NATO/Riga Summit Issues

Assistant Secretary Fried: Welcome. Let me start out giving some background about the Riga Summit.

NATO spent the 1990s dealing with the strategic consequences of the fall of the Berlin Wall, and it dealt with the war in Kosovo -- late, but in time. It dealt with the consequences of the breakup of the Bosnia War and the breakup of Yugoslavia very late and probably not in time, and it wasn’t a NATO operation really until the peace, after Dayton. And it dealt successfully with NATO enlargement. And that was a huge debate. It’s hard to imagine ten years ago how divided opinion was in Western Europe and the United States about NATO enlargement because it seems like such an obvious success and so easy that it is hard to imagine how truly radical the idea felt 14, 15 years ago.

But NATO did not deal in the 1990s with a much larger set of questions -- which is what is the proper field of NATO activity and what does NATO do in the 21^st Century? What is its chief mission?

The people in the Clinton administration, and I served in the Clinton administration also. I am technically a political appointee but I’m career diplomat actually and I’ve served two Presidents of two different parties. So when I refer to the people in the Clinton administration, it’s also me.

The people in the Clinton administration who dealt with these issues drew the lesson from Kosovo, and I remember one of them telling me, we know what NATO is for. That is, NATO is going to perform combat missions and other missions outside its traditional field of activity, not in response to a Soviet invasion of Germany, and these missions may come in areas we hadn’t anticipated and in ways we hadn’t anticipated. But that was a thought, and Kosovo was relatively close to Europe.

After 9/11, NATO had to grapple with a much tougher set of questions. On September 11^th we were hit; on September 12^th NATO voted Article 5 for the first time in its history in response to an event nobody had foreseen on September 10^th. No one thought that NATO’s first Article 5 invocation would be in response to an attack on the United States.

The consequences of that attack and that invocation of Article 5 have colored NATO’s work ever since. NATO is now in Afghanistan fighting its first extended land combat mission in its history. In Afghanistan. The last place anyone in NATO expected NATO would be fighting or operating. NATO is supporting the AU modestly, but it’s doing so in Africa. NATO has a modest training mission in Iraq. NATO provided earthquake relief in Pakistan. NATO provided modest assistance in Louisiana, in the United States, for God’s sakes.

In short, what NATO is becoming in practice -- although not yet in theory -- is an organization, an alliance which does not have geographic limits on its operations. It is potentially worldwide in its missions.

Now, it is also in the process of beginning to develop the expeditionary capabilities to carry out these new missions. The Riga Summit is part of a process of NATO intellectually and organizationally and militarily finding its place in a 21^st Century world.

Now, NATO was created, it is said, to deal with the Soviet threat, but that was only part of the original mission. If you go back and read the Washington Treaty, it doesn’t mention the Soviet Union, it doesn’t mention communism. It mentions common values and it mentions threats to those common values.

Now, all of this is colored by the fact that it was Stalin who was in charge of the Soviet Union and that was a threat to us all in different ways. Some of the countries represented here were on the wrong side of the line that Hitler and Stalin drew and ended up in captivity for 45 years. But the Washington Treaty includes in it the possibility of NATO responding to very different threats and yet remaining itself.

I went into the question of Riga historically because to understand what is happening to NATO and the promise of Riga we can’t just look at a couple of programs and look short-term. We have to look in terms of the sweep of transatlantic history and put this in some kind of context.

So Riga will be a moment where the alliance takes another major step toward becoming its 21^st century self, an organization capable of action far a field, an organization which is in action -- not simply preparing -- an organization which has the capability to be the principal military arm and security arm of the transatlantic alliance of democracies facing global challenges. That’s a huge step forward and this process did not begin at Riga and it won’t be completed at Riga, but Riga will mark a major step forward.

There are obviously a lot of initiatives. NATO will not invite new members in but it will have language about the continued process of enlargement. NATO has various initiatives having to do with strategic airlift and special forces, and all of those are very good and some of them are quite important. But step back and you can look at NATO becoming something very different than the static Cold War organization which we all relied on. NATO did a great job, but it never actually did anything except exist.

