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 You are in: Under Secretary for Public Diplomacy and Public Affairs > Bureau of Public Affairs > Bureau of Public Affairs: Office of the Historian > Foreign Relations of the United States > Johnson Administration > Volume XXXI
Foreign Relations, 1964-1968, Volume XXXI, Central and South America; Mexico
Released by the Office of the Historian
Documents 21-43

21. Memorandum From the Presidentís Special Assistant for National Security Affairs (Bundy) to President Johnson/1/

Washington, July 20, 1964.

/1/ Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Cuba, OAS Resolution (9th MFM), Vol. V, 7/64-8/64. Confidential. According to a July 14 memorandum from Sayre to Bundy this memorandum was drafted by Sayre. (Ibid., Latin America, Vol. II, 6/64-12/64)

Your meeting July 21, 6 p.m., with heads of Latin American delegations

You are receiving the heads of the Latin American delegations to the Foreign Ministers meeting on Cuba on July 21 at 6 p.m. All of these delegations are headed by Foreign Ministers, except Mexico and the Dominican Republic, which will be represented by their OAS Ambassadors. We have discouraged the Dominican Foreign Minister, Donald Reid Cabral, because he is a Chief of State, and we would have had to treat him accordingly. The Mexican Foreign Minister, Jose Gorostiza, is not coming because Mexico has been in a minority and he didnít want to take a public beating in his first international meeting.

The meeting will also include Secretary Rusk, Tom Mann, Ambassadors Bunker and Duke, Senators Morse and Hickenlooper, Congressmen Selden and Mailliard, Secretary General of the OAS Mora, and myself.

Our suggestion is that during this reception you should talk informally with the Foreign Ministers in somewhat the way that you have with the Latin American Ambassadors. The group has been kept small for this purpose. Since you already talked on Latin American problems, our suggestion is that you might give them a general review of the world situation, and Horace Busby is putting some suggested remarks into final form./2/ The experts think that such a review would be welcomed by the Foreign Ministers, and that they would find it flattering to hear your views on the world. If you agree, the prepared remarks could be made available to the press through George Reedy, together with some background comment.

/2/ The remarks prepared by Busby have not been found.

These prepared remarks do not contain any argumentation on Cuba because we think the Foreign Ministers would regard this as undue pressure before they begin their deliberations. At the same time, it is entirely proper that you should informally state your own views in a private session, and we would plan to make it clear in backgrounding that you had done so, since we do not want the Republicans to be able to claim that you are uninterested in the resolution. In such informal remarks we suggest that you may want to make the following points which Tom Mann and Dean Rusk are already making in their discussions with the delegates:

1. Venezuela has been the victim of aggression and we should support her.

2. We should not do anything at this meeting that would give Cuba or the Soviet Union an impression that we have lessened our resolve to defend the Hemisphere against aggression.

3. Therefore we should adopt a strong and substantial resolution.

The present line-up on the Cuban resolution is reasonably hopeful. The Venezuelans are insisting on a mandatory break in relations and air service with Cuba, and eleven other Latin American countries share this view. Both on the merits and for political reasons we do not want to be against the Venezuelans, who are very firm on this issue.

Argentina, Brazil, and Bolivia are debating this issue of mandatory sanctions, but we think they will probably agree. That would give us 15 votes in favor of a resolution on Cuba at least as strong as the one you have already reviewed.

The Mexicans, however, are said to be bitter about the possibility of being forced to suspend relations and air service. They regard this move as a sanction against Mexico, not Cuba, and they are likely to carry Chile and perhaps Uruguay with them.

Haiti will try to blackmail us, but will probably vote on our side because we have two-thirds without her.

This picture is not perfect, and Tom Mann had hoped in particular for a less troublesome Mexican reaction, but I do not think we should try to second-guess him from the White House at this stage. I will try to have an up-to-the-minute account for you tomorrow before the meeting./3/

/3/ Although no substantive record of the meeting has been found, according to a memorandum for the record by W.Y. Smith it was discussed at the daily White House staff meeting on July 22: "At the soiree between the President and certain Latin American ambassadors yesterday the Mexican ambassador [to the OAS, Vicente SŠnchez Ga-vito] misbehaved a bit. There was informal agreement before him that nothing would be said on the OAS resolution on Cuba, now under discussion by the OAS Foreign Ministers. The Mexican ambassador, however, made an impassioned plea for a resolution that the Mexicans could live with. The President handled the matter expertly, making some bland reply. Secretary Rusk stepped in and said that the resolution was the subject for discussion later, not at the meeting then underway." (Memorandum for the record, National Defense University, Maxwell Taylor Papers, Chairmanís Staff Group, Box 25)

McG. B./4/

/4/ Printed from a copy that bears these typed initials.


22. Memorandum From Robert M. Sayre of the National Security Council Staff to the Presidentís Special Assistant for National Security Affairs (Bundy)/1/

Washington, July 23, 1964.

/1/ Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Cuba, OAS Resolution, Vol. V (9th MFM), 7/64-8/64. Confidential.

At the OAS meeting this morning, Argentina came out strongly against Cuba, but at the same time said that the action taken should be a matter of conviction with each American Republic. The Foreign Minister said Argentina had already resolved what it would do-it has broken relations, etc., but did not want to vote a resolution that would give other countries troubles. How Argentina will come out is hard to say; its position this morning was not helpful. The military members of the Argentine delegation are most unhappy with their Governmentís position. Stateís Director Argentine Affairs/2/ continues of the view that the Argentine Government will have to get in line or face the prospect of being tossed out by the military as it was in 1962, when it failed to agree at Punta del Este.

/2/ Henry A. Hoyt.

Haiti said it would vote with the majority on sanctions, but a double-cross is possible. The Haitian Foreign Office put the heat on Ambassador Timmons to get approval of an export license for T-28ís in the same conversation about Haitiís support on Cuba.

Brazil is working with our delegation, and is ready to go down the line with us. Counting Haiti, there are 13 votes lined up with us. Rusk discussed with the President at lunch, a telegram to President Paz to get Paz to instruct his Foreign Minister to vote with us./3/ Peru says it will vote with the majority, but it is also still talking like Argentina.


/3/ Although no substantive record of this discussion has been found, the President approved the telegram to Paz. (Telegram 49 to La Paz, July 23; National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964-66, POL 23-8 VEN) Rusk also called Ambassador to Bolivia Douglas Henderson to emphasize the importance of Boliviaís vote: "Sec asked what time he [Henderson] would see Pres Paz and Henderson said 4:15. Sec asked him to do his very best; this could make quite a lot of difference. Sec said we could get very good result if Henderson was successful. Sec. asked the Amb to phone us after his interview." (Rusk to Henderson, July 24, 2:50 p.m.; ibid., Rusk Files: Lot 72 D 192, Telephone Calls 7/1/64-8/5/64) No record of a return call from Henderson has been found. The subsequent reply from Paz was non-committal. (Telegram 121 from La Paz, July 25; ibid., Central Files 1964-66, POL 23-8 VEN)


Chile, Mexico and Uruguay are opposed to sanctions, and unlikely to change their minds.



23. Summary Record of the 536th Meeting of the National Security Council/1/

Washington, July 28, 1964, 12:15 p.m.

/1/ Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, NSC Meetings, Vol. 2, Tab 9, 7/28/64. Top Secret. The time of the meeting is from a memorandum dictated by McCone on July 29. According to McCone, Rusk "forecast that the resolution will have an important effect on Castro and intimated, but did not express, the thought that there would be a change in Castroís attitude as a result of the resolution. He [Rusk] seemed highly satisfied with the resolution." (Ibid., John McCone Memoranda, Meetings with the President, 1/4/64-4/28/65) President Johnson, who joined the discussion at 12:46 p.m., may have missed the Secretaryís report on the OAS resolution, which was first on the agenda. (Ibid., Presidentís Daily Diary)

Ninth Foreign Ministers Meeting; Cyprus, Mainland China

Secretary Rusk reported on the recent meeting of the Foreign Ministers of the Organization of American States, which was convened to deal with Cuban subversion in this Hemisphere, especially the shipment by Cuba of arms to Venezuela. Secretary Rusk summarized the Resolution adopted by the Foreign Ministers. The major advance is the agreed definition of "subversion" as "aggression". Secretary Rusk made the following points:

1. The United States did not press Mexico to break its air link to Cuba because this is the last remaining airline operating between Havana and the mainland.

2. The clause in the Resolution calling on non-OAS States to join with States in the Hemisphere in taking measures against Cuba is of major importance.

3. Chile, Uruguay and Bolivia may comply with the Resolution and break relations with Cuba. What Mexico will do remains in doubt./2/

/2/ Although Mexico refused to sever its ties to Cuba, the other countries later announced suspension of relations in accordance with the OAS resolution: Chile (August 11), Bolivia (August 21), and Uruguay (September 8).

4. An important achievement was to handle discussion in the meeting so that it did not become a United States versus Latin America contest. Emphasis was kept on the threat to Venezuela arising out of the shipment of arms by Cuba.

5. The United States avoided arm-twisting.

6. We hope the message contained in the Resolution will get through to Castro, as the Punte del Este Resolution did not.

7. The meeting was a success from our point of view. It was impossible to obtain unanimous agreement on the Resolution but Brazil, contrary to earlier meetings, played a constructive role./3/

/3/ The final act of the meeting of Foreign Ministers, including the text of the OAS resolution, is in Department of State Bulletin, August 10, 1964, pp. 179-184.

[Omitted here is discussion on Cyprus and Laos.]

Bromley Smith/4/

/4/ Printed from a copy that bears this typed signature.


24. National Intelligence Estimate/1/

NIE 80/90-64

Washington, August 19, 1964.

/1/ Source: Central Intelligence Agency, Job 79-R01012A, O/DDI Registry. Secret; Controlled Dissem. According to a note on the cover sheet this estimate was prepared in the Central Intelligence Agency with the participation of the intelligence organizations of the Departments of State and Defense and the NSA and FBI. The United States Intelligence Board concurred in this estimate on August 19.



The purpose of this estimate is to review, with respect to each Latin American country:/2/

/2/ Excluding Cuba, but including British Guiana and Surinam. The current estimate with respect to Cuba is NIE 85-64, "Situation and Prospects in Cuba," dated 5 August 1964. [Footnote in the source text; for text of NIE 85-64, see Foreign Relations, 1964-1968, Vol. XXXII, Document 281.]

(a) The internal conditions which favor or hinder Communist political or subversive activities.

(b) The strengths, capabilities, and policies of indigenous Communist elements, and the policies of their overseas patrons (the USSR, Communist China, or Cuba).

(c) The strengths and capabilities of the internal security forces.

These matters are reviewed in 21 annexes, each relating to one of the countries under consideration. These annexes are introduced by a summary estimate in general terms.

The Estimate

1. Each of the 21 countries under consideration has its own distinctive character and internal situation. Each is exceptional in some respect. The appropriate annex should therefore be consulted as regards the situation in any particular country./3/

/3/ As an indication of the range of variation within the region, consider the following extreme cases:

Area (sq. mi.): Brazil, 3,300,000; El Salvador, 8,000. Population: Brazil, 78,000,000; Surinam, 335,000. Density: Haiti, 420 per sq. mi.; Surinam, 6. Literacy: Uruguay, 88 percent; Haiti, 10 percent. GNP: Brazil, $14.4 billion; Surinam, $101 million. Per capita: Chile and Venezuela, over $700; Haiti, $71.

Three countries have predominantly white populations: Costa Rica (98%), Argentina (97%), and Uruguay (90%). Nine are predominantly mestizo: Paraguay (95%), Honduras (90%), Chile (88%), El Salvador (78%), Panama and Venezuela (70%), Nicaragua (68%), Colombia (57%), and Mexico (55%). Five have large, generally unassimilated Indian populations: Bolivia (55%), Guatemala (54%), Peru (50%), Ecuador (40%), and Mexico (30%). The Dominican Republic is predominantly mulatto (70%); Haiti is almost 100% Negro. The populations of Brazil, British Guiana, and Surinam are too variegated to permit classification in these terms. [Footnote in the source text.]

