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 You are in: Under Secretary for Public Diplomacy and Public Affairs > Bureau of Public Affairs > Bureau of Public Affairs: Office of the Historian > Foreign Relations of the United States > Johnson Administration > Volume XXVI
Foreign Relations 1964-1968, Volume XXVI, Indonesia; Malaysia-Singapore; Philippines  
Released by the Office of the Historian

Documents 89-112


Sukarno's Confrontation With the United States
December 1964-September 1965

89. Intelligence Memorandum/1/

OCI No. 2057/64 Washington, December 2, 1964.

/1/Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Indonesia, Vol. III, 9/64-2/65, [2 of 2]. Secret. Prepared in the Office of Current Intelligence.


1. For the first time in several years there are the faint stirrings of an anti-Communist movement in Indonesia. Provoked by increasing boldness on the part of the Indonesian Communist Party (PKI) and by Sukarno's own increasing reliance on the party, several non-Communist figures have raised a new banner called "Sukarnoism." The movement is ostensibly dedicated to the defense of the President's almost mystical Five Principles (Pantjasila), but its main purpose appears to be that of combating PKI influence in the government and throughout the country.

2. It is too early to measure the movement's strength or effectiveness. While it reportedly has received indirect approval from Sukarno and appears to have enlisted important support, it could well collapse overnight if its strategy of winning the President's support should fail and Sukarno should move to suppress its growth.

3. The movement first came to light during Sukarno's absence on a foreign tour from 17 September to 5 November, when articles berating the PKI appeared in the Djakarta press. The PKI responded, of course, and a lively polemic followed for several weeks. However, during the week immediately preceding and the one immediately following Sukarno's return, the polemic subsided, almost as if the Sukarnoists feared retribution from the President. The only government move against the group, however, was the banning of a single Sukarnoist newspaper soon after the President's return. In the absence of further repressive action, the group seems to have taken on new courage, and its leaders are trying to organize and expand the forces involved.

4. Minister of Trade Adam Malik leads the group, but Chaerul Saleh, third deputy prime minister and concurrently minister of development, is also deeply involved. Malik, who is a former Indonesian ambassador to the Soviet Union, and Saleh are ideologically attuned to the "right wing" of the Murba (Proletarian) Party, usually described as the national Communist Party of Indonesia. With Indonesia having moved a considerable distance to the left under Sukarno, Malik and Saleh represent a "moderate" position, and their activities are arousing the hopeful interest of individuals who stand further to the right. The new group has advocated the spreading of Sukarnoism, i.e., the President's teachings, as a means of unifying the nation. Its spokesmen state that the campaign to crush Malaysia and to spread Sukarnoism are inseparable. Early in the press polemic, they attacked Communist Party Chairman Aidit for a statement he allegedly made disavowing the need for Pantjasila, to which all recognized political parties are obliged to subscribe--"once the revolution is won." Although this particular line of attack has been abandoned, the Sukarnoists continue to warn against those who are not true "Pantjasilaists."

5. Malik told US Ambassador Jones on 19 November that his movement has the support of the Nahdlatul Ulama (NU), the only large Moslem party which is still legal; the right wing of the National Party; and lower levels of the bureaucracy and political parties. Sukarnoist press elements have organized a "Body to Support Sukarnoism"; youth groups have organized a "Sukarnoist Student Movement"; and several non-Communist labor federations reportedly have banded together in an "undercover body" to support Sukarnoism. The labor groups feel they must keep their organization secret to avoid attack by the PKI. Malik feels that for the time being the movement must remain a loose coalition.

6. Whether the Sukarnoists have the extensive support they claim cannot be verified. For the most part only the statements of Djakarta politicians are available. There is a large but disparate body of non-Communist opinion in Indonesia, however, which would rally if given a safe opportunity. By early November in North Sumatra, at least, newspapers were cautiously echoing the new line from Djakarta.

7. Sukarno apparently is willing to see how the situation develops. According to Malik, a NU official on 18 November requested and received Sukarno's consent to "endorse non-Communist ideas" in a speaking tour of East and Central Java. Sukarno is said to have questioned the NU leader closely about the new movement's support, and the official reportedly told him that the NU is fully backing the new force.

8. Probably as a result of this meeting and reports about it, support for Sukarnoism during the next few days began to mushroom. Two military leaders--Minister for Defense General Nasution and Navy Chief of Staff Admiral Martadinata--spoke openly in its behalf. Army leaders, initially sympathetic but circumspect toward the new movement, are now making statements which, while not specifically supporting it, obviously align them with the Sukarnoists. Minister of Information Achmadi, who earlier had opposed it, reportedly told Sukarnoist supporters in North Sumatra to ignore attacks and to spread the doctrine but to preserve national unity. Even First Deputy Prime Minister Subandrio, who has tried to curry favor with the PKI for the past year and a half, reportedly received a Sukarnoist delegation, was "very friendly," and gave "valuable advice." Parliament, scheduled to open on 3 December, has postponed its next session until the second quarter of 1965. The change may have been arranged to avoid an early showdown between the PKI and the Sukarnoists.

9. The PKI, with its allies in the left wing of the National Party, for the time being is on the defensive. It has labeled Sukarnoism a disguise for "Communist phobia"--a favorite term of Sukarno's--and has stressed that the anti-PKI campaign developed behind Sukarno's back while he was out of the country. It charges that Sukarnoism is an attempt to displace NASAKOM, Sukarno's term for the cooperation of nationalist, religious, and Communist elements.

10. Prospects of the Sukarnoists seem to depend largely on the President. Although he is opposed to divisive political tendencies, Sukarno is at the same time ever willing to find effective pro-Sukarno elements that can be used in his political balancing game. In view of his preoccupation with his own political position and his possible concern that the PKI is pushing too hard, the successful development of Sukarnoism may be of interest to him. He could be willing to overlook for a time the fact that there are elements within Sukarnoist ranks whom he distrusts and whom he has considered expelling from the recognized political scene.

11. A major factor in Sukarno's permissive attitude toward the new anti-PKI group may be his hope that he can use it in maneuvering to schedule new talks on the Malaysia issue, and he may even believe he can use it to get economic assistance from the West.

12. Sukarnoist spokesmen are urging the US Embassy to take steps to encourage UK-Indonesian or Indonesian-Malaysian talks. They state that unless the Malaysia issue is peacefully settled, the new non-Communist movement will be smothered in the continuing anti-Malaysia clamor, and efforts to remedy Indonesia's deteriorating economy will continue to be frustrated. Although Sukarnoist leaders have identified themselves with the Malaysia confrontation, they seem to be trying to change its emphasis from a politico-military to a politico-economic one as a means of pressing national economic development. Although the Sukarnoists are not necessarily being directed by Sukarno to approach the Americans, their needs and strategy for the moment coincide with his.


90. Memorandum From the Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for Far Eastern Affairs (Green) to the Assistant Secretary of State for Far Eastern Affairs (Bundy)/1/

Washington, December 2, 1964.

/1/Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964-66, POL 32-1 INDON-MALAYSIA. Secret. Copies were sent to Rostow, Jorden, and Cuthell. A note on the memorandum indicates that Bundy saw it.

Conclusions Emerging from my talks with Mr. Peck, Undersecretary for Far Eastern Affairs, at the UK Foreign Office, November 27, 1964

During the course of an hour's talk with Mr. Peck November 27 in his office regarding the Indo-Malaysian confrontation, I drew generously on points developed in Mr. Cuthell's memo to me of November 25 and his talking points of November 23/2/ for your conversations with Australian Foreign Minister Hasluck. In essence, I suggested that there was merit in the UK entering into discussions with the GOI as soon as appropriate looking to negotiations over the Malaysian issue. Set out below are my conclusions as to the British position on this issue, based on my talks with Peck.

/2/Neither found.

1. There is no prospect that the UK will be willing or politically able to agree to resume talks with the GOI as long as Indonesia continues to introduce new troops into the conflict. (This confirms views expressed in Deptel 502 to Djakarta)./3/ Several factors bear on British thinking:

/3/See footnote 6, Document 88.

(a) There is at present no real evidence of Sukarno's willingness to call off the confrontation.

(b) The UK believes that Sukarno is just beginning to feel the pinch of a more resolute UK and US posture. Let him really feel the squeeze, together with the costs and risks involved, and maybe (but only maybe) he will then be genuinely inclined to negotiate on acceptable terms.

(c) Meanwhile, the UK does not feel it prohibitively expensive to resist the Indonesian confrontation. Besides, the situation in Kalimantan is unlikely to escalate and the Malaysian mainland incursions are so ineffective as to contribute to the GOM's rising self-confidence. The GOI is likely to suffer more from the confrontation than the UK/GOM.

2. The UK feels that any talks on the confrontation issue should be principally between the GOI and GOM and that the UK should not play into the hands of Sukarno who is trying to create the impression that Indonesia's opponent in this confrontation is a non-Asian ex- colonial state. Furthermore, the UK recognizes GOM sensitivities over any hint of a GOI-UK deal behind Malaysia's back.

3. While the UK is not disposed to take any initiative at this stage with regard to talks or negotiations, it will keep lines of communication open and give due attention to overtures from the GOI side. Peck considers that the appropriate channel of communication is in Djakarta and he questions the reliability of feelers elsewhere and the utility of trying to conduct talks elsewhere (such as in Bangkok, as suggested in London's 2553 to the Department)./4/

/4/Dated November 25. (National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964-66, POL 1 INDON-UK)

4. Peck did not say so, but I gained the impression that if a month were to go by without any new landings on the Malaysian mainland or without any increase in the scale of Kalimantan incursions, there might be a basis for starting down the road of talks and negotiations. I believe that, to have any real chance of success, such a lifting of the intensity of the confrontation would have to be decided and acted upon quietly and unilaterally by the GOI. Its completed performance might set the stage. However, there is no guarantee that even then the USG and GOM would be willing to move to negotiations.

5. Peck seemed skeptical re the thesis (developed in Djakarta's 962 to the Department)/5/ that negotiations are now an urgent necessity in view of the danger that the PKI-Subandrio group would try to stir up the confrontation in order to submerge the nascent "Sukarnoist" movement in a wave of nationalistic frenzy. He did not argue against the possibility of this happening but he was deeply suspicious of Saleh and perhaps others among the Sukarnoists. Moreover, he saw no basis on which now to open negotiations with the GOI. Both the UK and GOM could not and would not concede on basic principles.

/5/Document 88.


I see no point and considerable hazard in pushing the British on this issue--at least at this time. It is up to the Indonesians to take some tangible move to create the atmosphere and confidence necessary for beginning talks looking to negotiations. To enter into such talks prematurely is almost certain to lead to developments which tend to inflame rather than tranquilize the situation. Even to appear at this juncture to be too eager to start negotiations runs the clear risk of being misread by Sukarno.

This is not a question of our deferring to the British position in Malaysia in return for their understanding and support of our positions in Laos and Viet-Nam. It is a question of doing what is best in pursuing our own interests in Indo-Malaysia. It so happens that the UK and US interests there and in Southeast Asia generally are the same.

Obviously there is great advantage in quiet coordinated US and UK policies in the confrontation issue. The time may arise over the next few months when we believe the British should press forward with talks looking to negotiations, but when the British will be reluctant to do so. If meanwhile we develop the closest rapport with the British on this issue, showing understanding and forbearance, then our chances of influencing the British position when the time is ripe will be enhanced.


91. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Indonesia/1/

Washington, December 9, 1964, 6:25 p.m.

/1/Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964-66, POL 23-8 INDON. Confidential; Immediate. Drafted by Ingraham, cleared by Cuthell, and approved by Bundy. Repeated to Manila and USUN for Cunningham.

531. Djakarta's 1074./2/ Fully endorse your efforts see Sukarno soonest re attacks on USIS installations. When you see him, should make clear you speaking under instructions.

/2/In telegram 1074 from Djakarta, December 9, Jones reported that he was advised by Indonesian police not to visit the USIS Library in Surabaya, which was damaged by demonstrators on December 7. Jones was advised that his presence would incite further demonstrations. Returning to his office, Jones received word that USIS operations in Surabaya were closed by local authorities to maintain law and order and to protect the facilities. Jones reported that he had requested to see Sukarno urgently. (Ibid.)

You will, of course, be insisting that GOI take immediate steps insure full protection all USG establishments in Indo. You should emphasize our shock that GOI, rather than taking essential measures calm situation, has instead made official statements which can only be read as condoning mob action and inciting further violence. You should cite specifically Dec 5 Foreign Dept statement (Djakarta's 1060)./3/ You should recall that we have received repeated assurances from Sukarno and other responsible Indo leaders that USG properties would be protected, yet Surabaja library has now been arbitrarily closed by Indo authorities and you prevented from traveling Surabaja by alleged inability GOI control situation. Restating line you took with Leimena, you might wish raise question whether we are to conclude from this that GOI unable maintain internal order.

