1964-1968, Volume XXXIII, Organization and Management of Foreign Policy; United Nations|
Released by the Office of the Historian
260. Editorial Note On February 14, 1967, Ramparts magazine published full-page advertisements in the New York Times and Washington Post announcing that its March issue would "document how CIA has infiltrated and subverted the world of American student leaders over the past fifteen years" through covert ties to the National Student Association. The same day both the Times and the Post devoted front-page stories to covert CIA funding of the National Student Association. The next day the wire services, enlarging on a story in the Washington Star, carried reports that CIA was covertly supporting other youth organizations operating abroad with funds channeled through foundations. On February 15 President Johnson appointed a committee to review the relationships between CIA and private U.S. voluntary organizations operating abroad. Composed of Under Secretary of State Katzenbach (Chairman); Secretary of Health, Education, and Welfare John W. Gardner; and Director of Central Intelligence Helms, the Katzenbach Committee (as it was known) recommended in its March 29 report to the President that it "be the policy of the United States Government that no federal agency shall provide any covert financial assistance or support, direct or indirect, to any of the nation's educational or private voluntary organizations." For text of the public report, see American Foreign Policy: Current Documents, 1967, pages 1214-1217. The report's notes and appendices, which were mostly classified and not made public, are in the Johnson Library, National Security File, Subject File, Ramparts-NSA-CIA. Upon receipt of the report, President Johnson stated: "I accept this committee's proposed statement of policy and am directing all agencies of the Government to implement it fully." (Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States: Lyndon B. Johnson, 1967, Book I, pages 403-404) For documentation concerning the Ramparts exposé and its aftermath, including implementation of the Katzenbach Committee's report and the review of coordination and policy approval for covert operations, see Documents 261, 263-265, 267, 269, and 272, and the following files: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files l967-69, POL 13-2 US; ibid., Katzenbach Files: Lot 74 D 271, CIA, Rusk CIA Committee, Report of the Committee, and Katzenbach Committee; Department of State, INR/IL Files, State-CIA Relations (1957-1968), NSC 5412 (1957-Basic Document), and 303 Committee; Johnson Library, National Security File, Subject File, Ramparts-NSA-CIA; ibid., Agency File, CIA; ibid., Confidential File, Oversized Attachments, 12/2/68, re U.S. Government and Private Voluntary Organizations; National Security Council, Special Group/303 Committee Files, Minutes for 1967; and Central Intelligence Agency, Executive Registry, Job 80-R01580R, Katzenbach Committee Report, and NSA. In his memoir, Facing Reality: From World Federalism to the CIA (New York: Harper & Row, 1980) pages 85-109, Cord Meyer, Jr., recounts the background of the Ramparts exposé and its consequences from his perspective as Chief of CIA's Covert Action Staff and, after July 1967, as Assistant Deputy Director for Plans. 261. Memorandum From the Deputy Director of the Bureau of Intelligence and Research (Denney) to the Deputy Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs (Kohler)
260. Editorial Note
On February 14, 1967, Ramparts magazine published full-page advertisements in the New York Times and Washington Post announcing that its March issue would "document how CIA has infiltrated and subverted the world of American student leaders over the past fifteen years" through covert ties to the National Student Association. The same day both the Times and the Post devoted front-page stories to covert CIA funding of the National Student Association. The next day the wire services, enlarging on a story in the Washington Star, carried reports that CIA was covertly supporting other youth organizations operating abroad with funds channeled through foundations.
On February 15 President Johnson appointed a committee to review the relationships between CIA and private U.S. voluntary organizations operating abroad. Composed of Under Secretary of State Katzenbach (Chairman); Secretary of Health, Education, and Welfare John W. Gardner; and Director of Central Intelligence Helms, the Katzenbach Committee (as it was known) recommended in its March 29 report to the President that it "be the policy of the United States Government that no federal agency shall provide any covert financial assistance or support, direct or indirect, to any of the nation's educational or private voluntary organizations." For text of the public report, see American Foreign Policy: Current Documents, 1967, pages 1214-1217. The report's notes and appendices, which were mostly classified and not made public, are in the Johnson Library, National Security File, Subject File, Ramparts-NSA-CIA. Upon receipt of the report, President Johnson stated: "I accept this committee's proposed statement of policy and am directing all agencies of the Government to implement it fully." (Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States: Lyndon B. Johnson, 1967, Book I, pages 403-404)
For documentation concerning the Ramparts exposé and its aftermath, including implementation of the Katzenbach Committee's report and the review of coordination and policy approval for covert operations, see Documents 261, 263-265, 267, 269, and 272, and the following files: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files l967-69, POL 13-2 US; ibid., Katzenbach Files: Lot 74 D 271, CIA, Rusk CIA Committee, Report of the Committee, and Katzenbach Committee; Department of State, INR/IL Files, State-CIA Relations (1957-1968), NSC 5412 (1957-Basic Document), and 303 Committee; Johnson Library, National Security File, Subject File, Ramparts-NSA-CIA; ibid., Agency File, CIA; ibid., Confidential File, Oversized Attachments, 12/2/68, re U.S. Government and Private Voluntary Organizations; National Security Council, Special Group/303 Committee Files, Minutes for 1967; and Central Intelligence Agency, Executive Registry, Job 80-R01580R, Katzenbach Committee Report, and NSA.
In his memoir, Facing Reality: From World Federalism to the CIA (New York: Harper & Row, 1980) pages 85-109, Cord Meyer, Jr., recounts the background of the Ramparts exposé and its consequences from his perspective as Chief of CIA's Covert Action Staff and, after July 1967, as Assistant Deputy Director for Plans.
261. Memorandum From the Deputy Director of the Bureau of Intelligence and Research (Denney) to the Deputy Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs (Kohler)/1/
Washington, February 15, 1967.
/1/Source: Department of State, INR/IL Files, 303 Committee, Jan-June 1967. Secret. Drafted by Denney and William McAfee of INR/DDC. The memorandum is an unsigned copy.
Directives on Covert Operations. NSC Directive 5412/2/ provides for the coordination of covert operations abroad such as subsidizing student organizations, newspapers, labor unions or political parties, and establishing proprietary business organizations. It was required that CIA coordinate all such activities with the Department. INR/DDC is the unit in State through which these operations are to be coordinated.
/2/See footnote 5, Document 263.
Directives on Clandestine Collection.NSCID 5,/3/ originally approved in the late 1950's, provided for notification to the Ambassador on clandestine collection activities after consultation with the Secretary of State, but despite this directive such notification took place only in rare circumstances. President Kennedy's letter of May 29, 1961/4/ made clear the Ambassador's responsibility for all activities of all US agencies abroad and CIA on August 10, 1961/5/ instructed its station chiefs to provide the Ambassador information on clandestine collection activities so he could judge the political risks. Normally, the State Department remains uninformed, and the question of principle as to CIA's obligation to inform the Department remains unsettled, though the Department has not for at least 4 years sought to force the issue.
/3/See footnote 3, Document 221.
/4/Printed in American Foreign Policy: Current Documents, 1961, pp. 1345-1347.
/5/See footnote 3, Document 243.
Necessities if State policy guidance is to be adequate.Adequacy of review on either covert operations or clandestine collection activities requires the following: 1. Provision by CIA of enough detail not only on the general purpose of an operation but on how it is to be carried out. 2. Timely notification i.e. well ahead of 303 or other meetings in which approvals are given. 3. Regular status reports on programs underway. 4. Full information and below the 7th floor level, i.e. INR/DDC, to insure appropriate working level coordination and staffing of proposals for the benefit of 7th floor.
Adequacy of Review Procedures for Clandestine Operations (5412)
Current procedures on 303 Committee items are not too bad except for shortness of time for staffing. INR has been concerned about what may be a trend by CIA officers to bypass INR in the Department to clear operations on a piecemeal basis with Country Directors or Assistant Secretaries. On some of these we lack adequate detail on how certain programs are to be carried out and we lack continuing review of major ongoing programs in the light of changing circumstances. The NSA story is an example.
1. Propose in the 303 Committee a detailed substantive review of current programs under CIA/DDP jurisdiction.
2. Reissue in revised form the March 16, 1956 directive from the Secretary on Special Procedures within the Department for Handling 5412 Operations. The original document is attached./6/
/6/Not attached, but a copy is in the Department of State, INR/IL Files, State-CIA Relations, 1957-1968.
3. Notify CIA through the 303 Committee of the tightening up of Departmental procedures for the handling of 5412 activities and request that their contacts with State conform to the directive.
Adequacy Clandestine Collection Review Procedures. Field coordination is not bad, although there is nearly always a current glaring exception. [8 lines of source text not declassified]
1. A new reminder to CIA that the President's letter requires notification to the Ambassador on collection activities which might have political impact.
2. CIA has not admitted to a responsibility for clearing important clandestine collection activities in Washington. It is not easy to draw the line in these cases but we think the principle should be agreed and that we should undertake a process of developing adequate clearance procedures.
Chairmanship of the 303 Committee
Should the question of 303 chairmanship be reopened? When Mr. Bundy left the White House there was a period of doubt on the question. Since then Presidential directive establishing the SIG and the IRG's has placed greater responsibility for policy guidance on the Department.
Other issues which might be thought about while NSA flap directs high level attention to CIA
1. Should State seek to review all or parts of the CIA budget? Bureau of the Budget officers charged with such duties have discussed with INR the inadequacies of the present system. No proposal for change has, however, come from BOB.
2. [3 lines of source text not declassified]
3. Should State seek review of DOD clandestine activities, rather than rely on the present system in which the DCI is supposed to coordinate DOD activities?
4. How much of CIA's usefulness in the clandestine field has been impaired? Is it time for a new agency? For decentralization of such activities for existing agencies? For parallel actions by increasing confidential funds of existing agencies?
262. Editorial Note
On February 18, 1967, President's Special Assistant Rostow forwarded to the President copies of minutes of 303 Committee meetings that referred to "CIA connections with support for youth and student groups." Noting in his covering memorandum that the last reference was December 3, 1964, Rostow observed that "the basic work of the 303 Committee is to examine new programs; although, in the period I have been here, I have asked for reexamination of certain programs when current issues arose." For text of the memorandum and attachments, see Foreign Relations, 1964-1968, volume X, Document 171.
In a February 24 memorandum to the 303 Committee, Peter Jessup proposed that the committee "reexamine the criteria under which the 303 Committee approves of future, current, and long-standing projects." Jessup continued: "Rather than examine each and every project of the type presently under public scrutiny, the committee should, at the earliest opportunity, give its attention to those activities which are recommended for continuation. The committee in the future should at no time approve an umbrella of projects or extensive programs in principle but should pass on each subordinate proposal which has an allocation of funds." Jessup noted that the committee had been briefed several times on youth and student activities prior to 1965 but that "since that time-some 26 months ago-the subject has not again been raised except indirectly" on July 8, 1966. In concluding his memorandum, Jessup stated: "The Executive Secretary will undertake in the immediate future to reexamine all existing approvals to see if there are any projects 'coasting' on earlier approvals. We should try to examine each continuing project no less frequently than once a year." (National Security Council, Special Group/303 Committee Files, Minutes)
At the 303 Committee meeting on May 5, Rostow "asked that the committee undertake its top-to-bottom review of projects on a steady basis between now and December and with first consideration due to those efforts which have a direct Katzenbach Committee connotation. This would include those which might eventually be transferred, terminated, or whose status results in any current ambiguity." (Minutes of 303 Committee Meeting; ibid.)
263. Paper Prepared by the Central Intelligence Agency/1/
Washington, February 23, 1967.
/1/Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Katzenbach Files: Lot 74 D 271, Report of the Committee. Secret; Sensitive. The paper was prepared for the Katzenbach Committee (see Document 260) and was Appendix C to the committee's report but was not made public.
