a resolution. Some reality has to be put into this.

Caglayangil: I came to this post from a political career. You see I had no training as a diplomat.

Kissinger: Well I came in as a professor!

Caglayangil: I would like to explain my position very clearly. If I had said in Ankara okay, we will stop the sailings in the disputed areas, then there would have been no need to come to New York. But the Aegean sea doesn’t belong to Greece. Turkey cannot accept directives from Greece. We can’t accept anything that appears to suggest that we are being authorized by Greece to do what we need to do.
Kissinger: I’m saying that both sides should agree not to engage in research . . .

Caglayangil: But the point is that they have already done their research.

Kissinger: You’ve done it too. If they now agree that they will not engage in such research doesn’t that strengthen your case? Doesn’t that strengthen your argument that it is a disputed zone?

Caglayangil: But we need to know what the natural resources of the area are.

Kissinger: You said yourself you could get this from satellites.

(To Habib) This isn’t getting us anywhere.

Caglayangil: I have another idea. Why don’t Greeks give us their results from their research and say that we can have it. Then maybe we can accept the situation.

Kissinger: As far as the US is concerned, we can go on playing the game in the Council until we have a situation where no one knows who proposed what. Then there will be some sort of resolution and that is a situation perfectly possible for us. I should think a resolution wouldn’t be all that favorable to Turkey. I can’t say what we would do then; it depends in part on our political situation. I can say we won’t veto. But then where are we? Nowhere. We won’t get into a middle of a war. You have your political problems, but we have ours. We’re going for negotiations one way or another. How we get there doesn’t matter. It seems to me we have an agreement already on the general principles; i.e. there are political negotiations necessary and that there are sensitive areas.

We are not going to be driven by the Europeans on behalf of Greece or indeed by the Turks into a totally passive situation. (A further long discussion ensued among the Turks.)

Caglayangil: I thank you for your frankness. I want to make things clear from the Turkish viewpoint. First we believe we are right in our research activity. So if it leads to an armed clash so be it. But it also relates to the relationship between big and small powers. You must take your position from your point of view.

Esenbel: We will not be the cause for any escalation.

Kissinger: Let me understand correctly. A half hour ago I understood you to say that you would agree to take into consideration that there are sensitive areas, provided the Greeks would say that they are ready for political negotiations.

Esenbel: That’s right. And he will suggest this to Ankara.

The solution is for the President of the Council to make a statement. It could say that the members have listened to the statements of both sides. He understood they were prepared to resume negotiations
and would be prepared to refrain from any action that might aggrava-
te the situation. The President would say that in this way the Coun-
cil believes that the problem could be solved. The result would be that
the Council would have acted similarly to what it did in the Iceland/
UK case.

Caglayan: Then I will try without committing myself after this
appeal from the Security Council to get my government to agree to re-
sume negotiations. I would also seek to get them to agree not to con-
duct research in areas that might cause difficulties. These would be ar-
eas that you would find some way informally to indicate to us. Perhaps
your dog could be the emissary!

Now I cannot take this kind of idea to the full Cabinet or to the
National Security Council. I will need to arrange it more privately with
the Prime Minister and with the Chief of the General Staff.

Kissinger: I understand. Let me have a private talk with Bitsios
and we will ourselves work on a consensus statement. But we will not
discuss this with any other foreign government for the present.

Caglayan: It is vitally important that the Greeks neither directly
or indirectly disclose any of this.

Kissinger: If they do we will understand the actions that you may
feel you then have to take. This assumes of course that you yourselves
will not leak any of this.

Caglayan: Of course.

Kissinger: I know you are a man of honor and we have no reason
to think that you will do this.

Turkmen: It must be clear also that the appeal by the Greeks to the
ICJ is withdrawn.

Kissinger: The way to do that is that you will say that you will ne-
gotiate to develop a joint approach to the ICJ.

I will talk to Bitsios alone to reduce the risk of leaks. We don’t
want to do anything that would embarrass Turkey. We will also speak
to the French about their going ahead with their resolution drafting
without sufficient consultation with us. This is an intolerable situation.

I agree that a resolution alone is no real solution. No matter what
language we agree on the problem would remain.

Turkmen: Can we sum up. You will talk to Bitsios about what we
have talked about. There will be agreement that the Council would
wind the session up with a statement by the President.

(Mrs. Kissinger enters the room and there is a five minute inter-
ruption.)

