Afghanistan Interdiction/Eradication of Illegal Narcotics and U.S. Lead Rebuilding Programs

Chairman Kolbe, Congresswoman Lowey, and other distinguished Members of the Subcommittee, thank you for the opportunity to discuss our efforts to assist the government and people of Afghanistan in curbing the production and trafficking of illegal narcotics.

The State Department plays a key role in carrying out the President’s National Drug Control Strategy. We manage a diverse range of counternarcotics programs in approximately 150 countries throughout Latin America, the Caribbean, Asia, Africa, and Europe. These bilateral, regional, and global initiatives aim to fight the cultivation of drug crops at their source, disrupt the trafficking of drugs and precursor chemicals, and help build host-nation law enforcement capacity.

My statement today provides an overview of the U.S. Government’s five-pillar strategy and the challenges we face in confronting the heroin trade and to support a lasting, stable democracy in Afghanistan.

Narcotics Production in Afghanistan

Afghanistan is the world’s leading producer of illicit opiates, accounting for over 90 percent of the global supply, according to estimates by the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC). Afghanistan is the world’s foremost narco-economy; illicit opiates account for roughly one-third of total GDP. Last year the value of Afghan opiates was nearly $3 billion, roughly 80 percent of which benefits drug trafficking networks rather than poor Afghans. The narco-economy helps fund some Taliban elements, fuels corruption, and undermines the development of Afghanistan’s legitimate economy and democratic systems.

Although Afghanistan’s opium poppy cultivation dropped by 21 percent in 2005, cultivation has rebounded dramatically in 2006. According to the just released estimates by the UNODC the crop rose to 165,000 hectares in 2006. That is a 59 percent increase over the UNODC’s estimate for last year. It exceeds 2004’s previous all time record (131,000 ha.) by 26 percent. Resulting opium production, according to the UNODC, is projected at 6,100 metric tons, another all time record. U.S. estimates of Afghanistan’s poppy crop will be issued later this fall and are also expected to reveal a major increase in cultivation in 2006.

We are particularly concerned by developments in Helmand province, which accounted for a full 42 percent Afghanistan’s opium poppy crop. Increasing violence in this southern province hindered efforts to suppress poppy cultivation and we have seen increased reporting suggesting a relationship between narcotraffickers, Taliban, and other anti-government forces. If Helmand province were independent, it would be the second largest opium producing country in the world behind the rest of Afghanistan.

This year’s increase in cultivation represents planting decisions made by farmers last fall following disappointing eradication efforts in the spring and summer of 2005 that failed to introduce sufficient threat to deter planting for the new season. We have had more success in eradication efforts this year, both in Helmand province and nationwide, although it is too early to tell how much impact this will have on this coming fall’s planting decisions. Nevertheless, despite the overall increase in the size of this year’s poppy crop, we can already see signs of progress in some regions of Afghanistan. The vast majority of the increase in this year’s crop was concentrated in a few provinces where higher security threats and weak governance limited the central government’s ability to suppress poppy cultivation. In other areas, including provinces in the east that were once among Afghanistan’s largest poppy cultivators, better governance and economic development (assisted by U.S.-supported alternative livelihoods programs) are among several factors that could have helped hold down poppy cultivation.

We must and will continue to evaluate and refine our counternarcotics strategy to learn from both our successes and our failures. Unfortunately, there is no silver bullet or simple solution to the pervasive threat that the narcotics trade poses to Afghanistan’s security and stability. We are continuing to work closely with the Government of Afghanistan to improve our counternarcotics efforts, especially in regions that saw sharp cultivation increases in 2006. We believe that, with a sustained commitment and your continued support we can achieve the goals you entrusted to us – to build a strong Afghan democracy that is not a supplier of illicit narcotics to the United States or the rest of the world, and denies drug profits to those financing terrorism.

In August President Karzai told a group of Afghan officials, "Once we thought terrorism was Afghanistan’s biggest enemy--poppy, its cultivation, and drugs are Afghanistan’s major enemy."

