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 You are in: Under Secretary for Political Affairs > Bureau of African Affairs > Releases > Remarks > 2005: African Affairs Remarks

U.S. Participation in the Sudan Donors' Conference, Oslo, Norway, April 11-12, 2005

Two Senior Government Officials
Foreign Press Center Briefing
Washington, DC
April 8, 2005

(10:40 A.M. EDT)

SENIOR GOVERNMENT OFFICIAL ONE: Thanks a lot. You'll have to bear with me. I got some of these handwritten notes at the 11th hour, so if I sound more incomprehensible than usual it's not just the early morning, but it's actually my own notes.

The Deputy Secretary and AID Administrator Natsios will attend the Oslo Donors' Conference and I'll let [Senior Government Official Two] come up with the details on what the AID Administrator is going to do and actually focus a little more heavily on the conference.

The Deputy will then go to Sudan to advance our policy in dealing with these two interrelated and extremely difficult issues; that is, the implementation of the comprehensive peace agreement and the crisis in Darfur.

Let me say something about the North-South comprehensive peace accord first. Obviously, its conclusion on January 9 was a major achievement that holds the possibility of overcoming 22 years of strife in Sudan. Together with our troika partners, the UK and Norway, the U.S. helped lead the broad African negotiation that ended this complex tragedy with a fairly complex agreement. The implementation of the comprehensive peace agreement is behind schedule. The Deputy Secretary will press the Sudanese parties to follow through with timely and effectively implementation.

On the second issue, Darfur, where tens of thousands have died and millions have been displaced, it's obvious the region is plagued by violence, atrocities and that the humanitarian catastrophe we label genocide and others have called a crime against humanity has continued to cast a large shadow over the achievement of a comprehensive peace accord.

The U.S. has been in the forefront of the international community in providing aid to Darfur as well as to southern Sudan. Brave USAID professionals are working in dangerous conditions in Darfur to ensure delivery of these desperately needed assistance.

The enormous humanitarian and world catastrophe in Darfur has cast a shadow over these accords, as I've said. If this situation continues to worsen, neither we nor others will be able to effectively support the comprehensive peace agreement in the style in which we were hoping. This is not to say that we will not do things in the south, but that our ability to have a comprehensive major impact will be, obviously, decremented greatly by this problem in Darfur. The promise, essentially, that the agreement holds for Sudan will have been wasted and we have the danger of a downward spiral, which we're all seeking to avoid.

What is the Deputy going to do in Oslo and in Sudan? He'll obviously urge the Sudanese parties to act more responsibly, to rise to the occasion, to press harder to finish this peace agreement, and in the case of Darfur he'll urge the rebels and others to get on with a ceasefire so that the humanitarian assistance can flow more effectively.

He's already set the stage for this by talking to both Vice President Taha and the SPLM Chairman John Garang several times telephonically before this and is now looking forward to meeting them both on this trip. In the beginning of the trip, he'll go, obviously, to Khartoum, where he'll meet with senior officials, including Vice President Taha. Our understanding currently is Bashir will be out of the country at an Egyptian-hosted meeting, but nonetheless Taha is the partner for peace with John Garang and is the effective administrator for this. So we'll have actual engagement with him on the ground on this issue as well with a more comprehensive meeting with Sudanese officials.

The Deputy will go down to Rumbek in southern Sudan to meet with SPLM leader John Garang but also with John Garang's staff and supporters to have a more comprehensive discussion on where we are on this implementation and reconciliation process. He'll obviously emphasize U.S. support for both these things, but particularly for reconstruction in the south.

He'll also briefly visit Darfur to see the conditions there for himself, show support for U.S. and other international humanitarian aid workers that are there, and talk with the African Union mission leadership about their work in ending the violence and how we and others can actually support an expansion of that force, if it makes sense.