/3/In telegram 1060, December 5, the Embassy reported that the Foreign Ministry stated that it "fully understands the anger of the youth which caused them to make the demonstrations." (Ibid.)

You should also emphasize that, quite apart from damage done relations between our govts, these attacks and GOI failure publicly disown them are creating strong and growing resentment among US public. In this connection, suggest you stress insult to US flag, noting that US public no less aroused by such despicable acts than Indos would be under similar circumstances.

To extent possible, we believe discussion should be confined primarily to incidents themselves and to serious impact these and other recent Indo actions are having on US-Indo relations. See no advantage in permitting Sukarno divert discussion into review positions in Indo-Malaysia dispute at this time./4/

/4/In telegram 1098 from Djakarta, December 11, Jones reported that he spoke with the "rare phenomenon of a somewhat defensive Sukarno" who expressed regrets for the attacks, promised compensation, stated that he did not condone such acts, and pledged to protect U.S. installations in the future. (Ibid.)



92. Memorandum of Conversation/1/


New York, December 11, 1964, 10 a.m.

/1/Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964-66, POL 15-1 INDON. Confidential. Drafted by Toussaint and approved in S on January 7. This was Part I of III. The other memoranda of conversation, which were attached, were about UN financing and peacekeeping and Indonesia's economy.


New York, December 1964

President Sukarno's Health
US-Indonesian Relations
New US Ambassador to Djakarta


The Secretary
Donald R. Toussaint, USUN

Deputy PriMin Subandrio
Ambassador Zairin Zain (Indonesian Ambassador to the United States)

President Sukarno's Health

The Secretary began the meeting by asking about President Sukarno's health. Deputy PriMin Subandrio said that an X-ray taken in Vienna some months ago had revealed there was a stone in President Sukarno's right kidney. Inasmuch as his other kidney is already affected, Subandrio said, the X-ray had given rise to real concern. Subsequent examination, however, had shown that the second kidney stone was not serious. As a result, the concern over President Sukarno's health had in general disappeared.

U.S.-Indonesian Relations

The Secretary broached the subject of U.S.-Indonesian relations by commenting that "we have been having difficulties lately." The Secretary said he understood President Sukarno had expressed to Ambassador Jones regrets over the damage caused by demonstrations at USIS facilities in Djakarta and Surabaya recently and had promised the Indonesian Government would make adequate compensation for the damages. Although appreciating President Sukarno's statement to Ambassador Jones, the Secretary continued, it must be recognized that the general effect of such incidents is most unfortunate, for they hamper efforts to improve U.S.-Indonesian relations. The U.S. feels very strongly, the Secretary said, that steps should be taken to prevent incidents of this nature in the future. Subandrio, in reply, laughingly but apparently seriously expressed the hope that Indonesian facilities in Washington would not receive "reciprocal treatment."

When the Secretary asked what was uppermost in Subandrio's mind concerning U.S.-Indonesian relations, Subandrio said it must be admitted that U.S.-Indonesian relations are indeed at a very low level. Nevertheless, he said, he had not lost hope they could be prevented from further deterioration; he felt there was a possibility they could even be improved. Subandrio then went on to note, however, that there is among the Indonesian public great pressure for terminating all U.S. information activities in Indonesia. Such a course, he said, was not favored by President Sukarno.

The Secretary replied in a general way that relations between any two countries tend to develop on a basis of reciprocity, that their improvement or deterioration depends on the actions of both sides.


The Secretary broached the subject of Malaysia by commenting that the U.S. does not fully understand what Indonesia wishes to achieve in the dispute concerning Malaysia. Subandrio said that President Sukarno had already agreed to a formula for a solution in Tokyo. One advantage of the Tokyo formula is its "face saving" character--that is, it would permit a solution which stemmed not from Western pressure but, rather, from recommendations made by an Afro-Asian group. The Indonesian Government, Subandrio said, still stands by its adherence to the formula worked out in Tokyo.

Subandrio said he believes there is still a possibility for a solution of the Malaysian dispute, although he admitted he saw no prospect of an immediate solution. He commented that the political climate was more favorable now than it was six months ago, suggesting that the new UK Government might be "less inhibited" from finding a solution than the previous UK Government. He said he still wishes to undertake talks with the new British Foreign Minister, Patrick Gordon Walker, and indicated the possibility of such talks was one reason for his present trip./2/

/2/In telegram Secto 34 to London, December 11, Rusk summarized this portion of his talk with Subandrio for Ambassador Bruce. Rusk stated that he thought Gordon Walker would wish to know that Subandrio was making himself available in Europe and would be interested in talking with Gordon Walker. (Ibid., POL 32-1 INDON-MALAYSIA)

The Secretary said it was his impression that the atmosphere in London is now "somewhat different." He went on to emphasize, however, that both the British and the Malaysians feel it is impossible for the political process of negotiations to begin functioning as long as Indonesian raids and incursions against Malaysian territory continue. The Secretary then asked for Subandrio's views as to the chances for a period of quiet during which such raids and incursions would cease. Subandrio replied, somewhat evasively, that such a period of quiet would be possible if there were indications that all sides are willing to find a solution and if all sides proved willing to tone down their provocations. In this respect, Subandrio specifically referred to broadcasts beamed to Indonesia by Radio Malaysia.

After a brief discussion of the economic situation in Indonesia (see Part III), the Secretary said he could see no reason for not arriving at a quick, peaceful solution of the dispute. The U.S., he said, wants such a solution, for if confrontation were to grow into a serious armed clash, the result could not but be costly and unfortunate for all concerned. At this stage, the Secretary said, the most important thing is the future of Indonesian raids and incursions. He went on to express the hope that some informal way could be found to terminate such incidents. In this way, it might be possible to bring into operation the political process of negotiations, such as the four-nation Afro-Asian group agreed to in Tokyo. The Secretary went on to say that the U.S. does not like to envisage the prospect of the chain reaction which could develop from the fact that Malaysia has allies which, in turn, are allied to the U.S.

The Secretary asked Subandrio what he envisaged as the next step toward a solution of the dispute, and specifically, whether there is any other nation, such as Thailand or Japan, which could be of real assistance in finding a solution. Subandrio replied that any steps toward a solution must use the Tokyo agreement as a basis. He then suggested that it is now up to the UK to take some initiative. In his view, Subandrio stated, there are no insurmountable obstacles to a solution. He went on to emphasize that President Sukarno has been "very easy" in the past and would continue to be so in the future provided the proper "psychological atmosphere" can be created.

When the Secretary asked whether the Indonesians had had any serious contact with the Malaysian Government, or whether Subandrio planned to talk with the British Permanent Representative, Lord Caradon, in New York, Subandrio replied in the negative. He said there had been private discussions with Singapore businessmen concerning possible solutions of the Malaysian problem, but that there had been no official contacts with the Malaysian Government.

New U.S. Ambassador

When escorting Subandrio to the elevator, the Secretary noted that Ambassador Jones had resigned at his own request, entirely for personal reasons. The Secretary went on to say that he hoped we would soon be able to give the Indonesian Government definite news of Ambassador Jones' successor.


93. Telegram From the Embassy in Indonesia to the Department of State/1/

Djakarta, December 15, 1964, 5:45 p.m.

/1/Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964-66, POL 32-1 INDON-MALAYSIA. Secret; Priority. Repeated to Bangkok, Canberra, Kuala Lumpur, London, Manila, Singapore, Tokyo, Wellington, USUN, and CINCPAC for POLAD.

1119. Malaysia-Indonesia Dispute (Part I). This message in two parts. My analysis of current state of dispute and justification for USG initiative are set forth below. Following telegram presents specific recommendations.


Efforts to settle Malaysia dispute have been on dead center for months. Result has been a continuing deterioration in US-Indonesian relations, increasing danger of escalation of military conflict, strengthening of PKI within Indonesia, and ever tighter Indo bonds with Asian Communist regimes. Importance of settlement increases with each passing day if effective support is to be given to anti-Communist movement within Indonesia and if we are to maneuver Sukarno into position in which he has no recourse but to accept some kind of peaceful settlement.

Dept has made clear and I agree that sine qua non preceding talks is de facto cessation of hostilities. I continue to believe that four-power AA Commission (AACC) is most likely instrument--indeed perhaps only one ready to hand--through which settlement can be effected. Sukarno, having pledged himself to accept commission's recommendations, avoids necessity of selling to his people (or to PKI) any particular formula and can accept through this mechanism solution that he could not afford to support directly.

Objections to AACC have been brought up by Brits on ground that Sukarno would always be able to exert sufficient pressure upon his own nominee (Pakistan at moment seems likeliest selection) so that no proposal to which he objected could be adopted. My own view is that through diplomatic channels we could determine other three members so that from GOM standpoint cards would be stacked in its favor. (If successful in earlier steps I am proposing in following telegram, I would also hope we might help AACC find acceptable formula, e.g. [garble] plebiscite.) In any event, if Sukarno is bluffing, which I doubt because I think it is in his own interest to achieve some kind of drawback, I believe it is time we called his bluff. If we do not, he will always be able to exploit his position with many as having gone last mile in order to achieve peaceful settlement.

In our view, internal developments as described in recent reporting and state of Sukarno's health are strong pressures on President to find way out of militant confrontation.

I hear much from UK sources to effect: "We've got Sukarno on the run. This is no time to talk settlement." This neglects consideration of Sukarno's character and fierce national pride of other Indo leaders. He will never accept humiliation and in present impasse there is real danger he will turn to whatever alternatives are available, regardless how desperate they may be. There no need to outline these self-evident alternatives. Any of them would inevitably bring about further US military involvement in SEAsia, further deterioration of relations with Indonesia, and further likelihood of GOI control by PKI, with all of its larger implications for USG position in this area.



94. Telegram From the Embassy in Indonesia to the Department of State/1/

Djakarta, December 15, 1964, 6:15 p.m.

/1/Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964-66, POL 32-1 INDON-MALAYSIA. Secret; Priority. Repeated to Bangkok, Canberra, CINCPAC for POLAD, Kuala Lumpur, London, Manila, Singapore, Tokyo, USUN, and Wellington.

1120. Embtel 1119./2/ Malaysia-Indonesia Dispute (Part II).

/2/Document 93.


For almost two months we have been holding back, hoping for fruitful results from anticipated direct discussions between UK and GOI, but combination of British reluctance and tentative nature Indo overtures has resulted in exactly nothing thus far. It seems to me that further delay simply plays into hands of those elements in Indonesia who do not want a solution to this dispute and increases danger escalation. Problem then is how to get Sukarno to call off his dogs.

In Embtel 646 we suggested a scenario for dealing with composition of the 4-power commission which has received general Dept approval in principle and endorsement of Embassies Manila and Kuala Lumpur but no steps have as yet been taken to implement it./3/ In order to bridge essential first stage of placing parties in contact and halting Indo hostilities, I have another suggestion which may be worth a trial. I would suggest we put this into effect immediately if any talks which may be held between HMG officials and Subandrio during latter's current trip do not produce prompt and specific results. My suggestion is essentially an elaboration of Dept's point no. one in Deptel 502 (rptd KL 454 and London 3503),/4/ but requires that Amb Bell and I get into this actively somewhat as follows:

/3/In telegram 646 from Djakarta, October 2, Jones suggested that after abatement of military hostilities and considerable diplomatic spade work, the AACC should be constituted with Thailand (the Philippine's candidate), Pakistan (Sukarno's candidate) and Malagasy Republic (a potential candidate for Malaysia) with Japan named as the fourth member. (National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964-66, POL 32-1 INDON-MALAYSIA)

/4/See footnote 6, Document 88.

Step 1: I go to Sukarno and endeavor to obtain agreement to make unpublicized halt in further guerrilla raids, incursions, sabotage, etc., for period three (3) weeks as earnest of GOI's good intentions./5/ Simple plea on my part would be redundant and probably useless. I propose that I seek his commitment in return for promise of active display of American interest in promoting settlement at end of three week period.

/5/In telegram 726 from Kuala Lumpur, December 16, Bell stated he did not think that the Malaysians would be willing to act on the basis of a 3-week cessation of hostilities. Bell recommended trying to obtain an open-ended commitment from Sukarno for cessation. (National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964-66, POL 32-1 INDON-MALAYSIA) In telegram 1135 from Djakarta, December 17, Jones stated that he did not intend to imply that hostilities would be permitted to resume after 3 weeks, but he was sure that he could not convince Sukarno to give an open pledge. (Ibid.)

It seems to me scenario along following lines would have best chance of success. I would tell Sukarno that I not acting under instructions but that I believe USG would be willing assist in bringing contesting parties together if it clear GOI really wants to negotiate. I would point out fact HMG and GOM appear to doubt that he wishes end military action. Thus I believe it essential he demonstrate his serious intentions by halting all military action for a period of three (3) weeks. I would tell him that if this is done I believe my government would agree to assist in efforts to move dispute to conference table. I would then outline briefly steps described below. Ask President whether he believes idea has merit, and seek determine whether he interested in putting into effect three (3) week moratorium to see if plan can be carried out.

