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 You are in: Under Secretary for Public Diplomacy and Public Affairs > Bureau of Public Affairs > Bureau of Public Affairs: Office of the Historian > Foreign Relations of the United States > Johnson Administration > Volume XXXI
Foreign Relations, 1964-1968, Volume XXXI, South and Central America; Mexico
Released by the Office of the Historian
Documents 44-71

44. Memorandum From the Presidentís Special Assistant (Rostow) to President Johnson/1/

Washington, February 10, 1967.

/1/ Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, International Meetings and Travel File, Inter-American Summit Meeting, Vol. III. Secret. A notation on the memorandum indicates the President saw it.

Your 6:00 p.m. Appointment with Secretary Rusk on OAS Summit Preparations

Secretary Rusk wishes to discuss what he should say about the Summit meeting at Buenos Aires in view of the wide inter-agency disagreement on what our part of the Summit deal should be.

The Summit Deal

We are asking the Latin Americans to:

-take the plunge on economic integration;
-modernize their agricultural and educational systems;
-forego expensive military equipment.

These steps involve tough political decisions. What we are prepared to do to help is critical to their willingness to take the decisions. The success of the Summit hinges on this interplay.

Linc Gordon and Sol Linowitz have recommended this package as our part of the deal:

1. Express willingness to ask Congress for up to $300 million for Latin American integration adjustment assistance, to be contributed over a period of years and on a matching basis after the Latin American Common Market treaty is negotiated.

2. Approve asking Congress in this session for an authorization and appropriation in FY 1968 of $300 million for replenishment of the Inter-American Development Bank Fund for Special Operations, i.e., $50 million more than you have already approved for authorizing legislation for FY 1968.

3. Indicate an intention to ask Congress to increase our Alliance for Progress assistance for education and agriculture by $100 million in FY 1968 (it is already in the budget) and (an average of $200 million for the following four years, dependent on demonstrated need and adequate self help).

4. Consider modifying tying arrangements for our capital project loans (but not program loans) to permit hemisphere-wide procurement after the Latin Americans negotiate a Common Market Treaty. This would shift the tying from the present individual country basis to a

regional basis. The balance of payments effects would not be appreciable.

A table on how the costs of this package would be spread out over the next five years is at Tab A./2/

/2/ Not attached, but the table is attached to another copy of this memorandum. (Ibid.)

Views of Other Agencies

Treasury-Joe Fowler opposes Recommendations 1 and 4 of the package. I donít believe he is sympathetic toward economic integration. He feels that if integration adjustment assistance is necessary, the Inter-American Bank should handle it, and by increasing our contribution (as per Recommendation 2) we would meet our responsibilities. On Recommendation 4, he agrees that the balance of payments effect will probably be small, but he fears adverse psychological effects on our balance of payments posture.

AID-Bill Gaud is strongly opposed to Recommendation 3. He fears that an increase of this dimension in the Alliance will most likely result in the Congress granting it at the expense of other areas.

BOB-Charlie Schultze prefers not to mention a specific amount for integration adjustment assistance in Recommendation 1. On paragraph 2, he favors seeking authorization only in this session, leaving the issue of whether to seek a supplemental appropriation this year or next January to be decided later.

My Views and Recommendation

Latin America stands at a crossroads. Over the next few years population increase, growing urban unemployment and agricultural backwardness could, at present rates of modest growth, lead to new social crises and political extremism. If the Latin American Presidents are willing to establish a Common Market and make a major effort to boost agriculture and improve education, the region during the 1970ís could attain a level of "take-off" for self-sustained growth which would promote social and political stability and dependence on US public financing.

The issue boils down to whether you wish to exploit this historic moment to get the Latin Americans to move boldly on integration, and thereby put your stamp on it, or whether you prefer to let nature take its course. The pressure of events can be expected to move the Latins gradually toward integration over the next 15-20 years. And we can take our chances on the present rate of growth under the Alliance keeping the hemisphere a step ahead of social and political troubles.

I favor the Gordon-Linowitz package because:

-I believe you should take advantage of the historic moment.

-If we make our part of the deal any less, I doubt whether the Latins will be willing to make the commitments we want.

-The package is so structured that financial commitments on integration and the untying of aid will not come into play for another 18-24 months after the Latins have negotiated their Common Market Treaty.

-The FY 1968 budget already provides for the $100 million for agriculture and education for the coming fiscal year. By the time FY 1969 rolls around, the Vietnam situation hopefully will not represent the current drain and permit a further modest increase in the Alliance for Progress assistance./3/

/3/ According to the Presidentís Daily Diary the meeting on OAS summit preparations was evidently rescheduled for February 11 (Johnson Library); see Document 45.



45. Memorandum of Meeting/1/

Washington, February 11, 1967.

/1/ Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, NSC Histories, OAS Summit Meeting 4/67, Chron. 4/1/66-3/13/67. Secret. Drafted by Bowdler. A copy was sent to Rostow. The memorandum indicates the meeting began "at approximately 1:00 p.m." and was held in the Presidentís office.

The President
Secretary Rusk

Assistant Secretary of State Lincoln Gordon
U.S. Ambassador to the Organization of American States Sol Linowitz
Mr. Walt Rostow
Mr. William Bowdler

Secretary Rusk opened the meeting by explaining the nature of the two conferences he would be attending in Buenos Aires,/2/ i.e., approval and signature of OAS Charter amendments and preparation for the OAS Summit.

/2/ Reference is to the Third Special Inter-American Conference and the Eleventh Meeting of Consultation of Ministers of Foreign Affairs of the American Republics, held in Buenos Aires, February 15-27 and February 16-26, respectively. Documentation on both is in the National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Conference Files, 1966-72: Lot 67 D 586, CF 122 through CF 133; and the Johnson Library, National Security File, International Meetings and Travel File, Third Special IAC and Eleventh MFM Bilateral Papers, 2/67. Also see Document 46.

On the Summit meeting he described what we expected the Latin Americans to do in negotiating a Common Market. We would help them by contributing $300 million over a period of years for integration adjustment assistance after they negotiated a treaty. The Secretary mentioned that the Europeans might be persuaded to contribute the remaining $125 million which we made available to the European Monetary Agreement members.

Mr. Gordon pointed out that the $123.5 million left was being considered for possible use in supporting a world-wide agricultural diversification fund. We need a decision on which project it should be used for, assuming we can get the Europeans to relinquish their claim. The President asked Secretary Rusk and Mr. Rostow where the $125 million should be put. They both recommended the Latin American Common Market. The President told them to proceed on this basis.

Secretary Rusk next brought up the replenishment of the IDB/FSO (Inter-American Development Bank Fund for Special Operations). The President asked whether any or all of the $300 million contemplated was in the FY 1968 budget. A quick check with Budget Bureau Director Schultze revealed that none had been included. Following further discussion of the amounts required by our Summit package and the inter-agency disagreement on its elements, the President said that he wanted Congressional approval before he made a commitment of the magnitude contemplated. He directed that a joint resolution be prepared, separate from the AID bill, which would place the Congress behind the Summit offer. Secretary Rusk could test the willingness of the Latin Americans at Buenos Aires to assume the commitments we want. If he finds a basis for the Summit, then we can use the time between the Buenos Aires meeting and the Summit to put the joint resolution through.



46. Telegram From the Embassy in Argentina to the Department of State/1/

Buenos Aires, February 19, 1967, 0312Z.

/1/ Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1967-69, POL 3 IA. Secret; Nodis.

3192/Secto 26. Eyes Only for the President and Acting Secretary from Secretary.

We have now reached the point where the opinions of all countries are in and it is possible to report general agreement that there should be a summit conference and, indeed, that a failure to hold one would have a very negative effect throughout the hemisphere. I have seen all the FonMins personally and have encountered only the friendliest reactions to you and to the US. There is general understanding of the burdens we are carrying these days and real appreciation for the personal attention which you have given to Latin American affairs and to the Alliance for Progress despite your many other problems.

As far as the ministers are concerned the fact that I am remaining over the weekend has been accepted as a compliment contrasted with the notion that my departure before the end of the conference is somehow a "walk out."/2/

/2/ Rusk headed the U.S. delegation in Buenos Aires until February 21, when he was replaced by Ambassador at Large Ellsworth Bunker.

I have tried to be very realistic with my Latin colleagues about what they should expect from the US. On the subject of integration I have insisted that this is their decision. I have emphasized that if they were to move toward integration because of the possibility of modest amounts of help from the US they would move for the wrong reasons and integration efforts could not succeed. They understand fully that we must consult with the Congress before making commitments and that, in such consultations, we must have specific information on what our friends in Latin America really intend to do. We cannot have them come up with some meaningless phrases involving the word "integration" and expect that we will come forward with substantial additional assistance. It would take the Congress only ten minutes to prick any such bubble and ask for specifics. Somewhat to my surprise, I am beginning to feel (after a full dayís discussion today) that they really are quite serious about integration. They seem to recognize that rapid modernization will pass them by unless they enlarge their markets among themselves and open up the possibilities provided by the internal American market for US and the enlarged European Common Market.

Again in the direction of realism I have stated quite simply that they must compete with the rest of the world for private investment, that private investment cannot be commanded by US or anyone else but must be attracted by them, and that if they fail to attract it they cannot expect the same investments to come through the public sector at the taxpayerís expense.

I have also tried, in personal conversations with ministers, to remind them that a meeting of Presidents is an informal meeting at the highest political level and is not an occasion to resolve every trivial issue which twenty governments might have in mind. Some of the nervousness about the need for "adequate preparation" arises from an unrealistic view of what Presidents will do when they get together. You will not wade through stacks of black boots but will share your political and other problems with each other and give direction to the grand strategy of the hemisphere. My impression is that the FonMins will greatly simplify the recommendations they make to their Presidents. From our own point of view, it seems to me that the principal benefit to come from a summit meeting is the enlistment of public interest in the hemisphere, in the successes and prospects of the Alliance for Progress and in your own personal commitment to what happens to ordinary men and women. Our own people have been hearing almost nothing else but Viet-Nam, President de Gaulle and China, and hemispheric affairs have dropped somewhat into the background. We will need this public attention as a defense against Congressional assaults on the Alliance for Progress.

Outstanding among the FonMins have been Mexican, Chilean, Argentine, Brazilian and Colombian colleagues. It is a great relief to find Chile in a cooperative mood and I have no doubt this reflects the growing personal relations between you and President Frei. Tony Carrillo has been a stalwart friend.

I have emphasized in talks that we are not pressing for a summit meeting if there is any reluctance on their part. Their response has been one of alarm that we might lose interest. I think they realize that they are competing for the attention of the American people with many other problems and that it is in their interest to find a way to dramatize hemispheric cooperation.

I have tried to keep our Congressional delegation involved as much as possible although private meetings of ministers have limited their participation. They came, understandably enough, with considerable skepticism about whether the Latin Americans really mean business on integration. It is a skepticism which I myself shared. But if our Latin friends demonstrate that they mean business and are prepared to take some additional tangible steps, I think our Congressional friends will be both surprised and impressed.

We have had press backgrounders every day since my arrival and I will try to have a wrap up with them before I depart for Washington./3/

/3/ For texts of the resolution of the Eleventh Meeting of Consultation of Ministers of Foreign Affairs of the American Republics and the final act of the Third Special Inter-American Conference, see Department of State Bulletin, March 20, 1967, pp. 473-476. The amendment of the OAS Charter-the so-called Protocol of Buenos Aires-was adopted on February 27, becoming effective 3 years later upon ratification of two-thirds of the member states.



47. Memorandum From the Presidentís Special Assistant (Rostow) to President Johnson in Texas/1/

Washington, March 6, 1967.

/1/ Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, International Meetings and Travel File, Inter-American Summit Meeting, Vol. II. Confidential. The memorandum is an uninitialed copy; a handwritten note indicates that it was "sent via wire to Ranch." According to the Presidentís Daily Diary, Johnson was at his Ranch in Texas, March 2-6. (Ibid.)

Meeting the Latin American Experts on the Summit

I met yesterday at my home for lunch with Milton Eisenhower, Adolf Berle, Tom Mann, Jack Vaughn, Linc Gordon and Sol Linowitz to discuss the Latin American Summit.

We had a useful three-and-a-half hour session reviewing the Summit package and joint resolution, discussing the focus of your speech at the Summit and examining some new ideas which you might advance.

These are the highlights:

-All thought that the Summit package was well structured to get at the root of Latin Americaís basic development problems.

-All agreed that time was running short in Latin America and the moment for decisive action was now. The Summit offered a historic opportunity for the Latin Americans to make the necessary political commitments and for you to redefine US policy.

-All agreed that we should encourage the Latin Americans to move rapidly down the path of economic integration as the single, most important step they can take to speed up the development process and transform economic and social situations. Our help should be closely geared to their performance.

-Milton Eisenhower stressed that the Summit gave you the chance to dramatize at the highest level that our relation with the Latin Americans is that of junior partner and that while money is important and we will help, it can only be a supplement to their own commitment and action.

-Adolf Berle focused on the trade issue, pointing out that if meaningful help for the LDCís does not come from the Kennedy Round negotiations, we may have to think in terms of extending regional preferences for Latin America.

-Jack Vaughn observed the need to come to grips with the birth rate and the urban slum problem, but all recognized the difficulties in doing anything meaningful at the Summit in these two areas.

On themes for your Summit speech:

-Milton Eisenhower suggested that in emphasizing economic integration you point to the dramatic shift in policy which this represents for us. Historically, we have discouraged it. Only in the last ten years has our thinking shifted. You would be the first President to give it a major thrust forward.

-Adolf Berle said you should point to the progress made in recent years in strengthening democracy and getting governments to work for the people as never before.

-Both Eisenhower and Berle urged that you stress that the US is not in the business of building empires but wants to help others in this hemisphere, and elsewhere, to build up themselves. Berle had an excellent quote from Seneca about there being no possibility of lasting friendship except between equals.

In the realm of new ideas, the group thought we should examine these areas:

-speeding up a satellite communications system for Latin America;
-help in promoting educational TV;
-development of research libraries on microfilm;
-cooperation in development of "food from sea" resources;
-development of protein concentrates for child-feeding programs; and
-computerized access to information, perhaps drawing on NIHís development of an electronic library in medicine.


48. Memorandum From the Presidentís Special Assistant (Rostow)/1/

Washington, March 7, 1967.

/1/ Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, NSC Histories, OAS Summit Meeting, Chron. 4/1/66-3/13/67. Confidential.

Secretary Rusk
Under Secretary of the Treasury Barr
AID Administrator Gaud
Budget Director Schultze

Meeting with the President on OAS Summit Preparations on March 1, 1967

/2/ According to the Presidentís Daily Diary, Johnson held a meeting on March 1, 5:42-6:50 p.m., "to discuss plans for Latin American Summit meeting." The attendees included Rusk, Sayre, Linowitz, Gaud, Rostow, Bowdler, Under Secretary of the Treasury Joseph W. Barr, and Deputy Assistant Secretary of the Treasury for International Affairs Winthrop Knowlton. (Ibid.) No other record of the meeting was found.

