Roundtable Discussion with Murrow Journalist International Visitor Program

AMBASSADOR FRIED: Well, given that this is, I’m told, Russian and Turkish speaking, [greeting in Russian]. [Laughter]. You’re very welcome here in the Department of State, and I’d like to talk a little bit about U.S. foreign policy in the second Bush term, and then stop fairly quickly and answer your questions, if that’s all right, if that’s a good way to proceed.

The Bush foreign policy has really evolved from the September 11th terrorist attack as an initial event and gone through several phases. In the initial aftermath of September 11th, we faced a national emergency. We were attacked essentially by the Taliban and al-Qaida from Afghanistan, and we took action there.

Iraq you know about and that has been discussed, and I don’t want to spend the whole time talking about Iraq, but we felt that one of the lessons of September 11th was that you could not wait for dangers to gather and do nothing. And that containment of someone like Saddam Hussein might not be a viable strategy, especially since containment wasn’t working.

But as time went on, you will notice if you study President Bush’s speeches carefully that in his foreign policy speeches and in the National Security Strategy documents of the United States he gradually emphasized issues other than the strict military and intelligence side of counterterrorism and started speaking about longer term issues of building democracies and reform and stability through reform. We stopped defining al-Qaida as an enemy in a narrow sense of being a terrorist organization and started speaking more about radical, anti-democratic, Islamist ideology as a longer term problem for which the answer was not principally a military or intelligence answer, but was an answer rooted in reform, support for democracy, support for states, for nations seeking to deepen their own democracies.

This emphasis on democracy as a long-term answer to the problems of Islamist extremism and the terrorism derived from that extremism is apt to be an enduring legacy of the Bush administration – more than what is usually considered to be the Bush administration’s foreign policy legacy, things like preemption. Preemptive military action: I think that is going to be less important, and the emphasis on democracy is more important.

Now, because there are a great many Turkish speakers here, it may have occurred to you listening to me that Turkey’s experience of building a secular democracy within a society which is mostly Muslim, and then in recent years deepening that democracy may be very relevant. Indeed, we find that experience to be relevant because Turkey is at once a country with a Muslim population and a democracy, and a secular nation state.

Those achievements are very relevant to the kind of problems we face now, which is dealing with a radical Islamist ideology which denies in principle the relevance of democracy and denies that democracy can take root in a society which has Muslim traditions.

We reject the notion of a clash of civilizations, and we reject the notion that any one religion is intrinsically more disposed to democracy than any other religion.

Similarly, we believe that democratic reforms, the rule of law, and a kind of openness toward the world is a better answer to the problems left behind by the Soviet Union than nationalism or authoritarianism. There is a debate in Russia today whether democracy – well, there isn’t even much of a debate. Many Russians believe that democracy equals chaos and that democracy as it was practiced in Russia in the ‘90s demonstrates that democracy is not terribly relevant to the problems of post-communism.

In our view this is mistaken, and the problem of reform in Russia in the ‘90s was not that it was too democratic, but that it was not consistent enough.

I see there is a journalist from Poland here. In the beginning of the 1990s Poles didn’t know whether they would succeed. The economy in Poland was in complete ruin. The country was very poor. The infrastructure was wretched. The demographics were bad. Not as bad as they are in Russia today, but actually pretty bad. And the Poles’ answer to that was not to turn away from reform and embrace authoritarianism, but to push ahead with reform, and they did so in the early ‘90s with great concentration, and the results later speak for themselves of massive economic growth, rising standard of living, and gradual stability on a much higher level of national existence, actually.

So the Bush administration looks at democracy not as is sometimes assumed in Europe as a kind of Messianic ideology that bears no relationship to reality, but as a rather practical solution to problems and a practical solution which has been successful in the past 17 years, since 1989, in cases where it has been applied consistently.

Now one of the challenges we Americans face is that for 60 years we did not really regard democracy as relevant to the broader Middle East or countries which were Muslim. During the 1970s we talked about democracies and human rights as the answer to communism, but we seemed very happy to deal with authoritarian regimes in Egypt and conservative, absolutist monarchies in Saudi Arabia.

The results in the Middle East were not terribly satisfactory, and what we have done in this administration is to do away with this red line around the broader Middle East which said within this red line democracy and the normal rules don’t apply. They do apply.

The problem with this kind of an approach is that although democracy, I am convinced, will be the fate for the broader Middle East in the long run; in the short run life is not life the way the Soviet Union used to describe it – a triumphant march to a better future. It’s pretty complicated stuff.

But we do believe that democracy is applicable in the Middle East, just as it has been applicable in Asia, South America, Eastern Europe, and South Asia.

