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 You are in: Under Secretary for Public Diplomacy and Public Affairs > Bureau of Public Affairs > Bureau of Public Affairs: Office of the Historian > Foreign Relations of the United States > Johnson Administration > Volume XXXI
Foreign Relations, 1964-1968, Volume XXXI, South and Central America; Mexico
Released by the Office of the Historian
Documents 245-278


245. Memorandum From the Chief of the Western Hemisphere Division (King) to Director of Central Intelligence McCone/1/

Washington, January 3, 1964.

/1/ Source: Central Intelligence Agency, Job 80-01690R, DDO Files, Western Hemisphere, Chile, [file name not declassified]. Secret. Drafted on January 2. Forwarded through the Deputy Director for Plans. Copies were sent to DDCI, DDP, and ADDP.

Political Action Program in Chile

A. WHD Memorandum to DCI on Same Subject Dated 24 December 1963
B. Memorandum dated 30 December 1963 from E.H. Knoche requesting clarification on some points of the WHD Memorandum/3/

/2/ Not found.

/3/ Not found. Enno Henry Knoche was Executive Assistant to the Deputy Director of Central Intelligence.

1. Our comments on the questions posed in Mr. Knocheís memorandum are listed below.

2. Support for the Democratic Front

On 19 December 1963 the Special Group approved a one-time payment [less than 1 line of source text not declassified] to the Democratic Front [less than 1 line of source text not declassified]./4/ The suggestion for this payment originated with Ambassador Cole and was concurred in by Assistant Secretary Martin. Arrangements are now being made to transfer this money [less than 1 line of source text not declassified]. This Special Group paper did not request regular monthly payments to the Democratic Front.

/4/ The minutes of the meeting are in Department of State, INR/IL Historical Files, Special Group Files, Meetings, January 2, 1964.

During his December 1963 Washington visit, [name not declassified] mentioned that the Democratic Front required 1.5 million dollars for its election campaign-one million of which it could raise locally. The implication was a pitch for $500,000 from United States sources.

3. Present Assistance to the Christian Democratic Party

a. Policy Approval

In view of the ambiguous position of the Christian Democratic Party on a number of issues of interest to the United States, the subject of assistance to this party was periodically coordinated at various levels, with the people responsible for policy. The idea of assisting the Christian Democrats was first broached to us on 22 March 1962 by Ambassador Cole and the then Special Assistant to the President, Richard Goodwin. The Special Group approved a program of assistance to the Christian Democrats on 19 April 1962 and again on 30 August 1963./5/ The Latin American Policy Committee approved the continuation of the assistance at meetings held on 10 January 1963 and 20 June 1963./6/ On 14 August 1963 Mr. Martin and Ambassador Cole agreed again that this assistance should continue. The Special Group paper on one-time assistance to the Democratic Front which was approved on 19 December 1963 refers explicitly to our assistance to the Christian Democrats./7/

/5/ The funding approved was [text not declassified] and [text not declassified], respectively. The minutes of the Special Group meetings are in the Department of State, INR/IL Historical Files, Special Group Files, Meetings, April 26, 1962 and September 6, 1962.

/6/ The minutes for both meetings are ibid., LAPC Action Minutes, 1962-1963.

/7/ Reference is to a CIA paper for the Special Group, December 13, 1963. (Ibid., Special Group Files, Meetings, December 19, 1963)

b. Rationale for this Assistance

The reasons for our non-attributable assistance to the Christian Democratic Party are:

(1) To Deprive the Chilean Communist Party of Votes

The Christian Democratic Party is the fastest growing party in Chile. Its social program and evangelical fervor has enabled it to compete successfully with the Communists for the votes of students and workers. The Christian Democratic Party is the only non-Communist party in Chile in a position to attack directly the Communist Party at its mass base. This has been demonstrated in the municipal elections of April of last year, in the student elections, and in the fight for control of labor unions, which, though still controlled by the Communists, are showing the signs of Christian Democratic Party inroads.

(2) To Achieve a Measure of Influence Over Christian Democratic Party Policy

This objective could not be realized effectively because of security restrictions under which we must operate in this case. The Special Group, in approving assistance to the Christian Democratic Party, insisted that this assistance be non-attributable. [1-1⁄2 lines of source text not declassified] Since security has been tightly maintained, Eduardo Frei, the leader of the Christian Democratic Party, is unwitting of the fact that he is being aided by the United States Government and believes that this assistance is being provided by his [less than 1 line of source text not declassified] friends.

(3) To Foster a Non-Communist Coalition

One of the original objectives in March 1962 was to strengthen the Christian Democratic Party so that it would be more attractive to the Radical Party as a coalition partner. Up to April 1963 the Radicals had been the largest single party and the Christians the second largest in Chile. Hence a coalition of these parties with the greatest voter appeal was viewed as a viable non-Communist barrier. Since the Radical Party joined the Conservatives and Liberals in their own alliance, the Democratic Front, on 11 October 1962, this objective is not now feasible.

4. Parliamentís Role in the Election of a President

In the event no candidate achieves a majority, the Chilean constitution does provide parliament with the right to select the president between the two leading candidates. The composition of the present parliament is such that it could select the runner-up over the Popular Front candidate. Historically, however, parliament has never passed over the candidate who received the largest popular vote, and we have no hard intelligence to the effect that any leading groups are planning to do this, if it should become necessary, nor do we have any indication that public opinion would approve such a move. Moreover, parliamentary elections are scheduled for March 1965, and it is unlikely that many parliamentarians will conclude that their reelection will be best assured by going against the will of the people by flouting Chileís proud democratic spirit and by assuming the responsibility for the civil unrest that would follow such a decision.

5. Military Intervention

Traditionally, the Chilean military establishment has not interfered with the political life of the country. The last military coup occurred in 1932. The Chilean military stood idly by and watched a Popular Front government assume power in 1938 and permitted it to govern until 1941 when it fell of its own weight and without military intervention. Although the military have the capabilities to intervene, we have no intelligence or other reports indicating they are planning or considering this.

6. How Business Circles View the 1964 Elections

The fact that the Socialist/Communist Front did not do as well as anticipated in the municipal elections of April 1963 has created some new optimism in regard to the 1964 election results. However, although we (and our counterparts in the State Department) do not view the election of the Popular Front candidate as a probability, we do feel it is a distinct possibility. Business circles of course have no illusion about what would happen should the Socialist/Communist Front win, but they believe this possibility to be less likely than we do.

Should a Christian Democratic victory occur, it might be noted that the Christian Democratic Party tends to favor selective nationalization and increased state planning. Undoubtedly, private industry would be in a better position with Duran as president and will probably suffer increased restrictions under a Christian Democratic administration.

7. Should we be Supporting the Christian Democratic Party

Although the Christian Democratic Party and the Democratic Front do not, in large measure, compete for the same votes and the Christian Democratic Party has demonstrated its ability to compete with the communists for worker votes, its position on a number of issues of interest to the United States makes it advisable to reexamine our aid to this party. [21⁄2 lines of source text not declassified] In any event, we must face the fact that the Christian Democratic Party will be less favorable and responsive to United States Government policies than the Democratic Front, that it will try to establish relations with Iron Curtain countries, that within the limited capability of Chile it will endeavor to increase its trade with the Soviet Bloc and will not follow the United States lead in foreign policy with the same willingness as the present government.

8. Should we Alter our Chilean Program

Two aspects of our Chilean program should be exploited with Secretary Mann.

a. Depending on [less than 1 line of source text not declassified] our intelligence reports, and State Department findings, the entire subject of Chilean election subsidies, with particular emphasis on assistance to the Democratic Front, should be discussed with Secretary Mann.

b. If a decision is made to continue assistance to the Christian Democratic Party, an effort should be made to achieve greater influence over it by modifying the Special Group restriction on non-attributability. Funds could be provided in a fashion causing Frei to infer United States origin of funds and yet permitting plausible denial.

J. C. King/8/

/8/ Printed from a copy that bears this typed signature.


246. Memorandum From the Presidentís Special Assistant (Dungan) to the Presidentís Special Assistant for National Security Affairs (Bundy)/1/

Washington, January 18, 1964.

/1/ Source: National Security Council, 303 Committee Files, Subject Files, Chile thru 1969. Top Secret.

It seems to me that the Special Group might, at an early date, give consideration to the interests of the United States in the Chilean election which occurs in December 1964./2/ No one familiar with Latin American affairs has any doubt as to the importance of the outcome of this election, not only in Chile but throughout the hemisphere.

/2/ The presidential election in Chile was scheduled for September 4.

I believe it is an opportune time for us to review what our posture should be toward the two major non-communist political groupings and whether we should be furnishing indirect assistance to either or both.

I would suggest that State and CIA be given the assignment to make an assessment of the situation-an updating of the recent NIE/3/-and make a recommendation with regard to support. This should be undertaken promptly, in my opinion./4/

/3/ Reference is to NIE 94-63, "The Chilean Situation and Prospects," October 3, 1963, an analysis "with particular reference to the September 1964 presidential elections." (Foreign Relations, 1961-1963, vol. XII, American Republics, Microfiche Supplement, Chile)

/4/ At the end of the memorandum is the following typewritten note: "Mr. Jessup telephoned Mr. Dungan to advise him that Chilean proposals have been approved recently and another paper may be forthcoming in a few weeks. Mr. Dungan never returned the calls."



247. Memorandum for the Record/1/

Washington, February 28, 1964.

/1/ Source: Central Intelligence Agency, Job 90-347R, DDO Files, [file name not declassified]. Secret. Drafted in the Western Hemisphere Division.

Conversation between Chief and Deputy Chief, WHD with Assistant Secretary Mann, on 28 February 1964

1. On 28 February 1964 Chief, WHD advised the undersigned of his conversation with Mr. Mann in which Mr. Mann expressed a desire to have the Special Group approached for the purpose of obtaining its approval for election support of the Democratic Front [less than 1 line of source text not declassified] Mr. Mannís rationale was that Duran, being more pliable-from the American viewpoint-in economic matters than Frei: that American copper companies would conceivably be ready to invest five hundred million dollars in Chile as they were prepared to do in 1958, that Duran might draw further votes away from Allende, all this would point to the desirability of helping [name not declassified] at this time. Mr. Mann felt that the [less than 1 line of source text not declassified] injection recently given [name not declassified] when compared with the [less than 1 line of source text not declassified] a year given the CDís was out of balance; Mr. Mann felt that the support to the CD should be continued because they too offer strong competition to Allende.

2. Chief, WHD requested the undersigned to think about the best way to get a paper to the Special Group at the earliest possible date./2/

/2/ In telegram 04580 to Santiago, February 28, the CIA reported that a proposal to increase financial support to the Democratic Front would be submitted to the Special Group on March 5. The CIA also indicated that the administration intended to propose a cutback in the subsidy to the Christian Democratic Party. (Ibid.) The Special Group, however, did not meet on March 5 and failed to discuss Chile at its next meeting, March 12. (Department of State, INR/IL Historical Files, Special Group Files, Meetings)

[name not declassified]/3/

/3/ Printed from a copy that bears this typed signature.


248. Editorial Note

In a memorandum to Assistant Secretary Mann, March 6, 1964, Ralph W. Richardson, the officer-in-charge of Chilean affairs, assessed the significance of the upcoming congressional by-election in Curiců. Although the seat itself was not important, Richardson explained that the by-election would "serve to measure the relative strengths of the political parties," possibly determining "future realignments prior to the Presidential election." He pointed out that Julio DurŠn Neumann, the Democratic Front (DF) presidential candidate, had already declared the by-election a national "plebiscite," confident that the DF parties would repeat their share of the municipal elections in April 1963, when they received a combined 49% of the vote. The Popular Action Front (FRAP), however, also enjoyed a "special advantage" at Curiců: "its candidate is the son of the late Socialist Deputy." As for the presidential election, Richardson concluded that "the time is rapidly approaching when we should come to some basic decisions, whatever the outcome of the Curiců election. I think we need to weigh not only the probabilities of victory by the DF and the PDC, but also such issues as whether it is in the US interest to try to keep DurŠn and the Democratic Front in the race, even if we were to decide to do what we can to favor Freiís chances of winning." (Washington National Records Center, RG 84, Santiago Embassy Files: FRC 69 A 6507, 1964, POL 14 Elections (Presidential) 1964 (1))

On March 15 the FRAP candidate won the Curiců by-election with 39.5 percent of the vote; the next day, DurŠn resigned as the DF presidential candidate. McGeorge Bundy asked Ralph Dungan to comment on these events at a White House staff meeting, March 18: "Dungan said he was not really upset about the by-elections in Chile in which the communists gained, nor, he said, is the ambassador. There is a three to one chance that everything will turn out all right. Bundy reminded him that with those odds, we could lose five countries in Latin America." (Memorandum for the record by W.Y. Smith, March 18; National Defense University, Taylor Papers, Chairmanís Staff Group) On March 25 Assistant Secretary Mann also discussed the political fallout from Curiců at a meeting with Central Intelligence Agency officials, including Desmond FitzGerald, J.C. King, and Cord Meyer. According to a record of the meeting: "FitzGerald said the most important thing is to keep people from panicking as a result of Curico. King proposed we give additional support [less than 1 line of source text not declassified], but through channels other than those now being used. [1 line of source text not declassified] He said the Agency is thinking in terms of [less than1 line of source text not declassified]. Cord Meyer said this would of course have to go to the Special Group. King agreed." Mann wondered whether "a leftist Radical candidate in the race wouldnít help keep leftist Radicals from drifting to Allende." The participants agreed that "the matter will be pursued after Mann has talked with Cole." (Memorandum from Carter to Hughes, March 26; Department of State, INR/IL Historical Files, ARA-CIA Weekly Meetings, 1964-1965)

Richardson later commented on the impact Curiců had on the decision-making process: "While I agree that we certainly do have a situation to worry about, I still cannot repress a feeling of satisfaction in seeing how quickly and cleanly our 'decision' to swing behind Frei was made for us. I really had wondered before DurŠnís disaster whether we were going to get any definite decision from the front office on which group we should help." (Letter to Jova, April 3; Washington National Records Center, RG 84, Santiago Embassy Files: FRC 69 A 6507, 1964, POL 14 Elections (Presidential) 1964 (1))


249. Memorandum From Gordon Chase of the National Security Council Staff to the Presidentís Special Assistant for National Security Affairs (Bundy)/1/

Washington, March 19, 1964.

/1/ Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Latin America, Vol. I, 11/63-6/64. Secret.

Chiefs of Mission Conference-Brazil and Chile

I attended a few sessions of the Chiefs of Mission Conference. One of the more interesting included discussions by Ambassadors Gordon and Cole about the situations in Brazil and Chile.

[Omitted here is discussion on Brazil; see Document 185.]


1. In contrast to Brazil, the economic situation in Chile is remarkably good. Ambassador Cole said there is a growth rate of 5%, unemployment is at a low level, and savings are up. Progress has been made in land and tax reform. There are, of course, some problems-e.g. unfavorable balance of payments and inflation. These problems tend to be related to Chileís desire to push forward quickly in the field of economic development.

One of the outstanding aspects of the Chilean economy is the extent of U.S. involvement. The U.S. has big stakes in copper and manufacturing of all kinds. The huge U.S. involvement in Chile leads the Chileans to an ambivalent attitude towards the U.S. For example, while they like us in many ways, there is plenty of latent hostility.

2. Chileís biggest problem is political-the election for the Presidency in September (it should be noted that in Chile the President has great power). It now appears that there may be only two primary candidates-Frei, the moderate, and Allende, the extreme leftist. If there is a two man race, Frei is very likely to win. If there is a three or four man race, Allendeís chances will be improved. On balance, Ambassador Cole estimates that the odds are 3 to 1 against Allende winning in September. He noted, however, that a year ago he would have placed the odds at 10 to 1.

3. In effect, there are four possibilities vis-ŗ-vis Allende and the election.

(a) Allende could get beaten at the polls.

(b) Allende could get the most votes but not get the Presidency. According to Chilean law, if no candidate gets a majority, the assembly chooses one of the two leading candidates. Normally, it chooses the candidate with the most votes; however, it does have constitutional power to pick the second biggest vote-getter.

(c) Allende could win but be overthrown by the armed forces or the "carbinieri"; this would have to be done before Allende gets a chance to consolidate his power. Normally, the armed forces are very non-political, but they might conceivably intervene if Allende won.

