

# Radio Free Europe and Radio Liberty

## 28. Memorandum for the 303 Committee<sup>1</sup>

Washington, January 27, 1969.

### SUBJECT

Radio Free Europe (RFE) and Radio Liberty (RL)

#### 1. Summary

The aims of this paper are three-fold. It offers (a) a review of efforts made to resolve the status of the Radios since the press disclosures of CIA covert funding activities in 1967; (b) it describes the activities and effectiveness of Free Europe, Inc., and Radio Liberty Committee, Inc.; and (c) it discusses three basic alternatives for the Radios, and the consequences of each.

This paper concludes that the only realistic hope of retaining the present benefits of the Radios is in continuing their status quo, and therefore recommends that the Committee endorse and recommend to higher authority their continued operation as CIA proprietary covert action projects, to be funded in amounts sufficient to keep them technologically competitive with comparable broadcasters.

#### 2. Problem

Radio Free Europe and Radio Liberty have been the oldest, largest, most costly, and probably most successful covert action projects aimed at the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe. They represent an investment over almost 20 years of \$350 million, and currently are undertakings that involve some [number not declassified] people and a cost of \$32 million annually. Following the 1967 disclosures of CIA covert funding activities, and the enunciation of the Katzenbach guidelines proscribing such support to private voluntary organizations, repeated efforts were made to find a politically less vulnerable alternative means of supporting the

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<sup>1</sup> Source: Department of State, INR/IL Historical Files, 303 Committee Files, January–June 1969. Secret; Eyes Only. Tabs A–H, described below, are attached but not printed. No drafting information appears on the memorandum.

Radios.<sup>2</sup> A one-time grant that assured their continuation through June 1969 was approved by higher authority in December 1967. The status and funding of the Radios beyond that date must be resolved at an early date.

### 3. *Factors Bearing on the Problem*

#### A. *Origin of the Requirement*

The requirement for a reappraisal of RFE and RL originated in the flood of publicity in early 1967, and in the policy guidelines laid down by the Katzenbach Committee to the effect that, "No Federal agency shall provide any covert financial assistance or support, direct or indirect, to any of the nation's educational or private voluntary organizations."

Because RFE and RL did not represent a clear-cut case of CIA involvement with legitimate American private voluntary organizations, and because they have been of such importance to U.S. policy interests for so long, Secretary Rusk decided that the Radios fell outside the purview of the Rusk Committee, which had been appointed by President Johnson to review overt funding possibilities for the "CIA orphans." Secretary Rusk requested instead that the Radios be handled as a special case, and that consideration of their future be undertaken by the 303 Committee.

On 29 June 1967, the 303 Committee considered nine alternatives submitted by CIA:

1. status quo
2. conversion from non-profit to profit-making corporations
3. reincorporation abroad
4. relocation abroad
5. support by an umbrella public-private mechanism as envisioned by the Katzenbach Report
6. support by a public-private mechanism specially intended to promote private international broadcasting
7. overt funding by USIA
8. transfer to USIA/VOA
9. termination

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<sup>2</sup> On February 15, 1967, President Johnson appointed a committee composed of Under Secretary of State Nicholas Katzenbach (Chairman), Secretary of Health, Education and Welfare John W. Gardner, and Director of Central Intelligence Richard Helms. The panel was established in response to press reports, particularly in *Ramparts* magazine (February 1967), of CIA secret funding over the years of the activities of private organizations, which became involved in confrontations with Communist-influenced groups at international gatherings. (*The New York Times*, February 16, 1967, pp. 1, 26) The Katzenbach Committee presented its report to the President on March 29, 1967; see *American Foreign Policy: Current Documents, 1967*, pp. 1214–1217. For text of President Johnson's statement endorsing the report's conclusions, see *Public Papers: Johnson, 1967*, Book 1, pp. 403–404. For relevant documentation, see *Foreign Relations, 1964–1968*, volume X, National Security Policy, Documents 186, and 197 and *ibid.*, volume XXXIII, Organization and Management of Foreign Policy; United Nations, Documents 26–29.

The 303 Committee reduced these to three possibilities—status quo, support by a public-private mechanism established by Congress, and transfer to USIA—and appointed an interagency Radio Study Group to further analyze the main stumbling blocks of these remaining alternatives. This Group consisted of representatives from State, Defense, Bureau of the Budget, USIA, CIA and the White House.

The Radio Study Group and its subcommittees conducted an exhaustive two-month study which included consultations with the Embassies in the Radios' host and target countries. The Group's study, presented to the 303 Committee on 20 September 1967, found only two realistic choices—continuation as constituted, or termination—and recommended that RFE and RL operations be continued on substantially their existing scale. The Bureau of the Budget registered a demurrer to these conclusions, recommending instead that RL be terminated and that RFE either be given a one-time terminal grant or an open appropriation by USIA until other arrangements could be made. The 303 Committee decided to summarize the problem and present it for the personal decision of the President on the advice of the Secretaries of State and Defense. (See Tab A for Radio Study Group Report.)

While the problem was under consideration by the three principals, the Director of Central Intelligence, on the authority of the President, canvassed key Congressional reactions to the various alternatives. The Congressional leaders consulted were: Senator Richard B. Russell, Senator Milton R. Young, Representative George M. Mahon, Representative Frank T. Bow, and Representative Glenard P. Lipscomb. They unanimously agreed to continued funding of these activities. The Director was also advised by the President's Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board that it was unanimous in its belief that the Agency should continue supporting the Radios, and that it wished these opinions made known to the President.

On the basis of these reactions, the Bureau of the Budget proposed in November 1967 that both Radios be surge-funded with one-time grants in amounts sufficient to sustain them through FY 1969. This course was considered by the 303 Committee and recommended to the President on 15 December 1967. Thus, in December 1967, RFE and RL were given lump sums totaling \$49 million. This arrangement technically concluded CIA's financial relationship with the Radios in compliance with the Katzenbach Committee stipulation that all covert aid to private voluntary or educational organizations should cease by 31 December 1967, but left open the way to future resumption of CIA covert financial responsibility should this be decided by a new Administration. In practice, and as requested by the 303 Committee, [*1½ lines not declassified*].

While no provision was made for their existence after 30 June 1969, the thrust of the 303 Committee's recommendation in December 1967 leaned strongly toward their continuation.

In November 1968, facing the question of whether to include Radio funds in CIA's FY 1970 budget, the Bureau of the Budget again reopened the question of the Radios' future status in an independent analysis of the problem that outlined five alternative solutions:

1. resume CIA covert funding without public acknowledgement by determining that the Radios are in the "overriding national security interest" as defined by Katzenbach doctrine;
2. resume covert CIA funding, reincorporate the Radios abroad;
3. allocate \$30 million to CIA's FY 1970 contingency reserve and leave the ultimate decision to the new Administration;
4. commence overt funding through USIA or State Department;
5. provide for overt appropriations through a public-private mechanism established by Congress.

The Director of the Bureau of the Budget, with the concurrence of State, USIA, CIA, and Mr. Walt Rostow, recommended the third alternative to the President. In December, however, the President wrote off the \$30 million which was recommended for inclusion in the Agency's contingency reserve in favor of leaving both the policy decision and the budgetary problem in the hands of the incoming Administration.

Whichever of the various alternatives is agreed upon, the decision must be made at the earliest possible date, so that either normal operations can be assured for FY 1970, or termination plans can be set in motion.

#### B. *Activities*

Originally intended as political action instruments to mobilize the post-war emigration from Eastern Europe and the USSR into an effective opposition, the parent organizations of the two Radios have long since turned virtually their entire efforts to broadcasting. In doing so, their broadcasts have evolved in step with the development of official U.S. policies toward these countries. For nearly 20 years, the two Radios have used the cover of privately financed, non-profit American corporations. But during that time funds have come largely from CIA, [1½ lines not declassified].

##### 1. *Radio Free Europe (RFE)*

Radio Free Europe has been in operation since 1949, and currently broadcasts 19 hours a day to Poland, Hungary, and Czechoslovakia, 12 hours a day to Romania, and 8 hours a day to Bulgaria. It is the principal activity of an organizational parent body, Free Europe, Inc. (FE, Inc.), located in New York City, which also sponsors *East Europe* magazine and other publications, supports East European émigré groups,

conducts large-scale book-mailing programs into Eastern Europe, and facilitates diverse East-West contacts. General Lucius D. Clay is Chairman of the Board of Directors of Free Europe, Inc.; the President is William P. Durkee. Other members of the Board include Crawford H. Greenewalt, Roswell L. Gilpatric, Michael H. Haider, Livingston T. Merchant, and Robert D. Murphy. James M. Roche, Chairman of General Motors Corporation, has accepted the Chairmanship of Radio Free Europe Fund, Inc. (RFEF), the fund-raising arm of FE, Inc.

RFE's programming headquarters are located in Munich, Germany, with transmitters in Biblis and Holzkirchen, Germany, and in Gloria, Portugal. The facilities are licensed by the host countries under agreements entered into directly by RFE as a private corporation, and without the intercession or official acknowledgement of support by the U.S. Government. RFE is operating in Portugal on the basis of a ten-year license renewed in 1963, and in Germany on a year-to-year, automatically renewable license.

FE, Inc., employs [*number not declassified*] people and has an FY 1969 budget of [*dollar amount not declassified*], of which \$16,418,000 is for RFE. Of the total budget, [*dollar amount not declassified*] was raised by RFEF.

There is an abundance of testimony to RFE's effectiveness as an important factor in the life of Eastern Europe. It comes to us from U.S. officials stationed in the target areas, as well as from regime officials who have remarked both publicly and privately on the success of the Radio in attracting listeners. This in turn is supported by audience research data gathered by USIA and by RFE itself, showing RFE to be the most widely listened to Western station in Eastern Europe. This would suggest that RFE satisfies urgent needs of the majority of the population of these countries which are not and, as the result of domestic political conditions, cannot be satisfied by their home radio stations and censored press. (See Tab B for audience research studies.)

During the historic spring and summer of 1968, RFE's audience in Poland, Hungary, and Romania reached an all-time high, as people listened to the Radio for news of developments in Czechoslovakia, denied to them by their own media. In Czechoslovakia itself, primarily because of the freedom accorded domestic media by the Dubcek regime, the RFE audience declined temporarily. But after 21 August, and particularly after the clandestine Czech radios encountered difficulty in obtaining adequate information and maintaining consistent service, the population turned toward RFE, and its September 1968 audience research poll showed that listenership reached a record 71 per cent. (See Tab C for research poll.)

In this crisis period, RFE informed its Czechoslovak audience of the world's indignation at the invasion, including the criticism expressed by Romania and Yugoslavia and by a majority of the Western

Communist Parties. The regular broadcasting schedule was extended to 24 hours a day, with news broadcasts every half-hour.

The impact of the Radio on the Czechoslovak people during the crisis impressed Ambassador Beam to such an extent that he said on 31 October, "They are doing a great job." He also noted that Radio Prague had relied on RFE's coverage of the Olympics in Mexico City rather than originate its own programming. (See Tab D for Czech statements.)

Former Ambassador Gronouski cabled from Warsaw in March 1968 during the student demonstrations that as much as 40–50 per cent of the student population followed RFE for news of the riots, particularly in quest of information from other parts of the country, and that the news broadcasts were "especially appreciated by the Polish audience." Another Warsaw report stated that many Poles were full of praise for RFE's coverage of the news, noting particularly that RFE broadcasts obliged the Polish media to react hastily in their own news treatment, with considerable fumbling as they attempted to present their version of the facts.

Ambassador Hillenbrand in Budapest reported that RFE has unquestionably furnished its Hungarian audience with more, and more timely, information on the Polish riots and the Czechoslovak situation than did the local media. Further information received from the Embassy in Budapest indicates that RFE's appeal seems to be increasing in Hungary, and that despite the regime's displeasure, Hungarian officials listen to it regularly and probably use it as a gauge of public sentiment and reactions.

One of the most valuable service that RFE performs for its target audience is that of cross-reporting news from other East European countries that is suppressed by regime media. Thus, RFE has been able to tell its Polish, Romanian, Hungarian, and Bulgarian listeners about the Czechoslovak liberalization program from the fall of Novotny to the present day. Likewise, Czechoslovakians, Bulgarians, Hungarians, and Romanians heard details of the Polish student demonstration that they would not possibly have learned from regime organs. Yugoslav developments, the independent moves of Romania, all of these are immediately made available to the other Bloc countries by RFE.

Testimony to the efficacy of radio in general—and RFE in particular—came recently in response to Secretary Rusk's request to all U.S. diplomatic missions for suggestions on specific ways for the United States to call attention to its efforts in the Paris talks with North Vietnam. Ambassador Hillenbrand replied that the official media of the countries of Eastern Europe are offset by widespread listening to foreign broadcasts and recommended that maximum feasible attention be given to publicizing the U.S. position on RFE and VOA. The Embassy in Warsaw reported that "with respect to the Polish public, we feel that

U.S. broadcast media—which are the most effective means of reaching broad elements of the Polish population—should continue full factual coverage of the Paris talks and other developments relating to Vietnam.” (See Tab E for official documents.)

## 2. *Radio Liberty (RL)*

Radio Liberty has been broadcasting to the Soviet Union since 1953, and transmits 24 hours a day in Russian, 14 hours a day in Ukrainian, and lesser amounts in 15 other languages of the USSR. Radio Liberty Committee, Inc. (RLC), the parent body located in New York City, also sponsors the Institute for the Study of the USSR in Munich, conducts the Agency’s largest book-mailing program to the USSR, and runs a program for providing Latin American press and radio with journalistic material on Communism developed by RL. The President of RLC is Howland H. Sargeant, and its Trustees include General Alfred Gruenther, Peter Grace, Jr., and Whitney Seymour.

RL’s programming headquarters are also situated in Munich, with transmitters in Lampertheim, Germany, in Pals, Spain, and Pa Li, Taiwan. RL’s license agreement with the West German Government is valid to 9 July 1971. Although the West Germans have the option of terminating the agreement earlier, their relations with RL are extremely good and it is not expected that they will exercise this option. The Radio’s Spanish license was granted for 12 years on 15 July 1959, and its Taiwan license does not expire until 30 July 1971.

The Radio Liberty Committee, Inc., currently employs [*number not declassified*] people and has an FY 1969 budget of \$12,953,000, of which [*dollar amount not declassified*] is for RL.

Replying to a State Department request for an evaluation of Radio Liberty in July 1967, Ambassador Llewellyn Thompson recommended that RL be continued in operation. Noting that RL broadcasts are heavily jammed, he said that despite this interference it has been able to hold on to an audience. He also pointed out that jamming operations tie up Soviet resources and entail costs which, together with the impact of the broadcasts on the population, might make it possible for the United States Government to use eventual cessation of RL broadcasts as an indirect bargaining counter at a later date. Ambassador Thompson said that the political climate at that time was not suitable for making a unilateral concession. (See Tab F for Ambassador Thompson’s cable.) Since July 1967, the atmosphere has deteriorated. The USSR has intensified its jamming of RL, resumed jamming of VOA and other Western broadcasters, rejected an official U.S. protest on this subject, and registered a protest of its own over the printing of a collection of Soviet protest documents in USIA’s *Problems of Communism*.

RL’s reaction to the nine-month Czechoslovak interlude and the subsequent invasion has been to encourage, prior to the invasion, a

crisis of confidence in the Soviet leadership's judgment and intentions, and afterwards to arouse apprehension over the leadership's misreading and brutal handling of the Czechoslovak situation, and to inculcate doubt as to the rationality of CPSU policy-making in times of stress. During the invasion, RL pressed into service its previously experimental one thousand kilowatt (megawatt) transmitter, and the Moscow Embassy has reported that its monitoring indicates that this signal can more than hold its own against the previously impenetrable groundwave jamming in the metropolitan Moscow area where the elite target audience lives. (See Tab G for monitoring and Embassy reports.)

In the USSR intellectual turmoil has begun to verge on political dissent, and RL has been particularly well suited to respond to this development. About 20 per cent of all output has focused on these sensitive areas. Among other things, it has broadcast the texts of virtually every one of the scores of Soviet protest documents, something VOA has been reluctant to do because of its official status, and frequently has read them at dictation speed so that they can be copied by listeners for further dissemination inside the USSR. In the fall and winter of 1967–68, RL concentrated heavily on reporting Soviet persecution of Ukrainian nationalist intellectuals, and serious youth problems in Georgia and Moldavia. Immediately afterward, in March 1968, the Ukrainian Party Secretary responsible for ideological and cultural affairs was demoted, and Radio Kiev was obliged to present a special interview with an official of the prosecutor's office to answer queries which, according to the broadcast, stemmed from the "noisy sensation" created by foreign press and radio about the trials of Ukrainian intellectuals.

There has never existed a firm basis on which to estimate the size of RL's audience. But several indicators of RL's relative standing are available. It is known, for instance, that even without the megawatt transmitter, RL's signal was capable of geographically covering, at various times, 90 per cent of the USSR's territory. From RL's analysis of its listener letters and from interviews with listeners who travel abroad, it is fairly clear that RL looms as one of the three or four most important stations broadcasting to the USSR, along with VOA and BBC, and that it probably ranks in popularity immediately behind these two stations. It is clear also that RL is recognized for what it is, a "political" station with a political message, and that therefore most of its audience is probably listening through preference rather than by accident. It is evident from this that RL is not so much in competition with VOA or BBC as it is complementary to their efforts, and that because RL offers a significantly distinctive product it is sought out for different reasons by many of the same people who also listen to other Western stations.



A number of indications of RL's impact are derived from audience responses and regime reactions. Several mail tests have shown that only about one letter in thirty reaches RL from inside the USSR. Despite this censorship, RL annually receives between 500 and 1,000 listener letters, and additionally interviews about 500 listeners who arrive in the West as legal travelers and refugees. After a two-year slump in Soviet listener mail that affected all Western radios, the rate of mail flow to RL in 1968 was 43 per cent higher than the previous year and might suggest that a greater number of people were listening than ever before. Listener evidence also shows that in times of international crisis, RL's audience size rises sharply. During the period of Polish student disturbances and Czechoslovak tensions in March 1968, RL was told by a Soviet literary critic that in Moscow "the streets were empty and quiet" because of people listening to foreign radio and that "Radio Liberty enjoyed the greatest success." Evidently because of its coverage of East European developments and Soviet intellectual dissidence, RL was the object of more regime denunciations (78) in 1968 than in any previous year. Most of the attacks made reference to the Radio's treatment of these two subjects. Finally, Soviet efforts to jam RL around the clock have continued unabated since 1953, whereas jamming of VOA was discontinued in 1963 and only resumed during the invasion of Czechoslovakia.

### *C. Pertinent U.S. Policy Considerations*

The processes of fermentation and political adjustment which are now developing in the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe can be expected to continue in the near future. Economic and social problems are likely to become more acute during the next few years. Intellectual ferment is likely to grow and expand to broader categories of the population. The Soviet military may become more clearly differentiated as a power group. Problems of nationalism and regionalism in various outlying areas of the USSR and in Eastern Europe may increase in overall importance.

The pervasiveness of these processes that have emerged during the last two years has exceeded expectations in this regard, and both Radio Liberty and Radio Free Europe have played crucial roles in addressing themselves to these phenomena. We now would anticipate that in Eastern Europe the invasion of Czechoslovakia will prove only a stopgap measure toward containing pressures that will now be redirected into subtler forms of expression, and that in the USSR the current sporadic intellectual dissent will likely grow into the rudiments of a cohesive intellectual opposition to the regime if such dissidence is driven underground by the present repressions. These circumstances would make the Radios even more important than previously.

#### D. *Alternative Courses of Action*

A determination must now be made as to whether the Radios should be continued after 30 June 1969, and, if so, whether they should be funded [*less than 1 line not declassified*] by CIA. There is no reason to believe that additional staff review will make that decision any easier. The problem of what to do with RFE and RL has been studied exhaustively and almost continuously for the last three years by some of the most competent specialists in and outside the Government. The value of the Radios as irreplaceable assets has been affirmed over the years by every study group, official and private, that has addressed itself to the problem. Every reasonable alternative has been explored, and additional options from which to choose are not likely to be developed. What is required now is a policy decision based on value judgment.

##### 1. *Continuation*

It has been recognized by each reviewing body that RFE and RL represent important U.S. assets in terms of rare talent, specialized organization, and base facilities which have taken nearly 20 years and \$350 million to develop. Once dispersed, these assets could be recreated only with immense difficulty, if at all. In itself this represents a powerful argument for continuing the operations.

If the Radios are to *retain their present status and functions*, however, there is no satisfactory alternative to the resumption of *covert financing by CIA*. If the Radios were openly associated with the Government, either through a public-private mechanism or as a line item in the USIA budget, they would be vulnerable to extensive debate each year, and it would become necessary *inter alia* to publicly explain and defend the more politically-charged missions of RFE and RL as distinct from those of VOA. Such open affiliation with the Government would be a contradiction in terms for a gray radio. It would confirm that the Radios were official instruments of the U.S. Government, and the contracts and licenses under which they operate as private organizations would become null and void, with the transmitters in Spain and Portugal reverting to the governments of those countries.

