
2. MEHTA'S CONVERSATION WITH THE DCM PRIMARILY RELATED TO THE COLOMBO CONFERENCE. HE DIGRESSED REGARDING INDIA'S PROBLEMS WITH BANGLADESH AND PAKISTAN IN WAYS WHICH, PARTICULARLY IN LIGHT OF SUCCEEDING CONVERSATIONS, BECAME RELEVANT TO US-INDIA RELATIONS. AFTER DESCRIBING THE STATUS OF INDIA'S PROBLEMS WITH BANGLADESH, MEHTA SAID THAT WHILE HE DID NOT WISH TO SPEAK OFFICIALLY, HE VERY MUCH HOPED THAT SOMETHING MIGHT BE DONE TO
DEMONSTRATE THAT THE US DOES NOT REJOICE IN THE DIFFICULTIES BETWEEN BANGLADESH AND INDIA. THE DCM REPLIED, OF COURSE, THAT EXCEPT FOR ECONOMIC MATTERS THE US HAD REFRAINED FROM US INVOLVEMENT IN BANGLADESH'S AFFAIRS. WE REPORT THIS TO INDICATE THAT MEHTA, WHOM WE BELIEVE IS SEEKING TO IMPROVE RELATIONS WITH THE US, STILL BELIEVES HE NEEDS HELP IN DEMONSTRATING US BONA FIDES IN BANGLADESH.

3. SHIFTING TO PAKISTAN, MEHTA SPECULATED ABOUT PAKISTAN'S MOVIES IN REGARD TO RECENT STATEMENTS CONCERNING KASHMIR. HE WONDERED IF THEY WERE MADE FOR PUBLIC CONSUMPTION OR IF THEY REPRESENTED SOMETHING MORE SERIOUS. IN ANY EVENT, HE SAID, ALTHOUGH INDIA HAS SO FAR REFRAINED FROM ANY COMMENT, IT CANNOT DO SO INDEFINITELY. (DELHI IS A BIT NERVOUS ABOUT ITS SOMEWHAT SHAKY POLITICAL RELATIONS WITH SHEIKH ABDULLAH AT PRESENT AND MAY BE PARTICULARLY SENSITIVE TO BHUTTO'S COMMENTS ABOUT KASHMIR IN THESE CIRCUMSTANCES.) THEN MEHTA ASKED RHEUORICALLY IF SOME METHOD MIGHT NOT BE FOUND BY WHICH THE ANXIETIES OF THE SUBCONTINENT COULD BE ASSUAGED.


5. THE NEXT DAY TEJA WAS SOMETHAT MORE SPECIFIC REGARDING US MILITARY SALES BUT STILL RESTRAINED. IF US ARMS SUPPLY TO PAKISTAN IS OF SUFFICIENT QUANTITY TO HAVE "POLITICAL IMPACT", HE SAID, IT

6. THESE DISCUSSIONS LEAD US TO SEVERAL TENTATIVE CONCLUSIONS. FIRST, IT IS OBVIOUS THAT THERE ARE THOSE HIGH IN THE GOI WHO CONTINUE TO BELIEVE THAT THE US IS OPERATING AGAINST INDIA'S INTEREST IN BOTH BANGLADESH AND PAKISTAN; AND THERE ARE THOSE, SUCH AS THE FOREIGN SECRETARY, WHO WOULD LIKE TO BE ABLE TO PROVE THEM WRONG. SECOND, IT SEEMS CLEAR THAT TACTICALLY AT LEAST, THE GOI HAS BEEN HANDLING THE ARMS ISSUE QUITE DIFFERENTLY FROM IN THE PAST. IT HAS NOT COMPLAINED ABOUT MODEST SALES AND, INDEED, HAS NOT YET MADE AN ISSUE WITH US IN DELHI OF THOSE SALES WHICH ARE NOW BEFORE THE SENATE COMMITTEE. THIRD, IT IS CLEAR, HOWEVER, THAT THE GOI SEES A LIMIT TO ITS RESTRAINT AND THE A-7 EXCEEDS THAT LIMIT. MANTEL WAS TOLD BY THE MEA PLANNING JOINT SECRETARY (DAMODARAN) THAT INDIA DID NOT SEE AN A-7 TRADE OFF FOR REPROCESSING FACILITIES AS ACCEPTABLE IN ANY WAY. THERE ALSO SEEMS TO BE A MUCH MORE VAGUELY DEFINED LIMIT WHICH IS THAT QUANTITY OF ARMS SALES WHICH THE INDIANS SEE AS AFFECTING PAKISTAN'S STANCE REGARDING INDIA. IN THIS REGARD INDIAN OFFICIALS HAVE MADE IT CLEAR THAT OTHER FACTORS SUCH AS TIMING AND THE STATE OF US-INDIA RELATIONS WOULD HAVE AN EFFECT ON THEIR REACTION TO US ARMS SALES. IF US-INDIA RELATIONS WERE WARM AND A US ARMS SALE TO PAKISTAN WAS NOT MADE AT A TIME OF INDIA-PAKISTAN DIFFICULTY, INDIA MIGHT NOT BE CONCERNED ABOUT IT.

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7. We don't want to exaggerate the importance of this dialogue which in some regard resembles that which has taken place over the years and which we often would prefer to forget. We did note, however, a touch of restraint and a suspicion of a slightly more tolerant attitude throughout Mantei's numerous meetings in Delhi. This may represent change, or better tactics, or simply the views of intelligent Indians during rational moments.

8. We were particularly struck by the relaxed Indian attitude toward US arms sales to Iran. Several senior MEA officials (those responsible for planning, Soviet affairs, and even Pakistan) and the director of the Institute for Def Studies and Analysis told Mantei that while they did not necessarily agree with Iran's fears which engendered its arms purchases, neither were they concerned about Iran as a strategic rival in the future or as a potential arms supplier to Pakistan. The MEA Joint Secretary for Soviet Affairs remarked that the Russians had repeatedly urged the danger of the arms buildup in Iran to India in conversations with GOI officials and had been politely told that the Indians were not concerned since their relations with Iran were now excellent. Even assuming an element of disingenuousness, this argument, it
IS AT LEAST EVIDENT THAT INDIA IS NOT PREPARED TO EXPRESS ANY COMPLAINT ABOUT IRANIAN PURCHASES TO THE US OR IRAN ITSELF. SALES TO SAUDI ARABIA, ON THE OTHER HAND, WERE POTENTIALLY RISKIER FOR INDIA—OFFICIALS TOLD MANTEL—SINCE THE SAUDIS MIGHT WELL RASHLY COMMIT THEIR RESOURCES TO PAKISTANI ASSISTANCE.