COORDINATION AND POLICY APPROVAL OF COVERT OPERATIONS
A. Historical Evolution
1. The first formal authority for what is now called "covert action" in the post-World War II era was the National Security Council (NSC) directive NSC 4-A, which was approved on 19 December 1947./2/ Without elaborating coordination procedures, it directed the Director of Central Intelligence to undertake covert action and to ensure that the resulting operations were consistent with U.S. policy. The DCI was to ensure through liaison with State and Defense that operations were consistent with U.S. policy.
/2/For text, see Michael Warner, ed., The CIA under Harry Truman, pp. 173-175.
2. NSC 4-A was refined and superseded by the issuance on 18 June 1948 of a new NSC directive, NSC 10/2./3/ This defined more clearly the aims and methods of covert action and spelled out with more precision the procedures for ensuring that covert operations conducted under it were consistent with U.S. foreign and military policies. "Designated representatives" of the Secretaries of State and Defense comprised the "Senior Consultants," or "10/2 Panel," which included civilian representatives of State and Defense and a military representative of the JCS. These Senior Consultants met with the Assistant Director for Policy Coordination, the CIA office responsible at that time for planning and conducting covert operations, and reviewed proposed new covert projects to be conducted by CIA.
/3/For text, see ibid., pp. 213-216.
3. NSC 10/2 was further refined and superseded by the issuance on 23 October 1951 of NSC directive NSC 10/5./4/ This new directive authorized an expansion of world-wide covert operations and changed policy coordination procedures. The Psychological Strategy Board, which had been established on 4 April 1951, was charged with determining the "desirability and feasibility" of proposed covert programs and major covert projects. A new and expanded "10/5 Panel" was established, comprising the members of the earlier 10/2 Panel but adding staff representatives of the Psychological Strategy Board (PSB). It functioned much as the 10/2 Panel had, but the resulting procedures proved cumbersome and potentially insecure. Accordingly, when the PSB was replaced by the Operations Coordination Board (OCB) on 2 September 1953, coordination of covert operations reverted to a smaller group identical with the former 10/2 Panel, without OCB staff participation.
/4/For text, see ibid., pp. 437-439.
4. There subsequently was some retrogression toward the broader 10/5 Panel principle. On 15 March 1954, the issuance of NSC 5412,/5/ which superseded NSC 10/5, required that the DCI consult with the OCB and with other U.S. Government departments and agencies as appropriate to ensure that covert operations were consistent with U.S. policies. NSC 5412/1, which superseded NSC 5412 on 12 March 1955, directed the DCI to consult with the Planning and Coordination Group (PCG) of the OCB and made the PCG the "normal channel" for the policy approval of covert operations. (In March 1955, the DCI briefed the PCG of the OCB on those CIA covert action operations which he had previously approved under NSC 4-A, 10/2, 10/5, and 5412.)
/5/NSC Directives 5412, 5412/1, and 5412/2, and the annex to 5412/2 are at the Eisenhower Library, Special Assistant for National Security Affairs Records. NSC Directive 5412/2 and its annex are printed in William Leary, ed., The Central Intelligence Agency: History and Documents (Tuscaloosa: University of Alabama Press, 1984), pp. 146-149.
5. Covert coordination procedures reverted once more to a smaller and a more streamlined coordinative group with the issuance on 28 December 1955 of NSC 5412/2, superseding NSC 5412/1. NSC 5412/2 has remained in force up to the present. It removed the policy coordination and approval functions from the OCB and transferred them to "designated representatives" of the President and the Secretaries of State and Defense to meet with the DCI as the "normal channel" for policy approval of covert operations. The coordinative body came to be known as the "5412/2 Designated Representatives" or the "Special Group." It comprised (and comprises) representatives of the rank of Assistant Secretary or above. It was charged with reviewing in advance all major covert programs initiated by CIA or otherwise directed.
6. NSC 5412/2 coordinative procedures were slightly modified on 26 March 1957 with the issuance of an annex to the directive. The annex authorized approval solely by the Secretary of State of particularly sensitive projects that did not have military implications. This special authorization has not been utilized to date. It also required, however, that CIA keep the Departments of State and Defense advised on progress in implementing all approved covert action programs.
7. With the inauguration of the Kennedy Administration in early 1961, the Special Group (which changed its name to the "303 Committee" in June 1964 in accordance with NSAM 303)/6/ meetings were transferred to the White House under the chairmanship of the President's Special Assistant for National Security Affairs. (This was first McGeorge Bundy, then General Maxwell Taylor, then back to Bundy, and finally to Walt Rostow, the present chairman.) Prior to early 1961, the State Department member had been the "informal" chairman.
/6/See Documents 203 and 204.
B. Policy Doctrine
1. From the brief description of the evolution of coordination and approval procedures affecting covert operations, it is apparent that prior to March 1955, the governing NSC directives (5412, 10/5 and 10/2) provided for consultation with representatives of State and Defense but these individuals had no approval functions; nor did they include a representative of the President. Many of CIA's continuing covert action projects and programs were therefore begun when responsibility for policy conformity rested with the DCI in accordance with existing NSC directives. These projects and programs were in general discussion with State and Defense representatives, but the representatives were not called upon--nor were they authorized--to take affirmative action. (Normal Bureau of the Budget review procedures, of course, represented a measure of outside Executive control.) During this period certain decisions involving vital interests of the U.S. were, of course, referred to the President at the initiative of the DCI.
2. Even under NSC 5412/2, particularly in the early years (1955-1958), criteria governing submission of projects to the Special Group were never clearly defined, being left to the discretion of the DCI. During these early years, however, a considerable body of policy doctrine was established, which has been followed ever since.
3. At the beginning of 1959, regular weekly meetings of the Special Group were instituted, with one result that criteria for submission of projects to the Group were in practice considerably broadened.
4. Not until CIA's own internal instruction, dated 4 March 1963,/7/ on Special Group submissions, however, did the criteria for submissions become more formal and precise. The 1963 CIA directive noted that the decision to submit an operational program or activity to the Special Group would be made by the DCI, and that political sensitivity would usually be the chief criterion for submission. The instruction also noted that where unusually large sums of money are involved, the DCI may decide to submit a program or activity on the grounds of funds alone. The instruction detailed the following types of programs or activities which, as a general rule, require Special Group action:
Political and propaganda action programs involving direct or indirect action to influence or support political parties, groups or specific political leaders, including operations which use labor, youth, students, and influential military organizations as political pressure groups.
Economic action programs designed to influence governments to support U.S. national policy objectives, or to prevent Bloc countries from obtaining some strategic politico-economic advantage in countries or areas of importance to U.S. global strategy.
Paramilitary action programs.
CIA clandestine and covert action annexes to U.S. Country Internal Defense Plans.
The instruction also dealt with cases requiring resubmission to the Special Group: where there is need for a new policy determination or to reaffirm the previous policy decisions; when developments or changes are such as to make the subject a matter for re-examination by the Group; and if specifically required by the Special Group in its approval of the program or activity.
5. These criteria have remained unchanged in subsequent CIA internal directives.
C. Comparative Numerical Approvals of CIA Proposals
1. Statistical reflection of the action of approval authority on CIA programs early in its life are difficult to offer on a comparative basis because of the steady refinement of "programs" into individual "projects", but the best recapitulation available shows:
a. Projects approved by DCI on internal authority:
b. Projects approved by DCI in coordination with Operations Coordination Board or Psychological Strategy Board:
c. Projects approved or reconfirmed by Operations Coordination Board, the Special Group or 303 Committee:
2. As the sophistication of the policy approval process developed so did the participation of the external approving authority. Since establishment of the Special Group (later 303 Committee), the policy arbiters have questioned CIA presentations, amended them and, on occasion, denied them outright. The record shows that the Group/Committee, in some instances, has over-ridden objections from the DCI and instructed the Agency to carry out certain activities.
[Omitted here are discussion of specific proposals that were turned down, and section D on special briefings of BOB, White House, and other officials.]
E. State Department Coordination
1. Newly-appointed principal State Department officers and outgoing ambassadors are briefed in depth by CIA Headquarters officials on broad objectives and CIA's activities within the country. Shortly after an Ambassador arrives at his post, the CIA Chief of Station gives him a detailed and specific briefing on the Agency's covert action activities in the country. Covert action matters growing out of CIA's responsibilities under NSC directives provide for full participation and review by State Department and Ambassadors in the formulation of specific programs, with the decision on them being made at appropriate policy levels. In the field, this means full details on the substance and objectives of the activity, and, depending upon circumstances, clandestine means and methods to the extent that they are related directly to the substance of the activity. The purpose is to allow the Ambassador to judge the desirability of the program and inherent political risks. Instructions to Agency field stations with respect to CIA's field coordination with Ambassadors are frequently re-stated, the latest in January 1966./8/
2. CIA representatives participate in the mission Country Team meetings and are often requested to draft proposals for forwarding to Washington for policy review and approval, especially in the fields of internal security and covert action.
3. All 303 Committee programs or activities are coordinated with the Ambassador, as well as the Assistant Secretary of State of the area concerned. This coordination process has to be accomplished before the proposal is submitted to the 303 Committee. A number of approved programs or activities originate with the Ambassadors or the Department of State. 303 Committee proposals and other covert action matters are discussed between CIA Area Division Chiefs and their State Department counterpart Assistant Secretaries at regular, usually weekly, informal meetings.
264. Memorandum From the Deputy Director for Plans of the Central Intelligence Agency (FitzGerald) to All Staff Chiefs and Division Chiefs/1/
Washington, April 14, 1967.
/1/Source: Central Intelligence Agency, DDO/IMS Files, Job 78-06423A, US Govt-State Dept. Secret.
The following guidelines will apply for CS operations in the light of the Katzenbach Report,/2/ the next couple of years:
/2/See Document 260.
1. The most sensitive area is that of U.S. educational institutions and U.S. students. Where absolutely necessary, contracts with U.S. universities may be made for research and other similar specific services either (a) overtly by the Agency, or (b) using the Department of Defense or a commercial entity as a cut-out. These contracts should be kept at an absolute minimum. If necessary and as a result of university rules, grants may be substituted for such contracts.
2. Although the basic rule is that any consenting adult may be used by the Agency, we should be particularly careful to exclude, wherever possible, U.S. students and U.S. university professors. If, in the recruitment process, any reluctance is shown on the part of the individual, drop the matter. This does not bar such relationships completely but very thoughtful consideration should be given before any approach is made to anyone within the student or professorial category. Any such arrangements must be passed on by the DDP.
3. We will, under no circumstances, publish books, magazines or newspapers in the U.S. Fallout in the U.S. from a foreign publication which we support is inevitable and consequently permissible. Should a defector publish a book in the U.S., he may do so on his own; publication will not be supported by CIA.
4. Covert relations with commercial U.S. organizations are not barred.
[1 paragraph (3 lines of source text) not declassified]
6. "Twilight Zone" voluntary organizations, such as the Rand Corporation, Rotary, etc., are barred. This includes trade or professional associations.
When dealing on the edges of the Katzenbach rulings, and within the above guidelines, we should always pay particular heed to the price of disclosure, including careful consideration of the sensitivities of individuals involved.
When there is any doubt concerning the application of these guidelines--and there should be, often--consult with the DDP.
The following specific projects which fall in the gray area will have to be taken to the 303 Committee as soon as possible:
[6 paragraphs (7 lines of source text) not declassified]
The Katzenbach Committee, in reviewing our CA program, decided that certain of our activities must be discontinued and others must be transferred from CIA to public or legitimate private funding or, in some instances, a mix of public-private funding. Terminations and transfers must be accomplished, largely, by 31 December 1967. Each component will be provided with a specific listing of activities under its control which fall within the above guidelines.