Turkmen: It will be implicitly understood that the President of
the Council would exhort both parties to resume negotiations and to
refrain from any unilateral activities that would aggravate the situation. Meanwhile you will make available, sort of like dropping it on the street, a suggestion to us as to areas particularly sensitive as far as the Sismik is concerned.

There needs also to be an understanding that would encompass the point that Greece would drop its approach to the ICJ.

Kissinger: All right. That’s my understanding too. I will now go to Bitsios and see him alone. I’ll come back to see you then and then I will see my psychiatrist!

You guys have so complicated the Cyprus problem that no one can understand it and now you’re doing it to the Aegean.

What shall I say to the press? I propose I say that we have welcomed efforts on the part of the parties to seek a peaceful solution. I will say we had a good review of the situation and that we favor a peaceful solution and that I expect to get in touch with the Greek side to see what might develop.

Caglayangil: But don’t use words that suggest that you are being too much of a mediator.

Kissinger: I will say simply that I am trying to help but that we are not putting forth proposals of our own. Now tell me, why shouldn’t I be seen as a mediator. Am I that unpopular in Turkey?

Caglayangil: Not at all, you are very popular in Turkey.

We need also to know what happened to the Defense Cooperation Agreement.

Kissinger: Hearings will start in the Senate in early September, within a week or two after the Congress returns from the Convention recess.

Caglayangil: But are you intending to seek its approval before the elections?

Kissinger: We will fight for it. Certainly we will get it through the Committees. That’s the most important thing. It depends really on how long the Congress sits.

Esenbel: Well the difficulty is that they come back on the 23rd of August and then there is another recess from September 2 to 7 so probably not much will begin until after the 7th.

Kissinger: I’ll give you an answer after Monday.7 Certainly there will be congressional action on the Senate side before October 2.

Esenbel: The problem is on the House side.

7 August 16.
Kissinger: Let me check on Monday. I will give you an answer next week.

Caglayangil: The most important thing is US/Turkish relations. If another problem is to develop now it would be bad.

Kissinger: You know my friendship for Turkey. If we had been left alone in 1974 we could have settled the Cyprus problem then.

Caglayangil: Well, we never doubted your good will. Even after the elections I believe you will be my partner.

Kissinger: Don’t say that to my friends here in the room from my side. Their morale will go down!

Caglayangil: The election is not unlike the Truman situation.

Kissinger: The analogy is good. And after the elections, the President will be in a stronger position to deal with issues such as these.

I will call you on Tuesday or Wednesday about the DCA after talking with McCloskey.

(The Foreign Minister and the Secretary then went into the hall and met with the Press. The foregoing conversation resumed at approximately at 1:40 pm, again in the Foreign Minister’s suite.)

Kissinger: I have now talked to Bitsios alone. I have shown him a consensus statement along the lines you indicated might be acceptable. He understood completely the matter concerning the designation of certain sensitive areas regarding the Sismik and he understands that this must be kept secret. If not, Turkey would be forced and expected to resume the activity of the Sismik.

As far as the consensus statement is concerned, he said he did not have the authority to accept it but would get in touch with Karamanlis and be back in touch with us tomorrow. He asked whether we were supporting the European draft of the resolution. I said that if it goes that way we would want a chance to discuss it and to see what we could support.

This is our position. We will see what views can be taken into account. If we are forced to a resolution we will probably have to support it. I didn’t tell him that; but I am telling you.

I said that this would have to be a matter of discussion. We would have to take into account the views of other parties whom we have not yet consulted.

Caglayangil: What are your views about the resolution and about the situation? Is the situation such that I call Demirel now?

Kissinger: I would wait until we have an answer from Bitsios. The third point that they want is that they need to have some kind of reference to the ICJ, as a minimum. They say they can’t have a consensus statement that doesn’t even mention that.
Turkmen: Will they withdraw their unilateral approach to the ICJ? The way it would have to be formulated is that negotiations are designed to lead to a joint approach to the Court. It would also have to be understood that negotiations have to be substantive, meaningful, and political.

Kissinger: He said of course it was quite possible that negotiations will leave an area that will have to go to the Court. Of course if you settle everything it wouldn’t be necessary. But he certainly did not exclude the Court.

Caglayangil: So the President would include all of this in his consensus statement?