So that the participants in the meeting will have the same understanding of the decisions made by the President, I recapitulate them as follows:

1. Standby resources for integration adjustment assistance

The President approved obtaining Congressional support for the United States providing standby resources through the IDB to be matched by the Latin Americans for integration adjustment assistance to facilitate the transition to a fully functioning Latin American Common Market once appropriate steps have been taken by the Latin Americans toward progressive establishment of such a Market. The President agreed that in discussions with Congress an order of magnitude figure of 1⁄4 and 1⁄2 billion dollars, to be furnished over a period of years (probably not beginning until 1970), could be used.

Under Secretary Barr observed that Congressman Reuss is not in favor of economic integration and can be expected to oppose adjustment assistance. The President asked Secretary Barr and Ambassador Linowitz to speak with Congressman Reuss in the light of the Buenos Aires meeting decisions.

2. Replenishment of the IDB/FSO

The President directed that authorization for 3 years and appropriation of $300 million for the first year be sought during the current session of Congress.

3. Additional Alliance for Progress assistance for education and agriculture

The President agreed to increase Alliance for Progress assistance for education and agriculture by $100 million in FY 1968 (it is already in the budget) and an average of $200 million for the following four years, dependent on demonstrated need and self-help.

He expressed a preference for obtaining a specific Congressional commitment for the full amount, but agreed to be guided by what Congressional leaders think should be done about the Summit package price tag in the Joint Resolution. (See paragraph no 5.)

In response to Budget Director Schultzeís observation that a

substantial portion of the increase for education and agriculture would necessarily be for projects with a high local cost component, the

President said that he understood this and wanted the funds to be made available for sound projects in the two sectors with this understanding.

4. Modification of tying arrangements for capital project loans to permit hemisphere-wide procurement

The President agreed to modify tying arrangements in our loan policy toward Latin America with respect to project, but not program or local cost, lending to permit hemisphere-wide procurement after the Latin Americans begin major steps toward a Common Market and with subsequent tying to the US through the Special Letter of Credit procedure.

Under Secretary Barr asked that Treasuryís opposition to the modification be recorded.

5. Joint Resolution on the Summit

The President reviewed and approved the Joint Resolution (copy attached)/3/ and directed that consultation on the Resolution begin right away. The process should be started with the Congressional delegation that went to the Buenos Aires meeting: Senators Smathers and Hickenlooper, and Congressmen Selden and Mailliard. Senator Mansfield should be contacted next. Further action will depend on the advice obtained from these contacts. The President is prepared to meet with the Congressional leadership if this is desirable and necessary.

/3/ Attached but not printed.

The President also directed that State brief the Council for Latin America on the resolution and get them to sell it to key Congressional members such as Dirksen, Hickenlooper and Ford. In response to Ambassador Linowitzís inquiry as to whether he would be willing to receive the Council for Latin America group when they meet in Washington next week, the President replied that he would if he were in town.

With respect to the text of the draft joint resolution, the President accepted Secretary Ruskís recommendation that the paragraph on Europe be deleted.

The President expressed a preference for including a global cost figure for the Summit package in the final operative paragraph. He thought the Congress would also want to specify what it was agreeing to and would not be satisfied with amounts expressed only in hearings. But he agreed that Congressional leaders should be sounded out on this point. He is prepared to go the way they recommend.



49. Telephone Conversation Between President Johnson and the Representative to the Council of the Organization of American States (Linowitz)/1/

Washington, April 4, 1967, 8:35 a.m.

/1/ Source: Johnson Library, Recordings and Transcripts, Recording of telephone conversation between President Johnson and Sol Linowitz, Tape F67.11, Side A, PNO 1. No classification marking. This transcript was prepared in the Office of the Historian specifically for this volume.

President: Sol, how are you?

Linowitz: Iím fine, Mr. President.

President: I was talking to Morse this morning. I think the best way now that weíve got this thing in shape where we ask the Congress to consult with us and to give us their views on what we should do in regard to this program that we brought back from the Foreign Ministers meeting. The House has expressed themselves and the Senate has said that they do not want to do anything that would go beyond saying that they would consider considering it. Thatís about the best way I can read that resolution. It just says weíll give consideration to consideration./2/

/2/ In a special message to Congress on March 13, President Johnson presented a proposal to increase support to the Alliance for Progress and asked Congress to show its support by approving a joint resolution before the Punta del Este conference. (Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States: Lyndon B. Johnson, 1967, Book I, pp. 318-324. Although the House approved a modified version, the Senate Foreign Relations Committee rejected the resolution on April 3, opting instead for its own resolution by a vote of 9-0. A spokesman for the administration subsequently called the Senate resolution "worse than useless." The President went to Punta del Este without a formal expression of Congressional support. (Congressional Quarterly Almanac, 1967, pp. 331-333)

Linowitz: Yes, sir. There were only nine men in that Senate who said that.

President: Yeah, but theyíre the ones that are leading it, and they have more-We couldnít get anything but a zero on our end of it. They wouldnít either stand up or-So I told Morse that I thought that he ought to talk to Mansfield who is out in Montana and hold it up until he comes back.

Linowitz: Yes. Heís not due back till the end of the week though.

President: And I had much rather see it just-I donít see anything to be gained by bringing it out and having a mean debate. I donít think that-

Linowitz: I agree.

President: I donít think that you can get anywhere that way. And I think then we-It will destroy our ability to make any real commitment, but we can see how far they want to go.

Linowitz: Yes, sir. The only question, sir: there was talk of the possibility of getting the committee to reconsider. Do you think that-

President: I donít believe theyíll do that. Fulbrightís an adamant man and I do not believe we can beat the chairman of the committee any more than you can beat the President on who heís going to appoint as his appointments secretary. Heís just got that authority, and heís got that position, heís got that power. And this is a gesture to the Congress that a President would ask them to express themselves. Most Presidents donít ask them-theyíve done it two or three times-but itís generally they go on and make a commitment and treaty and send it up and negotiate without any resolutions or anything. Now if they donít want to be consulted, I think our public position can be: we sought to consult them, we were ready to put on our hearings. Weíll know next time if we submit something, we ought to submit it by putting the amount in it and asking just for an authorization. And I thought that if weíd bring Tom Mann and Jack Vaughn and Adolph Berle and Milton Eisenhower and David Rockefeller and all these folks in for the hearings that weíve been having up there-just arguing back and forth, and they could give the positive aspects of it-I would have thought that it would have been better, but our people didnít think so. So-

Linowitz: Did you know that I put that actually to both Morse and Hickenlooper and both of them said that it would be a mistake.

President: Yes. Well-

Linowitz: So-I think they were wrong. I agree with you, sir, that it would have been helpful to build us a stronger record.

President: Yeah, then they could have-Fulbright couldnít have said that we hadnít had a hearing and we didnít, we hadnít presented our case. Well anyway, I donít want us to get crossways, so I have told Mike Manatos to try to talk to Mansfield, so you ought, you and

Macomber/3/ ought, to get with Mike. I think the best thing to do is leave it in the committee and just say: "Well the House acted on it; the Senate chose not to go further than to say that theyíd give us consideration." Now we donít need a resolution for that.

/3/ William B. Macomber, Jr., Assistant Secretary of State for Congressional Relations.

Linowitz: Thatís right.

President: If they pass it, it wonít have any more effect on the conference or on me than it would to just stay in the committee and then it would have to go to conference committee.

Linowitz: At the press conference yesterday I read the latter part of your message in which you talked about your having the executive authority to do this but you wanted to go having first consulted with the Congress-and thatís exactly what you did.

President: Yeah. Well, now weíve done that.

Linowitz: The record is clear.

President: Weíve done it. So I would try then to get a hold of our friends or talk to Morse and anyone else on the committee that would be friendly, I guess Hickenlooper-

Linowitz: Yes, sir.

President: And just say: "Now it appears to us we donít have

the votes without a big fight. The President wanted to consult with the Congress. He has. Theyíve had a chance to express themselves, the com-mitteeís expressed itself, and it says in effect it doesnít want to do anything." So weíll just leave it there. Weíll go on to the conference, if they donít bomb us out down there. Iíve been very concerned about that. I donít like these intelligence reports I read about them./4/

/4/ A recent intelligence assessment judged that "the risk to President Johnson during the course of this trip will be slight-though greater than was the case with his visit to Mexico a year ago." (SNIE 98-67, "Security Conditions in Uruguay," March 23; Central Intelligence Agency, Job 79-R01012A, O/DDI Registry)

Linowitz: Well, you know, sir, that weíve been in close touch and-On the assumption that youíll be arriving at 11 in the morning: there isnít any problem that anybody can foresee before you get out of Montevideo and to Punta del Este. I agree with you that this action theyíve taken-you notice they did that to the Brazilians too. Itís just troublemakers who are hoping, I think, exactly what is happening will happen: that is people will begin to get a little worried about it. I think these, the people there donít, the Communists there donít want to have this conference. They think itís not going to do them any good, and I think theyíve-We probably will get more of this, a few here and there. But from what I can gather-and Iíve been in touch with Hoyt down in Montevideo and Iíve talked to the Uruguayans here on a regular basis-if we work it as we are now planning, arriving around 11-because I guess Frei is coming in at noon and youíre coming in at 11-weíll be out of there and into Punta del Este before the lunch hour and before any of these people are even around. So I think thatís going to work out all right. Weíre at least keeping an eye on it, sir.

President: Good. I would do that. I told them to take whatever people they needed. They want to borrow some military people to [wear] civilian clothes over there. And I sure think we ought to watch that very, very carefully.

Linowitz: Yes, sir, I agree.

President: I think that they can cause a Nixon incident/5/ very easy. And I heard a lot of ambassadors-I donít know, at least their personal opinion, but I heard a lot of them at the Ranch this week/6/ say awful nice things about what youíre doing, and you evidently have a very good rapport with them and understanding with them.

/5/ Reference is to Richard M. Nixonís trip to South America, April-May 1958, when demonstrators in Lima and Caracas showered the Vice President with spit and stones. For documentation on the trip, see Foreign Relations, 1958-1960, vol. V, pp. 222-248.

/6/ On April 1 Johnson hosted a barbecue at his Texas Ranch for Latin American Ambassadors to the United States and the OAS, and other guests. (Johnson Library, Presidentís Daily Diary)

Linowitz: Well, I do. I wish I had done better for you up at the Senate.

President: Well, we just canít do that. Thatís not you; thatís not you and I donít think itís me. I think Fulbright is very unhappy because he wasnít Secretary of State, and he was this way with President Kennedy, and I had to nurse him all during the Bay of Pigs. I had him down and worked with him because he couldnít, and then he took the position that we ought to bomb Cuba out, just the opposite of what heís doing now.

Linowitz: Well, I canít help the feeling that I let you down there, sir.

President: No, no. Not at all. No, we just havenít got that situation. And I think that this will have rather serious repercussions on our whole aid program. My judgment is they just donít have the votes there for aid this year. Thatís what Iím afraid of. I think yours is the most popular of all, and if you canít get them to commit on yours, why I donít know whatís going to happen with the others.

Linowitz: I think thatís true. Thereís one other thing, sir. I do, upon reflection, I do believe that Fulbright has chosen the worst possible place at which to take his stand.

President: Yes, I do too.

Linowitz: I just think that this was-if we could have picked a battleground, an issue on which we could say "this is how we ought to proceed, this is what weíve done, this is a case we can make"-I donít think we could have picked it better than this one, and thatís the one he chose to make an issue on.

President: Thatís right. Now how do we get that line drawn over the country?

Linowitz: Well, Iím meeting with Max Frankel of The New York Times in about 20 minutes. What Iím trying to do is, Iíve been doing constantly is, at least getting to these people. I know that Walt talked to The New York Times yesterday. I was on the phone yesterday with Punch Sulzberger,/7/ and the editorial today is pretty good-not as good as it ought to be, but itís pretty good. And Iím just trying to get this around to the news people so that they see this in the context. I had a good chance to talk to Scotty Reston/8/ before he took off. I hoped he was going to do a piece on consultation, but this is exactly what these people up on the Hill have been talking about and that no President has ever done more to give advance consultation for a meeting than what you did in this case, and for that you get blamed. Iíve been trying to do this with the people across. [sic] I was going to go on "Meet the Press" this Sunday, but I canít, of course, because theyíre going to have this strike again, but Iím trying it anyway, sir.

/7/ Arthur O. Sulzberger, publisher and president of The New York Times.

/8/ James B. Reston, associate editor of The New York Times.

President: Well, I think thatís very good and I think thatís quite important. I think you ought to point out to Frankel that this barbecue thing was not a great elaborate deal that he pictured yesterday. He said five hundred people, four or five hundred people: we had a hundred and four, I think.

Linowitz: Hell, he was down there. I saw him at the press briefing yesterday and I said: "where did you get your nose count?"

President: [Laughter] And he had it very elaborate, and very outlandish, almost like a bribe, and then winding up, I thought, that way, slap-happy stuff. I thought it was a little ugly, his article. But anyway, I think that we ought to say that we have tried to consult with them, the House has given us their opinion, and Fulbright and his group have said in effect that they donít want us to make any overtures to Latin America in this regard at this time until the Latin Americans act and then they want to take a look at it in the light of their action. Now thatís the effect of what theyíve said. So we will go, and we will listen, and that was what I told Walt to say in his backgrounder. He did, but didnít quite get it over. I read it. The impression weíve got to leave is to play this thing down as much as we can. We did that with Guam and we did it with Manila./9/ But they play it up, and they boost it, and they say "Great Big Elaborate Conference." Then when nothing really shocking comes out of it, then they say itís a failure. Now thatís what theyíll do again, so you better start Frankel off and say: "Now I want you to keep these notes, so when the conference is over, you wonít say we misled you. Weíre going there as we did in the Manila Conference, not to run it, not to ram something down their throat. The future of Latin America depends largely upon the Latins themselves; and weíre going to be an interested brother, sitting there, hearing their reports, and getting their recommendations; and weíre not going to try to force anything down them. Weíre not going to try to press anything upon them. We would have liked to have been able to have said that Ďif you will do these various things that you talk about doing, then we will support you to this extent.í But the Congress doesnít want to do that, and weíre not going to be angry about it, not going to fight about it, not going to get into any personal brawls about it, not going to mention anybodyís name. Weíre just going to make it clear that we canít say what we want to say, what we had intended to say, but we will come back, and we will point out what they say, and then submit our recommendations again." But letís play it down just as much as we possibly can, and say to him that weíre just going to be a good listener.

