MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION

PARTICIPANTS:

Pakistan

Aziz Ahmed, Minister of State for Foreign Affairs
Yaquub Khan, Ambassador to the US
Iqbal Riza, Minister, Pakistan Embassy
Iqbal Akhund, Permanent Representative to the UN

United States

Henry A. Kissinger, Secretary of State
and Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs
Alfred L. Atherton, Jr., Assistant Secretary of State for Near Eastern & South Asian Affairs
Robert B. Oakley, NSC Staff

DATE AND TIME:

Tuesday, September 30, 1975
11:30 a.m. - 12:15 p.m.

PLACE:

Suite 34-A, Waldorf Towers
New York, New York

Ahmed:

Congratulations on your success in the Middle East. It must have been tough.

Kissinger:

It was rough but not nearly as rough as since I came back. We are in a nihilistic phase of Congressional behaviour. Of course, they are hurting themselves by this since the really damaging thing politically would be to attack the Administration on domestic policy rather than foreign policy. What do they think they are doing? In any event, I am relaxed since this cannot last.

Ahmed:

Look at the investigation of the CIA and everything else.
Kissinger: It is typical of this stage of nihilism. I have refused to allow them to call up Foreign Service Officers to testify on what their policy recommendations were. This would be like the McCarthy period. My decision will cause a tremendous brawl.

Ahmed: We have submitted to you two lists of arms we need.

Kissinger: I hope the nuclear weapons are on the second list.

Ahmed: They are on the third list; we have the Pershing on the second list.

Kissinger: The Pershing issue is a big fraud. We never had any intention of giving it to Israel in any foreseeable time frame. The people who are pushing all this are the pro-Israelis who want to lock us into commitments to Israel. But you didn't want it anyway.

Ahmed: No, only the nuclear weapons.

Kissinger: The 1960 models are in surplus now so we should be able to give you some—but I had better watch what I say since there is no telling what you might report back to Bhutto.

Ahmed: We are being modest and restrained in handling the arms question.

Kissinger: Do you have the money yet?

Ahmed: We will find it from Saudi Arabia. But we think it will be easier to get answers first from you on just what is available and how much it costs. Then we can go to the Saudis.

Kissinger: I can inform you that we have approval to supply you with 24 TOW launchers and 450 missiles. You can get started on a training program while awaiting delivery of the rest. It is our intention to start slowly on our new military relationship with you, concentrating on defensive weapons, and get it going well before it can.
Kissinger: be disrupted. So let us not give any publicity to the TOW's or the invitation we are extending to your Air Marshal. Let us build up slowly but steadily—with maybe some artillery next—weapons that can reasonably be described as defensive.

Ahmed: We have been very careful in compiling our lists.

Kissinger: If you narrow the gap with India to 1 to 10 you will be in good shape. Seriously, we want you strong enough so that India will be afraid to attack.

Ahmed: We want A-7 and other weapons in a hurry. India might well attack us the 2nd or 3rd week of November in Kashmir.

Kissinger: Can they really attack there? I thought the terrain was too rugged, and it would seem as aggression anyway.

Ahmed: According to the Indian Constitution, all of Kashmir is part of India. We can take them on in Kashmir but they will fight us all along the border. We cannot be certain but we think this will happen and we must look out for it. If it happens, it will be a two-front war with Afghanistan joining in anytime there is war with India. But we can handle this with the A-7.

Kissinger: It has very long range and is an attack plane, isn't it?

Ahmed: Yes. Are you saying it is not considered defensive? It is a fighter as well.

Kissinger: I am simply stating facts about the plane.

Ahmed: We have been very interested in this plane for a long time. We want about 110 of them. We also need weapons in a short time frame since ordinary delivery will never get them in our hands before the war in November. We will do our best by ourselves but we need arms. It all depends on the USSR. The Indians cannot move without Soviet approval because of their treaty which obliges the USSR to help India.
Kissinger: The treaty is not so binding.

Ahmed: Yes it is since if India is attacked, the USSR is obliged to come in until the threat is removed. Really, this would bring the Soviets in even if India went first and we hit back. So whenever India wants to start something, she must have Soviet support. We think India will probably start a war. Mid-November to mid-December is the probable time. This year is unlikely, but we must be watchful, and next year is more certain. If we seem to be in trouble, the Afghans will join in. We have told our chaps to be ready to do their best on two fronts and not to expect anyone to come to their help. Outside help is a bonus and they should not count upon it. Iran could stop the Afghans by moving some of its units up to the borders but it would not do so for fear of the USSR. So what they will really do to help us is questionable. Nor have we been able to get China to assure us of support. That is why we need weapons off the shelf.

Kissinger: We have serious problems with our own army on rapid delivery. Don't you have a team coming soon? We can discuss all this when they come in October.