Against this backdrop it should also be recognized as a fact of life about which little can be done that there exists a widespread assumption, entertained especially by U.S. media, that the Radios are indeed financed by CIA. For the most part this has caused the Radios only minor difficulties, probably because their objectives are generally considered laudable, and because their activities are mostly conducted outside the United States. Moreover, among the scholars and journalists who have taken the time to familiarize themselves with the work of RFE and RL, most have emerged true believers in their worth, genuinely impressed with their expertise, sophistication, and restraint.

RL and RFE were only minimally involved in the publicity that followed the *Ramparts* magazine disclosure in February 1967. The only fire drawn by either of the Radios was directed at RFE's public fund-raising campaigns. As a result, public solicitation of funds through mass media was dropped, but discreet fund-raising from corporate donors was permitted. To support the corporate solicitation, the Advertising Council resumed in November 1968 its annual campaign on behalf of RFE, but omitting appeals to the public for funds. Since the expiration of the Katzenbach deadline on December 31, 1967, neither Radio has attracted any sustained or seriously embarrassing publicity, although both have continued to receive occasional queries about their source of funds.

This low-key interest in the Radios themselves will certainly continue. Some sharp questioning to sound out the new Administration for the record on its arrangement with the Radios may also be expected fairly early in the year, and there will probably be continued inquiry along the lines of the recent Evans and Novak column, probing the status and funding of the Radios.<sup>3</sup> Any criticism thus developing would undoubtedly focus on the Radios' public profile and on the charge of deception of the American public implicit in their proclaimed status as private organizations.

As long as these institutions continue to function in the public domain without a plausible source of support commensurate with the size of the operation, the problem of credibility will remain with us. Explanations or disclaimers short of outright disclosure of Government support will be suspect in unsympathetic circles. If, on the other hand, Government support were acknowledged, it would become extremely difficult if not impossible for the organizations to continue their operations in Germany, Portugal, and Spain.

On balance, it is recognized that there is no easy solution to the problem of continuing the operation of the Radios under a cover story

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<sup>3</sup> In their column of December 5, 1968, journalists Rowland Evans and Robert Novak wrote: "One of the many loose ends left by the lame duck Johnson Administration for President-elect Nixon to tie up poses an acute problem of credibility . . . : Clandestine financing of Radio Free Europe. There is scarcely any doubt that the Nixon Administration will maintain the hefty U.S. subsidy, size unknown, that is funneled through the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), to provide almost all the financing for Radio Free Europe's massive propaganda effort . . . The question Nixon must decide is whether to maintain the subsidy under the table or to bring it out in the open . . . With some of Nixon's financial supporters among Radio Free Europe's sponsors, the subsidy will assuredly continue—in one of three forms: (1) as a secret CIA contribution not acknowledged by the government; (2) as a CIA contribution whose existence is announced but size not disclosed or subjected to congressional scrutiny; or (3) as a regular congressional appropriation subject to normal congressional procedures." Evans and Novak, "Financing of Radio Free Europe Leaves Nixon Sensitive Problem," *The Washington Post*, December 5, 1968, p. A21.

which is intrinsically plausible and yet compatible with U.S. Government credibility. Ideally, the less that is said in response to press inquiry, the better.

In the last analysis it is believed that, if a determination is made to continue the operation of the Radios [*less than 1 line not declassified*], a public position will have to be taken by the Government which in practical terms constitutes an evasion of the question of financial sponsorship of the Radios. (A suggested scenario to cover this eventuality is attached as Tab H.)

In conclusion, it should be noted that a position taken with respect to the Radios in the above context will necessarily be affected by whatever policy the Administration chooses to adopt toward the Katzenbach rulings as a whole.

### 2. *Metamorphosis*

The possibility of openly affiliating the Radios with USIA was briefly considered in 1967 and was rejected as unsuitable for the following reasons. First of all, it is doubtful that Congress, faced with requests for appropriations for RFE and RL as part of VOA, would appropriate sufficient funds each year for RFE and RL. Moreover, the public appropriation/budgetary process would expose RFE and RL to conflicting pressures of outside criticism and review. The specific qualities that make RFE and RL broadcasts unique and allow them to foster U.S. interests in ways denied to VOA would be lost; i.e., their flexibility and hard-hitting commentary on internal affairs. The Radios would then be subject to the same policy restrictions and impediments as VOA.

The transmission bases and broadcast facilities of RFE and RL abroad would probably be lost since, as mentioned above, they are operated under non-transferable license agreements. There is little chance that the host countries would allow the U.S. Government to take over these facilities without exacting a high diplomatic or financial price. As for programs, they too would suffer from merger with VOA, in that target audiences, formerly well disposed, would view them skeptically because of their official sponsorship. Moreover, many members of the staffs of RFE and RL, with all of their rare talents and skills, would probably leave because of their reluctance to be associated with an official propaganda arm of the U.S. Government.

### 3. *Termination*

If the risks of continued covert funding are deemed unacceptable, and if, as indicated above, an autonomous affiliation with USIA is impractical, the only alternative for RFE and RL is termination. While it might be possible to salvage and turn over to VOA certain technical facilities, frequencies, and personnel, the unique element of RFE and RL broadcasts—detailed reporting and hard-hitting commentary on internal developments—would unquestionably be lost.

Termination at this particular time, in the aftermath of the invasion and occupation of Czechoslovakia, would be a significant unilateral concession to the Soviet Union and to the hard-line East European regimes. The absence of a plausible explanation for the cessation of broadcasting would suggest to the radio audiences in the USSR and Eastern Europe that the United States had lost interest in them. It might also be interpreted by West Europeans as another sign of U.S. disengagement, possibly suggesting that a deal had been struck with the Soviets.

Within the United States there are many elements, including large ethnic groups with close ties to many of the countries to which the Radios broadcast, for whom cessation of broadcasting would seem a serious and incomprehensible decision, especially in light of the Soviet invasion of Czechoslovakia. The attitudes of the ethnic groups would probably add significantly to the likelihood of adverse publicity attendant on termination, and would lend themselves to domestic political exploitation. Strongly negative Congressional reactions were encountered when the Director of Central Intelligence discussed the possibility of termination with key members of Congress in late 1967. A number of Congressmen are likely to show particular concern for the fate of RFE and RL because of their traditional responsiveness to the interests of domestic European ethnic groups, and because of their considerable knowledge of and belief in the work of the Radios.

Termination would be neither cheap nor swift. It is estimated that termination would require at least 12 months and approximately [*dollar amount not declassified*] for the two Radios.

#### 4. *Coordination*

There has been close coordination with the Department of State, the United States Information Agency, and with the Bureau of the Budget over a two-year period on the question of the Radios' future. Current operational and policy coordination is carried out on a regular basis with both the Department of State and USIA.

#### 5. *Recommendation*

It is recommended that the 303 Committee:

- a. Affirm the continued political relevance of the missions of Free Europe, Inc., and Radio Liberty;
- b. Authorize the CIA to resume covert funding of Free Europe, Inc., and Radio Liberty, in FY 1970 as an exception in the overriding national interest as provided in the Katzenbach Report, but without public admission;
- c. Agree that inasmuch as the broadcasting activities of Radio Free Europe and Radio Liberty are worth continuing, they should be maintained at a level sufficient to keep them on a qualitatively competitive footing with other international broadcasters to the same target areas.

The proposed FY 1970 budget for Free Europe is \$20,900,000 [*1 line not declassified*]; Radio Liberty Committee's proposed budget is \$12,900,000. There are, however, no funds budgeted in FY 1970 for the Radios as a consequence of the President's decision in December. It will therefore be necessary to increase the Agency's Fiscal Year 1970 budget in the amounts cited, which presumably could be done in the current review of the budget proposals placed before the Congress by the outgoing Administration.

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**29. Memorandum From the Deputy Director for Coordination,  
Bureau of Intelligence and Research (Trueheart) to the Under  
Secretary of State for Political Affairs (Johnson)<sup>1</sup>**

Washington, February 4, 1969.

SUBJECT

RFE and RL

At the meeting yesterday in the Secretary's office, the only public stance on RFE and RL which seemed to offer a way out of the dilemma with which we are confronted was to dissociate the radios from the Katzenbach report. That is to say, the present administration would take the position that it had looked into the situation thoroughly and had concluded that RFE and RL are not "educational or private voluntary organizations" and hence the policy recommended by the Katzenbach Committee does not apply to them.

I talked to Cord Meyer about this solution and he in turn has spoken to the RFE/RL people in New York. He tells me that the latter believe that they can live with this solution, provided we do not go further and explicitly acknowledge that the radios are supported by the government. By this I believe they mean that the position of the radios in the host countries would not be jeopardized and that the prominent persons associated with the radios in this country would not be embarrassed. I gather also that CIA itself could accept this solution.

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<sup>1</sup> Source: Department of State, INR/IL Files, 303 Committee Files, January–June 1969. Secret sent through Hughes. Cleared by McCloskey and in substance by Toon. A notation alongside McCloskey's clearance reads: "except for suggested leak, about which he [McCloskey] has serious doubts."

The proposed solution is not different in principle from one cleared with the ranking Republican and Democratic members of the CIA watchdog committees in 1967, so there should be a good chance that Congress would go along with continued CIA funding.

The remaining question is whether the approach is feasible in terms of press relations. I am inclined to think that it is. I presume that we would volunteer nothing but await a specific question about the radios. However the question might be put, the reply would be that the new administration has looked into this matter very closely, has concluded that RFE and RL are not among the nation's private voluntary organizations and hence not in fact subject to the policy recommended by the Katzenbach Committee. Although not essential, the spokesman should also be authorized to say that the new administration endorses the Katzenbach policy, thus heading off a charge that the government has resumed funding more politically sensitive organizations such as the National Student Association. If asked whether the government was now acknowledging government or CIA support to the organizations the reply would be "no comment." If asked whether the Katzenbach Committee itself regarded the radios as private voluntary organizations, the reply would be that we cannot speak for that Committee but this administration thinks that they are not. (If this approach is decided on it would be desirable to discuss it in advance with Mr. Katzenbach and possibly Mr. Gardiner.)<sup>2</sup>

This approach, would, of course amount to a tacit admission that the radios are supported by CIA. However, this is not news to anyone and I should not think the press would be able to make much capital out of the fact that we refused to say so in so many words. Conceivably, the whole situation could be further defused by an advance leak (possibly to Evans and Novak, who could thus complete their exposé)<sup>3</sup> explaining how the problem was to be handled. Such a leak could also make the point that public fund raising by RFE terminated some time ago.

I suggest you try this out on the 303 Committee tomorrow.<sup>4</sup>

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<sup>2</sup> Apparently, John Gardner of the Katzenbach Committee (see footnote 2, Document 28).

<sup>3</sup> See footnote 3, Document 28.

<sup>4</sup> See Document 30.

### 30. Memorandum for the Record<sup>1</sup>

Washington, February 5, 1969.

SUBJECT

Minutes of the Meeting of the 303 Committee, 5 February 1969

PRESENT

Mr. Henry A. Kissinger (Chairman), Mr. U. Alexis Johnson, Mr. David Packard,  
and Mr. Richard Helms

Mr. Robert P. Mayo and Mr. C. W. Fischer were present for Item 1.

Mr. Cord Meyer and Mr. Hugh Tovar were present for Items 1, 2, and 3.

Mr. William Trueheart was present for the entire meeting.

[Omitted here is a discussion of committee procedures.]

1. *Radio Free Europe and Radio Liberty*

a. Mr. Meyer briefed the Committee on the origins, operations, problems and present status of both Radio projects. There was considerable discussion including alternatives examined in previous exhaustive studies of the disposition to be made of the Radios. Particular attention was devoted to the possibility of VOA as an alternative, or successor or absorber of RFE.

b. All agreed the Radios are valuable assets, and it was finally concluded that there were realistically only two choices—continuation of the Radios as presently constituted with covert CIA funding, or termination.

c. All members opted for continuation of both Radios via covert CIA funding for FY-1970 at the budgetary and qualitative level recommended in the proposal paper before the Committee.<sup>2</sup>

d. Mr. Mayo noted that none of these funds had been previously provided for in CIA's FY-1970 budget and expressed the hope that some offsetting savings could be found elsewhere.

e. The Chairman stated that he would send forward a memorandum to the President advising him of the Committee's action and recommending that he approve the continuation of the Radios with covert CIA funding for FY-1970.

f. The Chairman also stated that he wished the Committee to review these projects again, but no date was set for such review. Mr.

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<sup>1</sup> Source: Department of State, INR/IL Historical Files, 40 Committee Minutes. Secret; Eyes Only. Drafted on February 6 by Trueheart.

<sup>2</sup> Document 28.



Helms observed that this could be undertaken any time at the convenience of the Committee principals.

g. The question of obtaining appropriate Congressional support for continuing the Radios was raised. Mr. Helms noted that any steps in this direction would be inappropriate until Presidential approval is secured. It was agreed that this step would be held in abeyance.

h. A good deal of discussion ensued on the question of how to handle press inquiries which will inevitably arise. Mr. Johnson suggested a formula. He said that the State Department had devoted a great deal of study to this matter and felt that the Radios did not fall within the restrictions imposed by the Katzenbach report relating to domestic educational or private voluntary organizations. He observed that the Radios' incorporation in New York was happenstance; they could just as well have been incorporated elsewhere and this should not be considered an overriding factor.

i. Mr. Johnson favored having an Administration spokesman, upon query from the press, respond that the new Administration had looked into the matter of the Radios very closely and had concluded that RFE and RL are not among the nation's private voluntary organizations and hence are not in fact subject to the policy recommendations submitted by the Katzenbach Committee.

j. Since the Radios are not subject to the policy recommendations in the Katzenbach report, there is no question of making an exception for their continuation in the "overriding national security interests" as provided for in the report.

k. It would also be desirable to state that the new Administration endorses the policy enunciated in the Katzenbach report in order to head off press accusations that the Administration is abandoning these principles and resuming covert activities in the more sensitive youth and student field.

l. Mr. Johnson thought it desirable to contact Messrs. Katzenbach and John Gardner beforehand to review the above stance with them in order to obtain their agreement and support. It was agreed that this would be worthwhile.

m. It was noted by the members that the foregoing approach would leave an intimation of CIA support to the Radios but would at least maintain the "fig leaf" of non-U. S. Government official support so important to the retention of transmitting facilities located in various foreign countries under existing leases between those countries and RFE and RL as private entities. It was agreed that Mr. Johnson's formula for handling press queries was probably as good as could be devised.

n. Mr. Mayo and Mr. Fischer raised the question of the feasibility of Radio Liberty soliciting private corporate funding support as does

RFE. A number of reasons were cited as to why this is not practical and the question was dropped.<sup>3</sup>

[Omitted here is discussion unrelated to Radio Free Europe and Radio Liberty.]

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<sup>3</sup> Following up on the decision of the 303 Committee at its February 5 meeting, Kissinger sent an undated memorandum to President Nixon with the recommendation that he “approve the continued support of Radio Free Europe and Radio Liberty with covert CIA funding in the approximate amount of \$32.3 million for FY 1970, subject to budgetary review, and the proposals for responding to press inquiries as they may arise.” The President checked his approval on Kissinger’s recommendation on February 22. (National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 379, Subject Files, Radio Free Europe & Radio Liberty, Vol. I) For the proposed responses to press inquiries, attached to Kissinger’s memorandum, see Document 31.

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### 31. Paper Prepared for the President’s Press Secretary (Ziegler)<sup>1</sup>

Washington, undated.

#### PUBLIC STANCE ON FUNDING OF RFE AND RL

##### *Background*

Following serious and sustained press and public attacks set off by the *Ramparts* disclosure that the National Student Association had received covert financial support from CIA, President Johnson on February 15, 1967 appointed a committee to review relationships between government agencies and “educational and private voluntary organizations” and to recommend “means to help assure that such organizations can play their proper and vital role abroad.” The Committee (made up of Under Secretary Katzenbach, HEW Secretary Gardner,<sup>2</sup>

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<sup>1</sup> Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 379, Subject Files, Radio Free Europe & Radio Liberty, Vol. I. Secret. No drafting information appears on the paper, which was sent to the President under cover of a memorandum from Kissinger (see footnote 3, Document 30). Attached to the paper is a note, February 22, from Haig to Ziegler. Haig wrote: “Ron: The President approved the Radio Free Europe and Radio Liberty package this morning. I thought you should be armed with this press treatment package in the event the story breaks while you are in Europe. However, I anticipate that you would work closely with Henry [Kissinger] on any treatment of the issue.”

<sup>2</sup> It would be advisable to consult Messrs. Katzenbach and Gardner before deciding finally on the press line suggested in this paper. [Footnote in the original.]

and CIA Director Helms) recommended that it should henceforth be “the policy of the United States Government that no federal agency shall provide any covert financial assistance or support, direct or indirect, to any of the nation’s educational or private voluntary organizations.” This policy was accepted by the President and went into effect March 29, 1967. Its basic purposes, in the words of the Katzenbach Committee, were “to avoid any implication that governmental assistance, because it is given covertly, is used to affect the policies of private voluntary groups” and “to make it plain in all foreign countries that the activities of private American groups are, in fact, private.”

With the exception of the National Student Association, the Katzenbach Committee did not identify the organizations which had received covert support, although a number of them had been cited (correctly) in press reports, including RFE and RL. It had long been an open secret that the latter were covertly subsidized by CIA and the press probably assumed that the Katzenbach policy was meant to apply to them. The radios, however, were not a major target of *Ramparts* or the subsequent press campaign. The only aspect of their operations which came under fire was the public fund-raising activities of RFE (since discontinued). It was not argued that government support of the radios was improper; simply that private persons should have been put on notice of this before being asked to contribute.

The Katzenbach report stated that the Committee believed that the process of terminating support to organizations affected by the policy could be largely or entirely completed by December 31, 1967. In fact, the State Department spokesman announced on December 29 that this target would be met and that “covert financial support will in every instance be discontinued prior to December 31, 1967.” He added that “at the time of termination of support, some of the organizations received contributions to tide them over the period required to develop new sources of funds.”<sup>3</sup>

The press appears to be well aware that funding of RFE and RL will require an early decision by the new Administration—the Evans–Novak column of December 5, 1968<sup>4</sup> laid out the issue explicitly—and press questions seem inevitable.

### *Discussion*

A decision to continue CIA funding of RFE/RL will pose press and public relations problems. Government support for the radios cannot be officially acknowledged without (a) jeopardizing their operating

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<sup>3</sup> In the case of RFE and RL, this amounted to \$49 million, an amount calculated to keep them in operation through FY 1969. [Footnote in the original.]

<sup>4</sup> See footnote 3, Document 28.

rights in the countries where they are based (Germany, Spain and Portugal) and (b) increasing our diplomatic difficulties in dealing with protests from the target countries regarding the content of the broadcasts. On the other hand, government support cannot be credibly denied. We are therefore obliged to reply noncommittally or evasively to the questions which are almost certain to be raised.

Such a stance will of course be taken as a tacit acknowledgement that covert funding is continuing. It is not believed, however, that this will jeopardize the position of the radios abroad to anything like the degree that an official acknowledgement would. Moreover, it is not expected that tacit acknowledgement would in itself open the Administration to attack. The radios have never been seriously criticized by the press except in connection with their public fund-raising operations (which were discontinued some time ago).

The real risk involved in a response indicating continued funding of the radios is that, in the context of the Katzenbach report, it could provoke charges that the government is resuming funding of domestic educational and private voluntary organizations of a politically sensitive sort, such as the National Student Association. Hence it is important to handle press questions in such a way as to make clear that whatever the government may be doing about RFE and RL does not affect basic policy regarding the latter.

#### *Scenario*

In line with the foregoing it is proposed that no statement be made about funding of the radios until a question is received. The most likely question will be a direct, "Is the U.S. government (or the CIA) providing funds to RFE and RL?" The response should be, "I have no comment to make on that."

This may well be followed by a question referring to the Katzenbach policy and asking if that policy does not prohibit the funding (or covert funding) of RFE and RL. The response should be, "It is my understanding that the Katzenbach policy applies only to 'educational or private voluntary organizations' and that all U.S. agencies are observing this policy."

A further question might be, "If RFE and RL are not private voluntary organizations, what are they?" The reply should be, "I see no reason for a discussion of what this is, or what that is—I have nothing further to say."

**32. Memorandum From Laurence E. Lynn, Jr., of the National Security Council Staff to the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger)<sup>1</sup>**

Washington, December 18, 1969.

SUBJECT

Termination of Radio Liberty

During a meeting on the CIA budget on December 17, the President reviewed the programs of Radio Free Europe and Radio Liberty, which are covertly funded by the CIA. He decided to retain Radio Free Europe and "improve it" but to terminate Radio Liberty.

The decision on Radio Free Europe, which is targeted on Eastern Europe, presents no problems. The \$22 million currently allocated to it in the FY 71 budget includes modernization funds.

The termination of Radio Liberty, which is targeted on the Soviet Union, is, however, a delicate matter. The reasons for its termination include the following:

—Radio Liberty programming, which now concentrates on providing news and editorial interpretation of current events, no longer stresses the need to liberate the Soviet Union from Communism. Nevertheless, it is heavily jammed. As a result of jamming and other technical factors, its signal is not received in wide areas of the Soviet Union and is picked up erratically elsewhere in the USSR.