/9/ Reference is to two conferences on Vietnam in Manila (October 1966), and Guam (March 1967).

Linowitz: May I just say, sir, two things. First, if I might suggest, I think itís awful important not to convey the suggestion that you didnít have, and that you donít have, full authority to speak as President on what you would like to do when you get there, and that this isnít interfering at all with that. What you had hoped to do was to go down there and say "not only I but the Congress gives you this assurance." That all you can do now is say "this is what I would like to have accomplished, but, of course, Iíll have to go back and see if Congress will go along with me." Is that appropriate to say that thatís the difference in the two?

President: Yes. Yes. Yes.

Linowitz: Because it seems to me, that one of the things that the aginners may now try to do is say this has cut off, or tried to cut off, your own executive authority, which is nonsense. And thatís the other side that troubles me a little bit, that the "worse than useless" phrase has created the impression that itís really put a damper onto your authority to go there and do whatever you think is right. And I just think that would be inconsistent too.

President: OK. All right.

Linowitz: OK, sir.


50. Memorandum of Conversation/1/


Punta del Este, Uruguay, April 11, 1967, 6 p.m.

/1/ Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1967-69, POL 7 IA-SUMMIT. Confidential. Drafted by Seidenman and approved in the White House on April 28. The memorandum of conversation is part 3 of 3; for parts 1 and 2, see Documents 540 and 541. According to George Christian, the meeting was held at Leoniís residence in Punta del Este. (Press statement, April 11; Johnson Library, Presidentís Daily Diary) President Johnson attended the Punta del Este Conference April 11-April 14.

Cuban Subversion in Venezuela


United States


President Johnson

President Leoni

Mr. Walt Rostow

Sr. Ignacio Iribarren Borges, Foreign Minister of Venezuela

Assistant Secretary Gordon


Assistant Secretary Solomon


Mr. Neil A. Seidenman, Interpreter


The President assured President Leoni that we are equally concerned with Venezuela about the matter of communist aggression. We have been gratified by Venezuelaís actions against Cuba. We support Venezuelaís position against Cuba in the OAS. We believe that measures against Cuba by the OAS need even more tightening up. We would also hope that Venezuela will have suggestions for further moves in this direction. We will welcome all the noise that Venezuela can make about Cuba in the OAS.

President Leoni mentioned the assassination of the brother of Minister Iribarren Borges./2/ He said that Venezuela has evidence that points to Cuban responsibility for this act, including material that has come to them in print from Havana. Venezuela intends to make a case against Cuba on this score in the OAS. Before initiating this action, Venezuela is carefully examining all of the details involved, inasmuch as it wishes to gather sufficient and convincing evidence and consult with President Johnson and the State Department as well as with the governments of other member countries. Venezuela wants to proceed in this way, so that whatever decision is taken-and Venezuela itself will not be asking for any specific decision-it will be on a unanimous basis, if this is possible.

/2/ Dr. Julio Iribarren Borges, former Director of Social Security, was assassinated on March 3.

The President reiterated his desire to cooperate with the Venezuelans in the work of facing the trials they are going through. He reiterated our support for Venezuelaís cause in the OAS against Cuba, which he said he hoped they would pursue with aggressiveness; we want to be of help in the matter of military equipment if we can-because we donít want Venezuela to have to wait one minute to chase the communists./3/

/3/ For further discussion of this matter, see Document 541.


51. Memorandum of Conversation/1/

Punta del Este, Uruguay, April 13, 1967, 1 p.m.

/1/ Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1967-69, POL 1 US. Confidential. Drafted by Reigersberg and Fisher on April 18 and approved in the White House on April 26. The memorandum is part 4 of 4. The full text of all four parts is in telegram 182377 to Quito, April 26. (Ibid.)

U.S. Policy Regarding the Alliance for Progress


United States
President Lyndon B. Johnson
Assistant Secretary Gordon
Assistant Secretary Solomon
Deputy U.S. Coordinator David Bronheim
Mr. Fernando A. Van Reigersberg, Interpreter

President Otto Arosemena
Minister of Industries and Commerce Galo Pico Mantilla
Minister of Finance Jose Federico Intriago Arrata

Responding to a question by Arosemena as to why the suggestions he had proposed in his speech before the Presidents at the Plenary Session that afternoon/2/ had not been approved and accepted, President Johnson stated that he had not wanted to get into the debate himself, since he felt that the Summit Conference document had been sufficiently well-prepared in advance and therefore satisfactory to all. He felt that the Latin Americans themselves should express their own views and that the American President should listen to their comments without actively participating in the debate. He assured President Arosemena that he would do everything possible to help the Latin American countries, but that his own position and internal problems should be understood by everybody. One difficulty is to try to convince people in the lower income brackets in the U.S. that they must contribute to foreign aid. Once this is achieved, it becomes very difficult to convince them that they should continue supporting assistance to Latin America when one of its presidents says that loans from the United States are tendered under unacceptable conditions. American taxpayers communicate frequently with their Congressional represent-atives, and if dissatisfied, make their views known in no uncertain terms. At the present time, the Foreign Aid Bill is the most unpopular piece of legislation facing the Congress.

/2/ Arosemena suggested that the Alliance for Progress must adjust to meet the economic realities of 1967; the terms required for assistance were unacceptable-the borrowing country was forced to contribute funds "above its capacity." Arosemena also questioned why the United States "should be so concerned with democracy in a noble but distant country such as Viet Nam," when democracy was so obviously in need of support in Latin America. An English translation of Arosemenaís address is ibid., ARA/EP/E Files: Lot 70 D 247, POL 3 Summit Conference.

The President said he had hope that the Latin American presidents would give him arguments which he could use to convince members of Congress of the importance of aid to Latin America. In his own speech, he had promised assistance in such fields as educational television, marine research, research on production of fish concentrates for food, and promotion of science and technology. The United States had increased its contribution to the Alliance for Progress by 35% in the last three years, but a recent request for additional funds had been turned down in Congressional Committee. He repeated that he needed arguments to try to change the views held by some United States Senators who appeared to be as difficult to convince as was the President of Ecuador, but that tonight he had fewer arguments to get the Foreign Aid Bill passed than he had twenty-four hours ago. U.S. press headlines tonight would probably make things more difficult and would probably compel the President of the United States to go back to his country able only to tell his people that in spite of everything it is still a moral obligation to support foreign aid.

The President discussed the historical background of the Summit Conference, indicating that while initially he had been reluctant to attend, he felt that his presence here would give new thrust to the Alliance for Progress. What really disappointed him was that, after being told in Washington that he was trying to do too much for the Latin Americans, in Punta del Este some had said that he was doing too little.

President Arosemena stated that he was very pleased to have met President Johnson personally, and that he felt that he was a different man from the kind of person Latin America thinks he is. He had felt that the President was a very human, practical, and compassionate man who faced many problems and many difficulties. It was not Ecuadorís intention to cause any difficulties for anyone. He suggested that Latin Americans must get to know President Johnson as he had and that many American Senators, including Senator Fulbright, should come to Latin America so that they could share the burden which was now carried solely by President Johnson. He further stated that people in the United States erroneously feel that Latin Americans do not pay enough taxes, while the Ecuadorean Government collects as many taxes as possible; if it collected any more, it might destroy the country.

After referring to the cost of the war in Viet Nam, to the increase in Alliance for Progress funds, and to his attempt to get more public and private funds channelled toward Latin America, the President emphasized that both he and the Ecuadorean President really worked for the same objectives, namely, to help the poor and hungry people.

President Arosemena said that he wanted to help, but that he had to face problems in his own country. He stated that he wanted President Johnson to go back to the United States with the support and backing of 300 million Latin Americans, and that this could be achieved easily by just adding two or three sentences to the Presidential Declaration. He stated that no U.S. monetary commitments would be necessary, and that the inclusion of these two or three phrases would give President Johnson the unanimous support of Latin America. He added that the Latin American presidents were really on his side, although they did not have the courage to come out and say so. He felt that, if he would sign the present Declaration, he would not be able to go back to Ecuador because his people consider the document a step backward from the Punta del Este Charter. While President Johnson had proved to him that the Alliance for Progress had been more vigorous in the last three years and had provided more funds than in any previous period, unfortunately, Latin America was not aware of this; the people did not know this, and they should be told.

President Arosemena asked President Johnson to help gain approval for adding a couple of sentences to the document so that he too could defend the Declaration as a worthwhile document. He suggested that the President could justify these additions before United States Senators by pointing out the advantages of preventing a popular upheaval rather than have to put one down after it got started, and also by the fact that United States loans are not really gifts, but rather down payments on an insurance policy aimed at protecting the hemisphere against communism and avoiding having the United States face a "gigantic Cuba" south of its borders.

The President once more referred to the highlights of his speech and to his personal pledge to assist the Latin American countries. He noted that the schools, classrooms, roads, highways and bridges that have been built are physical evidence that much is being done.

Assistant Secretary Gordon stated that every President and Foreign Minister attending the meeting agreed that the program for the future was a step forward and not a step backward from the Alliance.

The President said he could not understand how the programs which he had outlined in his speech could be interpreted as stagnation. He suggested that the President of Ecuador should consider a hypothetical situation in which Ecuador would have to assist the poor people of the United States, and in which after taxing humble Ecuadoreans heavily to obtain the assistance to send to the United States, the Americans would express their dissatisfaction and their President would say in a public meeting that assistance from Ecuador was insufficient, was slow because of red tape, and therefore was unacceptable.

President Arosemena stated that all he wanted was a slight change in the document and asked the President whether two sentences from his speech to the Summit Conference could be included in the final

Declaration. This would satisfy Ecuadorís requirements and provide for unanimity.

The President answered that he did not know whether the other Presidents would agree to such a procedure, and since the pertinent sentences were not then available, the matter should be discussed further between President Arosemena and Assistant Secretaries Gordon and Solomon. Assistant Secretary Gordon said he would be unavailable due to a conflicting meeting and it was agreed Assistant Secretary Solomon would meet President Arosemena later./3/

/3/ According to an attached handwritten note, much of the last paragraph was inserted by Solomon, reflecting his "annoyance at having been saddled by LG[ordon] with the dirty work." (Fitzgibbons to Carroll Brown, April 24; ibid.) No record of Solomonís meeting with Arosemena has been found.


52. Circular Telegram From the Department of State to All American Republic Posts/1/

Washington, April 17, 1967, 7:44 p.m.

/1/ Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files, 1967-69, POL 7 IA SUMMIT. Confidential; Priority. Drafted by Eaton, cleared by Sayre, and approved by Gordon.

176889. Subject: Summit Assessment. From Gordon.

1. Following is our summary assessment of Summit outcome. We will send you full sets of Summit documents/2/ as soon as possible.

/2/ The documentary record of the Punta del Este Conference is ibid., Conference Files, 1966-1972: Lot 67 D 586, CF 151 through CF 162; Washington National Records Center, RG 59, ARA/IPA Files, FRC 71 A 6682, Item 31, Meeting of American Presidents-1967; ibid., ARA/OAS Files, FRC 71 A 6682, Item 50, Meeting of American Presidents-1967; and Johnson Library, National Security File, International Meetings and Travel File, Punta del Este, 4/12-14/67.

2. Ultimate results of Summit decisions will not be known for number of years and will depend upon degree of implementation of actions agreed at Summit. However, we consider Summit meeting and Declaration signed there definite successes. Our reasons follow.

a. When President Johnson agreed a year ago to join with Latin American leaders to explore proposed Summit meeting, we saw meeting as opportunity for:

(1) Agreement on a few significant, concrete actions which, building on experience and achievements of first years of Alliance for Progress, could result in needed accelerated economic and social advances in future.

(2) Re-emphasis on cooperative approach, under which Latin American initiative and self-help would be stressed at same time that U.S. would reassure Latin America on its concern and assistance.

(3) Strengthening of personal relations among leaders of Hemisphere.

b. Substantive content of Declaration of Presidents of America signed at Punta del Este,/3/ which is result of long and painstaking preparatory process in which every signatory government (except Trinidad and Tobago) was deeply involved, goes beyond what might reasonably have been expected a year ago. It includes:

/3/ For text of the declaration, see American Foreign Policy: Current Documents, 1967, pp. 673-685, or Department of State Bulletin, May 8, 1967, pp. 712-721. Arosemena refused to sign the declaration, the only attending Latin American head of state to so refuse.

(1) A stronger, broader, and much more specific Latin American commitment to a Common Market than seemed likely when process began.

(2) Increased attention to multinational projects which will facilitate integration.

(3) Increased emphasis and better focus on two lagging but key sectors of the development process-agriculture and education.

(4) A special emphasis on science and technology which grew stronger as the preparatory process progressed, and culminated in a commitment to an Inter-American Science Program including several specific points.

(5) A useful (although not as strong as we had hoped for at one stage) statement on limitation of military expenditures.

(6) From the U.S., most importantly, (a) agreement to increased assistance in support of the greater Latin American efforts; and (b) in a major new trade policy departure, willingness to consult carefully within the U.S. and with other industrialized countries on generalized trade preferences, for limited time periods, by all industrialized countries in favor of all developing countries.

c. As stated above, all signatory governments (except Trinidad and Tobago) were deeply involved in preparatory process and final Declaration is truly inter-American document.

d. Personal relationships developed among Presidents during Summit were in almost all cases very satisfactory and should be helpful in future.

3. While reactions of other delegations to Summit varied in degree, all but Ecuador seemed agree that meeting had on balance been clear success. President Frei was most categorical and emphatic in so stating. President Diaz Ordaz made statement which probably most nearly expressed consensus when he said that while all might have wanted more from Summit, negotiators had achieved what was possible, and what they had achieved was a substantial advance. Arosemenaís negative position was not supported by any other Latin American President.

4. Press reaction to the Summit from within the U.S. has been strikingly and almost uniformly favorable. From reports we have had thus far, press reaction from Latin America has been uneven, perhaps reflecting to considerable extent lack of understanding of full meaning of decisions reached at Summit. In particular, many Latin journalists apparently failed to appreciate significance President Johnsonís statement on point 2(b)(6) above.

5. The job now before all the OAS Members is to follow up on the Summit decisions with sustained action. In some fields, notably economic integration, the lead must be taken by Latin America. In others, such as trade and the regional science and technology efforts, we shall be working jointly with them or, as in the case of preferences, following up ourselves with the other industrialized countries. In the expanded programs in agriculture, education, and health, the next steps should come from the national Latin American authorities concerned. The same is true on elimination of unnecessary military expenditures. In the whole process of implementation, we should maintain the attitude of urgency set forth in the Presidentís April 13 speech,/4/ and make clear that we view the Summit objectives as serious undertakings.

/4/ For text of the speech, see Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States: Lyndon B. Johnson, 1967, Book I, pp. 446-449. For other statements made during the conference, see ibid., pp. 442-446 and 449-451.