We intend to support democratic movements in that world, as well as in Central Asia and the post-communist hemisphere.

Now those are very broad outlines of American foreign policy in the second Bush term. Tomorrow I’m giving testimony in the Senate about the problem and the causes of Islamist extremism, mostly in Western Europe. This is a long-term challenge for us. Many of the Islamist radicals and the intellectual climate they live in remind me as someone who lived in the Soviet Union, remind me of 21st Century versions of Raskolnikov, an uprooted semi-intellectual with great ideas who falls into rather dangerous radical nihilism.

This is a challenge we have to face, and we have to face this together working with the governments of the countries you represent and with civil societies in your countries.

Let me stop here. You come from a great many countries. Your questions are apt to be different. I will do my best to answer them, but I wanted to give you an overall framework of what our thinking is like.

So with that, I’m at your disposal.

QUESTION: My name is Anna Novicka.... My name is Anna Novicka. I am from [the] Latvian newspaper Telegraf and I would like to find out about your opinion as the development in the relations in the triangle the United States, Russia and Europe is concerned if we take into account that the opinions of the United States and Russia are becoming more and more different. I mean the relationship with Syria, Ukraine, Belarus. Is there any future for relations in this triangle?

AMBASSADOR FRIED: Everybody got the question?

We want to work with Russia on a common agenda, and we want to work with Russia wherever possible. There are, objectively speaking, or there should be, objectively speaking, as used to be said in the old Soviet Union, no barriers to our cooperation because we are not each other’s principal problem. In practice, that cooperation has been more difficult than we Americans had hoped.

You mentioned Belarus. Is there anybody here from Belarus?

I don’t know why Russia has supported the recent elections in Belarus. No country in Europe believed these elections were free and fair. As far as I can tell no democracy anywhere in the world thought these elections were free and fair. I do not understand why Russia would find it in its interest to support the Lukashenko regime.

I think Russia is still trying to find its place in the world after the collapse of the Soviet Union, and I think back to the period, there was a period in history when Russia was the most advanced relative to Western Europe, the most successful, the most economically, culturally, scientifically dynamic, which was, of course, the generation before 1914 when Russia also thought of itself as a European country.

I think that the periods when Russia sought to be isolated from the world and separate and part of its own sitting in a kind of isolation were periods that did not bring Russia great results. Now this is not a US government view, this is only my view as someone who lived in Russia. But I hope that Russia will return to a path of convergence with and integration with the Euro-Atlantic community because Russia has a great deal to offer.

I also don’t think much of the theory of some Russians that the United States is out to encircle Russia. Encircling Russia is not our objective. We have other problems in the world. Russia is not a problem for us.

We were interested – you’re from Latvia, right? We were interested in seeing Latvia become a member of NATO and a member of the European Union not because we wanted to surround Russia, but because we wanted to complete a Europe whole, free and at peace.

A Latvia, a Poland, a Romania that are secure, prospering democracies are not threats to Russia. A Germany in NATO and the European Union, a Germany which is a democracy, is hardly a threat to Russia. There is no threat to Russia from the West. I believe there ought to be the basis for strategic cooperation between Russia and the United States. It’s proving more frustrating now than we had hoped.

QUESTION: My name is Kirill Krabu. I’ve got a question about Europe. As you know, Europe is growing up now and gets more and more powerful. Our currency rates now are higher than the dollar. For example, the Euro is higher than the dollar now.

How do you think about that, if this growth will continue? Is it a reason for the USA to be maybe afraid of Europe and to begin some polarization between Europe and USA? Because Europe is somewhere also now called as United States of Europe. So is it a reason to become polarized?

AMBASSADOR FRIED: No. We welcome a strong Europe. A strong Europe is good for the United States. The difficulties of the 20th Century – two world wars, the Cold War, Nazism, fascism, communism, were all products of a breakup, a kind of calamitous collapse of Europe in 1914.

Now why on earth would the United States, after having had to go to war twice in the 20th century to save Europe and fight the Cold War to defend democracy in Europe, be alarmed by the prospect of a secure, stable, prospering and democratic Europe today? It would be ridiculous. We want there to be a strong Europe.

There is not one serious person in Washington who worries about a U.S.-European rivalry. Commercially, yes. Okay, Boeing and Airbus will always fight. Of course they will. Well, so what? Ford and GM also fight. Let them. All right?

The strategic fact is the United States and Europe need to work together because the threats we face are common threats, and they mostly originate outside of Europe, both in the broader Middle East and the problems along what I call Europe’s frontiers of freedom – the Balkans, South Caucasus. These are where the problems are. But the United States and Europe are together a center of democracy and prosperity in the world, and the alliance there is very close and apt to be closer.