I would point out that actual performance and not just promise was essential as any default would inevitably become known to GOM/HMG and thus poison prospect for success. In addition, cessation of hostilities would be expected to continue during period active discussions taking place in capitals concerned.

Step 2: If Sukarno forthcoming, inform HMG and GOM of Sukarno's commitment and importance taking constructive attitude to see if he is bluffing. Also express reassurances that any USG initiative will be taken only when Sukarno's performance on promise is evident and that our efforts designed solely to get parties together, not to take sides in dispute. Throughout, I believe fact of cease-fire must be kept secret (we should have no difficulty measuring actual performance), for if GOM publicly reveals such a commitment in advance of more basic political understandings, Sukarno will almost certainly repudiate whole thing and charge Tunku with insincerity.

Step 3: If cessation of hostilities effective, I would proceed to Kuala Lumpur to confer with Amb Bell and discuss situation with such GOM authorities as Bell deems appropriate. (I am of course well acquainted with many GOM personalities from earlier years and would hope that announcement of my intention to resign will have removed to considerable degree whatever stigma of partisanship GOM leaders might have attached to me.) Frank discussion of internal Indo developments and attitudes might be useful in convincing GOM leadership that it in our common interest to engage Indos in negotiations as means avoiding escalation, buying time, and inhibiting PKI. I would be able to argue that Sukarno's adherence to moratorium on hostilities justified positive Malaysian participation in attempt to reopen political dialogue and search for appropriate mechanism or formula which could remove some of dangers inherent in present military phase of Indo confrontation.

Step 4: Amb Bell and I proceed together to Djakarta for discussions with Sukarno and Subandrio in effort nail down whatever understanding may have been reached with GOM, whether it involves initiation of direct GOI-GOM contacts, implementation of AACC concept, or some other suggestion.

In conclusion, I wish to say that in suggesting Dept use Bell and me to connect wires between KL and Djakarta, I do so recognizing that this is thankless task and that I would welcome any alternative Dept or Amb Bell may have to suggest. Main point is that I consider it vital to get something underway soonest. Time, as I have said before, is not on our side.



95. Telegram From the Embassy in Malaysia to the Department of State/1/

Kuala Lumpur, December 17, 1964, 5:45 p.m.

/1/Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964-66, POL 32-1 INDON-MALAYSIA. Secret; Priority. Repeated to Bangkok, Canberra, CINCPAC, Djakarta, Kuching, London, Manila, Singapore, Tokyo, and Wellington.

731. Embtel 726 to Dept./2/ There seems to be agreement that we should leave no avenue unexplored in effort take heat out of dispute and that we should make this effort in interest of (1) keeping Indonesia out of Communist arms, (2) trying avoid expansion our defense burdens in Southeast Asia, and (3) lifting confrontation pressures from Malaysia.

/2/See footnote 5, Document 94.

In addition views expressed reftel Dept may wish consider following additional points in determining nature and extent any US initiative:

1. Regardless of its nature Indos may interpret our initiative as sign of weakening determination and take it as proof that their strategy of applying military pressure to force Malaysians to negotiate is working. If this is their interpretation, atmosphere for negotiation unlikely be favorable. Malaysians and/or British would be at disadvantage from start.

2. Apparently underlying Amb Jones proposal is assumption that Malaysia-Indonesia dispute is source of worsening US-Indonesia relations. Corollary this assumption is that our intervention to promote settlement of dispute would lead to improvement our relations with Indonesia. I think we should consider alternative analysis that dispute not root cause our difficulties but rather a noteworthy reminder that US-Indonesian relations have been in long term declining trend for some time. If this be so (and Dept assessment of few months ago seems suggest Dept thinking in these terms), our support of Malaysia may simply have called attention to this trend somewhat sooner than might otherwise have been case.

3. In this regard it is possible that our difficulties with Indonesia stem basically from deliberate, positive GOI strategy of seeking to push Britain and the US out of Southeast Asia. If this is case, growing Indonesian alignment with Communist countries should be seen as outgrowth such strategy rather than as result of frustration over unsuccessful confrontation against Malaysia. Current intelligence reports, especially those covering Chen Yi's recent visit to Indonesia, suggest that GOI policy of at least tacit collaboration with ChiComs in SEA policy may indeed be of Indos own choosing. If this is situation, we should ask ourselves whether proposed new initiative in Malaysia-Indonesia dispute truly offers hope of thwarting rise of Communist influence over or in Indonesia, or whether it will merely encourage Indo belligerence while sapping morale of Malaysians and perhaps of other SEA countries. (Believe this view held by both UK and Australia.) Way we handle new intervention should be shaped in light our whole range of objectives in Southeast Asia. What we are up against now is problem of reconciling our objectives towards Malaysia, Indonesia and SEA as a whole. While it is extremely important to do what we can to rescue situation in Indonesia, it also important to ensure viability Malaysia and continued ability British to play their vital security role in this region.



96. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Indonesia/1/

Washington, December 18, 1964, 8:18 p.m.

/1/Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964-66, POL INDON-US. Secret. Drafted by Ingraham, cleared by Rusk, Harriman, Green, and McGeorge Bundy, and approved by William Bundy. Repeated to Kuala Lumpur, London, and Canberra.

554. Djakarta's 1144 (Notal)./2/ Dept shares your concern over worsening situation in Indo and concurs your proposal for full review with Sukarno when you see him Dec 19.

/2/In telegram 1144 from Djakarta, December 18, Jones reported that he planned to see Sukarno over the weekend for a frank discussion with him to avoid a chain of events which could result in "virtual elimination of US from Indon scene." (Ibid.) To prevent this eventuality, Jones wanted a personal message from President Johnson to Sukarno, an offer of the use of Walter Reed Hospital for treatment of Sukarno's illness, an invitation for Sukarno to come to Washington in the spring of 1965 for a working visit with the President, and a statement of U.S. willingness to assist in the Malaysia dispute along the lines of Document 94.

We not optimistic that any initiative open to us at this stage will be sufficient induce Sukarno to ease confrontation or even refrain from further moves against US interests in Indo. Conceivable, although doubtful, that combination adroit handling and pressure of events could make him trim his sails at this point. In any event, we agree every effort must be made. We believe, however, that points made in Kuala Lumpur's 731/3/ are valid. Sukarno will certainly attempt exploit any initiative on our part and will do his best interpret it as sign other side is weakening.

/3/Document 95.

One thing we must avoid is commitment to Sukarno (or proposal he would twist into commitment) which we cannot fulfill. We would also have to consult Malaysians and British before undertaking any explicit move aimed at reopening negotiations. Malaysians and British almost certain reject out of hand any formula that would require them start substantive talks with Indos in return for moratorium on incursions limited to specific time period. Open-ended moratorium would probably be salable without further conditions (i.e., academic insistence on withdrawals) but we cannot guarantee this or give Sukarno grounds for claiming our guarantee. Following approach has not been discussed with British or Australians and we would not propose do so until Sukarno response known.

When you see Sukarno, you should proceed along following lines:

1. Tell him you have been instructed to convey following personal message from President:

a. President has noted with concern recent reports regarding Sukarno's health. He extends his best wishes for speedy full recovery and hopes current difficulties will in no way impair Sukarno's continued leadership Indo people. If Sukarno and his doctors believe it would be helpful, President would be pleased provide services of appropriate US medical specialist to travel Indo to assist in diagnosis. FYI. You should take no initiative in offering US medical facilities. For various reasons, including responsibility for life of such a sick national leader, we prefer that Sukarno not come US for treatment. If specialist visits Indonesia, he will be similarly instructed. If Sukarno raises matter, however, you should respond that you would be happy inform USG of his interest and are confident USG would do whatever it could to be of help. End FYI.

b. President is concerned over present state US-Indo relations and is anxious reverse unfortunate trend of past few months. He understands Sukarno is considering visit to New York World Fair next spring. If so, and if conditions otherwise appropriate, this would provide excellent opportunity for friendly review our mutual problems. Sukarno might consider visit at time official Fair re-opening in order officiate at opening Indo pavilion. Following that, President would be happy welcome him to Washington for informal talks, subject to unforeseen circumstances which might affect schedule of either one./4/

/4/In a memorandum to McGeorge Bundy, December 18, William Bundy stated that he had in mind for Sukarno "nothing more than a noon call followed by a small luncheon. This would fit the kind of courtesy we would show any head of state who turned up for the World's Fair." William Bundy continued that "our medical reports make it sound at best 50-50 that Sukarno will be around then," still Bundy thought an offer of a visit could have a favorable effect for the present. (Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Indonesia, Vol. III, Memos, 9/64-2/65, [2 of 2])

2. In regard to Indonesia-Malaysia dispute, you should tell Sukarno (stating you doing so on instruction if you believe this useful) that we continue to be more than willing to assist Sukarno in finding honorable solution to the problem which exists between him and Malaysia. In our opinion, what is preventing negotiated solution at this point is fact that continuation hostile actions by Indonesia against Malaysia has led GOM, HMG, GOA to believe that, despite public protestations to contrary, Indonesia does not really want to settle the problem. We feel that if Sukarno would quietly cut off hostile action a new atmosphere would be created in which hopefully we would be able to work effectively to encourage negotiations. We cannot estimate how long this would take, but would watch situation closely and plan to keep in touch with Sukarno on it. You should emphasize, however, that we are simply unable to encourage anyone negotiate in this situation under present circumstances./5/

/5/In telegram 1182 from Djakarta, December 24, Jones reported that he had a 11/2 hour private talk with Sukarno that provided a full opportunity to discuss problems. The President's message and the offer of trip to Washington was "most helpful in establishing favorable atmosphere." (National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964-66, POL 15-1 INDON)



97. Memorandum From James C. Thomson, Jr., of the National Security Council Staff to the President's Special Assistant for National Security Affairs (Bundy)/1/

Washington, December 28, 1964.

/1/Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Indonesia, Vol. III, Memos, 9/64-2/65, [2 of 2]. Secret.

Replacement for Howard Jones in Indonesia

It seems to me that Sukarno's plea in Djakarta's 1183/2/ requires a speedy Presidential response. I assume you may want to discuss this at the Ranch tomorrow. Here are two possible courses of action.

/2/In telegram 1183 from Djakarta, December 24, Jones reported that at the conclusion of his conversation with Sukarno, the Indonesian President asked if Jones' tour of duty could be extended for 2 years as Sukarno "found it difficult to think of doing business with anyone else." (National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964-66, POL INDON-US)

A. If, as you suggested, the President is having second thoughts at letting Howard go, my own preference would be for us to be moderately forthcoming in the following manner:

1) The President should inform Sukarno, by letter, that he has checked with Jones and the East-West Center and has arranged a six-month delay in Jones' retirement.

2) He should express his deep concern over the state of U.S.-Indonesia relations and his hope that we can use Howard's final six months as a period in which to reverse the present deteriorating trend. Despite our desire for better relations, however, things simply cannot improve so long as the Indos pursue confrontation through raids against Malaysia. We cannot be helpful while aggression continues in any form; in the absence of aggression, we stand ready to be of assistance, etc.

(Rationale: There is no point in ridding ourselves of an asset like Jones at a critical time in Indonesia's internal development when Sukarno may well disappear from the scene. Howard knows all the rival leaders; he is also one of the few non-Marxists who still has regular access to Sukarno. There is also no point in turning down Sukarno's personal request at a time when we haven't yet found the ideal replacement.)

B. If, in the President's judgment, Howard should still move out on schedule, I would urge that a speedy decision be reached on his successor--and communicated through a conciliatory personal letter from the President in response to the present plea. I do not believe that Beam is the right man for the stormy period ahead. Ideally we need a man of warmth, vitality, and shrewd political sense, fast on his feet, with a personal tie to the President.

The following names are the unrefined product of my Christmas ruminations:

a) If we choose someone from inside the Service:

Henry A. Byroade (now Ambassador to Burma). Byroade's assets are a West Point background, extensive service in the Far East, a stint as NEA assistant secretary, good political instincts, an engaging personality. He struck it off extremely well with Nasser in 1955-6 (too well for Foster Dulles, as you will recall). He has been sitting on his hands in Rangoon. He lacks the Presidential tie.

b) If we choose an outsider:

Franklin D. Roosevelt, Jr.
Abram Chayes
Pierre Salinger
Eugene V. Rostow

(In two of these cases, Indonesia's Islamic cast should be borne in mind; not an insuperable obstacle.)



98. Telegram From the Department of State to the Mission to the United Nations/1/

Washington, January 15, 1965, 6:50 p.m.