United States Government Five-Pillar Counternarcotics Strategy

To confront this challenge, the U.S. Government’s five-pillar strategy is designed to provide both deterrents and positive and negative incentives to reduce Afghan involvement in the narcotics trade. The Public Information pillar focuses on convincing Afghans to reject opium poppy cultivation and trade. The Alternative Livelihoods pillar, spearheaded by USAID, establishes economic alternatives to poppy cultivation. Our Eradication pillar discourages poppy planting and eradicates those fields when prevention is unsuccessful. Our Interdiction pillar builds Afghan capacity to disrupt and dismantle the drug trafficking organizations through the arrest and prosecution of the command and control elements of these organizations. The Law Enforcement/Justice Reform pillar assists the Afghan Government in building its capacity to arrest, prosecute, and punish traffickers and corrupt officials.

Public Information

The Counternarcotics Public Information (PI) campaign is designed to raise awareness of the negative consequences of poppy cultivation and promote changes in behavior. The PI campaign includes strong, accessible messages opposing poppy cultivation presented by the Government of Afghanistan and promoting Afghan values such as religion, health, family, culture, security, and wealth. The PI campaign includes radio, TV, and print materials that will be distributed nationwide with provincially targeted messages, community outreach, and building public affairs capacity within key ministries. This year the public information campaign will deliver messages on the illegal, immoral nature of poppy cultivation, eradication warnings, demand reduction, rule of law, and alternative livelihoods programs. These messages will be widely seen and heard throughout the country. A local media company is spearheading the public information efforts. Currently, 90 percent of Afghans believe that growing poppy is wrong; the public information campaign aims to use these attitudes to gain Afghan public support for counternarcotics programs. Last year, much of the disseminated print media quoted President Karzai saying: "If we do not eradicate poppies, poppies will eradicate Afghanistan."

Alternative Livelihoods

Providing farmers with economic opportunities and alternatives to poppy cultivation is an essential part of our counternarcotics strategy in Afghanistan. The Department of State and USAID have been working through non-governmental organizations and contractors to help provide alternative livelihoods assistance to Afghan farmers, with USAID having the primary lead. As cultivating opium poppies is much more lucrative than other crops in Afghanistan, alternative livelihoods programs will only be effective at changing farmers’ behavior if the risks and costs of poppy cultivation are increased through the other pillars; onions, grapes, and wheat don’t come close to providing the economic return to farmers that opium poppies do.

Experience suggests that time is needed to provide sustainable livelihoods that are viable alternatives to growing poppy. Yet other factors push for quick solutions: the opium economy undermines the growth of the licit economy and it threatens the authority of the newly elected government. Thus, there is a need for immediate short-term assistance, as well as sustainable long-term economic development. USAID cash-for-work projects provide an immediate short-term alternative source of income to households that are dependent on the opium economy. These projects, such as cleaning irrigation canals and repairing roads, provide an income bridge until comprehensive alternative livelihood programs are in place. To date, $19.6 million has been paid in cash-for-work salaries to 214,000 farmers. As part of these programs, 6,200 km of irrigation canals have been cleaned, and 406 km of rural roads in poppy-growing areas have been repaired, reducing travel time by an average of 55 percent and reducing transport-related losses of farm goods by an average of 25 percent.

Comprehensive agricultural and business development projects accelerate economic growth, create jobs, and provide sustainable alternatives to poppy cultivation over the medium- to long-term. USAID projects launched last year provided credit to nearly 5,500 farmers, and some of these projects are starting to produce significant local benefit. They also supported planting fruit and nut trees on 3,000 hectares of former poppy-producing land in Nangarhar and Laghman (representing roughly 2 percent of arable land in Nangarhar and 7 percent in Laghman.) In addition, several investment proposals are under consideration, including agricultural processing factories.