And one of the big things we will try and do throughout this trip is rally more international support for this. That's really what Oslo is about and the U.S. has been pretty forthcoming that it will make a significant pledge. Jan Egeland said the other day that he's concerned that only five percent of the work plan has been pledged when you set aside the U.S. pledge. We are hoping that by meeting with a number of European officials in Oslo, the Deputy and Administrator Natsios will be able to urge more forthcomingness. The Deputy, as you know, spent some time earlier last week in Europe and this was one of his talking points in each of his stops. It wasn't necessarily a stock talking point, but it sure was top three in almost every place he stopped. So you can see we're taking a comprehensive approach to this.

Let me say one more word about what went on at the UN, just as way of background, backing up, of course, the Deputy's message on all this. It is the clearly expressed will of the United Nations on the situation in Sudan and what needs to happen to improve the situation there.

We had three resolutions last week. Hopefully, that sent a strong and unified international message to the Sudanese parties. The first one authorizes a 10,000-person UN mission to monitor implementation of the comprehensive peace accord and will push the parties to proceed with implementation and support their efforts to do so.

The second resolution adopted targeted sanctions on those responsible for violence in Darfur, as a way to reserve leverage, hopefully, to stop the violence, both the government and the rebels; as well, thanks to the arms embargo feature, as anybody else that's supporting the conflict in there.

The third and final one that you've been pressing [State Department spokesman Ambassador Richard] Boucher and others on is the Commission of Inquiry's findings and now the ICC is the approved track to go forward on seeing that impunity doesn't take place, to see that accountability is what happens. So that UN resolution also sets the stage to say the world is unified.

I'll let [Senior Government Official Two] give you a bigger view of the Oslo Conference since this, after all AID's business more than ours, but it's in the context of this overwhelming -- overarching policy that I've laid out there.

SENIOR GOVERNMENT OFFICIAL TWO: Thank you, [Senior Government Official One]. The meeting in Oslo next week is the culmination of a long planning for peace process that's paralleled the peace negotiations going on in Naivasha. Donors have been meeting for at least two years and are getting ready for the peace agreement to be signed so there's a fair amount of donor coordination that's already taken place.

Oslo is specifically to focus on needs identified in the World Bank-UNDP Joint Assessment Mission for Sudan. And I think you can find that document probably on both the World Bank and the UN websites, actually, which identifies recovery and reconstruction needs for the interim period which is the six years until there's a vote for southern Sudanese to decide the final status. The interim period is supposed to start on July 9th, although as [Senior Government Official One] noted, the pre-interim period has already seen some delays, but we're pushing for that to still be the case.

In addition to recovery and reconstruction needs identified in the JAM document, the UN work plan for 2005, which was released actually last October, is also on the table for donor support, as [Senior Government Official One] noted. Jan Egeland has been urging other donors to step up. The United States has provided sort of the bulk of the assistance thus far for humanitarian needs in Sudan this year and we're very concerned, actually, by the situation both in Darfur but as well in other parts of Sudan, where the food situation is quite serious this year due to sporadic rains and natural conditions on top of a large number of internally displaced persons moving home, either from northern Sudan to southern Sudan or within southern Sudan back to their home areas, now that the war has been successfully negotiated to an end.

So there's significant needs for the WFP food pipelines that we're very worried at the moment and hopeful that other donors will come forward and contribute to in Oslo. This will be a main point that the administrator stresses in his meetings with his counterpart development ministers while he's there as it is and has been in the Deputy Secretary's talking points as well. So that'll be an important outcome that we'll be working for.

In addition, robust results are what we're hopeful for in terms of overall pledges and commitments. Specifically, the Norwegians have asked donors to identify their pledges for the first two and a half years of the interim period, starting from July 2005 through 2007. And I think you'll find various donors that have different budget cycles and timelines and so that will be something to watch as the numbers are announced next week. But from what I understand, it sounds like we're going to have a good result on that.

So we think it's extremely important that reconstruction assistance move forward so that we can take advantage of the opportunity the Comprehensive Peace Agreement provides. If there's not a tangible peace dividend for war-affected areas, primarily southern Sudan but also the three areas of Abia, Nuba Mountains and southern Blue Nile, which were specifically identified in the Comprehensive Peace Agreement.