265. Editorial Note
In an April 17, 1967, memorandum to Thomas Hughes, Director of the Department of State's Bureau of Intelligence and Research, William McAfee of INR summarized the results of a survey of covert operations considered during 1966 by the 303 Committee and by the periodic meetings of regional Assistant Secretaries with their CIA counterparts: "The records [of INR's Deputy Director for Coordination] indicate that 87 covert operations of the type covered under NSC 5412 were considered during 1966. Of these, 34 were discussed in 15 303 Committee meetings; 46 were discussed in 110 Assistant Secretaries' meetings; 7 were reported by CIA as undertaken unilaterally (NSC 5412 provides that the Director of Central Intelligence must obtain the concurrence of State and Defense for major operations). Of the 87 operations, 9 were disapproved, 1 was redirected to a non-CIA action, and 23 were postponed, remanded for further study, noted, or abandoned."
Among McAfee's conclusions were the following: "Proposals for covert action are carefully weighed, and prudently decided upon. The present procedure is very far from a rubber-stamp process. However, proposals are sometimes made by CIA on very short notice to the 303 Committee, with little or no opportunity for thorough staff work in State"; and "There was very little review of on-going projects, other than those proposed for extension." (Department of State, INR Files, CA-Coordination & Review)
In an August 24, 1967, memorandum, William Truehart, Deputy Director for Coordination, Bureau of Intelligence and Research, reviewed procedures for approving small scale covert operations: "According to NSC 5412/2, paragraph 7, all major covert operations are normally to be approved by designated representatives of the Secretaries of State and Defense and a representative of the President. Thus 303 Committee action is not mandatory in all cases. In practice, CIA has sometimes checked out small covert action proposals in meetings with regional assistant secretaries or their deputies, which are also attended by officers of the Operations Staff of INR/DDC. Sometimes CIA has simply gone ahead on the recommendation of the Chief of Mission and Station Chief. The [less than 1 line of source text not declassified] limitation mentioned by Mr. Helms in the August 22 [303 Committee] discussion has been the usual yardstick of small scale, but political sensitivity has also been considered. In recent months, CIA has appeared to bring most if not all proposed covert operations to the regional meetings; here it has sometimes been decided to approve them without 303 Committee action as not major, and at other times to refer them to 303 Committee for approval." Truehart's memorandum then proposed a change in procedures for approving small scale covert operations. Intended for Deputy Under Secretary for Political Affairs Kohler, the memorandum was prepared but not forwarded. (Ibid., 303 Committee, July-Dec 1967)
266. Memorandum From the Director of the Bureau of Intelligence and Research (Hughes) to the Deputy Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs (Kohler)/1/
Washington, April 17, 1967.
/1/Source: Department of State, INR/IL Files, CA-Coordination and Review. Top Secret; Sensitive. The memorandum is an unsigned copy marked "Number 3 of 6 copies, Series A."
As we agreed orally, INR has drafted a revision of NSC 5412 which is attached (Tab A), in response to Walt Rostow's memorandum of March 29, 1967./2/
/2/Tab A is printed below. Rostow's memorandum to Rusk stated: "In view of the President's acceptance of the Katzenbach Committee report on CIA covert support of private organizations, we should proceed promptly to revise the now outdated National Security Council Paper 5412/2, dated December 28, 1955." (Johnson Library, NSAMs, NSAM 303)
I also attach a question-and-answer sheet discussing the changes in the draft, as compared with NSC 5412 (Tab B), and a tabular comparison of the texts of both versions (Tab C)./3/
/3/Tabs B and C are attached but not printed.
As stated in Tab B, there would appear to be four reasons for revising NSC 5412:
a. To make its language accord with the text and spirit of the report of the President's Review Committee;
b. To deal more explicitly with the risks, consequences, and alternatives of covert operations;
c. To plug loopholes;
d. To get rid of anachronistic cold-war language.
There are admittedly disadvantages to undertaking a revision. A good deal of discussion and inter-agency negotiation will be necessary, probably in an amount disproportionate to the objective. On balance, however, I think it would be advisable to try it. At least twice before, revisions of NSC 5412 were seriously considered. Not to revise it now, when the whole question of covert operations is under review in public as well as in private, might be hard to explain at some later time. Moreover, there seems to be no more promising time to make needed revisions./4/
/4/NSC Directive 5412 was not revised during the Johnson administration.
I realize that, as pointed out in the 303 meeting on April 7, CIA's platter is rather full at the moment. I would therefore suggest that we consider handing copies of the attached draft to Walt Rostow, Cy Vance, and Dick Helms, suggesting that it be discussed at a convenient future time.
1. Covert operations are defined as actions in furtherance of United States foreign policy which are so planned and executed (a) that United States Government responsibility for them will not be revealed, and (b) that if revealed, the United States Government could plausibly disclaim any responsibility for them. Excluded from this definition are armed conflict by recognized military forces, espionage and counter-espionage, and cover and deception for military operations.
2. The United States Government has undertaken covert operations as a necessary response to covert operations by major hostile powers, or the threat of such operations. Nevertheless, covert operations involve varying degrees of contradiction to basic legal and social principles. They therefore carry the serious long-term risk of eroding or negating these principles, which are fundamental to the achievement of long-range United States objectives.
3. It is therefore United States policy to keep covert operations to an irreducible minimum, and to undertake a covert operation only when it is determined, after careful consideration, that the prospective results (a) are essential to national security or national interests; (b) are of such value as significantly to outweigh the risks, both immediate and long-term; and (c) cannot be effectively obtained in any other way.
4. A Special Group is established under the National Security Council to approve and review covert operations, acting on the basis of unanimity. The Special Group shall consist of the Secretaries of State and Defense, or representatives designated by them; a representative of the President designated by him; and the Director of the Central Intelligence Agency. The Director of the Bureau of the Budget participates in periodic reviews of operations in progress, and may participate in other Special Group proceedings.
5. The Special Group shall specifically approve each covert operation before it is undertaken, review and evaluate each operation at not less than twelve-month intervals, and note (or may direct) its termination or its conversion to a less sensitive form of action, with the following exceptions:
a. The Special Group may delegate to representatives of any two of its members, of the rank of Deputy Assistant Secretary or above, its responsibilities with respect to minor covert operations under guidelines it establishes. All decisions reached by such representatives shall be promptly reported to the Special Group.
b. The Secretary of State may approve a particularly sensitive project which has no military implications. The fact of such approval shall be reported to the Special Group, as well as the termination of the operation so approved.
6. Under the authority of Section 102(d)(5) of the National Security Act of 1947, the Director of the Central Intelligence Agency shall be responsible for planning, conducting, and terminating covert operations which are approved by the Special Group of the National Security Council. He will provide the Special Group with all information concerning such operations that the Group deems necessary to its responsibilities. In exceptional circumstances, such as those in paragraph 7, covert operations may be assigned by the Special Group to the Secretary of Defense.
7. In theaters of war or areas in which United States armed forces are engaged in combat operations, (a) the Secretary of Defense shall assure that plans for covert operations are in consonance with and complementary to approved war plans of the Joint Chiefs of Staff; and (b) the conduct of covert operations will be under command and control relationships approved by the Secretary of Defense.
8. The Special Group may authorize an agency of the United States Government, other than the Central Intelligence Agency, to conduct an operation in support of national interests or national security without disclosing Government responsibility. The proposed operation must be such that overt Government sponsorship would largely negate its expected benefits, but at the same time must be of such nature that disclosure of Government responsibility would not be a significant embarrassment to the United States. Approval, review, and appraisal of each non-disclosed operation shall be either by the Special Group itself or by delegation in the same way as provided in Paragraph 5a above. The executing agency shall provide the Special Group with all information concerning such operation that the Group deems necessary to its responsibilities.
9. The Chief and Deputy Chief of each diplomatic mission shall be informed in advance of covert and non-disclosed operations affecting the country or organization to which they are accredited, and shall be kept informed on such operations until they are terminated, unless the Special Group determines otherwise.
10. The Director of Central Intelligence will recommend to the Special Group the procedures needed to ensure that the security of covert operations is maintained. Members of the Special Group will take special precautions in their respective agencies so that only those employees who must know are informed of each covert operation or have access to documents concerning it.
11. The Director of the Bureau of the Budget will assist the Special Group in arranging the financing of covert and non-disclosed operations.
12. No federal agency shall provide any covert assistance or support, direct or indirect, to any of the nation's educational or private voluntary organizations, except in individual cases specifically approved by the Special Group and by the Secretaries of State and Defense in unusual contingencies where overriding national security interests so require, and where open sources of support are shown to be unavailable. In no event shall any future exception be approved which involves any educational, philanthropic, or cultural organization.
13. This directive does not modify the responsibilities of the Secretaries of State and Defense and of the Director of Central Intelligence under existing laws and Presidential directives. NSC 5412/2, December 28, 1955, with the associated Memorandum and Annex of March 26, 1957, and NSAM 303 of June 4, 1964, are rescinded./5/ The Special Group shall exercise its responsibilities over all continuing covert operations approved under these or other previous directives.
/5/See footnotes 5 and 6, Document 263.
267. Editorial Note
From 11:10 a.m. to noon on May 5, 1967, a meeting was held in Secretary of State Rusk's office to discuss "actions which should be taken concerning covert operations and clandestine activities, in the light of recent disclosures of CIA involvements." Present were Rusk, Katzenbach, Kohler, and four members of the Bureau of Intelligence and Research: Director Hughes, Deputy Director Denney, Robert McAfee, and Donald Macdonald. The latter prepared a memorandum of the conversation on May 9. (Department of State, INR/IL Files, State-CIA Relations, 1957-1968; Johnson Library, Rusk Appointment Book for time and date of meeting)
Following some "initial general discussion," Rusk "said there was need for far-reaching policy discussion. For example, he thought that in the countries with whom we are close friends, we should be doing only those things we would allow them to do with us. Mr. Hughes noted the particular problem of CIA contacts with opposition leaders: should these contacts be retained when the opposition became the government? The Secretary spoke of the need to take some action on these issues." Hughes then "listed a number of examples of recent problems" and, upon concluding, "noted that the press had been aware of many operations, but had been sitting on the story before Ramparts blew it. There was a change of climate, and a de-stabilizing effect on the consciences of writers and others. Mr. Katzenbach noted that the CIA had been 'hardlining' so long that such publicity bothered them less than it did us."
Hughes then "noted that excellent personal working relations existed between CIA and INR, despite INR's burden of representing both sides." A general discussion of the "relative concerns of State and CIA" ensued, following which Hughes indicated "that he was not saying necessarily that for State to be fully informed of covert operations and clandestine activities would eliminate the risks. The Secretary noted the need to ensure that if we take risks we take them consciously. Mr. Katzenbach added that the risks should be worth taking," and Hughes agreed. "Hughes then briefed the results of the INR/DDC survey of 1966 5412 cases" (see Document 265), noting that "support to international activities of voluntary organizations had always been an exception to the normal procedures. He pointed out the problems of considering 5412 actions--how to weigh them and budget them." He observed that "when CIA made payments for information, such cases did not go through the 303 procedure at all" and "we don't know how much of this happens. Many cases which 'blow' are clandestine intelligence situations."
"As for inter-agency relations, Mr. Hughes said that some matters were procedural and mechanical, but the problem was basically a state of mind. He noted the CIA predilection for dealing directly with the policy officers. Although the CIA had acknowledged responsibility to inform Ambassadors of clandestine activities, the Department is as usual not informed, although NSCID 5 called for consulting the Secretary of State. The Secretary said that when he saw Foreign Ministers and other officials, he should know as much as the ministers themselves about their involvements with the U.S. Government. Mr. Hughes pointed out that the CIA quoted statutory authority to support its position on clandestine activities. The Secretary observed that there was no need to be paralyzed by statutory authority; that there was no activity touching on foreign affairs that he did not feel authorized to inquire into. Mr. Hughes said there was a question as to how much the Ambassador and others should know about involvements with high officials. This would require a revision in the NSC directive. The Secretary observed that not all Ambassadors should know everything. He didn't want to generalize about this subject in any direction."