(d) Allende could win and stay in power.

4. If Allende wins and stays in power, we are in trouble. For example, he will probably nationalize the copper mines, which in turn, might end the aid program because of the Hickenlooper amendment;/2/ this, in turn, could lead Chile to ask the Bloc for economic aid. There are very few significant short term things we can do between now and election time. Generally speaking, we should simply do what we can to get people to back Frei.

/2/ This amendment to the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961 was initially approved in August 1962, and subsequently revised in December 1963. Sponsored by Senators Bourke B. Hickenlooper (R-Iowa) and E. Ross Adair (R-Indiana), the amendment stipulated that the President suspend assistance to any country that expropriated the property of U.S. citizens or corporations without proper compensation. (76 Stat. 260)



250. Memorandum Prepared for the Special Group/1/

Washington, April 1, 1964.

/1/ Source: National Security Council, 303 Committee Files, Subject Files, Chile thru 1969. Secret; Eyes Alone. Dungan forwarded the paper to Bundy as an attachment to an April 2 memorandum in which he commented: "As I told you this morning, I have no way of knowing whether $750,000 is the right amount, but I certainly would not balk at it. You might inquire, however, why the cost of campaigning in [text not declassified] Chile is always so much higher than it is in the United States. As I indicated, I will follow up with Des[mond FitzGerald] on the implementation of this program without getting in any further than is absolutely necessary." (Ibid.)

Support for the Chilean Presidential Elections of 4 September 1964

A. Memorandum for The Special Group, dated 13 December 1963, Subject: Financial Support to Chilean Democratic Front [1 line of source text not declassified]
B. Memorandum for The Special Group, dated 27 August 1962, Subject: Support to the Christian Democratic Party of Chile (PDC)/3/

/2/ Not printed. (Department of State, INR/IL Historical Files, Special Group Files, Meetings, December 19, 1963)

/3/ Not printed. (Ibid., August 30, 1962)

1. Summary

This is a proposal for political and propaganda action directed at the defeat of Salvador Allende, the Communist-supported candidate for the Chilean presidential elections of 4 September 1964. The sum of $750,000 is being requested for the implementation of courses of action that will contribute to this objective by increasing the organizational efficiency and campaigning ability of the Christian Democratic Party, by inducing as far as feasible, supporters of the former Democratic Front to cast their votes for Frei and deny their support to Allende, and by attempting to discourage third candidacies-such as Jorge Pratís. It should be noted that representatives of the Christian Democratic Party visited, on their own initiative, the U.S. Embassy in Santiago on 26 March and, after presenting their current and proposed budgets, asked for a one million dollar subsidy for Freiís campaign. The Embassy and our field representative recommended that this amount be provided for this purpose.

Funds for this activity have not been programmed for FY 1964 and are not available within the Agency; it is recommended that this amount be obtained from the Agency Reserve for Contingencies.

2. Problem

To provide financial support, as necessary, to the democratic forces of Chile in an effort to defeat Salvador Allende, the Communist-sponsored candidate of FRAP. The objectives of this support are: (a) to minimize the number of democratic votes that may drift to FRAP as a result of the fractionalization of the Democratic Front; (b) to obtain the support of democratic parties and organizations for Eduardo Frei, the Christian Democratic candidate; (c) to strengthen the Christian Democratic organizational structure and campaigning ability so that it can appeal to the largest number of Chileans including FRAP voters, former Democratic Front supporters, and new voters; and (d) to induce "Independent" candidates, such as Jorge Prat, to withdraw from the campaign.

3. Factors Bearing on the Problem

a. The Curico by-elections of 15 March 1964 changed the Chilean political spectrum radically by forcing the withdrawal of the Democratic Frontís presidential candidate, Julio Duran, and disrupting the Democratic Front coalition composed of the Liberal, Conservative, and Radical parties.

b. The dissolution of the Democratic Front has polarized the elections around the candidacies of Eduardo Frei of the Christian Democratic Party and Salvador Allende of FRAP. In this situation the preferences of the voters who had been committed to Duran become the key to the election and to the defeat of Allende. In turn, the attitudes of these voters will be heavily influenced by the official position of the Radical, Conservative, and Liberal parties. The parties of the Democratic Front coalition polled approximately 921,000 votes in the April 1963 municipal elections which amounted to 46% of the votes cast. (Out of this 46%, the Radicals got 21.6%, the Liberals got 13.1%, and the Conservatives got 11.3%.) As a basis of comparison it should be noted that the Christian Democratic Party obtained 453,000 (23%) votes and FRAP 583,000 (29%) votes at that time. Since the estimated electorate for the 1964 presidential elections is two and one quarter million, either candidate will have to poll roughly one million, one hundred, and fifty thousand votes to win. Thus, even if there is no precise correlation between the voting patterns of municipal as compared to presidential elections it is clear that neither candidate can hope to win the elections of 4 September without appealing to a substantial number of the Conservative, Liberal, Radical, and new voters.

c. It can be said, in general, that the majority of the Conservative vote will be for Frei in view of this partyís Catholic tradition. The Liberal Party, which is staunchly anti-Communist, also can probably be depended upon to deliver a substantial segment of its vote to Frei. Historical factors, including the traditional anti-clericalism of the Radical Party and its past participation in a Popular Front Government, indicate that a substantial number of votes will probably shift from that party to FRAP.

d. The ability of the Christian Democratic Party to appeal openly for the vote of the former Democratic Front is seriously limited by Freiís need to maintain his image as an honest and dedicated leader of the underprivileged who is above political "deals." Conversely, the leaders of the former parties of the Democratic Front, especially the Radical Party which depends heavily on patronage to maintain its organization intact, would be hard pressed to throw their support to Frei in the absence of a PDC public appeal for their assistance. This dilemma poses the need for an external stimulus which will bring the Democratic Front parties and the PDC to a sophisticated agreement on the support of Frei for the presidential elections.

e. Apart from the problem noted above, there remains the persistent need to assist the PDC in the construction of an efficient capillary organization that will conduct an effective campaign, especially among peasants and women. A tentative analysis of the Curico election results indicate that the greatest FRAP gains and Democratic Front losses came from the category of peasants and women. Consequently, Frei must make a major organizational effort to counteract FRAP influence in these areas. The Curico campaign also demonstrated that the PDC organization is inadequately supplied with vehicles, party workers, loudspeakers, and the other accouterments of an effective campaign.

f. Thus, as a result of the situation outlined above, it becomes necessary to take all possible action to assist Frei in his campaign and to limit the number of former Democratic Front votes that might go to Allende. Some of the methods that will be used to achieve these objectives, insofar as feasible, are:

(1) Bring pressure to bear on the Radical Party to prevent it from formally endorsing Allende, or, failing in this, to remain neutral or to run its own candidate if it appears that he will not damage Frei. In the event the Radical Party declares for Allende, financial assistance will have to be provided to individual Radical leaders or groups capable of bringing Radical voters into the Frei camp.

(2) To influence the Conservative and Liberal parties to support Frei in a manner that will not damage his image as a reform candidate. To achieve this it will be necessary to provide financial assistance to the Liberal and Conservative parties or those of their leaders who will work to swing their votes behind Frei.

(3) Provide a substantial subsidy [less than 1 line of source text not declassified] for the purpose of strengthening his electoral machine and campaign capabilities. Efforts will also be made to influence Frei to reach a private agreement with the Radicals for their support in exchange for some patronage.

(4) Bring pressure to bear on Jorge Prat, partly through Conservative and Liberal leaders, to induce his withdrawal from the presidential contest.

(5) Provide financial assistance, as necessary, to ancillary organizations, such as youth and student groups, peasant organizations, slum dwellersí associations, labor unions, and womenís clubs, to bring their votes to Frei.

(6) In the latter stages of the campaign to buy some votes outright if required.

(7) [3 lines of source text not declassified]

(8) Some funds will also be utilized for specialized propaganda operations, some of which will be black, to denigrate Allende.

4. Coordination

This proposal has been coordinated with the Assistant Secretary of State for Inter-American Affairs who believes that-should it appear necessary at a later date-additional funds should be sought./4/

/4/ In a memorandum to U. Alexis Johnson, April 2, Mann approved the proposal with the following clarification: 1) that the money be divided, [text not declassified] going to support Frei and the remainder to other objectives; 2) that Frei be made "explicitly aware" that the U.S. Government was the source of the money; and 3) that the procedures for transferring the money be "closely coordinated with Mr. Mann." (Ibid., April 2, 1964)

In this regard, it should be noted that on 26 March 1964 the Embassy was visited by Freiís [less than 1 line of source text not declassified] campaign managers who presented their current budget showing a rate of expenditure of $100,000 per month which they claim they are meeting with much difficulty. They also presented a proposed campaign budget for the next five months of $300,000 per month which they state would be required to mount an effective campaign. The Chileans suggested that the U.S. Government make up this difference which amounts to one million dollars for the period from now to election time. The Embassy and our field representative reviewed the budgets, felt they did not seem unreasonable, and subsequently recommended that the Chileanís request for one million dollars be granted as soon as possible.

At the same time, the Embassy strongly recommended that the mechanics of the operation insure that this assistance not seem to come from U.S. sources.

5. Recommendation

It is recommended that:

a. Action under paragraph 3 f above be approved for immediate implementation.

b. The U.S. Government provide $750,000 for this purpose.

c. Funds [1-1⁄2 lines of source text not declassified], be passed covertly in a manner [less than 1 line of source text not declassified] to infer U.S. Government origin of the funds yet permit us plausible denial if necessary. This will be done by attributing the funds, explicitly, to U.S. non-official sources. This approach is required in an effort to obtain some essential leverage [less than 1 line of source text not declassified].

It is realized that this recommendation does not reflect the Embassyís position./5/

/5/ The Special Group met on April 2 at 3:30 p.m. in the White House Situation Room. (National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, U. Alexis Johnson Files: Lot 90 D 408, Date Books, 1964) The minutes of the meeting record the decision on Chile as follows: "The paper, ĎSupport for Chilean Presidential Elections,í was approved. Mr. FitzGerald announced that a solution to the slight difference of opinion between Ambassador Cole and the CAS in Santiago had been reached and that attribution of U.S. support would be inferred but there should be no evidence of proof. Mr. FitzGerald indicated that this was operationally feasible." (Department of State, INR/IL Historical Files, Special Group Files, April 9, 1964, 116)


251. Telegram From the Embassy in Chile to the Department of State/1/

Santiago, April 22, 1964, 7:15 p.m.

/1/ Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964-66, POL 14 CHILE. Confidential; Priority. Repeated to POLADs at CINCLANT and CINCSO.

939. Subject: Assessment Socialist-Communist Candidate Salvador Allende. Ref: Deptel 591;/2/ Embassy A-703, 1/29/63;/3/ A-755, 4/10/64./4/

/2/ Telegram 591 to Santiago, April 17, requested the Embassyís assessment of Salvador Allende: his personality, political objectives, and the short-term effect of his election, including the likelihood of a Communist takeover. (Ibid.)

/3/ Airgram A-703 from Santiago, January 29, 1963, reported that the Popular Action Front (FRAP) had nominated Allende as its presidential candidate. (Ibid., Central Files 1961-63, 725.00/1-2963)

/4/ In airgram A-755 from Santiago the Embassy transmitted and analyzed the FRAP campaign platform. (Ibid., Central Files, 1964-66, POL 12 CHILE)

Allende is a chameleonic person who over years has appeared on occasion as idealistic socialist reformer who believes democracy and other times as military revolutionist striving bring revolution a la Cuba to Chile. His motivation and drive for more than twenty years have centered on his ambition become first Marxist president of Chile and be first to bring "popular democracy" to power in South America. The essential opportunism of man is evident but always within a leftist sphere or orientation. He does not possess unusual intelligence and his ideas and program have changed little, if at all, over years. As politician he is good speaker and hard worker. Personally he is vain, quick tempered, easily offended, socially as well as politically ambitious, able turn on or off at will a considerable social charm. He is sensitive to charge he would be dominated by Communists or that he would institute anti-democratic measures. Nevertheless were he to achieve power we think he could be led by events into being harsh and ruthless with his opponents but more likely use exile than prison or pardon. It is probable that he thinks in terms Marxist regime similar Castroís Cuba in its free-wheeling, relatively independent line but more sophisticated, cultured, without emotional excesses of "tropical" country such as Cuba.

Domestically his major objectives appear be:

1) Nationalization copper, nitrate, iron, public utilities, banks, insurance, foreign commerce; 2) drastic land reform; 3) fully planned economy; 4) franchise to illiterates and military enlisted personnel.

Foreign policy objectives appear be:

1) Alignment with underdeveloped countries; 2) establish relations bloc countries and ChiComs; 3) drastic reduction US influence in Chile and Hemisphere including termination Military Assistance Pacts; 4) closer association with Cuba and pressure on OAS end Cubaís isolation and drastic but not clearly specified changes in OAS structure. As nearly as we can tell there is no visible disagreement on any above objectives between socialists and Communists. Presumably Allende as well as Ampuero socialists/5/ desire greater degree independence from Moscow, are against Communist proposed "single party of left" and logical and emotional grounds exist to explain rivalry which now present between parties. Despite Allendeís periodic statements (often to American press representatives) that he is not a Communist, and rather wide-spread belief among Chileans including many opposed to him that he basically democratic, mild socialist opposed to communism, record shows he has collaborated with Communists for more than 15 years with no apparent difficulty. We conclude shrewd Communist Secretary General Luis Corvalan has based his partyís support for Allende on some sureness of expectation that serious disagreements with Communists on Allendeís part will not arise. Probable that even should

Allende be tempted to turn on Communist partners once in office he would be unable do so due perhaps as much to patterns and associations he has established over years as to any direct control by Communists.

/5/ Followers of Raķl Ampuero DŪaz, secretary general of the Socialist Party.

If Allende should win the Communists will be able rightfully to claim most of the credit and we would assume they will press for due recognition in the form of positions within Allendeís government and will be granted them although socialists have told us and have been saying for years that these would not be key posts such as Interior or Defense. For Allende would be difficult say no to his principal supporting force which only one able effectively bring people into streets to support him should he desire it. We would expect many of Communists in various important but not top positions in ministries would come from those hundreds Chilean technicians and professionals now in Cuba who can be expected return immediately should Allende win. We would expect effective Commie control of several ministries could be achieved within few months after inauguration. We estimate bottom would drop out already shaky economy with Allende victory and beset by problems he likely turn naturally to Communists for support on more and more matters and in more and more areas. We think also Chilean middle-class will be rather easily intimidated by actual and threatened mob pressures which Communists can provide. Commie control likely become de facto in gradual manner not apparent most Chileans at least for many months.

Factors against takeover are first and most important armed forces including Carabineros, secondly Congress and thirdly strong Chilean democratic tradition which prevails in great majority presently politically aware Chileans. Communists are well aware obstacle armed forces present but they and Allende as well under existing system which calls for retirement of all officers senior to an officer promoted head service and promotion for all those below, at least have instrument which if played well offers possibility keeping armed forces neutral on sidelines political arena.

Among immediate effects Allende victory may be virtual panic among many upper and upper-middle class circles and certain paralization private investment. Our guess is Allende would try restore confidence by acting in reassuring manner fearing military and thinking of congressional elections in March 1965, but he would quickly have to take some nationalization step satisfy his supporters (most widely popular and least likely cause him trouble here would be telephone company). Should he gain control Congress through added socialist/ Communist seats and possibly agreement with radicals and/or left-wing Christian Democrats he would press ahead more vigorously with his program. We would expect Communists to favor "respectable" democratic via pacifica course until such time as they have achieved control political apparatus and at least have neutralized armed forces. We think possible but not probable that should he win by very small plurality over Frei and Congress hesitate on naming him he will gamble on armed forces traditional non-interventionist role and bring mobs into streets pressure Congress and if successful might then continue with drastic measures in hope of gaining sufficient control to handle likely reaction from democratic forces.