When I think of all the problems, the last of my worries is a U.S.-European rivalry. Besides, the worst days of 2003, 2004, the debate about the Iraq war – that is behind us now, thank God.

QUESTION: I am from Kosovo, Taner, the Balkans and anything about the Balkans. As you know the Kosovo problem and the challenge has not been solved yet and at the same time in Serbia there are sort of problems. So, the stability of the Balkans... and what is the American policy towards these two issues, especially the Kosovo status?

AMBASSADOR FRIED: The United States has been involved deeply in the Balkans since the breakup of the old Yugoslavia. Kosovo’s status is the last open question, just as Serbia’s future direction is the biggest problem.

We support the efforts of Ahtisaari, the former Finnish president, to negotiate arrangements for Kosovo’s final status this year. I don’t know what those arrangements will be, but I do know what they will not be. We will not go back to the situation before 1999. We will not partition Kosovo. We will not redraw borders. That is no secession, no greater this or greater that. And whatever solution there is in Kosovo has to respect the rights of Kosovo’s minorities –- ethnic Serb, ethnic Turkish.

NATO didn’t fight a war in Kosovo to support anyone’s nationalist agenda. The Serb population of Kosovo needs to be protected, it needs to be respected, it needs to have a home in Kosovo. Not because Belgrade insists, but because this is a matter of principle to us.

Then the whole region needs to move to Europe. You cannot have the Balkans outside of Europe as a breeding ground of poverty, theft, smuggling, and occasionally wars. And I believe that Serbia ought to be in Europe. This isn’t just about Kosovo, it’s about the whole region. And Macedonia should be in Europe.

What I can’t say is exactly what Kosovo’s final status will be, but that’s not up to the United States, that’s a negotiated process.

QUESTION: I am from North Cyprus. This is Basaran. Of course there is a... we have a Cyprus issue. In the Cyprus issue there has been a referendum as you know. The Turkish side said yes, and the Greek side said no, and because of that we could not reach to any peace. The Greek side of course established themselves as the member of European Union. So, there has been some commitments to diplomatic channels and economic commitments. Unfortunately, these commitments by United States have not been established. The... there was a meeting between our president and Condoleezza Rice but any committed promises were not established. So, if you can elaborate on this?

AMBASSADOR FRIED: I am very familiar with the Cyprus issue. We believe in one Cyprus. We support reunification of the island as a bizonal, bicommunal federation. We do not believe in separatism or cessation. We are very pleased that the Turkish Cypriot community also supports reunification.

I myself have met with Mr. Talat. We do not recognize him as president; we do not recognize the government, but we do understand that he is a leader of the Turkish Cypriot community, and we appreciate the fact that he supports a negotiated settlement to reunify the island. We encourage that. It’s the right policy. We look forward to the day when a reunited Cyprus with a secure Turkish community is in the European Union as a whole island.

Now we understand that bizonal, bicommunal federation also means that there have to be certain arrangements. We supported the Annan plan, as you know. It didn’t pass. I regret that. But we have to find a way to make progress. We do want to make progress on the basis that I stated. And we do want to encourage the Turkish Cypriot community, but without recognizing a separate state and without creeping recognition of a separate state because we do believe in unification. Again, this is what the Turkish Cypriot leadership says it believes, and I accept this. I believe their position is sincere.

So we look forward to working with the government of Cyprus, with the Turkish Cypriot community, with the United Nations, with Turkey, with Greece to advance a settlement which will help everyone.

QUESTION: I come from Brussels, speaking English.

About the Cyprus issue, this year everyone is expecting a crisis for Turkey about the Greek Cypriots and opening the port issue. Turkey clearly declared that they won’t open their ports unless there is a settlement in Cyprus. It will be a big crisis with, big or small I don’t know, but definitely a crisis for Turkey in the EU relationship.

Also there is a ground shifting for the settlement from UN to EU, and it seems that U.S. doesn’t respond at all. Since Mr. Annan has a very limited time and I don’t think that personally he will again try something else because of every limitation. Do you have any concrete steps in the short term for Cyprus? Not recognition of course, but to try for anything.

AMBASSADOR FRIED: You make a very good point, which is that this issue, and I’m putting it in my words not yours, but that this issue will not get better by itself. In fact, we have been thinking about how important it is that we do whatever we can to help promote a settlement.

I frankly appreciate the Turkish government’s support for a settlement. I don’t think that Talat could have done what he did without Turkey’s backing. This is a significant change. It means that Turkey also supports a bizonal, bicommunal federation.