2. Throughout Latin America there is a rising popular demand for radical change in existing conditions-economic, social, and political. The intensity of this demand varies from country to country and within most countries. Backwardness is not in itself a spur to revolution, but rising consciousness of deprivation is. Nowhere as yet is this demand explosive, but the longer it is frustrated and suppressed the more likely it is to become so. The direction that political change may take remains open. It could as well be democratic or Peronist/4/ as Communist. But everywhere the rising demand for change is accompanied by an intensification of nationalistic emotions. Because the predominent foreign presence in the region is that of the US, Latin America ultranationalism has a predominantly anti-Yankee character.

/4/ That is, an authoritarian regime catering to nationalistic and working class interests. [Footnote in the source text.]

3. This situation manifestly offers a fertile field for Communist political and subversive activity. Communists have been working to exploit it for about 40 years. Their efforts have been hindered by countervailing factors, most notably by the ignorance and apathy of the masses, by the existence of strong non-Communist leftist movements in some countries, and by the strongly anti-Communist attitude of the military, who still exercise ultimate political authority in almost all countries./5/ But the rising demand for revolutionary change, only partly a result of Communist agitation, will operate to ultimate Communist advantage-unless the Communists are forestalled by fundamental reforms carried out by strong and stable non-Communist regimes.

/5/ The anti-Communist attitude and effectiveness of the military have been most recently demonstrated in Venezuela and Brazil. But there is another side to this coin. In times not long past, such military figures as Arbenz, Batista, and Pťrez Jimťnez found it convenient to use known Communists in order to undermine democratic opposition, in some cases to longterm Communist advantage. [Footnote in the source text.]

4. We doubt that present efforts to reform Latin American society will have any fundamental effect over the short run in most countries. Rapid population growth will continue to press upon the limited resources available for consumption and capital investment. Thus the pace of economic and social development is not likely to be rapid enough to satisfy the rising expectations of the masses. The unwillingness or inability of traditional political parties and institutions to provide effective remedies will continue to enhance the appeal of charismatic leaders disdainful of the slow pace of evolutionary reform, and will afford the Communists recurrent opportunities to associate themselves with popular political and revolutionary movements.

5. Communism in Latin America is preponderantly an urban phenomenon. The Communists have made little impression on the rural masses, the bulk of the population, principally for want of contact and opportunity. In recent years, however, they have begun to make special efforts to reach and organize the peasantry, notably in Mexico, Peru, Chile, and Brazil.

6. Among the urban Communists there are two sorts with generally different characteristics: i.e., labor leaders and intellectuals. The Communist leaders with labor backgrounds tend to be older men, pragmatic, calculating (i.e., "opportunistic"), predisposed toward political organization and action reinforced by politically-motivated strikes and mass demonstrations. The Communist intellectuals, on the other hand, tend to be doctrinaire revolutionaries, at least verbally addicted to revolutionary violence, although they have little or no contact with the masses whom they would lead to revolution. This last consideration hardly deters the student element in this category, who tend to be highly "adventuristic."

7. In Latin America organized labor is composed largely of skilled workmen who enjoy a privileged status and are more interested in differentiating themselves from the masses than in leading the masses to revolution. This factor has limited the appeal of communism among industrial workers. By and large, the Communists have not been successful in their efforts to gain control of organized labor. Nevertheless, they have been able to gain strong influence or control in some unions, and to use this labor leadership to exert political influence, or to make expedient deals with power seekers or power holders. Often, however, Communist "control" of important labor organizations reflects only their skill in political machinations. In such cases they cannot rely on the rank-and-file to follow their lead when a direct economic interest is not evident.

8. The Communistsí most striking success has been among middle class students and intellectuals. These are the people most acutely aware of the shortcomings of the societies in which they live and most impatient to transform them. They are well aware of the powers of resistance of the vested interests and consider existing democratic institutions ineffectual as a means of achieving rapid and radical reform. They are attracted to communism by its promise to cut this Gordian Knot, and by the expectation of being able to play an important role in the new dispensation. Even the non-Communist intellectuals tend to think in terms of a Marxist analysis of the situation-i.e., to attribute national shortcomings to "federal" class rule and to "Yankee imperialism."

9. In many Latin American countries the Communists are much divided amongst themselves, by personal factionalism, ideological sectarianism, and disputes over tactics. From the beginning there has been a general division between those who would pursue a "hard" line-immediate revolutionary violence-and those who prefer a more expedient "soft" line-patient organization and agitation in preparation for an eventual revolution. A generation ago this difference was expressed in terms of Trotskyism and Stalinism. Trotskyist elements still survive in many Latin American countries. Nowadays, however, essentially the same difference tends to be defined in terms of the Sino-Soviet controversy, or of the influence of Fidel Castro.

10. For purposes of analysis, it is possible to distinguish between the attitudes of the USSR, Communist China, and Castroist Cuba toward revolution in Latin America, but the reservation must be made in advance that these distinctions are blurred in practice and are not universally applicable. The essential point is that Communist action in Latin America depends on the willingness of indigenous individuals to act, at whatever personal risk they are disposed to accept, and consequently on their own tactical and doctrinal predilections. The USSR, Communist China, and Cuba can incite, encourage, advise, and render some degree of clandestine aid from the outside; the decision to act, and in what manner, is local and personal. The CPSU does exercise a measure of control over the established Communist party organizations, but the "Chinese" and "Cuban" factions are merely obtaining ideological justification and material support where they can find it, for actions which they are moved to take for their own reasons. They are not under Chinese or Cuban control.

11. The Soviet leaders, and the Communist parties responsive to them, certainly desire to exploit every opportunity to impair US interests in Latin America and to reduce US influence there. To those ends they have worked to stimulate already existing tendencies toward anti-US nationalism and to identify the US with the unsatisfactory status quo. But the Soviets almost certainly regard the Latin American Communist parties as presently incapable of seizing and holding power in their respective countries-and as not surely subject to Soviet control if they should do so. Thus, in the Soviet view, Communist seizure of power in Latin America remains a distant objective, not a present potentiality. An intermediate Soviet objective is to facilitate the coming to power of nationalistic regimes disposed to turn to local Communists and to the USSR for support in their defiance of "Yankee imperialism."

12. The Soviets generally prefer to pursue their objectives in Latin America by political means. On the international plane, this means Soviet cultivation of good relations with selected incumbent governments through offers of trade and aid, and Soviet encouragement of an independence in foreign policy verging toward neutralism. In domestic politics, it means Communist party pursuit of legal recognition and of collaboration with other parties in popular fronts, as in Chile. But the Soviets and local Communists also consider it imperative to prevent the success of any democratic reform movement in Latin America. To this end, the Communists have collaborated on occasion with the most ruthless dictatorships and have sought by violence to frustrate democratic reformist regimes, as in Venezuela.

13. The Chinese and their ideological adherents scorn Soviet "opportunism" in Latin America and hold that revolutionary ends can be achieved only by revolutionary violence. But the Chinese are not "adventuristic." They too recognize that the Communist revolution in Latin America is a distant objective, to be patiently prepared for, not an immediate potentiality. As a practical matter, the Chinese are more interested in gaining the adherence of the Latin American Communist parties for their own immediate purposes in their present struggle with the Soviets for the leadership of the international Communist movement. But the Latin American enthusiasts for the Chinese line are considerably less sophisticated about this matter than are the Chinese. They take their Chinese texts literally because they are themselves motivated toward early violent action.

14. The Cubans, like the Chinese, advocate violent revolution, but they are more "adventuristic." They hold that their own experience proves that even a premature and abortive revolutionary attempt would be a positive contribution to the cause, in that it would provoke regressive measures which would arouse the population against the government and so hasten the day of the successful revolution. This idea has appeal for undisciplined and "adventuristic" elements who want immediate action. Castroís efforts to foment revolutionary action in Latin America have suffered severe setbacks during the past year-e.g., the reverses suffered by the FALN in Venezuela and by Leonel Brizola in Brazil. Nevertheless, he will continue to provide training and other aid to potential revolutionaries in anticipation of future opportunities./6/

/6/ In 1963 about 4,600 Latin Americans visited Cuba, of whom most presumably received some formal indoctrination. Several hundred probably received training in the techniques of guerrilla warfare and urban terrorism. [Footnote in the source text.]

15. Factional conflicts among pro-Soviet, pro-Chinese, and pro-Cuban elements have tended to disrupt and discredit the Communist movement in Latin America. Nevertheless, all seek in one way or another to destroy the position of the US in Latin America and eventually to revolutionize the continent. All three Communist lines can be pursued simultaneously in a given country, thus catering to diverse disaffected elements. Moreover, these distinctions do not always apply. The USSR approves of violent resistance operations in countries in which political action is impossible, as has been the case in Venezuela, although Cuba is the active agent in such cases. (The USSR has a strong presence in the Cuban agency charged with fomenting and supporting such operations.) On the other hand, Communist China and Cuba pursue a primarily political approach in countries such as Mexico, where that is obviously the more expedient course.

16. On the basis of a country by country review, the Communistsí chances for gaining control of any Latin American country in the foreseeable future seem slight./7/ Yet the same could validly have been said of Cuba in 1957. There is a real danger inherent in the situation, and that danger will persist for at least a generation.

/7/ Possible exceptions are British Guiana and Chile. If the Jagan regime is still in power when British Guiana becomes independent, the Communists would be likely to gain control of that country. The forthcoming election on the basis of proportional representation is designed to unseat Jagan, but the possibility of his winning cannot be excluded. If FRAP should win the presidential election to be held in Chile in September 1964, which is at least possible, the Communists would gain great influence in the government, but not immediate control of it. [Footnote in the source text.]

17. The danger in Latin America results less from the Communistsí ability to convert people to communism than from the ability of a few dedicated Communists to exploit for their own purposes the widespread tendency toward anti-US nationalism. Both the traditional order and the potential democratic order are under sharp attack by radical ultranationalists as well as by Communists. Many of these ultranationalists also seek dictatorial power, for the gratification of personal ambitions, but also in order to transform their societies without hindrance by vested interests. By their appeal to nationalistic emotions, they can gain a wider acceptance in Latin America than can the Communists. But an ultranationalist regime could become Communist through dependence on the aid of local Communists and of the USSR in its defiance of "Yankee imperialism." This is in some part the explanation of what happened in Guatemala under Arbenz and in Cuba under Castro. The significance of the local Communist parties in this context is that they provide a continuity of organization and purpose unusual in Latin American political life and a link with the USSR as a world power believed to be able to provide aid and protection in the event of a hostile confrontation with the US.

[Omitted here are Annexes A through U.]


25. Memorandum From the Presidentís Special Assistant for National Security Affairs (Bundy)/1/

Washington, October 26, 1964.

/1/ Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, National Security Action Memorandums, NSAM No. 297. Secret.

Secretary of State
Secretary of Defense
Administrator, Agency for International Development

Study of U.S. Policy Toward Latin American Military Forces

The report of September 2, 1964 on NSAM 297 has been reviewed./2/ The Department of Defense is requested to undertake to draft a new U.S. strategy for dealing with Latin American military forces.

/2/ The report, prepared by the Department of State, is ibid. Bundy evidently chaired an interagency meeting to review the report on October 19. In an October 19 memorandum Sayre briefed Bundy on the meeting, explaining that the agencies could not agree on the proper use of military assistance for internal security. (Ibid.) No substantive record of the meeting has been found.

Specific proposals should be studied for such changes in U.S. policies and programs of military assistance and other military-associated programs, projected over the next five years, as may be necessary to carry out the new strategy. The basic strategy objective should be the restructuring of Latin American military establishments to relate country force levels, defense budgets and military capabilities as closely as possible to the domestic resources available for military purposes and to realistic current and potential security threats, with dominant emphasis on the internal security threat. The study should assess the political feasibility of achieving any such restructure in the context of the Latin American political scene and the possible contribution which might be made to achieving the strategy objectives by regional institutions, such as the OAS or IADB.