Negative economic impact will be very great immediately and probably over short-term as well. Allende would probably try expand activities and efforts existing GOC institutions which directly involved in economy in effort compensate for lacks and lags in private sector. He will undoubtedly seek help from bloc and "unaligned" countries but conceivably might make unreasonable request of USG (e.g. low interest loan pay for expropriation copper companies and utilities) expecting turn down which he could use as ostensible justification Chilean public for turning [to] bloc. In general economic deterioration after Allende victory would tend stimulate and be used justify extreme internal measures toward full statist economic power as well as shift to excessive Chilean dependence Communist bloc aid and trade.



252. Transcript of Telephone Conversation Between Director of Central Intelligence McCone and the Assistant Secretary of State for Inter-American Affairs (Mann)/1/

Washington, April 28, 1964, 11:35 a.m.

/1/ Source: Central Intelligence Agency, Job 80-B01285A, DCI (McCone) Files, Telephone Calls, 3/4/64-5/19/64. Eyes Only. No classification marking. The text was prepared in the CIA from a tape recording.

DCI: Good morning, Tom.

M: Good morning, how are you?

DCI: Iím fine, how are you?

M: Fine. You sound like you are in a well.

DCI: Iíve got Pat Carter/2/ here and we were talking over Chile. I wanted him to hear what we were talking about, so if it is agreeable with you, Iíll continue to use this loud speaker.

/2/ Marshall Carter, Deputy Director of Central Intelligence.

M: O.K. sure.

DCI: Now, every place I go I get alarming reports on the intense effort of the Andes [?] backed probably by the Communists. I even got it from [31⁄2 lines of source text not declassified] a frightening story of the intensification of the Socialist Communists. He claimed they had 300 sound trucks and 3500 personnel, of which 3400 are members of the Communist Party, working on the Andes campaign at this time. I have no doubt that this is exaggerated . . .

M: Nevertheless, John, it is very serious. Are you familiar with the program we are working on?

DCI: Yes, I am thoroughly familiar with it.

M: Is there anything else we can do?

DCI: Yes there is. I do not think that your Embassy is set up to handle this problem properly. In the first place, Cole, the Ambassador, is not there and wonít be there until the end of June. Secondly, this is an area, my people tell me, where he is lacking in experience and also lacking in courage. I think you ought to take a very good look at that. He is coming out of an academic life and this is something he doesnít know anything about you see. Second thing, your deputy chief of mission, fellow named Jova, I donít get a very good report on him either. I donít know him.

M: What we planned to do with Cole, psychologically mainly, was to get him to try to go back, fly down for 10 days in the middle of his vacation. He is a very hard man to handle. He wants to quit, you know./3/

/3/ In November 1963 Martin recommended that Rusk call the Ambassador; Jova had suggested that Cole might stay for the presidential election if his arm were "properly twisted." According to Martin, this tactic was successful. (Martin, Kennedy and Latin America, p. 322) The Department, however, informed Cole on February 5 that the White House would announce his resignation in 2 days. (Telegram 425 to Santiago, February 5; National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964-66, PER Cole, Charles W.) Two weeks later, President Johnson asked Cole to remain in Santiago until September; Cole agreed to do so. (Telegram 682 from Santiago, February 19; ibid.)

DCI: Yes, I know. He had his resignation . . .

M: And we thought it would be a mistake to send a new man down just on the eve of.

DCI: Yes, I think that is right, but I wondered whether you

didnít have some political activist expert you could put down there on TDY.

M: Well, I think that is right. Weíll do that.

DCI: What we have done-I have taken J.C. King and removed him of all responsibility. He is generating a lot of ideas [11⁄2 lines of source text not declassified] and I am going to have the whole subject reviewed at the Special Group on Thursday/4/ so that the White House and everybody will be in circuit on it. I would appreciate it very much if you could go over, if you are gong to be here Thursday, and sit in on it. Can you do that?

/4/ April 30.

M: Yes, I can do that. I would like to. I have had the same idea that we should really wire in the White House on that.

DCI: All right. Well, letís do that on Thursday. Iíll get Mac to put it on the calendar first thing and that would set it at 3:30 Thursday afternoon./5/

/5/ At its meeting on April 30 the Special Group decided: "(a) that contact should be made with Ambassador Cole to urge his return for a visit in the coming weeks, (b) that talks with American business interests should proceed to determine the amount and method of their support, and (c) it was further decided that higher authority would be apprised of the closeness and importance of this Chilean election and that the Group itself would continue to review the problem in the coming weeks." (Memorandum for the Record, May 1; National Security Council, 303 Committee Files, Minutes, April 30, 1964) According to notes of the meeting taken by Hughes, "Mr. McCone said he had spoken twice to the Secretary about it [Chile] on the phone within the past 24 hours." Hughes also noted that "Mr. Mann asked how much money might be secured from American businessmen that McCone had been in contact with. McCone said about a million dollars." (Department of State, INR/IL Historical Files, Special Group Files, April 30, 1964)

M: Iíll be there and in the meantime, is that the only thing that occurs to you that we are not already doing?

DCI: Well, I think we have to get in closer touch with this business group that [name not declassified] heads and see if they might . . . .

M: Well, we had a meeting on this the other day. J.C. was there. He can tell you all about it. On what they can do, I asked the small group of people not to tell me what they were going to do, but to tell J.C. Whatever had to be done to do it through him.

DCI: He has an idea that they might move in on this beef problem which you are familiar with, I guess.

M: I asked yesterday that somebody get [to] work on that. I was very discouraged. Tom Taylor/6/ was talking about the beef thing which is important and I was unconvinced they were really going to get enough beef there. I asked the fellows yesterday to send a telegram out on this also, but . . .

/6/ Reference is evidently to A. Thomas Taylor, president of International Packers, Ltd.

DCI: Out to where?

M: I am going to work on it today to see what we can do about the beef. The trouble is that the passage to the Andes is going to be closed in about two weeks. If we donít get the cattle through on hoof then there isnít much storage facility there for frozen beef. We are going to have to fly it in almost by shuttle. And then there is the problem of price, of bringing the price down from the present level of 1750 pesos to 1350 pesos. That is a matter of money. But the first thing is to get the beef there or to get a secure way of making sure it will be there.

DCI: Well, we can go into that.

M: We are going ahead with a rather large PL 480 program and that is on the price of food again, but we are giving them all that they are asking for. The telegram we sent/7/ was to ask them if this was really enough. We didnít want to treat this as a routine PL 480 type deal. We want to get enough food down there to bring prices down. I think your idea is a good one. Weíll get the best guy we can down there on TDY.

/7/ Telegram 613 to Santiago, April 27. (Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Chile, Vol. I, 1/64-8/64)

DCI: Yes, that is what I would do, if I were you. We will keep J.C. in and we will give him all the support he needs.

M: Yes, I agree with that.

DCI: So that we will be . . . .

M: If you have any other concrete ideas, youíll let us know?

DCI: Iíll get [name not declassified] on the telephone. He has called me once or twice on this and I might even go up and sit down and talk with him personally. I know him very well. Iíll see if that can be arranged.

M: O.K. and if you get anything else concrete, let me know.

DCI: Will do.

M: I am worried about this. I think this is the biggest problem we have. O.K. John. Thank you.

DCI: Goodbye./8/

/8/ McCone later attached a note entitled "Information on the Beef Requirements in Chile," in which he estimated that Chile would require "approximately 5,000 tons of cattle on the hoof per month."


253. Memorandum From the Assistant Secretary of State for Inter-American Affairs (Mann) to Secretary of State Rusk/1/

Washington, May 1, 1964.

/1/ Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Chile, Vol. I, 1/64-8/64. Top Secret. Drafted by Dentzer.

Presidential Election in Chile

This memorandum will inform you of the status of the presidential race and indicate US Government activity concerning this important election./2/

/2/ Bundy forwarded this memorandum to the President under a May 13 covering memorandum that noted the importance of the upcoming Presidential election in Chile. "In essence, the problem we face is that a very popular and attractive candidate, named Allende, who has thrown in his lot with the Communists, has more than a fighting chance to win. We have a coordinated Government-wide program of action to strengthen his opponent and support actions in Chile which will work to the advantage of those now in power. It is a highly fluid situation and one in which there may have to be further action as we get into the summer. I have been very much encouraged by the determination and unity which all Departments of the Government are showing on this one, and we will be watching it very closely, but I do think you ought to know about it yourself." (Ibid., Memos to the President, McGeorge Bundy, Vol. IV)


On September 4, two months before our own elections, a critical presidential election is scheduled in Chile. The two leading candidates are Salvador Allende, an avowed Marxist leader of a Communist-

Socialist coalition, and Eduardo Frei. Frei heads the Christian Democratic Party, a somewhat left of center reform party close to the Catholic Church. In the 1958 election Allende came within 32,000 votes of winning a plurality and becoming president.

At this point in the campaign, most observers rate Frei slightly ahead, but the race will be extremely close and many things could happen in the four months before the election. The democratic forces are presently split, with Radical party candidate Julio Duran back in the race after the results of a congressional bi-election in March shattered his coalition of rightist parties and indicated he stood almost no chance of being elected. Also working against Frei is a Chilean tolerance for native Communists, who have long been on the public scene, and a long-standing anti-clerical feeling which hurts the Church-identified Christian Democrats.

Discussion of U.S. Action Program

Clearly, the September election will be determined by factors which are deeply rooted in the political, economic, and social fabric of the Chilean scene and by the campaign abilities of the major contenders. Given the consequences, however, if this major Latin American nation should become the first country in the hemisphere to freely choose an avowed Marxist as its elected president, the Department, CIA, and other agencies have embarked on a major campaign to prevent Allendeís election and to support Frei, the only candidate who has a chance of beating him. Chief elements in this campaign are the following:

1) Providing covert assistance through secret CIA channels to Freiís campaign chest and for other anti-Allende campaign uses. [less than 1 line of source text not declassified] has been approved by the Special Group and earmarked for these purposes, and additional funds will be sought as necessary.

2) Providing AID loans in CY 64 amounting to approximately $70 million, principally in program budget loans to maintain the level of the government investment budget, thereby keeping the economy as a whole active and unemployment low. $60 million of this aid has already been extended./3/

/3/ On April 3 the United States and Chile signed an agreement to provide $55 million in program loan assistance in CY 1964. For an account on how the funds were utilized, see United States Senate, Committee on Government Operations, Subcommittee on Foreign Aid Expenditures, United States Foreign Aid in Action: A Case Study, Washington, 1966, p. 31.

3) Examining means to alleviate the rising cost of living through efforts to increase the supply and lower the price of major foods. We are making available $20 million of PL 480, almost half of which is wheat. In addition, we are reviewing our on-going PL 480 Title III food distribution program through voluntary organizations to expand it wherever possible; the current FY 64 program costs $12.5 million and touches an estimated 2 million people, 1/4 of Chileís population.

4) Assisting U.S. business groups with information and advice through David Rockefellerís Business Group for Latin America-a blue ribbon group of American companies in Latin America-in their support of a Chilean business group helping Frei and attempting to hold down prices.

5) Organizing a political action and propaganda campaign through CIA contacts in coordination with or parallel to Freiís campaign. This includes voter registration drives, propaganda, person-to-person campaigning in the cities and rural areas, and arrangements to provide some Italian Christian Democratic organizers to Frei as advisers on campaign techniques.

6) Encouraging the GOC and IMF to avoid rupturing their stand-by stabilization agreement, a break which would have damaging financial and psychological consequences. An IMF team presently is completing a review in Chile, and a Chilean team sent by President Alessandri will arrive in Washington on May 4 for discussions with the Department.

7) Attempting discreetly through normal U.S. contacts with the non-political Chilean military and police to encourage their rising awareness of the subversion which would take place under an Allende government.

8) Continuing USIA placement in Chile of unattributed material, giving special care to low-keyed efforts which do not expose U.S. Government involvement.

9) Encouraging, through covert ties and private U.S. organizations, effective anti-Allende efforts by Chilean organizations including the Roman Catholic Church, trade union groups, and other influential bodies, such as the anti-clerical Masons.

We are attempting to insure that extraordinary caution is observed in this action campaign to conceal official U.S. government interest, and we have rejected several ideas which have seemed to entail undue risks or excessive American involvement.


I plan to strengthen our Embassy in Chile in the four months prior to the election by adding to the present staff there next week a top-ranking political officer with an excellent record on the Cuban desk, Robert Hurwitch./4/

/4/ Hurwitch was given the rank of first secretary in the Embassyís political section. Although he reported to Santiago in May, Hurwitch did not officially assume his position until July 5.

I also plan to raise with Ambassador Cole, who recently arrived in the U.S. by ship on two monthsí leave from post, the desirability of interrupting his vacation to return to Chile soon for a ten-day period. I am aware of the background concerning his two monthsí leave, but I am concerned about possible reactions in Chile and the U.S. to so long an absence in relation to this critical election./5/

/5/ Later that afternoon Mann told Rusk that "he would like to talk about Chile and a number of problems." A meeting was set for 6 p.m. (Rusk to Mann, May 1, 12:14 p.m., National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Rusk Files: Lot 72 D 192, Telephone Calls 4/20/64-5/22/64) According to Ruskís Appointment Book Rusk met Mann at 6:35 p.m. (Johnson Library) No substantive record of the conversation has been found.


254. Telegram From the Deputy Chief of Mission in Chile (Jova) to the Assistant Secretary of State for Inter-American Affairs (Mann)/1/

Santiago, May 5, 1964.

/1/ Source: Department of State, INR/IL Historical Files, Chile, 1964-1967. Secret; Priority. Also addressed to Dentzer. The telegram was forwarded through CIA channels.

76320. Please pass to Mann and Dentzer from Jova.

1. Accompanied by Robinson/2/ I had a two-hour conversation May 4 with Frei at latterís home. Also present was latterís top political advisor, Juan de Dios Carmona. At end of conversation/3/ Frei asked to see me alone.

/2/ John P. Robinson, AID mission director in Santiago.

/3/ During the earlier discussion, Frei expressed "unusual optimism" concerning his electoral prospects-although he "jokingly observed that his selfish interests should lead him paint a bleaker picture to the US authorities for obvious reasons." (Telegram 999 from Santiago, May 5; National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964-66, POL 14 CHILE) Jova urged Frei to reconsider his position on a presidential election by congress should no candidate receive an absolute majority of the vote; Frei had publicly accepted the tradition of selecting the front-runner, even though the Chilean constitution formally allowed a choice between the two leading candidates. Jova reported that "this is obviously a course which does not appeal to him [Frei], but which he might be prepared to follow if the margin by which he trailed were small and providing the military as well as the congress were cooperative." (Telegram 1005 from Santiago, May 5; ibid.)

2. He started off this private conversation by expressing gravest concern activities and indiscretion of [name not declassified]. He said he had been horrified to hear that on at least two occasions [name not declassified] had spoken indiscriminately in regard to USG aid to the Frei campaign. On one occasion speaking to Salvador Pubill, PDC campaign finance manager, [name not declassified] told him he saw no emergency requirement in collecting funds from industrialists for campaign in view of fact that Frei was to receive one million dollars in assistance from USG. On another occasion he told Antonio Baeza of COPEC that the financial resources of the business community should be kept in reserve for the congressional elections in March as the Frei campaign was well supplied with funds amounting to approximately one million dollars from USG and private sources. On a third occasion he said (it was not clear to whom) that on his recent trip to the U.S. he had agreed arrange with [name not declassified] and his group that the technique to follow would be to feed funds raised by [name not declassified] to Frei to help him win campaign but with ultimate intention of using this as a noose with which to control him once he were elected president.

3. Frei said that he has only seen [name not declassified] three times in his life and on only one occasion, at a recent tea at his house, had serious campaign matters been discussed. He was concerned however at [name not declassified] thrashing around in a variety of political fields in which he was unfamiliar and in which he seemed to be enjoying "playing cops and robbers". He told me that he had impression [name not declassified] respected and paid attention to me and hoped that I would convey to him the message to be discreet. Statements such as those he had made above might already have done great damage to his campaign and moreover they were in large part untrue. He hoped that all concerned would be extremely careful on any loose talk on any matters connected with financial assistance. Much of this in any case was still undecided upon but any linking of him to USG or U.S. private sector financial assistance was fatal.

4. (FitzGerald and Gomez felt that their own conversation with [name not declassified] seems bear out some of above allegations. Hence we decided Belton/4/ in view his close friendship might be best person admonish [name not declassified] and we asked him to do so prior his departure last nightís plane.)