[Laughter]

I don’t want to knock it. That was sufficient. Ask our Polish and Romanian friends. It was sufficient. But now NATO is fighting, and fighting in Afghanistan and many of the countries -- the Dutch, the Poles, the Romanians, I think Italians, I think everybody here, Germany -- I think everybody here has forces in Afghanistan, and we’ve all suffered casualties.

But particular acknowledgment, I think, is due to the Dutch, who had a national debate, a vigorous one, went into the south with their eyes open, were tested by the Taliban, and really beat the Taliban very badly on the battlefield. Very badly. This battlefield success has to be followed up. To turn a tactical success into a strategic success requires more than just battlefield victories, but I’ll take my victories in Afghanistan where I get them and say "thank you."

So, NATO is hugely important. It is an alliance that is growing. Obviously there are countries who want to come into it that aren’t in it now, and it’s an organization in action, as I said. It’s an organization which is doing things consistent with its original mission that were inconceivable 15 or 20 years ago.

And finally, the United States: there was a great debate, especially in the first Bush term of office, where many Europeans believed that the United States did not have sufficient regard for NATO as an institution. It regarded NATO as a toolbox and we would look at "coalitions of the willing".

If you do a content analysis of every major foreign policy speech or utterance in the administration in the second term, you’ll find that the number of times "coalition of the wiling" is mentioned drops to almost zero. It’s all "NATO".

President Bush, for whom I worked all through the first term, believes in NATO. He believes in NATO’s missions, and he believes in the organization. And the organization, as such, is important. As Chancellor Merkel says, rightly, we look at NATO as the center for strategic consultations in the transatlantic community.

By the way, for those countries here in the European Union or soon to join: congratulations to Romania and Bulgaria. A strong NATO doesn’t mean a weak EU. A weak European Union does nothing for us. A strong European Union is a good partner.

Yes, there is a lot of work to be done in the world and many challenges. We don’t need any weak institutions among our allies. We need strong institutions. There is more than enough work to go around.

Let me stop here with that kind of general overview and answer any questions that you’ve got.

Question: Do you think that Riga will also be a major step, as you mentioned, as you called it, towards NATO as a global alliance?

Assistant Secretary Fried: I would not put it exactly that way. NATO is a transatlantic alliance, but it is developing global partnerships in reality -- look at the countries with us in Afghanistan -- and its missions are global. So that’s not quite the same as a global alliance. A global alliance implies that any country can join NATO. I don’t think there is a consensus for that. I think NATO is rooted in its trans-Atlantic identity. But its action is where the action is.

Question: You said there’s no consensus, but there is a good intellectual argument to be made for a global alliance. Wouldn’t you agree?

Assistant Secretary Fried: Some serious people have made it, okay? But that’s not the position of the U.S. administration. There is a big difference between a global alliance and a transatlantic alliance with global partners and global missions. There’s a big difference. We think, let’s do what NATO needs to do right and move on from there. But we’re not raising that larger issue.

Interesting debate. I think former President Aznar of Spain has talked about this, Ron Asmus of the Clinton administration has talked about this a little bit. Serious people are raising this. I think the debate is very healthy, but no, that’s not where we are.

Question: You said that NATO has already changed in practice, but not in theory. When do you think that we could change even theory? I mean we have to change the treaty, of course, if we are to change it.

Assistant Secretary Fried: No, you don’t have to change the treaty at all. We do not anticipate changing the Washington Treaty at all. In fact if you go back and look at it, the Washington Treaty is one of these remarkable documents that are short and deceptively simple. It allows for a great deal of flexibility in NATO’s actions based on the consensus of its members, and it is very specific as to its values and very non-prescriptive in terms of action. It’s a remarkable document.

Theory has been catching up with practice a little bit at the Prague Summit, a little more at Riga. And I don’t mind. Americans tend to go from practice to theory. The French go from theory to practice. There is no reason that one is intrinsically better than the other, but theoretical debates are usually easier to resolve when life itself has resolved them for you, and that’s what’s happened.