/1/Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964-66, POL 32-1 INDON-MALAYSIA. Secret; No Foreign Dissem. Drafted by Howard M. Federspiel of the Office of Research and Analysis for Far East, Southeast Asia Division, INR; cleared by Allen S. Whiting, Director of that Office, Cuthell, Louise McNutt (UN adviser in FE), William G. Jones, Deputy Director, Office of UN Political Affairs, IO; in substance by Clyde W. Snider of the Coordination Staff, INR; cleared in substance with Thomas M. Judd, Officer-in-Charge, United Kingdom Affairs, and Richard W. Petree, Officer-in-Charge of Japanese Affairs. Pouched to Djakarta, Kuala Lumpur, Manila, London, Canberra, and Tokyo.

1786. Ref: NY 2546./2/ Following summary available intelligence Indonesian military buildup against Malaysia compiled in INR transmitted for your info and background use.

/2/In telegram 2546 from USUN, January 8, the Mission requested information on the recent Indonesian military buildup along the Indonesian-Malaysian border and British Commonwealth measures to counter it. (Ibid.)

1. Indonesian Military Buildup Against Malaysia

Over past four months Indonesia has committed considerable numbers regular military forces to the anti-Malaysia campaign. Large scale reinforcement currently underway in Indonesian Borneo, and, since mid-December, raids against mainland Malaysia have in- creased.

2. Assault on Mainland Malaysia. The Indonesian military has apparently formulated a plan for an amphibious assault on mainland Malaysia. The plan has reportedly been designed as a response should there be a British/Malaysian attack on Indonesian bases used in the infiltration effort. Reinforcements have been sent to Central Sumatra which may be destined for use in such operation, but no indications it actively preparing for such assault.

3. Indonesian capability undertake major effort against main- land Malaysia severely limited by lack sufficient continuing air cover, overall shortage transport, and extremely difficult logistic and supply problems. Difficulties encountered during early December joint serv- ices maneuvers, which included amphibious landing, probably made military and naval leaders aware Indonesian deficiencies in such operation.

4. Activities Against Mainland Malaysia. Since mid-December Indonesian bases opposite Singapore and mainland Malaysia have concentrated on infiltrating teams, varying from six to forty men, at various points along the western coast concentrating on Johore State. Several hundred persons, including Indonesian civilian volunteers, defectors from Malaysia, and large number of volunteers from regular Indonesian military and police units, located at these bases and available for infiltration. Since December 15, over a hundred persons have been infiltrated. All have been apprehended or killed by Malaysian security forces within days after they landed. We estimate raids of same magnitude will probably continue through January.

5. Indonesian Buildup in Kalimantan. At end December Indonesia reportedly intended increase its forces in Western Indonesian Kalimantan by three brigades. Component units from first brigade have already arrived. After reinforcements completed, probably mid-February, Indonesian forces estimated to number at least 12,500--an increase of at least 10,000 since November. Reinforcements apparently also planned in Eastern Indonesian Borneo although probably not on same magnitude as buildup western Kalimantan.

6. These forces will probably be used to infiltrate large teams in attempt gain control small pockets in Malaysian Borneo, possibly as basis for de facto recognition of a rebel government. Size of buildup suggests considerably larger infiltration attempt than a year ago when infiltration of up to 800 troops and volunteers created serious security problem in Sabah and Sarawak. While possibility of conventional attack against limited target cannot be entirely dismissed, problem of sustained air cover, supply difficulties, and certainly British retaliation would probably convince Indonesian military leaders not to follow such course. However, they may believe that infiltration of large units, possibly up to company size, would not prompt British counterstrike against Indonesian territory, and yet would be large enough to ensure capture and retention of territory.

7. Borneo operations probably still in planning stage, and probably will not occur until all reinforcements have been completed, possibly mid-February or early March.

8. British Malaysian Countermeasures. Over 60,000 army, navy and air force personnel are assigned to the British Far Eastern Command; overwhelming bulk committed to Malaysian theater of operations. This includes a reinforcement--now underway--of approximately 1,300 troops announced as part of a countermove against the Indonesian buildup in Indonesian Kalimantan. Malaysian armed forces number approximately 35,000 which, with units from Australia and New Zealand, brings Commonwealth strength to over 95,000.

Parallel with the buildup of troop strength, the Malaysian Government has imposed series security regulations which are designed to detect Indonesian infiltrations. In addition to regular air, naval and land patrols these include curfews in coastal areas, prohibition on the movement of all boats at night in vulnerable areas, and organization of populace into vigilante groups to guard coast and strategic points and report movements of strangers.

These efforts have been uniformly successful in Singapore and mainland Malaysia. A number infiltration attempts have been stopped on beaches, and in some cases infiltrators have been picked up while still in boats.

In Borneo, with long land border, sparsely populated frontier, and jungle terrain, Indonesia's capability infiltrate raiders has always been greater than against mainland Malaysia. In the past Malaysian/British force have not been directed against initial infiltrations but have concentrated on elimination of raiders after they entered Malaysian territory.

USUN. USUN may draw upon paragraphs 1, 4, 5 and 7 in oral briefing Rolz-Bennett./3/ UK Embassy Washington has concurred in passing this info to Secretariat, but Mission requested advise Rolz-Bennett info being made available in strictest confidence. Dept reluctant pass information re Malaysian/Commonwealth countermeasures when information readily available UN Secretariat from Malaysian and UK missions.

/3/Jose Rolz-Bennett, Under Secretary for Special Political Affairs, UN Secretariat.



99. Memorandum From James C. Thomson, Jr., of the National Security Council Staff to the President's Special Assistant for National Security Affairs (Bundy)/1/

Washington, January 16, 1965.

/1/Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Indonesia, Vol. III, Memos, 9/64-2/65, [2 of 2]. Secret.

The Sukarno Problem

Cooper and I had a lengthy session with Dave Cuthell of State Friday/2/ on possible actions we might take in response to Djakarta's 1358./3/

/2/January 15.

/3/In telegram 1358 from Djakarta, January 15, Jones recommended that in view of the deterioration in U.S.-Indonesia relations President Johnson invite Sukarno to meet with him in Washington. (National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964-66, POL 2 INDON) In a January 17 memorandum to the President entitled "Weekend Developments of Interest," McGeorge Bundy stated that "the cable [1358 from Djakarta] is interesting, but not wholly persuasive. Our preliminary judgment is that it would be better if Herbert should go to Manila, Kuala Lumpur, and Djakarta sometime in the next month (he would be much better than the Attorney General because it is closeness to you that counts now)." Since the receipt of Djakarta telegram, Bundy noted that Subandrio and Sukarno were more forthcoming, especially on the issue of USIS libraries. Bundy thought Humphrey's visit could prove a useful "time-gaining exercise." (Johnson Library, National Security File, Memos to the President, McGeorge Bundy, Vol. 8, Jan.-Feb. 1965)

State's preliminary view is that the situation is not quite as bad as Jones suggests; that it would be very risky to expend all our capital in a Presidential meeting with Sukarno outside the country (which would be used by Sukarno to push his self-image as the paramount leader of the Afro-Asian world); and that in any event such a meeting would treat only a symptom of the disease and not the disease itself.

Nonetheless, we are persuaded that a two-stage initiative might make good sense at this juncture: a brief trip by the Vice President to Manila, Kuala Lumpur and Djakarta sometime before mid-February (with Djakarta the focal point); and, if this first step brings any results, a meeting between the President and Sukarno in Hawaii sometime in April or May.

We believe that the situation does call for an early exercise in personal diplomacy, short of the Presidential level. If approved, a Humphrey visit should take place well before the Algiers conference, now scheduled for sometime in March--a conference at which Indonesia will certainly behave very badly. Judging by past experience, the Indos shape up rather well in anticipation of visits from our top brass. This might give us a respite during the period immediately before Humphrey's arrival; and if Humphrey gets anywhere with Sukarno, the visit might conceivably have some effect on the Indo performance in Algiers.

If the Humphrey visit goes smoothly, the Hawaii meeting might possibly be focused on some such gimmick as Howard Jones' installation as Chancellor of the East-West Center. The Center has been a long-time interest of President Johnson; and it would be feasible to hold a special convocation for Jones' installation to which Jones' pal Sukarno could logically be invited.

As a possible alternative to the Humphrey trip, we might also consider a first step of lower visibility and have Mike Forrestal test the climate in Djakarta.

As an alternative to the Hawaii meeting, we might consider a Presidential invitation to both Sukarno and the Tunku to come to Washington for talks--along the lines of his invitation to Papandreou and Inonu last year.

All this is very tentative and subject to a good deal more discussion at State. Cuthell is talking with your brother this weekend, and we hope to have a formal recommendation out of the Department by the middle of next week.



100. Note From the Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for Far Eastern Affairs (Green) to the Assistant Secretary of State for Far Eastern Affairs (Bundy)/1/

Washington, January 20, 1965.

/1/Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, EA/Indonesia Files: Lot 68 D 467, Political Affairs Relations--United States. Secret.

I think it would be sheer folly to have any presidential meeting with Sukarno except under terms we have previously approved. I don't want to belabor a point on which I gather you are agreed but here are a few considerations:

1. Sukarno is bent on a course of action from which he will not be dissuaded. Momentarily he might smile and do a few pleasant things but he would maintain his current course. This would be less than helpful to our President both at home and abroad.

2. A presidential meeting would be an open invitation for others to emulate Sukarno. It would show that the bad boys are the ones that get the attention. It would have decisively serious impact on countries like Korea, Vietnam and perhaps even Thailand and the Philippines as far as the Far East is concerned. God knows how the Africans would react.

3. We are anxious to have the British and Australians play a firm military role in Southeast Asia. We are also anxious to have their support for our actions in Vietnam, Laos and elsewhere. Merely to suggest a presidential visit to the British might be most harmful.

4. To favor Sukarno with a presidential invitation at this time would convince Sukarno all the more that he can play his pro-Communist iconoclastic role in world affairs without fear of reaction from the Americans nor indeed from the British since he would figure that the Americans would now exercise a restraining influence upon the British and Australians.

5. Jones' easy ambiance with Sukarno is helpful but it has not and will not influence Sukarno's course of action. Nor will our aid or lack of aid influence Sukarno. What sets limits on Sukarno's course of action are:

(a) Internal factors which are beyond our capability to influence;
(b) Afro-Asian criticism of his confrontation policies, of his quitting the UN, etc.
(c) Soviet reactions (e.g., Moscow can scarcely anticipate with pleasure another UNSC meeting on confrontation).

A presidential visit at this juncture while the above factors may be having a useful yeasty effect could upset the whole process.

6. Our President and Secretary continually use the line that we cannot have dealings with Communist China or admit it to the UN while Peiping pursues its present aggressive course in Southeast Asia. How can we reconcile this posture with a presidential meeting with a man who admits aggression against his Southeast Asian neighbors?

Marshall Green/2/

/2/Printed from a copy that bears this typed signature.


101. Memorandum of Conversation/1/

Washington, January 22, 1965, 10 a.m.-12:40 p.m.

/1/Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Files of McGeorge Bundy, Miscellaneous Meetings, Vol. I. Top Secret. Drafted by Bromley Smith. The meeting was held in the Cabinet Room at the White House.



Senator Aiken
Senator Dirksen
Senator Kuchel
Senator Long
Senator Mansfield
Senator Saltonstall
Senator Smathers

Congressman Albert
Congressman Arends

Congressman Boggs
Congressman Ford
Congressman Laird
Speaker McCormack

Vice President Humphrey
Secretary of State Rusk
Secretary of Defense McNamara
CIA Director McCone

The President's Staff

For Entire Meeting:
McGeorge Bundy
Lawrence O'Brien

For Part of Meeting:
Horace Busby
Douglass Carter
William Moyers
George Reedy
Jack Valenti

The President opened the conference with Congressional leaders by explaining why it had been called. He said that at the very beginning of the Congressional session he wanted to develop procedures which would make it possible for the Administration to think and plan with Congressional leaders. He was ready to be frank and candid in all matters but to do so the discussions must not get into the public domain. Real damage is done to the national interest when information such as that which will be given during the course of the morning meeting gets into the newspapers. The objective is to make possible an examination of our foreign policy and our defense structure by the Congressional leaders of both parties who are stewards of these policies. We do not separate Democrats and Republicans in Vietnam. He wanted to work with the legislative leaders in understanding, if not agreement, on both sides of the House and Senate. During the Eisenhower Administration the system of consulting Congressional leaders was the best he had ever known. The meetings were not many, perhaps 4 or 5, but President Eisenhower, who had been blunt and frank with Congressional leaders, had asked for their judgments on important problems.

The President said the Chairmen of the Armed Services Committee and the Foreign Relations Committee had not been invited to this morning's meeting because he wished to limit this conference to very few persons. At a later date it will be possible to enlarge the number. Secretary Rusk had already briefed the Congressional committees on foreign policy. Secretary McNamara would be going to the Hill later to spell out our defense posture, part of which had already been made public in the Defense message sent to Congress.

The President said he was available for personal meetings with individual legislative leaders at any time.