The study should include, but not be limited to, an examination of the following points:

1. A critical analysis of how Latin American military forces should be restructured in order to provide them with an increased capability to respond more effectively to internal security threats.

2. Whether, and the extent to which, the concept of hemispheric defense remains valid as a mission for Latin American forces and as a basis for U.S. military assistance in Latin America.

3. The current role of Latin American military forces in civic action with a view to determining whether military or civilian organizations provide the better channel for socially and economically desirable projects.

4. The utility of the Latin American military conscription sys-tem as a means of providing security forces and of absorbing excess labor.

5. How to identify, develop, equip, train and insure the availability of select units for OAS/UN peacekeeping assignments.

6. The proper balance between the roles of military and police units in maintaining internal security.

7. The feasibility of a shift in U.S. military assistance to increasing reliance upon credit sales instead of grants.

8. The feasibility of developing cooperative logistic arrangements and common-use training facilities on either a bi-lateral or regional basis among Latin American countries, including possible U.S. participation.

9. The contribution of U.S. military training programs to the education of Latin American military officers on the role of the military in a democratic society, on the effect of military expenditures on economic and social programs of the country, and on the need for continuing adjustment and reorganizations of military forces to meet current security threats.

The study should analyze disproportionate military expenditures, identified in the report of September 2, 1964 on NSAM 297, and the reasons for them, and propose specific measures for their reduction which are likely both to be politically feasible and to increase the effective utilization of available resources.

It is requested that the study and your recommendations, which should be drawn up in consultation with the Department of State and the NSC staff, be submitted by 1 February 1965./3/

/3/DOD submitted a draft report on January 12, 1965. (Washington National Records Center, OSD/ISA Files: FRC 330 70 A 3717, Latin America 1965, 320.2) Sayre later explained that there was disagreement on the utility of the draft report. According to Sayre, the report was "directed at how our military policy should be financed and not at what the military policy should be," leading JCS and State to take "sharp issue" with its conclusions. Rostow considered the report a "pedestrian" effort. While trying to remain neutral, Sayre insisted that the NSC "wanted a study which outlined a policy, not a financing arrangement." (Memorandum from Sayre to Bundy, March 8, 1965; Johnson Library, National Security File, Name File, Sayre Memos) For a summary of the final report, see Document 29.

McGeorge Bundy


26. Circular Telegram From the Department of State to Certain American Republic Posts/1/

Washington, February 12, 1965, 1:47 p.m.

/1/Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964-66, POL 3 IA. Confidential; Immediate; Exdis. Drafted by Mann; cleared by Sayre, Adams, Weismann, Read, and Chief of Protocol Lloyd N. Hand; and approved by Mann. Sent for action to the Embassies in Argentina, Bolivia, Chile, Colombia, Ecuador, Paraguay, Peru, Uruguay, and Venezuela.

1479. In late 1964 President Castello Branco invited President Johnson to visit Rio de Janeiro. Subsequently other Latin American Chiefs of State have also extended invitations to President Johnson.

President Johnson has suggested to President Castello Branco that in view of pressures on time of all Presidents, this might be good opportunity for all ten Presidents of South America and President Johnson to have informal meeting without agenda under circumstances which would permit each President to exchange views with every other President. GOB has welcomed this suggestion and has requested US to inform governments of nine South American republics of US proposal.

Precedents for group meetings of this kind include meeting of all Chiefs of State of Inter-American system in Panama in 1956 and President Kennedyís meeting with Presidents of Panama and five Central American countries in 1963.

Plans are that Presidents would arrive Rio April 28 or early morning 29th. April 29 and April 30 would be used for informal conversations without agenda by each President with other Presidents present on any topics of hemisphere or world interest which Presidents wished to discuss. Purpose of meeting would be to permit Presidents to become better personally acquainted with each other and with each otherís views rather than to have more formalized type of meeting. All discussions would be off the record.

Our thoughts are that similar meeting could be held with Chiefs of State in Middle America later this year or in 1966.

We hope other Presidents will share our view that such a meeting would be useful and have been authorized by GOB to state that invitations will be extended by President Castello Branco to all South American Chiefs of State who wish to attend.

Please inform President or Foreign Minister of foregoing and report reaction soonest.

Information addressees should take no action at this time./2/

/2/ On February 24 Mann raised the proposed trip with the President, particularly in light of unauthorized newspaper accounts. Mann suspected that the leak had come from "Latin American diplomats in Washington who were always anxious to talk to the press." The President wondered if the trip could be postponed; "the more he thought about it the more he felt it would be taking a lot of chances and not accomplishing much." Johnson suggested "that the Secret Service could say that they did not think now was a good time for the President to be traveling around. He did not think it would be good for a doctor to make the statement, but he thought that the Secret Service could." (Johnson Library, Papers of Thomas C. Mann, Telephone Conversations with LBJ, January 14, 1964-April 30, 1965) On March 7 the Department reported that "new developments in the international scene, particularly in Viet Nam, have made it necessary for President Johnson to defer consideration of possible visits to this hemisphere." (Telegram 836 to Buenos Aires, et al., March 7; National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964-66, POL 3 IA) At 8 p.m. the same day two Marine Battalion Landing Teams, the first American combat troops in Vietnam, arrived to defend the air base at Danang.



27. Editorial Note

On February 19, 1965, President Johnson nominated Thomas C. Mann as Under Secretary of State for Economic Affairs and Jack Hood Vaughn as Assistant Secretary of State for Inter-American Affairs. In recommending his successor, Mann told the President that Vaughn had done a "superior job" as Ambassador to Panama and had enough of a "liberal image" that "he might even be able to convert Schlesinger." Mann also said that Secretary of State Rusk had given "no objection" to the appointment. (Memorandum of telephone conversation, January 26; Johnson Library, Papers of Thomas C. Mann, Telephone Conversations with LBJ, January 14, 1964-April 30, 1965) Mann later told the President that "we had to build up Vaughn to the Latin American Ambassadors so they will think of him as the boss and let Mr. Mann work behind the scenes." (Memorandum of conversation, February 24; ibid.) In a meeting with Rusk on March 18, Director of Central Intelligence McCone criticized the choice, warning that "much of the good work accomplished in the last year or year and a half would be undone by Vaughn unless he was given very strong supervision and guidance by Rusk, Ball and Mann." According to

McCone: "Rusk indicated he had nothing to do with the appointment, inferred, but not mentioned, that the appointment was made by

the President." (Memorandum for the record, Central Intelligence Agency, DCI (McCone) Files, Job 80-B01285A, Memos for the Record) Vaughn was confirmed by the Senate on March 9 and assumed his new responsibilities on March 22. For additional documentation on the Vaughn and Mann appointments, see Foreign Relations, 1964-1968, volume XXXIII.


28. Memorandum for the Record/1/

Washington, April 8, 1965.

/1/ Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Special Group (CI) Files: Lot 70 D 258, 3/18/65-4/15/65. Secret. Drafted by C.G. Moody, Jr., Executive Secretary of the Special Group (CI).

Minutes of the Meeting of the Special Group (CI) 2:00 p.m., Thursday, April 8, 1965


Governor Harriman, Mr. McCone, General Wheeler, Mr. Komer, Mr. Gaud vice Mr. Bell, Mr. Wilson vice Mr. Rowan, Mr. Friedman vice Mr. Vance

General Anthis, Messrs. Adams, FitzGerald, Engle and Maechling were present for the meeting

1. Counterinsurgency Intelligence Summary

Special CIA Review of Latin America:

Mr. McCone began by saying that he wished to express as emphatically as possible the dangers in Latin America that require positive, concerted and prompt action. He reviewed the Latin American section in the summary/2/ and called the attention of the Group to recent statements out of Moscow for increased activity in Latin America naming the countries Venezuela, Colombia, Guatemala, Honduras, Paraguay and Haiti as immediate targets for wars of liberation./3/ He said that there is evidence that a policy decision has been made to conduct a more aggressive campaign not only in Latin America, but everywhere, though he only wished to address the Latin American situation today.

/2/ Reference is to a CIA Intelligence Memorandum, "Developments in Countries on the Counterinsurgency List," April 7. (Ibid.)

/3/ Reference is to the Conference of Representatives of Latin American Communist Parties, which met in Havana, November 1964; the communiquť of the conference was published in Pravda, January 19, 1965. The Conference endorsed a number of proposals in the struggle against "imperialism," including: "To render active support to those who are at present being subjected to brutal reprisals, such as, for instance, the Venezuelan, Colombian, Guatemalan, Honduran, Paraguayan and Haitian fighters." (Current Digest of the Soviet Press, Vol. XVII, No. 3, February 10, 1965, pp. 15-16)

Mr. McCone then briefed the Group on background information on this evidence and said that increased activity in certain designated target areas would be difficult if not impossible for some of the governments to handle. He stated that he is of the opinion that the Communistís planning in most Latin American countries is still in an embryonic stage and might be handled by small but skillfully trained organizations. He said that plans in each country must be developed to fit particular situations. He asked Mr. Desmond FitzGerald to outline a suggested approach to the problem.

Mr. FitzGerald explained that the counterinsurgency problem can be broken down into the three following phases:

Phase 1. In the earliest stages of insurgency, the subversion phase, the use of basic intelligence from successful penetrations to gain information, frustrate or hamper.

Phase 2. In the later and more violent terrorist stage, the use of intelligence in conjunction with local police forces who are trained to use the information. In this connection, security within police forces poses the greatest problem in Latin America in utilization of sensitive data.

Phase 3. In the more overt guerrilla and terrorist stage, the employment of military forces plus all other capabilities, especially communications and intelligence to permit rapid response by security forces.

To bridge the gap between Phase 2 and Phase 3 a small strike force must be provided which can be broken into small groups. Preferably this should be police. Such a force has been recommended for Peru and it will be air transportable. Mr. FitzGerald said that the Peruvians need air support for this plan and it probably will have to be provided by the U.S. Mr. McCone pointed out that this Special Police unit will be trained in counterinsurgency.

In response to the Chairman, Mr. FitzGerald said that the plan has been discussed with Peruvian officials, but would be raised again upon Ambassador Jonesí return this weekend because the Peruvians have a new Chief of Staff who was not in on the previous discussions. AID has agreed to finance this particular plan.

Mr. Friedman suggested that this concept should be used in all Latin American countries. Mr. FitzGerald replied that country-by-country treatment was preferable since each country had special internal political problems which affected their capabilities. Mr. McCone said that if we do decide to go forward with this plan, Peru could be used as the pilot plan. In replying to a question on funding, Mr. Gaud answered that there should be no problem, but each country would have to be studied separately to determine what is needed.

Mr. McCone suggested an action memorandum from the Chairman of the Special Group (CI), or an NSAM may ultimately be desirable. He emphasized that everyoneís support is needed. Mr. Komer stated that there is no doubt that the evidence indicates widespread activity and preventive measures should be taken now because the price is cheaper early in the game. The Chairman and Mr. FitzGerald both offered examples showing that few people in these countries including high government officials are aware of the Havana Conference of November 1964 or the Pravda statements, and suggested that psychological warfare is not receiving proper attention. Mr. FitzGerald pointed out that one of the main problems in creating security forces is that whenever a regime is toppled, the security forces are the first to be thrown out; this has had the effect of requiring constant retraining. General Wheeler stated he was in agreement with what had been said but felt we may be neglecting the source of much of the infection, Cuba itself. The Chairman agreed and asked Mr. Komer to advise Mr. McGeorge Bundy of the feelings of the Special Group on this score.

Mr. FitzGerald pointed out to the Group that U.S. military personnel in Venezuela are not permitted to accompany local forces into combat areas. This limits their capability to observe and take corrective action. The Group discussed the advisability of a high-level approach to the Venezuelan Government on the seriousness of this limitation.