Kissinger: I told him, that is Bitsios, that I would discuss this with you. He has to discuss it with Karamanlis. He knows Karamanlis cannot accept it without some reference to the ICJ.

Caglayangil: By what formula?

Kissinger: That surely can be negotiated if the Greeks buy the principle. We shouldn’t now try to negotiate the formula. Perhaps the way to do it would be to say that the Greek appeal to the ICJ has been put into abeyance or some such thing.

Caglayangil: I thank you very much.

Kissinger: I will call him again on this.

Turkmen: I am not a lawyer but my understanding is that once such a thing is put to the ICJ a process begins to run.

Kissinger: I’m sure we can clear this matter up as soon as I leave here, which I fear will be in about four hours! (The Secretary to Habib: They don’t seem to appreciate my sense of humor!) I will call Bitsios on this point.

Caglayangil: I thank you so much.

Kissinger: I do think it dangerous to go to Demirel yet. We don’t yet have a clear answer. Ambassador Bennett will report to me tomorrow as soon as the Greeks reply.

(There then ensued some discussion between the Turks and the Secretary concerning telephone numbers where he could be reached on Sunday.)
New York, September 29, 1976, 9:30 a.m.

SUBJECT
Secretary’s Meeting with Turkish Foreign Minister Caglayangil

PARTICIPANTS
Turkey
Foreign Minister Caglayangil
Ambassador to the United States Esenbel
Permanent Representative Ilter Turkmen
Mr. Ecemel Baratcu
Mr. Daryal Batibay (Interpreter)

US
The Secretary
Under Secretary Habib
Assistant Secretary Hartman
Nelson Ledsky (Notetaker)

The Secretary greets Caglayangil and photographs are taken.
The Secretary: How are you, Mr. Minister?
Foreign Minister Caglayangil: You seem in a terribly happy mood this morning.
The Secretary: I always smile when I see my friends.
Foreign Minister Caglayangil: How are you? I know you have just completed a very difficult trip to Africa.
The Secretary: I am fine. But you have already given yourself away. You will have to admit before the press that you speak good English.
What are we going to do for the rest of the UN session now that I understand you and the Greeks are about to settle all your differences?
Foreign Minister Caglayangil: Without you, we can’t settle anything.
The Secretary: You want me to settle your problems? Why not? Everyone likes to yell at us. So why not the Greeks and Turks?
Foreign Minister Caglayangil: I am glad to see you for two reasons... The Secretary (to Habib): Don’t you think our Turkish friends deserve a cup of coffee?

1 Source: Library of Congress, Manuscript Division, Kissinger Papers, Box CL 277, Memoranda of Conversations, Chronological File. Secret. Drafted by Ledsky and cleared in S on October 3. The meeting was held in the Secretary’s suite at the Waldorf Astoria. Kissinger was in New York to attend the UN General Assembly session.
Habib: Yes, I think we can arrange it.

Foreign Minister Caglayangil: I wanted to thank you for your assistance in connection with the recent Security Council action on the Aegean. You also deserve to be congratulated for your impressive record in Africa. You have done much to liberate those still under colonial rule.

The Secretary: If I am not mistaken, you have liberated quite a few nations in your time yourself.

Foreign Minister Caglayangil: Since our time is short, I would like to give you a summary of where we stand on the Aegean.

The Secretary: Before you tell me what concessions you are prepared to make, let’s have some coffee. As you know, my schedule this morning is such that after you leave, I have to see a delegation from SWAPO, then I see Bitsios. After that, a psychiatrist will have to wheel me away. Now for your capitulation.

Esenbel: Why have you scheduled the Africans in between the Greeks and the Turks?

Foreign Minister Caglayangil: Let me recapitulate. After the Security Council resolution in late August, we agreed to cut back the Sismik’s sailing program. We hoped this would enable negotiations to begin immediately, and certainly before the General Assembly convened in New York. The Greeks said they could not begin discussions until the Sismik had returned to port. We had no alternative but to accept their view.

We also asked the Greeks to withdraw their request for interim measures before the International Court of Justice. They did not accept our recommendation. Now, after the initial decision of the ICJ, we have asked the Greeks again to withdraw or suspend their case. If you recall, you had told us in New York that it was possible to suspend a case before the ICJ. Our lawyers had informed us to the contrary. Now the Greeks agree with us, namely, that suspension is impossible.

The Secretary: You were right. I was wrong.

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2 See Document 69.