[Here follows discussion unrelated to Indonesia-Malaysia.]

In addition to our problems with Nasser, the President continued, we are having trouble with Sukarno. Our Ambassador in Indonesia, who is one of our ablest, believes the only way to get Sukarno to turn away from his current policies, which are disastrous for the political and economic future of Indonesia, is to invite him to come here to meet with me. Ambassador Jones says we must appeal to the vanity of Sukarno in a final effort to halt him before it is too late. Ambassador Jones, in his cables, gives us a different picture of what is going on in Indonesia than appears in the newspapers.

[Here follows discussion unrelated to Indonesia-Malaysia.]

Secretary Rusk then discussed the situation in Indonesia. Sukarno is deep in domestic difficulties. His "confrontation" with Malaysia is possibly an attempt to divert attention from the serious local problems which he has not been able to solve. The United States is not going to take over the Malaysia problem because it is primarily a British problem. The British, already deeply committed, have sent substantial military force into the area. Sukarno will probably not push his "confrontation" policy to the point of undertaking major military actions. One new element is that knowledge of Sukarno's illnesses has become widely known and the succession problem is being discussed publicly in Indonesia. Although the United States has investments amounting to one-half billion dollars in Indonesia, any attempt to blackmail us by threatening to confiscate these investments is not a possibility. Sukarno now obtains $125 million dollars annually in foreign exchange from these investments which he would be unable to do without. These foreign exchange resources would be lost if he moved in to take over the oil companies. The only U.S. aid we are now giving to Indonesia consists of funds to pay for military training. We feel such training is in our interest because it helps to tie us closer to Indonesian military leaders, who may well play a major role in the decision as to the future political orientation of the country.

The President interrupted to say that all U.S. military assistance going to Indonesia is being provided because it is in our national interest, not theirs. He hoped that those present would make this point clear.

Senator Dirksen asked why the Australians are so upset about developments in West New Guinea. Secretary Rusk replied that the situation in West New Guinea is quiet. The Australians are concerned because if the Malaysian problem becomes more serious, there may be difficulties for them in West New Guinea.

[Here follows discussion unrelated to Indonesia-Malaysia.]

Bromley Smith


102. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in the United Kingdom/1/

Washington, January 25, 1965, 9:34 p.m.

/1/Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964-66, POL 7 INDON. Top Secret; Nodis. Drafted by Bundy, cleared with the White House, and approved by Rusk.

4596. For the Ambassador. Please deliver following message from the President to Prime Minister Wilson:

"Dear Prime Minister:

I am writing to share some thoughts about the worsening situation in Indonesia, and to invite your comment on possibilities that have occurred to me here. As you will judge from the contents of this letter, the thoughts expressed have been very closely held within my government, and I am sure the same will be true in yours.

Sukarno's withdrawal from the UN does not seem to us too serious in itself, and indeed may get him into serious difficulties during the year as he attempts to exert influence through the proposed Afro-Asian Conference. It is already clear that it has, if anything, worsened his standing in this circle.

Nonetheless, the recent events in Indonesia, both military and political, clearly point to the possibility of increased military action against Malaysia and of a further swing to the left in the internal political balance. Even though these latter tendencies may have been checked for the moment, the power of the PKI seems to be growing steadily, whether because Sukarno actually encourages this or because he no longer has full control. Even if his health should hold up, the prospect seems to be that the left will gain steadily. If he should die or become incapacitated, the left is now in a strong position to move to take over. In short, Indonesia seems to be moving rapidly toward more aggressive policies externally and toward communist domination at home.

As you know, we have never been hopeful that negotiations or discussions with Sukarno would produce lasting solutions and get him back to work solving his serious economic problems and bringing the left under control. Nonetheless, I feel strongly that we cannot let Indonesia continue along its present path without exhausting every possible measure to turn it from catastrophe. Even if we are unsuccessful, we would have made every last effort we could make to prevent it.

Two possibilities have now occurred to me that might just help. One would be to take advantage of Sukarno's now-repeated statement that he would accept the findings of any four-power Afro-Asian Conciliation Commission. This has been stated in terms of findings of such a Commission with respect to the sentiments of the inhabitants of Sarawak and Sabah. It carried also the implication that he would accept a call by such a Commission for the cessation of Indonesian aggressive activities--infiltration in Borneo and the sporadic raids now being conducted against Malaya itself. I do not think we can now expect the Philippines to play a useful role in resuming the negotiating track that broke off in Tokyo last June. The Thai seem equally disillusioned. However, the Japanese have retained some modest influence in Djakarta and might be prepared to undertake a quiet initiative in this direction. During my recent talks with Sato,/2/ it was clear that they were quite willing to do whatever might be helpful, although I most specifically did not urge that they take on this particular job at the moment. I wonder now whether this may not be worth a try.

/2/Eisaku Sato, Prime Minister of Japan.

I see all the difficulties, and of course the Tunku is quite right in insisting that actions are needed rather than words on the Indonesian side. But it seems to me that there is just enough hope in the recent indications to warrant another try.

My second idea is a much more far-reaching one, and I am sure you will not misunderstand my purpose in putting it forward for your reaction. Plainly, it would require the closest consultation with you and careful preparations with the Tunku.

Briefly, it has long been my judgment that Sukarno set great store by his personal relationship with President Kennedy. The rapport which appears to have existed between the two men did not change the basic direction of Sukarno's policy, but was certainly of value as a point of contact with the Indonesian President and may have had some moderating effect on his actions. Sukarno's personal vanity is maddening; but it may be a possible handle that might be turned to use. I have never met Sukarno and there is the possibility that we could use an official visit to the United States as a tactic to appeal to this vanity and at the same time provide an opportunity to divert him from his current path. The invitation in itself would confront him with a dilemma. His vanity and an acute sense of Indonesia's importance in the world would argue for acceptance of the invitation. The PKI would probably oppose the visit with every resource at its disposal. We might, therefore, drive a small wedge between Sukarno and the PKI, and his acceptance of the invitation would be from the outset some indication of his receptivity to the counsels of moderation. I have already told Sukarno, through Ambassador Jones, that I would be prepared to receive him--as I would any other foreign Chief of State in a like situation--if he should come to New York in connection with a reopening ceremony at the Indonesian pavilion at the New York World's Fair. Such an occasion would not arise before late April or May in any event, however, and I do not believe it could well serve as the occasion for really tough and serious discussions.

Accordingly, I have given thought to the possibility that I might invite him to visit the United States and to see me in the fairly near future, on the basis of what we would call an official visit, with some ceremony but with the greatest possible stress on direct discussions.

Again, I am well aware of the difficulties surrounding such a proposal. We would have to take every possible measure to be sure that it was not understood as an attempt by the US to obtain a compromise of the Malaysian dispute at the expense of the legitimate interests of Malaysia. Rather, we would make clear that our objective was quite simple--to have the opportunity for personal discussion and to stress our well-known view that it is in Sukarno's and Indonesia's own interest to call off confrontation of Malaysia and to turn the attention of Indonesia to the solution of its tremendous economic and political problem. You can well see that it would be essential from my own standpoint to make this position entirely clear to Congress and to our own public opinion, which would undoubtedly have great initial difficulty in understanding the purpose of the invitation.

There are many other arguments which I need not review with you in detail.

I re-emphasize my awareness of all the considerations arguing against this proposal, and recognize that it may prove as fruitless as other past efforts have been to change the course of Sukarno's policies. Nonetheless, Sukarno is today Indonesia, and I believe we should explore every possible avenue to reach him and influence him as a man.

I should be most grateful for your comments and counsel.


Lyndon B. Johnson"



103. Special Memorandum Prepared by the Director of the Office of National Estimates of the Central Intelligence Agency (Kent)/1/

No. 4-65

Washington, January 26, 1965.

/1/Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Indonesia, Vol. III, Memos, 2/64-2/65, [2 of 2]. Secret.

Principal Problems and Prospects in Indonesia


We are now faced not only with known and growing danger from Sukarno, but with the uncertainties of a possible Indonesia without Sukarno. If this ailing dictator should indeed die in the near future, his bequest to Indonesia would be international outlawry, economic near-chaos, and weakened resistance to Communist domination. Yet if Sukarno lives on for some time to come, the chances of the Communist Party (PKI) to assume power will probably continue to improve. We do not believe that a Communist Indonesia is imminent, or that Sukarno will initiate war. In our view, however, there is sufficient chance of such developments over the next year or two to warrant especial US intelligence and planning attention.

The beginnings of a scramble for succession to Sukarno are already evident. Should Sukarno leave the scene in the near future, we believe that the initial struggle to replace him would be won by Army and non-Communist elements, though Communists would continue to play an important role. Such a government would probably continue to be anti-US, xenophobic, and a threat to peace. Furthermore, unless the non-Communist leaders displayed more backbone, effectiveness, and unity than they have to date, the chances of eventual PKI dominance of Indonesia would quickly mount.

For the near future, Sukarno will almost certainly continue his Confrontation policy. He might sharply increase the level and intensity of Indonesian pressures against Malaysia, precipitating war with UK and Commonwealth forces; we believe it more likely, however, that he will continue present patterns of infiltration and occasional military probes, using large troop buildup and inflammatory threats essentially for diplomatic blackmail.

Sukarno will probably take various rash actions to lessen his remaining ties with the West and to continue his dalliance with Peiping. He apparently believes that long-run trends are working to weaken US/Western influence in Southeast Asia, that this provides Indonesia with the opportunity for considerable profit, and that division of the spoils with Communist China is a problem which can be safely managed at some later date. If persisted in, these views will prove ill conceived and costly, susceptible of upset by UK/US force, Chinese Communist guile, and domestic deterioration.

[Here follows the 12-page body of the memorandum.]

For the Board of National Estimates:

Sherman Kent


104. Memorandum From the President's Special Assistant for National Security Affairs (Bundy) to President Johnson/1/

Washington, January 30, 1965.

/1/Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Memos to the President, McGeorge Bundy, Vol. 8, Jan.-Feb. 1965. Top Secret.

Reply from Prime Minister Wilson on Indonesia/2/

/2/Dated January 30. (Ibid., Head of State Correspondence, Prime Minister Wilson, Vol. I)

1. Harold Wilson's long answer to your letter about a Sukarno/3/ visit has just arrived. As we rather expected, he takes a very dim view of it, and my brother and I believe that Dean Rusk will share our view that you would not wish to go ahead in these circumstances.

/3/Document 102.

2. Wilson's argument is that a Sukarno visit to Washington would be regarded as a triumph for his confrontation policy in Malaysia, and in the UK, and in Indonesia. The British obviously doubt that we could turn him around in any serious way, and they point out--certainly correctly--that in the current state of British opinion and deployment, there would be very harsh criticism of us from the UK.

3. Wilson's letter also takes a very different view from ours of the future inside Indonesia. They obviously think the army will prove stronger than the P.K.I. when Sukarno leaves the scene. If this is true, it is most encouraging, and it is worth a second look here.

4. This message ties in quite neatly with the problem of getting Lodge to the Far East. Our thought now is that you might invite him to go as an informal representative to Kuala Lumpur and Djakarta and that from those points he could easily be invited by Max Taylor for an informal visit in Saigon. The whole expedition could be purely a matter of "having a look," and could be compared quite smoothly to his earlier visit to third countries on behalf of Vietnam. This does not call for a decision until I get back from Saigon, but I think it is quite a good idea for the latter part of February. Lodge is alert and ready to go whenever you want him.

5. All this of course is separate from the proposed Bunker appointment, which will take a little longer and which would be neatly balanced, in a sense, by having Lodge take an informal travelling look-see that could include reassurances to the Malaysians.

McG. B./4/

/4/Printed from a copy that bears this typed signature.


105. Telegram From the Assistant Secretary of State for Far Eastern Affairs (William Bundy) and the President's Special Assistant for National Security Affairs (McGeorge Bundy) to the Ambassador to Indonesia (Jones)/1/

Washington, February 11, 1965, 0049Z.

/1/Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Indonesia, Vol. III, Memos, 9/64-2/65, [2 of 2]. Secret. Not sent over Department of State communications channels.

CAP 65036. CAS Djakarta pass to Forrestal/2/ from Bundys.

/2/Michael V. Forrestal traveled to Djakarta after serving on McGeorge Bundy's mission to South Vietnam in early February. Reports of Forrestal's discussions with Indonesian officials are in National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964-66, POL 7 US/Forrestal and POL INDON.

Glad you will have further talk with Sukarno. Regard occasion as valuable opportunity to express President's personal interest and concern and to probe as fully and frankly as possible Sukarno's intentions. Suggest that you tell him of President's deep regard for Indo people. Suggest you also express President's puzzlement and concern with direction of Indo-U.S. relations over past several months. President has held firm against rising tide of public and Congressional criticism and alarm regarding Indonesia. But President himself needs reassurance regarding Indo intentions, both privately from Sukarno through you and publicly through acts and words that would counter present impression of alienation between our nations.