6. You may draw on the foregoing assessment as you deem useful in both official and private contacts.



53. Memorandum From the Presidentís Special Assistant (Rostow) to President Johnson/1/

Washington, May 12, 1967.

/1/ Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Venezuela, Vol. III, 12/66-12/68. Secret.

Mr. President:

The Venezuelan security forces report that they have captured a guerrilla infiltration force coming from Cuba. They claim 12 prisoners (4 of whom are Cuban), the boat and outboard motor in which they landed, US $10,000 in 50 dollar bills, and quantities of ammunition and other supplies. Interrogation of the prisoners reveals that another landing from Cuba can be expected in the next few days.

CIA is trying to verify these reports. If the information is fully borne out, there will be a strong-if not stronger case-for OAS action against Cuba than there was following the discovery of the Cuban arms cache in Venezuela in 1963. The 1963 incident led to the Meeting of Foreign Ministers in July 1964 which applied diplomatic and economic sanctions against Castro.

The resolution of the Foreign Ministers also contained this warning:

"To warn the Government of Cuba that if it should persist in carrying out acts that possess characteristics of aggression and intervention against one or more of the member states of the Organization, the member states shall preserve their essential rights as sovereign states by the use of self-defense in either individual or collective form, which could go so far as resort to armed force, until such time as the Organ of Consultation takes measures to guarantee the peace and security of the hemisphere."/2/

/2/ For full text of the resolution, see American Foreign Policy: Current Documents, 1964, pp. 328-334, or Department of State Bulletin, August 10, 1964, pp. 181-182.

If the case is an airtight one, we may find the Venezuelans moving in the OAS for action pursuant to this warning./3/

/3/ The President wrote the following instruction at the bottom of the memorandum: "Why donít we provide leadership quietly now. L"



54. Memorandum From William G. Bowdler of the National Security Council Staff to the Presidentís Special Assistant (Rostow)/1/

Washington, May 15, 1967.

/1/ Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Cuba, Bowdler File, Vol. II, 2/66-7/67. Confidential.


I met this morning with State and CIA to review the latest information on the Cuban landing in Venezuela and to see how we can provide some "quiet leadership".

The facts in the case are as I described them in staff meeting this morning, except that CIA thinks the second rubber raft foundered and did not make it back to the mother ship.

The Embassy reports that the Venezuelans are more aroused over this incident than during the arms cache in 1963./2/ All major Venezuelan parties have publicly condemned the Cubans and called for a vigorous response. Only a small centrist party and the far left have withheld

/2/ In telegram 6016 from Caracas, May 14. (National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1967-69, POL 23-7 CUBA)

comment. The incident must be acutely embarrassing to the Venezuelan Communist Party which has been trying to resume the "via pacifica" line.

As of this afternoon, the Venezuelan OAS Delegation had taken no action to call for a meeting of the OAS Council to ask for collective action. This probably means that the Venezuelans are still debating whether to move in the OAS or the UN.

In considering the forum for OAS action and the measures which might be taken, the group concluded:

1. The only forum where meaningful obligatory action could be taken is a Meeting of Foreign Ministers under the Rio Treaty. This was the body which acted in 1963-64.

2. The OAS Council, under the special authority given to it by the 1962 MFM, could investigate the incident and make recommendations to governments. But this is an untried authority and it is doubtful whether the governments would want to use it in this case.

3. Use of armed force against Cuba-to blockade Cuban ports, to intercept and search Cuban ships on the high seas, or to overthrow Castro-is out of the question.

4. The measures which might be considered are:

-to condemn the Castro regime for its continued intervention.

-to establish a blacklist (OAS would do this) of trading and shipping entities and vessels which engage in significant new transactions with Cuba and agree that:

(1) no governmental contracts be awarded to listed entities;

(2) listed vessels be denied governmental or government-financed cargos;

(3) OAS member countries apply any other restrictions against the listed entities and vessels which their laws permit, and

(4) require commercial concerns in OAS member countries to observe the blacklist in their operations.

-to call to the attention of those governments supporting AALAPSO Cubaís aggressive activities and ask them to withdraw their support of the Organization.

-to press Mexico to break all ties with Castro.

State is putting the foregoing into a memo for Secretary Rusk/3/ to get his reaction and views on how to proceed. The Secretary may bring this subject up at the Tuesday luncheon./4/

/3/ Bowdler forwarded the Department memorandum to Rostow on May 16, noting that "it parallels what I put in my memo to you yesterday." (Memorandum from Bowdler to Rostow, May 16; Johnson Library, National Security File, Venezuela, Vol. III, 12/66-12/68)

/4/ May 16; no substantive record of the meeting has been found.



55. Memorandum From the Presidentís Special Assistant (Rostow) to President Johnson/1/

Washington, May 17, 1967.

/1/ Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Venezuela, Vol. III, 12/66-12/68. Secret. A notation on the memorandum indicates the President saw it.

Venezuelan Case Against Cuba

The Venezuelan Foreign Minister yesterday announced President Leoniís decision to call for a Meeting of Foreign Ministers (MFM) to consider the problem of Cuban support for guerrilla movements in the hemisphere. The Venezuelans have as yet taken no formal action in the OAS. Their OAS Ambassador has been recalled to Caracas. We assume that he will return with orders to ask the OAS Council to convoke an MFM.

Yesterday Ambassador Bernbaum spoke with President Leoni and Foreign Minister Iribarren. He found them both concerned over what further meaningful action can be taken to punish Castro short of use of armed force against Cuban territory. Bernbaumís reports are attached./2/

/2/ Transmitted in telegrams 6069 and 6070 from Caracas, May 16 and 17; attached but not printed. Also in the National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1967-69, OAS 5-2 and POL 23-7 CUBA, respectively.

You will recall that the 1964 MFM approved mandatory sanctions: break in diplomatic relations and suspension of trade and sea transportation. All have complied except Mexico.

State is taking a look at possible additional measures:

Through the MFM

1. A strong condemnation of the Castro regime.

2. An OAS blacklist of trading and shipping entities and vessels which engage in significant transactions with Cuba.

3. Authorization for OAS member states, acting individually and collectively, to stop and search Cuban flag ships (or ships without flag) in the Caribbean suspected of acting as mother ships for Cuban-sponsored infiltration teams.

Outside the MFM

1. Prevail upon Mexico to comply with the 1964 MFM decision and break all diplomatic and economic ties with Cuba.

2. The United States and Latin American countries having relations with the Soviet Union to impress upon the Soviets the gravity of continued promotion of subversion by Castro.

The blacklist and stop-and-search measures raise many serious problems which need careful analysis before we sign on. State is engaged in this analysis.

In the meantime-as you will see from Bernbaumís cable-we continue to help the Venezuelans as you promised President Leoni we would.



56. Memorandum From William G. Bowdler of the National Security Council Staff to the Presidentís Special Assistant (Rostow)/1/

Washington, May 31, 1967.

/1/ Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Venezuela, Vol. III, 12/66-12/68. Secret.

Venezuelan Case Against Cuba

Yesterday I learned that the Venezuelans were about to make a formal request for an MFM to consider the Cuban case.

In checking with ARA I found that they still had not sorted out where they wanted to go because of differences inside the Bureau and with E and EUR. I told Sol Linowitz and Bob Sayre that they had better alert Foy Kohler-whom the Secretary had tapped to follow up on this one-and ask him to resolve the differences. Getting the Secretary into an MFM without knowing where we are headed is a helluva situation.

Kohler met this morning with Solomon, Stoessel, Covey Oliver, Linowitz, Sayre and Bernbaum./2/ I participated.

/2/ Kohler convened the meeting "as a follow-up to the Secretaryís instruction" that "he [Kohler] work out a coordinated Department position." (Memorandum for file, May 31; National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, ARA Files, 1967-69: Lot 72 D 33, Venezuelan Complaint (Cuba))

These are the highlights of the meeting:

1. Sol reported that the Venezuelans are determined to proceed with a call for an MFM under Art. 39 of the OAS Charter-probably today. They claim practically unanimous support for the convocation, but do not have the faintest idea where they want to come out beyond appointing a group to collect all the evidence on Cuban intervention.

2. Kohler noted that we are now committed to an MFM and must proceed on this basis.

3. It was agreed that we could support these measures in the MFM which would find generally wide acceptance among the Latin Americans:

a. Condemnation of Cuba for its aggressive activity.

b. Better enforcement of existing OAS sanctions approved in July 1964.

c. A renewed appeal for cooperation by friendly non-member countries in restricting trade and shipping with Cuba, and a call on countries actively supporting Cuba (the Soviets, etc.) to reassess their position in the light of Cuban subversion.

d. Action by all OAS Members to deny bunkers and government cargoes to ships in the Cuban trade. The US is already taking this action.

e. Improvement of surveillance and intercept especially in the Caribbean, search, and seizure of suspicious Cuban and unidentified vessels within a 12-mile zone, permitted under international convention, and search and seizure of such vessels outside the 12-mile zone if there is specific information of subversive intent warranting such action.

4. A sixth measure was discussed at great length: an OAS blacklist of firms trading with Cuba to which OAS member governments would deny government contracts. Tony Solomon was strongly opposed on general trade policy grounds and the ineffectiveness of the measure. EUR endorsed this view. Covey Oliver favored the measure in the form of an MFM recommendation (not mandatory) as symbolic support for Venezuela. Kohler took it under advisement and to discuss with Secretary Rusk./3/

/3/ Kohler reached a decision before meeting Rusk: "I have mulled this matter over since that [May 31] meeting, trying to lean over backwards to understand the frustrations of ARA and of the Latin American countries. However, I have reluctantly come to the conclusion that the proposed economic sanction is not feasible." (Memorandum of record, June 1; ibid., ARA Files, 1967: Lot 70 D 150, Cuba, 1967)

5. Kohler made a strong point of the need for the Latin Americans to take the initiative in convincing the Europeans that they should restrict trade with Cuba. It was agreed that one action the MFM might take is to select 3 or 4 prominent and effective Latin American Foreign Ministers to go to Europe to discuss the Latin American concern over mounting Cuban intervention and the desire of the OAS for the European governments to curtail their assistance to Castro, particularly in credit guarantees and Iberiaís flights to Cuba. If the Europeans responded to this initiative, fine. If not, the OAS might consider a recommendatory blacklist.

6. As things now stand, this seems to be the sequence of contemplated action:

a. Venezuela will ask that the MFM be convoked initially at the ambassadorial level to appoint a committee to make a study of Cuban intervention in Venezuela, and other places (e.g., DR, Colombia, Bolivia, Guatemala) if the governments so request.

b. The study when completed would be presented to the MFM at the ministerial level.

c. The MFM would:

-denounce Cuba for its continued intervention.

-call upon the Europeans to cooperate with the measures approved by the MFM against Cuba in 1964.

-appoint a committee of Foreign Ministers to go to Europe to explain OAS concern and OAS desire for their cooperation in restricting assistance to Castro as long as he continues to promote subversion.

d. Depending upon the response of the Europeans, the MFM would reconvene. If their response is affirmative, no additional OAS action would be taken. If negative, the MFM might:

-apply the blacklist.

-deny bunkering facilities to ships calling at Cuba.



57. Memorandum From the Presidentís Special Assistant (Rostow) to President Johnson/1/

Washington, June 1, 1967.

/1/ Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Venezuela, Vol. III, 12/66-12/68. Confidential. A notation on the memorandum indicates the President saw it.

Venezuelan Case Against Cuba

The Venezuelans today asked for an early Meeting of Foreign Ministers (MFM) to consider their complaint against Cuba.

The convocation is under the OAS Charter rather than Rio Treaty. The essential difference is that a Charter MFM is limited to recommendations, while a Rio Treaty MFM normally takes mandatory measures.

Venezuela chose the OAS Charter track because it can count on almost unanimous support for convocation. This is not the case if they moved under the Rio Treaty.

The OAS Council meets on Monday, June 5, to act on the Venezuelan request. The first step will be to convoke the MFM at the ambassadorial level. A Committee will then be appointed to go to Venezuela (and other countries which have cases against Cuba) to examine all the evidence. The MFM at the ministerial level will meet after the Committee completes its report.

Venezuela has no clear picture of what it wants the MFM to recommend. Part of its difficulty is that there is little more that can be done against Castro of an effective nature short of armed force, which is out of the question. Another problem is the general unwillingness of the larger Latin American countries to apply additional economic pressure against countries trading with Cuba.

State is still sorting out what meaningful collective action can be taken. What is needed is a keener sense by the Latin Americans that Cuban subversion is a common problem and that they should be taking the lead in: (1) publicizing Cuban interventionist activities, (2) bringing pressure on the Western Europeans to curtail their trade with Cuba; (3) forcing the Soviet bloc to define its position and (4) strengthening their internal security forces to liquidate the guerrillas at the incipient stage. What is called for, in effect, is a collective security self-help effort by the Latins.

We will be trying to move them in this direction, making clear that they can count on our shield against overt Cuban military action and our support in developing their security capabilities.



58. Memorandum of Conversation/1/

Washington, June 2, 1967, 10 a.m.

/1/ Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1967-69, POL 23-7 CUBA. Confidential. Drafted by Bernbaum and approved in S on June 5.

Cuban Intervention in Venezuelan Affairs-OAS

The Secretary
Mr. Foy D. Kohler-G
Mr. Anthony M. Solomon-E
Ambassador Maurice M. Bernbaum

Following a discussion of Venezuelaís petroleum problem, the Secretary turned to the question of the U.S. position in the OAS on Venezuelaís complaint against Cuba.

Mr. Kohler said that he had come to the conclusion that the idea presented by ARA for the establishment of a list of firms doing business with Cuba to be utilized by the member states of the OAS in denying government contracts to such firms was not feasible. It was his impression based on Mr. Solomonís views that the potential costs to U.S. policy and U.S. interests were too great to justify the limited benefits which might be derived.

The Secretary then asked whether this would apply to the blacklisting of vessels touching at Cuban ports. Mr. Solomon said this was not a point at issue since such action was already taken by the USG and would merely represent a generalization of our policy. He explained that our policy involved the denial to such vessels of bunkering facilities in U.S. ports as well as government cargoes.

The Secretary then referred to OAS action involving the search of suspicious vessels outside territorial waters. He suggested in this connection the desirability of establishing a Caribbean Security Committee made up of countries bordering the Caribbean Sea. He thought that this would involve specifically the countries directly threatened by Cuban intervention without involving the South American countries more remote from the scene as well as Mexico. It was agreed in the ensuing discussion that this would have the great advantage of creating an organization which could facilitate and implement search procedures.

Ambassador Bernbaum then outlined a program which had been discussed the previous evening by Ambassador Linowitz, Ward Allen and others interested in the problem and which had been described earlier in the morning to Robert Sayre. This provided for the following measures:

1. An OAS denunciation of Cuban aggression in strong language.

2. Strong criticism of Soviet responsibility through assistance to Cuba making its actions possible and appealing to the Soviet Union to assist in solving this problem.