Provinces not covered by comprehensive development programs are the target of high visibility projects. These initiatives demonstrate the Government of Afghanistan’s concerns with these provinces and reward local initiatives to reduce poppy cultivation. A recent USAID project distributed seeds and fertilizer, accompanied by counternarcotics messages in the bags and on the radio, to 550,000 farmers in every district in all 34 provinces. Providing significant impact, nearly 40,000 metric tons of fertilizer and 14,000 metric tons of wheat and vegetable seed have been provided, representing 10 percent of fertilizer and 20 percent of seed demand for the 2006 planting season. The distribution of the seeds and fertilizer was timed to compete with the poppy planting season, and many farmers in 97 percent of districts received seed and fertilizer prior to planting season. Several millions of dollars worth of additional USAID assistance is also being directed to reward provinces that have taken decisive action against poppy cultivation through a Good Performers Fund.

Eradication

Over 50 percent of poppy is in areas where there are alternative livelihoods available. A credible threat of forced eradication is therefore essential to the success of a comprehensive counternarcotics strategy. Alternative livelihood programs, even if successful, cannot replace dollar-for-dollar the income derived from poppy farming, which can yield an income of up to 12 times more than licit crops. A public information survey reports that farmers are aware of the Government of Afghanistan’s ban on poppy production and planned eradication, but many do not believe those measures will be enforced. However, the UNODC indicates that fear of eradication is the single most effective deterrent to cultivation in Afghanistan. This finding highlights the importance of a strong eradication campaign.

Of each of the five pillars, the Eradication pillar has presented the greatest challenge to reducing substantially the largest (2006) and second largest (2004) illegal drug crops in history. Eradication efforts in Afghanistan have been slow and at times extremely dangerous. Because U.S.-supported eradication efforts in 2005 had little impact on the overall size of the poppy crop, the Department undertook a complete review of the program and took steps to increase the likelihood of success.

U.S.-supported Poppy Elimination Program (PEP) teams are working in seven critical poppy-producing provinces: Kandahar, Nangarhar, Uruzgan, Farah, Badakhshan, Helmand, and Balkh. The PEP teams, which focus counternarcotics efforts on the provincial level, will ultimately be responsible for coordinating public information campaigns and alternative livelihoods programs, monitoring cultivation and compliance, reporting significant developments to senior levels of the Afghan Government, verifying provincial eradication efforts, and, when necessary, requesting eradication by national authorities. These teams, while supporting the governors, report to the Minister of Counter Narcotics, who monitors the governors’ progress in eliminating opium poppy cultivation. Twelve of fourteen international PEP team advisors have been hired and are in place. While the deployment of full 7-member teams has proceeded slower than planned, we still believe they will be instrumental in the future in facilitating governor-led eradication efforts.

The Afghan Eradication Force (AEF) is a specialized police organization consisting of four mobile units of up to 150 eradicators and security personnel, each supported by air assets. The units are deployed by the Afghan Government to help meet poppy elimination objectives. The Ministry of Interior deploys AEF where the provincial efforts fail or where provincial governors request such assistance. To support both the PEP teams and AEF, we have purchased ten Huey-II helicopters that are providing emergency medical evacuation, support and protection of ground personnel if attacked, logistical re-supply, air transportation, reconnaissance, and command and control for counternarcotics operations. A lease arrangement also adds three aircraft (2 helicopters and 1 fixed-wing) to our air capacity. These aircraft provide both medium- and heavy-lift capabilities to support deployment of our eradication forces, move PEP teams, and support interdiction operations.

The rapid expansion of drug cultivation in Helmand this year demanded the immediate attention of Coalition and Afghan partners because Helmand and other southern Afghanistan provinces are also centers of activity of the Taliban and other anti-democratic forces. Recognizing the interrelated threat of insurgent activity and opium cultivation, Embassy Kabul organized a task force consisting of representatives of the Government of Afghanistan (including the Afghan National Army and National Police), the U.K., UNODC, the State Department, and the U.S. military to coordinate security and counternarcotics assistance. The Afghan government deployed the Afghan Eradication Force (AEF) to supplement the Governor of Helmand’s poppy eradication efforts. For the first time, the Afghan National Army and Afghan National Police were quickly deployed together and provided security in an area that is traditionally unstable. The provincial and central governments established their presence in previously lawless areas by sending in eradication teams.