Bearing in mind wide range of factors, we do not feel it possible or wise at this point to commit President to unspecified initiatives with Sukarno. We would rather not go beyond outstanding offer to receive Sukarno this spring if he comes to New York (Deptel 554 and Embtel 1182),/3/ leaving question of initiatives until we can see some useful point of application. Suggest, however, that you and Galbraith express President's willingness to consider any thoughts Sukarno may have regarding ways to improve our relations and reduce tensions in the region.

/3/Document 96 and footnote 5 thereto.


106. Memorandum From Director of the United States Information Agency Rowan to Secretary of State Rusk/1/

Washington, February 18, 1965.

/1/Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Indonesia, Vol. III, Memos 9/64-2/65, [2 of 2]. Confidential. Copies were sent to Ball and William Bundy.

Indonesia: Possible U.S. Courses of Action

Anti-American activities in Indonesia, particularly those directed against USIS during the last six months, have created a situation that I can describe only as intolerable. I believe that American interests and our national dignity, not only in Indonesia but elsewhere, require that action now be taken to indicate that we will not allow such actions to continue unpenalized.

I realize that our long-suffering patience in these matters has been due in large part to our desire to keep Indonesia out of the communist orbit at virtually any cost, but it seems obvious that the Indonesian government is abusing our patience to its advantage--and thus our present predicament.

What is happening to USIS in Indonesia is obviously part of the much larger picture of U.S.-Indonesian relations. It is apparent that the Indonesian government has decided to apply to these relations its now well-established strategy of exerting a steadily-increasing pressure on the official and private interests of foreign countries with whose policies it does not agree with the expectation that it can force a change in those policies. At present, USIS has been singled out for special attention. We shall soon have nothing worthwhile left in the way of an information operation. The pressures now being brought to bear on American rubber estates in Sumatra indicate that these interests are next on the list. Just as in the case of the Dutch, beginning in 1957, and of the British, following the establishment of Malaysia in 1963, this trend will continue either until we make the desired concessions to the GOI or until nothing remains.

While USIS is rapidly being deprived of its capacity for effective programming, it would be a serious mistake to close down any of our operations voluntarily. Such an action would be interpreted by both our enemies and friends as a retreat and as knuckling under to communist pressure. And since no significant differences appear to exist between the Government of Indonesia and the Partai Kommunis Indonesia insofar as immediate objectives are concerned, withdrawal on our part could only encourage further excesses against other American interests on the part of the government. Nevertheless, in view of the fact that USIS apparently has no future in Indonesia under present conditions, I am prepared to sacrifice a part, or even all, of our operation there if the Department is willing to take strong and immediate action (1) to protest what has happened to date, and (2) to put our opponents everywhere on notice that such actions inevitably have a price tag attached to them.

While superficially we appear to have little leverage with the Indonesian government, I am convinced that there are many courses of action open to us. The following come immediately to mind:

1. The top Indonesian representative available should be called in and bluntly informed that the activities which the Indonesian government has been tolerating, encouraging and even engaging in are contrary to established international and diplomatic custom and usage and that we do not intend to continue to suffer such treatment without retaliating. The press should be informed in advance that the Indonesians are being called in, and we should encourage as wide dissemination of the substance of our complaint as possible.

2. We should recall the U.S. Ambassador to Indonesia, making it clear publicly that we do not intend to replace him until we have had some satisfaction from the GOI.

3. Whatever remains in the way of a U.S. economic assistance program in Indonesia, including training, the supplying of spare parts, civic action, malaria eradication, etc., should be terminated immediately, with attendant wide publicity.

4. Although the GOI's information and cultural operation in this country is relatively small scale and hence cannot be equated with USIS in Indonesia, we should begin now to cut back certain of their activities here.

While the purely information operation of the GOI in this country has thus far been sporadic and largely ineffectual, the greatest activity has taken place in New York, as a part of the Indonesian Mission to the U.N. Following Indonesia's decision to withdraw from the U.N. we thought for a time that the GOI was planning to move this activity to its consulate general in New York, a supposition which was supported by the transfer of responsibility for publishing the Mission's bulletin, "News and Views," to the consulate general. However, the Permanent Mission resumed issuance of the bulletin under its imprint at the end of January. This obviously cannot continue after March 1, the date on which Indonesia's connection with the U.N. terminates. We do not yet know whether the consulate general will pick up the bulletin, or whether the embassy here will assume responsibility for its publication (as the consulate general information officer told one of our people would be the case). However, the embassy here has recently stepped up the issuance of its own information bulletin from a sporadic to a regular basis of once a week. Samples of Indonesian information output in this country are attached./2/

/2/Not attached to the source text.

We are inclined to believe that with the departure of the Indonesian U.N. Mission from New York, the GOI will probably attach greater importance to the remaining Indonesian presence there than has hitherto been the case, primarily because of New York's importance commercially and as the seat of the United Nations headquarters, with its sizeable number of Afro-Asian representatives. Therefore, the presence of the Indonesian Consulate General in New York suggests some other interesting possibilities for retaliation. If our information operation in Surabaya is closed down, we should ask the Indonesians to withdraw their information people from New York.

If we deem it wise to close all USIS facilities in Indonesia and pull out our personnel, we should inform Indonesia that we are expelling all Indonesians engaged in informational, cultural, and other work of a nature done by USIA. This would include several Indonesians in Washington as well as some staff members in New York and San Francisco.

Because of the attacks on our Consulate proper in Medan and the harassment of our Consul in Surabaya, we ought even explore the question of whether we wish to close down our Consulate as well as the U.S. Information Service in Surabaya and in turn ask the Indonesians to close their entire New York operation.

I am fully aware that the recommendations that I have made are harsh, and that some would produce an angry reaction on the part of Sukarno./3/ I believe that the only alternative is for us to continue taking abuse with the result that mob attacks will become the order of the day all around the world because government officials with grievance against us, or acting under communist pressure, will figure that they can get away with it.

/3/In a memorandum to McGeorge Bundy, February 19, Thomson noted that Rowan planned to see President Johnson that afternoon at 5:45 p.m. and Rowan might raise the issue of USIS in Indonesia along the lines of this memorandum. Thomson stated Rowan's position was "an over-reaction," a view shared by FE. Thomson also noted that Jones would return to Indonesia with the "toughest message ever communicated to the Indos, as a result of mob action." The USIS library in Medan had just been reopened, Djakarta's was in "temporary protective custody," and facilities at Jogjakarta and Surabaya were closed. If the President asked for Bundy's advice on Rowan's views, Thomson suggested that Bundy advise the President to "hold off any such rash response until Jones and Sukarno have a further confrontation." (Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Indonesia, Vol. III, Memos 9/64-2/65, [2 of 2])

Carl T. Rowan/4/

/4/Printed from a copy that bears this typed signature.


107. Letter From Michael V. Forrestal of the National Security Council Staff to the Ambassador to Indonesia (Jones)/1/

Saigon, February 19, 1965.

/1/Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Indonesia, Vol. III, Memos, 9/64-2/65, [2 of 2]. Secret; Official-Informal. Copies were sent to William and McGeorge Bundy.

Dear Howard,

I hope that by the time this reaches Djakarta, both you and Mary Lou will have returned.

First I want to tell you how deeply I appreciated your hospitality and your help during my visit. Second, I want to tell you how much I missed you during the last few days--especially at Boger. You will have seen the cable reporting my talk with the Bung./2/ Frank [Galbraith] will have filled you in on the peculiar circumstances. I have never had such a talk with the President before. We were both exhausted and we were alone virtually in the dark in that vast hall of the Palace. We conversed for about an hour.

/2/Not found.

The Bung was gloomy but restrained and very frank. Although I left depressed, I have since come to think that I caught a glimpse of the depth of this man's understandable frustrations. In particular, I am convinced that he would like to find a way out of his impasse with K.[uala] L.[umpur]. His difficulty is how to do it.

I don't know what we can do at this juncture to help him. I rather think it is something he will have to work out for himself.

I do have hope, however. My few talks in K.L. have convinced me that we are moving into a period where the circumstances on both sides will favor some form of negotiation. The Tunku is more confident, and therefore more reasonable by far, than he was last year. To some extent he finds confrontation politically useful; but he is also aware that it increases his political dependence upon the British which is beginning to irk him--particularly in his relations with Singapore.

In Indonesia I felt that almost every leader--except Aidit--really wanted a detente./3/ I can't estimate the mood of the population; but I would suspect that the mass of them do not particularly care one way or the other. In brief, I think Nasution was wrong when he said that the political climate in both K.L. and Djakarta did not favor talks. I would hope that the current feelers would lead to a Tokyo meeting which would in turn lead to the appointment of a commission. This commission could talk and supervise direct talks for a very long time--during which both sides might reduce their activities along the border.

/3/In an official-informal letter, February 25, Jones told Forrestal that he agreed that most Indonesian leaders wanted a resolution of the Malaysian problem, but internal pressures from the PKI would make it difficult for Sukarno to follow through on his desire for detente. He also agreed that the U.S. Government should have made an effort to restart the negotiations before the pressures from the internal situation and the appeal of Hanoi and Beijing became so strong. Jones noted that the Embassy tried hard to initiate early action. As for telecommunications equipment for the Indonesian Army, Jones wanted to keep the U.S. commitment, but he feared that time was running out. (Washington National Records Center, RG 84, Djakarta Embassy Files: FRC 69 A 6507, Defense 19-B)

Incidentally, there was a possibly important item which I failed to report from K.L. Ghazali made quite a point about getting Subandrio to say publicly that there were no longer any guerrillas to be withdrawn from North Kalimantan. I admitted that the Indos had said this privately (Sukarno told me this himself); but he insisted that a public statement would go a long way to setting the stage for talks.

His reasoning apparently is that such a statement would remove the gun from the head of the Malaysians since it would in fact be a relinquishment of the Indonesian claim that there was a successful rebel movement in the two territories. Ghazali is so mercurial that I do not know whether to take him seriously; but if it were possible to get Subandrio or Jani to say that the question of withdrawal of guerrillas was no longer an issue, you might get a good response from K.L.

On the question of U.S.-Indo relations I am not optimistic--at least in the short term. One of the prices we have to pay for our actions in Viet-Nam is a certain amount of flak in Djakarta. These actions, I am convinced, have had a very salutary effect on confrontation in both K.L. and Indonesia. But there is inevitably some adverse side-effect.

Since, by the nature of things, we shall probably have to continue our pressures in Vietnam, I think we will have to face a period of tension while Sukarno tries to adjust to the situation. In a way it's a shame we didn't start sooner--i.e., before Sukarno got caught in his drift toward Hanoi and Peking.

Therefore, I am inclined to believe that we should reduce our presence temporarily. I realize that the P.K.I. will always find targets; but I don't think we should give them unnecessary levers on our own public opinion. Thus, I would get the AID mission down to a minimum and pull out our libraries.

On the other hand, I do think that we should let the Army have the Java portion of the telecommunications equipment we promised them. Not only would this tend to keep our lines clear to them; it would probably also help them in the event there were trouble with the P.K.I. on Java.

Generally speaking, I would try to make our reduction as quiet and normal-appearing as possible--I would also try to maintain as much flexibility in coming back in again when conditions improve--hopefully after a solution or abatement of the confrontation problem.

Well, many thanks again for all your kindness. My affectionate regards to Mary Lou--and to Frank and Martha.

Best of luck to you.



P.S. I am sending copies of this to Mac and Bill Bundy just to let them know I am not sound asleep out here.


108. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Indonesia/1/

Washington, February 20, 1965, 12:39 p.m.

/1/Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964-66, POL INDON-US. Confidential; Priority. Drafted by Ingraham; cleared by Cuthell, Poats, Thompson, Green, Gilbert H. Kinney of the Vietnam Working Group, and Harriman; and approved by William Bundy and Rusk. Repeated to Manila for Jones and CINCPAC for POLAD.

727. Crescendo of harassments against USG establishment in Indonesia, culminating in attacks on Djakarta and Medan libraries has brought us to stage where we will have to consider constricting our relations with Indos to minimum unless GOI takes prompt steps to halt depredations and restore situation. We recognize how this could conflict with our long-range interests in Southwest Pacific, but point is at hand where that consideration may have to give way to our inability tolerate such treatment. Question is not only one of US public outrage at Indonesian insults, but of virtual impossibility continuing do business with Indonesia under present conditions.

In line with recent expressions by President and Secretary of growing concern over mistreatment US diplomatic establishments abroad, we feel it necessary to respond in tangible manner to GOI directed or tolerated misconduct. For present we are holding up $350,000 contribution to Bandung reactor, and are considering other appropriate measures. We will, of course, bear in mind in implementing these measures that large US private investment in Indonesia is potential Indo hostage, while we have no equivalent.