3. An appeal to friendly countries to assist in the efforts of the OAS countries to protect themselves against Cuban aggression by not encouraging or facilitating trade with that country.

4. The establishment of a high level committee, possibly made up of a selected group of foreign ministers to visit the European countries concerned and possibly the Soviet Union to make known the Latin American concern over the problem and to request collaboration. The results of this trip would be reported back to the MFM. In addition there might be behind the scenes agreement on the action by all OAS Chiefs of State to call in the Ambassadors of the European countries, Soviet Union, Canada and Japan to emphasize the appeal made in the OAS Resolution.

Further steps to be taken by the OAS would be applied in the event of the failure of the mission during its talks in Europe and other areas and would be the subject of further action by the OAS upon the submittal of their report. At that time there would be taken up various punitive measures such as (1) Generalization of U.S. policy toward vessels touching at Cuban ports to the other OAS countries; (2) The pressure on Spain to discontinue its air services to Cuba; and (3) Other appropriate and feasible measures.

Mr. Kohler said that he agreed with this program, particularly in the sense of making known to the Soviet Union the concerted feeling of the OAS countries. He felt that the Latin Americans had been far too weak and delicate in their approaches to the Soviet Union which he thought would be far more sensitive to such pressure than they apparently thought. He also agreed on the desirability of a widespread publicity campaign to make known the Latin American position.

The Secretary thought that this kind of program including the establishment of a Caribbean Security Committee would be useful. He did not, however, want the OAS action to be of such a nature as to create the impression that the United States was about to embark on an important punitive program against Cuba. He thought that we already had too many problems in our basket at the present time for such a policy to be adopted now. It seemed to him that a policy of this nature could be envisaged after a few more crises involving Cuba. The Secretary also wanted to know whether the proposed action by the Chiefs of State would be mentioned in the Resolution. Ambassador Bernbaum said that this might best be done behind the scenes. The Secretary agreed. He then asked whether the Ambassadors concerned would be called in by the Presidents en masse or individually. Ambassador Bernbaum thought that this might best be done individually. The Secretary then said that since a decision of this kind would involve President Johnson he thought it best for him to consult with the President before giving the green light. He wondered whether it might be possible for President Johnson to be exempted from this requirement by utilizing language such as "the highest feasible levels". Ambassador Bernbaum said that Foreign Ministers in Latin America did not have the prestige and weight of the Secretary of State and that it might therefore be desirable to arrange for the Chiefs of State in Latin America to do the job leaving the way open for the Secretary of State to do it in Washington. This produced some laughter and was left at that.


59. Telegram From the Presidentís Special Assistant (Rostow) to President Johnson in Texas/1/

Washington, June 24, 1967, 1939Z.

/1/ Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Latin America, Vol. VI, 6/67-9/67. Secret.

CAP 67582. As you requested, I had a good meeting this morning with CIA, State and DOD on the whole guerrilla problem in Latin America.

This is the boxscore:

Country by Degree of Urgency

Number of Active Guerrillas

Hard Evidence of Cuban Involvement



Yes: Cuban military officers among ranks, arms and training.



Yes: Arms deliveries via Mexico.



Yes: Arms, training, Cuban military personnel captured during infiltration mission, Cuban admission of operation.



Yes: But only training in Cuba.

Dominican Republic


Yes: Training, funds and special agents.



Yes: But only training in Cuba.



Yes: But only training in Cuba.

To understand these figures it is necessary to appreciate that each organized guerrilla can tie up 10-20 government soldiers. We do better in Viet-Nam only because of airpower, mobility, firepower, etc.

These are some further insights into the situation in each country:


We have put Bolivia on top of the list more because of the fragility of the political situation and the weakness of the armed forces than the size and effectiveness of the guerrilla movement. The active band numbers probably 50-60 but may run up to 100. CIA believes that "Che" Guevara has been with this group. There are indications that six other bands, totalling 100-200 men may be organizing in other parts of the country. President Barrientos is hard pressed in coping with the active band. If other fronts were successfully opened, the situation could get out of hand. The 17-man mobile training team we have in Bolivia expects to have another ranger battalion trained by September 1.

The active movement has 8 top Bolivian Communist Party leaders in it who were trained in the Soviet Union. The owner of the farm which the guerrillas used as their training camp belongs to a man (Roberto Peredo) who visited Moscow in 1966. We know of six Cuban military officers in this band. We also know that they have radio contact with Cuba using the same procedures taught by the Soviets.


The guerrillas are divided into two organizations. The FAR-250 men-has the backing of Castro. Last summer when President Mendez Montenegro took over, the guerrillas were making steady progress. With the death of FAR leader Turcios and strong pressure by the Guatemalan military. The guerrillas have been scattered and are on the defensive.

In September 1966, Mexican authorities uncovered an arms smuggling channel to Guatemalan insurgents. Documents found showed that over 4000 weapons had been sent. A Cuban Embassy officer was caught red handed passing money to the smugglers.


This is Cubaís primary target. After 1963 the guerrilla movement came to a virtual standstill while the Venezuelan Communist Party debated whether to pursue the peaceful or violent approach. The party split and Douglas Bravo led the activist faction into resumed guerrilla activity. Since mid-1966 his group (150-250 men) and the MIR group (100 men) have stepped up their campaign. Leoni responded by organizing 9 new ranger battalions which we are helping to train and equip.

Soviet-manufactured AK-13 weapons have been captured in Venezuela from guerrillas known to have landed from Cuba in July 1966. The boat and motors used are known to have come from Cuba. In May 1967 a Cuban/Venezuelan group landed from a Cuban fishing vessel. The Venezuelans escaped into the mountains, but two Cubans were captured and two killed.


There are two guerrilla units operating, one responsive to Cuba and the other to the USSR. After a long inactive period, they resumed operations last February. So far the operations have consisted of sporadic hit-and-run raids. The Colombian armed forces, which are well-trained and disciplined, are putting pressure on them. President Lleras has moved quickly to improve intelligence collection, strengthen coordination between services and mount social programs in guerrilla

areas. There is no Cuban presence in Colombia, but there is hard evidence of Colombians being trained in Cuba. The guerrillas do not represent an immediate threat to Lleras.

Dominican Republic:

There are no active guerrillas although there are indications that the Communist MPD and 14th of June Movement would like to open a front. The Dominican armed forces are keeping a close watch on their activities. Balaguer has given strong support to our efforts to help him develop special anti-guerrilla units. In recent months Dominican authorities have obtained documents from Cuban-trained agents showing that Cuba is furnishing money and training for guerrilla activities.

Ecuador and Peru:

Cuba tried to start guerrilla activities in these two countries about two years ago. The movements were quickly put down, but they remain as potential trouble spots. Cuba continues to train nationals from both countries.

I have collected a full folder of background material which you may want to review.

I told my working group to make a careful review of what we were now doing in each country and meet with me again in one week to discuss additional measures which we might take to strengthen the anti-guerrilla capabilities of these countries./2/

/2/ According to a June 24 note, the President told Jim Jones to "hold this, I want to talk to him [Rostow] about this tomorrow." (National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, ARA Files, 1967: Lot 70 D 150, Latin America Miscellaneous 1967)

Rostow was in the delegation that met Johnson on June 25 for the second Glassboro meeting with Soviet Premier Alexei N. Kosygin. (Johnson Library, Presidentís Daily

Diary) No evidence was found indicating whether Johnson talked to Rostow about Cuban subversion at Glassboro.



60. Editorial Note

President Johnson raised the issue of Cuban subversion in Latin America at the Glassboro Summit with Soviet Premier Alexei N. Kosygin. According to the official record of the afternoon session on June 25, 1967, the President said "he wished to inform Mr. Kosygin of an extremely important matter. He said we had direct evidence of Cubaís encouragement of guerrilla operations in seven Latin American countries. This was a form of aggression and was dangerous to peace in the Hemisphere as well as in the world at large. He pointed out that

Soviet-manufactured arms coming from Cuba had been seized in Venezuela in July 1966 and in May 1967, with seven Cubans having been captured in this latter incident. He also wished to point out that on March 13 of this year, Castro openly stated his support for this type of activity. The Government of Venezuela had stated its determination to put an end to such operations. Our Ambassador to the OAS and some of his colleagues from the Organization were now investigating in Venezuela the evidence of those activities. The President emphasized that he therefore strongly felt that Castro should be convinced to stop what he was doing. Mr. Kosygin did not comment on this statement." (National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1967-69, POL 7 US) For the complete memorandum of conversation, see Foreign Relations, 1964-1968, volume XIV, Document 235.

That evening Johnson gave former President Eisenhower the following account of this discussion with Kosygin: "[I] told him there were 6 or 7 hot spots; that theyíre using Soviet material, Cuba was; that we caught a bunch of them the other day in Venezuela; that they were giving us hell in the Dominican Republic, and Haiti, and Bolivia, and half a dozen places; that this is a very serious matter, Soviet equipment and

Castro-trained people." Johnson said Kosygin "ought to realize that we thought this was very serious and we were going to have to take action-the OAS was going to take action." The President then asked Kosygin for a response. According to Johnsonís account, Kosygin "said he couldnít comment now, but he was leaving for Cuba tomorrow, and he would bear these things in mind in talking to them. Acted like he was a little upset with Castro. Didnít say so." (Johnson Library, Recordings and Transcripts, Recording of telephone conversation between President Johnson and Dwight D. Eisenhower, June 25, 1967, 9:44 p.m., Tape F67.13, Side A, PNO 1) An uncorrected transcript of the conversation is ibid.


61. Memorandum From the Presidentís Special Assistant (Rostow) to President Johnson/1/

Washington, July 6, 1967.

/1/ Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Latin America, Vol. VI, 6/67-9/67. Secret. A notation on the memorandum indicates the President saw it.

Mr. President:

I had another good round yesterday with Covey Oliver and other members of the inter-agency working group on Cuban subversion in Latin America./2/

/2/ A memorandum of the meeting, drafted by Bowdler, is ibid.

This time we examined the adequacy of current DOD, CIA and AID/Public Safety (police) programs in the seven countries with active or potential insurgency movements.

Our conclusions were:


This is our most serious problem, not because of the size of the guerrilla movement, but the weakness of the security forces and fragility of the political situation. Given Boliviaís limited capacity to assimilate our assistance, we should for now:

-press forward with the training of a second Ranger Battalion, and develop an intelligence unit to work with the Battalion.

-expand our police program in rural areas.

-start contingency planning for dealing with a situation which Barrientos can no longer control.


President Lleras Camargo is concerned and working for better coordination and action by his security services. We have good on-going military, intelligence and police programs. We agreed that:

-DOD would review equipment needs of the armed forces in the light of CINCSOís recommendations.

-Covey Oliver would consider a modest expansion of the rural police program.

Dominican Republic

With the full cooperation of Balaguer and the armed forces, we have made good progress in our internal security programs. No additional measures by us are necessary. It would help if Balaguer got rid of his thuggish Chief of Police. Covey Oliver will ask John Crimmins to make the pitch.


There is no active insurgency, but this is a good time to help the Ecuadoreans improve their grossly deficient rural police. Covey Oliver will work out an expanded program with AID/Public Safety.


Mendez Montenegro has tackled the insurgency problem with energy and has accomplished a good deal. He has welcomed our assistance and we have responded with additional help on the military and police side. Our present programs look about right. A modest increase in our rural police program is warranted and Covey Oliver will pursue this.


There is no active insurgency. The security forces have demonstrated their ability to handle insurgent bands in the past. Our current programs are adequate.


We have done what Leoni asked you for at Punta del Este: to expedite delivery of equipment for 9 new Ranger battalions. [11⁄2 lines of source text not declassified] Additional support for the National Guard (police) in rural areas is needed and Covey Oliver will work this out with AID/Public Safety.

Another decision reached by the group is that henceforth Covey Oliver will organize a group (probably the same people who attended yesterday)/3/ which will meet on a regular basis to:

/3/ Documentation on the IRG/ARA Counter-Insurgency Subgroup is in the National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, IRG/ARA, 1966-68: Files: Lot 70 D 122.

-keep a close watch over Cuban insurgency trends throughout the hemisphere.

-review individual country situations and requirements.

-expedite decisions on increased assistance, as necessary.

As a starter Covey Oliver will write each Ambassador to impress upon him the importance which you attach to alertness to internal security requirements and communicating needs to Washington in a timely way./4/

/4/ Copies of the letter and subsequent replies are ibid., ARA Files, 1967-69: Lot 72 D 33, Military/Security Policy.

From the review which I have made, I am convinced that at the present level of insurgency in Latin America, the important elements of the equation are:

1. For the most part, the institutional base for internal security in Latin America is primitive. The opportunities we have to build it up vary with the local officials in power. We must be alert to every chance given us to advance the building process.

2. If the President of the country is concerned over the problem and willing to act, the armed forces will back him and, with our assistance, they can produce impressive results. This has been the case in Guatemala. We hope to repeat it in Bolivia.

3. The cost to us in furnishing "preventive medicine" assistance is small, but our Ambassadors and their country teams must understand the key importance of "preventive medicine" and exploit every opportunity which presents itself.

4. The "Establishment" in Washington must be geared to keeping a continuous review of the problem and acting quickly on assistance requirements.



62. Memorandum From the Presidentís Special Assistant (Rostow) to President Johnson/1/

Washington, September 7, 1967, 11:30 a.m.

/1/ Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Paraguay, Vol. I, 1/64-8/68. Confidential. A notation on the memorandum indicates the President saw it.

Asuncion Meeting on Latin American Economic Integration

/2/ A joint meeting of the Latin American Free Trade Association and the Central American Common Market was held in Asuncion August 28-September 2. Additional documentation on the meeting is in the National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1967-69, ECIN 3 LA, ECIN 3 LAFTA, and ECIN 3 CACM.

Bill Bowdler met with Covey Oliver and his Latin American Common Market experts to review the results of the Asuncion meeting which the press has reported as a failure.

Two things emerged:

-until we have a fuller picture of what took place at the LAFTA (South American countries, plus Mexico) session, where we do not have observer status, it is premature to draw conclusions about the lack of success at Asuncion and what country was responsible.

-despite inability of LAFTA to reach agreement on the first try on certain key issues, interest in the economic integration movement has not slackened and the timetable agreed at Punta del Este has not been irretrievably upset.

The Asuncion Goals

We had hoped the Asuncion meeting would agree on three major issues:

-programmed tariff reductions among LAFTA members.

-preparations by LAFTA members for a common external tariff.

-mechanism for joint LAFTA-CACM exploration of gradual merger into a Latin American Common Market.

Up until the last two days of the meeting, it seemed that agreement would be reached on the first two points based on a compromise formula which would give the poorest countries (Bolivia, Ecuador and Paraguay) free access to the markets of all the other LAFTA members in five years.