Ahmed: Thank you. That is the best approach. Also, concerning the Soviet threat, you know about the Soviet Ambassador in Kabul. When Bhutto had the Soviet Ambassador in Islamabad in to ask about this, he had us all present. The Soviet Ambassador said he would report immediately to Moscow and was sure it would be cleared up soon. He would let us know. But he has never returned. When our Ambassador to Moscow took it up there, the Foreign Ministry expressed surprise that we would credit any such statement. But when our Ambassador asked the Soviets about the Durand line, they said they were "not empowered" to discuss borders. It is not conclusive but it is very worrisome and worthy of note. We have informed you and the Iranians and the Chinese.
Kissinger: As I told you in Ankara, we would take a grave view of Soviet machinations and you can be certain that the Soviets understand that. The Indian Foreign Minister will be in Washington next week and I will tell him that any Indian pressure on Pakistan will ruin Indian efforts at friendlier relations with the United States. They are trying hard to improve their relations with us at the present time, due to their internal developments. It is nothing spectacular, but it is interesting.

Ahmed: Will there be a Communique in connection with Chavan's visit?

Kissinger: An agreed minute of the Joint Commission meeting, words but no real substance. The biggest question concerning the visit is whether I will be able to survive a dinner given by Ambassador Yaqub's colleague, Ambassador Kaul. He insists upon making some sort of comment about each of his guests after dinner, and since he takes at least half a minute for at least forty guests, that is already twenty minutes and then he gives a long toast in which he attacks United States policy. It is very boring. The last time I was at one of his affairs he gave a toast saying that some nations like economic power and some like military power but India likes spiritual power. I replied that I was surprised that he came out with spiritual power since I had expected him to say India has chosen nuclear power. In Bhutto's recent letter to President Ford he said that Pakistan may have to adjust its policy to meet the political realities in the area. What does that mean?

Ahmed: There will be no change in our relationship with you or with the Chinese, you can be sure of that.

Kissinger: What is the Chinese mood?

Ahmed: We hope we can get more support from them. They have been hard to pin down. They defer to you so I hope that you will talk to them about Pakistan when you go to China.
Kissinger: What is their attitude toward the United States?

Ahmed: Last night, Chou gave me the impression that it is about time something happened as a follow-up by you to the Shanghai Communique. As you know, they have been very cautious and patient on this issue but for the first time I detected a bit of impatience. In the past he has always said he appreciates the problems of the United States. This time he did not say that and he hinted that China is impatient. But they clearly want to continue to have good relations with you.

Kissinger: I will get eager on October 17 or 18.

Ahmed: Will you also visit Pakistan?

Kissinger: I simply do not have the time although I would love it. On this subject, I notice that your Prime Minister is excited over the visit by President Ford. You know we never set a date for the visit and whether or not President Ford visits Pakistan is not dependent upon what he does with India. We have a special relationship.

Ahmed: Can he come in connection with his visit to China?

Kissinger: This was never planned and I cannot imagine how anyone got this idea. You know how the Chinese are. Certainly we would never consider going to India or even to Pakistan in connection with a visit to China. It has always been seen as a separate trip. The President may visit Southeast Asia after China, perhaps the Philippines. They need to be shored up after what happened in Indo-China. Is it true that you are buying arms from North Vietnam?

Ahmed: We have made some inquiries but there is nothing definite. The article in Newsweek saying we are interested in buying arms from North Vietnam upset them very much although the leak did not come from us. We have no details of what they can supply and we have made no decision but we are checking. It appears that almost everything belongs to South Vietnam. We shall have to see what happens.
Kissinger: I do not know what they have to sell. Some things in some categories but I do not believe they have large overall totals. Also, I do not know what kind of shape it is in.

Ahmed: We are having more trouble with the Tarbela Dam. Last year we had to empty the reservoir in order to repair damage to the tunnels. This has been fixed but it now turns out that the river bed has been scarred by closing the tunnels and this must be repaired. This means a delay in refilling the reservoir with a subsequent loss of water for irrigation. We had been counting on a good crop this year, especially for wheat, in 1976 but it now looks as if we shall have to wait for another year. Can you help us with more PL 480 wheat?

Kissinger: What do we have already planned?

Atherton: 500,000 tons in the planning figure. The same as for India.

Ahmed: We needed at least one million before learning of the Tarbela problem. Now we need more.

Kissinger: We shall review the problem and see what can be done. Who built the dam with which you are having so much trouble? Repairing a big dam is a very tricky problem.

Ahmed: It was a French, Italian construction with some participation by the United States. It is the biggest dam in the world and they may have taken on more than they could handle.

Kissinger: We shall see what we can do with PL 480.