To lessen our exposure and to demonstrate our concern, AID will propose further substantial reduction in size of USAID mission in Indonesia. Proposals subject separate communications./2/ Question of MILTAG also under consideration.

/2/Not further identified.

With Ambassador scheduled return February 22, request Embassy advise Palace that he will be returning with instructions from USG and will seek appointment with Sukarno immediately upon return.

When Ambassador sees Sukarno, he should make clear he speaking under instructions and should convey following message in unmistakable terms: (a) USG, including President himself, views these inexcusable attacks on USG property with gravest concern, and fears they will completely destroy useful relations between us unless steps taken not only to halt them but to restore situation; and (b) as minimum, we must insist that all forms discrimination against US diplomatic community and violations accepted diplomatic standards cease immediately (Ambassador knows what they are and should cite them).

In ensuing discussion, Ambassador should draw on following points, conveying them in manner best suited to atmosphere but indicating that they being made under instructions:

1. Treatment USG properties and violations our diplomatic privileges has gone far beyond stage any sovereign country can be expected accept. Despite this, USG has hitherto exercised greatest restraint because of our sincere desire prevent relations from further deterioration and because we have been relying on repeated GOI assurances that seized properties would be returned to us and harassments halted. These assurances so far have proved valueless.

2. Sukarno and other GOI leaders have attempted portray these excesses as expressions spontaneous anger at US policies for which GOI cannot be held responsible. We cannot accept this portrayal, which in effect asks us to acknowledge that Sukarno and GOI have lost control in their own country. Facts are clear that GOI itself has taken lead in creating this deplorable atmosphere, not only by failing to speak out for law and order but by publicly condoning and endorsing mob violence.

3. GOI leaders have ventured suggest that USG must itself share in task of halting these excesses by modifying its policies in FE. We cannot believe this suggestion advanced seriously. We prepared at any time to discuss our policies with GOI, explain our motives, and listen to GOI views. These excesses, however, do not add to our appreciation of GOI viewpoint and interests but diminish it to vanishing point.

4. We particularly regret that Indonesians have used Viet-Nam situation as excuse for latest series of outrages. We know GOI disagrees with our Viet-Nam policy. However, such disagreements must in no way be allowed to result in destruction or violation of diplomatic, consular or any other property. Our actions in Viet-Nam stem from our firm commitment to help South Viet-Nam defend itself against outside aggression, and we determined to continue doing whatever is found necessary to meet that commitment. No actions by GOI or Indonesian mobs are going to change that situation to slightest degree, and we are sorry to see GOI sacrificing our bilateral relations in fruitless, undignified efforts to do so. (If Sukarno takes this opportunity to debate our Viet-Nam policy, you should draw on Depcirtels 1441, 1442, 1443, 1449 and 1467/3/ in response.)

/3/Dated February 7, 7, 7, 8, and 11, respectively. (All in National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964-66, POL 27 VIET S)

5. We have now reached critical watershed in our relations with Indonesia. We want better relations and we prepared do whatever we reasonably can to achieve them. At present, however, we are at point where we can do no more unless GOI responds by promptly restoring conditions which will permit us deal with each other under tolerable conditions.



109. Telegram From the Embassy in Indonesia to the Department of State/1/

Djakarta, February 22, 1965, 5 p.m.

/1/Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964-66, POL INDON-US. Secret; Immediate. Repeated to CINCPAC for POLAD. Upon receipt, passed to the White House, Defense Department, and CIA.

1643. Ref: Deptel 727./2/ While we agree with analysis reftel, Country Team seriously concerned that line Ambassador instructed take with Sukarno will worsen rather than help basic situation. Recent deplorable attacks US installations here are reflection rather than cause fundamental US-GOI problem. Debate with Sukarno on Viet-Nam and other policy issues along lines reftel is not only futile but will just anger him and probably increase our troubles. Country Team convinced day when we can profitably try to argue Indos into accepting our viewpoint on major world issues is, for the moment and hopefully temporarily, past. Believe we should "agree to disagree" with GOI on China, Viet-Nam, Malaysia, Congo, etc. We can, of course, discuss these problems but would be futile to lay our prestige on line by attempting convince them we are right and they wrong. Believe, however, we can and should attempt turn present unfortunate situation to some advantage by shifting dialogue onto preservation our bilateral relationships and seeking actions best designed to do this.

/2/Document 108.

Following additional factors underlie Country Team thinking:

1. If we seem attack and threaten Indos along lines reftel they will react adversely and irrationally. We will not convince them, merely aggravate them. Situation will continue to worsen, perhaps to breaking point.

2. With no real capacity for retaliation against Indo installations in US, we only increase danger to our own establishment here by vague threats and admonitions. We believe it important that USG retain foothold in Indonesia. If present trends continue we will be put in position sooner or later where we will have little alternative but to retaliate against some Indo installations in US. Resulting tit-for-tat exchange could eliminate US from Indonesia. As Dept aware, Indos are hypersensitive in dealing with big Western power and perfectly capable cutting own throats if they believe they being pressured.

3. We support delay in $350,000 contribution to Bandung reactor but fact remains it is limited lever over Sukarno, whereas if used punitively it will only hurt and antagonize some of our friends here (especially Siwabessy). Unilateral reduction size USAID as punitive measure similar. If this to be done believe we should do it in way which gets at least some mileage from GOI.

4. Despite what Sukarno, Subandrio and others have said, evidence is clear they do not want our USIS libraries, at least as they now function, and have little interest in USAID. Same is probably true other parts US installation. Indos seem be reaching point at which they "tolerate" our programs because they think we want them and because up to a point they want to avoid antagonizing us further. Reftel seems imply we should press for physical protection existing establishment by GOI. We agree but believe we should also examine that establishment more closely to reduce difficulty of protection.

5. Would be unrealistic for us to insist on retention USIS libraries or other aspects our programs directed toward Indo people when they are in such marked contrast with what GOI is telling its own people. GOI has given us clear signal on these libraries. We should recognize it.

6. Despite our policy differences with GOI, Country Team believes constructive discussion is possible and necessary regarding our bilateral relations. We believe Sukarno and many of his top aides want avoid break with USG. Reasons for this complex but probably include (a) fact that US is major world power as well as power in Pacific; (b) GOI view that USG may at some point be useful in exerting influence on Brits; (c) belief US is still potent source aid; and (d) though this seems be diminishing possible belief USG is useful as counter-ploy to Communist China. Sukarno's often expressed and we believe sin- cere friendship for Americans as individuals also should not be over- looked.

7. As result above analysis, Country Team believes our objectives should be (a) quietly to reduce hostages (especially unengaged people in USIS aid and MILTAG); (b) eliminate those parts our establishment which have become useless to us and source profitless friction with GOI; and (c) try to convince Indos it in our common interest to carry out (a) and (b) above in rational and orderly manner and in way that will preserve our future bilateral relationship.

8. Approach which seeks reduce our presence here may actually stimulate Indos to help preserve as much of our establishment as possible. Our apparent readiness to take initiative may shock some Indos into believing we are preparing to abandon them. This could rebound to our benefit. Continued effort by us to avoid reductions in establish- ment likely strengthen hand those who seek total elimination USG presence.

To summarize, Country Team and I believe attacks on US installations and other recent GOI actions are signal Indos do not want us here in strength and form we now have. This not to say attacks in any sense justified or should be condoned. What we mean is that discussion should not be restricted solely to attacks and ostensible reason for them (Viet-Nam). Rather these should be used as springboard for far-reaching exploration seeking rational and realistic basis for continued USG-GOI relations. Numbered paras 1, 2 and 5 in instructions (reftel) seem fit within this framework. Paras 3 and 4 would, I believe, be counterproductive. I therefore urge Dept amend my instructions and authorize me make following approach to Sukarno and Subandrio (I would hope see them together; if not I would go over same ground separately)./3/

/3/In telegram 731 to Djakarta, February 22, the Department agreed to Jones' revised presentation subject to certain comments and observations. The Department believed that Indonesia had moved from "agreeing to disagree" to "riotsmanship" in its differences with the United States over Vietnam. The Department hoped that Sukarno "would not put the course of bilateral Indonesian-American relations in the hands of the Viet Cong." The Department hoped for a clearer idea of what part of the USIS program Indonesia was prepared to defend and warned that the AID programs in Indonesia were under increasing Congressional scrutiny and unless Sukarno desired termination or substantial reduction, there was no chance of Congressional agreement. (National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964-66, POL INDON-US)

1. (Same as numbered para 1 reftel.)

2. (Same as numbered para 2 reftel.)

3. These events have brought us to critical position. We want better relations and are prepared do whatever we reasonably can to achieve them. We believe GOI also wants maintain constructive relations with us. However this mutual desire endangers present situation in which we faced by intolerable attacks on our installations.

4. We believe we can and must seek position in which we can have honest policy differences without excesses. One phase of present problem may be GOI view that US presence in Indo too large and active and no longer reflects actual state our relations. Seems to us this is what GOI trying tell us by these repeated attacks on our installations.

5. If so we would like bring this into open so we can discuss on fal [full?] and frank basis; otherwise, continuation present trends may endanger more permanent aspects of our relationship. We fully willing discuss reductions and adjustments in our programs and installations if GOI believes these desirable. However we want to take these up in orderly way on government-to-government basis and not as result mob attacks. These attacks only complicate problem and make understanding more difficult. I would then seek draw Sukarno and Subandrio out on USIS and other US installations and programs along lines set forth above. I would stress need for facing problem openly and directly and would say that in view importance USG attaches to this issue I believe it essential we have joint understanding on these matters within 30 days. I would tell them I would report their views to my government and will want to discuss matter further. I would, of course, make no commitments at this time.

Foregoing message in which I concur was drafted by Country Team prior my return this afternoon and held for my signature. As Dept aware, I have long held out for maintaining as complete US presence here as possible, considering that closing down of USIS installations would be heralded as PKI victory and swiftly result in further clipping away of US presence as PKI tacticians turn the heat on Peace Corps, AID [less than 1 line of source text not declassified].

It is obvious, however, that if GOI does not want USIS to continue its activity in its present form, we as guests in country have no choice but to accept verdict. It is of vital importance to our bilateral relationship that if utility of USIS operation actually has diminished to point at which we are getting no returns on our investment, whatever adjustment is to be made should be made in manner to do least damage to totality of US position. This I and all of Country Team consider can only be done by full and free frank discussion with Sukarno and Subandrio without establishing atmosphere of threat or implied punishment.

USITO 132/4/ reporting USIA Director Rowen's views being answered separately.

/4/Not found.



110. Memorandum Prepared for the 303 Committee/1/

Washington, February 23, 1965.

/1/Source: National Security Council, Special Group/303 Committee Files, Subject Files, Indonesia. Secret; Eyes Only. In a brief attached note, March 4, [text not declassified], the NSC staff member on loan from the CIA, summarized this proposal as "[less than 1 line of source text not declassified] to chip away at the PKI and continue covert liaison and support to [less than 1 line of source text not declassified] and [less than 1 line of source text not declassified] personalities." [text not declassified] also stated that the proposal included the "up hill work" of exploiting factionalism and emphasizing traditional Indonesia mistrust of the Chinese mainland. He noted that "everyone concurs" and that Helms argued against any break with Sukarno because "whatever equities exist will be decimated without representation there." (Ibid., 303 Committee Minutes, 3/5/65)

Progress Report on [less than 1 line of source text not declassified] Covert Action in Indonesia

1. Summary

Since the summer of 1964, [less than 1 line of source text not declassified] has worked with the Department of State in formulating concepts and developing an operational program of political action in Indonesia aimed at bolstering the more moderate elements in the Indonesian political spectrum to counter the growing power of the Communist Party of Indonesia (PKI). This program has been coordinated in the Department of State with the Assistant Secretary for Far Eastern Affairs and with the U.S. Ambassador to Indonesia.

The aim of this political action program is to reduce the influence on Indonesian foreign and domestic policies of the PKI and the Government of Red China and to encourage and support existing non-Communist elements within Indonesia. The program envisages continuation of certain activities which have been undertaken previously on a developmental basis plus other new activities which appear now to offer promise of success if implemented on a coordinated and sustained basis. The main thrust of this program is designed to exploit factionalism within the PKI itself, to emphasize traditional Indonesian distrust of Mainland China and to portray the PKI as an instrument of Red Chinese imperialism. Specific types of activity envisaged include covert liaison with and support to existing anti-Communist groups, particularly among the [less than 1 line of source text not declassified],/2/ black letter operations, media operations, including possibly black radio, and political action within existing Indonesian organizations and institutions. The estimated annual cost of this program is [less than 1 line of source text not declassified]. These funds are available [less than 1 line of source text not declassified].