Meanwhile, UNODC provided crop monitoring and eradication verification assistance in Helmand, while our public information campaign disseminated messages on eradication, alternative livelihoods, and rule of law. Alternative development efforts also focused on Helmand to encourage the transformation to a licit economy, including efforts to improve and build irrigation systems, roads, power, and export capability, and investments in agri-business improvements. These efforts continued even as the security situation in the region and country deteriorated.

Ultimately, the AEF eradicated 2,374 hectares in Helmand (1,918 ha.), Badakhshan (422 ha.) and Baghlan (34 ha). The UNODC estimates that Governor-led Eradication (GLE) was responsible for destroying another 13,339 hectares in 19 provinces, including 3,166 hectares in Helmand, 457 hectares in Badakhshan and 23 hectares in Baghlan. Thus, the total of verified eradication in the 2006 growing season is 15,713 hectares. This is more than a three-fold increase over last year’s eradication total. UNODC estimates this year’s verified eradication approached perhaps 10 percent of Afghanistan’s total poppy crop, as opposed to four percent last year.

Through our Public Information campaign, we intend to maximize the deterrent value of eradication to discourage planting as much as possible. Studies have shown that the threat of eradication is a significant factor in Afghan farmers’ decision whether to plant poppy. When Afghan farmers come to expect strong eradication efforts year after year, they will be less likely to wager their family income on cultivating an illegal crop. Our counternarcotics campaign in Afghanistan must be a comprehensive and sustained effort.

While we have made some progress in our eradication efforts this year over last, we recognize that more must be done to introduce risk to farmers who decide to plant poppy. We are currently exploring new techniques and technology to eradicate more efficiently, and we are ready to assist the Government of Afghanistan to increase eradication next year. Afghan farmers must realize that the Government of Afghanistan and its international allies are serious about eradication.

Interdiction

Interdiction efforts are focused on decreasing narcotics trafficking and processing in Afghanistan. Together with the U.S. Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA), DOD, and our international allies, we are helping to build Afghan capacity to disrupt and dismantle the most significant drug trafficking organizations through the arrest and prosecution of the command and control elements of these organizations.

The Afghan Ministry of Interior established the Counter Narcotics Police of Afghanistan (CNPA) to be responsible for nationwide counternarcotics law enforcement. DEA rotates Foreign Advisory Support Teams (FAST) every 90-120 days to support five specialized units of the CNPA. These five National Interdiction Unit (NIU) teams are composed of 25 members each, with every unit currently functional. The NIU is now receiving advanced training in such areas as firearms, navigation, raid execution, arresting and interviewing techniques, and evidence collection.

One recent notable success was a major seizure that took place in Pakistan in June, just two miles over the southern border of Helmand province. Seventeen metric tons of opium and morphine base were seized along with three mobile heroin factories, weapons, and ammunition. Put in perspective, twelve metric tons of morphine base is approximately equivalent to the entire amount of heroin consumed in the U.S. in one year. This victory is notable not only for its size, but also because it signals to processors and traffickers that they cannot act with impunity on either the Afghan or Pakistani side of the border.

In addition to the recent and significant seizure of Afghan opium in Pakistan, Afghan law enforcement, working with DEA and our international partners, have seized 6.2 metric tons of opium, 1 metric ton of heroin, 1.3 metric tons of hashish and 4.7 metric tons of chemicals; shut down 31 labs; and arrested or detained 82 individuals in FY 2006. (Working with DEA, Afghan counternarcotics police seized 42.9 metric tons of opium and 5.5 metric tons of heroin in FY 2005. They also shut down 247 clandestine conversion labs, and arrested or detained 32 individuals on charges related to these seizures.) Operations have included helping Afghan interdiction units to destroy clandestine labs, seize precursor chemicals and opiates, and arrest high-volume traffickers. Investigations have begun using Afghan judicial mechanisms such as court-approved search warrants and arrest warrants.