Look at the in-area/out-of-area debate. That was resolved in practice. Partly because of Kosovo, partly because of Afghanistan, and now it’s over. That was practice determining theory.

What don’t change are NATO’s common values. I’ve heard Europeans say that that bedrock of commonality is critical, and I agree.

Question: But if you want to open the membership to countries who are not in Europe or who are not in the United States or North America, but they have our same values --

Assistant Secretary Fried: This is a legitimate debate, but right now we’re looking at developing partnerships with nations far away. But that’s not the same as membership. So we’re not crossing that line yet.

Question: Can you talk more about [inaudible] and the possibilities to join NATO, what kind of news could you expect from either side?

Assistant Secretary Fried: NATO nations decided some time ago that we would not be issuing any invitations to anyone at Riga. This is known. There are the Adriatic 3 -- that is Croatia, Albania, Macedonia -- who all want to join. They all have Membership Action Plans. Then there is Ukraine and Georgia, and they’re very different. Georgia certainly wants to join NATO. It’s just gotten Intensified Dialogue. Ukraine is, I would say, trying to sort this out internally. There is no consensus in Ukraine.

I was not alarmed at all by Prime Minister Yanukovych’s statement of desire to cooperate with NATO but not push as fast toward membership. He is reflecting what I think is a genuine lack of consensus in Ukraine. Why should NATO or why should the United States force Ukraine to make those decisions? I don’t want countries in NATO unless they want to be in NATO. We’re not the Warsaw Pact. We’re not trying to grab countries. We want countries to want to be in NATO because it’s a lot of work. It’s a lot of work. Lithuania ought to know, you’ve got a PRT in Afghanistan, for God’s sakes, and doing rather well from everything I hear.

So let’s respect Ukrainian democracy. And Yanukovych, this time he won an election fairly. He’s Prime Minister with a genuine mandate. Since we respect democracy, let’s respect democracy. Let’s let Ukraine sort it out and let them realize that we’re not trying to grab them or trick them. Let them work through this issue and in the meantime let’s cooperate with Ukraine as best we can.

Georgia is different. They want to joint NATO. But let’s -- it’s been a heck of a week on Georgia, I can tell you, with Georgia-Russia issues, very intense --

Question: But no chance in the future?

Assistant Secretary Fried: Well, no, I’ve never said that. You don’t slam the door in the face of countries. NATO’s an open organization. I want to see Georgia consolidate its reforms, strengthen itself internally, demonstrate its responsible behavior in a rough neighborhood. These things take time. I’d be the last one to say no, some country cannot joint NATO because of its geography. The same was said about your country 15 years ago, and worse. In Washington, it was considered rude or irresponsible or even flaky to talk about the Baltic countries coming into NATO. I remember that argument. I was the object of that argument. [Laughter]. It’s all turned out fine.

But the point is, and what I say to Georgians and Ukrainians is, you think that someone else will decide your fate, that the United States or the allies or NATO or someone else will decide your fate, and that’s not true. You will decide your fate. If you do what other countries did after 1989, other things will take care of themselves. Other things will take care of themselves.

Look at Lithuania. Had Lithuania not succeeded, had it become Belarus -- there wasn’t a chance of that, but had it become Belarus -- you wouldn’t be in NATO, you wouldn’t be in the European Union, and it wouldn’t be our responsibility. It would be yours.

Or Yugoslavia -- I was in Belgrade last week and I said to them look, had you not drunk the cheap alcohol of nationalism -- which makes you drunk and then makes you blind and then kills you -- if you hadn’t done that, Yugoslavia would A, exist; B, be in NATO. Right? We wouldn’t be talking about Kosovo or Bosnia or anything else. I’d be in Belgrade talking about Lebanon, about what Yugoslavia was doing. You see my point?

It’s up to individual countries to make right choices or wrong choices.

Question: But maybe sometimes countries need some help.

Assistant Secretary Fried: They need help and they need a perspective. They need the possibility of an open door and a clear road, but it’s their responsibility to walk on it.

Question: Can I name another country?

Assistant Secretary Fried: Sure.

Question: And would you be as open-minded about it as Georgia -- Israel?