"At the conclusion of the meeting it was agreed that the Secretary would see Mr. Helms alone, after which the same group would meet again to discuss the problem further." Rusk met alone in his office with Director of Central Intelligence Helms on May 20, but no record of the discussion has been found. No record has been found of a follow-up meeting of the same group.
268. Memorandum From the Chairman of the President's Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board (Clifford) to President Johnson/1/
Washington, July 20, 1967.
/1/Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1967-69, INT 8 US. Confidential. An attached September 21 memorandum from Rostow to Secretaries Rusk and McNamara requests comments on the report. Reaction to the conclusions and proposals are in memoranda prepared by Director of Central Intelligence Helms, Deputy Director of the Bureau of Intelligence and Research George Denney, Jr., Director of the National Security Agency Carter, and Deputy Secretary of Defense Nitze. (Johnson Library, National Security File, NSAMs, NSAM 368)
This is the second report submitted by your Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board concerning the serious problem faced by U.S. intelligence agencies in physically handling the huge volume of intelligence information which is collected, stored, drawn upon, digested, analyzed and disseminated within the Government on a continuing basis.
In June 1965 you approved the Board's preliminary recommendations/2/ for action to resolve this information-handling problem, including (1) the establishment of specialized training programs for personnel of the intelligence agencies, and (2) an experimental, inter-agency system utilizing computers for the storage of intelligence information accessible to user agencies at remote locations over secure communications circuits. Over the past two years the Board has followed closely the implementation of these recommendations, and we are pleased to report that the beginnings of progress are being made by the member agencies of the U.S. intelligence community. However, we find that much more must be done.
/2/Dated June 15, 1965. (Ibid.)
The third recommendation of our report of two years ago, which you also approved, called for a broad study of the information-handling problem by a select panel of outside experts in related scientific fields, under the joint sponsorship of the Board and the Director of the Office of Science and Technology, Dr. Donald F. Hornig. This study, which was completed recently, included a thorough examination of all aspects of the information-handling problem confronting the intelligence agencies of our Government./3/ Based on our review of this study, supplemented by an independent review of the subject by the Board's Communications Panel, we have reached the following conclusions:
/3/The study has not been found.
1. Although individual agencies have taken noteworthy steps to improve their information-handling capabilities, the problem is not being addressed adequately on a concerted community-wide basis.
2. In recent years there has evolved a steady and tremendous growth in the input and output of intelligence information within and among the agencies making up the U.S. intelligence community. (As examples of the volume of intelligence input, one agency makes 30 copies of incoming reports from overseas posts; another agency distributes copies of incoming documentary messages to more than 200 different recipients; and a third agency's yearly total of 125,000 incoming reports is distributed in almost 5 million copies. The output of digested intelligence adding to the "information explosion" is illustrated by the Central Intelligence Agency's production of 35 million pages in 1965, representing more than a two-fold increase in four years. The immensity of the reservoir of intelligence information is indicated by the estimated total of 300 million documents, reports and other items of intelligence information which are on hand, and which require the services of over 7,000 people engaged in the handling of this store of material at a cost of around $100 million a year.)
3. The U.S. intelligence community has not yet exploited modern methods and technologies for information-handling, including automation techniques, as promptly or as widely as could be done to meet the problem, except for some significant steps taken by individual U.S. agencies. (As one example of this deficiency in the intelligence community as a whole, the current systems for handling and processing biographics intelligence files are inadequate in the following ways: (a) large numbers of duplicative biographics files are maintained by various member agencies of the intelligence community (b) in most cases these duplicative files have been inadequately cross-checked (c) there are differing procedures among agencies, and even within agencies, with respect to such fundamental matters as the organization, updating, and formats used in maintaining the files (d) as presently constituted the biographics files of the various agencies do not satisfy the needs of intelligence analysts with respect to prompt availability, completeness or reliability of the information sought, and (e) the actual service provided by these various files does not justify the current cost of maintaining them.)
4. In the absence of a modern information-handling system operated on a community-wide basis under strong and effective management, the U.S. intelligence community will not achieve a satisfactory capability to provide the President and other Government officials with discriminating, adequate and timely intelligence support. (We believe that another crisis situation such as the presence of Soviet strategic missiles in Cuba would most likely require improvised information-handling arrangements because of inadequacies in the present system.)
5. An effective community-wide intelligence information-handling system, designed and carried out under strong central management, should result in long-term, significant improvement in the over-all management and coordination of U.S. intelligence operations as a whole.
6. The extensive experience and particular competence of the Bureau of the Budget in the management and organization field are such as to warrant participation by the Director of the Bureau of the Budget in top-level Executive Branch guidance and support which should be provided to the U.S. intelligence community in its efforts to resolve the intelligence-handling problem.
Based on the above conclusions, we are of the opinion that a basic action is required in the form of a Presidential Directive which will establish the responsibility and authority of the Director of Central Intelligence (within his statutory mission relating to coordination of the overall foreign intelligence effort) for the creation and central management of an efficient, automation-supported intelligence-handling system with participation by all intelligence agencies of the Government. We believe that such a directive should also make provision within the Executive Offices of the President for top-level monitorship and guidance of the development of the over-all system in the interest of the national security.
Should you approve the basic action which we have just proposed, we also propose certain supplementary actions which we believe should be considered by the Director of Central Intelligence and member agencies of the intelligence community for inclusion in initial steps taken toward establishment of the ultimate system.
The Board's recommendations for action at the Presidential level, and within the U.S. intelligence community, are attached hereto. In submitting these recommendations the Board wishes to emphasize the great importance which we place upon the timely achievement of the objectives involved, as an essential element of actions required to improve the efficiency and effectiveness of the overall United States intelligence effort.
In the course of our study of the subject the Board has had the benefit of the views and comments of Dr. Hornig concerning the nature of the problem and actions which should be taken to remedy the situation. This report has the approval of Dr. Hornig and he joins in its submission to you.
Clark M. Clifford
Recommendations of the President's Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board to President Johnson on the Intelligence Information-Handling Problem
The Board recommends the issuance of a Presidential Directive, pursuant to Section 102 of the National Security Act of 1947,/4/ as amended, providing as follows:
/4/P.L. 253, approved July 26, 1947. (61 Stat. 497)
1. That the Director of Central Intelligence (a) undertake as a high-priority assignment the responsibility for the design and management, within the U.S. intelligence community, of a unified information-handling system to ensure on a community-wide basis the secure and efficient processing, storage and retrieval of intelligence information which is acquired and maintained by the U.S. Government in the interests of national defense and security; (b) in discharging this assignment, exploit to the maximum practicable extent scientific and technological advances in the field of information-handling; (c) establish the Office of a Deputy to the Director of Central Intelligence to assist him in discharging his responsibility for design and management of the community-wide information-handling system; (d) produce a phased plan for the definition and implementation of the unified information-handling system, with an identification of costs and benefits for each phase, for review in connection with the Fiscal Year 1969 budget (a detailed proposal for the first annual increment and overall estimates for the total system should be made available by November 1, 1967); and (e) submit semiannual reports to the President on progress toward implementation of the plan.
2. That the Director of the Bureau of the Budget, the Special Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs, and the Special Assistant to the President for Science and Technology, serve the President as a review body within the Executive Office of the President, having responsibility for (a) lending assistance to the Director of Central Intelligence in the implementation of his responsibilities pursuant to this directive, and (b) performing a monitoring function, including periodic follow-ups, with respect to the establishment and operation of the community-wide system.
3. That the member agencies of the U.S. intelligence community develop and operate information-handling systems meeting the requirements established by the Director of Central Intelligence with respect to the community-wide system for which he has design and management responsibility; and that the Secretary of State, the Secretary of Defense, and the Director of the Central Intelligence Agency establish in their respective offices a central focal point having responsibility for management and resources review of their internal intelligence information-handling systems, and for working with the designated Deputy Director of Central Intelligence in the achievement of the community-wide system.
Contingent upon the issuance of the Presidential Directive proposed above, the Board recommends that the following actions be included among the initial steps to be taken by the Director of Central Intelligence toward the achievement of a community-wide information-handling system, and by the respective intelligence agencies in support of that system:
1. The creation, on a priority basis, of a community-wide pilot system for the handling of intelligence information which compromises the biographic files on Soviet "elite" personalities; the tasking and funding of the experimental COINS project currently being conducted under the leadership of the Director of Central Intelligence, in order to accommodate the pilot biograhpics system; and the subsequent steady expansion of this pilot system to include other important biographics areas.
2. The conduct of an experimental program to provide automated support to those functions of the intelligence community's National Indications Center having to do with the timely processing, evaluation, and reporting of current intelligence indications; and utilization of the results of this experimental project, to assist in the further development of automated support to the total U.S. intelligence effort.
3. The establishment in each U.S. intelligence agency, in addition to the office of the Director of Central Intelligence, of a staff function to be concerned with operations research and systems analysis directed toward the formulation of new and improved information-handling methods and procedures, based on an objective evaluation of the needs of individual agencies and of the intelligence community as a whole.
4. The conduct of community-wide studies, under the leadership of the Director of Central Intelligence, to determine how automated data storage and recall and improved information-handling procedures might assist other elements of the community which perform evaluations of (a) the adequacy of the intelligence product to meet intelligence users' needs, and (b) the formulation and validation of intelligence collection requirements which generate that product.
5. Action by the Director of Central Intelligence to provide over-all policy guidance to U.S. intelligence agencies with respect to the establishment and conduct of experimental research facilities for the development of improved information-handling techniques.
6. Action by U.S. intelligence agencies, under the leadership of the Director of Central Intelligence, to develop an automation-supported system providing increased efficiency and economy in the control, dissemination and accountability of classified documents which are generated by the U.S. Government in great quantity and at great expense, and are presently inventoried and controlled by manual methods.
7. The development by the Director of Central Intelligence of new physical security regulations, procedures and guidelines to be implemented by U.S. intelligence agencies on a community-wide basis, with a view to providing adequate security protection for sensitive intelligence data within information-handling systems utilizing automatic data processing techniques.
8. Establishment of the Deputy Director of Central Intelligence, having responsibility with respect to the community-wide information-handling system, as a focal point to act as an interface between the intelligence agencies and the scientific and technical community, to ensure that information-handling techniques wherever developed are applied to information processes in the intelligence community.
The Board also recommends action by the Department of State, in consultation with the Director of Central Intelligence, to improve significantly the effectiveness and efficiency of the usage of intelligence information in the formulation of foreign policy, through such means as (a) better integration of the information produced by the Bureau of Intelligence and Research into the overall information system of the Department as a part of the policy-formulating process, and (b) exploitation of modern systems and information-handling technology applicable to the acquisition, processing, analysis, and evaluation of substantive foreign affairs information and intelligence information, and their joint use in policy formulation.
269. Memorandum From the Deputy Director for Plans of the Central Intelligence Agency (Karamessines) to All Staff Chiefs and Division Chiefs/1/
Washington, September 30, 1967.
/1/Source: Central Intelligence Agency, DDO/IMS Files, Job 78-06423A, US Gov't-Special Group. Secret.
[less than 1 line of source text not declassified] 20 May 1966/2/
1. Recent developments require that the Clandestine Services look more carefully at what operational programs or activities should be submitted to the 303 Committee. The 303 Committee and its predecessor Special Group were established by a National Security Council Directive to be comprised of designated representatives of the Secretary of State, the Secretary of Defense and the President, for the purpose of acting as the normal channel for giving policy approval in advance of major covert programs initiated by the CIA, as well as for securing coordination of support for such programs among the Departments of State and Defense and the CIA. Under the terms of the NSC Directive, specifically excluded from the Committee's consideration are operations involving armed conflict by recognized military forces, cover and deception for military operations, and, of special importance to CIA, espionage and counter-espionage operations.