3 On August 25 UN Security Council Resolution 395 passed by consensus. It appealed to Greece and Turkey to exercise restraint, urged a reduction in tensions, called for direct negotiations, and prompted appropriate judicial means, particularly the ICJ. (Yearbook of the United Nations, 1976, p. 321)

4 On August 10 Greece filed an application in the ICJ against Turkey requesting, among other things, that specified Greek islands be entitled to the part of the continental shelf appertained to them. On September 11 the Court, voting 12–1, did not find the breach of Greece’s rights such to cause irreparable prejudice to the rights at issue. Therefore, interim measures by the Court to protect Greece’s right were not required. (Yearbook of the United Nations, 1976, pp. 813–814)
Foreign Minister Caglayangil: Now we say the Greeks should withdraw their unilateral case before the ICJ and begin to negotiate in good faith.

The Secretary: My understanding is they simply want to delay the Court’s consideration of the matter and that this would be similar to a suspension.

Foreign Minister Caglayangil: This is not a serious Greek position.

The Secretary: The Greeks are apparently willing to take up to nine months to submit their memorandum which the Court will request. Then, if you take an additional nine months to submit your reply, there will be some eighteen months between now and the time the Court takes up the jurisdiction question.

Foreign Minister Caglayangil: Since the Greeks can make an application any time they wish—any time the negotiations falter or break down—I don’t see why they cannot withdraw their case now. The gimmick of delay is not to be taken seriously. The Greeks should not joke with Court procedures in this way.

The Secretary: I believe it is Greek domestic politics. Of course, I know this is hard for you to understand since you have no domestic political problems.

Foreign Minister Caglayangil: Every country has its domestic problems. Every state has problems with its domestic opposition.

The Secretary: Not every state has an Erbekan inside its government.

Foreign Minister Caglayangil: Other countries have problems with coalition partners.

The Secretary: I am in a different position. In our country the only support I have is outside the Government.

Foreign Minister Caglayangil: As you know, Mr. Secretary, I had a talk earlier this week with Foreign Minister Bitsios at his request. Our discussion concerned the Aegean. He made it clear that he could not accept our appeal that Greece withdraw its case before the ICJ. He said we could negotiate during the delay between now and the time the Court considers the case. He said we should first take up bilateral questions, the continental shelf and air space issues. If we made progress in these areas, then we could move on to other questions.

The Secretary: What questions would be left?

Foreign Minister Caglayangil: Cyprus.

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5 Bitsios summarized this meeting during his later conversation with Kissinger; see Document 69.
The Secretary: Do they want to settle Cyprus now? I didn’t think they have shown much interest in being involved recently.

Foreign Minister Caglayangil: They speak for the record, so as to make clear that Cyprus is not pushed aside. At the same time, they made clear that at this stage they do not want to take up the Cyprus issue. Bitsios then proceeded to ask me a series of questions about our sincerity and our willingness to negotiate a solution to Aegean problems.

The Secretary: What did you say?

Foreign Minister Caglayangil: I recalled to Bitsios that I had been seeing him off and on for two years. Each time we met, he always asked the same questions and set the same Greek preconditions. I suggested to him that the time had come for the two of us to talk in detail without notes or advisors for two or three days and see if we cannot come up with a set of agreements.

The Secretary: I suppose then the survivor could publish the results. (Laughter.) I know that if Ambassador Macomber were here, he would have had a heart attack by now. He claims you have no sense of humor, and that I drive you crazy with my jokes. As a matter of fact, I don’t joke with the Greeks.

Foreign Minister Caglayangil: You treat me the way you do because you know how thick my back is.

Turkmen: That is an old Turkish expression.

The Secretary: Leaving aside for the moment the question of where the negotiations are to be conducted, what can be negotiated on the Aegean?

Foreign Minister Caglayangil: This is the question I put to Bitsios. I asked him whether he expected to settle our Aegean problems through bilateral negotiations. He said no. In the view of Athens the positions of the two sides are so far apart that only the Court can decide. But the Court is not a technical agency which is capable of delimiting a continental shelf. So, in my view, we must open a debate between us as to how the Aegean should be delimited.

The Secretary: How do you think the Court would rule on the substance of the Aegean dispute? Don’t the Greeks want to go to the Court because they believe they would win the case?