That sends a signal to places like Darfur and to other parts of the country who have grievances that there's a good cause to negotiate settlements rather than to fight and to fit into the broader picture of what the CPA can do to help settle the situation in Darfur. So we're moving forward, we have a robust program already in southern Sudan and a very large humanitarian program in northern Sudan.

And I can elaborate on other aspects of our program, as you like.

MR. MACINNESS: Thank you very much. We'll do questions now. I'll remind those who came in late -- this is on background, and attribution is to senior government officials. Any questions?

SENIOR GOVERNMENT OFFICIAL ONE: It's early in the morning (inaudible) getting silence.


QUESTION: I'm somebody awake, you know. I'm Thomas Gorguissian with Al Gomhouria, Egypt. My first question is regarding, as much as we know from the reports that this one point billion -- $1.4 billion is the American side. What you are expecting from Oslo in general? I mean, three million -- three billion, I mean, or more?

The second part of the question is the political side. You mentioned, [Senior Government Official One], that there going to be some meetings in Khartoum, as much as I got. Are there other meetings going to take place in Oslo, too? In any other framework?

SENIOR GOVERNMENT OFFICIAL ONE: Let me answer the political question first and then I'll let [Senior Government Official Two] take a guess at the -- what the international community is going to give. (Laughter.) And (inaudible) anything, obviously, it will be a guess.

Oslo is a stage in which we can see John Garang, obviously, and Vice President Taha and the senior delegation. We can deliver a very high-level message that says, we stand behind the Comprehensive Peace Agreement in a very practical way. We're prepared and we will make a very sizable pledge when we get to Oslo. But we're concerned, you're not on schedule, there's a number of reasons for that, we're still optimistic you can get back on schedule, but you did originally say that by the 9th of July, the interim constitution would be in place. That would be a position for the Vice Presidency and John Garang, hopefully, when he takes the Vice Presidency would be in Khartoum. And there would be a transition government in place. And we're concerned, here it is in April and the interim constitution hasn't been done yet. John Garang himself, of course, can't actually go to Khartoum without a position, although he's finally now sent the senior delegation so that tangible step has taken place.

And thirdly, Darfur needs to be addressed. We got into this for a Comprehensive Peace Agreement. Sudan to develop rationally has to be seen as an organic whole and therefore Darfur has to be addressed and we'll call upon the Vice President first as the sovereign actor in this case, to do better. And we'll say that we're prepared to reach out in concert with others, to the rebels to make that happen. The African Union is already doing that we'll lend our weight to that.

And then finally, when we go down from the conference into Khartoum, we'll have a broader audience, having set the stage with the Vice President, to tell others that we are committed to this process. We, the United States, are committed to this process and we've just come from Oslo where the world is committed to this process.

But we've got to move faster and we've got to do better on Darfur, a broader audience, than to run back and have that same conversation; not just with John Garang, but with his cadre of other senior leaders to let them hear the message directly from us that we're with you in the long haul, but we've got to pick up the pace, we've got to do better at hitting the targets we've all set for ourselves, but we're prepared to help. And if there's something more we can do, let's have that conversation.

And then finally, as I mentioned, the Deputy will go off to Darfur to see for himself what's going on there and also, to reinforce that this has to be brought under control. But I'll let [Senior Government Official Two] take a guess at the numbers.

QUESTION: Can I follow up on --


QUESTION: As long as it's background, but my -- when you mentioned the issue of Darfur and other issues, you mentioned the issues of the three resolutions of the UN and then when you come (inaudible) political side -- political side you are mentioning this meeting in the context of the July 9th and the interim constitution and all these things.

What about this implementation of the list of the people who are required to be war criminals -- Darfur issue? I mean, is this part of this discussion or concern?

SENIOR GOVERMENT OFFICIAL ONE: We abstained, as you know, on the ICC on this particular piece. But given our strongly held views on the ICC and the Rome statute, the very fact that we abstained says we see this problem in Darfur as extraordinary to the point where we were willing to actually make compromises on issues that are very important to us, to see that the question of impunity wouldn't be left open.