Assistant Secretary Fried: Israel?

Question: Yes.

Assistant Secretary Fried: What I said earlier, I said earlier that NATO is an alliance of countries rooted in the transatlantic community. I don’t want to go down the road of speculating what might happen in the future, but right now we’re looking at a NATO of members and partners and Israel, like other countries in the region, is part of NATO’s Mediterranean Dialogue and we’ve established the Istanbul Cooperation Initiative for other countries in the Gulf. So right now there are a lot of partnership possibilities for Israel and other countries.

I’m well aware of President Aznar’s thesis. He wrote about this and he’s not the only one. It’s worth thinking about. These are valuable ideas, but we’re not there.

Question: As far we have been briefed, energy security is going to be an issue at the Riga Summit and the Russian President Putin is going to be there. Do the allies have anything to tell him in that respect?

Assistant Secretary Fried: President Putin will not be there. The only leaders in Riga will be the NATO 26. We’re not inviting partners. If we were inviting partners, President Putin would certainly be invited. So this isn’t a statement about Russia, it’s just the 26, so that’s just a factual matter.

With respect to energy, energy issues have been on the transatlantic agenda for a while and very intensely since January 1^st, since we all woke up to the gas cutoff of Ukraine. We, the United States, discuss them bilaterally, but we discuss them with the European Union and we’ve discussed it in NATO. There’s no one place to park the energy issue. You can’t park it in the European Union because it’s still an issue of national competencies. There will be a big fight among the Europeans about whether it’s national or EU.

In our view the issue is important and what organization takes what piece is secondary. We need to work together to diversify energy sources for Europe so that Europe is not overly dependent on any one source. Poland has got particularly strong views about this and has a rather active energy policy. I’ve had very good discussions with the Poles. This came up during the visit of Prime Minister Kaczynski recently, discussed at length and in some detail.

Does NATO have a role in energy security? There may be some value added for NATO, and NATO has a long history of discussing energy and pipelines in another era. So I think it will come up. I think that NATO has a role, and between the EU, between NATO and individual countries, I think we’re moving toward a good transatlantic consensus on energy policy and what we should do to help each other -- complicated issue, though.

Question: Can I ask about NATO and Afghanistan as well?

Assistant Secretary Fried: Sure.

Question: I know the official position of the US government is that all countries should do more, but if you have to convince all these countries to do a little bit more in Afghanistan, what is the country you would visit first to make your case?

Assistant Secretary Fried: That’s a very loaded question.

Look, a lot of countries have done a great deal more and recently. We ought to all recognize the Dutch, the Canadians, the British, who have been doing the bulk of the fighting in the south. Americans have been there too. Other countries have announced that they’re contributing more forces. The Poles stepped forward with a battalion and deserve a lot of credit. Poland has a serious military, quite capable.

Look, it’s important to remove caveats. It’s important that all of our forces be ready to help each other where needed. Now, the NATO mission in Afghanistan will extend shortly -- I guess it hasn’t happened yet but it will very soon -- extend its mandate to the whole country with Stage IV. And that means about 12,000 American troops will fall ultimately under NATO command. So that rule about removing caveats goes for us, too.

I don’t want to get into specifics. A lot of countries represented here are doing a lot and I think if caveats are removed and countries are available to go where they’re needed, I think we’ll manage.

Question: Does that mean that, in consequence, German troops should move to the south?

Assistant Secretary Fried: You see, this is why it’s a loaded question. [Laughter].

Look, I’ve visited the German PRT in Kunduz, and they’re doing a good job. And I know the issue is difficult in Germany. Obviously there are jobs that need doing in the west, in Herat, and in the north, and I don’t mean to suggest that those jobs aren’t valuable. They are very valuable. My only point was if NATO allies -- and this isn’t the Americans, it’s the Dutch, the Canadians and the British are fighting in the south -- if they need help we have to be prepared, all of us have to be prepared to act like allies. But that’s not a specific comment directed at Germany. NATO actually did well in the battlefield.