Hartman: I think it is clear that the Greeks believe that the law is more on their side, but there is some understanding that there is equity in the Turkish position as well. Our guess is that the Court will cite the law and ask the two parties to negotiate the equities.

The Secretary: Well, why not let the Court come to this conclusion? What would either side have to lose?

Hartman: Of course, no one can be sure exactly what the Court would decide.
Foreign Minister Caglayangil: I am ready to let the Court make its ruling. I am not afraid of the Court. Indeed, I am beginning to think that the Greeks are proposing delays because they may fear what the Court will decide. In my own view, we should move on to have joint exploration of the Aegean and then delimit after we know what is present in its waters. We could send out a joint boat to explore.

The Secretary: That will be a happy ship!

Foreign Minister Caglayangil: After the exploration, there would be a common understanding of where we are—what is important and what is unimportant.

The Secretary: The Greeks have not rejected this, have they? I had the impression from my conversation with Tzounis in Souda Bay last week that they might be prepared to undertake some joint exploration if one could decide in advance what the disputed area was. Isn’t that your impression, Art?

Hartman: No. I believe the Greeks want to settle the boundary question first before any kind of joint exploration is considered.

Foreign Minister Caglayangil: My position is clear. I want negotiations to get started. But the important question is what are we to negotiate and to what purpose? They only want to begin negotiations in order to have them fail, so they can cite the failure in going back to the Court. I want to settle the issues. As you know, the Aegean air space question is all but settled. One or two more meetings may be required. They do not want to meet on this question now unless there are also parallel talks on the continental shelf at the technical level. I don’t want technical level talks at all. I want the talks to begin on all subjects at the political level. This is the only way anything can be accomplished. Two days ago, I met with Bitsios. He did most of the talking and I did almost nothing but listen. I told him then that I would respond to his proposals on Friday. What I have just told you now, I will tell him when I meet him on Friday.

The Secretary: What should I tell him when I see him later this morning?

Foreign Minister Caglayangil: I would be happy if you could tell the Greeks to put aside their formalistic concerns, to set out with us to find a settlement. They must be told to sit down to negotiate seriously with us, to look at the security and political aspects and adopt an open mind in questions related to equity.

The Secretary: Can the two sides agree on where the disputed area is?

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6 See footnote 5, Document 69.
7 October 1.
Hartman: Yes. One of the problems, however, is that the Greeks seem to know where the resources are and the Turks do not.

Turkmen: That is not the point. What we want to do is to delimit and provide for the utilization of the entire Aegean. We are not talking here about a small area.

The Secretary: Your idea then, as I understand it, is to divide the Aegean in half down the median line and then make some special arrangements for the islands.

Turkmen: Yes, in a crude way, that is our position.

The Secretary: My understanding from my discussion with Tzou- nis last week was that the Greeks would accept joint exploration in the disputed zone, but it has never been clear to me where that disputed zone is.

Foreign Minister Caglayangil: In some parts of the Aegean, we favor joint exploration. In others, there ought to be separate arrangements whereby each side can exploit his own resources. In other words, our position is that either the whole Aegean should be divided in a manner satisfactory to both sides, or the whole Aegean should be jointly explored.

The Secretary: But excluding the territorial waters of the islands.

Foreign Minister Caglayangil: Yes, except for the islands.

Esenbel: The Greek position is totally different. They want the continental shelf fixed starting from the Greek islands, that is, that the islands are the base point from which the continental shelf with Turkey is calculated. That is what we cannot accept. About resources in the Aegean, I am no longer sure that the Greeks know more than we do. We both applied to the same institution in New York in the hope of obtaining maps showing resources in the Aegean, so I would say we are about even in this regard.

The Secretary: I don’t believe the Greeks will ever agree to joint exploration and exploitation of the whole Aegean. As far as I am concerned, having heard the position of the Greeks, such a notion would be out of the question. At the same time, however, I have learned in dealing with our friends in the eastern Mediterranean to let things cook a little. Several weeks ago, for example, I could have sworn we had developed a better result in New York than was eventually worked out ten days later in the Security Council. I would have thought the Greeks would have been far better off had they accepted the proposal we talked about then. But, they seem happy with the Security Council resolution, and so my judgment on these matters must somehow be faulty.

Foreign Minister Caglayangil: No, you are right. The Greeks would have been better off to have accepted the earlier compromise you discussed. Moreover, look at Cyprus. As you know, we had proposed a
cantonal system in Geneva. They would have been feasting in Athens today if they had accepted our proposal then.