/4/ William Belton, then political advisor to the Commander in Chief, Southern Command, had been counselor at the Embassy in Santiago, 1956-1958.

5. As will be reported in separate telegram/5/ Frei said he thought that Duran should be kept in the race at any price. Although some members of his party disagreed with him he said he still was of firm opinion that a withdrawal by Duran might have as its consequence the endorsement of Allende by Radical Party or instances of individual Radical senators and deputies proclaiming Allende individually. Such actions would then enhance Allendeís stature as "democratic", respectable candidate and would serve increase his independent votes.

/5/ Telegram 1000 from Santiago, May 5. (National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964-66, POL 14 CHILE) On April 5 DurŠn reentered the race as the candidate of the Radical Party.

6. He spoke with considerable cordiality in regard to Duran and expressed hope that some way might be found help him financially. While such support might be obtained from Radical bankers and business men, he doubted that enough would be forthcoming and felt that serious consideration should be given subsidizing him either from PDC campaign funds or from other (presumably USG) sources. He said subsidy required would add up to some escudos 450,000. From this campaign chest Radical deputies would in turn be subsidized at rote escudos 4,000 apiece. He said some "dignified" manner to channel this subsidy would have to be found, that it should not in any way be through PDC officials but might preferably be handled through some pro-Radical banker or business man.

7. Frei said he would call on Duran personally in next few days in order try salve his feelings which have been hurt by other PDC activities and church attitudes. He would speak to [name not declassified] on latter and asked me to do same. (I intend to do this by merely reporting to [name not declassified] without comment some of Duranís complaints.)/6/

/6/ Mann replied on May 18: "We informed [name not declassified] of [name not declassified] indiscretions and told him effort being made put gag on [name not declassified]. We have no reason to believe American business community will make contributions to campaign." (Mann to Jova, undated; Department of State, INR/IL Historical Files, ARA Country Files, Chile, 1964-1967)


255. Memorandum From the Deputy Director of Coordination for Intelligence and Research (Carter) to the Director of the Bureau of Intelligence and Research (Hughes)/1/

Washington, May 7, 1964.

/1/ Source: Department of State, INR/IL Historical Files, ARA/CIA Weekly Meetings, 1964-1965. Secret. Also addressed to Denney and Evans. Forwarded through Scott.

ARA-Agency Meeting of May 6, 1964

ARA-Mr. Mann, Mr. Adams, Mr. Pryce, Mr. Dentzer; Agency-Col. King, [name not declassified]; INR/DDC-Mr. Carter


Tom Mann referred to the attached communication/2/ from our Chargť in Santiago indicating that [less than 1 line of source text not declassified] has been making indiscreet remarks about U.S. Government aid for Frei.

/2/ Document 254.

Mann said the people on the ground are apparently right, that we must have a low noise level.

[name not declassified] said he had always thought [name not declassified] "indiscreet", and added that what he didnít like was [name not declassified] trying to bleed us and not pay himself. (See attachment #2.)/3/

/3/ Not attached.

King said we should decide whether we will give money to the [name not declassified] group. Mann interjected that [name not declassified] was a blabbermouth. King agreed, but pointed out the influence [name not declassified] has [less than 1 line of source text not declassified]. Mann wanted to know how much money was involved and King thought roughly $300,000 from the private sector.

Mann said there was some question now of whether the private sector should give any support. He said he would see [name not declassified] the next day and that we owed it to him to tell him [name not declassified] is talking. Mannís inclination is to back away right now in view of what [name not declassified] has said. Mann then asked, "do you agree I advise him to lay off"?

The consensus of those present was in the affirmative.

[name not declassified] said the post had recommended [less than 1 line of source text not declassified] for [name not declassified], but that he himself thought [less than 1 line of source text not declassified] would be better.

King explained that the money could be passed in such a way that "[name not declassified] will know he is under obligation but will be unable to prove it."

Mann said he just wanted to be sure [name not declassified] stayed in the race. King and Dentzer wanted to lay on some conditions beyond just staying in the race, which they said [name not declassified] would do anyway.

Mann summed up by saying we had agreed on three things:

"1) We have decided to give [name not declassified] money.

"2) I will advise [name not declassified] to stay out and

"3) on Frei, go all out-give him whatever he needs."

King wanted to know if he could give [less than 1 line of source text not declassified] now. He thought this need not go to the Special Group. Mann agreed provided the Agency had the leeway to give it. But he said King should meantime look at the effect this has on the Frei position.

Mann remarked that Chargť Jovaís reporting had become sharper in the past few days. He said he was getting more respect for Jova.

Mann also told J.C. King to check in with Jova when King returns to Chile. King, a bit unhappily, replied "if thatís the way you want it."

Subsequent to the meeting Pryce informed King, [name not declassified] and me that Hurwitch will go to Chile immediately, but that Belton will not go at present, though he may go a month or so before the elections. Belton has just been in Chile in connection with his

POLAD work at CINCSOUTH and this gave Jova a chance to consult with him.


256. Transcript of Telephone Conversation Between Director of Central Intelligence McCone and the Under Secretary of State (Ball)/1/

Washington, May 7, 1964, 11:45 a.m.

/1/ Source: Central Intelligence Agency, DCI (McCone) Files, Job 80-B01285A, DCIís Telephone Calls, 3/4/64-5/19/64. No classification marking. The text was prepared in the CIA from a tape recording.

B: Yes, John, how are you.

DCI: Fine. Say, I have had J.C. King in New York on this Chilean problem and there was a plan worked out in a meeting with [name not declassified] and Geneen/2/ of the IT&T [less than 1 line of source text not declassified] on how to handle this meat and food problem, inflation problem over the next 4 months. Now it can be handled through PL 480, AID, but it is going to require prompt and decisive action. I am calling you to have you jot it down on your pad to see that it doesnít get bogged down in the machinery of AID PL 480 and Alliance for Progress and all the rest.

/2/ Reference is to Harold S. Geneen, president of the International Telegraph and Telephone Company.

B: I talked with Orville Freeman yesterday in the context of the beef problem and there is a way to kill a couple of birds with one stone. If we could get a lot of beef down there right now it would help relieve the (blot) here where the President is trying to find every possible way to buy beef. In the meantime, it is something they very much want.

DCI: Yes. Of course that involves quite a cost problem. The beef can be gotten in the Argentine and transported . . . .

B: Yes, but at the moment the President would be willing to go far out on using domestic beef for that.

DCI: Well, I talked to the President about it and I told him that was a possibility, if he wants to take the lumps on the cost, then it is perfectly all right. It means quite a subsidy and there may be some way to do that. That might be a sure way to get prompt action.

B: Well, thatís the point. Now, the trouble is, all of this stuff isnít available. I mean, apparently there is some mottling on processing.

DCI: Well, I donít know . . . .

B: (. . . .) promised to look into it and he is supposed to call me this morning. Let me needle him on this whole thing.

DCI: They need 2700 tons of processed beef a month for the next 4 months. This is my own mathematics. Donít hold me to that figure. It may be up higher than that.

B: Well, they did make a contract with Uruguay, I think, or Argentina, I donít know, for part of it.

DCI: Well, now, unfortunately, I am going to be away for a couple of days, but I have got J.C. King on this Chile problem on a full-time basis. Now in addition to this, we have gotten the interested banking and industrial companies to come in and support political actions to the tune of million or million and one-half dollars and we will have to up our own ante in this thing, but the point I want to make is that this requires prompt action and this is one situation where we have to win the game. Tom is out of town. I donít know where he is. Tom Mann. But just keep this on the front burner and if there are any problems of procedure or approvals due to your machinery, why maybe we can use some of our machinery on a contingency basis, you see. In order to get immediate action.

B: Iíll get a hold of Orville and Dave Bell and we will crank the thing right up./3/

/3/ In a May 8 memorandum to Bundy, Chase noted the importance of the PL-480 program in Chile, and urged the Department to "move fast on these programs and to let us know if there is any way we can help." Bundy approved. (Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Chile, Vol. I, 1/64-8/64) The United States and Chile signed a PL-480 agreement on June 30, which included a one-time provision to support beef imports (up to 3,000 metric tons for 1964), and doubled the previous amount of financial assistance allotted under Title IV for the export of agricultural commodities to Chile, i.e., from $21 to $42 million. (15 UST 1428)

DCI: O.K. and I will be back here Sunday/4/ or Monday and weíll talk about it. Good, fine, goodbye.

/4/ May 10.


257. Memorandum for the Record/1/

Washington, May 12, 1964.

/1/ Source: Department of State, INR/IL Historical Files, Special Group Files, c. 120, May 14, 1964. Secret; Eyes Only. Drafted by Jessup. Copies were sent to Johnson, Vance, and McCone. The meeting was held at noon in the White House Situation Room. (National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, U. Alexis Johnson Files: Lot 90 D 408, Date Books, 1964) No CIA action papers were prepared for the meeting. (Memorandum from Joseph W. Scott to U. Alexis Johnson, May 11; Department of State, INR/IL Historical Files, Special Group Files, May 14, 1964)

Minutes of the Meeting of the Special Group, 12 May 1964

Mr. Bundy, Mr. Johnson, Mr. Vance, and Mr. McCone
Also present were Under Secretary Thomas C. Mann, Colonel J.C. King, and Mr. Desmond FitzGerald

1. Chile

a. Mr. McCone referred to several meetings he had had in recent days with American industrialists with major interest in the Chilean economy. In one instance, David Rockefeller headed a group representing various companies. In another, he stated that he had been visited by Clyde E. Weed, Chairman of the Board, and Charles M. Brinckerhoff, President of Anaconda Copper Company. He had also received a visit from the Chilean copper magnate, Augustin Edwards. All were concerned with the closeness of the coming election, the amount of backing being funneled to Allende by outside interests, and the need to bolster candidate Frei with funds. Mr. FitzGerald, recently returned from Santiago, and Colonel J.C. King had also been in contact with business interests.

b. Mr. Mann had recently been in New York, he said, and he, too, had talked to some of these businessmen. He felt that there was already too much open talk in these circles which was filtering back to Chile. Even Frei had pointed out that publicized large-scale U.S. business support for his candidacy would be a kiss of death. On the basis of the risks and the apparent lack of security, he felt the U.S. "private sector" should not engage in political action in this Chilean election.

c. The concept of American commercial firms passing financial aid surreptiously to the U.S. government raised so many questions of ethics, financial and interrelationships that Mr. McCone said he felt the matter should be discussed in the Group. A lengthy exchange of views ensued, but the conclusion was that the legal aspects were too labyrinthine and the questions of tax benefits, conflicts of interest and corporation behavior were too murky to make any clear determinations. The risks of acting as an agent, in effect, of U.S. capital and the lack of assurance on security before, during, and after the election led to the agreement that McCone would convey to Mr. Weed the U.S. decision not to become a partner with business interests in covert political action but at the same time to assure him that the U.S. was making every effort, on a priority basis, to prevent the election of Allende./2/

/2/ President Johnson evidently approved this decision. At the weekly meeting between ARA and CIA representatives on May 21, FitzGerald referred to the Presidentís "desire that U.S. private business not become involved in the Chilean election." Mann, alluding to Johnsonís views on the subject, agreed to FitzGeraldís proposal to meet AugustŪn Edwards in New York on the condition that the CIA bear "in mind the Presidentís admonition." (Memorandum from Carter to Hughes, May 26; ibid., ARA-CIA Weekly Meetings, 1964-1965) No further evidence has been found on the substance or circumstances of this "admonition."

d. It was determined that Mr. FitzGerald would then come up with specific proposals for a large-scale covert political action program in support of Frei at an approximate cost of $2,000,000. It was anticipated that this paper would be ready for submission to the Special Group later this week./3/

/3/ The outcome of the Special Group meeting was discussed on May 13 at the weekly meeting between ARA and CIA representatives. FitzGerald reported that earlier "he had almost been thrown out of McConeís office" for characterizing the Special Group discussion on May 12 as "good." FitzGerald concluded, however, that "the amount of private sector money involved was Ďtoo smallí and the proposal 'too risky'." Mann agreed with this assessment, adding that "it is now up to us to come up with a meaningful USG program to defeat Allende." FitzGerald explained that the CIA had prepared a proposal to the Special Group "for an additional $1,250,000 for use in the Chilean election." "Mann commented that that was very well as far as it went, but that we shouldnít tie ourselves to that amount. FitzGerald said this was no problem, since we could get more if needed." (Memorandum from Carter to Hughes, May 14; ibid.)

[Omitted here is discussion of Haiti.]

Peter Jessup


258. Editorial Note

On May 14, 1964, the Special Group considered a proposal to increase the funds available for covert use in the Chilean presidential elections. In a May 13 memorandum for the Special Group the Central Intelligence Agency maintained that "recent political developments and additional information" indicated that an additional $1,250,000 was needed for the program to defeat Salvador Allende Gossens, the candidate of the Popular Action Front (FRAP). The proposal was designed primarily to increase financial support to Eduardo Frei Montalva, the Christian Democratic candidate, thereby allowing his party to "campaign at its full potential." The CIA also argued, however, that its assistance was "instrumental" in maintaining the Radical candidate, Julio DurŠn Neumann, who had recently avoided an attempt within his party to endorse Allende. (Department of State, INR/IL Historical Files, Special Group Files, May 14, 1964) The Special Group approved the proposal at its meeting on May 14, including a "tentative breakdown" for the additional funds. (Memorandum from the CIA, May 13; ibid.) According to the minutes of the meeting, the Special Group, while agreeing to the "overall amount" of the program, endorsed "the principle of financial flexibility," a principle which was explained as follows: "if, as the campaign develops, one segment needs additional support and another less, authority exists to shift the subsidy in the needed direction." Bundy informed the participants that "higher authority was aware of the seriousness of this election." (Memorandum for the Record, May 14; ibid., May 21, 1964)


259. Letter From the First Secretary of the Embassy in Chile (Hurwitch) to the Presidentís Special Assistant for National Security Affairs (Bundy)/1/

Santiago, June 19, 1964.

/1/ Source: Washington National Records Center, RG 84, Santiago Embassy Files: FRC 69 A 6507, 1964, POL 14 Elections (Presidential) 1964 (2). Secret; Official-Informal.

Dear Mac:

I have had very much in mind your request for another opinion as to whether an Allende victory would be seriously detrimental to US national security interests. While a month in Chile hardly constitutes a valid basis in time for a definitive response, I am moved to write now before I become too deeply immersed in political detail, knowing that should the scene alter significantly I might write again.

I think that what is fundamentally happening in Chile is that political power has slipped from the hands of the upper classes and both the middle class (PDC) and the working class-or its spokesmen-(the FRAP) are making a determined bid to possess it. Traditionally, the middle class has looked upward and has been politically allied with the upper class. The comparatively recent emergence of the Christian Democratic party as an important political force, however, has brought a change. The PDC stems from and has in turn rallied to it the Chilean middle class, an agglomeration ranging in socio-economic terms from lower to upper middle class and in political terms from leftish to conservative orientations, and has attracted significant segments of the working class, as well. The upper class parties (Liberals and Conservatives) have in turn, somewhat reluctantly, come out in support of Frei, the candidate, but most find the PDC program too radical. The Socialists and Communists (now FRAP) have for decades struggled unsuccessfully to wrest political power from the upper classes through peaceful means via the ballot. Had not the PDC with its strong candidate attracted timely support, I think the FRAP with its good candidate would this time have had its best chance for victory to date. Whichever party wins, I believe, will effect social changes (diminishing the influence of the propertied classes) from which Chile probably will not be able to turn back. While under-estimating the resiliency of the upper classes would be foolhardy (they seem to have succeeded nicely in corrupting the Radicals), the ideology and spirit of the PDC seems to involve something deeper than mere political competition. The FRAP in power would recognize the upper classes only to the extent its purpose was served.

The Catholic Church has entered this game with a fair-sized stack of chips. The liberal wing of the Church, which is dominant here and ably represented by Cardinal Silva, is deeply attached to the Frei campaign and should derive considerable prestige and impetus from a Frei victory, within Church circles especially. Repercussions of a PDC victory in both Latin American political and Church circles should redound to our benefit. Conversely, an Allende victory in Chile would have discouraging effects throughout the Hemisphere.