So we have to look at what we can do to support a settlement. Now you’re right, we have always supported Turkey’s accession to the European Union on the basis that Turkey ought to be treated like every other candidate. Turkey meets the criteria, it should join. If it doesn’t, it shouldn’t. But no special rules.

This is a tough position for Turkey, I understand it. We want to make progress, and we were thinking about how to approach the Cyprus issue so as to avoid this kind of a problem. The Turkish government deserves credit for having supported a settlement. This is not trivial. This is a big deal. It means that Greece, Turkey, the Turkish Cypriot community, and the government of Cyprus all support a bizonal, bicommunal federation. They just argue about the ways to get there. I understand this. This is not easy. But we should not let this drift.

So that’s the premise of your question, and I frankly agree with you, and we’re thinking about this very actively right now.

QUESTION: I am from Azerbaijan, from the TV Company INS. From the year 2005 until today everybody who’s connected to the settlement of the Nagorno-Karabakh issue, they’ve been talking that this conflict has to be solved in the year 2006. If it’s not solved now then it will last for many years. But now we see that the talks are deadlocked and the non-constructive position of the Armenian president is indicative. How do you think, is it possible that this conflict is settled within one or two years? And please take into consideration that both parties have always claimed that they wouldn’t seize any territory? How do you see it?

AMBASSADOR FRIED: Happily the situation is not as stuck as it appeared immediately after Rambouillet. At Rambouillet Presidents Kocharian and Aliyev met. They failed to come to agreement on terms to settlement of the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict, and many people thought, oh my God, it’s over, there will be war, terrible things will happen.

Shortly after that I went out to Baku and Yerevan with Ambassador Steve Mann, who is the American negotiator as part of the Minsk group process of negotiating a settlement of Nagorno-Karabakh. And we had a series of useful, I think productive, discussions with the government of Azerbaijan, the government of Armenia, and we have had discussions here with Foreign Minister Oskanian of Armenia and Deputy Foreign Minister Azimov of Azerbaijan. Both governments appear serious about making progress. Both governments gave us something to work with. So we’re no longer quite stuck. We don’t have a solution yet, but we are confident enough that we’re proceeding with discussions with both governments, working with the Minsk group co-chairs.

It’s important that both countries understand that they both cannot have their maximum objectives at the same time. Both countries can’t achieve that. And, in fact, neither country will achieve its maximum objectives. Similarly, no country can receive anything. Both countries have interests that must be taken into account.

It’s going to take courage and political leadership to get out of a war cycle and start contemplating the much more hopeful future if there is peace.

You’re from Azerbaijan, right? Your country’s going to have a lot of money coming in from oil and gas, but only if there is peace. If there is war, there is no more money. All right? Just look at the map. You know what I’m talking about. You’re well set up for peace. Of course, the oil and gas money won’t do you any good unless it’s well spent, but that’s a different issue. So we’re determined to move ahead.

QUESTION: This is Liudmila Barba from Moldova. About the Kosovo status, many official people from Moscow, including President Putin, have indicated that in case Kosovo is recognized then Russia would be able to recognize the separatist regions in post-Soviet territory. Do you take into consideration this factor when you are thinking about the status of Kosovo?

The second question is about the widening of the European Union. After World War II, the United States supported the present European Union. Will the United States keep supporting the enlargement of the European Union to include Ukraine and Moldova?

AMBASSADOR FRIED: First, we do not regard Kosovo as a precedent for resolution of any other conflict. Not Transnistria, not Abkhazia, not South Ossetia, not Chechnya, or North Ossetia, or Ingushetia. It is not a precedent. Full stop.

We do not support separatism. We do not support separatist agendas.

Why is Kosovo different? Because Milosevic fought a war with NATO, for one thing, and he lost. Secondly, the United Nations has had administration over Kosovo for seven years. Third, the UN Security Council has repeatedly affirmed Kosovo’s status as under UN administration, its final status to be worked out.

So our position is very clear and should not be misunderstood.

The second question about the enlargement of the European Union. We’ve always favored it. We think it has been a fabulous success. It has been a fabulous success. We believe that enlargement should continue, although we recognize first that there is a debate in Western Europe about EU enlargement that we have to respect. And second, the countries have to be ready. It is not a gift, it is not a charity program. Your Polish and Latvian colleagues here can tell you that it was very hard to get into the European Union. They had to do a lot, but it was worth it.

As for Ukraine, Ukrainians have to decide themselves. Anybody from Ukraine here? Yes. All right. Ukrainians have to decide for themselves what they want. Then they have to do the work.