2. The Katzenbach Report/3/ brought new submission requirements for certain [less than 1 line of source text not declassified] projects and [less than 1 line of source text not declassified] programs. Mr. Rostow has recently made clear his desire that in all our political action projects we err on the side of presentation to the Committee. I have noted that the guidelines [less than 1 line of source text not declassified] may be variously interpreted by Division and Staff chiefs, with resultant unevenness in the overall scope of our submissions.
/3/See Document 260.
3. [less than 1 line of source text not declassified] is still valid, and I wish to emphasize that the amount of money involved should not be the criterion controlling submission to the 303 Committee. No Division or Staff chief should preclude submission to the Committee solely because the sum involved is small. Our paramount considerations must be the political sensitivity of the activity and its consistency with U.S. foreign policy.
4. [less than 1 line of source text not declassified] makes it quite clear that political and economic action programs involving direct or indirect action to influence or support political parties, groups or specific political leaders, including operations which use labor, youth, students, and influential military organizations as political pressure groups require 303 approval. [less than 1 line of source text not declassified] also is quite explicit that resubmission to the 303 Committee will be made when operational or other developments or changes are such as to make the subject a matter for re-examination by the Committee. Previous 303 Committee authorization may not be used to justify the funding of new or different activities.
5. As a supplement [less than 1 line of source text not declassified] and as an aid in pinpointing political sensitivity, the following are likely to require 303 Committee approval. If there is doubt about the need for policy review, you should err on the side of recommending presentation to the Committee.
a. Foreign politicians, both governmental and opposition, as well as certain military leaders, on the U.S. covert payroll who are used in any significant and continuing way for influence should be brought to my or the ADDP's attention for determination as to whether the case should be submitted to the 303 Committee. Projects involving foreign officials with whom we have relationships solely for espionage will not normally be submitted to 303. In those cases where use is made of a foreign political contact and he is receiving funds both for intelligence collection and covert action purposes, the area division chief will make a recommendation to me or the ADDP for final determination.
b. Activity having a political influence. An activity should be judged in terms of impact on the present or future government, impact on the leadership of a political party, and influence during an election. If a functional organization is used for other than intelligence collection, organizational or training purposes, we must assume that its use involves political influence, in its broad sense.
c. Certain counterinsurgency programs. Where our involvement in a counterinsurgency program is limited solely to the support and improvement of the local government's intelligence collection capability, 303 submission is not required unless special circumstances make it politically sensitive. Where our covert involvement encompasses civic action and other forms of nation building operations, 303 submission will normally be required.
6. Since a determination of what projects are politically sensitive obviously requires a value judgment on our part, I ask that you again review all projects which are in any way politically sensitive. I suspect that your review will uncover projects which have changed sufficiently to warrant submission to the Committee [2 lines of source text not declassified].
7. I have asked the ADDP to review such marginal cases as may exist, discuss them with you, and advise me as to any such cases requiring submission.
270. Sixteenth Report of the Intelligence Organization of the Department of State/1/
Washington, October 1967.
/1/Source: Department of State, INR/IL Files, PFIAB Materials, 1966-68. Top Secret. The report was prepared for the President's Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board and forwarded to Clifford by Hughes under cover of a November 9 memorandum. (Johnson Library, National Security File, Subject File, Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board)
A. Organizational Arrangements
The Interplay of Intelligence and Policy
With the exception of the renaming and reorientation of what is now the Office of Strategic and Functional Research (discussed below), there have been no significant changes since last year's report/2/ in the over-all make-up of the Bureau of Intelligence and Research, an organizational chart for which is appended as Annex A./3/ Rather than discussing "organizational arrangements" in the traditional, administrative sense, this report will therefore concentrate on the functional aspect. More specifically, it will describe the way in which INR, as the particular intelligence arm of the Department of State, is organized to fulfill one of its primary responsibilities, that of making available to the Secretary of State and other policy-making officials of the Department at all levels the information and the judgments of INR and of the intelligence community and of bringing the fruits of the national intelligence effort to bear on the formulation and implementation of foreign policy./4/
/2/Fifteenth Report of the Intelligence Organization of the Department of State, October 1, 1966. (Department of State, INR/IL Files, PFIAB Materials, 1966-68)
/3/Attached but not printed.
/4/The organization, roles, and function of INR were described for the public in a 19-page pamphlet published by the Department of State in 1973, INR: Intelligence and Research in the Department of State.
In its recent memorandum for the President on the intelligence information-handling problem,/5/ the Board concluded with a recommendation, calling for certain internal changes in the Department of State, which suggests a concern on the part of the Board that intelligence is seriously divorced from operations in the Department. It is with this apparent concern in mind that we have thought it timely to prepare for the Board this discussion of the principal mechanisms by which INR makes its work usable by its "customers."
/5/Dated July 20, 1967; for text, see Foreign Relations, 1964-1968, vol. X, Document 183.
There are basically two such mechanisms, and the Board is generally familiar with the first--the production by INR of finished intelligence, primarily in the form of "Intelligence Notes" and "Research Memoranda." These products provide support at three levels: essential background information on foreign policy developments and problems, analytical judgments based on continuing study of all information available to the intelligence community, and estimative projections into the future. Often they give the Secretary a viewpoint different from that of the regional bureaus charged with policy responsibility, thus confirming the rationale for the existence of a separate intelligence organization within the Department.
Less well known, it would seem, is the second major mechanism, and this report presents a fuller description of it than has been provided in previous years. It may be a failure to clarify the various aspects of the rather extensive intelligence briefing mechanism in the Department that accounts in part for what we have interpreted as a manifestation of concern on the part of the Board. For it is this highly personalized, extremely flexible briefing process that in fact drives home the conclusions of the intelligence process and insures that the policy maker receives the intelligence "message" by means surer than the automatic and impersonal circulation of paper.
Intelligence Briefings at State
At the opening of business each day the Director of Intelligence and Research or his Deputy gives a private, all-source briefing to the Secretary. In preparation for this briefing the Director has read and excerpted significant items from the highly-classified summary prepared the previous afternoon by INR, from CIA's evening Situation Report on Vietnam, and from the morning publications of CIA, DIA, and NSA. To avoid duplication, he has read the "Staff Summary," which is published by the Department's own Operations Center to give the Secretary a quick reading on items of operational importance from Departmental telegrams. During the half hour immediately before the Secretary's arrival in the Department, the Director then meets with an analyst from each of the several regional offices of INR to read and discuss with them the briefing notes they have just prepared on significant information selected from the full overnight flow of Foreign Service reports, TDCS reports, FBIS and the wire services, and NSA traffic. He is thus able to give the Secretary, in the shortest possible time and with an eye to the Secretary's appointments calendar and a knowledge of the most immediate problems before him, a distillate of worldwide current intelligence from the entire community along with interpretative commentary, including any differences of opinion that may exist within the community.
While the Secretary is being briefed, a similar individualized briefing is being conducted for the Under Secretary. The Under Secretary for Political Affairs and the Deputy Under Secretary for Political Affairs also receive private, all-source briefings each morning. To make possible so many nearly simultaneous briefings, INR's briefing panel has been expanded during the past year to five officers, the Director and Deputy Director now being assisted by three ranking officers from the Bureau.
All-source or simpler intelligence briefings are also conducted at other levels in the Department throughout the day. INR's regional office directors have standing arrangements for briefing the assistant secretaries of their counterpart regional bureaus, while nearly a score of analysts from INR regularly bring items of significance to the attention of the country directors concerned and to key officers in the functional Bureaus of the Department. Over the past several years the number of officers in the Department indoctrinated for access to special intelligence has expanded to include almost all country directors, and procedures for screening and bringing such intelligence to their attention on a timely basis have developed accordingly. Statistically, INR personnel each year conduct approximately 8,000 person-to-person special intelligence briefings within the Department. The number of ambassadors and other key personnel at overseas missions having access to special intelligence has also increased in recent years, and, as an additional means of assuring the fullest utilization of intelligence in the foreign policy process, INR analysts assist in the identification of pertinent reports for relay to the United States Mission to the United Nations in New York and to the seventy-five or eighty diplomatic missions now capable of being serviced through SSO [less than 1 line of source text not declassified] channels.
Aside from keeping the policy officer informed, the individual briefing system has the highly important additional benefit, through discussion between briefer and briefee, of keeping INR informed of the current needs and concerns of the policy officer. INR is thus able more effectively to gear its production of "policy-oriented" research papers to known needs and interests and to relay current requests for specific information to other agencies.
To the extent possible, these regular briefings are also used for discussion of those national intelligence estimates and special studies from other agencies requiring compartmented handling, but special briefing sessions are arranged as required. Last fall, for example, the Director of INR and the INR office directors concerned met with the Secretary and about a dozen other top officials of the Department to go over the annual estimates on Soviet strategic capabilities shortly after their approval by the USIB.
In addition, numerous activities of semi-liaison, semi-briefing character further expand the effectiveness of INR in bringing intelligence into communication with policy. INR office directors attend the staff meetings of their related policy Bureaus, other officers attend meetings at lower levels, and INR country officers are required to be in contact with their operational desk officers. The relationship with S/P is particularly close and effective. The INR Deputy Director for Research attends all regular meetings of the Policy Planning Council (S/P); he takes along any INR expert appropriate to the subject under discussion, arranges for experts to attend special discussions of S/P, and insures that members of S/P are aware of the INR officers who can help them in their individual projects. The Director of the Office of Strategic and Functional Research attends meetings of the politico-military staff (G/PM). In connection with both G/PM and S/P, INR officers have participated in both of the major studies undertaken in the last two years by the State-Defense Study Group, on China and the Middle East: for the second, INR contributed one full-time member to Ambassador Holmes' staff.
Finally, INR is becoming integrated with the mechanism of the SIG and IRGs. There is difficulty because the Department is naturally chary of crowding the sessions with its own officers. A modus operandi is, however, evolving satisfactorily. The relevant office directors keep in touch with the Bureau-IRG executive secretaries, and share in Departmental discussions of papers before the meetings. The INR Director regularly receives documentation and agenda of the SIG, and also regularly attends the briefing of the Under Secretary that takes place before each meeting of the SIG, while the SIG Executive Secretary debriefs to INR any pertinent information after the meeting. In this way INR has opportunity both to make its intelligence views heard before the meeting and to learn afterwards in what way it can assist in implementation of the SIG's decisions.
These individualized briefings and personal exchanges are, of course, merely supplements to, and not substitutes for, the continuous flow of intelligence information throughout the Department. The INR Communications Center not only handles the dissemination of incoming documents within INR and of INR's own products to other parts of the Department, to other agencies in Washington, and to overseas posts. In addition, it serves as the focal point for distribution throughout the Department of intelligence information from the other members of the intelligence community. Last fiscal year, for example, of the over 800,000 individual documents received by the Communications Center, just over half were Foreign Service reports and miscellaneous State Department publications intended for INR's own use. The remainder were from CIA, the military agencies, and miscellaneous sources. Copies of all of these were rapidly disseminated throughout the Department.
Thus, while restrictions on the flow of intelligence information may be at the root of the belief, to which the President's Board has apparently subscribed, that there is a schism between intelligence and operations within the Department, in actuality it is only documents containing special intelligence that do not circulate freely and promptly within the Department. Such documents are, to be sure, not left with the officials to whom they are taken for briefing; they are hand-carried to the designated recipients and immediately returned to one of the two areas in the building which meet the standards for controlling and protecting sensitive compartmented intelligence information. Given the fact that foreign diplomats, the press, and the general public have relatively free access to the entire building, it has never been considered feasible from a security standpoint to ease this admittedly cumbersome but nonetheless vital requirement. The fact remains that officers with need to know do without cavil have access to the material.