—There is a small possibility that the Voice of America could take over the very powerful Radio Liberty transmitters in Spain. (This would depend on the attitude of the Spanish Government toward reversion of part of the transmitting equipment.)

—There would be budgetary savings on the order of \$15 million per year.

The principal problems involved in termination are:

—Radio Liberty has political support in the United States (although less than Radio Free Europe) which would generate some domestic pressure for its retention.

—Because of the intricacies of local labor laws, difficulties might be encountered in terminating Radio Liberty's 871 overseas employees, the bulk of whom are in West Germany.

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<sup>1</sup> Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 379, Subject Files, Radio Free Europe & Radio Liberty, Vol. I. Secret; Sensitive. Sent for action.

Given the sensitivity of this issue, the details of the termination of Radio Liberty should probably be handled by a special inter-agency task force which would work out:

- when exactly to shut down Radio Liberty facilities;
- whether Radio Liberty should be put off the air abruptly or phased out over a period of time;
- how to handle any labor or other problems arising with the Governments of Spain and West Germany and to a lesser extent that of Nationalist China (where the rest of Radio Liberty’s overseas facilities are located);
- what kind of public announcement, if any, to make in the United States;
- how to handle public and Congressional criticism of termination;
- whether to transfer a \$700,000 a year book presentation program currently run by Radio Liberty to CIA or USIA.

Such a task force should be chaired by the State Department and include representatives from CIA, USIA, BOB, DOD and NSC.

*Recommendation*

That you sign the enclosed memorandum to Elliot Richardson (Tab A)<sup>2</sup> asking him to set up a task force to implement the termination of Radio Liberty.<sup>3</sup>

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<sup>2</sup> Attached but not printed.

<sup>3</sup> There is no indication that Kissinger approved or disapproved of the recommendation.

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**33. Memorandum From the Acting Director of Central Intelligence (Cushman) to the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger)<sup>1</sup>**

Washington, December 19, 1969.

SUBJECT

Termination of Radio Liberty

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<sup>1</sup> Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 379, Subject Files, Radio Free Europe & Radio Liberty, Vol. I. Secret.

1. We have just learned of the decision by higher authority to terminate the Radio Liberty project. We wish to appeal that decision at once for the reasons listed below.

2. Radio Liberty Committee (RLC), together with its counterpart Free Europe Committee (FEC), have been subjected to a series of exhaustive inter-agency reviews since mid-1967. In February of this year the 303 Committee examined fully and carefully the findings of previous studies, and endorsed the conclusions sustained by the latter.<sup>2</sup> Subsequently and pursuant to the 303 Committee endorsement, the President on 22 February 1969 approved the continuation of Radio Liberty [*less than 1 line not declassified*] with CIA covert funding.<sup>3</sup>

3. RLC operates Radio Liberty, a book distribution program to the USSR, and the Munich Institute for the Study of the USSR, under a current budget of [*dollar amount not declassified*]. Radio Liberty broadcasts 24 hours of the day in 18 languages of the Soviet Union with 1840 kilowatts of transmitter power from sites in Germany, Spain, and Taiwan. The main programming office is in Munich, Germany, and is supplemented by programming from a New York office. [*6 lines not declassified*]

4. While the size of Radio Liberty's audience cannot be firmly established, technical measurements indicate that with favorable propagation conditions the radio can cover 90% of the territory of the USSR. Although mail tests show that only a fraction of letters from listeners reach the radio, Radio Liberty has received as many as 1,000 letters in a year, reflecting audience interest. Several hundred interviews with Soviet and Western travelers confirm extensive listening to Radio Liberty, and denunciations by Soviet media are frequent and strong. Finally, the jamming effort against Radio Liberty has never ceased since it went on the air in 1953. This represents a budgetary burden to the Soviet Government substantially in excess of the cost of operating the radio.

5. Since 1965, intellectual dissent in the USSR has grown from a small pressure group within the literary-artists circle to the level of political dissent involving other elements of Soviet society. Radio Liberty, in its role as a free voice from abroad, serves as a catalyst for the growing number of Soviet dissidents who strive for freedom to interpret their society, its purposes and goals. They actively seek information and ideas and turn to foreign radio outlets like Radio Liberty, which, unlike VOA, is almost exclusively concerned with intensive coverage of Soviet internal developments, and seeks to correct the distortions and omissions of Soviet domestic output.

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<sup>2</sup> See Document 30.

<sup>3</sup> See footnote 3, Document 30.

6. Before the decision to continue was made, the 303 Committee considered other alternatives such as shifting to public funding and possible merger with USIA, as well as termination. It was felt that continuation under CIA [*less than 1 line not declassified*] covert funding was the only desirable solution.

7. Congressional attitudes elicited in October 1967, when the future of the radios was under scrutiny, showed a strong interest in the radios and a desire to see them continue in operation.

8. The Department of State has recently restated the U.S. Government's recognition that the Soviet émigrés, especially those who work for Radio Liberty and other émigré activities, have a special contribution to make to United States information programs, both overt and covert, which are aimed at influencing the attitudes of the Soviet people and their leaders in directions which would make the Soviet Government a more constructive and responsible member of the world community. Ambassador Thompson, while still in Moscow, recommended against termination.

9. [*7 lines not declassified*]

10. Since 1950, over \$132,000,000 has been spent in building up a smoothly running professional operation, which reaches its target effectively and is a source of concern to the Soviets. Once liquidated, an instrumentality of this type cannot be rebuilt.

11. Estimates of liquidation costs are roughly the equivalent of one year of normal operations, i.e., approximately [*dollar amount not declassified*]. Thus, Radio Liberty's termination results in no budgetary saving in FY 1971.

12. Over and above the considerations summarized above, we would place maximum stress on the fact that unilateral termination of Radio Liberty would entail a major political concession to the USSR, with no quid pro quo. This would be both unfortunate and unnecessary. It could lead to miscalculation by the Soviets as to our intentions and strength of purpose. It would, we believe, call into serious question the survival of Radio Free Europe.

13. The Agency urges, in the strongest possible terms, that the decision to terminate be reconsidered.

**R.E. Cushman, Jr.**  
*Lieutenant General, USMC*



**34. Memorandum From the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger) to President Nixon<sup>1</sup>**

Washington, undated.

SUBJECT

Disposition of Radio Liberty

On 22 February 1969 you approved the continuation of both Radio Free Europe and Radio Liberty with CIA covert funding. This decision was recommended to you by the 303 Committee and was based on previous exhaustive studies and evaluations by governmental and nongovernmental committees affirming the considerable value of both radios in support of U.S. policy objectives.

I am informed that in a budget discussion with Mr. Mayo on 17 December you expressed your intention of terminating Radio Liberty. CIA forwarded a memorandum on 19 December requesting that you reconsider this decision for the following reasons. This memorandum is attached at Tab A.<sup>2</sup>

1. Recent technical measurements reflect that with favorable propagation conditions Radio Liberty can cover 90% of the territory of the USSR. Extensive listening to the radio is confirmed by mail received and by interviews with Soviet and Western travelers. Soviet media denunciations are frequent and strong and the Soviet jamming effort costs substantially more than the operation of the radio.

2. Radio Liberty, as a free voice from abroad covering Soviet internal developments, serves as a catalyst for the growing number of Soviet dissidents striving to interpret their society, its purposes and goals.

3. The Department of State has recently restated its recognition that Soviet émigrés have a special contribution to make to U.S. information programs, both overt and covert, aimed at influencing the Soviet leaders toward making their government a more constructive and responsible member of the world community.

4. [4 lines not declassified]

5. Estimates of liquidation costs are [dollar amount not declassified] almost the equivalent of one year of normal operations; thus termination would result in little budgetary saving in FY 1971. Once liquidated an instrumentality of this type cannot be rebuilt.

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<sup>1</sup> Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 379, Subject Files, Radio Free Europe & Radio Liberty, Vol. I. Secret; Eyes Only. Sent for action. A notation on the memorandum indicates the President saw it.

<sup>2</sup> Printed as Document 33.

6. Unilateral termination of Radio Liberty would be a major political concession to the USSR with no quid pro quo and might result in the early demise of Radio Free Europe as well.

On 20 December the 303 Committee discussed this problem at length.<sup>3</sup> The members were unanimous in their view that Radio Liberty is of considerable value in support of U.S. policy objectives vis-à-vis the USSR and should not be eliminated voluntarily at this time.

Since the principal operating bases of both Radio Liberty and Radio Free Europe are located in West Germany, we agree that termination of Radio Liberty might well result in an early end to RFE because of political pressures brought to bear on the West German government in its newly developing relations with its Eastern European neighbors, against which RFE is targeted.

The 303 Committee believes that rather than unilaterally terminating Radio Liberty at this time, it would be prudent to continue it and watch developments during the next eight months or so in an effort to determine what quid pro quo might be obtainable from the USSR and/or West German governments should it then be considered desirable to terminate Radio Liberty. The State Department will make a study of the political implications involved in continuation or termination of Radio Liberty, and CIA will make a study of the administrative problems that would be involved in Radio Liberty's termination.

*Recommendation*

That you approve the continuation of Radio Liberty for FY 1971 at the budget figure of \$14,935,000 which was agreed upon between the CIA and the Bureau of the Budget.<sup>4</sup>

Approve

Disapprove

Other

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<sup>3</sup> The discussion is in a Memorandum for the Record, December 29, 1969. (Department of State, INR/IL Historical Files, 303 Committee Files)

<sup>4</sup> President Nixon initialed the approval line on December 23.

**35. Memorandum From Helmut Sonnenfeldt of the National Security Council Staff to the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger)<sup>1</sup>**

Washington, April 7, 1970.

SUBJECT

Polish Complaints to Germans About Radio Free Europe

During the second session of the FRG-Polish talks in Warsaw, the Poles in a side meeting forcefully raised the question of the operations of Radio Free Europe.<sup>2</sup> The Poles presented the Germans with a number of "extracts" from 1968–69 RFE broadcasts to Poland which allegedly attacked political figures in "harsh and scurrilous" terms. The Poles implied that continuation of such broadcasts would complicate Polish agreement to FRG requests for a softer Polish propaganda and cultural line. Subsequently, the FRG Foreign Office indicated that the Germans might make an approach to RFE. State then instructed RFE to be most responsive to any approach which might be made, in order to avert any FRG inclinations to raise basic questions about RFE operations in Germany.<sup>3</sup> There have also been recent attacks on RFE operations from Romania.<sup>4</sup>

USIA Director Shakespeare has sent you a memo (Tab B)<sup>5</sup> expressing concern that the Polish complaints might be the opening gun in a concerted campaign to liquidate RFE operations in Munich

<sup>1</sup> Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 379, Subject Files, Radio Free Europe & Radio Liberty, Vol. I. Secret. Sent for action. Concurred in by Frank Chapin.

<sup>2</sup> The attached telegram 2984 from Bonn, March 25, noted: "Finke-Ossiander, who was again on Duckwitz's delegation to the Polish talks, told EmbOff in course of conversation . . . that Dobrowolski (Polish MFA German Affairs) forcefully raised RFE issue in course of side-meeting with Finke. . . . Finke emphasized A) that FonOff had not yet decided whether or how to approach RFE regarding it; and B) that her own comments were therefore purely informal. Finke then did say, however, that on basis of glancing through material Dobrowolski had provided her, purely personal reaction was that, if genuine, it raised 'question whether this sort of thing is still necessary in 1970, when problems in East-West relations are hardly the same as in the early Cold War years.'"

<sup>3</sup> The attached telegram 3300 from Bonn, March 25, reported: "Finke-Ossiander . . . indicated to EmbOff March 25 that she would recommend a FonOff approach to RFE over the scripts the Poles had complained about. . . . She expects that the approach will be made by Pommerening (FonOff Eastern Structural Questions) to RFE Munich Chief Walters." The Embassy suggested that State "discuss this background situation with RFE, urging it to take a most responsive line toward any eventual FonOff presentation."

<sup>4</sup> As reported in airgram A-113 from Bucharest, March 27. Attached but not printed.

<sup>5</sup> Attached but not printed.

altogether. He reports that during his visit in Poland last summer, literally every Government official told him that RFE must go. Mr. Shakespeare believes that, if RFE is to become a bargaining counter in FRG-Polish deals, there should be full awareness that RFE is the most effective propaganda weapon in Eastern Europe. He thinks it should be carefully watched and the Germans made aware of our concern. A brief acknowledgment to Mr. Shakespeare is at Tab A<sup>6</sup> if you wish to send one. (I think the Germans will before long turn the heat on RFE and RL.)

*Recommendation*

That you sign the memo at Tab A.

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<sup>6</sup> On April 13 Kissinger signed the attached memorandum to Shakespeare, which reads: "I appreciated your memo on Polish complaints about Radio Free Europe operations, and agree that this should be watched with care." He added a handwritten note at the bottom: "I think the Germans are likely to put the heat on us before too long. HK"

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**36. Telegram From the Embassy in Germany to the Department of State<sup>1</sup>**

Bonn, June 3, 1970, 1700Z.

6296. Subject: German reaction to RFE: Pommerening's interview with RFE Director Walter.

1. In a move approved by FonMin Scheel, Pommerening and RFE Director Ralph Walter met in Bonn May 20 to discuss Polish and other Eastern European protests against RFE. On June 2, Pommerening gave the DCM the following frank evaluation of his talk with Walter.

2. Pommerening said that, speaking quite honestly, he did not find Walter's response satisfactory. He said that a more cooperative response from RFE was necessary to head off what he feared could become a very serious problem. He said that RFE broadcasts confined to facts present no problem. The difficulty is that the tone of RFE broadcasts is at times unfortunate and inflammatory. He cited one particular case in a broadcast to Poland in which RFE urged voters in a local

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<sup>1</sup> Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 379, Subject Files, Radio Free Europe & Radio Liberty, Vol. I. Secret; Priority; Exdis.

election not to vote for a certain candidate, known as a hard-line Stalinist. Pommerening made a sharp distinction between RFE and Radio Liberty, with which there was no problem.

3. Pommerening then said that protests from Eastern European countries are beginning to mount. They have now had protests in one form or another from Poland, Hungary, Bulgaria and Romania. Recently they have received an official protest from the Hungarians. Furthermore, the Hungarians have let the FRG know that RFE might pose a threat to the Olympic Games. There could, for example, develop a common Eastern Bloc position boycotting the 1972 Olympics in Munich unless RFE was removed from Germany. Pommerening said he felt that such a development could lead to very unfortunate pressures in the FRG and especially in the Munich area, with irresistible public clamor to remove RFE so as not to jeopardize the 1972 Olympics. Pommerening said the FRG wanted at all costs to avoid this kind of situation.

4. He added that the situation was made even more difficult by the fact that the Poles over the last six months, based on the FRG's analysis, have conspicuously toned down their propaganda attacks on the FRG. This makes it much more difficult for the FRG to counter Polish protests by saying that they after all are doing the same thing.

5. Pommerening said that the Foreign Office had prepared a paper for the Minister stressing the gravity of the RFE problem, particularly in the context of US-German relations. The paper pointed out that RFE was supported by private Americans, many of whom are very influential and play key behind-the-scenes role in the US Government. It would be most unfortunate if these people, many of whom are also strong friends of the FRG, were antagonized and given the impression that the FRG was "selling out" to the Communist Bloc. At the same time, the paper points out, mounting Bloc protests against RFE can, especially because of the Olympics, lead to irresistible pressures to remove RFE from Germany, with "VOA left to do the job" as he put it. The argument will be made that RFE is after all a private company with a questionable status which was acquired back in the occupation days. The paper therefore urges strongly that, to avoid a serious situation in US-FRG relations, RFE be urged to be cooperative in modifying its broadcasting to the maximum extent possible.

6. *Comment:* We consider the RFE situation to be serious. The paper Pommerening referred to is undoubtedly going to Brandt in the near future. We also know from his staff that Minister Ehmke is directly interested. The RFE problem is therefore likely to come to a head at the top levels of the German Government in the near future. It is urgent, in our view, that action be taken as soon as possible on our side. If the Germans are forced into a position where they feel they must demand the removal of RFE (which is the way things are now going), the

result can be a confrontation with resultant strains on US-German relations. We strongly hope this can be avoided and that RFE can continue to operate on German soil.

7. To deal with the problem, we believe that an appropriate high-level representative should be prepared to come to Bonn from the US as soon as possible. Such a representative should be empowered to give the Germans sufficient assurances of modifications in RFE's approach to enable them to counter Eastern European pressures. We are convinced that there are forces on the German side (like Pommerening himself) who want to retain RFE; our job is to give these forces the necessary ammunition.

8. Department requested to repeat this message to other appropriate posts including Munich for Doherty and to make it available to all interested parties in the US, including Durkee in New York.

**Rush**

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**37. Memorandum From Helmut Sonnenfeldt of the National Security Council Staff to the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger)<sup>1</sup>**

Washington, June 5, 1970.

SUBJECT

RFE Problem with Bonn is Getting More Serious

The attached message (Tab A)<sup>2</sup> from Bonn indicates that the crisis over Radio Free Europe is picking up. I understand that funding and other aspects have been considered in the 40 Committee recently.

The issue is the expected one: mounting Eastern European pressure to get rid of the Radio. There now apparently is a threat from several East European countries to boycott the Munich Olympics in 1972 if RFE is still there. The Germans want to avoid a confrontation with us (they say) and have apparently been trying to get RFE to do something to its scripts to remove any basis for charges that they are inflamma-

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<sup>1</sup> Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 379, Subject Files, Radio Free Europe & Radio Liberty, Vol. I. Secret; Exdis. Sent for action. Concurred in by Jessup.

<sup>2</sup> Printed as Document 36.

tory. It is far from clear, however, that even if RFE were to modify its scripts [*1 line not declassified*] the East Europeans would cease their pressure. There have been suggestions that the Germans should assign someone to Munich to pass on scripts and participate in operations generally, but it is highly unlikely that the Germans would want to be that much more identified with the Radio. If present trends hold, sooner or later the Germans, whatever is in the scripts, will be confronted with the choice of keeping the Radio and avoiding a problem with us *or* propitiating the East for the sake of “successes” in Ostpolitik.

Bureaucratically within the US Government, CIA had wanted to send Fred Valtin to Bonn today to see if a *modus vivendi* between RFE and the Germans could be found and also to determine whether RFE scripts are in fact offensive. (CIA says the Poles have in the past given the FRG doctored tapes to make RFE appear in a bad light.) State, however, has held up Valtin’s trip on the ground that whoever goes to negotiate with the Germans should be properly instructed. State and CIA have been meeting for the past week to consider the options. I gather they have guidance from you to the effect what we should not permit the Germans to bargain with our chips. However, it is not clear that there is any specific White House direction of the current State/CIA effort to develop a course of action or that any more basic thought is being given to the future of RFE or a possible alternative to it.

I take it there is a judgment in the Administration that both RFE and Radio Liberty can at some point be used *by us* for bargaining purposes with the East and that for this reason we should keep both operations functioning in Munich, whatever the Eastern pressures on the Germans to circumscribe or remove them. This also presupposes German unwillingness to antagonize us for the sake of relations with the East. This set of judgments may well be accurate; but if it has not already been subjected to analysis, it certainly should be.

*Recommendation*

That you pursue this matter further in the 40 Committee.<sup>3</sup>

Approve

Disapprove

Put on agenda for next meeting

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<sup>3</sup> At the bottom of the memorandum, Kissinger added by hand the options “Approve” and “Disapprove” and initialed “Approve.” The option, “Put on agenda for next meeting,” is also written by an unknown hand. The date of June 12, 1970, is stamped below the options.

**38. Memorandum From the Director of the United States Information Agency (Shakespeare) to the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger)<sup>1</sup>**

Washington, June 5, 1970.

SUBJECT

Radio Free Europe

With reference to my memorandum of April 1 and your response of the 13th,<sup>2</sup> I feel sure you have by now seen Bonn's telegram No. 6296<sup>3</sup> regarding Radio Free Europe.

The message, shorn of diplomatic niceties, reports German demands for the neutralization and ultimate elimination of the RFE as an instrument of our propaganda in Eastern Europe. The reference in the telegram to "irresistible pressures" to eliminate the RFE from Germany with "VOA left to do the job" means to me just that.

While I endorse the Ambassador's suggestion that a high level representative should ultimately come to Bonn prepared to discuss the subject with the Germans, I believe we might in the interim take some steps which should give the Germans pause before they finally decide to sacrifice RFE for the sake of some, as yet unknown, concessions from the comrades.

1. We should emphatically associate ourselves with the view of the Foreign Office paper warning against the reaction of private and influential Americans who are also "strong friends of the FRG" and emphasize their and our own concern. We should try to get individual statements of concern and transmit them to the FRG.

2. We should also point out that, with a great many RFE employees aware of the Polish pressures, the German reaction to such pressures cannot long remain secret and the FRG must be prepared to face hostile reaction of U.S. public opinion as well as their own which is already alarmed by the tempo and intensity of Brandt's Ostpolitik.