Department of State air assets continue to provide transport and logistical support to DEA FAST and NIU teams. The Department of Defense provides air lift, medevac, in extremis support, helicopter assets, and pilot training to support interdiction missions. DOD has also refurbished three and leased two MI-17 helicopters, and has committed to provide eight additional MI-17s to the Ministry of Interior for interdiction operations by the end of this year.

Law Enforcement/Justice Reform

The Law Enforcement/Justice Reform pillar encompasses both police and justice efforts to increase overall rule of law. Having an effective arrest and conviction mechanism with legal consequences is fundamental because it creates an atmosphere in which corruption, narcotics trafficking, and other illicit activities are effectively countered. This deterrence of illegality through regularizing legal structures and building Afghan law enforcement’s capacities to prosecute illicit activity is one of the interrelated elements of our overall counternarcotics strategy.

U.S. Government support for rule of law programs in Afghanistan is broadly divided among three agencies: USAID focuses on civil law issues; the State Department funds programs focused on improving the criminal justice system at large including police training; and the State Department funds the Department of Justice (DOJ) Senior Federal Prosecutor Program in Kabul that provides law reform advice and assistance as well as training, mentoring, and support of the Afghan counternarcotics task force of prosecutors and police.

The goal of the U.S. police assistance program, in coordination with the Germans, the rest of the international community, and the Afghan Ministry of Interior, is to develop rapidly an Afghan capacity to provide public security. The program helps Afghanistan develop a competent, professional, civilian police force with the necessary training, equipment, infrastructure, institutional capacity, and organizational structure to enforce the rule of law in Afghanistan. To reach that goal, we are providing basic training to a total of 62,000 police, including 12,000 border police.

To support training needs, the U.S. operates a Central Training Center in Kabul and Regional Training Centers (RTC) in Gardez, Mazar-e-Sharif, Kandahar, Konduz, Jalalabad, Bamiyan, and Herat. Utilizing these facilities, the State Department has trained more than 62,000 police in basic police techniques as of late August 2006, including more than 7,000 border police. However, to better reflect the "readiness" of the Afghan police, in coordination with DOD’s Combined Security Transition Command – Afghanistan we prefer to report the number of trained and equipped police – currently more than 42,000, including border police.

We currently support approximately 93 police advisors and 243 field mentors as well as 13 Ministry of Interior mentors in country. Utilizing FY 2006 funds that will be transferred from the Department of Defense, we will deploy up to 100 additional mentors over the next several months. Mentors are deployed throughout the country and engage directly with local and provincial police officials to provide critical on-the-job training and mentoring to help professionalize police throughout the country.

The curriculum of the police-training program includes firearms safety, maintenance and qualification; defensive driving; literacy education; counternarcotics skills; and professional standards/ethics.

We also continue to work with the Government of Afghanistan to implement police reform initiatives at the MOI to help it transition into a professional democratic police organization. This year we are focusing on pay and rank reform. This program will restructure the police, eliminating the top-heavy nature of the current organization while simultaneously bringing pay for Afghan Police to a level commensurate with equivalent ranks in the Afghan National Army.

Anti-corruption efforts are key to the long-term success of the Afghan law enforcement sector and counternarcotics efforts. We consider eliminating corruption a high priority and are working closely with the newly developed Professional Standards Unit at the MOI to help mentor and guide efforts to pursue high-level corruption investigations.

Development of the Afghan police must be complemented by the establishment of an effective criminal justice sector. Criminal Justice Reform efforts in Afghanistan have two primary components: criminal justice reform and corrections support. A subcomponent of both is support for counternarcotics prosecution.