After hearing Director McConeís presentation on new Communist insurgency effort in Latin America, the Special Group (CI) called for a full-scale review of this problem by the agencies concerned. To this end the Group proposed that the Latin American Ad Hoc Working Group analyze: (a) the intensified threat arising out of decisions at Havana Conference in November 1964; (b) the effectiveness of current CI programs addressed to this problem-intelligence, police, military aid, economic aid, psychological warfare and counter-propaganda, and (c) ways of stepping up U.S. and local efforts to cope with the threat on a country-by-country basis. The Latin American Working Group should report to CI Group by 1 June 1965, but may do so earlier on a country-by-country basis./4/

/4/ No evidence was found that the Latin American Ad Hoc Working Group completed a full-scale review of counterinsurgency.

The Group also endorsed the CIA/AID proposal for a special airborne police unit to be tried out on an experimental basis in Peru and asked that the Latin American Working Group comment as soon as possible on the feasibility of this proposal for other Latin American countries./5/ It was further agreed that USIA would be represented on the Ad Hoc Working Group.

/5/ Regarding the airborne unit, the so-called Special Police Emergency Unit (SPEU), see Document 471.

[Omitted here is discussion of a report on Public Safety Programs.]

C. G. Moody, Jr.
Executive Secretary
Special Group (CI)


29. Memorandum From Secretary of Defense McNamara to the Presidentís Special Assistant for National Security Affairs (Bundy)/1/

Washington, June 11, 1965.

/1/ Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Latin America, Vol. III, 1/65-6/65. Secret.

Study of U.S. Policy Toward Latin American Military Forces

In response to your memorandum of October 26, 1964 on the above subject,/2/ I am forwarding herewith a study prepared in the Department of Defense proposing a new strategy for dealing with Latin American military forces./3/

/2/ Document 25.

/3/ Dated February 25; attached but not printed.

The basic recommendations of the study are: (1) to initiate in

FY 67 a gradual, selective and controlled phasedown of MAP matťriel grants extending over two three-year periods: (a) FY 67-69-maintenance, overhaul items; (b) FY 69-71-investment items, and (2) concurrently to place increasing emphasis on credit sales, local defense production and better budgetary planning and programming by Latin American military establishments in a major effort to bring their forces more into line with domestic resources and with a realistic appraisal of the security threat. The proposal would include provision of matťriel grants for emergency purposes to meet foreign exchange inadequacies or for political reasons on an ad hoc basis when specifically justified.

The views of the Department of State, AID and the JCS have been sought and fully considered in drawing up this paper. However, it has not been possible to reconcile the differing views with the result that not all of the conclusions and recommendations of the study are concurred in by other agencies.

The principal objections of the Joint Chiefs of Staff are: (1) to the threat analysis, which they believe understates the insurgency problem, and (2) to the relatively minor military importance the study attaches to the future anti-submarine warfare requirements in South American waters. An extract of their views is enclosed as a separate memorandum./4/

/4/ Undated; attached but not printed.

The views of the Department of State are also enclosed in a separate memorandum./5/ While the Department of State accepts most of the conclusions of the study, they reject the above basic action recommendations. They acknowledge that the proposals are sound in principle and desirable of attainment, but believe that action should be delayed until some indefinite time in the future. Their fundamental reason is that to embark on such a course of action would be disruptive of U.S. influence in these countries and might tend to alienate the military forces on whom the Alliance for Progress must depend to maintain stability in the area.

/5/ Reference is to a letter from Vaughn to McNaughton, March 29, attached but not printed.

In the light of these comments, I recommend that the new strategy proposed in this study be regarded as a long-term goal, but one which must be approached without a rigid time frame.

Under our present MAP guidance we have been undertaking:

(1) A systematic effort to induce Latin American MAP recipients, to the extent feasible, to gradually assume the maintenance burden, e.g. spare parts and overhaul, now being borne by the MAP, and

(2) The development of integrated grant-credit packages of military assistance designed to provide maximum leverage in (a) holding down external military procurement of the Latin American armed forces to agreed upon levels and (b) directing their procurement toward realistic security requirements.

I believe that our best course of action is to continue these efforts, concentrating on prudent management of the MAP rather than upon the initiation of a new strategy.

In the meanwhile, the enclosed study provides a useful basis upon which to measure our progress toward accomplishment of the long-range goals of our Military Assistance Program in Latin America./6/

/6/ For additional discussion of U.S. policy toward Latin American military forces, see Document 65.

Robert S. McNamara


30. Action Memorandum From the Assistant Secretary of State for Inter-American Affairs (Vaughn) to Secretary of State Rusk/1/

Washington, August 4, 1965.

/1/ Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964-66, AID(AFP). Confidential. No drafting information appears on the memorandum.

Celebration of Fourth Anniversary of Charter of Punta del Este (Alliance for Progress) August 17, 1965

We have previously avoided a major celebration of the anniversary of the Charter of Punta del Este because the statistics provided no basis for celebration. The figures for 1964 are good, however, and prospects for 1965 are as good or better. But more important, the Alliance needs a psychological shot-in-the-arm and the personal imprint of the President. It is erroneously charged that we are neglecting the social aspects of the Alliance. Some Latins assert the Alliance died with Kennedy; others that our Dominican policy overshadows it./2/

/2/ On April 27 the President sent U.S. Marines to the Dominican Republic to protect American lives in the midst of civil war. He later claimed that action was necessary to prevent the establishment of a Communist dictatorship. In response to criticism that he had acted unilaterally, the President dispatched Ambassador at Large Harriman and a team of high-level officials to Latin America for consultation.

Mr. Sayre discussed this problem with the President on July 23 when he accompanied Ambassador Dungan. The President asked Mr. Sayre to send over a proposal./3/

/3/ According to the Presidentís Daily Diary Johnson met Dungan and Sayre on July 23, 2:55-3:43 p.m. (Johnson Library) Although no substantive record of the meeting has been found, a note attached to this memorandum reports that the President asked the two men "for ideas on how to revitalize the Alliance." (Note from Read to Rusk, August 4; National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964-66, AID(AFP))

We assume we could not get the President to make a trip to Latin America now because of Vietnam. In any event, I would be reluctant to recommend it, because of the security problems associated with it.

The President should kick if off in Washington. He has already taken the first step by the loan signing ceremony at the White House on July 29 with the Central Americans./4/ We have in mind a "social justice" address at the White House. The President has offered a trip on the Sequoia. After thinking this over, I have concluded that a boat trip does not do what we want, but would take as much of the Presidentís time. The Sequoia cannot accommodate the 33 OAS and White House Ambassadors. Moreover, we get little, if any, publicity. If a White House ceremony does not appeal to the President, we might consider something as unique as a luncheon at Monticello, Jeffersonís home. Jefferson was the exponent for all the things we want the President to emphasize-individual liberty, social justice, higher education, modernization of agriculture, etc.

/4/ Reference is to a $35 million AID loan to the Central American Bank for Economic Integration. For text of the Presidentís remarks upon signing the agreement, see Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States: Lyndon B. Johnson, 1965, Book II, pp. 809-811.


That you sign the memorandum (Tab B) to the President./5/

/5/ There is no indication of Ruskís approval on the memorandum, but a copy of the signed memorandum to the President is in the National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964-66, AID(AFP). During the signing ceremony on August 17 at the White House Johnson emphasized several elements to strengthen the Alliance, including: stabilizing the price of such basic commodities as coffee, cocoa, and sugar; and promoting economic integration in the region by reducing tariff barriers. (Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States: Lyndon B. Johnson, 1965, Book II, pp. 884-889)


31. Memorandum of Telephone Conversation/1/

Washington, August 27, 1965, 1:30 p.m.

/1/ Source: Johnson Library, Papers of Thomas C. Mann, Telephone Conversations with LBJ, May 2, 1965-June 2, 1966. No classification marking. Drafted by Viola Emrich (M).

Mr. Mann
The President

The President called and said he wanted a real good announcement written this afternoon he can put out on Monday/2/ which would say that he has been devoting a good deal of personal interest and attention to our relations with our good neighbors in this Hemisphere; that since he became President he has consulted with not only the people in the State Department that are experienced in this field but with the Congressional leaders and with the private sector and labor leaders and with the educators and former officials-Burley [Berle], Eisenhower and others who have served in official functions; that he has exchanged views and visits with some of the Presidents and officials of the nation and the Hemisphere, but the heavy workload has kept him from seeing them as much as he likes. He has met all the Ambassadors, OAS and Latin America, and that he has asked Dr. Milton Eisenhower, President of Johns Hopkins, who has served the Government for many years with distinction, an authority in this field, has written in this field and travelled in Latin America and advised him on this matter, to plan some visits to Latin America, and that he would hope that in the next few days that he would make his first one-his itinerary would be announced later, and a somewhat longer visit made in the next few weeks and perhaps others./3/ That he will be accompanied by a staff of experts in the economic and political fields-get out of military angles as much as possible-and that he will be consulting regularly with the Department officials in the next few days. Be sure to bring in when he says expert some of his ideas and dreams that went into the Act of Bogota, subsequently reaffirmed and implemented in the Alliance, but give him some good credits for his ideas and dreams. Also that his stuff was copied by the Kennedys and he had no recognition, this means more to us than to them.

/2/ August 30.

/3/ Eisenhower agreed to this arrangement earlier that afternoon. (Johnson Library, Recordings and Transcripts, Recording of telephone conversation between President Johnson and Milton Eisenhower, August 27, 12:25 p.m., Tape 6508.10, PNO 7)

The President said to build him as a real patriot. He asked Mr. Mann to touch base with Morse, say that earlier in the year he asked Eisenhower, Fulbright went to Brazil, asked Vaughn to visit some places;/4/ he said he had told Morse on two or three occasions to visit any countries he wanted. He said to ask Dr. Morgan and Selden,/5/ touch base with them and say we want them to go if they want to; donít tell him just ask. In the past, off-the-record, has asked Eisenhower to go and asked them to go, not on the same trips but individually to any countries they want to. He said to make it a good announcement and get Watson/6/ to put it on his wire tomorrow.

/4/ Fulbright headed the Senate delegation that accompanied high-level U.S. officials on a trip to Brazil in early August. (Department of State Bulletin, August 23, 1965, p. 332) Vaughn left on August 20 for a 2-week trip to Latin America, including stops in Mexico, El Salvador, Panama, Ecuador, Bolivia, Chile, and Peru. For Vaughnís report to the President on the trip, see ibid., October 4, 1965, pp. 548-549.

/5/ Congressmen Thomas E. Morgan (D-Pennsylvania), Chairman of the House Committee on Foreign Affairs, and Armistead I. Selden, Jr. (D-Alabama).

/6/ W. Marvin Watson, Jr.

Mr. Mann asked when would he want to make it. The President said the Secretary is coming down for dinner tomorrow night and Mr. Mann can send it by him, he will leave by Noon. He said he thought he would make it Sunday, quick as he can before Bobby is on every front page.

The President said to say in the announcement that he has asked Fulbright and other members of the Latin American Committees, he has Secretary Vaughn down there now, and give him the biggest title-Ambassador at Large if need be. Make a good announcement that will make the Latins happy. He said he wants to go to Mexico first, and told Mr. Mann he would call Flores/7/ and tell him that the President is sending an emissary and turn out for him and talk up everything for Mexico, sugar and everything else and put on a big show for him. The President said he would check it with his President and by Tuesday or Wednesday of next we would hear from him.

/7/ Antonio Carrillo Flores, Mexican Foreign Minister.

The President said we didnít want to get to Brazil, we are out of Brazil, he would say Mexico or two others. He said Mr. Mann could talk to Flores pretty quick and see if he likes it, while the Sugar Bill is up would be a good time. He said that Milton Eisenhower could have a good welcome and show good relations and could reflect it in this country.

Mr. Mann asked if Flores would be too many, and the President said no, should be at least three days on the plane, one place a day. Mr. Mann suggested perhaps one in Central America and one in Panama.