At the last moment, Peru asked to receive similar treatment as the poor countries. The other LAFTA members balked, and Peruís continued refusal to drop its request worked as a veto. This, in turn, seems to have triggered a veto by Paraguay of other decisions relating to programmed tariff cuts and preparations for a common external tariff.

We do not know why Peru took this inflexible position. It had not been enthusiastic about a common market from the start, and recent financial problems probably compounded its fears about competition from other countries. Significantly, none of the big three-Argentina, Brazil, Mexico-opposed the concession to the poor countries. They would have been harder to turn around than Peru.

The Asuncion Round in Perspective

Disappointing as the results were, it is important to look at the Asuncion round in perspective:

-the meeting showed that most of the LAFTA countries are prepared to move rapidly toward a common market.

-LAFTA gave its blessing to the formation of an Andean subregional group (Venezuela, Colombia, Ecuador, Peru, Bolivia and Chile) which plans to reduce trade barriers among themselves at a faster pace than provided in the Presidentís timetable.

-at the joint LAFTA-CACM meeting the Foreign Ministers agreed to recommend annual meetings to consider acceleration of execution of the Punta del Este decisions and decided to establish a Coordinating Committee to study on a priority basis five key aspects of the merger of the two groups.

-the Meeting of Presidents envisaged an 18-month period or more for the Latin Americans to negotiate all the specific arrangements leading toward a common market.

-LAFTA members, while disappointed at the inability to reach agreement on all issues, do not look upon the meeting as a failure. This is reflected in public statements by the Argentine and Colombian Foreign Ministers.

-the European economic integration movement faced several complex negotiating sessions before basic obstacles were removed.

What Needs to be Done

To keep the momentum of the movement going, two things must be done:

-get Peru turned around.

-have the LAFTA Foreign Ministers renew negotiations as rapidly as possible, preferably before the second quarter of 1968 which they have set for their next meeting.

Among the opportunities we will have to use our influence with the LAFTA group are:

-the Meeting of Foreign Ministers in Washington on September 22-23 to consider Venezuelaís complaint against Cuba.

-the World Bank and Fund meetings in Rio de Janeiro in mid-September. Tony Solomon and Don Palmer (Covey Oliverís Common Market man) will attend.

-a special CIAP meeting in Rio at the end of September to consider the financial aspects of economic integration.

-Tony Solomon is going to Peru after the Rio Bank-IMF meeting to address a group of Peruvian businessmen. He will speak on the advantage of economic integration. He will also be able to talk to Belaunde about the Peruvian attitude.

-We may help Peru overcome its integration fears by supporting the Andean subregional group, with necessary adjustment assistance if they take specific action cutting tariffs among themselves.

Before deciding how to use these opportunities, we need a full reading of what took place at the LAFTA meeting. State has asked our Embassies for this assessment./3/

/3/ The President wrote the following instructions on the memorandum: "Letís follow these carefully & keep me informed. L"



63. Telegram From the Presidentís Special Assistant (Rostow) to President Johnson in Texas/1/

Washington, September 7, 1967, 2151Z.

/1/ Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Latin America, Vol. VI, 6/67-9/67. Secret. James R. Jones, Assistant to the President, wrote the following note on the telegram: "9-7-67. Sent copy to Christian & he might leak it."

CAP 67764. This lively memorandum to me from Covey Oliver on counterinsurgency developments in Latin America will give you some satisfaction.

"As you know, we and the Latinos have our ups and downs in the counterinsurgency business. But I want to call to your attention an unusual series of successes which have taken place in three Latin American countries during the past few weeks. They are particularly significant in that they follow close on the heels of the militant and optimistic pronouncements by Castro and his fellow Latin American revolutionaries at the recent Havana meeting of the Latin American Solidarity Organization (LASO).

1. Bolivia:

A. An important cache of passports, signal plans and other documents was discovered by a Bolivian Army element. Inter alia, the documents provide solid evidence that Che Guevara earlier this year was in Bolivia operating with the guerrillas.

B. On August 31, a Bolivian Army patrol executed an imaginative and sophisticated ambush of the guerrilla rearguard, killing several key Cubans and Bolivians, and taking prisoner a knowledgeable Bolivian who is cooperating well under interrogation./2/

/2/ Documentation on the subsequent capture and death of Ernesto "Che" Guevara de la Serna is in Documents 170-173.

2. Venezuela:

In early August, Venezuelan police learned that the principal action arm of the Communist subversives in Caracas was a 50-man terrorist unit called Strategic Sabotage Command. Since that time, the unit has been Ďdecapitated.í The commander was captured and his four lieutenants killed in a series of police raids. A roundup of the lower echelons is now underway.

3. Nicaragua:

On August 12 the Guardia Nacional began a sweep of an area of north central Nicaragua on the basis of fragmentary reports of guerrilla training camps. Insurgent basecamps were located and we estimate that in a subsequent series of firefights at least 14 Castro-oriented guerrillas were wiped out. The survivors are reported fleeing the area on an Ďevery-man-for-himselfí basis.

The situation in Guatemala continues to improve, while in Colombia there have been no significant contacts between government forces and insurgents recently.

All in all, while one swallow doesnít make a summer, August 1967 has been a vintage month for the COIN forces in Latin America."


64. Memorandum From the Presidentís Special Assistant (Rostow) to President Johnson/1/

Washington, September 25, 1967, 4 p.m.

/1/ Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Subject File, Organization of American States, Vol. II. Secret. A notation on the memorandum indicates the President saw it.

OAS Meeting of Foreign Ministers

/2/ The final plenary sessions of the Twelfth Meeting of Consultation of the Ministers of Foreign Affairs of the Organization of American States were held in Washington September 22-24. Documentation on the meeting is ibid., International Meetings and Travel File, Ministers of Foreign Affairs, 9/22-24/67; and National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Conference Files, 1966-1972: Lot 68 D 453, CF 212 and CF 213.

On all counts, the OAS Meeting of Foreign Ministers went well, within the limits of what we thought possible.

The basic resolution was approved 20 to 0, with Mexico abstaining.

The resolution has all the points which the Venezuelans and we originally sought (copy attached):/3/

/3/ Attached but not printed. For an excerpt of the Final Act, see American Foreign Policy: Current Documents, 1967, pp. 648-652; the text of the final act of the meeting, including the "basic resolution," is in Department of State Bulletin, October 16, 1967, pp. 493-498.

-a strong condemnation of Cuba for acts of aggression in Venezuela and Bolivia.

-a request to free world countries to restrict their trade with Cuba and a recommendation to OAS members that they press this request individually or collectively.

-an expression of serious concern to the Communist countries that their support of Castro stimulates his subversive activities, and a recommendation to OAS members that they make joint or individual representations to manifest this concern.

-a call upon governments supporting the Afro-Asian-Latin American Peopleís Solidarity Organization to withdraw their support of the organization because it fosters subversion.

-a recommendation to OAS Governments not to use ships in the Cuban trade and deny them bunkering facilities.

-a call on OAS Governments for tighter controls over subversive activities.

At Congressman Seldenís request, Secretary Rusk tried to get in the notion of the OAS Secretariat keeping a list of private firms trading with Cuba, but this did not prosper.

In the separate resolution, sponsored by Chile, Venezuela and Colombia, it was agreed to call attention in the UN to Cubaís subversive activities. Mexico went along with this decision.

The resolutions will not topple Castro but they provide OAS-sanctioned levers for pressuring our European friends and Soviet bloc countries to put the heat on him. Now we must get the Latins to pull these levers. Covey Oliver is working on this.

The resolutions also give Venezuela strong moral support which will be helpful to President Leoni domestically. To the extent that Cuba becomes a political issue here over the next 13 months, the resolution will help to show that we have been active in mobilizing additional collective action to squeeze Castro.

We may well find that Castro will persist in his guerrilla activities, despite getting his fingers burned. This raises the question of what further action can be taken to deter Castro. Bill Bowdler and I were discussing this over the weekend. We concluded that the next step might be measured retaliation by the aggrieved state against Cuba. There is authority for this in the 1964 resolution. Many aspects need to be sorted out. We plan to use the IRG-SIG mechanism to assess the advisability of this course.



65. Record of Discussion and Decisions of 22nd Meeting of the Senior Interdepartmental Group/1/

Washington, September 28, 1967.

/1/ Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, S/S-SIG Files: Lot 70 D 263, SIG/RA #22, 10/2/67, Future Agenda Suggestions. Secret.

Under Secretary of State, Chairman
Deputy Secretary of Defense
General Johnson for the Chairman, JCS
Admiral Taylor for the Director of Central Intelligence
Director, United States Information Agency
Administrator, Agency for International Development
Under Secretary of the Treasury
Under Secretary of Agriculture
The Special Assistant to the President, Mr. Walt W. Rostow
The Deputy Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs
The Staff Director

Ambassador Foster, ACDA
Mr. Oliver, Chairman IRG/ARA
General Orwat, JCS
Mr. Lang, ISA

[Omitted here is discussion of future agenda suggestions and the status of talks on the nuclear non-proliferation treaty.]

3. US Regional Policy Toward Latin American Security Forces

A. Summary of Discussion

The Chairman of IRG/ARA introduced the subject with a brief review of the report itself and its current status./2/ He mentioned the ACDA dissent and the fact that, owing to time pressures, staffing by the Serv-ices had not yet been completed./3/ He listed the main reappraisals and reformulations of policies contained in the report. He noted that the Navy wished to give further consideration to the specific lines of action (page 20) suggested for navies in the area. On the sale of F-5s, to which the ACDA dissent was addressed, he pointed out that this kind of question had been raised at each of the previous plateaus of air force re-equipment-T-5 to 600 mph and now to near supersonic.

/2/ The report, approved by IRG/ARA on September 20, recommended that the United States carry out its "commitment to cooperate with the larger South American countries in obtaining jet fighter aircraft of the F-5 type in 1969-70 to replace jet fighter aircraft in existing inventory. It is recognized that air combat support could be performed by less sophisticated jets but that for primarily political reasons we are prepared to see the five large South American countries receive these aircraft." (Ibid., SIG Agenda: #22-9/28/67)

/3/ In a September 23 memorandum to the SIG Acting ACDA Director Alexander argued that the United States "should continue to resist pressure from the Latin American countries for supplying supersonic military aircraft." (Johnson Library, National Security File, Agency File, SIG, 22nd Meeting, 9/28/67, Vol. 2) In an October 20 memorandum to Katzenbach, Chairman Wheeler reported that, subject to several reservations, the JCS generally supported the paper, including the proposal to provide F-5 aircraft to the larger South American countries. (Ibid.)

The Chairman stated his view that this policy paper should be considered a general re-statement of our present policies with some new emphasis, but that SIG should not give approval to the paper in all its details. Gen. Johnson summed up his view that the general thrust of the policy was good and a simple adjustment would probably meet the one criticism noted. (He mentioned that a paper 36 months in preparation/4/ should not have to be staffed in five days.)

/4/ In a September 28 memorandum to Oliver, Sayre explained that the report was a late response to NSAM No. 297: "One of the first things I did when assigned to the White House in 1964 was to get McGeorge Bundy to ask for a study and an agreed U.S. security policy for Latin America. Defense and State appointed a study group which worked for six months. It produced a study which DOD/ISA considered satisfactory, but State, JCS and CINCSO refused to accept it. It was finally sent to the White House for information. Primarily because of the Dominican crisis, but also because DOD/ISA preferred the ad hoc system which it controlled, we have made progress slowly." (National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, ARA/IG Files: Lot 70 D 122, U.S. Regional Policy Toward L.A. Security Forces-1967)

Mr. Barr explained his difficulty in presenting the case for arms sales to Latin America in his recent Congressional appearances. He welcomed the detailed statement and reasoning behind US objectives and thought these would be useful to him in the future, although he foresaw continued opposition on the Hill. Some important and influential leaders saw our activities in this field as only aiding military dictatorships. Others on the SIG thought opinion was less opposed in the Armed Services and Foreign Relations and Foreign Affairs Committees.

Mr. Gaud thought that, leaving the F-5 problem aside, the other policies would win support in the Congress. Gen. Johnson suggested that Gen. Porter had good relations on the Hill and would be willing to help with any Congressman who might benefit from a first hand view of the practical problems in this area.

Mr. Rostow summed up the case to be made as follows: the military play an important role in the countries which is not well understood; they can be a force for progress; and we do have some leverage through equipment modernization. Therefore, we should aim to guide the military leadership toward support of democratic institutions, toward the right military tasks, toward a reduced share of GNP for military purposes and toward keeping the modernization impulse in line with US interest as against outsiders (e.g., the French). A strong case can be made using such examples as Venezuela and Peru.

Mr. Foster agreed that the policy paper was a good one but maintained that the F-5 sales were contrary to it. He queried whether the "commitments" mentioned in the paper circulated by Mr. Oliver were in fact definitive. Mr. Rostow cited the letter to the Brazilian President and Ambassador Tuthillís authorized oral remarks./5/ Gen. Johnson said he had no knowledge of the letter but on his recent trip to Brazil he was left in no doubt by his Brazilian hosts that they considered we had a commitment to sell F-5s and that they expected the authorization for talks with Northrop to come shortly after October 1. Mr. Foster also recalled the Punta del Este recommendation on arms limitation but Mr. Nitze thought the Latin Americans would consider F-5 purchases as "necessary expenditure" in the terms of the resolution.

/5/ See Document 230.

Mr. Foster thought the Foreign Relations Committee particularly would take the line that we arenít holding down the appetites. Mr. Oliver thought a good case could be made that we are. On a comparative basis Latin Americaís military expenditures were smaller than those of other areas on military expenditure and of those sums only a small part went for matťriel. The Latin American forces were in many cases used more as CCC-type camps and, said Gen. Johnson, for vocational training. The Chairman said that the comparative element should be added to the IRG/ARA paper.

The Chairman thought we had delayed the sale as long as feasible but we were now faced with imminent Mirage sales. Gen. Johnson pointed out that F-5 deliveries would not be made before 1969, whereas the Mirage was available now.

Mr. Gaud described the special case of Peru, where we must make a decision on a program loan with conditions-no Mirage purchases, sound economic policies, no higher defense expenditure, but agreement to F-5 purchases. He concluded, as did Mr. Rostow, that a Peruvian purchase of Mirage aircraft could result in Congressional retaliation on the Alliance for Progress. Mr. Rostow stressed the importance of President Belaundeís position and the consequences for him of our failure to comply with the request for F-5s. If pressed too far by us and by his military, Belaunde might denounce AID entirely, to the great damage of the Alliance, to American policy, and to the President of the United States.

Mr. Gaud and others stated their firm belief that the matter had to be discussed with Congressional leaders before action is taken or we would run a serious risk of equally strong reaction against our sale of F-5s.