3. Finally, we should point out that the closing down of the RFE which is of immense concern to millions of Americans of Eastern European origins might produce a political problem for President Nixon and might conceivably result in a demand of that influential and vocal segment of U.S. public opinion for *our* boycott of the Olympics.

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<sup>1</sup> Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 379, Subject Files, Radio Free Europe & Radio Liberty, Vol. I. Secret.

<sup>2</sup> Document 35 summarizes Shakespeare's April 1 memorandum, which is not printed. Regarding Kissinger's April 13 response, see footnote 6, Document 35.

<sup>3</sup> Document 36.



I suggest these as preliminary steps with further action depending on German reaction to the above.<sup>4</sup>

**Frank**

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<sup>4</sup> On July 6 Kissinger responded in a memorandum to Shakespeare: "I think your concerns about RFE, in your memo of June 5, were well covered in the conversations you and Bill Buckley had with the President. I have also followed up with State. I appreciate your keeping me advised of this problem, and presume it will be worked out with Bonn in light of the President's strong endorsement." (National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 379, Subject Files, Radio Free Europe & Radio Liberty, Vol. I) Regarding the conversation among Shakespeare, Buckley, and President Nixon, see Document 40.

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### 39. Editorial Note

President Richard Nixon met with journalist William F. Buckley, Jr., and USIA Director Frank Shakespeare on June 9, 1970, at 10:45 a.m. to discuss Buckley's visit to Europe, including "some of the Iron Curtain countries," in his capacity as a member of the USIA Advisory Commission. (Memorandum from Chapin to Kissinger, June 3, and memorandum from Sonnenfeldt to Kissinger, May 26; National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 809, Name Files, Buckley, William) Although no record of the conversation has been found, on June 21 an article in the *Washington Star* by Charles Bartlett reported: "President Nixon has bluntly warned the West Germans against any deal with the Communists that involves the removal of the Radio Free Europe transmitted from Munich. The Bonn government, pressing for a pact with Poland has asked that the broadcasts at least be toned down, but Nixon has told the Germans that the Radio Free Europe broadcasts are not negotiable. . . . The President has told them that if the station is negotiated out of Munich, the U.S. forces also may leave German soil."

In response to the article, Helmut Sonnenfeldt of the National Security Council staff wrote to President's Assistant for National Security Affairs Henry Kissinger on June 22: "I gather that this is a slight garble of what the President said in the meeting with Shakespeare and Buckley, i.e., that the Munich radios stay as long as the troops." Kissinger wrote by hand at the bottom of Sonnenfeldt's memorandum: "That's pretty accurate." (Ibid., Box 379, Subject Files, Radio Free Europe & Radio Liberty, Vol. I)

**40. Transcript of Telephone Conversation Between the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger) and the Assistant Secretary of State for European Affairs (Hillenbrand)<sup>1</sup>**

Washington, June 9, 1970, afternoon.

K: He<sup>2</sup> wants you to know he wants a tough line on that<sup>3</sup> and he wants it part of our policy in Germany.

H: There's a meeting<sup>4</sup> going on—the problem is not abolition but re-programming.

K: He won't have it. They will not bargain with our assets there.

H: There may be some high level [omission in transcript] on this in due course.

K: From Brandt? It should be discouraged.

H: We are doing that but it will come up in the discussion they are having. In fact, they have already raised it. We are having an inter-agency meeting and I will bring it up.

K: He wants a tough line.

H: No re-programming?

K: That's how it was brought up by Shakespeare.<sup>5</sup>

H: OK, I understand.

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<sup>1</sup> Source: Library of Congress, Manuscript Division, Kissinger Papers, Box 367, Telephone Conversations, Chronological File. No classification marking.

<sup>2</sup> Apparent reference to Nixon.

<sup>3</sup> Apparent reference to Radio Free Europe.

<sup>4</sup> It is unclear to which meeting Hillenbrand is referring.

<sup>5</sup> See Documents 35 and 38.

**41. Report Prepared in the Central Intelligence Agency<sup>1</sup>**

Bonn, June 22, 1970.

*Report From Valtin*

"1. Pommerening, after expressing foreign office appreciation for Washington dispatch of special emissary, expounded for about fifteen minutes on problem, as seen by foreign office, as result of two Polish oral *démarches* (each accompanied by written bill of particulars).

"2. He emphasized that, while Poles appear persistent in their complaints, there is no indication they intend to make RFE an issue over which German/Polish negotiations are at all likely to break down. As a matter of fact, the Poles are handling the problem very cleverly in more-in-grief-than-in-anger manner, telling the Germans that they do not mind facts or even "objective analysis" and that they only object to "scurrilous attacks on leaders" and "intervention in Polish internal affairs." Also cleverly, the Poles keep telling the Germans that the latter's own propaganda stations meet these criteria and that RFE is the only problem. Poles have not said so directly, but the implied intent of their comments boils down to: Is it not time that the FRG close down this foreign and out-of-step-with-the-time Cold War instrument operating on German soil?

"3. Pommerening advised that the second Polish *démarche* had requested a written German reply, to contain both reaction to specific charges and statement on FRG intentions vis-à-vis RFE. In reply to our question as to how they intend to handle this, Pommerening advised that he and his immediate superiors had recommended to Duckwitz (and felt quite certain this recommendation would be accepted) that there should be no written reply, and that an oral statement (a) not go into specific Polish charges and, instead simply assert that the matter is being looked into, and more important (b) advise Poles that both RFE's status in Germany and its activities are entirely within the Federal Republic's constitutional provisions of freedom of speech and freedom of political action, and that thus the FRG has no intention of changing RFE's status or charter.

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<sup>1</sup> Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 379, Subject Files, Radio Free Europe & Radio Liberty, Vol. I. Secret. A June 24 cover memorandum reads: "Attached herewith are two copies of Mr. Valtin's detailed report on his initial 22 June conversation with Dr. Pommerening of the West German Foreign Office. . . . As you will note in paragraph 14, Mr. Fessenden does not intend to forward this information separately and he requests that . . . [it be made] available to appropriate Department officials, Mr. Kissinger and Mr. Shakespeare." A typed note at the top of the page reads: "USC Attachment to CA-15, 24 June 1970."

"4. Pommerening advised that in this connection both the timing and the substance of DCM's *démarche* of last week had been most welcome. He said that receipt of this expression of strong USG interest, and of support by influential private Americans, had been most important in shaping the opinions of the upper foreign office hierarchy on how to handle Polish complaints. In effect, Pommerening said the Fessenden *démarche* had led to a basic foreign office decision that the RFE problem should not be allowed to become an issue of real substance between the FRG and the USG.

"5. Pommerening also gave flat assurance that FRG was not planning to close down RFE. He said that there were and are a few officials who wish the problem would go away, i.e. that RFE move to some other country. We told him that this might hypothetically be possible from a strictly technical point of view, but that such a move (apart from the overwhelming logistical and political problems) would obviously result in a radically different type of RFE and would thus be contrary to USG interest in maintaining RFE as a viable and effective instrument of mutual interest to the USG and the FRG. Pommerening agreed and repeated his assurance re no FRG intention close down RFE.

"6. Pommerening then said that, despite the stance to be taken by FRG in reply to the Poles, there remained a problem to be worked out. He said specific Polish charges had been looked into and substantiated by the Federal Press Office, and that these broadcasts (involving scurrilously personalized attacks on individual Polish political leaders and one case of direct interference in Polish elections) were of such nature that the FRG would have to agree they should not be transmitted by any radio operating from German soil. After stating that presumably there is no FRG intention or desire turn RFE into a pure news station, and after obtaining explicit Pommerening statement that it is the FRG intention to allow RFE to continue broadcasting critical analysis and commentary, we asked him for a specific definition of German request for moderation. He said that this is not an altogether easy task but what it boiled down to was: (a) No scurrilous personalized attacks on individuals; (b) No direct interference in internal affairs (such as telling people whom to vote for or not); and (c) Avoidance of shrill and inflammatory language (in terms both of choice of words and tone of voice) in news and commentary, especially the latter. In this connection, Pommerening said, RFE should take Radio Liberty as a model.

"7. After assuring Pommerening that USG and management radio are not insensitive to the problem that operation of radios here might pose for the FRG, we expressed the hope that the FRG will in fact handle reply to Poles as described above with Pommerening agreeing that any substantially different handling would inevitably constitute encouragement of salami tactic. We then stated we felt sure of our

ground in being able to assure him that RFE management was completely responsible in its position on the problem areas raised by him and were doing everything possible to ensure compliance with its own already existing strictures along this line. In fact, if FRG request for modification did not go beyond the points raised by him (which he confirmed), then there is no problem. Pommerening expressed satisfaction but at the same time wondered whether RFE management, whose skill and good will he did not doubt, were always able to control its broadcast desks, especially members of the more recent emigration. We pointed to the [highly?] responsible RFE handling of the 1968 Czech crisis as evidence of what RFE management can do along this line even in an emotionally highly charged atmosphere. Pommerening acknowledged this, saying the FRG was very worried about RFE at the time but had found everything just right. We then made the point that in an undertaking of this type and magnitude, control could not be absolute and that the occasional exceptional slip has to be accepted as a fact of life. Pommerening agreed and said this presented no problem. On the other hand, what the FRG could not live with would be a situation wherein Poles (and other Bloc regimes with whom FRG has, or will establish, diplomatic relations) are able present the FRG with a steady stream of documented infractions of above strictures.

"8. In reply to our query, Pommerening advised that it was his impression that the Polish complaints relate largely (and perhaps altogether) to the period prior January 1970. We said that this was not an unimportant factor, since it was our impression that RFE had made some adjustments in its broadcast policy since the advent of the FRG negotiations with Poles and Soviets. In fact, RFE had gone to great lengths to present FRG Ostpolitik along lines the FRG would find eminently satisfactory. Pommerening acknowledged that he had so far not had time to study RFE's compilation on this subject.

"9. After stating that the only way to address ourselves to Polish complaints is to know their precise nature, we requested that the FRG make the papers available. Pommerening acknowledged the validity of this request but, while undertaking to give it a try he could not guarantee it, as the entire file they had was with Duckwitz and it would take the latter's authorization to turn over Polish material. It was in this connection that he advised that the FRG had gone all-out to prevent any leak on Polish complaints on FRG handling thereof, including making no copies of any papers relating thereto.

"10. Pommerening then advised that the Poles had also complained on the detailed nature of the questionnaire used by organizations which on behalf of RFE question Polish visitors to the West. The Poles said such questions are clearly only within the sphere of intelligence and security services, not a radio station.

“11. After Pommerening had advised that RL presents no problem, we said that in USG opinion the two radios are inseparable, i.e. basic change in one will inevitably affect the other sooner or later. Pommerening agreed.

“12. The Olympics as a factor in FRG thinking on RFE was discussed. Pommerening agreed that Bloc threats on this angle are bluff on which the Bloc is not at all likely to follow through, unless there is a basic deterioration in FRG/Bloc relations for other (and more important) reasons. He expressed apprehension, however, about public reaction in Germany (and on the part of non-political Federal officials) if the Bloc undertakes a major overt campaign on the RFE issue in relation to Bloc participation in the Olympics. He felt this might produce strong pressure against continuation of RFE. Pommerening did not react to our comment that the volatility of such a reaction from the public would no doubt be very much dependent on how the FRG reacts to an overt Bloc campaign if in fact the Bloc mounts it.

“13. Walter briefed on above. We concluded that, as defined by Pommerening, meeting the FRG request for modification requires little (if anything) more than RFE closely adhering to its own (already existing) strictures. On the other hand, since it is clear the Pommerening (and others who figure in this equation) are not really aware what RFE represents today, both in terms of what it does and what political factor it truly represents in the evolving Bloc situation (and Pommerening acknowledged his own gaps of understanding), Walter agrees that RFE must devote considerably more time to an educational effort in the next few months vis-à-vis German officialdom.

“14. DCM Fessenden has read this report. Since none will be sent by the Embassy, he requests that it be made available soonest to Sutterlin and Coerr.”

## 42. Report Prepared in the Central Intelligence Agency<sup>1</sup>

Bonn, June 26, 1970.

*Report from Mr. Valtin*

1. Valtin had a lengthy meeting with State Secretary Ahlers this afternoon. His information on subjects which are not directly related will be separately reported.

2. On Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty he was unequivocal in assuring us that there has been no West German decision to close them down. As a matter of fact, and while a number of ranking officials have concerned themselves with the problem of the Radios informally in recent months, the subject has not been on the agenda for the Cabinet or any other decision-making body, nor has any meeting been held of those officials who would have to be consulted on any basic decision on the Radios (and this would have to include Ahlers).

3. After we had told him that the question of the Radios' future was one of the reasons for Mr. Valtin's visit to Germany at this time, Ahlers (citing recent license renewal) said that he saw no problem. He asked whether the U.S. Government wanted the Radios to continue. We answered positively and then expounded at length, giving the essence of last week's Fessenden démarche (without referring to it as such), describing in some detail the responsible manner in which the radio management handles broadcasts, and emphasizing the points made in the reference (CA-18, 26 June 70, paragraph 5-D). Ahlers then said that in the light of these factors he felt quite sure that the FRG would allow the Radios to continue to operate as at present. We then told Ahlers that we had just been told differently and briefed him in confidence on the meeting with Minister Ehmke and State Secretary Bahr. He exploded, called Bahr an "all-out appeaser" (his characterization of Ehmke was only slightly less harsh), and then advised us per paragraph two above.

4. The discussion brought out the following comments by Ahlers:

A. The Radios, as foreign owned and controlled propaganda instruments operating from German soil, clearly do present a problem to the FRG in terms of both sovereignty and its attempts at normalization with the Bloc which are now underway. The "appeasers" see

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<sup>1</sup> Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 379, Subject Files, Radio Free Europe & Radio Liberty, Vol. I. Secret. A typed note at the top of the page reads: "USC Attachment to CA-19, 26 June 1970." A covering memorandum from Sonnenfeldt to Kissinger reads: "Attached is a paper for this morning's 40 Committee meeting, which has just been delivered by CIA and should be distributed to the Committee members."

it largely in the latter light, but there are also a number of important officials, otherwise firmly persuaded of the continued need for the ideological struggle with Communism, who see a real problem in the Radios from the sovereignty angle.

B. The number of officials who are concerned about the Radios, and who are inclined not to allow them to continue as now constituted and located, is increasing.

C. The German Press is becoming more concerned and pressure is gradually developing, at least in terms of questions being raised with the Federal Press Office, but also, even if it is yet less so, in editorials and the running of anti-radio articles.

D. The retention of the Radios as now constituted and located will thus not be an easy matter at best.

E. Moreover, in the light of the Ehmke/Bahr position and the manner in which at least Bahr can be depended upon to pursue it, there is really only one way to forestall a FRG decision against the Radios: To get to Chancellor Brandt and persuade him otherwise. That effort may not succeed but it is the only route that offers any chance for success.

F. To prevent this from becoming a matter of public controversy (which, according to Ahlers, it is certain to become if the problem is handled as a formal USG/FRG issue), the consultations/negotiations should be kept within an unofficial channel.

5. Ahlers promised to be of assistance, both in keeping us informed of developments and, at the right moment, by exerting influence on Chancellor Brandt and others who are still open to discussion on this problem.

6. He agreed that, in view of Ehmke's "no hurry" posture (CA-18, 26 June 70, paragraph 7), there is no need for immediate action vis-à-vis Chancellor Brandt (but Ahlers also agreed to flash word to us in case unanticipated developments make a quick action essential after all). We told him that the next step would be for us to report our findings to Washington and that we would get in touch with him after the problem had been considered there.

7. DCM Fessenden has been briefed on the above.



43. **Memorandum From Edward Weintal of the United States Information Agency to the Director of the United States Information Agency (Shakespeare)**<sup>1</sup>

Washington, July 1, 1970.

RE

Radio Free Europe

*Memorandum of conversation with Polish Ambassador, Jerzy Michalowski*

I lunched today with Ambassador Michalowski at the International Club—at his invitation.

After an exchange of amenities, the Ambassador came right to the point and asked whether Charles Bartlett's story describing the President's "intervention" in the matter of RFE was accurate.<sup>2</sup>

I replied that I knew nothing of the President's "intervention" but did know that the President, as well as the concerned agencies of the U.S. Government, felt very strongly about assuring the continued existence of RFE.

The Ambassador replied he understood our concern because once RFE was removed from Munich, it would be "dead." "I am sure," he said, "that neither Spain nor Turkey would have it."

Michalowski then said that the Polish Government has not yet made the elimination of RFE a condition of the basic agreement with the Federal German Government. "We don't want to do that at this stage, but as soon as the basic agreement is concluded, we shall certainly return to RFE."

Following the basic agreement, Michalowski said, there will be another round of negotiations dealing with "Normalization of Relations." This will include establishment of Embassies, Consulates, etc. It is at that stage that the Poles intend to make the elimination or at least sanitization of RFE as a condition sine qua non. The Ambassador made it clear that Gomulka himself and the top leadership of the Government and Party were involved in this.

"I feel certain," the Ambassador continued, "that at that point we will be told by the FRG Government that they agree with us but that the 'Americans won't let us touch RFE'."

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<sup>1</sup> Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 683, Country Files, Europe, Germany, Vol. V. Confidential. The memorandum was forwarded to Kissinger by USIA's Acting Director, Henry Loomis, under a July 8 covering memorandum.

<sup>2</sup> For the relevant excerpts from Bartlett's article, see Document 39.

“In that case, we shall face a Polish-U.S. confrontation. This is the last thing I want.”

“If there is a conflict between FRG and U.S.A. this does not concern me in the least,” the Ambassador continued. “If as a result of the RFE, there should be a Polish-FRG conflict this may concern me a little more. But if I am faced with a Polish-U.S. conflict, I shall be directly concerned and I must try to avoid it at all costs.”

I asked the Ambassador what he meant by confrontation.

He replied that obviously “there would be no war,” but U.S.-Polish relations which he had tried hard to improve would deteriorate “and no one wants that.”

I remarked that I have heard a lot about the wickedness of RFE, but have yet to see specific charges against it.

The Ambassador said that RFE really was nothing but a “gossip column” run by malicious but extremely able journalists. (“I wish I could hire them for the Polskie Radio,” he said at one point.)

“They often goof, though. In one case they had to apologize to a woman writer whom they accused of being a U.B. agent. In another, they charged a prominent labor leader with being a collaborationist during the war. All the man did was to write a poem for a German-sponsored newspaper in Cracow. The man had already been tried in 1945 and exonerated.”

The Ambassador contrasted RFE policies with his own. When a Polish paper wrote an article abusive of Martha Mitchell, he said, he had personally written to Warsaw to have such attacks stopped. And, he says, they *were* stopped.

I then remarked that I had yet to hear from him what the Polish Government would be willing to offer as a quid pro quo in the unlikely case the Germans would agree to some sort of curbs on the RFE. He said there was very little the Poles could do, but mentioned compensation to holders of pre-war Polish bonds as one of the quids, i.e. “provided we would be given access to Exim Bank loans.”<sup>3</sup>

At this point the conversation turned to Viet Nam, Cambodia, and the Middle East. The Ambassador contributed nothing of interest.

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<sup>3</sup> Regarding Poland’s request for Export-Import Bank loans and the related issue of Poland’s debts to U.S. holders of pre-World War II bonds, see Documents 132, 152, 168, 169, 170, and 175.

#### 44. Editorial Note

On July 9, 1970, Russell Fessenden, Deputy Chief of Mission at the Embassy in Bonn, who was in Oberlin, Ohio wrote a personal letter to Ambassador Kenneth Rush in which he discussed, among other topics, strategy for dealing with the Brandt government's objections to Radio Free Europe's continued operation in West Germany. Fessenden wrote:

*"RFE.* The current plan is to send Bob Murphy, as a member of the RFE Board in New York and an old German hand, to see Brandt personally. The purpose would be to let Brandt learn directly of the President's strong personal interest and to try to get him to leave RFE alone in order to avoid a major U.S.-German confrontation. A confrontation seems inevitable; the position at the top in the U.S. Government is indeed very hard. The President is reported to be very negative about the Bahr-Ehmke reaction. I also reported on the Duckwitz 'démarche' to me at your Third of July party. (I had no chance to write this up before I left Bonn, but did so in Washington. Duckwitz brought the subject up, saying that the Poles had put it on the agenda for the next meeting. He characterized RFE as a 'nuisance' which is 'not in tune with the times.' He asked whether it couldn't be moved out of the country. He obviously is even softer on this subject than Bahr and Ehmke, who at least do not believe RFE should be used as a bargaining counter in the Polish negotiations. In the face of this Duckwitz comment, I felt I had no alternative but to give him the full U.S. position, as set forth in our instruction. I stressed the inevitability of a major U.S.-German confrontation unless something is done. This seemed to have some impact on Duckwitz. However, he no doubt will be the most difficult on this question because of his strong personal commitment to the success of the Polish negotiations.)

"In addition to the Murphy visit to Brandt, EUR has in mind a second action designed to soften the blow. This would be a discreet approach to someone like Ehmke saying in effect that this is not a propitious time to push the RFE issue when the Administration is preoccupied with the troops issue, as well as many difficult East-West issues. (The feeling in Washington on RFE is so strong that there is a tendency to equate RFE with the US troop presence in Germany.) There may be no formal instructions on this second, informal and discreet approach.