The Secretary: You are right. That is one negotiation I permitted to get away from me. I never did understand completely what occurred. One thing is clear—we underestimated British incompetence. Of course, you, too, would have had a heart attack if the Greeks had accepted your proposal. You made your offer knowing the Greeks could not accept, since they would then have voluntarily given up the northern third of the island.

Esenbel: We had indicated a five-cantonal arrangement.

Foreign Minister Caglayangil: This is all beside the point now. Perhaps I could ask a few questions. You will recall that last time we discussed the American elections, I told you I thought Ford had a greater chance of winning than most Americans thought.

The Secretary: I told you then I agreed.

Foreign Minister Caglayangil: I still believe he will win the election.

The Secretary: That is my conclusion also. We have polls which have not yet been published which show Ford ahead by one or two percentage points in the country as a whole. If one figures in the fact that Carter is some 10 percent ahead in the South, the President is clearly ahead everywhere else in the country. I personally now think Ford is going to win. I perceive no big event coming along that could possibly help Carter. Once you begin sliding, unless there is some big event to turn it around . . .

Foreign Minister Caglayangil: If there is a big event, I would think it would work to the detriment of Carter.

Hartman: We would not want you to produce such an event.

Foreign Minister Caglayangil: Another question. In his speech yesterday before the General Assembly, Soviet Foreign Minister Gromyko spoke of the situation concerning arms build-up south of the Soviet Union. What specifically was he referring to?

The Secretary: I have not read his speech. Did he talk about demilitarizing and disarming the areas in the southern Mediterranean?

Turkmen: He didn’t go quite that far.

The Secretary: Can someone get me that portion of the Gromyko speech?

Foreign Minister Caglayangil: My problem was that I didn’t quite understand what Gromyko said. His speech was in English, but it was so poorly translated that I am not completely sure what he was talking about. My impression is, however, that it contained a threat and a warning to the Soviet Union’s southern neighbors.
The Secretary: I will just have to read it before commenting.

Foreign Minister Caglayangil: Another point. Is a Turkish-US Defense Cooperation Agreement stalled? At one point this month, I thought there was some movement, but it is now your view that we can obtain nothing until after the elections.

The Secretary: Yes, that is correct.

Foreign Minister Caglayangil: How soon after the elections?

The Secretary: Immediately after Congress returns we will put great pressure on the legislature to get the agreement through. It is now my turn. I have one question for you. Early in our conversation, you said that without our assistance there could be no settlement. What did you have in mind?

Foreign Minister Caglayangil: What I have said many times before, that Greece will not be flexible on the open issues between us until Congress acts to approve the US-Turkish Defense Cooperation Agreement.

The Secretary: Well, I am sorry to say this will not be possible until Congress returns.

Esenbel: Couldn’t the President call back the Congress before January 7?

The Secretary: He could, but I think that would be most unlikely.

Esenbel: Then not until after January 7.

The Secretary: I would have to say so.

Foreign Minister Caglayangil: There was one further small issue. It is saddening to me how the recent discussions in the General Committee of the United Nations turned out on the issue of the Cyprus agenda item. All we wanted was to enable the Turkish Cypriots to have an equal voice with the Greek Cypriots in the debate. Unfortunately, you decided to be silent in this matter and in the end abstained on the final vote. Right after the vote, the issue of South Africa and apartheid came up, and your delegate urged that the matter be referred to the Special Political Committee so that all the parties to the dispute could be heard. This is exactly the position we wanted for the Turkish Cypriots. So we do not understand why you take one position on an African matter and another on Cyprus.

The Secretary: I didn’t know we were taking this position with respect to apartheid. It was probably the missionary band in the State Department—the retired clergy in the African Bureau. On substance, we agreed with your position, but could find no one else to vote with us. I issued instructions that if the Western Europeans would join us, we would vote with you. Unfortunately, I was told that they all dropped out.

Turkmen: The Germans and the Japanese would have voted with us if you had.
The Secretary: My perception is that we were the last one to give in—that all others gave in before we did.

Hartman: That is correct. The EC–9 decided to vote together and abstain. Once that decision was taken, there was no hope. Germany gave up, as far as we knew, before the UK, who were the last to wither.

Turkmen: The problem was you waited too long. If you had decided two days previously to vote no, we could have gotten eight or nine votes with you. But that is water over the dam now.