It was interesting. I remember that there was some concern in the Karzai government that if NATO troops came in, they would not be as effective as American troops and that they might get tested by the Taliban, which would make that same assumption. And if the Taliban made that assumption, they were very, very wrong, and they paid for it. The Dutch troops, the Canadian troops, the British troops fought very well, and the Taliban just got hit very hard.

Question: Are you happy when the German Secretary of Defense advises the combat troops in the south that they should not act as occupant forces? That it would be more important to build the country and to reconstruct?

Assistant Secretary Fried: Look, success requires reconstruction and civilian projects. When the Taliban is attacking you, you have to fight back, and not just defend yourself. You have to go after them.

The Taliban seemed, I can’t speak for them, but they seemed to have made a calculation that the south was a good place to reestablish themselves. The south is where they came from; they may have thought they could score victories and create a sense of political defeat of the government and the allied powers, and that didn’t work. That’s a battlefield victory. Ultimate strategic victory requires political and economic and infrastructure improvements, so we have to follow up.

Question: But in the north there are no combat so it’s easy to say and to advise to build up the country. I thought maybe you --

Assistant Secretary Fried: I’m not going to say anything critical at all. I know that Germany is doing a lot now in Kosovo. There’s a German KFOR commander. There’s a German battalion stationed in Mitrovica in the north, which is going to be a tough area. So I’m not here --

Question: My last try. [Laughter].

Assistant Secretary Fried: Keep trying. [Laughter]. That’s good. I’m not going there.

Question: If our chancellor was named Schroeder, would you then --

Assistant Secretary Fried: Oh, man. That’s just too much. [Laughter].

I will say this. Look, we worked well with Germany, better than is often recognized. It was, after all, Schroeder’s government that made the decision to go into Afghanistan. That has to be recognized and respected. We get along very well with Chancellor Merkel. She enjoys enormous respect in Washington, as you’ve found out. The way she expresses herself, the way she manages issues for Germany, disagrees with the United States, commands respect here because of the straightforward way in which she does it, and we work very well with Germany. So you’re 0 for 3. [Laughter].

Question: What do you think about the role of Russia in the future?

Assistant Secretary Fried: The role of Russia in what? With NATO? In the world? In general?

Question: Now it is the 27th member outside. Do you think it could be a real and effective member?

Assistant Secretary Fried: Russia doesn’t want to joint NATO. They just don’t. We think, as a general rule, the potential for NATO-Russia cooperation is still untapped. There’s a lot more we could be doing. We certainly support it. In some areas we cooperate very well with Russia; in other areas we have differences. But there’s a lot we could be doing together, and I hope we get to the point where we can.

I think everyone here, all the countries represented here, supports a strong NATO-Russia relationship. The NATO-Russia Council has some real potential, does some good work, and there’s more that we should be doing.

Russia has mixed feelings about NATO, and that reflects Russia’s view of itself in the world, which is still evolving.

One more.

Question: I would like to ask a question which our journalists always ask. When [inaudible] new EU members’ citizens that need visa for coming here? Do you have any news? [Laughter]. Sorry.

Assistant Secretary Fried: You don’t have to apologize, there’s a very fair question. First of all, we look forward to the day when this is possible. You know our current law and you know the problem. The visa waiver program is available to countries where the visa refusal rate is under 3 percent. So you know that answer.

We are looking at ways --

Question: Maybe you could give some hope for us?

Assistant Secretary Fried: The fact is other countries whose visa refusal rates were very high in the past are now getting very close to the 3 percent threshold, and this is also a function. I don’t have any doubt that Lithuania and Poland and other countries will make it. The question is, what can we do to speed it up even more? That’s a fair question. I don’t have an answer for you yet, but there are people who are looking at this.

No, I don’t mind the question.

Look, I have a lot of personal sympathy. My grandfather came over from what was several countries, but Poland among them. He never would have gotten a visa at the American embassy. Never. He was 16 years old, from a small village, zero chance. So this isn’t just abstract to me; it’s quite personal. I have a lot of sympathy and I look forward to the day when that’s possible, so it’s fair to ask.

Good luck.

Question: Thank you very much.