The President said to make it sound good and mention his ideas and dreams, Act of Bogota, and talk to him this afternoon and select the countries. He said to get Oliver in, and to get it to him without question, he wants it tomorrow. He said to salute it big./8/

/8/ The President left Washington on August 27, his 58th birthday, to spend the weekend at his Ranch in Texas. (Johnson Library, Presidentís Daily Diary) Before Rusk arrived the following afternoon, The New York Times reported that Senator Robert F. Kennedy was planning to visit South America in November. (The New York Times, August 28, 1965) The Johnson administration apparently decided against announcing its own plans for Milton Eisenhower. No evidence has been found that Eisenhower visited Latin America as the Presidentís personal emissary in 1965.


32. Memorandum of Telephone Conversation/1/

Washington, November 4, 1965, 4:45 p.m.

/1/ Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, ARA Files, 1965-67: Lot 70 D 295, Inner Office Memoranda, November 1965. No classification or drafting information appears on the memorandum. A copy was sent to Sayre.

Mr. Vaughn
Governor Harriman

Governor Harriman said that he had talked to Bobby Kennedy about a couple of things before he left and he had mentioned having a good talk with JV, and seemed quite happy about it. JV said that Kennedy had seemed quite rough./2/ In reply Harriman stated that Kennedy was a wonderful fellow but it was hard for him to get readjusted-that he felt things were just not as good as they used to be. JV mentioned that Kennedy had three specific points, which bother him and on which he felt he must speak out-

/2/ For an account of the meeting between Kennedy and Vaughn, see Arthur M. Schlesinger, Jr., Robert Kennedy and His Times, pp. 693-694.

1) D.R. (Harriman interrupted to say that he thought Kennedy wrong in his views on the D.R. and had told him so)

2) Policy in Peru-and

3) Recent developments in Brazil.

On the last point JV mentioned that Kennedy thought we should stop aid and Harriman remarked that this was "crazy." Harriman then explained that Kennedy had asked him to keep in touch and he (Harriman) felt that Dungan and Linc Gordon could do Kennedy some good. Continuing, Governor Harriman said that his interest was to be sure Kennedy was constructive-rather than destructive-because he "has so much steam," and asked if there was anything he could do in the way of communicating with him. JV and Harriman discussed further the things Kennedy would probably say in LA-he will probably say that we were wrong in the D.R. but that he is willing to forget the past and talk about the future. It was agreed that Kennedy was not as bad as Fulbright but that he would talk and would "raise this hell in Brazil" (Harriman). The Governor asked what Kennedy planned to do in Argentina and JV said that he wouldnít do anything since we are so far on the way of resolving the oil problem. Chile?-he wouldnít say anything. Venezuela?-no, the main problem there is oil and he feels it is too complicated for him to go into. Harriman asked if Kennedy really planned to talk against our policy in Peru and JV replied that he would express his view that we should stick to the Alliance for Progress objectives and not work with the oil companies. Harriman expressed hope that Linc Gordon could get to him on Brazil but JV said most likely Kennedy would be asked about Brazil before he gets there.

Going to another subject, Governor Harriman asked if Chile was going to show up at Rio and JV said that chances are that they will be going-the question mark being Venezuela. Harriman said that he thought Venezuela would follow Chile-JV said no, that they would not go because they did not have diplomatic relations./3/ As to U.S. policy on the Brazilian situation JV stated that the Second Institutional Act contained 32 different authoritarian steps the President could take and we felt it best to wait and see what he chose to do before making any statement of condemnation. Harriman said that it was his understanding that Castello Branco took these steps to appease his military and JV said "yes, he did."

/3/ Although a Chilean delegation attended the Rio conference, Venezuela refused to send a delegation; in accordance with the Betancourt doctrine, the Leoni administration had suspended diplomatic relations with Brazil after the coup díťtat of March-April 1964.

Returning to the subject of Kennedyís trip Harriman asked JV if he planned to write to any of the Ambassadors and JV said he was going to discuss this with the Secretary. Harriman suggested that a letter be sent Linc Gordon and Ralph Dungan-Dungan and Kennedy are friends and this might be helpful. Thought it advisable to let the Ambassadors know the mood Kennedy was in. Governor Harriman again stated that he would do anything he could to help in corralling Kennedy and asked JV to mention this to the Secretary./4/

/4/ According to the Secretaryís Appointment Book Vaughn met Rusk on November 8 (10:40 a.m.); the two men also attended a briefing session for the Rio Conference on November 9 (3 p.m.). (Johnson Library) No substantive record of either meeting was found.


33. Memorandum From William G. Bowdler of the National Security Council Staff to President Johnson/1/

Washington, November 17, 1965, 5:30 p.m.

/1/ Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Latin America, Vol. IV, 3/65-8/66. Secret.

Visits by Secretary Rusk and Senator Robert Kennedy to Latin America

The main developments in our Latin American relations this past week have centered on the visits of Secretary Rusk and Senator Robert Kennedy to several Latin American countries. Ellsworth Bunker brought you up-to-date on the Dominican picture yesterday./2/ The only other significant development is that of President Freiís reported decision to put an end to the copper strike, now in its fourth week. This may involve military intervention in the mines.

/2/ According to the Presidentís Daily Diary Johnson met Bunker twice on November 16. (Johnson Library) For a memorandum from Bunker to the President, November 15, see Foreign Relations, 1964-1968, vol. XXXII, Document 144.

Secretary Ruskís trip. Secretary Ruskís brief visits to Venezuela, Argentina and Uruguay, on his way to the Rio Conference, went very well./3/ The Communists and extreme leftists carried out some of their usual propaganda and pyrotechnic stunts but these did not directly affect the Secretary, except for one incident in Montevideo.

/3/ The Secretaryís itinerary in South America was: Venezuela (November 13-14); Argentina (November 15-16); Uruguay (November 16); Brazil (November 16-24); and Paraguay (November 24). Rusk was chairman of the U.S. Delegation to the Second Special Inter-American Conference, which met in Rio de Janeiro, November 17-30.

In Venezuela, the Secretary had a useful talk with President Leoni on the world situation. Leoni gave him a full airing of Venezuelaís complaints over our oil import restrictions. This was to be expected. As we told you last night, the Venezuelan Foreign Minister misread part of their conversation as an invitation by you to President Leoni to visit the United States. This may have been a deliberate attempt to display U.S. support for Venezuela, despite its decision not to attend the Rio meeting.

The visit with the Argentines was particularly cordial. President Illia showed special interest in the Vietnam problem and expressed support for our position. He stressed the necessity for the Latin American countries to promote the objectives of the Alliance for Progress and to rely on self-help measures. He reported that he had already spoken to the Chilean and Uruguayan Presidents about the Alliance along these lines, and planned to continue the dialogue with other Presidents. Secretary Rusk compared notes with the Argentine Foreign Minister on key issues at the Rio meeting and found a large measure of agreement. Secretary Rusk was so encouraged by his talks with the Argentine President and Foreign Minister and by what his economic team found on Argentine self-help measures, that he has asked that we consider moving ahead with some assistance projects being held in abeyance pending Argentine self-help performance and satisfactory settlement of the termination of the oil company contracts.

Secretary Rusk was in Montevideo for only three hours. An otherwise productive round of talks with President Beltran and Foreign Minister Vidal Zaglio was marred by an incident at an unscheduled wreath-laying ceremony. A 25-year old man broke through police lines and managed to get close enough to the Secretary to spit at him, but did not hit him.

Senator Kennedyís trip. Senator Kennedy has visited Peru, and today completes his tour in Chile./4/ From press and Embassy reports, the Peruvian visit was quite successful. Large, enthusiastic crowds turned out to meet him, and he was not the target of any anti-U.S. demonstrations. On the touchy issue of nationalization of the International Petroleum Company (IPC), he took a correct public position, despite his sharp disagreement with the Administrationís position on the handling of the IPC case with the Peruvian Government. He said that this is a matter for the Peruvian people to decide. He also acknowledged that under international law, a country is within its right to expropriate foreign property, provided it makes prompt, adequate and effective compensation.

/4/ Kennedyís itinerary in South America was: Peru (November 10-13); Chile (November 13-18); Argentina (November 18-20); Brazil (November 20-30); and Venezuela (November 30-December 1).

After his departure from Lima, two pro-nationalization magazines carried accounts of what he is alleged to have said on the IPC case at a private party. No one from the Embassy was present, so we do not have an official account. The thrust of these stories is that he, in effect, encouraged nationalization, pointing out that other Latin American countries had done this before without any significant long-term damage to their relations with the U.S. He is also alleged to have made some unflattering references to the Rockefeller family (IPC is an ESSO holding) and to have said that the Peruvian Ambassador in Washington advised him not to mention the IPC problem. This latter remark is already causing the Ambassador some trouble at home.

Ambassador Jones brought these stories to Kennedyís attention in Santiago and he has authorized a statement reaffirming his public position on expropriation and describing the use of remarks he made in a private conversation as "an irresponsible distortion of my position." The text of the statement is at Tab A./5/

/5/ Attached but not printed.

So far we have only press reports on Kennedyís five-day visit to Chile. He seems to have received a warm public reception, without incident, except in his speaking engagements with university groups. The themes he has stressed-e.g., the importance of the Alliance for Progress, praise for Freiís revolution-in-liberty program, the vital role which young people have to play-have gone over well and created no problems for him or for us.

He seems to have been adroit in handling questions about the Bay of Pigs and our action in the Dominican Republic. The press reports that he described our Dominican intervention as a mistake, but he has taken strong issue with questioners who cast our intervention as "American imperialism". The press has him saying more than he should about changes in his program in Brazil resulting from recent events there. The Brazilian Embassy has informally protested to State over his alleged remarks.

At the University in Santiago, a group of extremists tried to prevent him from speaking. Opposing students shouted them down. At Concepcion, he ran into stronger opposition as "pro-Communist" students used eggs and stones and saliva to disrupt his talk.

The larger projectiles reportedly did not hit him, but he was spat upon.

We will have a more complete and accurate report of the Chilean leg of the journey as soon as the Embassy reports are received./6/

/6/ The Embassy reports on Kennedyís trip were transmitted in: telegram 751 from Lima, November 11; telegram 761 from Lima, November 13; telegram 670 from Santiago, November 19; telegram 747 from Buenos Aires, November 23; telegram 1351 from Rio de Janeiro, December 2; and telegram 602 from Caracas, December 1. (All in National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964-66, LEG 7 KENNEDY)



34. Telegram From the Embassy in Brazil to the Department of State/1/

Rio de Janeiro, November 30, 1965, 2315Z.

/1/ Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964-66, POL 3 IA. Confidential; Immediate; Limdis. Passed to the White House.

1329. For the Secretary from Harriman.

The Final Act of the Conference was signed today with considerable enthusiasm./2/ Carrillo Flores spoke for the conference members, underlining progress in the social and economic fields. Throughout the conference he has been far more cooperative than previous Mexican ministers.

/2/ The text of the first two resolutions of the Final Act, a proposal to amend the OAS Charter and the Economic and Social Act, are in Department of State Bulletin, December 20, 1965, pp. 996-1001. The full text of the Final Act, which included 30 resolutions, is in The OAS Chronicle, February 1966, pp. 5-29.

Chairman Leitao concluded the session with a brief, businesslike speech summarizing the real achievements of the conference. In addition, he returned to Castello Brancoís theme of collective security and the need to equip the OAS with means for dealing with the new kind of threat we face today, namely, aggression by subversion. He handled skillfully the question of new members by expressing the hope that Canada, Trinidad, and Jamaica would soon join the organization and suggested that they be welcomed by acclamation. All, including the Guatemalan, clapped enthusiastically. This I believe satisfies the assurances you gave to the Jamaica and Trinidad representatives who can now report to their governments that conference expressed unanimous welcome if they indicated desire to join./3/

/3/ All three countries eventually joined the OAS: Trinidad and Tobago (1967), Jamaica (1969), Canada (1990).

The Economic and Social Act was approved without a dissenting voice. The Latinos agreed to a series of actions which they themselves are to take to promote development by self help and particularly by mutual assistance. They were not looking solely towards Uncle Sam, but with new emphasis on self help and particularly mutual aid among Latin Americans. Jack Vaughn and Walt Rostow deserve much credit in helping to hammer out the principles agreed to. Recalling the inestimable value of mutual assistance in Europe in Marshall Plan days, all this appeals to me as being a major forward step.