B. Decisions and Next Steps

(1) The Chairman summarized the general agreement of members to continued development and implementation of the following guidelines for US action:

(a) Increasing Latin American military role in internal defense;

(b) Attempting to enhance OAS/UN peacekeeping role of L.A. military forces;

(c) Continued "go slow" on more sophisticated equipment; and

(d) Re-examining US military presence.

(2) SIG agreed that the "general thrust" of the policy was good and its objectives were generally approved subject to possible changes as the JCS complete their staffing.

(3) SIG further agreed that the State-Defense Study Group should not consider themselves bound in any way by this document but should be free to reexamine these policies in their review of broader area policies.

(4) On the F-5 sales, SIG agreed that we must proceed but that it was essential to inform Congressional leaders prior to final action with the Latin American countries. The Chairman of IRG/ARA was requested to prepare a detailed, step-by-step plan for dealing with the sales of F-5s to all the countries in question and including the tactics to be used domestically.

C. Suggestions for Further Follow-Up

(1) Should we study the actual influence of the Latin American military and also analyze what groups are represented in forces today? (IRG/ARA-Admiral Taylor suggested Major Gen. Roland del Mar would be a good person to conduct such a study. The Chairman also suggested the Rand Corporation.)

(2) The Chairman asked that the projected State-Defense study on Latin America consider the following:

(a) Multilateral programs to influence Latin American military;

(b) Possible pooling of sophisticated equipment (helicopters, interceptor boats) (General Johnson mentioned the Army Regional Assistance Command);

(c) Mr. Gaudís suggestion to relate aid to increasing use of resources on economic development as an indirect way to hold down defense expenditure./6/

/6/ In April 1968 Ambassador Edwin M. Martin submitted the joint State-Defense study, entitled "Latin America: A Recommended U.S. National Strategy." The SIG discussed the Martin study at its meetings on May 2 and June 13. At the latter meeting, Katzenbach directed that the Country Teams consider the study "in their policy/program planning and development." (National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, S/S-SIG Files: Lot 70 D 263, SIG/RA #41, 6/26/68, Chairmanís Summary at Discussion and Decision)

(3) Gen. Johnson requested preparation of a SIG discussion on how to give useful guidance to American military officers in their contacts with Latin American military leaders (State-G/PM to prepare paper for SIG discussion and action).

AA Hartman
Staff Director


66. Special National Intelligence Estimate/1/

SNIE 80/90-2-68

Washington, January 29, 1968.

/1/ Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Agency File, SIG, 29th Meeting, 1/9/68, Vol. 3. Secret; Controlled Dissem. According to a note on the cover sheet this estimate was prepared in the Central Intelligence Agency with the participation of the intelligence organizations of the Departments of State and Defense and the National Security Agency. The United States Intelligence Board concurred in this estimate on January 29. Hartman circulated copies of the estimate to SIG members on January 29. (Ibid.)


The Problem

To estimate how US interests in Latin America would be affected by a US refusal to sell F-5s to certain Latin American countries.


Recent US foreign aid legislation (the Conte-Long and Symington amendments)/2/ directs the President (a) to deny grants or credits to certain countries for the purchase of "sophisticated weapons systems;" (b) to withhold economic aid from such countries in an amount equivalent to the cost of such equipment purchased by them; (c) to terminate economic aid to such countries if unnecessary military expenditures are materially interfering with economic development; (d) to use the US voting power in the Inter-American Development Bank to deny any loan which might assist in the acquisition of "sophisticated or heavy" military equipment./3/ The full text of these amendments is set forth in the Annex.

/2/ Reference is to two amendments to the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961 (as amended), one sponsored by Representatives Silvio O. Conte (R-Massachusetts) and Clarence Long (D-Maryland), the other by Senator Stuart Symington (D-Missouri). The Conte-Long amendment required the President to withhold economic assistance to any "under-developed country" that used military assistance to acquire sophisticated weapons systems. The provision did not apply to Greece, Turkey, Iran, Israel, Taiwan, the Philippines, and Korea, or to any country that the President specifically exempted on the basis of national security. (81 Stat. 937 and 81 Stat. 940) The Symington amendment stipulated that the President terminate development loans and PL-480 assistance to any country that made military expenditures "to a degree which materially interferes with its development." (81 Stat. 459)

/3/ The SIG discussed the impact of the Conte-Long and Symington amendments on foreign assistance to Latin America at its meeting on January 9, and Katzenbach approved the suggestion for further consultation with Congress. He also asked Helms to prepare "an assessment of the political costs in Latin America of a withdrawal of the F-5 offer." (Record of discussion, January 18; National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, S/S-SIG Files: Lot 70 D 263, SIG/RA #29, 1/1/68, Strategy for Cyprus Settlement)

For the purposes of this estimate, we have assumed a determination that such weapons as the F-5 and Mirage 5 jet aircraft are "sophisticated weapons systems" within the meaning of the Acts.


A. A number of Latin American countries, having put off replacement of obsolescent military equipment for some years, are determined to undertake early procurement of particular items. They see an especially urgent requirement for jet aircraft, and the governments of Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Peru, and Venezuela have received recent assurances from US officials that the F-5 will be made available. If the US now refuses to provide F-5s, resentment in these countries will be strong. Some or all of them would almost certainly decide to acquire Mirage jets. They would also shift to greater reliance on European countries for the supply of other types of military equipment, and perhaps for military training as well.

B. Denial of the F-5s would be regarded in Latin America as but one part of a change in US policy-a change centered on the use of economic aid as a lever to restrict military expenditures. Most Latin Americans would consider this an affront to their national pride and an unwarranted interference by the US in their internal affairs; their reactions would be intense and adverse. US relations with the governments and the military establishments of major Latin American countries would suffer. The US would encounter increasing difficulty in obtaining cooperation under the Alliance for Progress and in the Organization of American States.

C. The loosening of ties with the Latin American military would endanger joint programs in specialized training and counterinsurgency, sharply increase US problems in carrying out contingency planning, and make it more difficult and expensive for the US to maintain facilities for space ventures and nuclear detection./4/

/4/ Mr. Thomas L. Hughes, The Director of Intelligence and Research, Department of State, believes that this paragraph overstates both the existing advantages of our Latin American military relationships and the potential jeopardy to them. [Footnote in the source text.]

D. Those Latin American governments which responded to the denial of F-5s by arranging to purchase Mirages or other "sophisticated" jet aircraft would then run the risk of curtailment or termination of US developmental aid. In this event, the effect on their economies would vary considerably: in Argentina and Venezuela, for example, they would not be severe; in Brazil, Chile, and Peru they would be more serious. In several of the major countries, there would be internal political effects, reenforcing existing tendencies toward more assertive nationalism and sharper anti-US attitudes.

E. Damage to US relations with Latin America from such developments would be severe and would persist for some time. How long relations remained clouded, and how widely such effects would spread through Latin America, would depend on many broader political and economic factors and on the general world situation./5/

/5/ The implementation of the Conte-Long and Symington amendments, particularly in Latin America, was discussed at SIG meetings on January 25 and February 15. (National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, S/S-SIG Files: Lot 70 D 263, SIG/RA #30 & SIG/RA #31) The subject was also discussed at an NSC meeting on February 7 in which the President agreed to send Oliver to Latin America, including a stop in Peru to raise the F-5 issue with President Belaķnde. A record of the NSC meeting is in Foreign Relations, 1964-1968, vol. IX, Document 73.

[Omitted here are the Discussion section and Annex of the estimate.]


67. Action Memorandum From the Presidentís Special Assistant (Rostow) to President Johnson/1/

Washington, February 5, 1968, 5 p.m.

/1/ Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Latin America, Vol. VII, 1/68-2/68. Secret.

Measures to Invigorate the Form and Substance of Our Activities in Latin America

You asked for ideas to dramatize our Latin American policy. I suggest the following:

Measures Demonstrating High-level US Interest

1. Special Message to the Inter-American Cultural Council. Dr. Eisenhower and Dr. Hornig leave for Venezuela on February 13 to attend a special meeting of the Inter-American Cultural Council. The Council will pass on programs for carrying out the OAS Summit decisions in education and science and technology. I suggest you send a special message, with emphasis on the possibilities of satellite ETV. I have asked Dr. Hornig and Doug Cater to prepare a draft.

Call me

/2/ The President approved the first five measures, adding the handwritten instructions noted in footnotes below.


2. Trip by the Vice President. To demonstrate our interest in economic integration and in opening the inner frontiers of South America, the Vice President could make a 3-week tour, visiting primarily projects related to development of the heartland of the continent: road building, hydroelectric plants, colonization, community development, cooperatives. Covey Oliver, Bill Gaud (who hasnít been to Latin America except to Punta del Este) and perhaps some Congressman should go with him. They would dramatize these two distinctly Johnsonian dimensions of the Alliance for Progress: integration and multinational projects.

Call me

/3/ Johnson wrote: "check Pickets, Parades etc." Rostow later explained the instruction as a "careful check of the security aspects." (Memorandum from Rostow to Read, February 7; Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Latin America, Vol. VII, 1/68-2/68) Humphrey left for Latin America on March 31 and was in Mexico City that evening when Johnson announced that he would neither seek nor accept the nomination of the Democratic Party for reelection. (Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States: Lyndon B. Johnson, 1968-69, Book I, pp. 469-476) After signing Protocol II to the Treaty of Tlatelolco, Humphrey returned to the United States on April 1. (Hubert H. Humphrey, The Education of a Public Man, pp. 358-360) The Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America was signed by 14 Latin American countries at Tlatelolco on February 14, 1967; see Foreign Relations, 1964-1968, vol. XI, Document 226.


3. Invite Presidents to the Opening of Hemisfair. Hemisfair officials could invite the Presidents of participating countries to the opening of the Fair. As part of their visit to San Antonio, you could invite them to the Ranch.

Call me

4. Visits of Latin American Presidents. You have the President of Paraguay, Alfredo Stroessner, scheduled for March. For the remainder of the year you could have:

President Leoni of Venezuela. He was invited for January but could not make it. State is proposing July.

President Lleras of Colombia. He is going to Europe this spring and would like to stop in the US.

President Balaguer of the Dominican Republic. He will have finished half of his term on July 1.

The Amistad Dam will be ready for dedication in September. You could join President Diaz Ordaz for that ceremony.

Call me

/4/ Johnson wrote: "plus 2 or 3 others." The following Latin American Presidents visited the United States in 1968: Stroessner of Paraguay (March), Trejos Fernandez of Costa Rica (June), Barrientos OrtuŮo of Bolivia (July), and Diaz Ordaz of Mexico (December).

5. Interview with Selected Latin American Newsmen. An interview with a group of carefully selected, prominent Latin American reporters would give you good exposure in Latin America. You could make it an informal, personal affair by having the interview in your office and taking the newsmen on a tour of the White House. This could be filmed by USIA for the newsmen and played all over Latin America. You could use the interview to project your vision of an economically integrated Latin America with the benefits that this would bring to the entrepreneur as well as the average citizen. State and USIA have developed a plan for bringing such a group of newsmen to the US, using Hemisfair as the cover.

Call me

5. [sic] More Direct Contact by Covey Oliver with Latin Americans. Covey has just finished a highly successful, two-week swing through Central America and Panama. He plans to travel to Peru, Chile, and Brazil, starting this week. A Taveras Dam loan signing ceremony in the Dominican Republic in March is another possibility. On these trips he tries to reach the people through TV, press conferences and public appearances in places outside the capital. His mastery of Spanish and natural empathy are a great asset./5/

/5/ Johnson underlined the last two sentences of this paragraph and wrote: "good give us all he can take."

Our OAS-CIAP man should also be doing some missionary work of this nature, but he lacks the language and substantive knowledge of country problems and what CIAP might do to dramatize the Alliance. Nevertheless, if you reject proposal 2 above, he could tour the inner frontiers and be photographed on the modern roads, at dams, gas pipelines, etc. in the interior.

Measures to Give New Thrust to the Alliance for Progress

1. Restructure CIAP. CIAP is not giving leadership to the Alliance. The Chairman tends too much towards private diplomacy and does not exert enough firm, imaginative, public leadership. Our man is not feeding him ideas and pushing him for action behind the scenes. There is a serious structural weakness-7 part-time members cannot do the job of policy direction, country review, and performance follow-up that is required. It is politically impossible to replace the present members, but a few more full-time members with imagination and drive could be added. The new men are needed to translate the Summit directives into specific courses of action, determine priorities and, through close personal contact, persuade governments to move accordingly. Bill Bowdler has prepared a proposal for restructuring CIAP which he is taking up with Covey and Sol. We are shooting to get this done at the Inter-American Economic and Social Council meeting in June.

We can also expect more dynamism from a new OAS Secretary General if Galo Plaza is elected.

2. New US Executive Director on the IDB. Related to our leadership in CIAP is leadership in the Inter-American Bank. The Bank is assuming a larger role in the Alliance. Last year annual investments by the Bank reached the half billion mark. It did more dollar lending than our entire AID program in Latin America. My hunch is that the Congress will increasingly want to funnel assistance through the multilateral lending institutions, so the IDBís role in the Alliance is likely to increase. This makes it most important that we have a top-flight pro as US Executive Director who knows how to work with Latins while protecting our interests-especially since our top man on the Bank management is not effective. I know you are considering this matter. You have in Ray Sternfeld-the present US alternate-the man who can do that kind of job. I strongly recommend that you name him. (Tom Mann and Joe Barr agree.)

Call me

/6/ This option is checked.

3. Modernize our Military and Security Relations with Latin America. The pattern of these relationships was established during World War II and the years immediately thereafter. They are outdated. There is too much emphasis on bilateral programs with us and an excessive paternalism on our part. As we have done in the economic field, we should get the Latins to think more of military and security policy in collective terms and in relationship to economic and social goals. New instruments of inter-American cooperation are needed to replace the present antiquated-and stigmatized-ones. Bob Sayre has prepared a strategy for doing this which Nick Katzenbach has approved and is now awaiting the concurrence of Secretary McNamara.

4. Three Additional Measures Contingent on Future Developments. These measures of high impact for Latin America are contingent on future developments:

a. Untying of AID for the Western Hemisphere, when our balance of payments situation permits.

b. Granting of Trade Preferences to Latin America, if the Europeans continue their preferences for Africa and do not go along with further temporary worldwide tariff cuts for the LDCs./7/

/7/ The President checked measures 4b and 4c.

c. A New Program to Open South Americaís Inner Frontiers More Rapidly, after the heavy expenditures in Vietnam decrease.



68. Memorandum From William G. Bowdler of the National Security Council Staff to President Johnson/1/

Washington, March 1, 1968.