[Omitted here is the remainder of the report.]
271. Memorandum From the Under Secretary of State (Katzenbach) to President Johnson/1/
Washington, November 10, 1967.
/1/Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1967-69, INT 8 US. Confidential. An attached November 6 covering memorandum from Thomas L. Hughes (INR) to Katzenbach indicates that his staff had revised the memorandum and its attachment in accordance with Katzenbach's guidance provided in his October 14 memorandum to Hughes. In that memorandum, also attached, Katzenbach complained that the Department of State paper had "an overly bureaucratic tone," and he suggested it should be revised to "stress the substantive necessity of having such a system as our intelligence resources increase. The means we choose to achieve control over our resources should be secondary to the fact that we must find some way to create a common data base. This data base must enable us to distinguish between the relevant facts from the mass of information flowing into the Government." He also proposed deletion of discussion about foreign service reporting which, he felt, was "a problem to be dealt with at a much later stage when we discuss how information from the common data base is to be distributed."
The Secretary has asked me to examine the present and prospective needs for information handling in the Department of State in the light of the welcome initiative and recommendations recently made by your Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board./2/ I am enclosing a memorandum which sets forth our position on those recommendations.
In essence, the Department strongly favors new efforts to improve information handling within the intelligence community and shares the view of the Board that immediate, concerted action is required.
Our objective is to provide the leadership in the foreign affairs agencies with a common data base of relevant facts. We believe that, to assure the adoption of complementary elements of a unified system by all members of the community, thorough coordination is called for, and that the Director of Central Intelligence should be designated as coordinator. Until further study has been made of the needs of each agency and the scope of the proposed system, it seems premature to determine the extent to which centralized management may be required in either the design or the operation of the eventual system, and we believe that the recommendations of the Board should be amended in this respect.
We realize that until the present financial uncertainties facing the Government are resolved, designs and plans for a comprehensive information-handling system must be considered tentative and preparatory. The costs will be considerable, and our memorandum discusses the need for a carefully-formulated funding plan and Congressional strategy.
Nicholas deB Katzenbach
THE INTELLIGENCE INFORMATION-HANDLING PROBLEM:
The Department of State strongly favors new efforts to improve the intelligence community's information-handling system, so as to insure better methods for the dissemination, use, and retrieval of foreign affairs information.
The Department of State is the prime user of the increasing flow of materials which constitute intelligence and foreign affairs information. Thus, in designing any information-handling program, apart from technical military data, the information requirements of the Department of State are preeminent and the system must serve the needs of the Secretary of State as the principal adviser to the President in the formulation and execution of the foreign policy of the United States. The adequacy of the Government's information base for foreign policy formulation is obviously one of the matters falling within the general supervisory authority assigned to the Secretary of State by NSAM-341 of March 2, 1966./3/
The Department agrees fully with the President's Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board in its description of the urgency of the problem, aggravated by the tremendous growth in the collection and distribution of intelligence information, and in its view that immediate concerted action by the intelligence community is required. The Department has long felt the need for an effective community-wide intelligence information-handling system which would not only cope with the anticipated proliferation in intelligence and foreign policy information but would also permit the timely retrieval of primary foreign affairs documentation long consigned to archives. Thorough coordination is required to assure the adoption by all members of the United States intelligence community of complementary elements of such a system.
It nevertheless seems premature, at this embryonic stage in the development of a complex system, to make a determination that strong, centralized management will be required or even feasible. We are far from knowing what the information needs of the respective agencies will be in the future.
Under the provisions of National Security Council Intelligence Directive No. 1,/4/ the Director of Central Intelligence has the responsibility of "coordinating" intelligence community activities, with the advice and assistance of the United States Intelligence Board. This cooperative relationship has worked well, and the Department believes that it is within this context that the information-handling effort should be undertaken. Accordingly, for the purpose of initial system design and program presentation, the Director of Central Intelligence should be designated with USIB participation to coordinate intelligence community action and Basic Recommendations No. 1 and No. 3 should be amended accordingly. The degree of centralized management which may ultimately be needed will become clear only as the design of a compatible community-wide system takes shape and its constituent elements are identified.
/4/Dated January 19, 1950; printed in Foreign Relations, 1945-1950, Emergence of the Intelligence Establishment, Document 432.
With this change, the Department would have no difficulty with the additional provision of Basic Recommendation No. 1 which charges the Director of Central Intelligence with the coordination of a phased plan for review with the Fiscal Year 1969 budget. A great imbalance exists among the several Departments and Agencies as to the current level of development, and a special effort will be necessary to upgrade some components of the system, including those of the Department of State. The Department has recently employed a small staff of information-handling experts to develop a program for a modern substantive information-handling capability. We now have a proposal for a five-year program of technological modernization with an initial program in Fiscal Year 1969 calling for fifteen additional positions and $334,000 in operating and contracting funds. The entire five-year plan for the Department in Washington might be in the magnitude of eight million dollars. Substantial additional sums would be required for installation of the system at field posts. This program has been designed to meet the Department's own internal requirements.
The costs to the community as a whole of the information-handling system proposed by the President's Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board will undoubtedly be many millions, and consequently a most carefully formulated funding presentation for Congressional consideration will be required. Fundamental budgetary and strategic considerations are involved, and questions of how to budget for common-use elements of the system as well as for departmental components of the unified community system should be left for subsequent high-level decision. Equally important is the issue of whether there should be a composite intelligence community program, presented as a single budget request for funding outside the normal appropriation cycle, or whether the program should be presented in pieces as regular parts of the annual budget of each community agency having responsibility for providing a facility or service which will be a part of the community program. The best solution may be a combination of specially-provided community funding for central and common components, plus identified departmental budget items for departmentally-operated components.
Finally, the Department agrees with the rationale for the creation of a high-level review body within the Executive Office of the President and wholeheartedly supports Basic Recommendation No. 2.
The Department also agrees that, contingent upon the issuance of the recommended Presidential Directive, early consideration should be given to such actions as those listed in the form of Supplementary Recommendations by the President's Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board. No discussion of these recommendations is deemed necessary at this time.
In a final recommendation, the President's Board proposes that the Department seek to improve its internal procedures for using intelligence information in the formulation of foreign policy. Before commenting on this recommendation, it would be useful to have the benefit of the Board's thinking as to the nature of present deficiencies in this regard.
272. Memorandum From the Secretary of the 303 Committee (Jessup) to the Executive Secretary of the President's Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board (Coyne)/1/
Washington, February 8, 1968.
/1/Source: National Security Council, Special Group/303 Committee Files, Subject Files, The 40 Committee. Eyes Only.
During 1967, the 303 Committee, under the chairmanship of Mr. Rostow, charged the CIA with the task of submitting to the 303 Committee every project which might, under the widest interpretation, come under the Katzenbach Statement of Policy:
"No federal agency shall provide any covert financial assistance or support, direct or indirect, to any of the nation's educational or private voluntary organizations. This policy specifically applies to all foreign activities of such organizations and it reaffirms present policy with respect to their domestic activities.
"Where such support has been given, it will be terminated as quickly as possible without destroying valuable private organizations before they can seek new means of support."/2/
/2/Report of the Committee on Government Assistance to Educational and Private Voluntary Organizations. [Footnote in the source text. For full text of the statement, December 29, 1967, see American Foreign Policy: Current Documents, 1967, p. 1235.]
Approximately 34 major projects (some of which served as umbrellas for additional subsidiary activities) were examined. The committee approved, in most cases, so-called "surge funding" solutions by which terminal monies were allocated to these organizations for a fiscal year or so until they could establish themselves independently or find their own sustenance in the private sector. In a few select instances, projects were reestablished abroad in order to continue without violating the Katzenbach guidance in fact or in spirit. Needless to say, each determination had close coordination with the Bureau of the Budget. In a few complex instances, the committee determined that a project did not by definition come under the Katzenbach committee injunction.
The greatest amount of time was spent on the decision, approved later by higher authority, to continue Radio Free Europe and Radio Liberty./3/
/3/For minutes of the 303 Committee meeting on December 15, 1967, at which agreement was reached on how to proceed with respect to Radio Free Europe and Radio Liberty, see Foreign Relations, 1964-1968, vol. X, Document 197.
/4/Printed from a copy that bears this typed signature.
273. National Security Action Memorandum No. 368/1/
Washington, February 9, 1968.
/1/Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, NSAMs, NSAM 368. Confidential. Copies were sent to the Secretaries of State and Defense, the Director of the Bureau of the Budget, the President's Special Assistant for Science and Technology, and the Chairman of the President's Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board.
The Director of Central Intelligence is requested to consider the recommendations in the attached memorandum from the President's Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board and take such actions as he deems appropriate to improve information handling in the intelligence community./2/ In this connection, the Director of Central Intelligence should prepare a proposal for the phased implementation of a community-wide information handling system to insure the secure and efficient dissemination, processing, storage, and retrieval of intelligence information.
The proposal should discuss alternative ways to manage such a system and present the Director's recommendation. The plan should identify the costs and benefits of each phase of the program and include a specific detailed proposal for the first annual increment as part of the FY '70 budget. The President's Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board should be consulted in the preparation of the Director's report.
The plan, with the concurrence or comments of the State Department and the Defense Department, should be submitted to my office by May 1, 1968./3/
/3/A preliminary plan developed by the Intelligence Information Handling Committee of the U.S. Intelligence Board was approved by the USIB at its meeting on October 17. The plan and accompanying memoranda are in the Johnson Library, National Security File, NSAMs, NSAM 368.
274. Editorial Note
[text not declassified]
275. Précis Prepared by the Executive Director-Comptroller of the Central Intelligence Agency (White)/1/
/1/Source: Central Intelligence Agency, Executive Registry, Job 80-B01676R, Professional Manpower Comm. Secret. White forwarded the précis, together with the full Report of the Committee on Professional Manpower, March 1968, to Helms and Taylor on March 29. The report, a copy of which is ibid., was prepared by an internal, four-person committee, chaired by the Director of Training, John Richardson.
PRÉCIS OF PROFESSIONAL MANPOWER COMMITTEE REPORT
1. Summary. The quality of the Agency's current cadre of junior officers (i.e., those entering duty between FY 1963 and FY 1967) is equal to or better than previous junior officer groups. CIA's recruitment effort and competitive position are generally satisfactory, although there are recruitment impediments which need remedying and some tentative signs that reactions to anti-Agency publicity and the Vietnam War may pose problems in the future. Finally, all directorates are experiencing difficulties--some unique to particular directorates and some common to all--in the area of purposeful career management and the retention of the ablest junior officers. The above conclusions and the following observations were derived from surveys of over [less than 1 line of source text not declassified] Agency supervisors and [less than 1 line of source text not declassified] junior officers.
2. Quality and Sources of Junior Officers. Eighty-six per cent of the Agency supervisors surveyed believe that the FY 1963-67 group of junior officers equals or surpasses those officers entering duty before 1963. (The 14% who felt the contrary all were DD/P or DD/I supervisors.) The Career Training Program is the principal source of DD/P junior officers, an important source for the DD/S (which relies equally on direct hire from business), incidental for the DD/I (which draws 40% of its employees from universities), and irrelevant for the DD/S&T (which relies heavily on universities and industry). Recruitment data and a study near completion by the Office of Medical Services suggest that job performance and career potential bear a strong correlation to the quality of educational institution attended by junior officers. (See Tab J for a brief discussion of this observation.)/2/
/2/Attached but not printed.
3. Recruitment. CIA's university recruitment efforts are proceeding satisfactorily, although some indications that CIA recruiters spread themselves too thin suggest the need to weed out unproductive institutions and to concentrate on some 100 "quality" institutions. Each directorate, but especially the DD/I and DD/S&T, have developed "unilateral" access to the academic community and increasingly rely on such access for recruitment. Recruiters observe that some highly promising prospects are lost because of the lengthy waiting period that ensues between initial interviews and tentative acceptance. Finally, it is believed by some recruiters that the Vietnam War may be negatively affecting recruitment; and DD/I supervisors feel that adverse publicity about the Agency may be affecting the attitudes of good prospects, as well as impairing Agency-academic relations in general.