On the other side, Radio Habana has been clamoring for an Allende victory. After his reverses in Venezuela and Brazil, Fidel must be desperate to demonstrate to his Soviet patrons through an Allende victory that they are indeed backing the right horse. The FRAP campaign appears well-financed and that Fidel among other outsiders has purchased a stack of chips would not be surprising. For the Soviets, an Allende victory should significantly strengthen their "peaceful co-

existence" line to the discomfiture of the Chicoms, and encourage the USSR to allocate more resources elsewhere in LA to propagate similar victories. A Chilean base on the mainland would of course be very valuable to the USSR (cf. the long frontier with Argentina).

A Frei victory, on the other hand, could lead to greater adherence by Latin American left extremists to the Chicom line of violence. While in many senses a "violence" line might be easier for us to handle in Latin America, it may not be amiss for our policy planners to take a look now at the implications for US policy toward the Hemisphere of a Frei victory as it relates to the Soviet/Chinese split.

To move from the broader dimensions of the significance of the Chilean elections, from which I really do not think the local situation can or should be divorced, assessments of the FRAP and Mr. Allende are of course critical. Ernst Halperin had done the best recent study of the Communists and Socialists in Chile that I have read (it is entitled Sino-Cuban Trends: The Case of Chile-Tom Hughesí people have it). One gains the impression in Chile that the Socialists are more intellectually inclined and not as tough-minded or as well organized as the Communists who constitute the dominant element in the FRAP. They are, incredibly enough, often more left than the local Communist Party, are less addicted to the via pacifica and are rather admiring of China.

Allende is a good vote getter, but does not seem to be a man of outstanding ability, courage or intelligence. Although many here maintain that once in power Allende would control or break with the Communists, the evidence is that he has made strong public and private commitments to them (nationalization of the copper mines, Cabinet membership, etc.) and has a long history of unmarred relations with them (dating from 1951). Given the stakes, it is really difficult to see how the outside as well as the local Communists would readily surrender their considerable financial and other investments in an Allende victory. Nor would Allende, given a thin margin of victory at best together with his personal qualities, be likely to be an independent-a la Castro. He might adorn his administration with as many respect-able trappings as possible-pacts with the Radicals, and, less likely but still possible, with the left wing of the PDC. Beneath the dress,

however, the heart of the matter should I think be regarded as heavily Communist-influenced, unless there were an accompanying open break with the Communists or similar clear evidence that Allende had chosen a course not hostile to us. I should be inclined to view ambivalence on his part negatively, for little in his past appears to warrant giving him the benefit of a doubt in view of his Communist alliance.

An Allende victory would constitute a defeat for US policy. It probably would be accompanied by alarms from the U.S. press and business interests, inevitably justified by Castro crowing and Soviet needling of the Chinese. As a practical matter, whatever our assessment of the significance of an Allende victory, we may find our maneuverability the day after the election (results are known rapidly here) severely circumscribed. (I have often thought that the real tragedy for us of Castroís having embraced the Marxist, rather than our, world lay in the limitations now placed upon the flexibility of US policy toward situations which superficially resemble that of Cuba.) Another "Castro" in the Hemisphere, particularly one who achieved power through the democratic process in a country where we have invested the highest rate of per capita assistance, would be awfully tough to handle from both the international and domestic standpoints. This would clearly be a case where one and one totalled much more than two and the consequences throughout the Hemisphere of a second Castro would be serious. I would hope that we would, nevertheless, be able to avoid precipitate action and to retain enough flexibility to encompass the possibility that Allende unexpectedly might decide to steer his course in our direction either voluntarily or as a result of our margin of influence. The risks of a policy on our part which appears to accept Allende, however, could I think only be justified by expectations based on something much more concrete than a general notion that good-will on our part will engender a similar response.

You may imagine how pleased I am to be here and to have the opportunity to chew on this problem with very competent colleagues. I hope the foregoing has not needlessly taken too much time out of your busy day.

With warm regards.


Robert A. Hurwitch/2/

/2/ Printed from a copy that bears this typed signature.


260. Telegram From the Embassy in Chile to the Department of State/1/

Santiago, July 2, 1964, 11 a.m.

/1/ Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964-66, POL 14 CHILE. Confidential; Priority. Repeated to CINCSO and CINCLANT for POLADs.

10. I saw President Alessandri for about one hour today accompanied by Jova. President said that while new $15 million credit helpful, he disappointed in that he expected $30 million along with a rise in copper prices. I reminded him that he could add the PL-480 proceeds to his $15 million but he maintained that little of this would arrive before election date and much not until after his mandate finished. Hence, he foresees deficit of as much as $45 million.

He said he profoundly disturbed by short-sighted political stance we seem to be taking in that he understands USG only concerned with period through September 5 with the implication being that an Allende victory might see shutting off of aid. He said that while he believes Frei will win we should not discount possibility of Allende victory and urged that we take longer, broader view of matter. Should Allende win, Alessandri would have two months during which to educate Allende and to "channel him into less poisonous paths." He did not think that Allende himself wanted "extreme solutions" and would do his utmost to hold down the Communists. In answer to my question, said he did not believe Allende is true Marxist but merely an opportunist whose campaign was considerably less violent than that of Gonzalez-Videla. When I expressed concern at Allendeís links with Communists in todayís circumstances, Alessandri observed that in many ways Communists easier deal with than Socialists and that his real fear was of Ampuero whom he considered real extremist. In any case, should Allende win, he hoped USG position would be one of reserved watchful waiting and readiness to move rapidly and with flexibility.

He maintained that if we closed all doors on Allende, we would push him further left and on path similar to Cuba. He compared cases of Cuba and Bolivia maintaining that latter had been saved by US flexibility but recognized that this flexibility easier for US due to minimum US investment as compared to Cuba and (Chile) he speculated whether Cuba might not have taken different route if US had been more prudent and then urged prudence in regard Chile even if Allende won.

In view of above, he felt it particularly necessary that during his last two months in office, Chile have an easier economic situation in order give Alessandri some room for economic maneuver during time when he will be "educating" the next president. Regardless of who wins, he said it would be necessary bring him down to earth after stratospheric euphoria of campaign and its many promises. If either candidate were to attempt to fulfill promises, would soon ruin Chile and would be thrown out in a short time. In many ways, he said Freiís lot will be more difficult than Allendeís as he will be under greater pressure fulfill his promises.

In any case, regardless which is victor, Alessandri felt he himself would have important role to play during two month interim period and felt if he given the necessary assistance, his influence on next president might be decisive.

I told him that I would report his views to Washington and was certain that his opinion as to next administration would be useful. As regards his request for more aid, told him could make no commitment and while I would report his views to Department, still hopeful he would find that PL-480 would arrive soon enough to do the trick in conjunction with $15 million credit. The president said he wished he could believe this but is certain he would need more money.

Comment: I believe Alessandriís views important but think it by no means certain that Allende will be willing to work with Alessandri and be "educated" during interim period.

I see no immediate need give active consideration Alessandri request for additional $15 million. But it may become clear that further US aid required after IMF review Chilean situation scheduled later this month or, more likely, after September election. In either case, we should be prepared move fast if necessary./2/

/2/ The Chilean Ambassador to the United States, Sergio Gutiťrrez-OlŪvos, reiterated much of Alessandriís argument in a meeting with Mann on July 6. According to a memorandum of the conversation, "Mann said that while he was not as optimistic as President Alessandri regarding Allendeís susceptibility to influence, the Department intends to be realistic and flexible if Allende wins." (Ibid., AID(US) CHILE) In telegram 25 to Santiago, July 8, the Department reported that Alessandri should now feel reassured that the United States would not "cut his Administration adrift in final 60 days in event Allende wins." The Department, however, did not wish to negotiate the terms for additional economic assistance until September, "when our response can take into consideration Freiís views and/or situation then prevailing as well as incumbent GOC position." (Ibid., AID(US) 9 CHILE)



261. Information Memorandum From the Presidentís Special Assistant for National Security Affairs (Bundy) to President Johnson/1/

Washington, July 8, 1964.

/1/ Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Chile, Vol. I, Memos 1/64-8/64. Secret.

Survey Poll on Chilean Presidential Candidates

You are right: [less than 1 line of source text not declassified] a poll in April and May of the three candidates for President in the Chilean election./2/ The poll showed that Frei (Christian Democrat) would receive 52% of the vote: Allende (Socialist-Communist) 36%; Duran (Radical) 7% and 5% undecided. [less than 1 line of source text not declassified] a poll in March before a by-election in which the Radicals lost badly. In that poll, Frei was also ahead. The second poll showed Duran lost badly and that Frei picked up slightly more of the voters who switched from Duran than did Allende.

/2/ Mann reported the results of the poll in a telephone conversation with the President on June 11; see Document 16.

The poll was taken by an experienced [less than 1 line of source text not declassified] firm which had previously conducted polls in Chile. Nevertheless, the poll was a small sample-only 2000. State regards it only as an indicator of how the situation lined up in May and not what it might be now or how it might end up on September 4.

Chilean President Alessandri thinks Frei is ahead but he also went to great lengths in a recent conversation with our Ambassador to urge that the United States keep an open mind on Allende and not cut off financial assistance should Allende win./3/

/3/ See Document 260.

The Chilean President race is a hard one. The Christian Democrats are coming from behind. They now have a good organization but they have to guard against over-confidence and fight all the way to the finish line if they hope to win.

[1 paragraph (2 lines of source text) not declassified]

McG. B./4/

/4/ Printed from a copy that bears these typed initials.


262. Editorial Note

On July 23, 1964, the 303 Committee considered a proposal to provide "supplementary support for the Chilean presidential elections." In a July 21 memorandum to the 303 Committee the Central Intelligence Agency reported that an additional $500,000 was needed for the program to defeat Salvador Allende Gossens, the candidate of the Popular Action Front (FRAP). The money would permit Eduardo Frei Montalva, the Christian Democratic candidate, to "maintain the pace and rhythm of his campaign effort"-and allow the CIA to meet any "last minute contingencies." The CIA explained that Frei had miscalculated his finances, an error "attributable to the PDCís inexperience in organizing a campaign of this magnitude." (National Security Council, 303 Committee Files, Subject Files, Chile thru 1969) In a July 23 memorandum to McGeorge Bundy, Peter Jessup recommended the proposal as follows: "We canít afford to lose this one, so I donít think there should be any economy shaving in this instance. We assume the Commies are pouring in dough; we have no proofs. They must assume we are pouring in dough; they have no proofs. Letís pour it on and in." (Ibid.) The 303 Committee approved the proposal for supplementary support at its meeting on July 23. (Memorandum for the Record from Jessup, July 24; ibid., Minutes, July 23, 1964)


263. Telegram From the Embassy in Chile to the Department of State/1/

Santiago, July 29, 1964, 6 p.m.

/1/ Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964-66, POL 14 CHILE. Confidential. Repeated to CINCSO and CINCLANT for POLADs.

167. Ref: Embtel 158./2/ Subj: Freiís Views on US Role in Final Days of Campaign.

/2/ Telegram 158 from Santiago, July 29, reported on the circumstances that led to the meeting among Frei, Jova, and Stevenson. The Embassy also explained that the meeting was "the first time we had spoken with Frei for almost two months as due to FRAP attacks on Embassy and attempts link Embassy and PDC had thought it best maintain discreet distance." (Ibid.)

Frei said he thought that the US and the Embassy in particular should continue to act with prudence and discretion in regard to his campaign. The last weeks of the campaign will be particularly bitter and great care should be exercised not to permit an extraneous matter to arise and possibly play a disruptive and possibly decisive role on the course of the campaign. He thought our own activities had been well handled in this regard and implied that he saw no reason why discreet contacts between Embassy and selected PDC leaders should not continue to be maintained.

When discussing financial resources he observed that PDC was adequately supplied and in any case it was desirable that the Chilean people themselves be made to feel an obligation to contribute and thus feel selves as personally involved in campaign. He hoped we could assist him, however, through furnishing information on FRAP activities. He hoped that in our conversations with our liberal and conservative contacts we would stress to them the need to maintain the "national and popular character of the campaign" and that the face of the right not be shown too much. With our Radical friends he hoped we would urge them to keep Duran in the race.

He made the interesting observation that he felt that among the reasons that it was necessary for him to win by a really large majority was the reassuring effect that this would have on potential private investment from abroad. A win by a mere plurality or by a very narrow majority would keep alive the suspicion in the United States and Europe that communism was still just around the corner in Chile and this would discourage the massive investments that he felt Chile needed.

We told him that Ambassador very specially hoped he and his cohorts would keep in mind fact that US was also engaged in political campaign and that ill-considered statements or actions in Chile could also create complications there. "Understanding attitudes" were a two way street. Frei said he very much aware of this problem and sympathized with attitude of parts of American public which complained of lack of support and understanding for US policies in spite of extensive and long continuing assistance programs. A balance had to be struck between local and international considerations and this was often difficult.



264. Memorandum From Robert M. Sayre of the National Security Council Staff to the Presidentís Special Assistant for National Security Affairs (Bundy)/1/

Washington, July 31, 1964.

/1/ Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Chile, Vol. I, Memos, 1/64-8/64. Secret.

Chilean Contingency Planning

The LAPC has held two meetings on a contingency plan for Chile. Although the first draft, and the revised draft which the LAPC considered July 30, cover contingencies should Frei win (a) handily or (b) by a slim margin, all of the discussion has centered on the contingency of an Allende victory./2/

/2/ The Latin American Policy Committee first met on July 9 to consider a draft of the contingency plan for Chile. The May 28 draft was forwarded on June 5 as an enclosure to airgram A-926 from Santiago. (National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964-66, POL 1-1 CHILE) The action minutes of the July 9 meeting are in the Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Latin America, Vol. II, Memos 6/64-8/64. The revised draft and the minutes of the LAPC meeting on July 30 have not been found.

As you are aware, the polls and recent reports indicate Frei is ahead. Frei himself is now plotting his strategy on winning big instead of just winning.

The consensus on contingency plans is shaping up as follows, based on current intelligence:

1. The revised draft of July 30 is too wordy (it runs to 31 double-spaced pages), attempts to cover too much ground, and proposes courses based on inadequate intelligence. It should be tightened up and shortened.

2. We should proceed on the assumption that Allende is bad medicine, but we should not slam the door because he might double-cross his Communist friends. President Alessandri, Felipe Herrera, and others, insist we can work with Allende.

3. The most likely possibility, should Allende win, is that he would try to establish a broadly based government, play for time to consolidate himself, and try to get the U.S. to finance his administration. We should, therefore, move promptly, but without provocation, to get him to define his position. We should do nothing that would let rumors start that we support him. (Current intelligence is that the Communist Central Committee is telling its people they cannot expect any important posts in an Allende Government at first.)

4. If Allende wins a bare majority, the key to keeping him out peacefully is Radical support for Frei in the Congress. The Chilean Congress has a tradition of confirming the candidate with the highest popular vote, but we could push for a Frei approval on the theory that the Chilean people gave a majority vote to policies espoused by Frei and Duran, and a minority to Communist-Socialist policies.

5. The Soviets will probably offer substantial financial assistance to Allende if we refuse, and may be even if we do not. But they would be inheriting an economy which is in serious difficulty as opposed to Cuba, where it was basically strong. In the Soviet-Chinese fight, Chile is extremely important to the Soviet thesis that communism can achieve power by peaceful means.

6. We would have an extremely difficult time marshalling forces against letting a victorious Allende take office, or doing anything about getting him out. Chilean tradition is to let the victor take office. If the reluctance of Latin Americans on Cuba is any criterion, the Latins would not go along with a move against Allende. There would probably be a serious division of opinion in the U.S.

7. The armed forces in Chile are anti-Communist. It is possible that they might move as the Peruvian military did to keep out Haya de la Torre, but the odds are they would not. They would more likely play it as the armed forces did in Brazil, but divisions among the Chilean armed forces are less likely.

DOD is reviewing its supply situation in the Canal Zone, should additional riot control supplies be needed in a hurry. It is also identifying the location of additional supplies in the U.S., should these be needed. Riot control supplies already approved, are in place in Chile, and the feeling is that these are adequate for the foreseeable future, i.e., the next month or two.

State is having another try at a contingency paper and the LAPC will review it at an early meeting./3/

/3/ No evidence has been found that the LAPC met to discuss a subsequent draft of the contingency paper for Chile.



265. Memorandum From the Presidentís Special Assistant for National Security Affairs (Bundy) to President Johnson/1/

Washington, August 13, 1964.