/2/On December 14, 1961, the Special Group (predecessor of the 303 Committee) agreed to spend [text not declassified] during FY 1962 "to support civic action and anti-Communist activities to be executed through [Indonesian] [less than 1 line of source text not declassified] instrumentalities" and [text not declassified] during FY 1962 and 1963 "to assist [less than 1 line of source text not declassified] in covert training of selected personnel and civilians, who will be placed in key positions in the [less than 1 line of source text not declassified] civic action program." (CIA Paper for the Special Group, December 11, 1961, and December 14, 1961, Minutes of the Special Group; ibid., Subject Files, Indonesia and Special Group Minutes, 12/14/61)

2. Problem

To counter the growing strength and influence of the Communist Party of Indonesia and Communist China over Indonesian foreign and domestic policies.

3. Factors Bearing on the Problem

One of the main factors bearing on the problem is the close affinity between the current objectives of Sukarno and Red China and the support provided to Sukarno by the PKI in contrast to the lack of coordination and common ground for action among the various anti-Communist elements within Indonesia.

a. Origin of the Requirement

The requirement for a program of this type arose out of a series of discussions of the problem between Ambassador Jones and the [less than 1 line of source text not declassified] and between Ambassador Jones and officials of the Department of State and the CIA in Washington.

b. Pertinent U.S. Policy Considerations

The program is consistent with U.S. policy which seeks a stable, non-Communist Indonesia.

c. Operational Objectives

Portray the PKI as an increasingly ambitious, dangerous opponent of Sukarno and legitimate nationalism and instrument of Chinese neo-imperialism.

Provide covert assistance to individuals and organizations capable of and prepared to take obstructive action against the PKI.

Encourage the growth of an ideological common denominator, within the framework of Sukarno's enunciated concepts, which will serve to unite non-Communist elements and create cleavage between the PKI and the balance of the Indonesian society.

Develop black and grey propaganda themes and mechanisms for use within Indonesia and via appropriate media assets outside of Indonesia in support of the objectives of this program.

Identify and cultivate potential leaders within Indonesia for the purpose of ensuring an orderly non-Communist succession upon Sukarno's death or removal from office.

Identify, assess and monitor the activities of anti-regime elements for the purpose of influencing them to support a non-Communist successor regime.

d. Risks Involved

Risks involved in this program include the possibility that were Sukarno to learn of its existence and to suspect that one of the objectives of the program is to weaken his control of Indonesian affairs, further deterioration of relations between Indonesia and the United States could result. An additional risk is the possibility that too blatant anti-PKI activity is likely to invite repressive measures on Sukarno's part, assisted by PKI attacks upon key anti-Communist leaders, with concomitant further disarray within the non-Communist groups. Nevertheless, it is believed that a program of this type should be attempted.

e. Funding

The estimated annual cost of this program is [less than 1 line of source text not declassified]. Funds are available [less than 1 line of source text not declassified] to support this program.

f. Support Required from Other Agencies

No support will be required from other agencies other than that normally deriving from Country Team cooperation in the field.

g. Timing of the Operation

[less than 1 line of source text not declassified] has been developing active relationships with leading nationalist personalities [1 line of source text not declassified]. Through secure mechanisms some funds have been given to key personalities to bolster their ability and their resolve to continue their anti-Communist activities which essentially are in the U.S. direction. The proposed operational program will be carried out as soon as approved.

4. Coordination

This operational program has been approved by Assistant Secretary of State for Far Eastern Affairs and by the U.S. Ambassador to Indonesia. Continuing coordination of specific projects will be effected in Djakarta with the Principal Officer.

5. Recommendation

It is recommended that the 303 Committee approve this program./3/

/3/The 303 Committee approved this paper on March 4. [text not declassified] of the CIA took the opportunity to urge "a larger political design or master plan to arrest the Indonesian march into the Chinese camp" based on the Maphilindo concept. He argued a major effort was required to prevent the United States from being excluded from Indonesia, suggesting that the loss of a nation of 105 million to the "Communist camp" would make a victory in Vietnam of little meaning. McGeorge Bundy stated that as a major political problem, Indonesia was receiving attention, but it "could not be settled in the 303 forum." (Ibid., 303 Committee Minutes, 3/5/65)


111. Telegram From the Embassy in Indonesia to the Department of State/1/

Djakarta, February 24, 1965, 2 p.m.

/1/Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964-66, POL INDON-US. Confidential; Priority. Repeated to CINCPAC for POLAD and passed to the White House, Defense Department, and CIA.

1658. Pass USIA for Rowan, Bunce./2/ Ref: Deptels 727,/3/ 731;/4/ Embtel 1643./5/ Serious talk with Sukarno alone this morning (Subandrio had departed for Medan) resulted in repeated promises and protestations that he would "do his best" to improve operating conditions for Embassy here as well as bilateral US-Indonesia relations. His statements were accompanied by vigorous complaints re treatment he was receiving at hands US press and accusations of CIA participation in conspiracy against himself. In response my complaint that his previous orders to permit our access to USIS Libraries had not been carried out, he summoned his aide and gave specific instructions to local authorities to this effect. Following meeting I issued press statement reported TOUSI 195./6/

/2/William K. Bunce, Deputy Director, Far East, USIA.

/3/Document 108.

/4/See footnote 3, Document 109.

/5/Document 109.

/6/Not found.

Meeting was unique in that there was no banter, hardly opportunity for usual exchange of courtesies. Promptly at 0730 President excused himself from group of courtiers and we got down to business at once. I reviewed situation as it existed two weeks ago at time of my departure for Manila, reminded President of promises he had made at that time, deplored deterioration in Emb operating conditions and overall US-Indo relationships since then and made points in Deptel 727 as modified by subsequent exchanges with Dept. I put up forcibly the proposition as to whether GOI was going to let mob action destroy possibility of satisfactory bilateral relations. I said I knew Sukarno could control situation if he made the effort although some of my people were now beginning to challenge this. I told Sukarno that we took very serious view of situation, that my government, including President Johnson, views inexcusable attacks on USG property with gravest concern and fears they will completely destroy useful relations between us unless steps are taken not only to halt them but to restore normal operating conditions. In making points 1, 2 and 5 in Deptel 727, in order impress him with fact we had about reached point of no return, I drew reftel from my pocket and read him actual text of portions of it. I then went on to suggest that we had reached stage where some basic decisions were required. We could no longer continue on present basis. We recognized that we were guests in Indonesia. Despite fact that USIS Libraries were established with a view to improving relations and creating better understanding between our two countries, we appeared to have reached point at which these installations had become local point of contact [conflict?]. If they were in fact not helping relations but rather reverse, perhaps we should consider closing them down. It obviously made no sense to continue effort which, aimed at creating understanding, was being exploited by hostile elements uncontrolled by GOI to exacerbate relations between us.

I suggested that we both consider this possible course of action from point of view of what was best for US-Indo bilateral relations and if it seemed closing USIS installations was the answer, then decision should be reached on basis mutual understanding and implementation carried out in cooperative manner calculated to do least harm to our relations.

President responded by nodding his head thoughtfully, indicating he wished to think matter over carefully. He said he would talk to me again about it in near future. I told him that conditions were currently intolerable and that I felt basic decision had to be reached in very near future as to whether libraries were to be closed and our books sent home or whether libraries were to be reopened. I reminded him that we had earlier discussed possibility of reopening Jogjakarta Library as gesture toward improved relations. I asked him to set a date for further discussion of this matter.

I then went on to summarize other harassments to which we had recently been subject, including specific mention of difficulties in utilization ALUSNA aircraft, harassment at airport in connection with receipt and delivery of APO mail, threatening circular letters addressed to American and Indonesian employees of Embassy and other unpleasantnesses. Under current circumstances, US Embassy was being harassed and discriminated against in violation of all international customs and usage to point where we could not conduct our normal business. I also mentioned Subandrio's trip to Medan and said that I had been informed that this trip represented first step in takeover rubber estates.

Sukarno vehemently denied this, said shoe was on other foot, that Subandrio was proceeding to Medan accompanied by Sudibjo of National Front, in effort to guard and protect American properties. As to other harassments, Sukarno said that he would do everything he could. As first step, he summoned his aide as reported above, and gave him specific instructions to notify local authorities in Jogjakarta, Surabaya and Djakarta that we should have access to USIS Libraries. At same time Sukarno said American Government was making it very difficult for him in his relationships with his own people because of our policies in Asia. I responded that America and Indonesia would be neighbors in the Pacific for centuries to come and that regardless of differences of views on such current issues as Vietnam, Malaysia, the Congo, etc. it seemed self-evident that it was in interest of both countries to maintain friendly bilateral relations and that these relations should not be impaired by mob action condoned by governmental authorities.

Sukarno admitted that he regarded action against USIS as retaliatory for US press attacks against him and Indonesia. He mentioned several examples to which he objected including recent Newsweek cover story. He said we always hid behind our freedom of the press but that unfriendly attacks on head of state by American journalists had same effect in Indonesia as demonstrations against USIS installations had in US. I pointed out obvious difference between two--Sukarno had the power to control press and mobs in Indonesia whereas our government did not have the power to control our press which was reacting to unjustified attacks on American property. "Can't your people understand that I am hurt, personally hurt, by these press attacks?" Sukarno asked. I reminded him that some of the greatest idols in American history including Presidents Lincoln, Roosevelt and Kennedy had been maligned by American press. He was no exception.

I drew conversation back to practical situation which called for immediate remedy. I suggested that Sukarno make public statement clarifying GOI responsibility under international law for protection of foreign persons and property and reminding his people that disagreements between nations did not warrant such hostile actions as we were currently experiencing. I concluded by repeating that this situation could not be allowed to drift any longer and that I felt we should shortly reach discussion as to future of American presence in Indonesia. I urged him to consider seriously how USIS problem should be handled and requested further appointment to follow up our discussions today later this week. Sukarno agreed and set up appointment for [garble--meeting?] Feb 26.

Without committing himself specifically, he again promised to do everything he could to improve situation but asked me to appeal to USG to move carefully in Asia and to do anything we could do to improve unfair and distorted press treatment of Indonesia and himself.

Sukarno comments on CIA subject in separate telegram./7/

/7/In telegram 1662 from Indonesia, February 24, Jones reported that in his discussion with Sukarno, "I categorically denied that CIA was involved in any operations against him. I told him [1 line of source text not declassified]" that "his suspicions that CIA was working to topple him were absolutely unfounded." According to Jones, Sukarno was unconvinced, referring to the "invisible government." Sukarno stated that Jones was not a party to nor aware of these clandestine operations. When Jones asked Sukarno to show him documentary evidence, Sukarno retorted it was no use because anything Sukarno showed him Jones would claim was "no good." Jones concluded, "We left it at that." (National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964-66, POL INDON-US)



112. Memorandum of Telephone Conversation Between the Assistant Secretary of State for Far Eastern Affairs (Bundy) and the Under Secretary of State (Ball)/1/

Washington, March 2, 1965, 9:50 a.m.

/1/Source: Johnson Library, Ball Papers, Telephone Conversations, Indonesia, [4/12/64-11/10/65]. No classification marking.


Ball said he thought we were creating an impression of looking undignified, and he thought we were going to ask Jones about his coming back.

Bundy said he had talked to the Secretary about this and explained his strong feeling that we are almost certainly headed for a very sharp cut-down in all our activities and we are going to announce our plans when they are clear. The way we do it makes a good deal of difference in whether we get back in at a later time and Jones' role at this point. Ball said he thought we should be taking the initiative in cutting down. Bundy said we are prepared to but we should do it as gently as possible for the time we move back in (presumably after Sukarno).

Ball thought these actions were hurting us in many other places. Bundy explained his visit to the Hill yesterday and there appeared to be no animosity as to the way the Dept was handling Indonesia. Ball said he did not think we had a program for reducing. Bundy said there was one and that it is just about racked up./2/ Ball said he would like to see it. A meeting was agreed on for today at 4:30 in Ball's office./3/

/2/On March 4 USIA announced it was closing all USIA Libraries and Reading Rooms in Indonesia in the face of Government of Indonesia failure to restrain mob violence and its placing of the USIA operations "under conditions that we find intolerable." The text of the statement is in American Foreign Policy: Current Documents, 1965, p. 755.

/3/No record of this meeting has been found. At 7 p.m. on March 2 Ball talked on the telephone with Under Secretary of State for Economic Affairs Thomas Mann. Ball informed Mann that Bunker would be going to Indonesia for a special assessment of the situation, but he asked that Mann not reveal it because he did not want to give Sukarno "a kudo" when "he is kicking us to death." Ball informed Mann that "we are pulling USIA out on March 3. Mann stated that Moyers recommended that since Sukarno planned to take over U.S. oil assets in Indonesia, the U.S. needed an Ambassador there. Mann did not think the President was as firm on this as Moyers was and agreed to talk to Moyers about it. (Johnson Library, Ball Papers, Telephone Conversations, Indonesia, [4/12/64-11/10/65])

Ball said he was disappointed in Jones' actions of late. He thought he was becoming too soft in order to go out with good relations. Bundy was not in complete agreement on this.

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