Foreign Minister Caglayangil: What should we say to the press when we leave this morning?

The Secretary: We cannot announce a settlement until after I have seen Bitsios. I suppose that we should say that we discussed the Aegean, Cyprus, and bilateral questions, that we had a friendly and useful exchange, that the United States is prepared to do what it can to assist the parties in making progress on their open issues.

Foreign Minister Caglayangil: That is fine with me.
The Secretary: Let me walk you to the elevator.

247. Telegram From the Embassy in Turkey to the Department of State

Ankara, November 8, 1976, 1225Z.


1. The failure of the 94th Congress to approve the new US/Turkish Defense Cooperation Agreement (DCA) prior to its early Oct adjournment may turn out to have more significant consequences than as yet sensed either by the Congress or by many Turks.

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2 The Senate Foreign Relations Committee considered S.J. Res. 204, which implemented the DCA, in September at the request of the Ford administration in order to show Turkey that the process to restore bilateral relations had begun. No action was taken on the resolution prior to adjournment. (Congress and the Nation, 1973–1976, Vol. IV, p. 888)
2. If the Congress had endorsed the DCA before adjournment the Turkish Parliament would almost certainly have soon followed suit, thereby again placing the presently threatened US/Turk military partnership on a stable foundation. Some months from now we may find ourselves looking back on last summer as a lost opportunity which may not come back to us again. This is not inevitable; matters may not take such an unfortunate turn. But it is a sufficiently real possibility as to require that we take clear note of it at this time—and make a major effort to avoid it.

3. A key to the problem is timing. Even if the next Congress endorses the DCA, the effort to restore our relationships here can still fail. It can fail because of the congressional action’s not coming soon enough to avoid the pre-election campaign which we will soon be headed into here in Turkey.

4. The Turkish general elections have to be held not later than next October, and they may come as early as this coming spring. As in the United States, the Turkish political campaigns begin many months before election day and once this period is under way, the Parliament’s tendency is to put off controversial legislative actions until after the election. Acting at least in part on this same principle, the Congress has delayed action on the DCA until mid-winter at the earliest.

5. Even if President Ford had been re-elected, it would appear from our vantage point here that it would at best have been problematic as to whether completion of congressional action on the DCA could have been achieved by a mid-winter time period. With the arrival of a new administration, it would appear that this would be even more problematic. Presumably, any new administration would wish to re-examine the DCA before deciding the stance it would take respecting it. After weighing current circumstances—and our basic interests—in the Eastern Mediterranean, however, I would very much hope that the new administration will decide to endorse this agreement as it is presently written and seek early congressional approval. But even if it should decide to do this, there is still the danger that in competition with the many other problems the new administration must face, this decision will be delayed to a point where mid-winter congressional action becomes an impossibility.

6. An additional factor is the timing of USG–GOG agreement on a new US/Greek DCA. It is possible that the conclusion of this agreement may be delayed until some time after the new administration takes office. If, as we assume, the new administration will wish, if it is

3 See Document 64 and footnote 3 thereto.
at all possible, to go to the Congress with both agreements at the same
time, this could cause further delay in seeking congressional action on
the US-Turkish DCA.

7. While deadline predictions are especially risky, it would appear
to me now that if the Congress has not completed action on the DCA
by mid-March, it will then be too late for the Turkish Parliament to act
on it prior to their own election campaigns. If I am correct in my as-
sumption that the elections will be next fall rather than next spring,
this means that Turkish parliamentary action will be delayed for the
better part of an additional year. Moreover, it is likely to mean that the
agreement itself will become an important and controversial issue in
the campaign. For the longer the Congress delays action on the DCA
the more likely it is that the political opposition to the Demirel gov-
ernment (and increasing segments of the Turkish public) will become
committed to the defeat or renegotiation of the DCA, and/or that the
Demirel government itself may collapse or be defeated, thus leaving
the DCA with no sponsor. All this in turn means that by November
1977, when the election is over and the Turkish Parliament has recon-
vened, there can be no assurances that the agreement can still be passed
by the Parliament, even though today it would be passed without very
much difficulty—and once passed would cease to be either a major or
current issue here.

8. In addition, the longer we delay in putting back on a solid ba-
sis the US/Turk relationship, the longer we add to the risk of serious
Greek/Turk confrontations—confrontations which could eventually be
of a character to threaten prospects for restoring military partnerships
with either Turkey or Greece.

