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 You are in: Under Secretary for Public Diplomacy and Public Affairs > Bureau of Public Affairs > Bureau of Public Affairs: Office of the Historian > Foreign Relations of the United States > Kennedy Administration > Volume XIX
Foreign Relations, 1961-1963, South Asia
Released by the Office of the Historian

1. Editorial Note

A number of major issues affected U.S. policy toward South Asia during the period 1961 - 1963. Most of these issues had deep roots and were inherited by the Kennedy administration when it took office in January 1961. Two of the more intractable problems dated back to the partition of the subcontinent in 1947 and the establishment of Pakistan. Among other tensions created with the birth of Pakistan were boundary disputes between Pakistan and India, and also between Pakistan and Afghanistan. The dispute between Pakistan and India was over rival claims to territory in the state of Jammu and Kashmir. The Kashmir dispute was the most serious of the problems affecting the subcontinent, and had the effect of creating the intermittent threat of armed conflict between India and Pakistan. The dispute between Pakistan and Afghanistan was over the Pathan tribal area of Pakistan along the Northwest frontier, referred to by Afghans as Pushtunistan. The United States, which had encouraged Pakistan to become a part of the Western alliance system as a member of both the Central Treaty Organization (CENTO) and the Southeast Asia Treaty Organization (SEATO) during the Eisenhower administration, had sought periodically to foster compromise solutions to these boundary disputes, but to no avail. A third boundary dispute, between India and China in the Ladakh district of Kashmir and along the McMahon Line which marked the boundary between China and India's Northeast Frontier Agency, posed no problems of mixed sympathy for the Kennedy administration, given the tensions that existed between the United States and the People's Republic of China.

U.S. concern to foster solutions to the disputes between Pakistan and its neighbors was magnified by competition between the United States and the Soviet Union for influence in South Asia. Policymakers in Washington were particularly concerned to prevent the expansion of Soviet influence in India, the leading and most populous of the neutral nations. They were also concerned about Soviet influence in Afghanistan, traditionally viewed as the gateway to the subcontinent.

Documentation on all of these issues is in Foreign Relations volumes dealing with South Asia for the 1947 - 1960 period. For material on the major issues affecting South Asia during the last years of the Eisenhower administration, see Foreign Relations, 1958 - 1960, volume XV, pages 1 - 823.

2. Memorandum From the Assistant Secretary of State for Near Eastern and South Asian Affairs (Jones) to Secretary of State Rusk/1/

/1/Source: Department of State, NEA/SOA Files: Lot 66 D 7, Pakistan, 1961. Secret. Drafted by Theodore E. Weil (NEA/SOA).

Washington, January 31, 1961.

Significant Problems: Trends in Pakistan

Reports from our Ambassador in Karachi during recent months indicate the possibility that in certain quarters in Pakistan there is a trend toward a neutralist position. While President Ayub and his Government give every evidence of continuing as loyal allies and friends of the United States, there are indications that they may not wish to maintain a defiant attitude toward the U.S.S.R., but that they may wish to reach some sort of an accommodation. To date the principal manifestation of this possible trend is the Pakistan negotiation with the U.S.S.R. for a Soviet oil exploration team which the Pakistanis declined to consider when it was first offered by the Soviets in 1958. The U.S.S.R., for its part, following its propaganda attacks on Pakistan at the time of the U - 2 incident, appears to have engaged in a strategic retreat vis-à-vis Pakistan and has been deliberately friendly in its relations.

Our Ambassador in Karachi believes United States - Pakistan relations may have reached a critical stage and that Pakistan policies may be significantly influenced during the next few months by United States statements and actions. He also believes that if the U.S.S.R. brings an oil exploration team to Pakistan, it may enjoy "a major propaganda break-through."

The Ambassador likewise reports a feeling of insecurity among the people of Pakistan in matters pertaining to relations with the West and states that doubts are generated by press reports of possible increases in aid to India which omit reference to Pakistan.

The Ambassador reports that President Ayub continues to give assurances that his Government strongly supports collective security and other concepts in harmony with United States policies; that he emphasizes an urgent need for United States declarations making it clear that we attach great importance to nations allied with the West and feels the United States should use the leverage of aid to India to persuade the Indians to pursue "less pro-communist lines."

The Ambassador therefore believes there is an urgent need for a statement at the earliest practicable date which will reassure our Pakistani allies regarding our attitudes.

I believe there is convincing evidence that responsible Pakistanis are considering the desirability of moving toward a more nearly neutral position between the U.S.S.R. and the United States, and that it would be in our interest to include in our public statements evidence that we do not take Pakistan for granted; that we intend to honor our military commitments and continue our aid programs.