"One other RFE issue I was asked about was Strauss's view. You may recall that Ehmke and Bahr said that Strauss shared their views on RFE for the same reason: infringement of German sovereignty. There was some skepticism in Washington as to whether Strauss really felt this way, and we were asked to try to ascertain his real views. You might ask Jock [Jonathan Dean] to look into this. One note of caution

here: I think we should be very careful in approaching Strauss (maybe we shouldn't do it at all). It would be very bad if RFE became a political football between the Opposition and the Government. There is a danger that someone like Strauss would seize on the issue as another indicator of the Government's 'appeasement' policy." (Department of State, Files: Lot 74 D 430, Box 4, Personal Correspondence File)

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**45. Memorandum From Helmut Sonnenfeldt of the National Security Council Staff to the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger)<sup>1</sup>**

Washington, July 17, 1970.

SUBJECT

Scheel Visit—Radio Free Europe

Although it is unlikely that this subject will come up, you may want to consider pulling Scheel aside at some point to impress on him the President's personal interest in the radios and our strong hope that this will not become a bone of contention between us.

*Background*

As you know, Fred Valtin of CIA has been in Germany and has had a round of talks with various Germans.

It is very clear that Bahr and Ehmke want to get the radios out. It isn't clear yet whether they have talked to Brandt and if so what his view is. But it takes very little imagination to believe that he can be persuaded that over time the existence of the radios is incompatible with his policy of reconciliation with the East.

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<sup>1</sup> Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 683, Country Files, Europe, Germany, Vol. V. Secret; Sensitive; Nodis. Urgent; sent for information. A notation on the memorandum indicates that Kissinger saw it. Handwritten markings at the top read: "Scheel Talks—Keep for HAK info" and "Scheel Visit." Scheel visited the United States from July 17 to 18. No documentation has been found to suggest that Radio Free Europe was discussed during his visit. For documentation on the Scheel visit, see *Foreign Relations, 1969–1976*, volume XL, Germany and Berlin, 1969–1972, Document 101. Also see *Akten zur Auswärtigen Politik der Bundesrepublik Deutschland, 1970*, Vol. II, pp. 1196–98, 1201–02.

The fact that Ahlers and Spangenberg (Heinemann's chef de cabinet) oppose Bahr and Ehmke gives us little to lean on. Ahlers himself is a very ambivalent character as regards his attitude toward us and Spangenberg is a decent enough but rather opaque type. Heinemann in any case is a superdove. In any event, it is Bahr and Ehmke who sit at the Palais Schaumburg and have direct access to Brandt.

The Foreign Office, whose influence is negligible, except to the extent that Brandt needs Scheel to preserve the viability of his coalition, wants to avoid a confrontation with us. They also accept, as indeed do Bahr and Ehmke, that the radios should not be made a bargaining element between the FRG and the Poles in any explicit way. Duckwitz, although now retired but still in charge of the negotiations with the Poles, recently assured Fessenden that the Germans will not entertain any Polish effort to put RFE on the agenda for the next round of the Polish-German negotiations. Evidently, judging from the attached talk between Ambassador Michalowski and Ted Weintal (Tab A),<sup>2</sup> the Poles do not intend to do so either. But what they do intend to do is to make removal of RFE a precondition for the next round, after the Oder-Neisse is settled, for a "genuine" normalization of relations.

My hunch is that what Bahr will do is to whisper to his Eastern friends that if they do not raise the question formally, he will take care of it in his own way.

The problem with linking the radios to our troop presence<sup>3</sup> is this: in order to maintain the fiction that the radios are private organizations, we gave the Germans the right to license them as private broadcasting institutions on their soil. This happens every June (or maybe July) but with the understanding that three months before, in April, the Germans can notify the radios that the license will not be renewed. This may well be what Ehmke was implying when he told Valtin that there was no immediate hurry in dealing with the radios. Valtin thinks the Germans may be thinking of April 1971 or 1972. (The latter date may be related to Hungarian hints that Eastern participation in the Olympics may be jeopardized if RFE is still in business in 1972. I think this is pure bluff.)

Consequently, any explicit linkage of the radios to the troops is going to undermine the whole elaborate structure we have erected over the years (including private boards of trustees and fund-raising drives) to give the radios private character and, incidentally, greater freedom of operation than the official radios.

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<sup>2</sup> See Document 43.

<sup>3</sup> See Document 39.

Whatever internal re-examination of this entire question you may want to undertake—whether a further independent study of the radios’ effectiveness, or exploration of combining them with other existing radios—it seems to me that the most important thing to avoid is a unilateral German decision not to renew the licenses, be it as part of an explicit deal with the Eastern countries or as a gesture of “reconciliation.” *If the radios go it should be because we want them to go, whatever our reasons may be.* I would strongly warn you against the notion of making their removal a part of some bargain between ourselves and the Eastern countries. We should do it only if (a) we decided the money was no longer worth spending, (b) we concluded that the East had available the sources of information now provided by the radios, i.e., the radios had become an anachronism (about the year 2000), or (c) we cannot afford a crunch with the Germans.

If the matter should be raised with Scheel at all it should be wholly privately and the utmost stress should be placed on the fact that the President personally regards the operations as essential. If Scheel then leaks it to others than Brandt, they will at least know that the President is directly involved. Ultimately, however, I think the matter should be taken up directly with Brandt—and the sooner the better. Once Bahr and Ehmke get his position frozen, his prestige becomes involved and we will get into a first-class confrontation.

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**46. Memorandum From the Assistant Secretary of State for European Affairs (Hillenbrand) to the Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs (Johnson)<sup>1</sup>**

Washington, July 30, 1970.

SUBJECT

Radio Free Europe (RFE) and Radio Liberty (RL)—Status of Negotiations with FRG

When our “special emissary,” Fred Valtin of CIA, went to Germany in June he encountered high-level objections to the continuance of RFE

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<sup>1</sup> Source: Department of State, INR/IL Historical Files, 40 Committee Minutes, August 7, 1970. Secret. Sent through Coerr. Drafted by A.E. Wellons (INR/DDC) and Skoug and cleared by Sutterlin and Cline (INR).

and RL.<sup>2</sup> Minister Ehmke and State Secretary Bahr of the FRG Chancery, who are leading foreign policy advisors to Chancellor Brandt, told Valtin on June 25 that both Radios must be removed from Germany within the next year or two. This signal that some top West German officials favor closing down RFE and RL, probably before the Olympic Games begin in Munich in 1972, calls for a further US approach in the interest of discouraging such an action.

After considerable discussion, the Department and CIA officers concerned concluded that the next stage in our discussion of the subject with the FRG should be an explanation to Chancellor Brandt of the importance the USG attaches to the continuance of RFE and RL. Since the Radios are ostensibly non-official, and since we do not know the degree to which Brandt may be aware of or share the views of Ehmke and Bahr, we believe it would be wise to avoid using an official channel (e.g. Embassy) or high-level intercession (e.g. Robert Murphy)<sup>3</sup> at this stage. Such approaches should be retained, however, as possible future options if it appears that a representation by a high-level U.S. personage is required.

We have accepted CIA's recommendation that it would be best at this stage for Valtin, who handled the problem previously and is well-known to key German officials including Brandt, to return to Germany to see Brandt personally and privately. Valtin would try to ascertain whether a firm FRG decision has been taken to have RFE and RL leave Germany by the summer of 1972. It should be highly useful to the USG to obtain a first-hand reading of Brandt's attitude, regardless of whether the German Government has made a decision, and using Valtin now has the advantage of preserving maximum flexibility for future U.S. moves.

*Recommendation:* If the oral report of the CIA representative in the 40 Committee includes a proposal that Valtin discuss the Radios with Brandt as outlined above, that you support the proposal.

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<sup>2</sup> See Documents 41 and 42.

<sup>3</sup> See Document 44.

47. **Memorandum From the Deputy Director of the Bureau of Intelligence and Research (Coerr) to the Assistant Secretary of State for European Affairs (Hillenbrand)**<sup>1</sup>

Washington, August 13, 1970.

SUBJECT

Minutes of the Meeting of the 40 Committee, 7 August 1970

The minutes of the meeting of the 40 Committee, dated 10 August 1970, contained the following items:

*"2. Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty—Summary of Developments*

In bringing the Committee up to date on the status of RFE and RL relations with the Bonn Government, Mr. Valtin's marching orders to see Chancellor Willy Brandt were confirmed.<sup>2</sup> Mr. Kissinger said it would be appropriate for Mr. Valtin to indicate higher authority's known strong feelings on the subject."<sup>3</sup>

[Omitted here is item 3.]

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<sup>1</sup> Source: Department of State, INR/IL Historical Files, 40 Committee Files. Secret; Eyes Only.

<sup>2</sup> According to a July 30 memorandum from Hillenbrand to Johnson, Valtin met with senior German officials in June and was told that the radios had to be closed down prior to the 1972 Munich Olympics. "After considerable discussion," the CIA and Department of State agreed to send Valtin back for a direct presentation of the issue to Chancellor Brandt. (Ibid.) On August 20 Valtin met once again with Ehmke and Bahr; the planned meeting with Brandt was postponed. See Document 48.

<sup>3</sup> According to the minutes of the 40 Committee's June 29 meeting: "The Chairman, Mr. Kissinger, stated that higher authority took a very dim view of certain reported German attitudes." (Department of State, INR/IL Historical Files, 40 Committee Files)



#### 48. Telegram From Fred Valtin to the Central Intelligence Agency<sup>1</sup>

Bonn, August 20, 1970.

1. Had hour and a half meeting with Minister Ehmke on 19 August, with State Secretary Bahr participating for first half. Atmosphere, while somewhat tense during period our initial presentation, was otherwise cordial throughout, and meeting ended on note that talks in informal channel should continue in next few months to seek agreement on mutually acceptable solution in effort to avoid, if at all possible, an official USG/FRG confrontation on the Radio problem.

2. We opened meeting by stating that position they had taken in June (i.e. that Radios "must go") had created a potentially very serious situation. The matter had been carefully considered at highest level as a problem of inter-agency interest (i.e. not just by CIA) and conclusion had been reached that FRG's position is not acceptable. Bahr (who at very beginning of meeting had been in euphoric mood due "the marvelous way" in which his trip to Washington had worked out) asked whether "highest level" included the President. We advised them (per Dr. Kissinger's instructions at 40 Committee meeting)<sup>2</sup> that the President is aware of the problem and, while obviously not involved in details, feels strongly that Radios constitute effective instruments and must be preserved. We then advised them that USG, while reserving the right to fall back into an official confrontation posture, has deliberately chosen to continue these talks in the informal channel, hoping thereby to be able to avoid a confrontation. They should clearly understand, however, that we were speaking to them on USG instructions and that, to repeat, the situation is potentially very serious.

3. Ehmke/Bahr obviously had expected to hear something quite different and seemed to be stunned that USG should take this issue so seriously. They both expressed some dismay, but both (and particularly Ehmke) stated that strong USG feeling would naturally be fully taken

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<sup>1</sup> Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 684, Country Files, Europe, Germany, Vol. VII. Secret. Repeated to Munich. The telegram was attached to a memorandum from Helms to Kissinger, August 25. Helms wrote: "Attached is a copy of Fred Valtin's cable from Bonn. . . . You will note that discussions with Chancellor Brandt are proposed for late September or early October. Prior to that meeting we will request further reviews with your office and with the State Department on the line to be taken." Also attached was an NSC routing memorandum that reads as follows: "Ed—orig sent to *Sonnenfeldt*/Jessup (cy) for action. 8/26/70." Copies were sent to Lord, Kissinger, and Haig.

<sup>2</sup> See Document 47.

into account in further FRG deliberations on this subject. Ehmke then advised that position they had taken with us in June had been discussed with Brandt in interim and that Brandt had agreed. What we had told them today, said Ehmke, would of course also be made known to Brandt and would no doubt be most carefully weighed by Brandt. In this connection, Ehmke relayed Brandt's regret at not having been able to meet us at this time, and Brandt's assurances that he would do so on our next visit.

4. Ehmke asked for explanation of reasons for USG hard position. This given to him in considerable detail along lines familiar to Headquarters. Essence: The Radios constitute uniquely effective instruments, represent no anomaly in the 1970's or in an era of *détente* (and, to contrary, are even more essential in the more complex ideological struggle in such an era), and cannot be replaced once terminated, nor can any USG or Fedrep communication media substitute for them. Ehmke/Bahr said they agreed on all points made by us, and they reiterated their position that FRG does not desire the termination of the Radios, only that they no longer operate from German soil. We countered by saying that that request amounted to termination, because none of the alternatives cited by them in June is feasible and because, after careful study of relocation possibilities, USG had concluded this cannot be done, if at all, without radically affecting the nature and effectiveness of the Radios.

5. We also advised them that, apart from USG position on this issue, they should give most careful thought to effect negative decision would have on Fedrep image, both in terms of reaction by peoples in Bloc countries and in terms of reaction in U.S. (and on latter we specifically referred to Congress, American industrial leaders who back RFE with contributions, influential private Americans who old friends of Germany and who sit on RFE Board, and sizable minority population elements in U.S.). Both Ehmke/Bahr acknowledged validity of this point and said it, too would have to be carefully weighed.

6. Ehmke said that in light non-feasibility relocation and other alternatives (Bahr chimed in that these findings showed that Fedrep in effect was being asked to carry the burden no other country was willing to even share), he might personally reach conclusion not to push the issue, if it were not for one inescapable factor: The certainty that sooner or later (and surely no later than in the months prior to 1972 Olympics when Bloc can be depended upon to mount its non-participation bluff), FRG will come under intense pressure from both the radical left and right on the sovereignty issue and, if tied to Olympic problem, from highly influential Sports/Athletics Lobby and every other non-governmental organization, including business interests. If so (and Ehmke is certain such or similar situation will arise at some point), the two Radios will become a political football in Germany—

and Ehmke feels that no German Government (no matter how then constituted) would be able to resist the pressures that will then develop. This then, according to Ehmke, would result in worst of all possible worlds, i.e. termination of Radios under public pressure and, if related to Olympics, as result successful ploy by Bloc. In light of these considerations, Ehmke said, he had to come to the conclusion that indefinite status quo not feasible from FRG point of view, nor in his opinion in terms USG interest in Radios and larger equities. Consequently, it is essential that USG and FRG continue to talk about this problem to see whether some mutually acceptable solution can be found. Ehmke emphasized that there was no hurry since current license year had just started, and he also reiterated FRG desire that these talks continue to be conducted quietly in the informal channel.

7. Bahr asked whether USG was thinking in terms any specific time frame, such as two and five years. We answered in the negative, advising them that this position based on impossibility to foretell the course of world events with any accuracy and that Radios might be considered even more essential in two or five years than now. Bahr said this would make it more difficult to reach agreement.

8. After saying that we had not thought of this before and that our question did not imply any sort of commitment, we asked whether the FRG position against the indefinite continuation of the Radios pertained to the entire complex of both Radios, or did they feel more strongly on either the continued presence of the transmitter facilities or the editorial and programming headquarters. This query caused quite a discussion between Ehmke and Bahr, but they finally agreed (while also emphasizing that they could not make a commitment) that the transmitter facilities were the real problem. Both felt that, if these were removed or in the process of being replaced outside Fedrep, FRG could cope with domestic and Bloc pressures against Radios, i.e. they could and would defend continued operations of headquarters of both Radios in Munich. We reiterated we not in position to make any commitment and emphasized had no way of knowing whether relocation of transmitter facilities is technically or politically feasible, but we assured them that their differentiated approach to these two aspects of Radios would be reported to Washington.

9. After stating that we under strong impression that current nature of Radios, and their immense importance to Bloc developments, not fully understood or appreciated by FRG officialdom, we passed Ehmke the background briefing folders on RFE and RL prepared by Headquarters.<sup>3</sup> He expressed appreciation and promised to study carefully.

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<sup>3</sup> Not further identified.

10. We questioned Ehmke quite closely on 9 August *Stern* article. He maintained that it was not leaked by Chancellery and that, in fact, he had made effort kill the article when *Stern* called him on it prior publication. He said leak might have come from someone else who participated in cabinet meeting at which it decided that RFE license abrogation clause not to be used. (*Comment*: This was first word that this question had been discussed at Cabinet level.) Ehmke would not promise anything when we asked that Chancellery issue dementi on *Stern* article.

11. Ehmke lodged mild complaint re what he believes our (CIA) and/or RFE action in getting Springer Press recently to come out with articles attacking FRG for being soft on Radios. We gave him unequivocal assurances that CIA and Radios not involved.

12. It was agreed that next round of talks, including meeting with Brandt, should take place late September/early October.

13. DCM Fessenden has read this report.

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**49. Memorandum From the Deputy Director for Plans, Central Intelligence Agency (Karamessines) to the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger) and the Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs (Johnson)<sup>1</sup>**

Washington, October 23, 1970.

SUBJECT

Discussion with Chancellor Brandt on RFE and RL

1. Attached is a résumé of Fred Valtin's meeting in Bonn with Chancellor Brandt on the presence of Radio Free Europe and Radio Liberty in the Federal Republic. Minister Ehmke was also present.

2. Mr. Valtin's cabled report reflects that the conversation was cordial throughout and that the Chancellor stated categorically that he does not want the problems presented by the Radios to become a matter of controversy between the Federal Republic and the U.S. Government. The Chancellor further indicated that if an earnest examination of all potential compromise solutions reveals that these are not feasible, he would be prepared to permit a continuation of the status quo.

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<sup>1</sup> Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 379, Subject Files, Radio Free Europe & Radio Liberty, Vol. I. Secret.

It appears, however, that the Chancellor is especially concerned about domestic pressures on the government if the Eastern Bloc threatens not to participate in the 1972 Olympic Games at Munich because of the presence of the Radios.

3. Another meeting is planned between Minister Ehmke (or Chancellor Brandt, if appropriate) and Mr. Valtin<sup>2</sup> when the U.S. study of possible alternatives is completed.

**TH Karamessines**

### **Attachment**

Mr. Valtin described the evolution of the Radios into highly sophisticated instruments capable of influencing developments in the Soviet Bloc and their effectiveness was described in detail. In response to the Chancellor's query, Mr. Valtin confirmed that the American management controls the content and tone of the broadcasts and he described how [*less than 1 line not declassified*] the State Department exercise policy supervision over the Radios. Mr. Valtin summed up his presentation by emphasizing that the U.S. Government places a very high value on the Radios. They are seen as uniquely effective instruments, which are not an anomaly in the 70's; even in an era of détente the Radios are essential factors in the ideological struggle.

Chancellor Brandt agreed with all of the points made and stated that he did not question either the effectiveness of the Radios or their continued validity. Moreover, neither he nor his Government wanted to terminate the Radio operations. He expressed the hope that there was no misunderstanding in Washington regarding his position on the need to continue the ideological struggle with communism, particularly in an era of "negotiation rather than confrontation." The Chancellor said he had made it clear to Brezhnev during his visit to Moscow that their treaty concerned inter-governmental relations only and not ideological differences. Brezhnev replied that "the last thing we want is ideological fraternization."

Mr. Valtin referred to State Secretary Bahr's statement in June 1970 that "the Radios must go" and commented that should the Federal Republic of Germany (FRG) persist in this view, it would lead to the Radios' liquidation. The position expressed by Bahr, therefore, created a potentially serious situation. The issue, which is considered to be a problem of inter-Agency interest, has been thoroughly discussed and the conclusion reached that the FRG's position, as enunciated by Bahr,

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<sup>2</sup> No record of this meeting was found.

is not acceptable since relocation appeared impossible and, even if technically feasible, this would affect the nature of the operations so radically as to make their continuation almost certainly not worthwhile. The Chancellor was advised, moreover, that the President had personally reviewed the problem and he feels strongly that the Radios must be preserved.

The Chancellor, while reiterating his positive view of the Radios' role and effectiveness, said they do present a problem in the context of the FRG's attempt to establish more normal relations with the USSR and the Bloc countries. Therefore, the Radios are and will probably continue to be a problem since they provide a convenient peg for the Bloc to continue their accusations of the FRG's alleged revanchist attitudes. He acknowledged that it was unlikely that either the USSR or individual Bloc countries, all of whom have their own rationale for wanting more normal relations with the FRG, would permit negotiations to break down solely on the issue of the Radios and, in any event, the FRG will be able to deal with actual or anticipated Bloc pressures regarding the Radios. All appropriate German officials had been advised that it is Government policy that the Radios are not negotiable and any *démarches* on this question are to be rejected. The recent official announcement concerning the license renewal for the Radios was designed to reduce speculation on the status of the Radios and, more importantly, to indicate to the Bloc that the FRG position on this matter is firm.

The sovereignty aspect, as raised earlier by Bahr, did not appear to bother Brandt who said that he does not attach as much importance to this aspect as do some of his advisers. He did remark, however, that the operation of foreign owned and controlled propaganda media on German soil does constitute an anomaly so many years after the end of the occupation.