On the political side, the guidelines to the preparatory committee for the amendment of the charter on organization went along without much hitch except for the paragraph on the responsibilities that might be assigned to the council "relative to the maintenance of peace and the peaceful settlement of disputes", a phrase proposed by Guatemala and passed by split vote in committee one. Our delegation felt since it had been included we should stick to those who had supported it, and not give in to the soft group. After some rather heated discussion, the paragraph was approved 12 to 1 with 6 abstentions. Some appeared to be afraid that "maintenance of peace" was a first step to a peace force. Nevertheless, the whole section was unanimously approved.

There have been, however, a few reservations attached to the final document.

The resolution on human rights was constructive and the resolution on consultation prior to recognition of governments resulting from coups was innocuous.

Old hands here say that there was greater consensus and less argument than usual, and a good spirit of confidence in the progressive steps taken, particularly those relating to integration, mutual aid and area development.

The discordant note was the rigidities of countries such as Peru, Chile, Uruguay in the field of peaceful settlements. The majority, however, recognized that the long-festering disputes must be got out of the way if there is to be real economic integration and mutual aid. Peruís failure to get Lima as a conference site was a lesson to the conference, and the conference was profoundly impressed by our recent settlements with Panama and Mexico.

President Johnsonís proposal to extend the duration of the Alliance has been warmly received and was frequently referred to with appreciation./4/ There is no doubt your own week of consultation here had a highly salutary influence and your parting statement set the tone for the conference. The effective teamwork of the delegation could not have been better and the assistance of efficient Embassy was invaluable.

/4/ Rusk read the Presidentís message to the delegates, including the following passage: "Recognizing that fulfillment of our goals will require the continuation of the joint effort beyond 1971, I wish to inform the Conference-and through you, your respective governments-that the United States will be prepared to extend mutual commitments beyond the time period foreseen in the charter of Punta del Este." (Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States: Lyndon B. Johnson, 1965, Book II, pp. 1123-1124) The text of the Secretaryís address to the conference, November 22, is in Department of State Bulletin, December 20, 1965, pp. 985-995.



35. Memorandum From the Deputy Director for Coordination, Bureau of Intelligence and Research (Koren) to the Director (Hughes)

Washington, January 11, 1966.

[Source: Department of State, INR/IL Historical Files, ARA-CIA Weekly Meetings, 1966-1967. Secret. 4 pages of source text not declassified.]


36. Editorial Note

[text not declassified]


37. Memorandum of Telephone Conversation Between President Johnson and the Under Secretary of State for Economic Affairs (Mann)/1/

Washington, January 17, 1966, 11:05 a.m.

/1/ Source: Johnson Library, Papers of Thomas C. Mann, Telephone Conversations with LBJ, May 2, 1965-June 2, 1966. No classification or drafting information appears on the memorandum.

The President said that they had been giving a lot of thought to making Jack Vaughn the Peace Corps Administrator to succeed Shriver./2/ He did not know whether Vaughn would be interested, but what would we do if he were?

/2/ R. Sargent Shriver was also Director of the Office of Economic Opportunity.

Mr. Mann said he did not know. The President said we needed someone with a liberal image who could get rid of this crowd. Mr. Mann said he thought it would be a good move for Jack and good for the President, because Mr. Mann thought Bobby K. had his knife sharpened for Mr. Vaughn and perhaps Morse and a couple of others also. Mr. Mann said he thought they fully intended to cut Vaughn down in 66. The President agreed and asked about Ambassador Gordon. Mr. Mann said he thought he would be as good as the President could get. He has some lines out to the left-he belonged to the left three years ago. He came in with Kennedy. Mr. Mann said he thought that Berle and Gordon had been on an advisory committee to the President/3/ and had had a lot to do with the Alliance and the liberal image, so presumably this would stand him in good stead. Mr. Mann said on the other hand, Gordon is a determined guy, but all good people are. He has his own views and he sticks to them.

/3/ Adolf A. Berle served as the chairman of two task forces on Latin America, November 1960-July 1961; Gordon was a member of both.

The President asked about his loyalties. Mr. Mann said he did not think he had any strong ones to Kennedy but that he did not consider Kennedy his enemy. The President asked what Ambassador Gordon had reported about the Kennedy visit down there and Mr. Mann said he would have to look this up./4/

/4/ See footnote 6, Document 33.

The President asked if Mr. Mann thought that Vaughn would go for this. Mr. Mann said he did not know but he thought he could help talk him into it. The President asked who we would put in Brazil and Mr. Mann said he did not know. The President mentioned Berle, but Mr. Mann said no, he was too old, too contentious and too arrogant. He thought he would talk down to the Brazilians.

The President told Mr. Mann to think about who we could put in there. He asked if Oliver would do it instead of coming home. Mr. Mann said Oliver was a Spanish type. He said he would think about it and call the President back. The President said to call him back in an hour./5/

/5/ In that telephone conversation with the President, at 12:10 p.m., Mann reported that "he had done a little looking around and he thought that the choice of Gordon for ARA would be the best the President could do." Mann expected that Vaughn would agree to the proposed change; he also suggested several candidates to replace Gordon in Rio. (Johnson Library, Papers of Thomas C. Mann, Telephone Conversations with LBJ, May 2, 1965-June 2 1966) Johnson called Vaughn at 1:50 p.m. and received a call at 3:14 p.m. from Gordon in Cambridge, Massachusetts. (Ibid., Presidentís Daily Diary) One hour later the President announced that Vaughn would replace Shriver as Director of the Peace Corps. (Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States: Lyndon B. Johnson, 1966, Book I, pp. 24-25) After meeting Gordon the next morning Johnson announced his nomination as Assistant Secretary. (Ibid., p. 26) Gordon took office on March 9. On May 22 John W. Tuthill was appointed to succeed Gordon as Ambassador to Brazil.


38. National Intelligence Estimate/1/

NIE 80/90-66

Washington, February 17, 1966.

/1/ Source: Central Intelligence Agency, Job 79-R01012A, O/DDI Registry. Secret; Controlled Dissem. According to a note on the cover sheet this estimate was prepared in the Central Intelligence Agency with the participation of the intelligence organizations of the Departments of State and Defense, and the National Security Agency. The United States Intelligence Board concurred in this estimate on February 17. The estimate supplements NIE 80/90-64 (Document 24).


/2/ Excluding Cuba, for which the current estimate is NIE 85-65, dated 19 August 1965. [Footnote in the source text; for text of NIE 85-65, see Foreign Relations, 1964-1968, vol. XXXII, Document 305.]

The Problem

To estimate the character of the insurgency threat in Latin America, and the prospects over the next few years./3/

/3/ By insurgency we mean the systematic use of violence to overthrow or undermine the established political and social order. We exclude military coups díťtat, endemic banditry, and spontaneous disorder. [Footnote in the source text.]


A. There has been a rash of insurgencies in Latin America since Castroís triumph in Cuba in 1959, but only a few have developed much virulence. The more active ones, in Venezuela, Guatemala, Peru, and Colombia, have either lost ground or gained little over the past year.

B. The growth of Latin American insurgencies has been hindered by the disunity of extremist groups, the want of willing martyrs, and the failure to attract much popular support. It has also been contained by the counteraction undertaken by the governments involved, with substantial US support.

C. Insurgencies tend to prosper along one of two lines: the largely unhampered expansion of a guerrilla campaign, as in Cuba, or the exploitation of a sudden upheaval, as in the Dominican Republic in 1965. Thus the prospects for a particular insurgency are likely to depend less on its initial strength than on the disabilities of the government which may prevent effective counteraction. The danger of insurgency is probably greater in some chronically unstable countries not now plagued by insurgent activity, such as Bolivia or Haiti, than in a country like Venezuela, where the government is moving effectively against an active insurgency and, to an extent, against the underlying social tensions.

D. In this context, the inherently unstable political situations in the following countries render them vulnerable to the rapid development of insurgency: Bolivia, the Dominican Republic, Ecuador, Guatemala, Haiti, Honduras, and Panama.

[Omitted here is the Discussion section of the estimate.]


39. Memorandum From Secretary of State Rusk to President Johnson/1/

Washington, May 3, 1966.

/1/ Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Memos to the President, Walt W. Rostow, Vol. 2. Confidential. No drafting information appears on the memorandum. Rostow forwarded the memorandum to the President on May 4.

OAS Charter Amendments


1. At the OAS Conference in Rio last November, it was unanimously agreed that the Charter of the OAS should be amended in three respects:

(a) To improve the structure of the organization by holding annual meetings of Foreign Ministers and in other respects;

(b) To strengthen the capacity of the organization to assist in the peaceful settlement of disputes among member countries; and

(c) To incorporate as treaty obligations the basic principles of the Alliance for Progress, including self-help and mutual assistance to accelerate economic and social progress. It was made clear that mutual assistance included actions by the Latin Americans for one another as well as actions by the United States.

2. A special OAS Committee met in Panama in late February and March of this year to draft Charter amendments in accordance with the decisions of Rio. Substantial agreement was reached on the matters of structure and peaceful settlement of disputes, but there was disagreement between the Latin American and United States delegations regarding the economic and social chapters. We believed that the Latin American proposals were unnecessarily elaborate, and that they might involve treaty commitments to aid and trade policies which would be opposed by the Senate as an unacceptable infringement on Congressional prerogatives. We, therefore, reserved our position, indicating that further consultations were required with the Senate on the basis of which we would offer counter-proposals. We stated, however, that the United States Government stands by the basic principles of the Economic and Social Act of Rio, and that our differences related only to the appropriate form for incorporation of these principles into treaty language.

3. After Assistant Secretary Gordon returned from Buenos Aires in early April,/2/ a revised draft was prepared and presented to the Latin American Subcommittee of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee. It was discussed at length on April 25 with about 12 members of Senator Morseís subcommittee. Senator Fulbright participated as Chairman of the full Committee.

/2/ Gordon went to Buenos Aires in late-March for the fourth annual meeting of the Inter-American Economic and Social Council. For text of his remarks before the Council, March 29, see Department of State Bulletin, May 9, 1966, pp. 738-746. Gordonís report on the outcome of the meeting is in telegram 1470 from Buenos Aires, April 2. (National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964-66, AID (AFP) 3 ECOSOC-IA)

4. On Monday afternoon, May 2, Senators Fulbright and Morse, together with Senators McCarthy, Aiken and Carlson met again with Assistant Secretary Gordon. Senator Morse, speaking for the group stated that it was the Committeeís considered opinion that commitments to mutual assistance, even with the safeguards contained in the State Departmentís draft, should not be incorporated into treaty obligations, but should be left to normal legislative action. The Senators recognized that Article 26 of the present Charter (adopted in 1948) does include a broad commitment to economic cooperation. The discussion made it clear that their objection to going further is related to concerns arising from the Vietnamese situation and generally from concern about the breadth of international commitments of the United States. All efforts to persuade them that the Western Hemisphere situation differs from others, in view of our long-standing special relations within this Hemisphere and the collective security engagements under the

Inter-American Treaty of Reciprocal Assistance (Rio treaty) of 1947, proved unavailing.

5. We have prepared a revised draft of the relevant articles which removes the qualified undertaking "to extend mutual assistance", thereby meeting the central objection of the Committee. In an effort to keep faith with the understandings of Rio and to avoid a potential major setback in the climate of inter-American relations, we have drawn from the present Article 26 and then tied the use of resources under that Article to the self-help commitments and other provisions of the Alliance for Progress. Even this proposal will probably be regarded by the Latin Americans as a significant retreat from the Rio agreements; but we believe that it might barely suffice to bridge the gap. Anything less would not do so.

6. Enclosure 1/3/ contains in parallel columns (1) the "Panama Draft" on mutual assistance as approved by all the Latin American Delegations, (2) the draft submitted to the Senate Committee and opposed by them, and (3) the new proposed draft, the first article of which is identical with Article 26 of the present Charter.