/1/ Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Memos to the President, McGeorge Bundy, Vol. VI. No classification marking. Copy to Reedy.

This is merely an extra note of insurance, but you may want to know that we have been asked by our friends in Santiago not to make any public recognition of Chileís break with Cuba./2/ In response to this request, we are making no public statement at all, and when pressed by reporters we will say simply "This is a decision taken by a democratic government in the light of its own assessment of its international obligations, and that is all we need to say about it."

/2/ Although it had recently voted against such action at the 9th Meeting of Foreign Ministers, Chile suspended diplomatic relations with Cuba on August 11.

If we look as if we are interfering in any way, it will be bad for our friend Frei and good for the Communist-supported Allende.

The election prognosis continues favorable at the moment./3/

/3/ A handwritten notation at the end of the memorandum reads: "O.K. L".

McG. B.


266. Memorandum From the Special Assistant to the Assistant Secretary of State for Inter-American Affairs (Barall) to the Assistant Secretary of State for Inter-American Affairs (Mann)/1/

Washington, August 20, 1964.

/1/ Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, ARA/LA Files: Lot 66 D 65, Chile 1964. Confidential. Copies were sent to Adams, Rogers, and Dentzer.

U.S. Identification with Frei in the Chilean Election

At your staff meeting, today, and in all conversations regarding the forthcoming election in Chile, both Chileans and Americans unquestioningly accept U.S. support of Frei. While the alternative of Allende is a horrible one, it is safe to predict that we will have many severe problems even with Frei, and that Chileís problems will not be solved automatically by the election results-at least this is what my Chilean friends tell me, and all support Frei.

Since we are identified as such ardent supporters, Frei is likely to ask for enormous sums of money on political rather than economic-development grounds. He is almost certain to urge us to finance some doctrinaire programs which will be unacceptable to the U.S.

Frei is not likely to have the political strength to cope with inflation and mount an effective stabilization program. Even if he obtains a majority of the popular vote, it is hard to believe that he will be able to coalesce a majority in the Congress, particularly since he cannot be sure of internal discipline on the part of the left wing in his own party. For the same reason, and in the light of his promises to workers and peasants, I donít see how he can tackle the problems of wage stabilization effectively.

Although I am sure we cannot change our over-identification with Frei before the election, I would recommend a much cooler, factual, "show-me" attitude as soon as the election results are known, so that he doesnít take for granted U.S. support for his programs on the theory that we consider him to be the only alternative to a Communist takeover. I am not suggesting that we should not be willing to provide massive aid to Chile if the conditions are right. But if we provide big sums without real assurance of permanent change for the better, the net result may be permanent change for the worse-and weíll get Allende next time around.


267. Memorandum for the Record/1/

Washington, August 21, 1964.

/1/ Source: National Security Council, 303 Committee Files, Minutes, August 20, 1964. Secret; Eyes Only. Drafted by Jessup. Copies were sent to Thompson, Vance, and McCone.

Minutes of the Meeting of the 303 Committee, 20 August 1964

Mr. Bundy, Ambassador Thompson, Mr. Vance, and Mr. McCone

1. A special meeting of the 303 Committee was called for 1600 on 20 August 1964 to discuss two papers concerning Chile: a CIA paper dated 20 August 1964, "Supplementary Support for the Chilean Presidential Elections of 4 September 1964,"/2/ and an undated CIA memorandum, "Church Social and Political Projects in Chile."/3/

/2/ Not printed. (Ibid., Subject Files, Chile thru 1969)

/3/ Dated August 20. (Department of State, INR/IL Historical Files, 303 Committee Files, c. 9, August 20, 1964)

2. The first paper cited a cable of 19 August 1964 from the "Joint Embassy Election Team" in Santiago/4/ seeking additional funds as the political race enters its last two and a half weeks. The sum requested was [less than 1 line of source text not declassified], and in view of the extreme long-range importance of the outcome of this political struggle, the Committee members felt that this late hour request was justified.

/4/ Not found.

3. The second paper dealt with the political action program undertaken by [less than 1 line of source text not declassified] in support of the CDP candidate. [less than 1 line of source text not declassified], apparently on the basis of conversations with various U.S. citizens, private and official, over the past year, assumed that he had a tacit commitment for financial support. Although no formal commitment to [less than 1 line of source text not declassified] was ever authorized, the Committee felt that [less than 1 line of source text not declassified], regardless of his erroneous impression, had made measurable contributions to the Frei campaign through his "front" organizations and that some allocation of funds should be made to defray his stated deficit of $395,000.

4. Accordingly, the Committee approved the sum of [less than 1 line of source text not declassified] as requested by the "Joint Embassy Election Team" with the stipulation that no more than [less than 1 line of source text not declassified] of this sum should be allocated to [less than 1 line of source text not declassified] political action program deficit./5/

/5/ According to his own notes of the meeting, "Ambassador Thompson commented that [less than 1 line of source text not declassified] seems a great deal, but he did not enter any caveat to that effect." (Department of State, INR/IL Historical Files, 303 Committee Files, C. 9, August 20, 1964)

Peter Jessup


268. Memorandum Prepared in the Central Intelligence Agency/1/

Washington, September 1, 1964.

/1/ Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Chile, Vol. II, 9/64-11/64. Secret. Dungan forwarded the memorandum to Bundy and Moyers on September 4 and in a covering memorandum noted: "I know that both of you are interested in the Chilean election which is being held today. Therefore, I thought you would want to see a memorandum which I had prepared earlier this week by DDP giving their estimate of the outcome of the election. This analysis does not reflect the views of the Intelligence component of the Agency."

Chilean Election Forecast

1. The total of registered voters for the 4 September 1964 election is 2,915,000, 45.7% of whom are women. An estimated 83% turnout is expected amounting to approximately 2,400,000 voters going to the polls.

[Omitted here are the detailed results of several election predictions.]

b. An August 1964 sampling of the important areas of Santiago and Valparaiso shows Frei ahead by 20.2% over Allende in these cities:









/2/ Bundy forwarded these results to the President on August 25. (Memorandum from Jessup to Bundy, August 24; Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Chile, Vol. I, 1/64-8/64)

(For an examination of details as well as regional polling data in five provinces, please see attachments 2 and 3.)/3/

/3/ None of the attachments was found.

6. Divisional Estimate:

a. We do not believe that it is possible to predict this election with any great degree of accuracy, that is to say, within one to two percent. For one thing, polling must be relatively inexact in view of the fact that expected voters this year exceed by more than one million the number of voters in the past presidential election. (This greatly increased expected vote is due mainly to laws passed during the Alessandri regime making voting mandatory.) As a consequence, pollsters do not have available the type of district bench marks which are used so extensively in polling in the United States. The enormously increased registration and expected vote can be assumed, however, to be of distinct advantage to the Christian Democrats in view of the fact that new registration will be heavily weighted among women who by and large favor Frei by more than two-thirds.

b. Some general regional observations are of interest. The northern provinces have traditionally been communist and radical strongholds. The PDC has worked hard to change this and Allende seems to have only a slightly favorable margin there. In the central urban area with its high number of women registrants Frei should win Santiago and Valparaiso by a substantial margin. In the central rural area Allende may carry Aconcagua and Talca with the vote being close all the way down to Malleco. The PDC seems to do not badly among the campesinos in Curico, Talca and Chillan. In the race in Concepcion, traditionally radical and marxist, Frei has a 50-50 chance.

c. From recent polls it would appear that the undecided vote as of the middle of August is about 5 percent. There is some indication that this undecided vote comes principally from Allendeís semi-defectors; logically, one would expect it to be composed also of radicals who find it difficult to choose between a far leftist and a catholic candidate.

d. We believe that Frei will win by a clear majority. From the point of view of U.S. interests a clear majority for Frei would be highly satisfactory and therefore we believe that this is the important point rather than trying to predict the exact percentage. Such a majority would mean that the election would not have to be thrown to congress and therefore that the uncertainties surrounding that process, including the possibility of rioting, would be eliminated. Furthermore, with a clear majority Frei would not have to make any political deals with other parties. Forced to predict, however, we would give the following: Frei-53 percent; Allende-41 percent; Duran-6 percent./4/

/4/ Rusk briefed the President on the Chilean election at a NSC meeting on September 1: "It looked as if a victory for the non-Communist forces in Chile would come up in the election 4 September, partly as a result of the good work of CIA; and this development would be a triumph for democracy and a blow to Communism in Latin America." (Memorandum for the record by Ray S. Cline, September 1; Central Intelligence Agency, Job 80-B01285A, DCI Files, Meetings with the President) The election was also discussed on September 2 at the weekly meeting between ARA and CIA representatives. While FitzGerald gave the DDP prediction cited above, Mann said that "his source had indicated that Frei would probably win by a plurality but not by a majority." Mann congratulated the Agency, saying that, "regardless of the outcome, he believes that we have done everything that is possible." (Memorandum for the record by FitzGerald, September 3; ibid., Job 78-03041R, DDO/IMS Files, US Government-State)


269. Editorial Note

On September 4, 1964, the Johnson administration closely monitored the official tabulation of votes for the presidential election in Chile. The Department of State received hourly updates from the Embassy in Santiago and forwarded the telegraphic reports to the White House. (Memorandum from Chase to Bundy, September 4; Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Latin America, Vol. II, 6/64-12/64; telegrams 366, 367, 368, 369, 370, and 371 from Santiago, September 4; National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964-66, POL 14 CHILE) Although the initial returns suggested the eventual outcome, the actual result was surprisingly decisive. With 87 percent of the electorate participating, Eduardo Frei Montalva, the candidate of the Christian Democratic Party, received 56 percent of the vote; Salvador Allende Gossens, the Popular Action Front (FRAP) candidate 39 percent; the Radical Party candidate, Julio DurŠn Neumann, finished third.

President Johnson addressed the importance of the Chilean election at a news conference on September 5. The election, he said, served as a reminder of the strength of democratic institutions throughout Latin America; it was a victory for democracy as well as a defeat for communism, i.e. "those who are hostile to freedom." The President suggested that some credit should go to the Alliance for Progress, whose ideals and programs Frei had endorsed during the campaign. Johnson was careful to point out, however, that the election "was an internal matter in which the people of Chile were the only judges of the issues." (Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States: Lyndon B. Johnson, 1963-64, Book II, page 1040) Frei expressed his appreciation for these remarks on September 7, when Ambassador Cole delivered an oral message of congratulations from President Johnson. Frei also praised the Embassy for its role during the campaign, citing "its discretion and cooperation." (Telegram 383 from Santiago, September 8; National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964-66, POL 14 CHILE)

In a September 2 memorandum the CIA argued that various elements of the covert political action program-the financial and organizational assistance given to Frei, the effort to keep DurŠn in the race, the propaganda campaign to denigrate Allende-were "indispensable ingredients of Freiís success." "Freiís chances of winning the election," the Agency concluded, "would have been considerably more tenuous, and it is doubtful if his campaign would have progressed as well as it did without this covert U.S. Government support." (Department of State, INR/IL Historical Files, Chile, 1964-1967) The day after the election Cole reported that the combined effort of U.S. agencies "contributed significantly to the very satisfactory Frei victory on September 4." (Telegram 372 from Santiago, September 5; National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964-66, POL 14 CHILE)

The 303 Committee also discussed the Chilean election at its meeting on September 10. The official minutes of the meeting record the discussion as follows:

"Mr. Bundy indicated that a vote of commendation should be extended to those responsible for the successful outcome of the Chilean election. Those present concurred wholeheartedly. Mr. McCone remarked that the voters, themselves, in Chile deserved some commendation for the high numbers of the electorate voting (86%) and the very few votes that were invalidated (six-tenths of 1%). Ambassador Thompson indicated that there were those who felt that President Frei could still prove a difficult personality. Mr. McCone commented that certain U.S. business leaders with direct interests were immensely pleased and felt that they could negotiate any problems arising during the Frei administration. Mr. McCone added that it was the present analysis of his area specialists that without the large scale covert support provided for the campaign, Frei would have gained, at most, a bare plurality. This was the first clear majority in a Chilean election in 22 years." (Memorandum for the Record by Jessup, September 11; Department of State, INR/IL Historical Files, 303 Committee Files, September 24, 1964)


270. Intelligence Note From the Director of the Bureau of Intelligence and Research (Hughes) to Secretary of State Rusk/1/

Washington, September 5, 1964.

/1/ Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Chile, Vol. II, 9/64-11/64. Confidential.

Freiís Victory in Chile has Broad Hemispheric Significance

A new dimension to democratic left. For the first time in Latin America, a Christian Democratic Party has achieved power. These parties, which are beginning to gain a foothold in several Latin American countries, are outspokenly pro-Western in foreign policy. In domestic policy, they advocate a middle road between capitalism and Marxism with strong emphasis on the role of the working man. The Communists and particularly the Castro regime have watched the Christian Democratic parties with concern, fearing that their advocacy of revolutionary changes with freedom might attract majority support. Freiís victory confirms their fears.

Smooth transfer of power foreseen. Frei will lose no time in designating the officials of his government. In staffing the ministries he will be able to call upon some of the most able technicians in the present Alessandri government who are members of his party. Outstanding among these is Sergio Molina, Director of the Budget and coordinator of Chileís 10-year development program, adopted in 1961. Foreign Office undersecretary, PDC member Enrique Bernstein seems likely to become the new Foreign Minister./2/ The PDC lacks enough top caliber technicians and administrators, however, to fill all the governmentís top posts and it will probably turn to political independents.

/2/ Frei announced his cabinet on October 26: Gabriel Valdťs Subercaseaux, a Christian Democrat, was named Minister of Foreign Affairs; Molina, a political independent, Minister of Finance.

Congressional hurdle. Frei must now buttress his personal victory-the first majority obtained by any Chilean presidential candidate since 1942-with greater representation of his party in Congress where it has only 32 out of a 192-seat total. In August the PDC said that its most pressing goal is to increase its congressional strength in the March 1965 elections when all the Chamber and about half the Senate will be renewed. Although the party is almost 30 years old, its spectacular increase in strength has occurred only since the last congressional elections in 1961. While the present Congress may give Frei limited emergency powers to help solve some of the countryís immediate problems, Frei will need a much larger plurality over the long pull.

Even if his party doubled its strength in Congress next March, he would still need additional support in attacking Chileís longstanding problems. The two rightist parties (Liberal and Conservative), which helped to elect Frei as "the lesser of two evils", will probably desert him when he moves against their entrenched interests. He has repeatedly attempted to win the Socialists in the FRAP away from the Communists, but with virtually no success so far. His most likely source of new support seems to be the center Radical Party, which might cooperate with him in return for guarantees of security for the many Radicals holding government jobs.

Implications for US. Freiís victory is being hailed by stateside radio broadcasts as a victory both for Western democracy and the US. This is to some extent an over simplification, and the US will face problems as well as opportunities in Chile. While Frei has supported Western political objectives and the Alliance for Progress, he has at times been vigorous in his criticism of capitalism. His reform efforts will doubtless provoke propertied interests and lead to charges that he opposes free enterprise./3/ Meanwhile, Frei has scheduled an economic mission to the US. He has been holding conversations with US copper companies in an effort to achieve a mutually satisfactory relationship with them. The PDC goal is to double copper production by 1970 in order to generate the revenues needed to support the partyís social program.

/3/ The CIA assessed the outlook for the president-elect as follows: "Frei will be a less accommodating and a more nationalistic ally than Alessandri, because of his zeal for reform. Freiís favorable attributes more than offset this." "With some good fortune and tactful handling, Frei could become an outstanding leader and statesman in Latin America and an exceptionally valuable, if occasionally carping, friend of the United States." (Special Report prepared by the CIA, [text not declassified]; Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Chile, Vol. II, 9/64-11/64)


271. Memorandum From the Presidentís Special Assistant for National Security Affairs (Bundy) to President Johnson/1/

Washington, September 20, 1964.

/1/ Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Memos to the President, McGeorge Bundy, Vol. VI. No classification marking. A notation on the memorandum indicates the President saw it.

Ralph Dungan and Chile

I have talked to both Dungan and Dean Rusk about this, and Rusk plans to talk to Tom Mann./2/ You may want to speak to Mann about it yourself on the El Paso trip.