3. Memorandum of Conversation/1/

/1/Source: Department of State, Central Files, 791.5 - MSP/2 - 861. Official Use Only.
Drafted by J. Wesley Adams (NEA/SOA) on February 13 and approved in B on February 20.

Washington, February 8, 1961.

United States Aid to India

Mr. B. K. Nehru, Commissioner General for Economic Affairs, India
Mr. George W. Ball, Under Secretary for Economic Affairs
NEA--Mr. Howard R. Cottam, Deputy Assistant Secretary for Economic and Regional Affairs
OR--Mr. Sidney B. Jacques, Director, Office of International Resources
SOA--J. Wesley Adams, Officer in Charge, Economic Affairs

Foreign Aid Requirements of Third Plan

Following an exchange of pleasantries, Mr. Nehru presented a statement on India's requirements for foreign aid to cover its Third Five-Year Plan beginning April 1, 1961 (Annex A)./2/ The figures contained therein, he said, were revisions of those set forth in a previous memorandum/3/ which he had supplied Under Secretary Bowles, and which he understood the Under Secretary had given to the Under Secretary for Economic Affairs. In its essentials this memorandum proposed: (1) a U.S. commitment in principle to support India's's Third Plan up to a certain ceiling of aid, (2) a substantial amount of "free" or "non project" aid, (3) "untied" aid and (4) that India, on a population basis and for compelling political reasons, had a good case for receiving "substantially more than one-third" of total American aid.

/2/The annexes are not attached.

/3/A copy of this undated memorandum is attached to a January 31 covering transmittal memorandum from S/S to NEA. (Department of State, NEA/SOA/E Files: Lot 65 D 115, Third Five Year Plan)

Following his perusal of Mr. Nehru's document Mr. Ball remarked that, as Mr. Nehru was well aware, current United States laws and regulations made it difficult to accede at this time to some of the proposals advanced in the memorandum. He commented on particular points as follows:

(1) Long-Term Commitment. The problem of a long-term commitment in support of the development programs of various countries was currently under consideration by the Administration. He could not predict the final results of this study but could assure Mr. Nehru of the Administration's sympathetic interest in supporting India's development.

(2) Tied Loans. Mr. Ball said that he personally hoped that the United States might be able eventually to move away from the present strict position on U.S. procurement. In view of the current balance of payments position, however, he doubted that there was any immediate prospect of our being able to depart from this policy. The issue, he said, was tied up with a resolution of basic long-term problems of capital movements.

(3) Amounts of Assistance. Here again, Mr. Ball explained that the Administration had under study the over-all problem of volume and type of aid which it might be able to provide on a global basis. As Mr. Nehru was aware, the U.S. was subject to ever-widening demands on its resources.

Mr. Nehru said that his government was faced with three main problems with respect to the financing of its Third Plan:

First, he said, was the volume of aid and in this context he reviewed briefly the history of the efforts of the creditor or consortium countries to assist India. Unfortunately, he said, these countries had not been able to make available the full amount of $1,050 million in aid which had been indicated over the last few years. With the greater expenditures contemplated over the Third Plan the Government of India will need even greater foreign assistance than in the past if its Plans are to prove successful.

Secondly, it was most important that India obtain, to the extent possible, advance commitments of aid in order that the Plan projects might go forward without hindrance. He knew it would be difficult under present U.S. legislation, but hoped it might be possible for the United States to make a general commitment of support up to a certain amount, to be followed by annual appropriations and with the money to be disbursed as required.

A third problem concerned the organization of aid to India. The International Bank for Reconstruction and Development, he said, intended to invite all of the capital exporting countries to participate in the next meeting of the "Aid India Club" now expected to convene in April in London. Mr. Nehru said that if this meeting were to prove successful in producing firm commitments of substantial aid it was important that the United States begin conversations now to urge on the European participants the importance of their coming to that meeting prepared to make firm commitments. In this connection, he presented a table of a proposed apportionment of aid to India among the contributing countries (Annex B).

Asked by Mr. Ball whether the figure of $500 million included in the Indian table as the amount of aid to be obtained from the IBRD and IDA had, in fact, been discussed with Bank officials, Mr. Nehru said that it had. He remarked that both institutions and, in particular, the IDA, should be able to make a more substantial contribution. Noting that the Soviets had already promised $500 million in support of the Third Plan, he said that the GOI expected that the USSR would contribute an additional two sums of $150 million each. Mr. Ball thanked Mr. Nehru for the table.