/3/ Both enclosures are attached but not printed.

7. Enclosure 2 contains in parallel columns the entire chapter on economic standards (1) as approved by the Latin American Delegations at Panama, and (2) as contained in the United States counter-proposals submitted to the Senate Committee.

8. The problem of timing is very tight. The Buenos Aires conference of Foreign Ministers to approve Charter amendments is now scheduled for July 30. To meet this date the OAS Council must submit its report by May 31. We do not want to maintain the present Buenos Aires schedule unless agreement on assistance among all the Member Governments can be reached before May 31. Assistant Secretary Gordon leaves Friday morning for Central America and Chile and hopes to discuss this matter on his trip. Any significant slippage in the Buenos Aires schedule would affect adversely the proposed Presidential Summit Meeting.

Alternative Courses of Action

(Linc Gordon and I would welcome the opportunity of a few minutesí discussion with you on these alternatives at your earliest convenience.)/4/

/4/ No decisions are recorded on the memorandum. According to the Presidentís Daily Diary Johnson met Rusk and Gordon on May 5 to discuss the proposed amendments to the OAS charter. (Johnson Library) Although no substantive record of the meeting has been found, the administration apparently proceeded on the basis of the first alternative.

1. We can proceed to negotiate the revised language without further consultation with the Senate. In this case, we should inform them that we have taken their basic point into account and are seeking to negotiate the new language which would be given to them.

2. We could take the revised proposals back for further discussions with the Senate Committee at the State Department level. In the present frame of mind of key members, this would run the risk that they would object on the ground that the proposed Article 7 gives a broader construction to the existing obligation under Article 6, and constitutes in spirit, if not in form, a commitment to mutual assistance.

3. The new proposals (or a return to something stronger) could be discussed with the Senators with your own participation.

Dean Rusk


40. Memorandum From the Presidentís Special Assistant (Rostow) to President Johnson/1/

Washington, May 27, 1966.

/1/ Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, National Security Action Memorandums, NSAM No. 349. Confidential.

Frontiers of South America

On January 31, 1966, you requested that I undertake urgently a preliminary assessment of the potentialities of developing the frontiers of South America.

I attach a summary report and seven appendixes./2/ In addition, there is included a special report developed by the Department of the Armyís Engineer Agency for Resources Inventories./3/

/2/ The report was prepared by the Departmentís Policy Planning Council in May 1966; attached but not printed. Rostow was chairman of the Council until April 1, when he succeeded Bundy as Special Assistant to the President.

/3/ Dated February 14; attached but not printed.

These represent the present state of thought and knowledge in the town. They have been assembled to provide a foundation for future systematic work. None can be regarded as definitive.

In compiling the data and writing the report, I have received the whole-hearted support of every element in the government with interest in and knowledge of the problem:

Agency for International Development
Department of Agriculture
Department of Commerce
Department of Interior
Department of the Army
National Aeronautics and Space Agency.

This is, I believe, the first time this problem has been systematically examined in our government. It is evident that there is much more for us all to learn; and my first recommendation is that, under Linc Gordonís leadership, work on this problem be made a continuing account and that the various agencies capable of making a contribution continue to expand and refine their knowledge on a coordinated basis. A working party operating under the Latin American IRG might perform this function.

In addition, CIAP should set up a working group that would regularly engage the IBRD, IDB, AID, and the OAS in this field.

What emerges of substance may be briskly summarized as follows:

1. South America is at a stage of historical evolution where the further development of its frontiers can contribute to food production, a widening of markets, regional integration, and the settlement of various bilateral disputes.

2. A rational program for exploiting these frontiers must be geared to other aspects of South American development, with careful attention to the comparative benefits to be derived from intensive investment in existing areas as opposed to extensive investment in expanding the frontiers. The opening of the South American frontiers has an important role to play in the regionís future; but it is not a panacea.

3. There are four major complexes which comprise the bulk of the frontier regions of South America capable of rational economic exploitation from the present forward.

-The Darien Gap area of Panama and Colombia;

-The Andean Piedmont, running in an irregular narrow belt for 3,000 miles from the Venezuelan border through Colombia, Ecuador, Peru, to the Santa Cruz region of Bolivia;

-The Campo Cerrado area, east and south of the Amazon basin;

-The Gran Chaco and Gran Pantanal region covering portions of Bolivia, Paraguay, Brazil and Argentina.

There are special further potentialities in the tropical flood plains of the Amazon; the Guayana region of Venezuela and British Guiana; the linking of Buenos Aires to the whole region south of Rio-Sao Paulo; and the River Plate drainage system.

The character of all these regions are briefly sketched in the report.

4. There is little prospect in sight for the economic exploitation of the vast Amazon-Orinoco basin unless the proposal for making it a lake (by damming the rivers) should prove feasible.

5. As the survey of seventy-four projects under way or envisaged indicates (Appendix I), there is now a great deal of activity focused on the opening up of the frontiers; and it is generally following a rational pattern. The task for policy in Latin America is to make the expansion of the frontiers more effective and purposeful.

6. A political point of some importance: the opening up of these frontier regions could, in a number of South American countries, strengthen the sense of nationhood and contribute to political and social stability. Moreover, notably in the Andean Piedmont, but elsewhere as well, the laying out of roads and organized settlements is a significant element in preventing the possibilities of Communist insurgency.

7. Detailed recommendations are set out in Part Four of the attached summary report. Briefly, they are:

-The Darien Gap complex be urgently examined as a whole, notably in the light of our Panamanian negotiations. Its various elements have been hitherto treated separately.

-We maintain a policy of selective but continued support for road-building in each of the four countries engaged in opening up the Andean Piedmont. (The report isolates the road segments judged most rational for the next phase.)

-We assign specific responsibility to Linc Gordon quietly to explore the possibility of exploiting work on multinational projects to ease or settle the major outstanding bilateral quarrels in South America.

-We clarify our minds on the economics of frontier settlement in the light of recent experience and establish Alliance for Progress policies based on this review. No serious agreed guidelines now exist.

-We examine urgently on an interdepartmental basis, perhaps under the aegis of the SIG, the security and other problems involved in a systematic use of orbital remote-sensor measurement of land and geological formations in South America, providing you with a report. These methods could accelerate rapidly mineral discovery and exploitation, notably in the Andes.

-We intensify our support for your proposal, via CIAP, for accelerated development of chemical fertilizer production in Latin America.

-We set up both within the CIAP framework and within the U.S. Government continuing systematic work on the development of the South American frontiers.

-CIAP should consider this summer (after the report on multinational projects by the Development and Resources Corporation, headed by David Lilienthal) the publication of materials that would dramatize what is going forward in this field and its potentialities for Latin American development and integration.

-We re-examine (with full attention to our balance of payments position) our present policy on local cost financing of development projects with a view to permitting financing of local costs of certain infrastructure projects as part of an over-all program for opening frontier areas.

If further detailed examination of this study makes sense to you, I recommend that an NSAM be issued assigning responsibility for the task to State-specifically to Linc Gordon. A suggested draft NSAM for your approval is at Tab A./4/

/4/ Attached but not printed. In NSAM No. 349, May 31, the President instructed the Department to report on development of the South American frontier. (Johnson Library, National Security File, National Security Action Memorandums, NSAM No. 349) Progress reports, dated February 14, 1967, July 2, 1967, and March 25, 1968, are ibid.

You may wish to weave into your statements on Latin America passages indicating an awareness of the frontier development going forward, its potentialities, and your support for it. A possible draft is at Tab B./5/

/5/ Attached but not printed. The President approved the draft statement. In a speech marking the fifth anniversary of the Alliance for Progress, August 17, Johnson referred to development of the inner frontier: "The eastern slopes of the Andes, the water systems of the Gran Pantanal River Plate, and Orinoco, the barely touched areas of Central America and of Panama-these are just a few of the frontiers, which, this morning, beckon to us." (Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States: Lyndon B. Johnson, 1966, Book I, pp. 824-829)

Should you (or the Vice President) visit Latin America, you may wish to visit certain selected frontier areas as well as the conventional cities./6/

/6/ A handwritten note by the President at the end of the memorandum reads: "Good. L"



41. Memorandum From the Presidentís Special Assistant (Rostow) to President Johnson/1/

Washington, October 15, 1966, 12:30 p.m.

/1/ Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Memos to the President, Walt W. Rostow, Vol. 14. Secret. A copy was sent to Moyers.

Our Program for the OAS Summit

Secretary Rusk in the attached memorandum/2/ requests your approval of general guidelines for our negotiators on Summit preparations.

/2/ Memorandum from Rusk to the President, undated; attached but not printed. A copy, dated October 14, is in the National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964-66, POL 7 IA SUMMIT.

The guidelines are based on a Summit program which has substantial inter-agency concurrence except for the budgetary implications. Because of the difference, Secretary Rusk is not asking that you make a decision on this aspect until you can review the Summit price tag in the light of the total aid request for FY 1968.

These guidelines provide adequate interim direction for the preliminary multilateral preparatory work which will take place during the next 6-8 weeks.

The Summit Deal

We are asking the Latins to:

-integrate their economies and sharply reduce tariffs.
-revamp their antiquated agricultural and educational systems.
-work with us in promoting private investment.

It will take courage for the Latin American Presidents to take their countries down this uncharted path.

To induce them to step off into the dark and break past the obstacles, a substantial U.S. "carrot" will help. Expanded economic

assistance is our part of the deal.

The guidelines will enable our negotiators to explore:

-how far the Latins are prepared to go.
-how much inducement must we offer to make them take the jump.

Based on their findings, you can decide on the specific proposals.

Our Present Summit Program

It is designed to begin meeting now serious social and political problems we see coming in the decade ahead from population increase, growing urban unemployment and continued backwardness of agriculture. The main elements are:

1. Latin American Economic Integration

The broadened, more competitive market that can result from more rapid economic integration is the single, most promising move that Latin America can take to accelerate growth and reduce future foreign aid needs.

We would expect the Latin Americas to agree to a concrete plan for automatic reduction of intra-zonal tariffs and non-tariff barriers; a commitment to adopt reasonable external tariffs, declining as their economies strengthen; competitive investment and internal trade policies; and reasonable access to the region for foreign investment.

You, in turn, would announce at the Summit our readiness to support this effort by expanding our contribution to the Inter-American Bankís Fund for Special Operations (IDB/FSO). This would involve increasing the U.S. contribution in the three fiscal years 1968-70 from the present level of $250 million per year to $300 million, with an indication that if additional funds are required, we would consider further replenishment of the FSO.

The IDB would agree to set aside a stated amount of the new resources to:

a. finance sound multinational projects in support of economic integration and development of "inner frontiers" (e.g., roads, flood control, hydroelectric power, irrigation, communications).

b. assist countries with temporary adjustment problems resulting from rapid integration (e.g., balance of payment difficulties, affected industries and workers, export financing for intra-Latin American trade).

2. Higher Alliance Targets: Primarily Agricultural and Education

Annual per capita growth rates in Latin America should increase from the 2.5% level realized in 1964 and 1965 to 4-6%. Economic integration will help. But also basic to the objective are more dynamic agricultural sectors and broader access to higher quality education.

The type of across-the-board programs and self-help we have in mind are described in the guidelines paper (Enclosure 1 of the Rusk memo)./3/ In addition to remedial measures for the more common deficiencies, the programs include some exciting new ideas such as establishing two or three regional centers of excellence in science and engineering in Latin America.

/3/ Attached but not printed.

At the Summit you would announce an increase in AID bilateral assistance in these two fields of up to $200 million per year for 5 years.

3. Stimulate Private Investment

There are two proposals for increasing U.S. investment in Latin America under favorable conditions which State has advanced but on which full inter-agency agreement has not been reached. They are:

a. an imaginative idea for expansion of AID risk guarantees developed by Tony Solomon.

b. the negotiation with the Latin Americans of an agreed investment code to encourage use of modern technology and provide for coordination of foreign investment with development plans.