/2/ Rusk raised the issue with Mann on September 3, the day before the presidential election. "The Sec asked if he [Mann] had a good man for Chile; we should have a name available soon. Mr. Mann said he had called [Deputy Assistant Secretary for Administration] Tom Beale and had pointed out the urgency. Mr. Mann said they had cleared through Ralph Dungan who had been mentioned as a chief candidate. Sec asked if Mann had any suggestions personally. Mann said we should take one of our better ambassadors out of the field-someone strong on economics. Assuming Frei wins, we will be faced with an economic problem. Mann said he did know someone else but had not yet had an answer. Mann suggested the Sec sound out the President. Mann thought the candidate should also know the language. Sec said let us give some thought to the matter; we should move fairly fast." (Rusk to Mann, September 3, 1964, 3:05 p.m., National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Rusk Files: Lot 72 D 192, Telephone Calls 8/25/64-9/13/64)

Everyone agrees that the job of Ambassador in Chile is now highly important. Frei plans to embark on a course of anti-Communist reform which will involve important negotiations with major American copper interests. We need an Ambassador who is fundamentally sympathetic to the cause of democratic reform, but realistic on the need to meet the fair interests of our businessmen.

Tom Mann will do a very good job on protecting our interests, but he is a little insensitive to the Chilean need for reform. So Dean Rusk and I both believe that a progressive and imaginative Ambassador will be needed as a counterweight, and that Dungan would be an excellent choice. This situation is much like that in Panama, where Vaughn is doing an excellent job of producing new ideas, while Tom Mann keeps an eye on the brakes.

Ralph Dungan is a liberal Catholic with strong convictions on the need for progressive policies. He is also a realist. He is a good friend of Frei, with whom he has been in close touch for years. I am convinced that he wants to do this job because it engages all his own convictions, and not because he wants the empty pleasure of being called Ambassador.

Ralph is not absolutely ideal for this job-it would be better if he had some business reputation, and better also if he spoke Spanish (although he is prepared to work on that passionately). But against any presently available businessman, Ralph has the great advantages of prestige in your Administration, proven sympathy for the progressive anti-Communist effort in Latin America, and a close personal relationship with Frei. He has the confidence of the Secretary of State, and he will be an energetic and loyal Ambassador for you personally.

Dean Rusk thinks we should send Coleís successor to Santiago very promptly. I myself do not believe that is very important. If you now make clear your intention to send Dungan at the right time, he could readily stay here until Thanksgiving or even New Yearís. An able Chargť can easily keep house between now and then.

What is needed is a decision. It will not be good for the Frei administration to believe that we are unable to pick a man for this crucial job during the next six weeks. We have twice delayed Coleís resignation, and we have now run out of spare time.

If you do designate Dungan, I think we can get cordial and responsive notices from the Times and the Post, and also from other less doctrinaire observers of the Latin American scene./3/

/3/ The White House announced on October 2 that President Johnson had nominated Dungan as Ambassador to Chile. (Telegram 290 from Santiago, October 2, ibid., Central Files 1964-66, PER Dungan, Ralph) Dungan was officially appointed on November 24, confirmed by the Senate January 15 (Congress had been in recess at the time of his appointment), and recommissioned January 18. He presented his credentials in Santiago December 10.



272. Memorandum From the Deputy Director of Coordination for Intelligence and Research (Carter) to the Director of Intelligence and Research (Hughes)/1/

Washington, October 1, 1964.

/1/ Source: Department of State, INR/IL Historical Files, ARA/CIA Weekly Meetings, 1964-1965. Secret. Also addressed to Denney and Evans.

ARA-Agency Meeting September 30, 1964

ARA-Mr. Mann, Mr. Adams, Mr. Pryce
CIA-Mr. FitzGerald, [name not declassified]
INR/DDC-Mr. Carter


FitzGerald said the Station Chief in Chile had talked with Ambassador Cole shortly before the latterís departure from Santiago and that Cole said Secretary Rusk doesnít want us in our dealings with the Frei Government to use leverage acquired through support of the CD./2/ FitzGerald said this made him very unhappy. He wanted to know if Mann was aware of a directive of this nature.

/2/ According to Ruskís Appointment Book, Rusk met with Cole on September 11. (Johnson Library) No substantive record of the meeting has been found.

Mann said he was not. In any case, he added, it depended on the way you use leverage. He doubted that the Secretaryís directive was "as sweeping as it sounds." He thought the matter could easily be cleared up by talking with the Secretary./3/

/3/ A handwritten note in the margin by this paragraph reads: "INR participation?"

[name not declassified], who made a recent trip to Chile, said he found Jova (DCM) concerned about "our using our power position." Mann commented he was not worried about using it; only about our misusing it.

FitzGerald said "itís the atmosphere of mistrust that bothers me."

Said Mann: "Donít worry. I trust you."

Mann went on to reveal there will be a new Ambassador in Santiago soon and indicated it would be Ralph Dungan, though cautioned that this was to be held close since the agrement had not yet been requested.

Mann said a topflight economist is needed to replace the outgoing economic counselor./4/ In his view the political battle is over. The battle now will be in the economic field.

/4/ The outgoing chief of the economic section, Thomas R. Favell, did not report to his next assignment until August 1965. He was replaced 3 months later by Robert G. Walker.

[name not declassified] reported that while in Chile he talked with [less than 1 line of source text not declassified] whom we assisted to the tune of [less than 1 line of source text not declassified] shortly before the September 4 election./5/ [less than 1 line of source text not declassified] told him that funds on hand would last only until December, clearly implying he expected more. [name not declassified] said he made it clear to [less than 1 line of source text not declassified] that no more funds would be forthcoming. Asked if [less than 1 line of source text not declassified] had clearly understood this [name not declassified] replied, "He didnít hear me."

/5/ See Document 267.

[Omitted here is discussion of Cuba and Venezuela.]


273. Editorial Note

At a meeting with Central Intelligence Agency officials on October 12, 1964, Assistant Secretary Mann reported his approval of a proposal for additional covert assistance to the Christian Democratic Party. The proposal would provide [text not declassified] to maintain the grass-roots organizations of the party-the slum-dweller and campesino departments-for the remainder of the calendar year. Ray Herbert, Deputy Chief of the Western Hemisphere Division, recommended extending the term of the program, arguing that the Christian Democrats were "the only effective force fighting Communists in these areas." Mann disagreed: the Christian Democrats might use U.S. support against the "other non-Marxist parties." He maintained that the current proposal was sufficient but agreed to reconsider the issue in several months. When Herbert raised the question of assistance for the congressional elections in March 1965, Mann was more adamant: "Tell them not to expect any help to beat other non-Commie groups. Tell them we helped them fight Marxists. This is different. This would be intervention." (Memorandum from Carter to Hughes, October 13; Department of State, INR/IL Historical Files, ARA-CIA Weekly Meetings, 1964-1965)

On October 13 the CIA drafted a memorandum to the 303 Committee detailing its program to support the Christian Democratic grass-roots organizations. Before the memorandum was submitted, however, Mann insisted on redrafting the proposal. The final memorandum stipulated that the CIA explain to Frei: a) the difference between assistance for a presidential election against a Marxist candidate and assistance for a congressional election against a field of democratic parties; and b) that the current program was intended for a "transitional period" only, to allow the Christian Democrats to combat Communist influence in the "campesino and slum sectors." (Ibid., 303 Committee Files, October 29, 1964) Ambassador-designate Dungan expressed similar concerns when asked to comment on the proposal:

"I would only add to the recommendation a caveat that support during this period does not mean a continuation of support for this or other PDC activities in the future. It seems to me that this should be made explicit so that no inference to the contrary might be drawn. It may well be that we will want to continue some support, but unless there are overriding considerations of which I am not aware at this time I believe it is a sound principle to permit popular democratic parties to go it alone. If the PDC or any other democratic party comes to power, part of assuming the responsibility that goes with power is finding ways and means of supporting the party structure."

The 303 Committee approved the CIA paper, as amended, by telephone on October 20. The official record of the decision notes that Dunganís statement set "the limitations under which any future proposals of this kind will be viewed in this Chilean post-election period." (Memorandum for the record from Jessup, October 22; ibid.)


274. Memorandum of Conversation/1/

Washington, October 12, 1964.

/1/ Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964-66, POL 7 CHILE. Confidential. Drafted by Lunn.

Meeting of Mr. Mann with the Mission of President-Elect Frei of Chile

Mr. Mann, Assistant Secretary, ARA
Mr. Solomon, Deputy Assistant Secretary, ARA
Mr. Rogers, Deputy U.S. Coordinator, AA/LA
Senator Radomiro Tomic, Member, Chilean Delegation
Sergio Molina, Member, Chilean Delegation
Jorge Ahumada, Member, Chilean Delegation
Josť PiŮera, Member, Chilean Delegation
Thomas R. Favell, Counselor Economic Affairs, Santiago
John P. Robinson, Director, USAID, Santiago
William T. Dentzer, Jr., Director, Bolivian-Chilean Affairs, ARA
Harry H. Lunn, Jr., Office of Bolivian-Chilean Affairs, ARA

Mr. Mann welcomed the special mission sent by President-elect Frei to begin economic discussions in Washington with the U.S. Government and international agencies. Senator Tomic, chairman of the mission, responded and noted the informal and unofficial nature of the teamís visit since the Frei Government will not take power until November 3.

As an introduction to the economic program proposed by the new government, Senator Tomic described the political situation in Chile which had led to Freiís election on a program of "Revolution in Liberty". He noted that the March 15 by-election in Curico effectively had eliminated the candidate of the "status quo" government coalition and forced a choice between Freiís democratic reform program and the Marxist alternative offered by Allende. While Freiís decisive election showed the clear preference of Chileans for the democratic alternative, one could not ignore the nearly 40% vote for Allende. Chilean expectations for the Frei Government are high and immediate performance is necessary to consolidate the Governmentís position in the March 1965 Congressional elections.

Senator Tomic then commented on the basic contradiction of a country with rich resources and a facade of effective democracy which had failed to fulfill its economic and social promise to the people. For the future, one of the strongest assets of the country in fostering democratic institutions would be the international solidarity enjoyed by Chile, especially within the Inter-American system inspired by Presidents Roosevelt, Kennedy and Johnson.

The Frei Government, Senator Tomic explained, would pursue parallel and inter-related economic and social programs. On the economic front, the government will attempt to spur development through doubling exports-primarily relying on increased copper production, but also emphasizing steel, paper, wood and fishmeal-and overcoming agricultural production and marketing problems. Priority social goals involve agrarian reform, education, housing and "promotion popular", a broad scheme of community social and economic action.

This program necessarily will be extremely expensive and Chile must rely on international solidarity to make possible the future pledged by Frei to the Chilean people; in particular, Chile looks to the United States for assistance. In economic discussions this week, Chile will seek renegotiation of debt falling due in the next few years held by agencies of the U.S. Government-especially the Export-Import Bank ($75 million) and the Treasury ($21 million)-and will make a case for further credits from these agencies, including program assistance from AID of $150 million.

Mr. Mann thanked Senator Tomic for his frank exposition and indicated the interest of the United States in President-elect Freiís objectives and the desire of the United States to provide significant assistance for a sound and realistic economic plan. He noted that we are far more prepared to give heavy assistance to a plan that will work than we are to contribute small amounts to a bad plan that merely increases a nationís debt and postpones the day of economic reckoning. The sole question was whether a program would work and be effective. Mr. Mann expected that discussions this week would focus on such basic technical issues as inflation and programs for productive and social investment, and that a program could be developed that we would find possible to support within the limits of our ability. In this connection, Mr. Rogers noted that FY 1965 funds for the Alliance are limited and subject to considerable competition as the result of favorable development opportunities elsewhere in the hemisphere.

Senator Tomic asked that an understanding on levels of U.S. assistance be reached as soon as possible because the new government needed to act quickly and decisively in the five months remaining before the Congressional elections. Senor Molina raised the particular problem he will face in assessing external resources for the budget message he must submit as Finance Minister on November 18. Mr. Mann indicated his expectation that the current week of discussions would make it possible to move ahead on arriving at subsequent assistance projections as the program and its requirements become clear.


275. Memorandum of Conversation/1/

Washington, October 17, 1964, 10 a.m.

/1/ Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964-66, POL CHILE-US. Confidential. Drafted by Dentzer and approved in S on November 23. The time of the meeting is taken from Ruskís Appointment Book. (Johnson Library) The memorandum is part II of II; part I recorded Ruskís initial meeting with the Chilean delegation on October 14. (National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964-66, POL CHILE-US)

The Secretaryís Second Meeting with the Mission of President-Elect Frei of Chile

The Secretary
Mr. Mann, Assistant Secretary, ARA
Mr. Solomon, Deputy Assistant Secretary, ARA
Senator Radomiro Tomic, Member, Chilean Delegation
Sergio Molina, Member, Chilean Delegation
Gabriel Valdes, Member, Chilean Delegation
Jose Pinera, Member, Chilean Delegation
Jose Zabala, Director, CORFO, New York
Mr. Dentzer, Director, Bolivian-Chilean Affairs, ARA

The Secretary asked whether the delegation was satisfied with its discussions in Washington./2/ Senator Tomic responded, expressing his satisfaction. Mr. Mann also expressed satisfaction with the talks.

/2/ In addition to meetings with Rusk and Mann, the delegation met with Dungan, AID Administrator Bell, EXIM Bank President Linder, and representatives of CIAP, IDB, IBRD, and IMF. (Telegram 331 to Santiago, October 17; ibid., POL 7 CHILE)

In response to Secretary Ruskís question about the next step in negotiations, Mr. Solomon indicated that a mission would be sent to Santiago as soon as possible after Freiís inauguration to pursue these discussions further in conjunction with the Embassy and AID mission there.

The Secretary asked about the European portion of the delegationís trip. Mr. Valdes indicated the results of the trip were good, that the Europeans were interested in Chile, and that the Europeans were interested to know what the U.S. would do, especially on the question of debt rescheduling. Mr. Mann affirmed U.S. willingness to attempt to work out arrangements with the European creditor nations which would be in line with Chilean hopes.

Senator Tomic spoke of the importance of U.S. assistance to Chile in the spirit of inter-American solidarity, and emphasized that the Frei government wished to show achievement to the people before it requested of them the full sacrifice that Chilean development would require. The Secretary assured him that the U.S. would keep in close touch with Senator Freiís advisers in the period leading up to the November 18 budget presentation to the Congress by the Chilean Minister of Finance, an event mentioned by the Chileans earlier as a date by which they hoped to have a clear picture of the amount of U.S. aid in 1965. Secretary Rusk also indicated his hope that efforts by the Chilean people would be called for at that time, and Senator Tomic assured him that this would be the case. Mr. Mann indicated he was willing to go along with the Frei government in postponing some of the sacrifices necessary so long as an earnest start was made now. He indicated to the Chilean mission that the Frei government would get at least what the Alessandri government received in terms of U.S. aid and added that he hoped circumstances would support even more aid. He stated the U.S. could not make any commitment now, however, and Tomic indicated he understood why this was the case.

Secretary Rusk inquired about agricultural imports into Chile, which he was informed ran about $125 million dollars a year. The Secretary stressed the importance of cutting back on this use of foreign exchange.

Senator Tomic asked for a special message from President Johnson to Frei on the occasion of the inauguration, and the Secretary indicated such a message would be sent.

The Secretary concluded the meeting by expressing his hope that the delegation has been satisfied with its mission to Washington. Senator Tomic indicated they were indeed satisfied and that they understood why the United States could not go further at this time, even though the Chileans might like to have a commitment. The Secretary assured Senator Tomic that the United States would move promptly in pursuing this subject and stressed again the two points mentioned in his previous interview with the delegation, the need for using foreign aid on a sound basis to build lasting achievements and the need to use funds committed on a timely and current basis. Senator Tomic assured the Secretary that Chile would do its part in carrying out the responsibilities of its partnership with the United States if the U.S. did likewise. He expressed the hope that Chile would be independent of U.S. assistance at the end of Freiís six years in office. Mr. Mann assured Senator Tomic that the U.S. was willing to help Chile or any friendly nation that sincerely tried to help its people and sought to put its own house in order.


276. Telegram From the Embassy in Chile to the Department of State/1/

Santiago, November 13, 1964, 1 p.m.