The Chancellor fully accepted the U.S. Government position that a relocation of the Radios in their entirety is tantamount to termination and thus out of the question. Nevertheless, he said the FRG seemed to carry the entire political burden of the Radios and he asked whether some degree of "burden sharing," such as a possible relocation of the transmitters, might be feasible. The central problem is the emission of propaganda broadcasts, under German license, from German soil; the FRG is most vulnerable to attack because it can grant or withhold the licenses. The programming/editorial/research activities in Munich are not licensed and are comparable to any other journalistic activity, whose freedom to exist and function is guaranteed under the German constitution. In response to Mr. Valtin's comment that if a relocation of the transmitters was feasible and agreed to, we might later be asked to move the Munich Headquarters, the Chancellor unequivocally

stated that as long as he had anything to say he would not ask that the two Munich Headquarters be removed.

The Chancellor, in response to his question, was told that a study on transmitter relocation is in process but far from completed; it is already apparent, however, that the chances of relocation appear to be slim. The reasons for this include such factors as the paucity of locations which are feasible from the technical standpoint, the uncertainty of the outcome of negotiations with Spain and Portugal regarding augmentation of current facilities, the financial costs involved and the two-year lead time which is necessary for the installation of equipment. Even if an immediate decision to relocate were made, the transmitters located in Germany would be needed through the 1972 Olympic Games. The Chancellor appeared to be dismayed at these findings although he made no specific comments.

The Chancellor wondered whether some other solution, such as a contractual U.S. Government/FRG arrangement on the Radios, might be feasible as the FRG would be able to deal with Bloc complaints on that basis. (In a subsequent discussion between Mr. Valtin and Ehmke, it was agreed that this particular proposal would, among other factors, radically change the Radios' image and was not, therefore, a desirable solution.)

The Chancellor also suggested that, as one possible alternative, it would be helpful if only a portion of both Radios' transmitters or all of the transmitters of one of the Radios were moved from Germany. Mr. Valtin did not comment on this proposal other than to say that it would be included in his report of the meeting.

The Chancellor stated that he was especially concerned about the intensive domestic problems which will result from Soviet Bloc pressures in connection with the Olympic Games. He agreed with Mr. Valtin's analysis that the threatened Soviet and Eastern European boycott of the Olympics was a bluff; nevertheless, he feels that sport, business and political groups will fall for the bluff and he is apprehensive over the Government's ability to cope with such a situation. Mr. Valtin said public reaction to such a Bloc ploy is directly related to how the FRG handles it. The Chancellor agreed but said there are situations wherein public opinion is dominant no matter what the Government does and emotions are likely to be so intense on this issue as to make it impossible for any German Government to contain them.

The Chancellor emphasized that he does not want the Radio problem, serious as it is, to become a matter of controversy between the FRG and the United States. He hoped that some mutually agreeable formula could be found to reduce the political burden on the FRG and he urged that all possible alternatives be examined by Washington in

good faith. However, should such potential alternatives be found technically or politically impossible, “things will remain as they are.”

It was agreed that another meeting between Mr. Valtin and Ehmke (and, if appropriate, with the Chancellor) should take place once the U.S. Government has completed its study of possible alternative solutions.

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**50. Memorandum From Director of Central Intelligence Helms to the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger)<sup>1</sup>**

Washington, undated.

SUBJECT

Senator Case's Proposed Legislation Re Radio Free Europe and Radio Liberty

1. Yesterday we learned by chance of a press statement issued by the office of Senator Clifford Case for release on Sunday, 24 January, stating that the Senator plans to introduce legislation on Monday, 25 January to bring Radio Free Europe and Radio Liberty under the authorization and appropriation process of the Congress. The statement also notes that similar legislation is to be introduced in the House by Representative Ogden R. Reid. The text of this release is attached as Tab A.<sup>2</sup>

2. We first learned of Senator Case's interest in these Radios last October, when the State Department informed us of a letter from Senator Case to Secretary Rogers of 8 October asking several questions about these Radios. A copy of Senator Case's letter is attached as Tab B.<sup>3</sup> At that time Agency and State Department representatives agreed that some of Senator Case's questions could not be answered fully on an unclassified basis and that the matter had best be handled by an oral briefing by Assistant Secretary Abshire. It was further agreed that the Agency stood ready to participate if this appeared desirable.

3. We understand that State Department representatives have on a number of occasions attempted, in conversations with Senator Case

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<sup>1</sup> Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 379, Subject Files, Radio Free Europe & Radio Liberty, Vol. I. Secret.

<sup>2</sup> Attached but not printed.

<sup>3</sup> Attached but not printed.



and members of his staff, to schedule such a briefing but without success.

4. Needless to say, the effectiveness of these radios would be seriously damaged by the introduction of such legislation or the publication of the attached release.<sup>4</sup>

Dick

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<sup>4</sup> In an attached January 22 memorandum to Kissinger, Haig wrote that Helms's submission was "proof positive of the kind of lax interdepartmental discipline which is creeping upon us. . . . [Helms] points out that at least State was aware that Case was boring into the RFE/RL issue. Since that time, State has been unable to collar Case and brief him on the problem and no one, Rogers or Helms, had enough foresight to ask the White House to intervene. The cost of this bureaucratic fiasco is obvious. Our first exposure to the issue was yesterday when we learned of the Case press release, embargoed until Sunday's newspaper. Everyone involved must have known the President's view on this which has been articulated both through the 40 Committee and within the context of our recent difficulties with the SPD." Haig recommended that Kissinger follow up with formal inquiries to "the Secretary of State and the Director of CIA asking why appropriate action was not taken to at least attempt to preclude this action both at the departmental level and then subsequently through the use of whatever White House leverage could be mustered."

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## 51. Minutes of the 40 Committee Meeting<sup>1</sup>

San Clemente, California, March 31, 1971, 10:26–11:55 a.m.

### SUBJECT

Various—see summary of conclusions

### PARTICIPATION

Chairman—Henry A. Kissinger

State

Mr. U. Alexis Johnson

Defense

Mr. David Packard

JCS

Lt. Gen. Richard T. Knowles

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<sup>1</sup> Source: Department of State, INR/IL Historical Files, 40 Committee Files. Top Secret; Eyes Only; Nodis. The meeting took place in the conference room of the Western White House.

CIA

Lt. Gen. Robert E. Cushman

Mr. Thomas Karamessines

Mr. William Nelson<sup>2</sup>

[*name not declassified*]<sup>2</sup>

Mr. David Blee<sup>2</sup>

NSC Staff

Mr. Frank M. Chapin

Col. Richard T. Kennedy

Mr. Keith Guthrie

[Omitted here is the summary of conclusions and sections unrelated to Radio Free Europe and Radio Liberty.]

Dr. Kissinger: Now we can turn to Radio Free Europe.

(Mr. Nelson left and Mr. [*name not declassified*] joined the meeting at this point)

Dr. Kissinger: (to Mr. [*name not declassified*]) Do you want to present your findings?

Gen. Cushman: The paper was prepared by the State Department.<sup>3</sup>

Mr. Johnson: This is a monumental piece of work. It is a very fundamental question that we face. In 1961 we had a task force on this that came out almost in the same place. At that time nobody listened to the task force.

Mr. Karamessines: In 1967 there was another task force.<sup>4</sup>

Mr. Johnson: There are two issues. First, do we think that RFE and RL are worth preserving? Second, what do we have to do to preserve them? Do we want to move away from CIA funding as matter of preference or only so far as we are forced to do so? The third question is what direction we go if we are forced to drop CIA funding.

Dr. Kissinger: Another problem is the question of relocation and modernization. This is an issue between us and the Germans.

Mr. Johnson: On Question 1, we would say that RFE and RL are worth preserving. On Question 2 we would prefer things to remain as they are. The existing system has worked well. Whether we have to answer question 3 depends on whether we are forced to make changes by Senator Case. We have been made unable to change his position. He professes to be in favor of maintaining RFE, and he also says he is willing to consider various means to provide overt funding. He has a new bill which represents some movement on his part, but it still has lots of bugs. In addition Senator Fulbright has called hearings for April

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<sup>2</sup> Not present for entire meeting. [Footnote in the original.]

<sup>3</sup> Not found.

<sup>4</sup> Apparent reference to the Katzenbach Committee (see footnote 2, Document 28).

28, and we will need a position by that time. The first alternative for [new types of funding]<sup>5</sup> is something on the order of what Case is proposing. This would involve a mixed public and private corporation for which Congress would appropriate the money. The corporation would pass this along to RFE and RL. The second proposal is to set up RFE and RL as a public corporation and make a direct appropriation to them.

Dr. Kissinger: Would this be a one-time appropriation?

Mr. Johnson: No, appropriations would be made annually. A third proposal is a direct appropriation to one of the existing agencies for example, the State Department. We object to this because it would make these radio stations a government institution. It would not be possible to separate them from VOA.

Dr. Kissinger: We would be stuck with responsibility if RFE and RL took a more aggressive line.

Mr. Johnson: Yes. This would give us problems diplomatically.

Dr. Kissinger: This defeats the purpose of RFE and RL.

Mr. Johnson: I am getting some information about the Public Broadcasting Corporation. It may provide a useful precedent. My own feeling is that we can't make a decision without further exploration with Congress. We have never talked about this with them, except with Senator Case and [Rep.]<sup>6</sup> Ogden Reid. If we want to explore overt funding, we would have to talk with the leadership to see if anything is feasible. If there appears to be no feasible alternative, we can go back to Senator Case and say: "Overt funding means the death of RFE. Yet, you say you want to keep RFE, so let's stay where we are."

Alternatively, we can say to him that we have found a possible feasible course which we are prepared to support.

There are two real alternatives: a cut-out corporation and one supported by direct appropriations. Secretary Rogers made the point that since it is well known that RFE is being funded by the U.S. Government, why not turn it into a public broadcasting corporation with funds appropriated directly? Marty Hillenbrand thinks this would create difficulty for Germany, Spain and Portugal. They like a cut-out arrangement.

Mr. [name not declassified]: This is easier for them. It helps if there is no line item in the budget.

Mr. Karamessines: In creating a corporation we need not confine its responsibilities to the two radio stations. It could also handle other activities.

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<sup>5</sup> Brackets in the original.

<sup>6</sup> Brackets in the original.

Dr. Kissinger: A single corporation could also reduce the number of pressure points against the U.S. Government. I know the line between the two alternatives is a thin one.

Mr. Johnson: I am inclined to think that this thin line is important.

Mr. [name not declassified]: The radios themselves opt for direct funding.

Dr. Kissinger: Why do they prefer that?

Mr. [name not declassified]: No one would be looking over their shoulders.

Mr. Johnson: What about the problems with the host governments?

Dr. Kissinger: [With direct funding]<sup>7</sup> how would we distinguish the two radios from VOA? What is the rationale?

Mr. [name not declassified]: We can point out to the boards of directors the problems involved in keeping RFE and RL separate from VOA. As for a rationale, the boards are looking at the precedent of the Public Broadcasting Corporation.

Mr. Packard: How much private funding does Radio Free Europe receive?

Mr. [name not declassified]: One million dollars.

Dr. Kissinger: If there is an item in the budget, how do we avoid getting stuck with responsibilities for the broadcast? If the Russians raise hell and Dobrynin comes to see the Secretary, the mere fact that the station is not administered by the State Department will not help.

Mr. Johnson: A cut-out would remove the radios one more step from the State Department.

Mr. [name not declassified]: We don't favor direct appropriations. However, the boards of directors do.

Dr. Kissinger: I think they just want people off their backs.

Mr. Johnson: I am not clear in my own mind as to how the boards are appointed. Ostensibly, how is it done?

Mr. [name not declassified]: The RFE Corporation selects the directors.

Mr. Johnson: Who is the Corporation?

Mr. [name not declassified]: Gen. Clay.

Mr. Packard: It is a self-perpetuating corporation.

Dr. Kissinger: Does Radio Liberty have a different board?

Mr. [name not declassified]: Yes, it does. There is no overlapping. The Radio Liberty board is less active.

Mr. Johnson: [1½ lines not declassified]

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<sup>7</sup> Brackets in the original.

Mr. [name not declassified]: [1 line not declassified]

Mr. Johnson: [1 line not declassified]

Mr. [name not declassified]: [1 line not declassified]

Mr. Johnson: [1 line not declassified]

Mr. Karamessines: [1 line not declassified]

Gen. Cushman: (to Mr. Johnson) [1 line not declassified]

Mr. Johnson: [less than 1 line not declassified]

Mr. Karamessines: [1 line not declassified]

Gen. Cushman: [1 line not declassified]

Mr. Johnson: [2 lines not declassified]

Mr. [name not declassified]: [less than 1 line not declassified]

Dr. Kissinger: The new proposal calls for fifteen directors of whom only three would be appointed by the President.

Mr. Johnson: That is the Case proposal.<sup>8</sup> That is not what we are suggesting.

Dr. Kissinger: Are we all agreed that the present situation can't be maintained?

Mr. Johnson: We won't be certain until we take soundings on the Hill.

Gen. Cushman: However, I wouldn't make any bets on being able to keep the status quo.

Mr. Johnson: If the present situation continues, CIA will maintain its links with the organization.

Gen. Cushman: Senator Case seems determined to blow that arrangement out of the water.

Mr. Karamessines: Fulbright is also. In addition there are the problems with the Germans.

Dr. Kissinger: We would have the German problem in any event.

Mr. Karamessines: They prefer a non-CIA fig leaf.

Mr. [name not declassified]: But they insist on a fig leaf.

Dr. Kissinger: The only thing that would help the Germans—and then only slightly—would be a cut-out. This would be better for them than State Department or public control. My own feeling is that in any event this will only hold for one to two years. They won't let RFE and RL stand in the way of Ostpolitik. (to Mr. Karamessines) Do you think that CIA involvement is particularly a problem for the Germans?

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<sup>8</sup> See Document 50.

Mr. Karamessines: Yes, now that it has been the subject of a public statement by a U.S. Senator. However, Brandt has said that he won't let these pressures keep us from working out a solution.

Mr. Packard: What is the budget?

Mr. Karamessines: \$36 million for the two organizations.

Dr. Kissinger: (to Mr. Johnson) I agree that we should undertake extensive consultations to see if there is support for the existing arrangement or any alternatives.

Mr. Karamessines: Do you want this to be done jointly by the State Department and the White House?

Mr. Johnson: Why have the White House involved at this stage?

Mr. [name not declassified]: We can't carry the ball on this.

Dr. Kissinger: (to Mr. Johnson) I think you should do it. If a Presidential call at the right moment will help, that can be arranged.

Mr. [name not declassified]: Should Clark McGregor be involved at some point?

Dr. Kissinger: Clark can help. However, I don't want to get involved.

Mr. Johnson: Senator Russell's passing has complicated the situation. He kept the dogs off for many years.

Dr. Kissinger: Who handles this now?

Mr. Johnson: Senator Ellender.

Dr. Kissinger: He is mad at me because I haven't looked at his home movies. We have now set a time, but he wants to check the list himself to see that all the senior personnel are there.

Mr. Karamessines: Do we need a cut-off date?

Dr. Kissinger: I don't think we can settle this before the new fiscal year. We need another year under the present management. This is the first point we should get across to Senator Case.

Therefore, we conclude that the status quo can probably not be maintained, though we will take soundings to see if it might be possible. Management by the State Department is rejected. A direct appropriation is not what is wanted. The real choice is between a cut-out and the status quo. (to Mr. Johnson) You will make some inquiries on the Hill?

Mr. Johnson: In talking about this I will need to be clear on how the board is to be appointed.

Dr. Kissinger: I suggest that the State and CIA have their legal people develop some ideas on how a new corporation would look. Then we should meet before a proposal is made on the Hill. What is needed is an alternative to the Case bill.

Mr. Karamessines: Is Senator Case holding up hearings expecting an answer from us on his bill?

Mr. [name not declassified]: He told Marty [Hillenbrand]<sup>9</sup> that he wants an answer by April 1.

Mr. Karamessines: If we are responsive, perhaps we can fend off his proposal.

Dr. Kissinger: Why not get this done by this time next week? As soon as it is approved, State can start Congressional consultations.

I don't think we need to raise the relocation and modernization question at this time.

Mr. [name not declassified]: The only thing is that we are on the hook to Brandt. We talked rather vaguely to him in October about needing at least two years.<sup>10</sup>

Dr. Kissinger: You could tell him that we are committed to getting some work done on the legal status of the stations.

Mr. Karamessines: He will hold for that.

Dr. Kissinger: I agree.

[Omitted here is discussion unrelated to Radio Free Europe and Radio Liberty.]

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<sup>9</sup> Brackets in the original.

<sup>10</sup> See Document 49.

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## 52. Memorandum From Director of Central Intelligence Helms to President Nixon<sup>1</sup>

Washington, May 11, 1971.

The purpose of this memorandum is to alert you to the funding problem faced by Radio Free Europe and Radio Liberty.

As you are well aware, the Central Intelligence Agency has funded these Radios for about 20 years, and I know you agree that they have proved their worth to our national interest over this period.

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<sup>1</sup> Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 379, Subject Files, Radio Free Europe & Radio Liberty, Vol. I. Secret; Sensitive. In a covering memorandum of the same date, Helms wrote Kissinger: "Even though the 40 Committee will consider the problem of Radio Free Europe and Radio Liberty at its meeting on the 13th, there is a great deal to be done in a short space of time if the Radios are to avoid being without funds on 1 July. Therefore, I would appreciate your seeing that the President is made promptly aware of this since it may be necessary for him to become personally involved if the situation is to be salvaged in time."

The Agency's role was to provide funding and liaison techniques of such nature that any Government direction or control of the Radios could be plausibly denied. These arrangements were successful in the initial period, but in recent years more and more allegations of CIA backing have appeared in the press. The circumstances are such, therefore, that plausible denial has been increasingly difficult.

On several occasions we have looked for alternative means of giving the necessary financial support (programmed at 36.2 million for FY 1972) without success. Recently, as you know, Senator Case, without prior consultation with this Agency or any other component of the Executive Branch, introduced a bill to provide for public annual appropriations for the Radios.<sup>2</sup> The Department of State, with our assistance, has proposed a revised version of this bill, which would create an American Council for Private International Communications, Inc., which would be funded from congressional appropriations. In turn, the Council would be authorized to provide the necessary financial support for the Radios. In this manner, the Radios would keep their independent, private corporation nature, which is essential not only for their effectiveness but also to maintain the necessary foreign licenses. We believe this revised bill presents a satisfactory solution, and we are working with the Department of State in an attempt to assure the enactment of the bill.

There is considerable doubt that the bill will become law before 30 June 1971, the end of this fiscal year, and an appropriation for the support of the Radios might be delayed until well into Fiscal Year 1972. We have explored possibilities for interim funding to cope with this situation if it occurs but have been informed by the Chairmen of our Appropriations Subcommittees of the Senate and the House, Senator Ellender and Representative Mahon, that they are strongly opposed to any continuing financial support by CIA beyond 30 June 1971 by appropriation, transfer of funds from other agencies, or continuing resolution, as any such action might encourage inquiry and publicity concerning other sensitive and important appropriations.<sup>3</sup>

The Office of Management and Budget is aware of this dilemma and has tried to be helpful. As of now, however, no satisfactory alternative has been developed.

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<sup>2</sup> See Document 50.

<sup>3</sup> Helms informed Kissinger of the views of Representative Mahon and Senator Ellender in an April 16 memorandum. (National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 379, Subject Files, Radio Free Europe & Radio Liberty, Vol. 1)



This problem will be discussed by the 40 Committee at its meeting scheduled for 13 May.<sup>4</sup> Without wishing to anticipate these deliberations, I believe that the continuation of the Radios is of sufficient importance to our foreign policy goals to warrant alerting you to the difficult problem which they now face.

Dick

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<sup>4</sup> See Document 53 and footnote 9 thereto.

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**53. Memorandum From the Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs (Johnson) to the 40 Committee<sup>1</sup>**

Washington, May 12, 1971.

SUBJECT

Radio Free Europe (RFE) and Radio Liberty (RL)

*Background*

At its meeting of March 31, 1971,<sup>2</sup> the 40 Committee agreed that the concept of creating an independent agency or other public-private mechanism for channelling publicly appropriated funds to RFE and RL should be examined. The Committee asked for a draft Bill and on April 7, 1971, was given a draft designed to create an "American Council for Private International Communications." The draft Bill was modelled on the "Public Broadcasting Act of 1967" (PL 90-129).<sup>3</sup>

As its meeting of April 14, 1971,<sup>4</sup> the Committee approved the State/CIA recommendation that preliminary soundings of Congressional opinion be undertaken "in order to obtain a reading on whether the proposal should be presented officially to the Senate." In light of this decision, the Department of State 1) submitted the draft Bill to OMB so that the appropriate clearance process could be undertaken

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<sup>1</sup> Source: Department of State, INR/IL Historical Files, 40 Committee Files. Secret; Exdis. Tabs A-E to this memorandum are attached but not printed.

<sup>2</sup> See Document 51.

<sup>3</sup> 81 Stat. 364, approved November 4, 1967.