Justice reform is an important component of the strong array of deterrents that we are building to combat narcotics production and trafficking. An Afghan Presidential decree has now provided that all significant counternarcotics cases be transferred to Kabul for prosecution by a specialized Criminal Justice Task Force (CJTF)—made up of approximately 30 Afghan prosecutors and 35 Afghan investigators. The CJTF develops cases for prosecution in the Central Narcotics Tribunal (CNT), a court located in Kabul that has exclusive nationwide jurisdiction over significant (as determined by weight) drug cases and drug-related corruption cases. The CNT has trial and appellate chambers with a total of 14 judges. The CJTF is currently conducting over 100 prosecutions, and over 60 active investigations. Recent victories include the extradition to the United States of high-value targets Haji Baz Mohammed and, in a separate investigation, the conviction of three mid-level traffickers charged and tried under the new drug law for distributing heroin. In addition, the CJTF successfully prosecuted Nadir Khan, a former official in the Afghan Ministry of Interior, on narcotics offenses. More than 20 others have also been convicted before the CNT for trafficking.

A new comprehensive Anti-Narcotics Law enacted by Presidential decree in December 2005 includes provisions for modern investigative techniques and for extradition pursuant to the 1988 U.N. Convention against Narcotics and Psychotropic Substances. In July, the DOJ program provided intensive training to the CJTF and CNT members on the implementation of the new law and its investigative authorities. In addition, the work of the international mentors in the CJTF has made clear the need for further criminal code and procedural reforms if the Afghan criminal justice system is to gain in effectiveness and public confidence. The CJTF and CNT will serve as models or test-grounds for the training and development of the wider Afghan criminal justice system.

During 2007, the CJTF and CNT will relocate to the Counter Narcotics Justice Center, a new secure facility equipped with offices, courtrooms, and a pre-trial detention center.

Other State Department justice programs provide support to the Government of Afghanistan to improve the administration and enforcement of the rule of law. They include two programs based in Kabul, one for criminal justice reform, the other for corrections support. The Justice Sector Support Program consists of seven criminal justice advisors who provide legal counsel and mentoring to Government of Afghanistan justice personnel. U.S. criminal justice experts train and mentor judges, prosecutors, and defense counsel in criminal procedures, cases, and trials. The second program, the Corrections System Support Program, consists of 13 advisors who provide training, capacity building, and infrastructure support to the corrections system in Kabul and key provinces.

We work closely with our Afghan and international counterparts in implementing our justice programs, which include the National Legal Training Center and a joint U.S.-Italian-Afghan initiative to establish a facility to provide standardized legal training and mentoring. Along with supporting legal training, we also recognize that legal education is critical to ensuring that a professional, qualified cadre of legal experts can support the justice system in the future. Thus, we are implementing a $2 million, three-year grant offering law professors from Afghan Universities the opportunity to participate in an intensive year-long Master of Laws (LL.M.) program at a U.S. law school focusing on comparative law, modern legal practices, and criminal law and procedures. We have also sponsored three small but important grants that have taught legal awareness and rights to Afghan girls and women in Kabul and brought Afghan women judges to the U.S. for judicial training.

Conclusion

The seriousness of the narcotics problem in Afghanistan calls for a long-term commitment on the part of the U.S. Government to help the Government of Afghanistan combat narcotics production and trafficking. U.S. efforts are focused on the interrelated pillars of Public Information, Alternative Livelihoods, Elimination/Eradication, Interdiction, and Law Enforcement/Justice Reform. The recent announcement of a large increase in opium poppy cultivation does not mean our strategy is not sound; it reflects planting decisions made a year ago by Afghan farmers before the increases in eradication, interdiction, and prosecution that occurred over the past 10 months. Nevertheless, we fully recognize that we, with interagency cooperation both here in Washington and in Kabul, need to continue to sharpen and refine the strategy. Congress’s continued support for our assistance programs to combat illicit narcotics and promote the rule of law in Afghanistan is greatly appreciated. Afghanistan’s long-term stability depends on its ability to successfully confront the narcotics trade and develop strong institutions. Your continued interest and support are critical to this effort.

I am happy to answer any questions you may have.