QUESTION: Thank you very much. Naziya Bissenova from Kazakshtan. Mr. Fried, actually I have several questions but to be fair I will ask only one question.

Presently, Russia is using its energy card when playing on the international arena and this question refers to the Central Asian countries and Kazakhstan.

Due to the position of the Russian monopoly Gazprom in the pipelines, they are in charge of everything. Europe and the United States are concerned about the situation that still the question of energy security hasn’t been solved. How do you think, how soon will the alternative corridors be found?

AMBASSADOR FRIED: Well, that is one of the questions of the hour. The Russians have put energy security on the agenda of the G8. We believe that energy security comes from transparency and an open investment regime. It does not come from a closed regime or politicization or corruption.

Russia is going to make a lot of money off of energy under any scenario. That’s not the issue. The issue is whether gas and oil will be developed according to commercial or strategic principles. We believe in commercial principles. We believe that an open investment regime will be better actually in the end for Russia. Certainly your country and Azerbaijan and Turkmenistan have a lot at stake here. So, in a way, does Ukraine.

We think that a closed system is not good, either for your country or for Georgia or for Ukraine or for Western Europe, and, frankly, I don’t think it’s good for Russia.

An open system will force governments – an open system will raise energy prices to world levels, which is not a bad thing, but you can’t have energy prices at world levels for some countries and not for others. And it’s very odd that your country sells its base for $40 a thousand cubic meters and that same gas is resold for $240 a thousand cubic meters. I see you know exactly what I’m talking about.

The system needs to be open, and then Russia is going to make billions of dollars anyway, but it will do so under conditions which also benefit other countries.

QUESTION: I have very short question, and I can hear from you very short answer. I am from Georgia, Ekaterine Kadagishvili. Everyone knows about the Rose revolution. More than two years have gone after this event. I am just interested if U.S. government sees any ... some... steps before, steps forward to democratic principles in this country or are some aspects where U.S. government maybe is disappointed.

AMBASSADOR FRIED: I do see progress. But, of course, in the end of 2004 Georgia was, well, the end of 2003, I guess. That’s when we have to date it from, from the Rose Revolution. Georgia was in pretty bad shape, so I see progress from a pretty low base. There has been progress. This progress needs to be sustained for a long time. Civil society has to be strengthened, the economy has to develop, the state has to become functional, but not authoritarian. Georgia cannot afford military adventurism. I don’t care how frustrating it is to have North/South Ossetia and Abkhazia in their current situation. There is no military answer. But I think there is progress.

You can tell me more, but I’ve been to Georgia three times in the past year, and each time it’s a little better. The government’s a little more organized, Tbilisi looks a little better, a few more roads have been developed.

QUESTION: Is this enough?

AMBASSADOR FRIED: No, it’s not enough. Of course it’s not enough. But look, I’m not a Georgia expert but I know something – I’m old, right? So I’ve seen post-communist, I remember post-communist development in Eastern Europe in 1989. After two years in Poland, the country I know the best, it was still a mess, but there was some progress. Was it enough? No. But they made more progress, they didn’t stop.

QUESTION: All other countries it seems like make more progress.

AMBASSADOR FRIED: No, actually Georgia’s done – Look, Georgia made no progress basically for 10 years after independence. It stopped a civil war, that’s true, but that’s all it did. Georgia has a lot more to do but it’s done something.

QUESTION: I’m Armine Amiryan, I’m from Armenia from Armenian TV. In terms of democracy and human rights protection, which countries within our region are more favorable conditions?

AMBASSADOR FRIED: Don’t ask me to rank order countries. [Laughter]. Look, a lot of Armenians were disappointed that the constitutional referendum last fall was not as free and fair as it should have been. We have recently concluded with Armenia an agreement to provide $250 million worth of assistance under the Millennium Challenge Account, but we have told Armenia very clearly that it has to deepen its democratic reforms as a condition of this program.

I think a settlement of Nagorno-Karabakh is critical for Armenia because the country needs to get beyond a mentality of encirclement in the war. The same could be said for Azerbaijan.

Democracy takes leadership from the top, it also takes leadership from civil society. And it is only – I don’t know about the rest of the world from experience, but I know that in post-communist societies the only successful countries emerging from communism have been countries which have implemented free market and democratic reforms and done so on a sustained basis over time.

Other models have been tried – from nationalism and fascism in Serbia, to a "go slow" approach in Romania. Is anybody here from Romania? You remember President Iliescu’s first term of office? Not exactly a great success. But when he came back the second time after Constantinescu, things advanced and got better. No matter what your politics I think everybody agrees it was better in the late ‘90s. That’s my point.

I really do have to go. Thank you.

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