<sup>4</sup> The minutes are in the Department of State, INR/IL Historical Files, 40 Committee Files.

and the Bill readied for prompt submission to the Senate should the Committee so decide; 2) requested and obtained from Senator Case a change in the proposed date for hearings on RFE/RL in the Senate Foreign Relations Committee<sup>5</sup> from April 28 to May 24; 3) conducted explorations, jointly with CIA, of Congressional opinion in accordance with the plan presented to the Committee with its memorandum of April 7, 1971 (Tab A).

*Results of Consultations*

*A. Prospects for Continued Funding of RFE/RL through the CIA Budget*

In accordance with the expressed desire of the Committee, consultations included examination of continued covert funding of RFE/RL through the CIA budget. During the course of the Congressional soundings, the Chairmen of the Senate and House Appropriations Committees expressed strong opposition to funding the Radios through CIA beyond June 30, 1971. The Chairmen are unwilling to include an appropriation for the Radios as they maintain that this would probably jeopardize the individual appropriations not only of CIA but other Executive agencies as well. In their view, this could come about as certain Committee members apparently intend to use the Radio funding question to expose, and attempt to discredit, sensitive activities carried out by the Executive branch. It was the judgment of the CIA and State Department offices for Congressional Relations that Senator Ellender and Representative Mahon would “under no circumstances” ask their Committees to include funds for the Radios in the CIA budget for FY 1972.

*B. Prospects for Interim Funding of RFE/RL through the CIA Budget until a New Mechanism is Established*

In view of the attitude of the Chairmen of the Appropriations Committees with regard to continuation of the status quo, their views were sought on the feasibility of funding the Radios through the CIA budget on the basis of a continuing resolution until such time as a new, public mechanism had been authorized and granted funds by Congress. The Chairmen somewhat reluctantly indicated this could be done for a few months—perhaps until the August recess, by which time the DOD FY 1972 budget is expected to be approved. This solution would provide funds for an additional 30 to 60 days, but no longer. Apart from the fact that the two Chairmen appear reluctant to use a continuing resolution, such a course is not deemed advisable for two reasons:

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<sup>5</sup> See *Public Financing of Radio Free Europe and Radio Liberty. Hearings Before the Committee on Foreign Relations, United States Senate, 92nd Congress, 1st Session* (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, 1971).

1. If there has been a hearing on CIA's "black budget" prior to June 30, as is expected, and if CIA has been formally advised that its FY 1972 budget cannot include funds for the Radios, the legality of using funds for this purpose under a continuing resolution is open to question.

2. Even if interim funds for the Radios could be secured on the basis of a continuing resolution for the DOD budget, a budgetary hiatus would occur if the Department of Defense budget is appropriated prior to action on appropriations for the proposed Council.

CIA has explored alternative methods of securing funds for the Radios to cover the period until an appropriation is made under the terms of the draft Bill creating the American Council for Private International Communications, Incorporated. It is not feasible to provide money from CIA reserves since the constraints imposed by the Appropriations Committee Chairmen in refusing covert appropriations in FY 1972 would be equally applicable to the use of reserve funds. Moreover, current requirements against the reserve funds are of such a priority nature that CIA cannot allow their use for the Radios unless assured that they would be replenished in full. CIA has also inquired of OMB whether transfer in FY 1971 of the required funds (CIA programmed \$36.2 million for the Radios in FY 1972) from the Department of Defense to CIA is feasible. OMB advises that such DOD funds are not available unless higher authority orders them released. OMB also feels that such funds, if available, could not be used for this purpose without Congressional concurrence.

As of now, therefore, no satisfactory method for interim funding has been developed, and there is a real possibility that the Radios will be without financial support at the beginning of FY 1972. Should this occur, liquidation procedures would have to be promptly initiated, and it is estimated that these costs are likely to exceed the combined annual budgets of the two organizations. However, in the above situation, funds are not available even for this purpose.

In light of these circumstances, it would appear that the only conceivable method of ensuring the orderly funding of the Radios until they come under the supervision of the proposed Council is to fund them for FY 1972 out of overall year-end FY 1971 savings. This would be tantamount to channelling unused, publicly appropriated, non-CIA funds to a use which would, for the interim, still be under CIA control (although the May 24 Senate Hearings will have, by the end of FY 1971, yielded a clear government acknowledgment that it funds the Radios).

*C. Prospects for passage in Senate and House of the Authorization Bill in its present form*

OMB anticipates clearing the draft Bill with minor technical changes within the next few days during which time it will discuss Treasury's reluctance to be used as a funding channel for the Council.

As the result of our review of the concepts in the draft Bill with Senator Case, he has indicated general agreement with it and expressed a willingness to act as its sponsor in its present form possibly with some modifications regarding the appointment of members of the Board of Directors. As a result, we believe the Bill's prospects in the Senate Foreign Relations Committee are good. In addition, Congressman Reid has also indicated his support, which should aid our testimony before the House Foreign Affairs Committee whose chairman, Representative Morgan, has also been briefed on the draft Bill. Other Senators and Congressmen, during the consultations, initially questioned the need for a new government entity in lieu of funding the Radios through State or USIA, but subsequently agreed with the approach in the draft Bill. Presently there is no known opposition.

We believe that there are reasonably good prospects for passage of an authorizing Bill of the type envisaged (Tab B)<sup>6</sup> in the Senate and House with the support of a liberal-conservative coalition with Case and Reid heading up the liberal side.

*D. Prospects of Appropriations being Approved once Authorizing Bill is passed*

Chairman Ellender, after some discussion, indicated that he would not actively support the Bill but that he would not obstruct it. He indicated his strong intention of having his appropriations bills pass the Senate prior to the August recess, although Chairman Mahon had indicated his belief that the Defense Appropriations Bill will carry over in the House until after the August recess. In other consultations, questions were raised concerning the Radios' funding levels in view of the dollar crisis and moves to retrench on our foreign expenditures.

*Conclusions*

The exploratory consultations have, unfortunately, produced more clarity on the impossibility of maintaining the present method of funding RFE/RL than on the possibility of funding the Radios reliably through a new publicly funded entity. Furthermore, they have revealed that the question of creating a new entity and obtaining funds for it is urgent in view of the strong reluctance of the Appropriations Committee chairmen to continue the present funding system into FY 1972.

The limited explorations of Congressional views suggest that there are "reasonably good prospects" of getting adequate support for an authorizing bill establishing an American Council on Private International

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<sup>6</sup> Attached at Tab B but not printed is the administration's draft bill, which provided for the establishment of a non-profit corporation, the "American Council for Private International Communications, Inc.," that would receive funding from Congress and private sources to provide for the operation of RFE and RL.

Communications. However, in view of the current inclination in Congress to cut foreign expenditures, it will take a strong effort by the Administration if funding for the Radios is to be maintained at the present level.

It is therefore concluded that virtually the only choice open to the Administration on the problem of funding RFE/RL is to proceed with the draft Bill. It is further concluded that personal involvement by the President will be required in order to get across to key Congressional leaders 1) the need to give the Bill priority in order to get it considered prior to or early in FY 1972; 2) the importance of continuing to fund the Radios at the present level.

### *Recommendations*

1. The 40 Committee is asked to recommend to the President that he approve the draft Bill (Tab B) for submission to Congress prior to the Senate Foreign Relations Committee hearings on the Radios now scheduled for May 24.

2. The 40 Committee is asked to recommend that the President, during the period prior to the Senate hearings, emphasize to the Congressional leadership the importance of expediting this legislation and of continuing the present level of funding of the Radios.

3. The 40 Committee is asked to recommend to the President that, until a new entity can be created and granted appropriations to fund the Radios, he authorize, with the concurrence of Congressional leaders: (a) the funding of the Radios at the present level out of overall FY 1971 US budgetary savings since there are no FY 1972 funds available to CIA for this purpose; and (b) the recognition of this interim funding by the State Department press officer, or other appropriate officers, if asked.

4. The 40 Committee is asked to approve the continuation of consultation by State and CIA with key members of Congress (Tab C)<sup>7</sup> to obtain additional support on a broader basis prior to the Senate Foreign Relations Committee Hearings scheduled for May 24. Some of the present members of RFE/RL Boards (Tab D),<sup>8</sup> might be used to contact members of Congress with whom they have personal contact. Outstanding public witnesses should be contacted for the hearings.

5. The 40 Committee is asked to recommend that the Treasury, as a department which disburses funds to a wide variety of independent entities and is not involved in the direct conduct of diplomacy or programs in the Communist countries, be designated as the channel for

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<sup>7</sup> Attached at Tab C but not printed is a list of key Congressmen and Senators on the Foreign Relations and Appropriations Committees of the House and Senate.

<sup>8</sup> Attached at Tab D but not printed is a list of board members of Radio Free Europe and Radio Liberty.

disbursing publicly appropriated funds to the new entity to be created to fund the Radios. (A copy of the letter from Treasury to OMB giving its position on this is at Tab E.)

6. The attention of the 40 Committee is invited to the subject of recommending a Chairman of the Board of the American Council for Private International Communications, Incorporated in order to provide during Congressional consultations an idea as to the caliber of the Board envisaged for the Council. Names such as those of Dr. Milton Eisenhower, Ambassador Robert D. Murphy, Ambassador Llewellyn E. Thompson, and Governor William Scranton, suggest themselves.<sup>9</sup>

U.A.J.<sup>10</sup>

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<sup>9</sup> The minutes of the 40 Committee meeting of May 14 reported: "The State Department paper dated 12 May 1971 reported on results of the preliminary Congressional soundings on the legislative proposal to create an American Council for Private International Communications, Inc., for channeling publicly appropriated funds to support RFE and RL. The Committee granted approval for the formal presentation of the draft bill to Sen. Case and Congressman Reid as Administration-supported legislation. The Chairman and Mr. Schlesinger agreed to direct the Treasury to assume the responsibility of acting as the direct disbursing agent for funding to the proposed Council, which will in turn fund RFE and RL." (Department of State, INR/IL Historical Files, 40 Committee Files)

<sup>10</sup> Initialed by Coerr for Johnson.

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#### 54. Telegram From the Embassy in Poland to the Department of State<sup>1</sup>

Warsaw, May 26, 1971, 1550Z.

1607. Subject: Polish Aide-Mémoire on RFE.<sup>2</sup>

1. I saw Vice Minister Foreign Affairs Winiewicz at his request morning of May 26. First question which he took up was RFE. Following lengthy oral presentation, which he said was made on instruc-

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<sup>1</sup> Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 379, Subject Files, Radio Free Europe & Radio Liberty, Vol. I. Confidential; Limdis.

<sup>2</sup> On June 6 Eliot wrote Kissinger that in the wake of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee hearings on public funding for Radio Free Europe and Radio Liberty (see footnote 5, Document 53), "the Polish Foreign Ministry on May 26 handed our Ambassador in Warsaw and later described in the press an aide-mémoire . . . calling for the termination of Radio Free Europe. The aide-mémoire accused Radio Free Europe of conducting 'subversive' operations and organizing 'a network of informants' in Poland. The

tions his government, he handed me aide-mémoire criticizing RFE in severe terms (text by septel).<sup>3</sup> Winiewicz said Polish Embassy Washington would not be approaching Department on this subject, although he would plan to mention it in his conversations which he hoped to have at Department June 4. After noting that RFE maintains sizeable offices in London, Vienna, and Copenhagen, Winiewicz said Poles planned approach governments in those capitals to protest RFE activities. When I inquired if Bonn would also be contacted, Winiewicz did not give direct response although he said problem had been raised frequently in past with FRG and had been one of first subjects he had mentioned to Duckwitz in Polish-FRG talks leading to treaty. Winiewicz commented that he felt FRG was becoming "uneasy" about activities of RFE on FRG territory.

2. Winiewicz stated that RFE constituted one of "thorniest" problems in Polish-US relations. Polish leadership has found RFE broadcasts deeply objectionable for years and has often said so, but to no effect. New leaders of Poland since December, although more open-minded than predecessors and sincerely desirous of better relations with US, also consider RFE a hostile operation which is a real block to improved relationships. Every step regarding US is made more difficult by RFE broadcasts, which are not confined to straight information but are deliberately slanted to focus on Polish failures and shortcomings, to criticize personalities and to sow distrust. Winiewicz mentioned that morning of May 26 Prime Minister Jaroszewicz had telephoned him in high temper to ask him to read latest summary of RFE broadcasts which he found infuriating. Winiewicz acknowledged that Poland had more than enough shortcomings, but it had some successes, too. While RFE broadcasts often had some truth to them, they were always distorted and twisted in unpleasant and unfair manner.

3. Winiewicz noted that Polish Government now had ample information about details of RFE operations (a reference to reports of Captain Chechowicz). RFE Munich was filled with Polish émigrés who were bitter because people's Poland was succeeding, and their venomous attitude was reflected in RFE broadcasts. Winiewicz hoped that

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Polish Embassy described this aide-mémoire a few days later in the press and also presented an aide-mémoire to the Federal Republic of Germany of similar substance. The Federal Republic's press spokesman responded on June 1 that Radio Free Europe's transmitter licenses had been extended for another year, until the summer of 1972. He stated that the Polish aide-mémoire would be examined. The Poles also made a démarche to the British Embassy in Warsaw about the activities of the London office of Radio Free Europe." (National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 379, Subject Files, Radio Free Europe & Radio Liberty, Vol. I)

<sup>3</sup> Telegram 1608 from Warsaw, May 26, contains the text of the Polish aide-mémoire on RFE. (Ibid., RG 59, Central Files 1970-73, RAD RFE)

US Government was aware of this situation, which seemed cut across stated US intentions of improving relations with Poland and other countries in Eastern Europe. Winiewicz added that in past, when RFE was allegedly private organization (although everyone knew it was financed by CIA), it might have been easier to overlook its operations. Now, however, when US had introduced bill in Congress to authorize appropriated funds for RFE, situation was different and even more intolerable. Winiewicz asked me to transmit aide-mémoire to my government and to report his remarks faithfully.

4. In reply, I said that RFE was private organization which did not speak for US Government. I could not comment on its activities nor on substance of its broadcasts. So far as aide-mémoire was concerned, I would transmit it to my government as an official statement of Polish Government, although I could not accept any of allegations contained therein. I also said that I would report fully on what Winiewicz had told me. I added that US was sincere in its desire for better relations with Poland and Eastern Europe, as often stated by President and by Secretary. In field of international broadcasting, VOA was official voice of US Government.

5. With regard to new legislation introduced in Congress for RFE and Radio Liberty, I described proposed organizational relationships and noted that there is ample precedent in US practice for private organizations to receive federal funds, citing poverty and refugee programs as well as private TV and radio stations assisted by public broadcasting company. New set-up would not alter private character of RFE or Radio Liberty, and their broadcasts, as stated by Asst. Secretary Hillenbrand in his testimony, would be used to convey news and analysis normally available in a free society.

6. Winiewicz concluded this part of our conversation by emphasizing impediment placed on US-Polish relations by RFE activities and requesting me to report his views to Washington.

7. *Comment:* Winiewicz approach and aide-mémoire represent intensification and formalization of long-standing Polish complaints against RFE. This is logical follow-up to revelations of Captain Cechowicz, recently-surfaced Polish undercover agent in RFE Munich. Polish stand also takes into account proposed legislation to fund RFE and RL by open Congressional appropriations. Polish media reporting on hearings in Washington emphasizes line that this will cast even more doubt on private character of radio stations, and this point is reflected in Winiewicz's comments as well as in aide-mémoire.

8. Department repeat as desired.

**Stoessel**



## 55. Letter From Director of Central Intelligence Helms to the Director of the Office of Management and Budget (Shultz)<sup>1</sup>

Washington, June 16, 1971.

Dear George:

I am writing to bring to your attention the very acute dilemma which we now face with regard to Radio Free Europe and Radio Liberty and to request your guidance with regard to the responsibilities of the Central Intelligence Agency after 30 June 1971. I believe you are familiar with my memorandum of 11 May 1971 to the President on this subject.<sup>2</sup> I attach a copy for your ready reference. Your staff has been good enough to provide me with a copy of your letter of 9 June 1971 to Senator Ellender, Chairman of the Senate Committee on Appropriations and his reply thereto of 10 June 1971.<sup>3</sup>

As I understand the situation, Senator Case's bill to establish a new funding mechanism seems to have no chance of passage prior to the end of this fiscal year. It is also my understanding that the Central Intelligence Agency is precluded from any further funding of the radios after that date, either for continued operation or termination.

The Radios are United States Government proprietaries. I therefore believe the Government is both morally and legally obliged to take some action to continue them, at least on an interim basis, or to terminate them as of 1 July 1971. The funds the Radios now have on hand would permit continued operation for no more than 30 to 45 days in the new fiscal year. Both will need guidance within the next few days in order to plan for the first weeks of Fiscal Year 1972. In the event that termination is to take place, costs associated with such action are estimated by the radios to be [*dollar amount not declassified*] for Radio Free

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<sup>1</sup> Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 379, Subject Files, Radio Free Europe & Radio Liberty, Vol. I. Secret; Sensitive. A copy was sent to Kissinger.

<sup>2</sup> Document 52.

<sup>3</sup> The letter of June 9 was not found. In his June 10 letter, Ellender wrote Shultz that he opposed continued funding of RFE and RL through the CIA even as an interim measure. "I want to stress the point that funds for the Government's support of these organizations must, in my opinion, be handled as an open appropriation. . . . This cannot be done if the interim funding is routed through the Central Intelligence Agency's authority under the Continuing Resolution. In the event the Government's support of these organizations is terminated, I recognize that substantial funds will be required to cover termination costs, and I will be glad to consider proposals for providing such costs." He added a postscript: "P.S. I want to make it clear that the Committee would consider a request for an 'open' appropriation for the required interim funding, pending the enactment and implementation of open funding legislation." (National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 379, Subject Files, Radio Free Europe & Radio Liberty, Vol. I)

Europe and [*dollar amount not declassified*] for Radio Liberty. However realistic these estimates may be, it is clear that a substantial amount of money would be involved. Reserves available for liquidation are only [*dollar amount not declassified*] for Radio Free Europe and [*dollar amount not declassified*] for Radio Liberty.

I should like to request that you advise me as early as possible as to what the Administration desires that the Central Intelligence Agency do about the funding and the management of Radio Liberty and Radio Free Europe, effective 1 July 1971.

Sincerely,

Dick

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## 56. Memorandum of Conversation<sup>1</sup>

Washington, June 17, 1971, 2:30 p.m.

### SUBJECT

RFE and RL (Part III of III)<sup>2</sup>

### PARTICIPANTS

#### *German*

Egon Bahr—State Secretary, Chancellor's Office  
Guenther van Well—Assistant Secretary, Foreign Office

#### *American*

Henry A. Kissinger—Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs  
Helmuth Sonnenfeldt—Senior Member, National Security Council  
James S. Sutterlin—Director, Office of German Affairs

As the final of three subjects covered in the conversation, State Secretary Bahr referred to RFE and RL and asked whether there was a special White House interest in the radio stations. Mr. Kissinger said that there was. Bahr then noted that the Federal Government was under a bit of pressure on the subject from the Poles who had recently sent an official letter raising this issue.<sup>3</sup> The Czechs have also made

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<sup>1</sup> Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970–73, POL GER W–US. Secret; Exdis. Drafted by Sutterlin on June 18. The meeting took place in Kissinger's office.

<sup>2</sup> Part I, which dealt with Mutual and Balanced Force Reductions (MBFR), is scheduled for publication in *Foreign Relations, 1969–1976*, volume XIII, Soviet Union, October 1970–September 1971; Part II, on the Berlin negotiations, is *ibid.*, volume XL, Germany and Berlin, 1969–1972, Document 257.

<sup>3</sup> See Document 54.

public complaints but have not approached Bonn officially. Bahr did not think that the Eastern European threats to boycott the Olympics should be taken seriously. He added that the Federal Government would withstand Polish pressure. The fact was, however, that the Federal Republic and Poland were only surrogates in this dispute. The two radios were really an element in East/West relations in which the U.S. and the USSR were the main players. He did not know exactly how the United States could introduce this issue in the American/Soviet dialogue. It should be understood, however, that the Federal Government could not solve the problem. It could only ensure that the programs broadcast were in line with the policies of the U.S. and the FRG. This could not and should not be achieved through a system of pre-censorship of broadcasts. It could only be accomplished by clear guidelines to those who prepared the programs.

Bahr said that insofar as the Polish letter was concerned he had proposed that the Federal Government take its time in responding. We could be sure that the reply would be coordinated with Washington.

Mr. Kissinger asked what precisely Bahr was suggesting that the United States should do. Bahr replied that Washington should take up the radio question with the Russians directly. If this were done then the FRG could forget about giving notice on the stations for another year. Bahr mentioned in this connection that the contracts would come up for renewal in August or September. He was told by the others present that the contracts had in fact already been extended and that the next occasion on which notice could be given would be in April 1972. Bahr then commented that in this case the radios would have to continue through the Olympics in any event. Herr van Well interjected that this was not necessarily so, since the Olympics would not take place until the summer of 1972. Moreover, there was a secret letter in connection with the radio contracts which permitted the FRG to give notice at any time if circumstances warranted. Mr. Sutterlin said that in his understanding there were differences in the FRG's contractual relationship with RFE and RL.