The truth of the matter is this, this will not be a rapid process to justice. What happens next is, literally, Kofi Annan will hand over this list of 51 to the designated prosecutor at The Hague and he's been named -- Ocampo or something, I don't have his name with me, but he's been named [Ed. note: Luis Moreno Ocampo. Press reports say Annan delivered the list to Moreno Ocampo on April 5, 2005]. And he will then have to do what a prosecutor legally is required to do. He'll have to review the evidence against each of these 51 people and then decide, as a prosecutor, using the standards that they've set forth in the ICC and The Hague, is this sufficient evidence to actually issue an indictment against these 51 people. So just because you're on this list of 51 doesn't necessarily mean that a competent prosecutor, when he examines the evidence, will decide he has enough.

And he's got a couple of choices. He can then say, "I need to gather more. There's fire here and I'd like to have a full package," or he can say, "I do have enough," and issue those indictments. It'll take, my guess is, based on what we've seen in Uganda and these other kinds of actions with the ICC, several months. This is not a rush to judgment kind of thing. And again, I suspect you'll see a mixed picture. You know, I'll be speculating, but there will be some that he'll think he has enough to indict. There may be some that he'll say, "This is shaky. If you really want me to go any further with this, you got to bring me more," and there will be others who'll say, "I see the beginnings of an indictment, but I need more information on this, this, and this," and then it'll be up to the investigators and other people that the ICC has to get that information.

One of the biggest problems is without Khartoum's cooperation, this will be a very difficult process. I would assume somewhere along the line, we'll actually have a discussion between the ICC and Khartoum and others, maybe the African Union, maybe the European Union as intermediaries to come up with a formula that will allow some practical investigation, et cetera. I don't want to prejudge how long that will take or how it plays out. I may guess wrong completely and maybe Khartoum will come to some compromise directly.

But all those things have to happen, so -- this UN resolution doesn't say, you know, "The war crimes trial starts tomorrow and the first name on the list is X." We're not there yet.

SENIOR GOVERNMENT OFFICIAL TWO: Yeah. I really can't say what the result of Oslo is going to be in terms of overall pledge, but I know from the Norwegians -- as of this morning, they have over 400 participants registered representing some 70 countries. So, that's an excellent turnout just in terms of representation and hopefully, most of those countries are coming because they have something to say and to put on the table, so we expect a good, positive result from that.

The Joint Assessment Mission estimates for the first two-and-a-half years, I think, a need of around $2 1/2 billion for recovery and reconstruction. That does assume a fair amount of oil revenues transferred to southern Sudan will go towards those needs as well and naturally, there are a few systems to get in place in order to make that happen. And that's one thing that programs such as USAID and other donors are already working with the southern Sudanese on, but that will be a key step to watch in the process of how resources meet actual needs, so --

QUESTION: Thank you. Hoda Tawfik, Al-Ahram newspaper, Egypt. To follow up on this problem of war criminals, Mr. Bashir said he will not let his people go to the war criminals -- to the tribunal. And you said you want to urge Europe and Africa and somebody else to urge the Khartoum Government. If they do not relent, how do you want to do it? How do you want to -- will you enforce it by law, by attacks? How? Or is it peaceful? I don’t know.

And the United States itself refuses to send -- have people to such tribunals, see, to international court and this is what -- you abstained at the UN, so why are you pushing Sudan that far?

SENIOR GOVERMENT OFFICIAL ONE: We're not pushing Sudan. That resolution was not an American resolution. It was a French resolution originally taken over by the British. The decision was to go to the ICC, which is Europe-based and we're not signatories. So the problem that Khartoum has in the first instance is not necessarily with the United States. It's with the international community and the UN Security Council as to how the ICC operates in these kinds of things.

You've got examples throughout the world where -- Yugoslavia, for instance, the old Yugoslavia -- Bosnia in the follow-up -- the United Nations and NATO troops, when they're on the ground, if they come across one of these people that's been indicted in that context, arrest them. There is no such body on the ground right now inside Sudan. Obviously, if people came out to Europe, they could be arrested, if they are on this list. If they come to any signatory country of the ICC, the people that have signed this have said that they will act on behalf of the ICC and there are many African signatories.