Budgetary Implications of the Package (Linc Gordonís estimates not concurred in by AID or BOB)

For FY 1968 the implications are




(in millions)

Economic Integration (replenishment of the IDB/FSO over the planned level of $250 million)



Increased Bilateral Aid for Agriculture and Education






For the four-year period beyond FY 1968:

-Replenishment of the FSO will continue for 2 years at $50 million per year.
-Requirements for bilateral assistance in agriculture and education will not exceed $200 million per year and may be less, depending upon allocation of IDA funds to Latin America.

The Original Package

Linc Gordonís original Summit proposals/4/ had three elements which have been deleted or diluted. They added a zest to the program which is now lacking.

/4/ As contained in a draft memorandum to the President, undated; attached but not printed.

1. Separate Integration Fund

As an inducement to the Latin Americans to take the plunge on integration he proposed a separate Latin American Integration Fund to handle adjustment assistance and a Multinational Projects window at the IDB to finance such projects. We would contribute up to $300 million to the fund and $500 million to the IDB for multinational projects, both over a five-year period.

Joe Fowler took sharp exception to these proposals and countered with the idea of using the Bankís FSO and increasing our contemplated annual contribution to the FSO by $50 million for the next three years. Linc reluctantly went along with this.

I think the Treasury formula dilutes the "carrot" aspect of the proposals to such a degree that much of its value as an inducement for prompt Latin American action is lost. We need more flexibility in negotiating with the Latins on integration.

2. Expanded Risk Guarantee Program

The Solomon proposal is to:

-expand the program in six basic fields: iron and steel, chemicals, fertilizers, pulp and paper, petro-chemicals, automobiles.

-cover up to the legal maximum of 75% of each investment, and relax the 100% tieing requirement.

-require the U.S. investor to offer for sale up to 51% of the stock of his company to Latin American purchasers within a fixed number of years after the start of the project (e.g., 15-20 years) and reinvest a percentage of his profits while he still held a controlling interest.

The proposal is encountering heavy going in Treasury and Commerce on balance of payments grounds and the advisability of conditioning guarantees to the mandatory offer of stock sales after a fixed period and to required profit reinvestment. I am not convinced by:

-the balance of payments argument because Latin America does not leak to Europe, or

-the preoccupation with conditioning of guarantees since the investor is free to decide whether or not he wants to accept them.

3. Limited Untieing of Procurement

To accommodate Latin American criticism to "tied" aid, Linc proposed extending procurement eligibility for Alliance financing to include Latin America. It would apply, in effect, to manufactured products, mostly capital goods. This is largely a gesture-but symbolically a meaningful one for the Latin Americans-because they produce few such goods on competitive terms. State estimates that over an initial three-year period the procurement might reach $15 million.

The Treasury objection is on balance of payments grounds. Since the proposal is largely cosmetic, Linc dropped it from the package. I think it bears closer examination.

My Reaction to the Program

It goes to the heart of what the Latins must do and only Presidents can take the political decisions required. It is, therefore, of Presidential stature.

If the Latins are willing to start down the track we propose, the bargain to help them financially is a good one.

The portions of Lincís original package which have not prospered are "carrot" which we may have to use to get the Latins to accept the deal. They should be held in reserve.


That you approve the guidelines proposed by Secretary Rusk, with the understanding that you wish to review at a later date each of the three aspects of Linc Gordonís original proposals not adequately covered in the Summit program as it now stands./5/

/5/ Although the memorandum does not record the decision, Bromley Smith subsequently reported that the President approved this recommendation-"with the understanding that no decisions or commitments are to be made with respect to additional United States assistance without prior referral to him along with a firm indication of what the Latin Americans are prepared to do." (Memorandum from Smith to Rusk, October 19; National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964-66, POL 7 IA SUMMIT)

Speak to me



42. Memorandum From the Presidentís Special Assistant (Rostow) to President Johnson/1/

Washington, November 30, 1966, 9:30 a.m.

/1/ Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Memos to the President, Walt W. Rostow, Vol. 15. Confidential. The President was at his ranch, November 19-December 9 and December 16-January 2.

Mr. President:

This broad agenda on Latin America was drafted yesterday by Gordon, Linowitz, and Bill Bowdler. It is worth reading as a quick summary of the Latin American situation.

For your talks on Saturday,/2/ I suggest the following simpler agenda.

/2/ December 3; the meeting was evidently held aboard Air Force One during a brief trip on December 3 to Ciudad AcuŮa, Mexico, where Johnson inspected construction of the Amistad Dam and met informally with President Diaz Ordaz. According to the Presidentís Daily Diary Johnson "went to a back cabin of the plane and was not seen in the front again until after landing." (Johnson Library) Passengers on the flight included Rusk, Gordon, Linowitz, and Rostow. Tom Johnson reported that "the President spent much of the flight in conversation with Secretary Rusk." (Memorandum from Johnson to Marie Fehmer, December 3; ibid.) No substantive record of the meeting was found.

1. Linowitzís trip to Central America. (Linowitz)
2. Preparations and Prospects for the Summit meeting. (Gordon)
3. Implications of the Summit for U.S. Policy. (Gordon)

For your information, Latin Americansí preparations for the Summit are now going rather well. We have put ourselves in the position where we do not have to decide what add-ons to the Alliance for Progress we shall make until we can see how seriously the Latin Americans are prepared to move forward. Our Latin American ex-perts are thinking in terms of an add-on of perhaps $200,000, partially through the IDB, which would put additional resources into inter-national projects and integration, on the one hand, agriculture and education, on the other.

W. W. Rostow/3/

/3/ Printed from a copy that bears this typed signature.




For Gordon-Linowitz-Rostow Talks With the President

1. General Political Situation

a) 1966 has been a banner election year: Costa Rica, Guatemala, Bolivia, Dominican Republic, Colombia, Brazil, Peru, Uruguay.

b) Except for the Argentine setback, representative democracy has been considerably strengthened through the electoral process and with it the promise of greater political stability.

c) Soft spots continue to be: Haiti, Ecuador, Dominican Republic, Guatemala, Panama.

d) So-called "arms race" centering around recent subsonic aircraft purchases by Argentina, Chile, and Venezuela is a real-but exaggerated-problem.

2. General Economic Situation

a) Most encouraging trend is that the hemisphere is moving out of the economic crisis stage and can now increasingly devote its attention and energies to development.

-All the major countries have passed the economic crisis stage; the ones still caught in it are small countries: Ecuador, Uruguay, Haiti, Dominican Republic, Panama.

-The new political and economic stability is fostering:

-institutional reform;
-steady increase in tax revenues;
-greater attention to development planning;
-more diversification;
-increase in important private investment projects;
-movement toward Latin American economic integration.

b) But the base for this progress is still fragile:

-problems of inadequate exports;
-inflationary pressures remain;
-rise in population;
-impact of any deflationary trend in the US and Europe;
-growing urban unemployment;
-backwardness of agriculture.

c) The Alliance for Progress at a crossroads:

-has had another year of solid accomplishments, although we will fall short of 2.5% GNP per capita;
-but economic and social progress must be accelerated if the present gains are to be consolidated;
-Alliance goals and requirements which the President will wish to keep in mind as he reviews the FY 1968 budget.

3. Special Issues

a) Summit Preparations:

-Status of OAS work;
-Status of our preparations;
-Linowitz trip to Central America;
-Projected Gordon-Linowitz trip to South America, following which they wish to report to the President on Summit prospects and obtain his approval of time and place for the Summit and of our program and its budget implications.

/4/ Gordon and Linowitz toured Latin America for consultation on the OAS summit and reported to the President on December 19. (Johnson Library, Presidentís Daily Diary) The President gave Senator Mike Mansfield (D-Montana) the following account of the meeting: "Theyíve covered most of the countries-I think all but a couple of them, Ecuador and Bolivia-and theyíre pleased with the situation generally. Theyíre particularly pleased with Carrillo Flores and Diaz Ordaz and what they said to them and so forth. They think that the summitís going to come off in good shape. They pretty well got an agenda, pretty well agreed upon, pretty well decided that itís not going to be a place to express your envies or jealousies or to demagogue or campaign." (Ibid., Recordings and Transcripts, Recording of telephone conversation between President Johnson and Mike Mansfield, December 20, 12:16 p.m., Tape F6612.05, Side A, PNO 4)

b) Dominican Republic

-Political polarization process and what we propose to do to arrest it.
-Present economic situation and outlook for 1967.

c) Haiti

-Duvalier has weathered another crisis, but the situation remains explosive.
-Status of our contingency planning.

d) Panama Negotiations

-Status of the negotiations.
-Outlook for negotiations of satisfactory treaties with the Robles Government.

e) Visits by Latin Americans

-President Frei.
-President-elect Costa e Silva.

f) Amistad Dam Visit

-Themes for remarks.


43. Memorandum From William G. Bowdler of the National Security Council Staff to the Presidentís Special Assistant (Rostow)/1/

Washington, January 17, 1967.

/1/ Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Agency File, Alliance for Progress, 9/1/66 (1 of 2). Secret.


Hal Hendrix/2/ is right about the Presidential image in Latin America, although I think he may overstate it.

/2/ Harold V. Hendrix was Latin American correspondent with the Scripps Howard Newspaper Alliance.

Goodness knows, the President has paid more personal attention to Latin America than probably any other President-the record of speeches, ceremonies, lunches, dinners, visits, boat rides, special delegations, personal letters, congratulatory messages, funeral planes, etc., is ample evidence.

These are his principal image problems:

-He does not project the sparkling intellectual image of Kennedy-young, scholar, pretty wife, small children, Catholic, etc.-which so appeals to the Latins.

-He had the distasteful-but necessary-job of sending troops into the DR and of fighting the nasty war in Vietnam with all the "egghead" criticism that it has brought.

-A very personal observation-I have for some time detected a growing cynicism among AID and USIA personnel toward the Alliance and the President which translates itself into lack of drive and imagination.

What I would do about it:

-The Summit meeting and the trip is the single most important thing the President can do.

-A trip by Lynda later on this year would project an image of youth, charm, good looks and stylishness.

-One or more taped television interviews with carefully chosen, well-known Latin American newsmen in the Presidentís office, with a trip around the White House; the same might be done on the distaff side. (Len Marks should be able to arrange these.)

-A Coordinator for the Alliance for Progress separate from the Assistant Secretary of State, but who will naturally work closely with him. The Alliance needs a figure of prestige who is close to the President and who can devote time travelling around visiting projects, conferring with Latin officials and instilling enthusiasm into our rank and file. The Assistant Secretary is too busy running the show back here to do the necessary missionary work the Alliance requires. The economics of the Alliance is in good hands-what it needs is a spiritual leader who will mirror the President. The change of the guard in ARA provides the opportunity to do this./3/

/3/ Reference is to the upcoming departure of Gordon, who had accepted the presidency of Johns Hopkins University. On January 20 Johnson called Senator Fulbright to discuss Gordonís replacement: "I want to get a good man that can move forward and be progressive; and I have nobody to reward, as you know, in the State Department and never have had; and Iíve just looked at them, and Iím telling you the Foreign Service from the Latin American standpoint is awfully weak. As a matter of fact, itís weak everywhere, Bill." (Johnson Library, Recordings and Transcripts, Recording of telephone conversation between President Johnson and J. William Fulbright, January 20, 5:30 p.m., Tape F67.03, Side A, PNO 1) On May 24 Johnson announced the nomination of Covey T. Oliver, Ambassador to Colombia, to be Assistant Secretary. Oliver was confirmed by the Senate on June 8 and took office on July 1.

-Len Marks needs to get the word to his staff in Latin America not to miss a chance to weave in the LBJ image in their operations.

-It might be useful to have the AID and USIA directors in the South American countries congregate in Venezuela at the end of the Presidentís trip for him to give them a pep talk./4/

/4/ Rostow wrote the following instructions to Bowdler on the memorandum: "Go and have a talk with Len Marks about this problem & your suggestions." Bowdler noted on March 4 that this was "done."



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