/1/ Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Latin America, Vol. VI, 10/67-4/68. Confidential. According to telegram CAP 80618 from Rostow to the President, March 1, the President saw the memorandum. (Ibid., Name File, Bowdler Memos)

Covey Oliverís Trip to Venezuela, Bolivia, Peru and Colombia

The trip was a highly successful venture from the standpoint of public relations and personal contacts. On the substantive side, Covey achieved a considerable measure of understanding of the need for cooperative action to meet a crisis situation in Haiti and for a new mechanism for discussing and defining Latin Americaís military role and equipment needs. Covey was unable, however, to get President Belaunde to reduce military expenditures by any meaningful amount or to postpone purchase of unnecessary military equipment. Covey will be sending you a full report./2/ Here are the highlights:

/2/ Rostow forwarded Oliverís report to the President on March 5. (Ibid., Country File, Latin America, Vol. VI, 10/67-4/68)

Inter-American Cultural Conference

The meeting approved programs to carry out the Summit directives in education, science and technology. The Latin Americans pledged sufficient funds to finance, with our matching contribution, a $16-million effort the first year.


President Leoni would like to visit Washington, but it seems doubtful that he can do so this year.

The security forces have made great strides in the past four years with our help. I visited the police Central Command Center and the Armed Forces Joint Operations Center and was impressed by their organization and skill. The ten Venezuelan Ranger Battalions, for which you authorized fast delivery of equipment, are all in the field. Insurgency has not been eliminated but is at one of its lowest points in years.


The visit gave President Barrientos a boost and us the opportunity to examine Boliviaís economic situation at first hand. The economic outlook is generally good, but Barrientos faces a temporary budget problem resulting largely from increased expenditures from the counter-guerrilla effort and the drop in tin prices. He is prepared to trim his budget and impose new revenue measures but still needs modest assistance from us.

Liquidation of the Guevara guerrillas has given the Bolivians pride and much needed self-confidence. The security situation looks reasonably good. I was impressed by dedication and quality of our country team in La Paz. The AID Mission is particularly impressive.


Covey did not get very far with President Belaunde on reducing the share of the budget for military expenditures or postponing the acquisition of additional military equipment. Belaunde is the prisoner of a strong-minded military, an opposition-controlled Congress bent on currying the militaryís favor and his own weakness as a political leader. Peru is one case where the Symington-Conte-Long amendments clearly apply. But this would probably provoke a crisis of confidence in Peru which would end up with the military ousting Belaunde. Rather than make a formal finding of applicability, it is better to turn the faucet on bilateral assistance to a trickle.

Despite our problems on aid, it is evident that there is vitality in the Peruvian economy. Control of insurgency is good. These factors make Peruvians pass off our curtailment of aid with a shrug of the shoulders.


President Lleras was pleased to get your invitation to make a visit. He accepts, leaving the dates to be worked out. From his conversation with Covey Oliver and what we know of Llerasí performance during the past 18 months, it is clear that Lleras is a rare combination-for Latin America-of good executive, smart politician, knowledgeable economist, and statesman with a broad grasp of hemispheric and world problems. He is getting the Colombian economy back on its feet. With a smart mix of force and economic assistance he is making steady headway in curbing insurgency.



69. Memorandum of the 583rd Meeting of the National Security Council/1/

Washington, March 6, 1968, noon.

/1/ Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, NSC Meetings, Vol. V, 3/6/68, Inter-American Objectives and Problems. Secret. No drafting information appears on the memorandum. The meeting took place in the Cabinet Room, and according to the Presidentís Daily Diary it began at 12:46 p.m. (Johnson Library)


The President
The Vice President

Secretary Rusk
Deputy Under Secretary Bohlen
Assistant Secretary Oliver
Deputy Assistant Secretary Sayre

Secretary Clifford
Under Secretary Nitze

General Wheeler

Secretary Fowler

Director Helms

Director Marks

W. W. Rostow
B. K. Smith
Tom Johnson
W. G. Bowdler

Assistant Secretary Oliver opened the discussion on Latin America by reporting on his appearance this morning before Senator Morseís Latin American Subcommittee. He said he had been "well and tolerantly" received with no grilling on the arms buildup in Latin America.

On the Latin American paper before the NSC,/2/ Assistant Secretary Oliver singled out three issues:

/2/ A copy of the paper is attached to a memorandum from Paul C. Warnke, Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs, to McNamara, March 5. (Washington National Records Center, OSD Files: FRC 330 73 A 1250, Latin America 1968, 0-092)

(1) the problem of keeping up the momentum of the Alliance for Progress if the Alliance appropriation were cut a second year in a row.

(2) the drop in Latin American trade in 1967 which amounted to 6%, or $600 million.

(3) some-though exaggerated-backsliding on economic integration since the Summit.

Reporting on his trips to Central America and four South American countries, Mr. Oliver made these points:

(1) The Central American Common Market (CACM) is going through a difficult adjustment period. The members are considering restrictive measures which would undo the progress made by CACM. We should shift the emphasis of our assistance away from bilateral aid and toward adjustment assistance tied to the strengthening of CACM institutions.

(2) As the Mexican Foreign Minister has suggested, we should place more emphasis on physical integration to encourage economic integration.

(3) During the South American tour, he launched the idea of a periodic meeting of Ministers of Defense as a way of getting the Latin Americans to focus more realistically on their military requirements.

(4) In his conversation with Belaunde, he achieved limited success in getting the promise of a memorandum explaining projected military expenses for 1968, but he received no assurances with respect to postponement of additional military equipment.

The President gave these directives:

(1) that a task force be established to make a detailed study of existing national road systems in Latin America and how they might be linked up. He indicated a willingness to give his support to findings of the task force./3/

/3/ The President subsequently said that the study might be expanded to include air transportation and communications. [Footnote in the source text.] On April 5 Johnson approved a State Department plan to promote the task force proposal in Latin America. (Memorandum from Rusk to the President, April 4; National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1967-69, POL 3 IA SUMMIT)

(2) that top level officers responsible for managing our Latin American affairs make a special effort to visit Latin America and engage in other activities demonstrating our continued, high-level interest in the area.

[Omitted here is discussion of other subjects.]


70. National Intelligence Estimate/1/

NIE 80/90-68

Washington, March 28, 1968.

/1/ Source: Central Intelligence Agency, Job 79-R01012A, O/DDI Registry. Secret; Controlled Dissem. According to a note on the cover sheet this estimate was prepared in the Central Intelligence Agency with the participation of the intelligence organizations of the Departments of State and Defense and the National Security Agency. The United States Intelligence Board concurred in this estimate on March 28. The estimate superseded NIEs 80/90-64 and 80/90-66 (Documents 24 and 38).



This estimate treats the question of revolutionary development in Latin America more broadly and over a longer period of time than has been customary in previous estimates.

There are many defensible definitions of the word revolution, and many traditional applications of that word to events in Latin America, where in the past 40 years there have been more than a hundred successful golpes, insurrections, and other violent or irregular changes of government. Our subject here is not simply the sudden overthrow of regimes but the pressures in Latin America for fundamental change. In an effort to assess the potential effects of those pressures, we define revolution as a series of developments which, in a relatively short time, produces profound and lasting change in a nationís political, economic, and social institutions. Among other movements to bring about such change, we survey the current status and future prospects of the several Communist insurgencies.

Some of the judgments we reach in this paper are quite specific and apply to the next year or two. Some, considerably more general, pertain to the next four or five years. Still others describe emerging trends which will be felt in the area over more than a decade.


A. The focus of attention in most discussions of this subject has been on insurgency movements supported by Castro. Such movements are still active in three countries: Colombia, Guatemala, and Venezuela. In all three cases they are relatively small, have attracted little sympathy among the local populace, and are encountering strong responses by the security forces. In no case do insurgencies pose a serious shortrun threat to take over a government, though they are troublesome, difficult to deal with, and likely to remain an unsettling factor on the political scene.

B. Even over a much longer period, we do not believe that these, or similar insurgencies which may become active, will be the main engine of revolution in Latin America. The factors and forces which bring revolutions will be more complicated and will vary widely from country to country in form and character.

C. Because discontent has not yet become organized and acute, and because there is a lack of appealing radical leadership, revolution seems unlikely in most Latin American countries within the next few years. Over a longer period, however-certainly within the next decade-we see conditions developing throughout the area which will be much more conducive to revolution. Whether and when these conditions actually produce revolutionary changes will depend upon fortuitous combinations of factors within individual countries.

D. The establishments which now control the seven largest Latin American countries (Brazil, Mexico, Argentina, Colombia, Peru, Venezuela, and Chile) are much stronger than any proponents of revolutionary violence. Though the government of such a country might be displaced during the next year or two, the change almost certainly would not be revolutionary. In Chile, the government which comes to power in 1970 may follow revolutionary policies. In a number of the smaller countries, there is greater likelihood of a sudden overthrow of government and also more chance that a revolutionary government might come to power. (See Annex B for a discussion of six smaller countries which are particularly lacking in stability.)

E. Elements on the political left will be in the forefront of most future revolutionary movements, but we do not believe that the Communist organizations in Latin America have, or will develop, the strength to play the central role. We do not rule out the possibility that they might attempt on their own to seize power in one or more countries, but we think it far more likely that they would make common cause with other stronger revolutionary elements, settling temporarily for an influential voice in a new government and hoping to progress from there.

F. While we do not conclude that Castro-style insurgency is of no importance, we do believe that the forces which undertake future revolutions will develop and operate primarily in the cities. They will require-or wish to have-mass support, and such support will be more readily obtainable in the cities than in the countryside. The influx of people from countryside to city in Latin America is striking, and most of it swells the population of the slums. In 1940, there were five Latin American metropolitan areas with more than one million residents; in 1960, there were nine. We estimate that in 1970 there will be 18, and in 1980, 26.

G. The inhabitants of these urban slums-and particularly the young people born in them-will, we think, provide a key source of revolutionary raw material. The source of revolutionary leadership will vary from country to country; the personal qualities of the individuals will be of much more importance than the class or profession they represent. Some may be from the military-perhaps younger officers or noncommissioned officers; others from the Catholic priesthood; others from the university-intellectual community; and still others from new versions of existing political parties.

H. Varied as they may be in other respects, we believe that revolutionary movements will have one important common feature: a nationalistic, independent attitude with strong overtones of anti-US sentiment.

[Omitted here are the Discussion section, Annex A, and Annex B of the estimate.]


71. Action Memorandum From the Presidentís Special Assistant (Rostow) to President Johnson/1/

Washington, June 6, 1968, 2:15 p.m.

/1/ Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Latin America, Vol. VIII, 9/68-10/68, 2 of 2. Confidential.

Offer of Integration Adjustment Assistance to the Andean Subregional Group

In the memorandum at Tab A,/2/ Under Secretary Katzenbach requests authorization to explore with the governments of the Andean Subregional Group (Bolivia, Chile, Colombia, Ecuador, Peru and Venezuela) a United States loan of up to $25 million for adjustment assistance to industries affected by formation of an Andean Common Market.

/2/ Tab A is a May 29 memorandum from Katzenbach to the President; attached but not printed.

This group of six middle-size countries is now considering a treaty establishing a common market. The private sector in three (Venezuela, Ecuador and Peru) is nervous about adverse effects of rapid integration and are pressuring their governments to delay the treaty.

A year after Punta del Este it is clear the Latin American Common Market is more likely to come through a series of subregional groups than the merger of the Central American (CACM) and South American (LAFTA) blocs, as contemplated at Punta del Este. That is why the action of the Andean Group is the most promising development on economic integration since the Summit.

The last-minute opposition of the private sector in some Andean countries threatens establishment of this subregional common market. By offering to join in establishing adjustment assistance, we may help the governments overcome this resistance. No loan would be made unless this objective is assured.

The key issue in making an adjustment loan offer is the tying arrangement. State argues that we will maximize our chances of getting governments to move if we follow the formula we use in the Inter-American Bank-our dollars could be used only to purchase goods and services in the United States, in the country of the user, or from other members of the Andean Group. This is also the formula we use in our loans to the Central American Integration Bank. (We allow this flexibility in Latin America because a large proportion of Latin foreign exchange eventually comes back to the US, even if it is not directly tied to US purchases.)

Secretary Fowler raises three issues on the State proposal (Tab B):/3/

/3/ Tab B is a June 1 memorandum from Fowler to the President; attached but not printed.

1. He takes sharp exception to the tying formula. He wants the dollars tied to 100% US procurement, as we do in our bilateral aid loans. To do otherwise, he says, would undermine your January 1 balance-of-payments program and subsequent directive to AID to tighten up on balance-of-payments aspects of its operations.

2. He questions the wisdom of immobilizing $25 million of scarce FY 1969 funds. He thinks $25 million should be an upper limit and it should be used for adjustment assistance and capital financing.

3. He wants the Inter-American Bank to be associated with integration lending proposals. He recalls that in considering adjustment assistance for the Latin American Common Market prior to the Summit, Treasury took the line that the IDB should manage the adjustment fund.

These are my comments on Secretary Fowlerís points:

1. The State tying formula would be a significant sweetener which would improve the odds on moving the proposal forward. The

balance-of-payments impact would be minimal and at least a year in the future. The State tying arrangement would not weaken your January 1 program/4/ because it would not cause substantial outflow nor introduce a new principle in balance-of-payments policy. AIDís ability to achieve its new outflow targets would not be impaired. The targets will still be met.

/4/ Reference is to the Presidentís statement on January 1 outlining a "Program on Action to Deal with the Balance of Payments Problem." (Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States: Lyndon B. Johnson, 1968-69, Book I, pp. 8-13)

2. AID would not automatically immobilize $25 million of FY 1969 funds. AID wants to talk to the Andean group about our joining with them in setting up an adjustment fund. The $25 million is only a ball-park figure. There would be no obligation of funds until a concrete loan proposal is worked out-based on the Andean Common Market coming into operation on terms satisfactory to us-and your approval under the new commitments procedure obtained.

3. Inter-American Bank Association with the Andean group can be explored when we discuss the loan with the Andean governments. I would not make the IDB association an absolute condition.

I recommend you decide this one in favor of State, in the understanding that the amount of our loan offer will be flexible and participation of the Inter-American Bank will be examined further if the Andean countries are interested in the proposal.


1. Authorize offering Andean Group adjustment assistance loan up to $25 million

Call me

/5/ The President checked this option. No indication of the Presidentís subsequent decision appears on this memorandum. In an October 23 memorandum to the President Rostow noted: "Last June you authorized State to explore with the six governments a possible AID loan of as much as $25 million for Ďadjustment assistanceí." Johnson subsequently approved a proposal to proceed with the loan, even though several countries, including Venezuela, Peru, and Ecuador, appeared reluctant to join the subregional group. (Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Latin America, Vol. VIII, 9/68-10/68, 2 of 2)

2. On the tying formula, approve:

the formula we use with IDB
the restrictive formula recommended by Secretary Fowler


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