So Khartoum's problem is not with how this is being handled legally, it's with the actions on the ground and their failure to address it. They had plenty of opportunities to do something about this in their own court system and now, belatedly, they've arrested 15 people the other day, just as this is being debated in the United Nations.

We're still optimistic that despite what Bashir said, and I think he had to defend his sovereignty, I understand that as a political issue -- he'll find some way to make this a more effective compromise and address the underlying problem which is, there can not be impunity. No matter how you count, more than 100,000 people have been killed, at least two million people have been displaced, these are serious crimes, we called it genocide. The world community doesn't agree with us. What this Commission of Inquiry has said is this is high crimes and war crimes, crimes against humanity, but not rising to the level of genocide. It's a different question. Will they enforce it by war? It's much too soon to get into that kind of thing. The truth is there's a transition government about to take effect in the summer, hopefully, the government could revisit that issue.

There are other ways out of this, other than the more dramatic. And as I pointed out, this is not an instant thing. As I've said in another forum, the truth is that the underlying ethnic and tribal relations in Darfur have been profoundly disturbed by this. And what you're going to need to address, the great number of people that have had a hand in this, one way or another, and rebels included, is something like what the Rwandans did, this Gacaca process, something like what the South Africans did in terms of the Truth and Reconciliation Commission.

But you're also going to need that top piece that says this has risen to the level of an international crime and now we, if we mean anything by the Geneva Convention, if we mean anything by the Security Council resolution, have to act and this 51 is in the first target list, but you need all three pieces. And everyone is focused on the high drama, obviously, of the ICC and the 51, but there's a practical problem that needs to be solved in Darfur and it has to be solved in a way that respects the ethnic traditions, et cetera, otherwise indicting five or six men isn't going to change the fact that I've got to revenge my brother who was killed or my cousin who was killed or I've got to get even for the cattle that were taken.

You're going to need an African process that's sensitive to that situation and that's not for the outsiders to decide, that's for the Sudanese and other Africans to discuss what will work; is it something like Rwanda. My guess is it's going to have be something like Rwanda and something like the Truth and Reconciliation Commission because if you're going to reconcile, let's say, some of the senior tribal leaders that are implicated in this, if you take one of them out of the equation and try them, what does that do to the inter-ethnic relations? That's where Bishop Tutu's kind of Truth and Reconciliation Commission may come in. It's something for senior people that are willing to say, "I've done something wrong, but I'm part of the solution, too." And in that context, we, Africa, can find some way to solve this problem. You're going to need all three pieces and we're focused on the 51. The 51 is the small one and that's what this dialogue needs to be about.

This is where Egypt and others can play a significant role. And you know, while Khartoum is saying, no, no, no, they shouldn't be saying no, no, no, forever. They should address this fundamental problem. This is where we're open to influence. And in a spirit in which cooperation starts to rise on the broader picture, the compromises at the top level will be easier.

So it's too soon to say we're going to go chasing people around and we'll have to see what the ICC decides. It is in their hands, not ours. We've made it clear we'd prefer to have handled it via an African-style tribunal like Rwanda or something else. We didn't have the votes. We couldn't even get that resolution to the floor. We would have had nine or 10 abstentions by the signatories, so that was never a viable action, unless Africa -- and we had asked Africa, who spoke out and said they wanted something different; they didn't, so the ICC thing has preceded it. It's complex, but it's very early to make any long-range judgment.

QUESTION: Mike McCarthy from DPA. The U.S. has compiled a lot of evidence with regard to what's happened in Darfur. Have you guys made any headway yet in determining what role the United States will be able to play in providing evidence to the ICC?