4. Career Management. Career planning is not practiced in the Agency with the possible exception of the DD/I which has consistently effected the five-year plans conceived as an aspect of the Midcareer Development Program and which has a centralized system for identifying and developing "comers." The Midcareer Course is viewed more as a "battery recharge" than a development program for the ablest officers. The over-all attrition rate of junior officers entering duty during FY 1963-67 is [less than 1 line of source text not declassified]. (The attrition rate of junior FSO's for FY 1966 and FY 1967, by contrast, was slightly under [less than 1 line of source text not declassified].) The separation rate is [less than 1 line of source text not declassified] in the DD/S&T where industry constitutes an economically attractive alternative and where the fact that the middle and senior grades are occupied by relatively young officers induces some junior officers to conclude that advancement will be slow. DD/I's attrition rate is [less than 1 line of source text not declassified], accounted for in part by a [less than 1 line of source text not declassified] turnover in females. DD/P's loss rate is [less than 1 line of source text not declassified], and the reasons cited include the relative lack of promotion headroom caused by a serious congestion at the senior levels of the CS. Concern is expressed that the CS may be losing some of its ablest young officers.
5. Major Recommendations.
a. Agency intercourse with the academic community needs to be encouraged and improved, including greater substantive exchange between DD/I analysts and key faculty and graduate students, more selective campus recruitment with concentration on "quality" institutions and exploration of ways to counteract or reduce adverse publicity.
b. The Midcareer Program requires both greater review and higher priority. "Comers" need to be spotted and encouraged by the directorates. Individual career plans, especially for the most promising, require more attention and greater follow-through.
c. Additional attention should be given to the congestion at senior levels of the CS and further means developed to induce or compel early retirement or reassignment within the Agency.
d. Centralized procedures should be developed to analyze the high attrition rate among junior officers. Directorates should determine the real reasons why officers leave, and report annually the rate and causes of separation.
276. Memorandum From Spurgeon Keeny of the National Security Council Staff to the President's Special Assistant (Rostow)/1/
Washington, April 8, 1968.
/1/Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Rostow Files, Presidential Program. Secret.
At your request, I have prepared the following list of Presidential initiatives and actions which the President might consider during the balance of his term:
[Omitted here is material unrelated to intelligence.]
6. Strengthening the Director of Central Intelligence. The President might undertake by appropriate executive actions to strengthen the position of the Director of Central Intelligence so that he can carry out more effectively the functions supposedly associated with his office. For a variety of reasons, the Director of the CIA has never been able to perform the over-all intelligence coordinating role assigned to him as Director of Central Intelligence. Strong institutional opposition has developed within the various intelligence organizations of the DOD to any external role for the DCI. The President now has the opportunity working with Secretary Clifford, who as former Chairman of the PFIB was in a unique position to understand this complicated organizational problem, to take certain actions which, although desirable, might be quite controversial in the intelligence community. General Taylor, acting either as Chairman of the PFIB or as head of a small task force, could be assigned the job of coming up with specific proposals. If this problem is not sorted out now, it will be a long time before a new Administration comes to grips with it.
[Omitted here is material unrelated to intelligence.]
277. Memorandum by President Johnson/1/
Washington, May 1, 1968.
/1/Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Subject File, President's Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board, Box 41. No classification marking. In an April 15 memorandum to President Johnson, Maxwell D. Taylor, whom the President appointed on February 23 to succeed Clark Clifford as Chairman of the President's Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board, wrote that at its April 11-12 meeting the Board discussed "ways and means to discharge more effectively its responsibilities," and its members agreed that it would be "most timely" for the President to issue a statement reaffirming the importance of the board. Taylor enclosed an undated draft memorandum that the President might send. Under cover of an April 20 memorandum to President Johnson, Rostow forwarded Taylor's memorandum and draft statement. "In my judgment," Rostow wrote, "a reinforcing memorandum of this type would be timely and helpful." (Ibid.) Nevertheless, the President apparently did not act on this initiative, so Rostow forwarded it to him again under cover of a May 1 memorandum. This time Rostow added: "He (Taylor) is convinced--and I agree--that he should confer with the major users of intelligence, notably the regional Assistant Secretaries of State, to check on whether the intelligence material being generated is appropriate to their operational needs and being well and fully used. For that reason, as well as to give a general impetus to the President's Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board under its new Chairman, I recommend that you go forward with this memorandum." (Ibid.) The memorandum printed here is identical to the draft memorandum submitted with Taylor's April 15 letter.
Pursuant to my appointment of General Maxwell D. Taylor to serve as Chairman of the President's Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board, as successor to Secretary Clark M. Clifford, I wish to emphasize the importance which I attach to the foreign intelligence function in government and to the mission of the Board. In this period of rapid political and economic change, the operation of government is more dependent than ever before on reliable, timely intelligence leading to a wise evaluation of the world situation. Under the coordination and guidance of the Director of Central Intelligence, all members of the U.S. foreign intelligence community contribute to this essential service.
I shall continue to look to the Board for a continuous review and assessment of all aspects of the activities of the foreign intelligence community and shall expect to receive recurrent recommendations from it for strengthening the effectiveness of these activities.
In accordance with the provisions of Executive Order 10938 of May 4, 1961/2/ and of my memorandum of October 19, 1965 on this same subject,/3/ I wish the Board to be able to assure me at all times of the quality, responsiveness and reliability of the intelligence which reaches the decision-makers of Government. To assist it in this mission, I ask the heads of Departments and Agencies concerned to cooperate fully and freely with the Board in the discharge of its mission.
/2/See Document 183.
Lyndon B. Johnson
278. Letter From Director of Central Intelligence Helms to the Deputy Secretary of Defense (Nitze)/1/
Washington, May 17, 1968.
/1/Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Agency File, CIA, Vol. III. Secret.
In accordance with our telephone conversation, I am going ahead with the organization of a National Intelligence Resources Board to be chaired by the Deputy Director of Central Intelligence with the Director, Defense Intelligence Agency and the Director, Bureau of Intelligence and Research, Department of State as members. The purpose of this Board is to assist me in developing my judgments concerning the need for resources to support the foreign intelligence effort.
The Board will evaluate the responsiveness of individual projects and activities to the intelligence objectives, requirements and priorities established by USIB and provide me with recommendations concerning the level of funding generally appropriate for such projects and activities. I shall look to it for advice in connection with questions which arise during the course of the review of the four major national intelligence programs (the CCP, NRP, CIP and CIAP) concerning needs for the procurement, development or utilization of resources. One of the important functions of the Board will be to examine the inter-relationship of intelligence programs and determine relative needs for coverage of particular intelligence objectives as between different sources or systems.
In formulating its recommendations, the Board will utilize USIB committees as well as my staff for National Intelligence Programs Evaluation, which will of course continue to work closely with the staff elements of the Defense Department responsible for the review and supervision of Defense Department intelligence programs.
My recommendations will be brought to you and the Secretary of Defense when and as formulated.
/2/Printed from a copy that indicates Helms signed the original.
279. Memorandum From the Secretary of the 303 Committee (Jessup) to the President's Special Assistant (Rostow)/1/
Washington, June 6, 1968.
/1/Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Intelligence File, 303 Committee. Top Secret.
[2-1/2 lines of source text not declassified], what do we do about projects once we have approved them to maintain some sort of check.
The answer is quite simple: We call explicitly for progress reports as frequently as we want them, and since projects are approved on a yearly basis their renewal automatically comes before us.
We have had some 18 status reports specifically requested during the past 18 months and 30 project renewals. The minutes handed to the Board members give an indication of this. We also feel free to request summaries of certain situations such as Haiti where an unstable situation exists, and from time to time the committee recommends some action.
To the question: Are there any activities which should come under the committee which for one reason or another evade the committee's scrutiny?, we can answer: Following the Katzenbach committee explorations in December 1967, the 303 ordered that all projects involving covert action programs not specifically considered by the Katzenbach committee should be rounded up for review by the 303. We are satisfied that this has been done with complete goodwill, and in those areas where there may be laggards (projects approved earlier but not reviewed recently) we can direct that they be placed on the agenda./2/
/2/[text not declassified]
The only countries to which I would not give a complete clean bill of health as of this moment are [less than 1 line of source text not declassified]. In each of these instances, appropriate persons are aware of the covert activities there but the committee as such, with its present makeup, cannot be said to have signed off on them.
Examples of the gradual tightening noose on all activities of potential embarrassment are twofold. First, the Chief of Naval Operations Binnacle program, a long-standing extensive U.S. submarine reconnaissance program which had semiannual briefings for the committee, is now considered mission by mission on a monthly basis and has been incorporated into the JRC forecast. Second, certain U.S. Coast Guard and Geodetic Survey nonreconnaissance missions have been brought into the monthly schedule since they have a small embarrassment potential.
I think you can emphasize that this is one of the less cumbersome, more effective, tight working groups in government with Rostow, Bohlen, Nitze and Helms, men who have worked closely over the years and understand each other's problems. There is no friction and a sense of accomplishment.
Two trends might be noted: One is the "platter is full" attitude of Secretary Rusk, who is reluctant to entertain additional new risks at a time of sensitive talks, problems like the Pueblo and an election year. This is to say that Secretary Rusk takes a very careful look and is "from Missouri" as far as requirements are concerned-they had better be of an urgent nature in these times.
The second trend is that of the heavy hand of the Bureau of the Budget which increasingly, due to its Presidential directives, does not necessarily accept the unanimous approval of the 303 without taking issue in its battle to cut costs./3/
/3/[text not declassified]
280. Memorandum for the Record
Washington, August 12, 1968.
[Source: Central Intelligence Agency, Executive Registry, Job 80-B01580R, PFIAB. Top Secret; [codeword not declassified]. 3 pages of source text not declassified.]
281. Letter From the Assistant Director of the Federal Bureau of Investigation (Sullivan) to Director of Central Intelligence Helms/1/
Washington, October 24, 1968.
/1/Source: Central Intelligence Agency, Executive Registry, Job 80-B01580R, FBI. Secret; Personal. William C. Sullivan was FBI Assistant Director in charge of the Domestic Intelligence Division.
Reference is made to my desire to discuss with you matters affecting the American intelligence community. As you know, I mentioned this to you some months ago and you said you would like to have Rufe Taylor in on the discussion. This, of course, is most acceptable to me.
To give you a very brief general idea of what I have in mind, a few thoughts are being set forth below as follows:
First, rightly or wrongly I do not believe that the American intelligence community is functioning at the peak of its efficiency. In fact, as a whole I think we are considerably below this level. (Naturally I am much better able to substantiate this view relative to my own work than I am with the work of others.) The community has but one basic objective and that is the security of the United States. We should let no stone go unturned in achieving this end.
Second, as we exist now I think we suffer from (1) lack of effective coordination; (2) inadequate knowledge of each other's operations; (3) obsolete administrative procedures and relationships; (4) thinking which is geared at times to past decades; (5) conflict of organizational interests; (6) on occasions unnecessary organizational and personality clashes and rivalries; (7) certain negative overtones in delimitations agreements; (8) failure to use fully each other's resources; (9) duplication and, at times, working at cross-purposes with each other; (10) a too limited use of the great scientific resources that could be applied to intelligence problems; (11) an inadequate sharing of highly specialized skills, talents, and abilities of certain employees of our respective agencies; (12) fixing of definite responsibilities individually, collectively and organizationally; etc.