/1/ Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964-66, AID(US) 8 CHILE. Confidential; Immediate. Passed to the White House.

126. For Mann and Bell from Solomon. I met with Frei for over two hours this morning, accompanied by Chargť, Dentzer and Robinson. Molina and Ahumada also present.

Frei opened meeting by expressing his great appreciation for substantially increased U.S. assistance and good will toward Chile shown in all levels of U.S.

He then took up the subject of U.S. assistance in CY 1965, explaining his approach to the first year of his governmentís life, that previous Chilean Governments had always asked the people to sacrifice for stabilization programs but that the programs never worked, that past governments had not cared about all the people, and that his people were mindful of this. For this reason, he wanted to achieve both a reduction in price inflation this year and show concrete benefits to the people, distinguishing his government thereby from its predecessors. He said that reaching the goal of only a 25 per cent price inflation in 1965 was his number one aim and that if he fell short of this, he would consider his first year a failure. If he attained this goal, he could go to the people with the political strength and moral right to demand greater sacrifice. He stated that he hoped, therefore, to sustain a heavy public investment program during this year, but he said that the information given him concerning proposed U.S. assistance for 1965 indicated it fell short by $40 million of his needs. I explained this was not so, and reviewed with him two budgets showing that 1965 U.S. assistance to the balance of payments including debt relief would be $135 million or 35 per cent greater than in 1964 and that 1965 assistance to the budget would be $102 million or 50 per cent greater than the actual 1964 level.

He was surprised and I believe impressed by these figures, which put U.S. aid in 1965 into the best-but fair and defensible-light, contrary to the figures presented on a different basis by his Minister of Finance. I further explained the changes we hoped to see in their investment program, exchange rate policy, etc. and believe was able to disabuse him somewhat of his belief U.S. conservative tradition underlay our position and rather that we were only concerned with workable achievement of targets.

Frei then turned conversation to the need for $20 million assistance for remainder of 1964. He said he had understood from reports to him prior to the Tomic mission to Washington and from subsequent conversations in Santiago with our Embassy that the U.S. would be willing to be of assistance for the final portion of 1964, that it was imperative in terms of investor confidence that his government not be forced to break the IMF agreement, and that his government could not afford to begin its tenure by holding off unpaid creditors to an unprecedented extent. It then became clear that GOC would have 100 million escudos in unpaid bills as of December 31 in contrast to usual float of 50 million. Frei inquired whether it would be possible for the U.S. to give $20 million now, subtracting this sum from our announced program loan for 1965 for the time being, but with a "gentlemanís agreement" that the same advance against 1966 assistance would be given toward end of 1965. After explaining impossibility of this, I offered to expedite as much as possible the processing of the aid program loan with the possibility if negotiations went quickly enough of signing the program loan agreement in mid December accompanied by initial tranche. However, this would still have to stretch over the full extent of CY 1965, and thus require adjustment in 1965 expenditures or revenues. Molina not enthusiastic about this and mentioned he might try New York banks and hoped we would give him support. I didnít answer and turned conversation to specific alternatives on finding local resources which we believe possible and preferable.

While this subject was left unresolved, it emphasized GOC need for wide access to escudos from the program loan to finance the investment budget. I therefore agreed on Freiís request and as a gesture of cooperation to reduce the project component of our 1965 aid loan $10 million, increasing program loan to $80 million, as authorized by Washington.

Frei also asked that we jointly work out some kind of announcement concerning the nature of this weekís talks. I told him we could not make any loan announcements or specify amounts of assistance but would be glad to work out some language of a generalized nature reporting on the work of the past week.

At conclusion of this general discussion, Frei asked me to stay on alone. Tenor of discussion was that he expected to come under attack in the coming months from certain sectors of the Chilean business community-not the industrial sector but the banking and commercial sectors-and he hoped to have U.S. understanding that these attacks would be based on reasonable curtailment by legitimate governmental means of their power in society, as we would be able to judge for ourselves. I suggested as a friend that his best defense against such attacks was carrying out the financial discipline and other policies essential to both the private sector and overall Chilean development. He asked once again for our assistance in helping to resolve his financial problems of 1964, which he characterized as an infortunate inheritance from the previous government. In mentioning this, he acknowledged his confusion over previous reports that the U.S. would be willing to render such assistance, and he asked that U.S. officials never shrink from giving him any bad news about the future, whether it concerned aid or any other subject. In the course of agreeing I made clear what he had not realized before our discussions that any post election assistance would have had to come out of the same total Fiscal Year 1965 Chilean pot and really it boiled down to timing. He accepted this simplistic approach and conversation ended on warm note. We invited to tea today./2/

/2/ An account of the "tea" meeting between Frei and Solomon is in airgram A-385 from Santiago, November 16. (Ibid., AID(US) 9 CHILE) The agreement to provide $80 million of program loan assistance in CY 1965 was signed on January 5. For an account of how the funds were utilized, see United States Senate, Committee on Government Operations, Subcommittee on Foreign Aid Expenditures, United States Foreign Aid in Action: A Case Study (Washington, 1966), p. 32.



277. Memorandum for the 303 Committee/1/

Washington, January 25, 1965.

/1/ Source: Department of State, INR/IL Historical Files, 303 Committee Special Files, January-June 1965. Secret; Eyes Only.

Financial Support to Selected Candidates in the 7 March 1965 Congressional Elections in Chile

1. Summary

This is a proposal to provide funds in the amount of [less than 1 line of source text not declassified] to approximately 35 selected candidates running for Senate and Chamber of Deputies (Lower House) seats in the 7 March 1965 congressional election in Chile. Selection of these candidates is being made jointly with the Ambassador. Each candidate is involved in a close race with a candidate of the Communist-Socialist FRAP coalition and in some cases against undesirable extremist candidates of his own or other parties as well. This action is primarily a denial operation against the FRAP [2 lines of source text not declassified]. Candidates to be supported represent all non-FRAP parties, and support is for specific individuals rather than for parties. Funds will be passed covertly through several channels to ensure maximum security. The net result of this operation should be an increase in the overall ability of the Chilean Christian Democratic Party (PDC) to promote those activities needed to bring about necessary reforms and to reduce the effectiveness of the FRAP opposition.

2. Problem

To defeat those FRAP candidates who are in close competition with candidates from other parties in the 7 March congressional election. Secondary advantages to be obtained from this denial operation will be: (a) the defeat of troublesome members of non-FRAP parties who are running on the same party ticket with the more moderate, pro-U.S. candidates who receive our support [21⁄2 lines of source text not declassified].

3. Factors Bearing on the Problem

a. Significance of the Congressional Election

The March election will be the most important political event to take place in Chile in 1965 since its outcome will influence future political alignments and determine whether the Frei government can successfully carry out its reform program. Elective offices to be filled are all 147 seats in the Chamber of Deputies and 20 of the 45 Senate seats. The FRAP is trying to stage a comeback after its defeat in the September presidential elections, while the PDC, which is now a minority party with only four Senators and 28 Deputies, is hoping to obtain the congressional strength it will need to implement its reform program. Even if the Christian Democrats attain an election majority in the Chamber of Deputies they will still need the support of individuals in other parties to put through this program in the Senate. The Radical Party is badly split, and the moderate Radicals now in control of the party are being challenged by left-wing Radical candidates who are determined to swing the party into an alliance with the FRAP in opposition to the Frei government. A small dissident Socialist group which supported Frei in the presidential elections is running candidates under the label of the Democratic Party and is hoping to attract a portion of the electoral support of Socialists and other FRAP members who are dissatisfied with Communist domination of the FRAP coalition. The FRAP parties themselves were unable to reach a firm electoral agreement; in some districts there is an electoral pact whereby all FRAP coalition members are instructed to vote for one of the FRAP parties; in other districts the FRAP parties will be competing against each other.

b. Discussion

Since all political parties are participating in the March elections, we are not basing our support on a choice of one political faction, as was necessary in the presidential election where the campaign was clearly between the Christian Democrats and the Communists. The upcoming congressional races have been studied in great detail, electoral district by district, in order to select candidates of non-FRAP parties who need help in order to defeat their FRAP opponents and who have a good chance of success if they receive our support.

4. Coordination

This proposal has the approval of Ambassador Dungan, who has reviewed the list of proposed candidates and has agreed that covert support should be provided to most of them. The remaining candidates are under consideration and final selection will be made only with the approval of the Ambassador.

5. Recommendation

It is recommended that the amount of [less than 1 line of source text not declassified], which is available within the CIA, be used to provide covert support to selected candidates who are in close competition with FRAP contenders in the 7 March congressional elections in Chile./2/

/2/ Acting Deputy Under Secretary Thompson agreed to support the proposal on the understanding that Dungan would determine the amount of money actually spent. (Memorandum from Mann to Thompson, February 3; ibid.) The 303 Committee ratified this decision by telephonic vote on February 5. (Memorandum from Murat W. Williams to Mann, February 16; ibid.) On March 7 the Christian Democrats captured an absolute majority in the Chamber of Deputies and emerged as the strongest party in the Senate. In a March 11 memorandum, the CIA reported that Dungan had authorized [text not declassified] for 29 candidates, [text not declassified] of whom were subsequently elected. The Agency assessed the outcome as follows: "The landslide proportions of the Christian Democratsí congressional victory had not been expected by the Embassy or the CIA Station or, indeed, by President Frei himself. It is believed that Agency operations contributed modestly to the victory by insuring the defeat of some FRAP candidates who might otherwise have been elected and by helping to elect [less than 1 line of source text not declassified] Christian Democratic deputies which assured a working majority." (National Security Council, 303 Committee Files, Subject Files, Chile thru 1969)


278. Telegram From the Embassy in Ecuador to the Department of State/1/

Quito, May 7, 1965, 2040Z.

/1/ Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964-66, POL 7 US/HARRIMAN. Secret; Immediate. Repeated to Bogota, Santo Domingo, Caracas, Montevideo, Rio de Janeiro, Lima, Panama, Guatemala, Buenos Aires, USCINCSO, and USUN. Passed to the White House, DOD and CIA.

842. For President and SecState from Harriman./2/

/2/ On April 27 President Johnson sent U.S. Marines to intervene in the Dominican civil war. In response to criticism that he had acted unilaterally, the President sent Harriman to Latin America to explain the decision and seek support from other countries. Documentation on the Dominican crisis is in Foreign Relations, 1964-1968, volume XXXII.

During my brief visit to Santiago, GOC had made most thorough security arrangements through national police, lining streets where needed and protecting chancery and residence, as well as Presidentís palace. We were greeted with some derogatory shouts and clenched fists, at the same time a certain number of friendly waves.

President Frei with Foreign Minister Valdes received Dungan and myself shortly after my arrival for over two hours and a half talk, mostly in English with little translation. Therefore we were able to cover a wide range of subjects. Frei listened attentively to my explanation of situation in Santo Domingo which required President Johnsonís decision, with description of some vivid details of Communist take-over and atrocities. I emphasized that Communist subversion was now the dangerous aggression the hemisphere had to face and described Brazilian and Argentine ideas regarding necessity to expand permanent arrangements for rapid OAS peace keeping capability in order to avoid President being faced with necessity to take unilateral action in another crisis. I said that although he [Frei] appeared now to be out of sympathy with the Presidentís decision, I believed he would reverse his opinion when all the facts were in and applaud the courage and decisiveness of President Johnsonís action. In any event the immediate situation was being dealt with at USGís request through the OAS in both political and peace keeping fields. There appeared unanimous agreement in objective of creating stability which would permit Dominican people select government of their own choice. I asked for his full cooperation to this end.

Frei replied that he understood the Presidentís dilemma and reasons his decision, but hoped that the President would understand the political scene in Chile. Chile has the largest Communist Party in the hemisphere. He believed he could reduce its influence through his policies. Communists had led in attacking former ruling class privilege. He was convinced the way to eliminate Communist influence was his social and economic revolution which would achieve more for the people and out-do them in appeal. He recognized importance of private investment and took pride in sensible new arrangements with Anaconda and Kennecott, and also with American Foreign Power and International Telephone and Telegraph. His policies were pro-American. He had won the election with that plank [in] his platform. He had great admiration for President Johnsonís domestic program, but we had to understand Chile feared military dictatorship and military intervention as much as Communist subversion. Chile was getting along well today with civilian governments in Argentina and Peru whereas military dictatorship particularly in Argentina would reverse this situation and possible Argentine military intervention menace Chileís independence. He and his colleagues had worked hard to develop Christian Democratic Party. 20 years ago they only had 20 percent as many votes as the Communists whereas today Christian Democratic Party vote was five times as large as the Communists. American liberalism had given inspiration and courage to the CDP and he hoped that this liberal United States image would not now be blurred by military action or identification with and support of military regimes. The Communist issue was not as clear cut in Chile as in the United States and U.S. should be prepared to accept certain risks to maintain our liberal leadership. The Communists had helped awaken the people to oppose the status quo and had to be dealt with as part of the political scene in many L.A. countries. In Chile the Communists could be beaten through political action rather than military suppression. Frei expressed confidence that his program would succeed and thus Communist influence would fade. I interrupted to say that Communist danger was different in almost every country and the tactics in dealing with it had to be flexible.

After much discussion, he agreed. He pointed out that he could not jeopardize his own leadership and that of the CD Party by becoming involved in military intervention in D.R. He therefore could not support the OAS resolution and cannot send troops./3/ If he proposed it, he would be defeated in Congress and reduce his influence. In any event he obviously did not want to take this action. Dungan asked if he would send a medical unit. This he declined as any military unit, even medical, required congressional action. But when I pressed him to participate, mentioning Peruvian food shipment, he finally agreed to send relief supplies. I pressed him on the necessity for Chile, as representing constructive liberal force in L.A., to take an active part in helping solve Dominican situation, and urged him to send a representative in whom he had confidence to Santo Domingo to keep him informed of the true situation during coming months. He admitted that he had no confidence in his present Chargť and turning to Valdes told him to select someone promptly. Neither man had any suggestions of concrete action to be taken except to state that some reasonably representative government must be established soonest with elections to follow as soon as practicable. He had expressed no choice of factions. He did however refer to Bosch as "a coward remaining securely under American protection in Puerto Rico." He had had communications from Colonel Caamano but had no judgement of his position. I explained rebel isolated position in a small part of Santo Domingo and lack of control of other parts of the country. I said we must avoid unilateral political action in the recognition of any group as this was almost as bad as unilateral military action. He agreed and commented that we must await more information from Santo Domingo particularly the commissionís report./4/

/3/ The OAS voted on May 6 to establish an Inter-American Peace Force, a unit that augmented U.S. forces in the Dominican Republic with contingents from several member states. Chile was one of five countries to vote against the proposal. (Department of State Bulletin, May 31, 1965, pp. 854-869)

/4/ On May 1 the OAS voted to send a five-member committee to the Dominican Republic. The committee was instructed to seek a negotiated settlement and report its conclusions or recommendations. Chile abstained from the proposal. (Ibid., May 17, 1965, pp. 738-748)

As I took my leave Frei expressed hope that even though we had differed on D.R. situation, and might again disagree on tactics for achieving mutual objectives this would not affect warm friendship that existed between our two countries and intimate personal relationship he had with Dungan in Santiago. He expressed great confidence in Tomic and hoped he could develop similar relationship in Washington./5/

/5/ President Johnson and Mann reviewed Chileís role in the Dominican crisis on May 25: "Mr. Mann said that although the Mexicans voted against us, they did not lobby against us. The Chileans did, and they are the ones who hurt us. The President said he thought we should take a few siestas ourselves and go to sleep for a while on some of their requests. Mr. Mann said he could not agree more." The two men later discussed how to implement this policy: "Mr. Mann said that we would have to go slow but we should put a price tag on it without ever admitting this has anything to do with their actions. The President said that Mr. Mann should tell these people that he is doing his best, but people are upset and it is very, very difficult. Mr. Mann said he understood very well." (Johnson Library, Papers of Thomas C. Mann, Telephone Conversations with LBJ, May 2, 1965-June 2, 1966)

To Santiago for Dungan:

Since this written in Quito hope you will make such comments or additions you feel desirable./6/

/6/ Dunganís account of the meeting between Frei and Harriman was transmitted in telegrams 1722 and 1729 from Santiago, May 7 and 8, respectively. (Both in National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964-66, POL 7 US/HARRIMAN)



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