SENIOR GOVERNMENT OFFICIAL ONE: We gave the evidence that we had gathered earlier, you know, to people that the Secretary sent to do the interviews. Let me take you back, historically. The Congress passed in July last year this joint -- since the genocide had taken place, the Secretary then decided that he would have to juridically take a hard look at this, and what we were always missing was the issue of intent, so we sent his team out and interviewed a number of refugees and when we were done, we were satisfied that there was a government hand in this and therefore, intent was established and we called it genocide. That material that we gathered, et cetera, and what we knew about that, we did provide to the Commission of Inquiry, because under Article 8 of the Geneva Convention, that's what we were required to do, is take it to the UN and set those events in motion. So, this Commission of Inquiry got the information from us. We'll have to see what the prosecutor asked for. It's not a tangible question yet and it'll involve all kinds of legal niceties, given the fact that we're not signatories to the ICC. So rather than speculate, we'll have to let a tangible case arise. They haven't asked us yet because they'd literally -- and as far as I know, they don't have the envelope even yet. We've already indicated, where we can be helpful by what we did with the Commission of Inquiry, we’ll do it. But there are all kinds of legal considerations that'll get involved when they make a specific request and I don't want to prejudge.

QUESTION: Are there any U.S. restrictions?

SENIOR GOVERNMENT OFFICIAL ONE: Well, I mean, the ones we always have. Obviously, we're not handing over classified information and those kinds of things, but particularly, if they don't ask. And even then it would depend on what he's missing. As I said, he's going to have to review this and then if he says, "I'm missing this particular thing, and I think the United States may have it" or "The United States may be able to provide me some assistance with it," then we'll have to deal with it. It's too soon to say.

QUESTION: Regarding the donations, the possibility of this will start with July 2005, right? It has to be covered -- the period from 2005 to 2007, right? And you mentioned the estimate is about $2.5 billion. I'm not talking about numbers now, I'm talking about the form of the -- I mean, like delivering this aid. Usually, there are two problems in the case of Africa and especially in Sudan and Darfur issue. One of these always done to the central government or avoiding central government, which is a problem sometimes more than facilitated.

And the second thing is that the geographic and weather nature of the place -- I mean, do you have any -- because before, Mr. Natsios and others are talking about -- a few months ago about -- that it's hard to go in the rainy time and all these things. And most of the things are -- even not reach the place.

I mean, so knowing that, how you are going to overcome these obstacles?

SENIOR GOVERNMENT OFFICIAL TWO: There are several aspects of getting assistance, actually, to the people who need it in Sudan, and southern Sudan has its set of circumstances, Darfur has its set of circumstances and other war-affected communities. First of all, the Joint Assessment Mission looked at recovery and longer-term reconstruction development needs primarily for war-affected areas and that meant the North-South War. That was what was on the table. The JAM process started a year ago January in 2004, more or less, and it identified eight sectoral clusters: health, education, infrastructure, water and sanitation, governance, capacity-building, things like that and identified the international experts in each of those sectors to work with SPLM and southern officials in the south and Government of Sudan officials in the north. They sent out teams in northern Sudan and southern Sudan to look at specific war-affected areas and to do a very detailed assessment of what the needs are.

So, that two and a half billion is primarily intended to focus on specifically communities that have been affected by the North-South civil war. Obviously, that's southern Sudan, but it's also Abia, Nuba Mountains, southern Blue Nile, and then there's some effort to address overall development issues that can't just be extrapolated from those three areas in northern Sudan. There are some issues that apply across the board.

Within the wealth-sharing protocol of the Comprehensive Peace Agreement, there's a provision for two multi-donor trust funds to provide an aid delivery mechanism for donors who want to do that. The World Bank will administer these funds. They, I think, just had a vote in their board meeting earlier this week on this. I'm sure they sent out a release to have them set up as quickly as possible and we've been having intensive donor consultations and with the Sudanese, both Khartoum and southern Sudan about how these trust funds will work.