Third, there is no need to tell you that we are living in an age of profound and rapid flux. It has been well said that the recurrent shock of our age is the discovery that concepts and patterns of action of a more secure past no longer fit present reality. It is suggested that the entire American intelligence community might do well to start with this as a premise and conduct a most searching, honest, and exhaustive analysis of our respective agencies for the purpose of re-structuring them to meet the great changes of our age. Your own thinking was in this context some weeks ago when at USIB you mentioned the Soviet invasion of Czechoslovakia and the need for all of us to engage in penetrative self-examination.
Fourth, with a new Administration of one kind or the other coming to the White House in January, it would seem this is the time for the American intelligence community to reassess its position, its policies, procedures, goals, etc., with the idea in mind of moving ahead of the winds of change instead of being blown by them later on willy-nilly.
Fifth, I am not certain just where and how we should begin, or the course to be set, or the means to pursue it. This is one reason I would like to have a talk with you.
Sixth, attached you will find some fragmentary thoughts relating to the type of thing that comes to mind when I examine our own operations here in the FBI. Obviously this is very incomplete and sketchy, but it may give you a working clue to what I have in mind and the over-all context to which I allude.
This week I must go to Iowa Wesleyan College to lecture. On my return I intend to take some annual leave and will not be back into the city until around November 10. When convenient for you and Rufe Taylor, I would like to get together following my return. It may be that this could be arranged after a USIB meeting. Sam Papich is familiar with the contents of this letter and will be in contact with your secretary to work out the necessary arrangements.
With all good wishes,
Washington, October 22, 1968.
Recognizing that other agencies have resources such as files, equipment, overseas coverage, experienced intelligence officers, technical specialists, linguists, and research capabilities, we have conducted a self-examination of our current efforts in order to determine what constructive steps could be taken to improve on existing coordination and/or dialogue with other agencies. Set forth are some suggested courses of action.
1. Do more to utilize selected Negro personnel, including ROTC members attending Negro colleges where manpower problems exist.
2. Utilization of selected and appropriate ethnic military personnel previously trained for the development of information in riot areas.
3. Increasing the screening of Negro military service personnel preparatory to their discharge as potential sources in racial areas and related fields.
4. The utilization and exploitation of military personnel with foreign backgrounds in whom hostile nations have expressed interest. Institution of steps to insure that such personnel are assigned to the continental United States rather than transferred to other areas throughout the world where their potential cannot be utilized to the best advantage of the United States.
5. Expand the use of Communist Party sources under Bureau control where foreign travel would bring the sources in contact with the communist leadership in foreign countries.
6. The reinstitution of sophisticated mail coverage between the United States and selected foreign countries.
7. The development of a program whereby all agencies making up the intelligence community would exchange lecturers at various training schools.
8. Improve the exchange of technical information between the FBI Laboratory and counterparts of other agencies making certain we take advantage of the research facilities available to those other agencies.
9. The utilization of professional intelligence officers in various colleges and universities under the cover of graduate students.
10. Revise the Legal Attaché system so our foreign service men can better assist foreign operations of The Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) and military intelligence.
11. Work as a unit to extract from the best brains in science concepts which can be translated into practical devices relevant to the gathering of intelligence information.
12. Develop a program for utilizing the United States as a base and source for developing persons who can be utilized in foreign intelligence operations of CIA.
13. Dovetailing specific practical programs to help accomplish the ends of item 12.
14. Pooling the best brains and individuals with the greatest amount of specialized experience for the purpose of helping to solve each other's problems and to arrive at solutions for difficult courses of action. Working out a joint program for developing intelligence information on investigative subjects who are constantly traveling into and out of the United States.
15. Designating personnel from respected members of the intelligence community to perform joint research and analysis on highly specialized operational matters.
16. Utilization of the total resources of the American intelligence community for penetration in various forms of the countries and the communications of hostile nations.
282. Editorial Note
In a 15-page report to the President on November 25, 1968, the President's Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board reviewed the highlights of its activities since its establishment on May 4, 1961, summarized 11 significant areas of progress to which PFIAB had made an important contribution, and provided current views on selected long-term intelligence problems deemed worthy of continuing attention. Chairman Maxwell Taylor presented the report to President Johnson on January 6, 1969. For text, see Foreign Relations, 1964-1968, volume X, Document 222.
283. Memorandum From the President's Special Assistant (Rostow) to the Chairman of the President's Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board (Taylor)/1/
Washington, November 25, 1968.
/1/Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Memos to the President-Walt Rostow, Vol. 108. Secret.
As requested, herewith some rather simple impressions based on my experience--notably that of the last eight years.
1. In the contemporary world, there is no way for the President to avoid a highly personal responsibility in national security affairs since:
--there are bound to be a substantial number of crises which involve the possibility of conflict, financial expenditure, or domestic political repercussions;
--the President (and the Vice President) are the only men in the Executive Branch who have a mandate from the people.
2. Therefore, the President must be able to operate with a full flow of detailed intelligence, carefully evaluated, sensitive to the exact questions which are on his mind, in what is inevitably an operational command post.
3. The first requirement is a flow of regular materials from the intelligence community tailored to meet the President's tastes, habits, and working style.
3. The second requirement is that the President develop with the Director of Central Intelligence a close personal working relationship of confidence which allows the Director of Central Intelligence to be present at the Tuesday lunch or its equivalent. The Director of Central Intelligence should, in his personal capacity, be part of the President's innermost circle in national security matters even if what he knows is not fully transmitted to his agency.
4. A third requirement is that the President's Special Assistant for National Security Affairs work with the Director of Central Intelligence and the other intelligence agencies in a wholly fraternal way to assure that the intelligence community is focusing on the issues most relevant to the decisions before the President or likely to come before the President. So far as the President is concerned--but he is not the sole consumer--the greatest "wastages" of intelligence take the form of papers which happen to come forward at a time when the President is focusing on another matter or where the form in which a question is posed in the intelligence community is not relevant to the precise issue to which the President is addressing himself. To generate maximum relevance, therefore, for the product of the intelligence community, the President's Special Assistant must steadily throw questions back at the intelligence community in the form which will make the responses of the intelligence community bear most directly on the President's decisions.
5. Since a great deal of the President's business in the field of national security policy will inevitably be conducted--as it has, in fact, been conducted in the post-war years--within a relatively small group of the President's closest advisors, it cannot be too strongly emphasized that relations of greatest mutual confidence should be cultivated-as they have been in recent years-between the Director of Central Intelligence and the other members of that small advisory group.
6. A final observation. The intelligence community should understand that on truly great matters the President himself, the Secretary of State, the Secretary of Defense, and the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs will form their own intelligence assessments. This has happened, for example, on questions such as these:
--What has been the character and the order of magnitude of the effect on North Vietnam of bombing attacks?
--What were Hanoi's intentions in the winter/spring offensive of 1967-68?
--What were Hanoi's motives in going to Paris?
--Would the Warsaw Pact forces assembled around Czechoslovakia move into Czechoslovakia?
--What are Soviet intentions towards the Middle East?
7. Just as a division commander in the field will form his own view of the enemy's capabilities and intentions, so will the senior men in our government. This is a fact of life. What is essential is that two conditions be satisfied: first, that all these men have available to them the intelligence and the evaluations made by the intelligence community as an essential part of the information on which they will form their judgments; and, second, as I have tried to emphasize, the Director of Central Intelligence himself be a working member of that central group.
284. Memorandum From the Chairman of the President's Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board (Taylor) to the President's Special Assistant (Rostow)
Washington, December 16, 1968.
[Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Subject File, Intelligence Handling and Disclosure. Secret. 2 pages of source text not declassified.]
285. Memorandum for the Record/1/
Washington, January 2, 1969.
/1/Source: Central Intelligence Agency, Executive Registry, Job 80-B01580R, FBI. Secret.
1. We discussed in rather general terms all of the items mentioned in subject letter.
2. Bill Sullivan expressed the view that there is inadequate coordination between the FBI and CIA in matters of counterintelligence operations, both at home and abroad. He expressed the view that it might be worthwhile to establish a small Board for the purpose of over-seeing counterintelligence operations, rendering decisions for cooperation therein or making policy recommendations to higher authorities if and as necessary. I asked him in this connection about the status of the ICC which he declared to be moribund but said that he would look into the possibilities of reviving it in somewhat different form. I suggested that a small group composed perhaps of the DCI, the Director of the FBI and the Director of the Defense Intelligence Agency might be worth considering if, organized under it, were suitable regional groups of counterintelligence people from those 3 agencies. The idea would be to supply detailed operational and staff advice for action as appropriate by the above mentioned counterintelligence group. By way of illustration I outlined the idea of the SIG and the IRG's in the development of foreign policy. I indicated that I thought any initiative in this direction ought to come from the new Attorney General inasmuch as the objective would be the security of the United States, principally at home. I took this occasion to point out that the restrictions imposed on the FBI by the Attorney General are at present a major factor in inhibiting counterintelligence operations within the United States and that they have their reflection in opportunities that might arise abroad but can't be seized if the FBI is inhibited from following through once the operation gets across U.S. borders. Before leaving this subject I suggested that Bill might wish to talk to Mr. Hoover with the idea of having a three-way chat between Mr. Hoover, the new Attorney General and the DCI at an early stage in the new Administration.
3. With regard to positive intelligence matters I outlined to Bill Sullivan some of the difficulties faced by the DCI in coordination of the use of assets, most of which are under the direction and management of the Department of Defense. The discussion ranged over difficulties with the National Security Agency, the inability of the USIB structure to compel compliance or even to follow up effectively on its recommendations. In this connection I said I thought it might be helpful if the position of the DCI as the principal intelligence officer of the President was more generally known and understood than is now the case. The only way I could see to accomplish this would be to have the charges laid on the DCI in the Presidential letters to him issued as a NSAM so that all members of the Community would be well apprised of what the President expects of the DCI. I explained to Bill the workings of the NIRB and our hopes for it as a means of achieving better knowledge of and coordination of one another's efforts in the positive intelligence field.
4. With the exception of paragraphs 8, 10, and 14 we did not touch on the 16 items mentioned in the enclosure to Bill's letter./3/ Even as regards paragraphs 8, 10 and 14 our conversation did not go into specifics except as otherwise outlined elsewhere herein.
/3/Attachment to Document 281.
5. Bill suggested the idea that a careful and thorough look at the entire Intelligence Community and its works might be undertaken by a special group of senior and knowledgeable officers in the Intelligence Community. I said that I did not think that such a procedure would be effective because of the conflicting loyalties and parochial views that would inevitably creep into such an examination, and gave as an example the difficulties which beset the Eaton Study Group. I said that I thought a better way of doing business of this sort would be for a stream-lined Board such as the PFIAB to establish, under a strong and knowledgeable Executive Secretary, a permanent working group of knowledgeable individuals whose function would be to determine by inspection and inquiry whether the DCI's instructions and recommendations for coordination of the national intelligence effort were being followed by the various members of the Intelligence Community and, if not, why not. Such a group would be in essence a sort of Inspectorate General of the PFIAB, totally supra-agency or department. I said that as far as I could tell, only the Bureau of the Budget conducts such surveys under the present organizational scheme of things and that their point of view, being oriented towards dollar savings, is not helpful in many cases. I expressed further the view that lack of mechanisms of the kind that we were discussing has permitted the Bureau of the Budget to become much more knowledgeable and influential than it ought to be in substantive affairs for which it has no responsibility.
6. We ended on the note that if Bill would take the initiative in the Department of Justice for suggestions to emanate from the Attorney General with regard to better coordination of the U.S. counterintelligence effort as it affects domestic tranquility, the DCI would be, and in fact is, addressing himself with the new Administration to those improvements which might effect the accomplishment of the purposes outlined in Bill's letter.
7. All in all, the discussion was rather general and agreeable from the standpoint that we both agreed that there certainly ought to be improvements but neither of us was sure just how to go about achieving them. We agreed that the thoughts expressed above were useful if for no other purpose than to provoke better thoughts.
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