9. We have considered what the situation would be here if Con-
gress did not complete action on the DCA before the Turkish political
campaign started but did give its endorsement sometime after the cam-
paign was underway. This would perhaps have a marginally benefi-
cial effect in reducing the political contentiousness of this issue in the
campaign, but only a marginal one. It would also give us the oppor-
tunity to argue that all the shut down installations should immediately
be reopened. (Turk negotiators in Washington last March said that these
installations would be reopened immediately after favorable congres-
sional action, but that was before the GOT decided that the agreement
also had to be put through its own Parliament.) Unfortunately, how-
ever, I believe that the GOT could not agree to do this prior to its own
Parliament having acted, particularly in the midst of a hard-fought po-
itical campaign.

10. Possibly the consequences of delayed congressional action
could turn out to be less serious than the foregoing suggests. If Con-
gress should continue to vote significant military assistance levels to
Turkey in the interim, both governments could end up muddling through an extended additional period of uncertainty. It is also possible, although I think unlikely, that in the intervening period, international and/or Turkish domestic developments would not rule out congressional and parliamentary approval roughly 13 to 15 months from now. To count on this, however, is a high-risk course indeed.

11. It is also possible that having found that we can get through one additional year or somewhat more without an agreement (but with continuing military assistance appropriations), we could then continue to get along in the years thereafter, still without either side having acted formally on the DCA. Again this would be a high-risk course, but it is a possibility that cannot be ruled out altogether. Should we end up following this latter route, we would have to insist on the opening of most of our closed down installations. We might not need to insist on all being reopened but certainly most of them must be allowed to function if the flow of our assistance is to continue. Even if our relationship could limp along in this way, however, it would be seriously plagued by the absence of all the key administrative and other vital arrangements which have been so carefully battled over in the DCA. Eventually we would have to work out, formally or informally, substitute arrangements which are not likely to be as desirable or workable as those embodied in the present DCA.

12. Another course that the new administration may examine is the negotiating of a new DCA, or at least the entering into of new negotiations designed to amend the present DCA—while insuring that at least the present level of military assistance continues to flow while this process is under way. The serious danger here, however, is that such an action would continue to invite all the basic risks of delay noted earlier. It also risks our ending up with either no agreement or an agreement less advantageous to us than the present one.

13. Still another approach would be to adopt the position of a number of congressional critics, i.e., that the DCA should be pressed with the Congress only when there is substantial progress in the Cyprus situation. Any public attempt to use this kind of open leverage on the Turks will be as unwise and unsuccessful in the future as it has been in the past. It will not produce progress on Cyprus. It will only hasten the deterioration of the US-Turk security partnership. On the other hand, the Turks have an even greater security stake in restoring the US-Turk partnership than does the US. If they can, without a display of public duress, be pushed into a more flexible and constructive stance on the Cyprus problem, this could help immeasurably with the Congress and thus help also Turkey’s own security position. For the basic reasons repeatedly spelled out in the Embassy’s earlier reporting, this will not be easy to accomplish. In a separate message, however, we will
be commenting on how a new effort in this regard might most effectively be mounted.\textsuperscript{4}

14. Regardless of whether such an effort can succeed, however, the basic point of this message remains: namely, that failure to get early congressional endorsement of the new DCA risks the continued deterioration and disintegration of the US-Turk security partnership. Given the importance of this partnership to the world strategic balance and to US security interests, it therefore seems to me that it is essential that the present administration make a major effort to convince the new administration of the need to move the DCA through the Congress in the early weeks of the next congressional session.

15. Otherwise we may find that inadvertently, but quite possibly irrevocably, we have lost a military partnership which, in our own security interest, we simply cannot afford to lose. This is not to suggest that if the partnership does disintegrate the Turks will switch sides in the Cold War. Initially they will probably not leave NATO. What will take place, however, (along with a probable increase in Greek-Turkish tensions) is (1) a disintegration of strength on the eastern flank of NATO; (2) the creation of a power vacuum in this area with all the obvious dangers this entails; and (3) a serious diminution of the US presence in the Eastern Mediterranean, along with all that this in turn entails not only for our NATO interests, but also for our interests with respect to Israel and the rest of the Middle East.

\textit{Macomber}

\textsuperscript{4} Not found.
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