It is allowed that aid can be delivered directly to southern Sudan without passing through Khartoum, so the multi-donor trust fund for the south will relate to the new government of southern Sudan. The multi-donor trust fund for the North will relate to the Government of National Unity and focus initially on those war-affected areas that I've identified. Many donors are going to utilize this mechanism for providing their assistance. There will be a governance structure. The World Bank has a very, sort of, complicated system already in mind for how to do this in a transparent way that ensures the aid goes to where it needs to go. Money is not going to be handed over either to the government in Khartoum or to the government in southern Sudan, certainly not by the United States. Other donors do tend to do budget support of this nature, but most of my donor counterparts that we've been discussing this with recognize the capacity issues and the need for some of these systems to be put in place.

One thing we're working on in southern Sudan, which is, you know, a brand new government out of nothing, is helping them with technical assistance to set up financial management systems, procurement systems, all the things needed whether they're dealing with oil revenues, aid flows, multi-donor trust fund. Our program will be largely bilateral through implementing partners, NGOs, contractors, the usual way AID does its business around the world.

Logistically, there are many constraints to getting assistance to remote places and most of these areas are still very remote. Infrastructure is vitally important and that's a key area identified in the assessment mission and it's been an emphasis of our program already. There is an emergency road repair program already underway through the World Food Program so that we can one, deliver food aid more efficiently and less expensively than flying it everywhere, but that will also facilitate movement of IDPs as they return home. It will facilitate opening up of markets and economic recovery, many things that are essential to the recovery and reconstruction of southern Sudan and to the linkage between northern Sudan and southern Sudan.

QUESTION: Just to put things in context, I have tried to ask two questions in numbers. Until this morning, how much -- the U.S. invest of -- donate to this all of Sudan and whether it's South or North or Darfur? The second thing is, you mentioned two or three times there were oil revenues. Do you have any estimate number of that?

SENIOR GOVERNMENT OFFICIAL TWO: I hesitate to speak off the top of my head. It's all in the joint assessment mission report and I know what they are predicting. The south will receive -- already in 2005 it is around a billion dollars in oil revenues for southern Sudan and there's an analysis of that if you look at the JAM report itself. The World Bank has worked intensively with the parties during the negotiations, particularly on the wealth-sharing protocol to provide some assistance and support in how they treat the oil sector and understand those flows.

I believe already, the oil revenues, according to the Wealth-Sharing Protocol, are due to transfer to southern Sudan the day after the signing of the peace agreement, so effective January 10th, the Government of Sudan in Khartoum is holding that money in escrow right now since there's nothing to transfer it to at the moment, but I think we're relatively satisfied that things are working out as they should according to the Wealth-Sharing Protocol and those monies are being put aside. And then the SPLM and the government of southern Sudan has been engaged with the joint assessment mission in identifying what those oil revenues will go towards in terms of recovery reconstruction needs and how that burden-sharing will take place between resources they have and what the donors will put on the table.

QUESTION: How much you spend (inaudible)?

SENIOR GOVERNMENT OFFICIAL TWO: Yeah, how much we spend -- gets dangerously close to Mr. Zoellick's announcement next week, so I think I --

QUESTION: Next week -- I mean, up until this moment, how much already -- I mean --

SENIOR GOVERNMENT OFFICIAL TWO: Well, there's several ways of looking at the numbers. In Darfur, the United States, since the outbreak of the conflict -- I think it's in the fact sheet that you should have in front of you on Darfur -- is around $485 million. I haven't looked at it this week. Six hundred [million dollars] since 2003 and then for the number for this fiscal year -- anyway, you have it in the document just in front of you, in terms of our humanitarian response to Darfur and then the other documents you have is also on our humanitarian response to Sudan, comprehensively.

What that doesn't include in terms of USAID's programs is our development assistance and our health budgets, which are in separate accounts and so it's not all neatly tabulated there. But USAID this fiscal year is over $600 million for Sudan. A large amount of that is humanitarian assistance and specifically, food aid because of the dire situations in Darfur and in southern Sudan.

That is not the number Mr. Zoellick is announcing next week, just to be clear.

SENIOR GOVERNMENT OFFICIAL ONE: Don't mention his name in that sentence. (Inaudible).

MR. MACINNESS: Thank you very much. Thank you both for coming.


# # #

Released on April 8, 2005

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