Mr. Kissinger then stated, on a personal basis, that a unilateral action by the FRG on the radios would not be well received in Washington. We are interested in their continued operation, although we have to be realistic about the problems they entail. He asked what it was that the United States should raise with the Soviets. Should we ask what the Soviet Union would offer us for removing the radios? Bahr said that this was what he had in mind. Mr. Kissinger proposed that we look into the question. We could consider whether it might be possible within some broader context to raise the radio subject with Moscow.

57. Memorandum for the Record<sup>1</sup>

Washington, June 22, 1971.

SUBJECT

Minutes of the Meeting of the 40 Committee, 22 June 1971

PRESENT

Mr. Kissinger, Mr. Mitchell, Mr. Packard, Mr. Johnson, Admiral Moorer, and General Cushman

Mr. Richard E. Davies and Mr. James R. Schlesinger were present for Item 1.

Mr. John Holdridge was present for Item 2.

Mr. William Broe was present for Items 3 and 4.

Mr. Thomas Karamessines, Mr. Wymberley Coerr, and Colonel Richard Kennedy were present for all items.

1. *Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty*

Alexis Johnson explained that he had Richard E. Davies along because the RFE/RL matter was getting down to the wire on interim funding.

Mr. Kissinger said that higher authority had just said that he would call Senator Ellender tomorrow if those concerned felt it would do any good. Mr. Kissinger offered to call Representative Mahon on the continuing resolution. (A call was placed and contact made before the conclusion of the meeting; Rep. Mahon said he would first have to talk with his staff.)<sup>2</sup>

Mr. Packard observed that Senator Ellender had said he was going to knock \$500,000,000 from the intelligence budget and that intervention by higher authority might be needed again.

Mr. Kissinger again asked who thought a call to Ellender would work.<sup>3</sup>

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<sup>1</sup> Source: Department of State, INR/IL Historical Files, 40 Committee Minutes. Secret; Eyes Only. Presumably drafted by Kennedy on June 25.

<sup>2</sup> According to a memorandum from Haig to MacGregor, June 25, Mahon and the House Appropriations Committee supported continued funding for RFE and RL through CIA as part of the continuing budget resolution. (National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 379, Subject Files, Radio Free Liberty & Radio Free Europe, Vol. I)

<sup>3</sup> On the same day as the 40 Committee meeting, June 22, Kissinger sent a memorandum to the President urging him to call Chairman Ellender. He wrote: "You agreed yesterday to call Chairman Ellender of the Senate Appropriations Committee to try to persuade him to acquiesce in the continued funding of Radio Free Europe and Radio Liberty via the CIA appropriation as an interim arrangement under the continuing resolution. Congressman Mahon, Chairman of the House Appropriations Committee, agreed yesterday to such an arrangement. Senator Ellender, however, now reportedly wants to introduce legislation specifically prohibiting continued funding under the CIA

Mr. Schlesinger said we needed all the help we could get. The USIA budget was currently under examination and to lay on the continuing resolution of funding through USIA was about the only option left.<sup>4</sup>

Mr. Karamessines was sure it was worth trying.

Mr. Schlesinger said it could be done by stretching the law; there was some precedent and there existed a general authority for assistance to "private parties."

Mr. Karamessines pointed out that the continuing resolution might make it more difficult for the Case proposal: If you can fund things for short periods via continuing resolution, why would there be a need for this new bill?, or so the negative argument might go.

Mr. Johnson said on the émigré support problem—an ancillary to the Radios, for which no resolution would account—it had been determined that it was technically and legally possible for State to cope, except for the funds [*less than 1 line not declassified*].

Mr. Schlesinger said that could be solved by a budget amendment.<sup>5</sup>

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appropriation. Nevertheless, I believe there is a 50–50 chance that Senator Ellender will change his mind if you intercede. Because of the complications of USIA funding or other 'open' alternatives, it is important to employ Presidential pressure even though the outcome is uncertain." On the memorandum are two notations by an unknown hand. The first reads: "P. will *not* call unless he is *assured* that the call will cause Ellender to acquiesce." The second note reads: "Will not call." (Ibid.)

<sup>4</sup> In another June 22 memorandum to the President, Kissinger wrote: "An arrangement which might meet Senator Ellender's objections would be to fund the Radios under USIA's appropriation. Director Shultz feels this is the only viable alternative for obtaining temporary funding. However, this 'open' arrangement has a number of shortcomings." (Ibid.) On June 25 the Senate Appropriations Committee voted as part of a continuing budget resolution to fund RFE and RL through USIA for fiscal year 1972. Congress approved the joint resolution, P.L. 92–38, on July 1. On June 25 Haig wrote to MacGregor: "[W]e had to accede to the USIA 'open' funding route in order to save the radios." (Ibid.)

<sup>5</sup> On October 27 Rogers wrote to Nixon: "Over the past 22 years selected exiles from eastern Europe who have rendered valuable services to the United States have been supported indirectly by the Central Intelligence Agency through Radio Free Europe (RFE) and Radio Liberty (RL). This support will end in FY-1972 when covert funding of the Radios ceases. The Administration's proposal (Case Bill) and other bills being considered by Congress which would provide overt, appropriated funds for broadcasting by RFE/RL would not authorize payments to these selected émigrés. . . . The Department and other agencies concerned in the 40 Committee . . . have concluded that the United States should continue its support of selected East European émigrés, who now number only 55. . . . The Department of State is prepared to assume responsibility for this activity by arranging personal stipends to be paid overtly under authority granted by the Migration and Refugee Assistance Act of 1962 (PL 87–510). . . . As most of the exiles are well over 60 years of age, it is proposed to arrange for the purchase of annuities from a private insurance company. . . . The cost of this one-time program would be \$1,850,000, which could be obtained through a Presidential Determination Order under Section 2(c) of the Migration and Refugee Assistance Act." In response, Nixon signed Presidential Determination 72–6 on November 1, which provided the requested \$1,850,000 for use by the Secretary of State under the Migration and Refugee Assistance Act. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970–73, RAD RFE)

Mr. Johnson raised the name of the President of Campbell Soup Corporation, William Beverly Murphy, as a likely man for the American Council for International Communications, Inc., should that concept be enacted.

Mr. Mitchell said he knew the man favorably and that he was actually upstairs in the White House at the moment. Mr. Karamessines said he had the endorsement of CIA. Mr. Kissinger said he would check on him promptly.

[Omitted here is discussion of items 2–4.]

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**58. Memorandum From Secretary of State Rogers to President Nixon<sup>1</sup>**

Washington, September 13, 1971.

SUBJECT

Radio Free Europe and Radio Liberty

Our efforts to obtain a satisfactory public mechanism for funding Radio Free Europe (RFE) and Radio Liberty (RL) are reaching a crucial point. At the beginning of August, the Senate passed a bill authorizing an appropriation of \$35 million to the Department for FY 1972 to fund the radios “under such terms and conditions as the Secretary considers appropriate.” The bill is intended by Senator Fulbright to be a “stop-gap” to keep the radios barely alive so that the Senate Foreign Relations Committee can decide next year, on the basis of studies now being done by the GAO and the Congressional Research Service, whether or not to terminate them.

The Senate bill, which is Senator Case’s original S. 18 amending P.L. 402 (the U.S. Information and Educational Exchange Act),<sup>2</sup> has a number of disadvantages. The principal one is that, by making the De-

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<sup>1</sup> Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970–73, RAD RFE. Confidential. Drafted by Baker on September 4. Cleared by Davies, Skoug, and Okun (SOV) and concurred in by Symmes (H), Coerr, Huffman (H), Alexander (USIA), and Strait (OMB). Attached to the memorandum are a copy of S. 18 as amended by Senator J. William Fulbright, Chairman of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, on July 30; a memorandum from Abshire to Haig, August 16, on Congressional strategy regarding RFE and RL; a memorandum from Hillenbrand to Rogers, September 4; and a letter from Kissinger to Rogers, November 1. None is printed.

<sup>2</sup> See Document 50.

partment the channel for the grants, it makes it considerably more difficult for our Embassies in Eastern Europe when presented with complaints about the radios to argue that the stations are independent and that we have no means of controlling their program content. A second disadvantage is that the radios' image of independence will be damaged by a direct funding link to the Department and their actual independence may well be eroded if we are obliged to press them to tailor their broadcasts in response to diplomatic pressures. A third disadvantage is that, if they become linked to a Federal agency such as State, the radios may have greater difficulty in claiming the independent status upon which their current transmitter licenses in Germany are based. A fourth disadvantage is the increased difficulty in getting annual appropriations for grants to the radios if they are considered within the State budget.

In view of these disadvantages, we feel it is important to obtain legislation from Congress distancing the radios from either the Department or USIA. This could be achieved by passage of a bill to create an American Council for Private International Communications, Incorporated, which was drafted in the State Department and introduced July 7, 1971 as H.R. 9637 in the House of Representatives by Representative Morgan, Chairman of the House Foreign Affairs Committee.

Our contacts with members of the House Committee, however, convince us that it is extremely doubtful, in view of Senator Fulbright's attitude and in the light of growing resistance in Congress to the establishment of government corporations, that H.R. 9637 could pass the House and be accepted by Senate conferees. Consequently, upon the advice of friendly members of the Committee, we have considered a proposal more likely to receive Congressional approval. This would be a bill providing for the establishment of a two-year commission charged with the responsibility for preparing a study of overseas broadcasting activities by the United States Government. The commission would be composed of a majority of Executive Branch officers and private citizens, appointed by you, plus Senators and Representatives.

During the life of the Commission, its Chairman, whom you would designate from among the private citizens you appointed, would be given the responsibility for making grants of US funds to Radio Free Europe and Radio Liberty for fiscal years 1972 and 1973. By limiting that responsibility to your appointee, we would hope to avoid the problem of having members of the Legislative Branch in the position of exercising executive authority, an arrangement which might set a disadvantageous precedent.

The establishment of the study commission as a funding vehicle, however, raises questions as to how broad a study the Executive Branch would be willing to accept in its efforts to solve the funding difficulties. A commission studying all overseas broadcasting by the United

States Government would have authority to investigate—in addition to RFE and RL—the Voice of America and the American Forces Radio and Television Service. It is possible that a study of such broad scope could lead to recommendations for the consolidation of all American-supported radios into one agency, resulting in the loss by the Defense Department of the AFRTS whose mission is troop information. It would, therefore, seem desirable to try to focus the study on international broadcasting directed toward audiences in the Warsaw Pact countries as well as international broadcasting activities originating in those countries. Particular emphasis could be given to the role of Radio Free Europe and Radio Liberty in that context. If a commission with this type of mandate were to be voted by the House, we could hope to avoid an examination of AFRTS or that part of VOA which is not concerned with broadcasting to Soviet Bloc audiences.

At the hearing of the House Foreign Affairs Committee scheduled for September 14, Under Secretary Johnson will testify in favor of the establishment of an American Council for International Communications, Incorporated, the vehicle which is our first choice. In view of the Congressional sentiment described above, however, he will, if you concur, be prepared to indicate in response to a question from Chairman Morgan, our willingness to accept a commission of the type described above—if that appears to be the best chance for separating the State Department and USIA from the administration of the grants to the radios. In taking this course, we would recognize that, in the mark-up process, the commission could emerge with a wider scope than we and USIA desire.<sup>3</sup>

Our main problem is to get strong support in the House and Senate for our bill or for the study commission alternative, which USIA regards as acceptable in the form described. If you consider that the alternative of a commission, even one in which your appointees have a majority, has too many disadvantages, we will need to have even greater involvement of the Congressional leadership to get our bill (H.R. 9637) through the House and the Conference Committee. In either event, I hope you can indicate to the Congressional leadership, as

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<sup>3</sup> Telegram 181533 to Bonn, Bucharest, Budapest, Moscow, Prague, Sofia, Warsaw, and Munich, October 2, reads in part: "House Foreign Affairs Committee voted September 30 to report out Fascell proposal for two-year Study Commission 'to review and evaluate international radio broadcasting and related activities' of RFE/RL. Commission Chairman would also administer grants for continuing operations during two-year period. \$36 million authorized for this purpose for FY 1972 (compared with \$35 million authorized by Senate bill). . . . While Department would have preferred legislation establishing permanent basis for radio operations, we have been convinced Fascell proposal has best chance for passage in present situation and provides best hope for acceptable outcome of Senate-House conference. Therefore, Department plans to urge support for it." (National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970-73, RAD RFE)



soon as possible after Labor Day, the importance you attach to preserving the radios through a mechanism which will reflect their independence from the Department and USIA.

General Lucius Clay, Board Chairman of Radio Free Europe, is anxious to see you and present his view that RFE's role would be steadily eroded unless Congress creates some structure such as a council or commission distancing the radios from the Department of State or USIA.<sup>4</sup>

**William P. Rogers**

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<sup>4</sup> In his November 1 letter replying to Rogers, Kissinger wrote: "The President has reviewed your memorandum of September 13, 1971, on Radio Free Europe and Radio Liberty and agrees with your views on the importance of obtaining a satisfactory mechanism for funding of the Radios. . . . The President particularly appreciates the yeoman efforts you and your colleagues have made with the Congress to enact some form of legislation to permit continuance of the Radios, and prefers that you continue to take the lead in this endeavor rather than his raising it in a Leadership meeting." (National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970-73, RAD RFE)

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## 59. Editorial Note

On December 30, 1971, Under Secretary of State U. Alexis Johnson reported in a memorandum to the Chairman of the 40 Committee that Congress had adjourned "without taking action on authorizing legislation for Radio Free Europe and Radio Liberty." "Although both the House and Senate have passed bills," he continued, "the Joint Conference Committee never met to reconcile them. We now hope that the Joint Committee will meet and take action shortly after Congress reconvenes on January 18, since the Continuing Resolution providing temporary financing for the radios expires February 22, 1972. It should be noted, however, that again on December 15 Senator Fulbright referred to the radios as a 'product of the cold war' which 'should be terminated.'" (National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970-73, RAD RFE)

On March 2, 1972, Theodore L. Eliot, Executive Secretary of the Department of State, wrote in a memorandum to Kissinger that "the problem of obtaining satisfactory authorizing legislation for grants to Radio Free Europe and Radio Liberty is at a crucial point. . . . Some involvement by the President, in the form of a discussion with or a letter to key Congressional leaders may be required in order to achieve this." (Ibid.)

On March 11 President Richard Nixon stated in a White House press release that he was “deeply concerned at the imminent prospect that Radio Free Europe and Radio Liberty may be compelled to shut down. . . . It would be a tragedy if their light should now be extinguished because of a parliamentary impasse between the two Houses.” (Department of State *Bulletin*, April 10, 1972, page 544)

On March 24 the Senate passed a revised version of S. 18, P.L. 92–264 (86 Stat. 114), which became law a week later. It authorized a grant of \$36 million for fiscal year 1972 for RFE and RL, to be provided directly to the radios by the Department of State.

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**60. Memorandum From the Acting Secretary of State (Johnson) to President Nixon<sup>1</sup>**

Washington, May 6, 1972.

SUBJECT

Study Commission for Radio Free Europe and Radio Liberty

The passage of legislation (Tab A)<sup>2</sup> providing for grants by the Department of State to Radio Free Europe and Radio Liberty through the end of the current fiscal year does not provide the permanent legal framework which we had originally sought nor the two-year authorization and Study Commission which the House of Representatives favored. It does, however, provide an authorization for which we propose to seek renewal, with a slight revision (Tab B)<sup>3</sup> for fiscal year 1973, while further consideration is given to the sources and methods of future support for these valuable radio operations.

To provide for this further consideration and to avoid the possibility of prolonged House-Senate disagreement over the composition of a study group, I recommend that you appoint a Presidential Commission charged with responsibility for (1) examining the need for the radios and their value in the context of United States foreign policy and

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<sup>1</sup> Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 380, Subject Files, Radio Free Europe & Radio Liberty, Vol. II. Confidential. Tabs A–D are attached but not printed.

<sup>2</sup> Regarding P.L.–92–264, passed on March 30, see Document 59.

<sup>3</sup> Tab B is a draft bill, modeled after P.L.–92–264, which provided for the appropriation of \$38,520,000 through the Secretary of State for funding of Radio Free Europe and Radio Liberty.

of international broadcasting in Europe, (2) considering the implications of the reports on the radios prepared at the request of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee by the Congressional Research Service and by the General Accounting Office, and (3) making recommendations as to the future method and sources for their financial support. While the ideal time for announcement of the Commission's appointment would have been when the bill at Tab B was introduced, time constraints make that impractical. Therefore, I believe the bill should be submitted immediately with the announcement of the appointment of the Commission to be made as soon thereafter as possible.

Appointment of such a Commission would serve several purposes: (1) Its report should provide the basis for a feasible legislative proposal for the radios for FY 1974; (2) The fact of the Commission's existence would assist our friends on the Senate Foreign Relations Committee to inhibit prior discussion of legislation for termination of the radios, which we believe Senator Fulbright may plan to introduce; (3) The suggestion that the Commission will be looking into sources of financial support for the radios would permit these friends to argue that Senator Fulbright's idea of obtaining European support is being pursued and that the radios should not be terminated in the interim; (4) The prestige of the Commission would be committed to its findings; and (5) In order to maintain the radios in existence pending their findings, these prestigious Commission members would presumably also be willing to work for the interim FY 1973 authorization.

The Commission would have a limited life and its costs for operations would be about \$75,000. It should be directed to submit its report to you for transmission to the Congress by February 28, 1973. It would consist of a Chairman and four members, to be appointed by you. The members would receive no pay but those resident outside Washington would receive per diem and travel expenses. The only paid employee would be the Executive Vice Chairman. By your direction, the working staff of the Commission would be drawn on loan from the various U.S. Government agencies which have been connected with the problems of the two radios (State Department, USIA, and, if desired, the CIA). Money for the operation of this Commission would be allotted from your discretionary funds.

A draft statement announcing the introduction of legislation and your intention to name such a Commission is at Tab C.<sup>4</sup>

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<sup>4</sup> The White House released a slightly revised version of the draft statement at Tab C to the press on May 10 (see Document 61).

A list of persons from among whom members of this Commission might be drawn is attached at Tab D.<sup>5</sup>

*Recommendation*

That you approve the submission of the draft legislation (Tab B) at the earliest possible time,<sup>6</sup> approve the draft statement to be issued at the time the legislation is submitted, and approve the idea of selecting, and clearing for appointment as soon as possible, a suitably composed Presidential Commission.

**U. Alexis Johnson**

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<sup>5</sup> On June 12 Kissinger, based on the list at Tab D, recommended the four commission members whom Nixon eventually appointed (see Document 61).

<sup>6</sup> An attached transmittal slip reads: "OBE: State decided to send up legislation itself and have White House issue a statement. A subsequent memo to Pres from State will follow." See Document 61.

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**61. Editorial Note**

On May 10, 1972, President Richard Nixon released a statement to the press regarding the future of Radio Free Europe and Radio Liberty: "I have . . . asked the Secretary of State to submit today a bill which would continue government support to the radios through fiscal year 1973. As with the fiscal year 1972 authorization, this bill would make the grants to the radios through the Secretary of State under such terms and conditions as he deems appropriate.

"A number of different views have been expressed in Congress as to how the radios might best be funded for the future. . . . To this end, I plan to appoint a Presidential Study Commission with instructions to render its report and recommendations by February 28, 1973, so that the administration and Congress can take them into consideration in formulating authorizing legislation for fiscal year 1974. . . . The Commission will render a great service by undertaking a critical examination of this subject and by providing the best possible basis for determining the methods by which support for these valuable organizations can be maintained without impairment to the professional independence upon which their present effectiveness depends." (Department of State *Bulletin*, June 12, 1972, pages 816-17)

On August 10 Nixon announced the membership of the study commission, renamed the Commission on International Radio Broad-

casting: Dr. Milton S. Eisenhower, President Emeritus, Johns Hopkins University (Chair); John A. Gronouski, former Ambassador to Poland; Edmond A. Gullion, former Ambassador to the Congo; John P. Roche, Professor of Politics, Brandeis University; and Edward Barrett, Director of the Communications Institute Division, Academy for Educational Development. For the text of the announcement, see *ibid.*, September 11, 1972, page 293. President's Assistant for National Security Affairs Henry Kissinger had recommended the four members to Nixon based on a longer list provided by State (see footnote 5, Document 60). Kissinger explained his recommendation to Nixon in a memorandum dated June 12: "All the proposed Commission members were also members of the ad hoc Citizens Committee for Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty, which was set up by George Ball last winter when the radios were under the severest attack by Senator Fulbright. I am sure that they will do an outstanding job of considering the financing options." (National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 380, Subject Files, Radio Free Europe & Radio Liberty, Vol. II)

On May 7, 1973, the Commission released its report, which "concluded that the radios were still performing a worthwhile function and recommended the creation of a Board for International Broadcasting to take over the State Department's role of administering funds" for RFE and RL. On October 2 Congress approved S. 1914 (P.L.-93-129), which established such a seven-member board. The law also approved \$50,209,000 in funding for the two radios for fiscal year 1974. (Congressional Quarterly, *Congress and the Nation*, volume IV, 1973-1976, page 856) For the text of P.L.-93-129, see 87 Stat. 456.