Sugar Quota for India

Remarking that Ambassador Chagla had already made a representation on the matter to Secretary Rusk, Mr. Nehru urged that favorable consideration be given to the Indian request for a sugar quota of 500,000 tons in the U.S. market. This request, he said, was closely tied in with the external financing of India's Third Plan. If granted, it would enable India to earn very substantial additional funds through commercial exports. Mr. Ball explained that the question of U.S. imports of sugar was currently before the Congress and that we had no way of forecasting what action the Congress might take; however, we would certainly keep the Indian request in mind. Mr. Nehru expressed his appreciation of the legislative aspect and stated that the purpose of his representation was to urge favorable consideration in any recommendations the Department might forward to Congress. He asked if there was any possibility that India might be granted a temporary allocation under existing legislation. Mr. Ball replied that it was his understanding that, under the law, the present quota countries stood first in line, and that only if these countries were unable to supply all of their entitlement could other countries be considered. Mr. Nehru concluded this point by asserting that it would help India enormously if it could obtain an export market for this very important industry.

Barter of Ferromanganese

As a last point Mr. Nehru inquired if it would be possible to negotiate a barter agreement wherein India would provide the United States with ferromanganese in return for agricultural commodities which would be re-exported by India to third countries in exchange for other commodities required by India. Commenting that he did not know if this would be possible, Mr. Ball said that he would investigate the matter.

In conclusion, Mr. Nehru said that Mr. Ball could expect him "to be something of a nuisance." India, he said, was a huge country and its problems and needs were great. He hoped that the United States would be able to continue the assistance which it had so generously offered in the past. Mr. Ball replied that he would be glad to receive Mr. Nehru at any time and that we intended to be of all possible assistance within the limits of our capabilities and our world-wide commitments.

4. Letter From the Ambassador to Pakistan (Rountree) to the Director of the Office of South Asian Affairs (Weil)/1/

/1/Source: Department of State, Central Files, 690D.91/2 - 861. Secret; Official - Informal.

Karachi, February 8, 1961.

Dear Tom: My colleagues and I have read with interest your paper entitled "Another Look at the Kashmir Problem," which was sent with your transmittal slip of January 5, 1961./2/

/2/The summary and conclusions portion of this paper, which was prepared by the Policy Planning Staff on November 18, 1960, is printed in Foreign Relations, 1958 - 1960, vol. XV, p. 214. The complete paper is in Department of State, S/P Files: Lot 67 D 548, India.

I find the paper in general a good outline of the problem, and am in general agreement with most of its contents. I am inclined to believe, however, that the general tone of the paper reflects a bit more optimism that Ayub and Nehru will succeed in finding a solution to the problem than events, particularly of the recent past, would support. Certainly the Pakistanis have become extremely disillusioned and believe even more strongly than before that some pressure will have to be applied on the Indians before they will move from their present adamant position. Yet the Pakistanis, and particularly Ayub, have often voiced the themes appearing in the paper that "progress toward a solution is apt to be directly dependent upon Ayub and Nehru," and "it will be more difficult to achieve a solution at a later date when Nehru and Ayub have passed from the scene." Ayub has long felt that only a strong leader in Pakistan such as himself, and a strong leader in India such as Nehru, can hope to solve the problem by peaceful means pursuant to arrangements which could be rendered acceptable to their respective publics.

As you know, President Ayub, as well as most Pakistanis, believes that the United States has not used to the extent that it should its appreciable potential influence upon Nehru to move toward a settlement of the Kashmir problem. Ayub and his cabinet fully understand the reasons for massive American aid to India and, although this has not always been the case, it is true now at least that they recognize that such aid to India is in fact in Pakistan's interest, as well as in the interest of the entire free world. Their main concern is that we have not used Nehru's imperative need for American assistance as an instrument to persuade him to be reasonable on the Kashmir problem, a solution to which is considered to be essential for the stability of and real progress in the area.

Apart from the general improvement of Pakistan - Indian relations which has taken place under Ayub's regime, there have been two significant developments which have led us to hope that a solution to Kashmir is not impossible. One is the fact that the Pakistanis cautiously state that the plebiscite called for by the United Nations (which they seem to recognize India will never accept) is not the only means by which the problem can be solved, and they have indicated a willingness to discuss some sort of partition. The other is the fact that Nehru disclosed a willingness in his last meeting with Ayub at least to discuss Kashmir, implying some basis other than India's claims to the entire area.

In light of this situation, I have some reservations about the statement in the paper that "for friends of India and Pakistan to intervene at this time with proposals for a solution would undoubtedly be counterproductive." As indicated above, this is not true in the case of Pakistan. In fact, the opposite is more nearly the case. The lack of American efforts to help find a solution is a continuing and major source of Pakistani disillusionment and dissatisfaction with us.

I realize that any approach to Nehru must be extremely cautious and couched in such terms as to avoid a reversal of the present excellent trend in Indo-American relations. Yet it seems to me that the expanded aid program to India and Pakistan, which appears likely, could provide an atmosphere and context conducive to some initiative on our part. Conversely, increased aid to India unrelated to Indo-Pakistan relations might drive Pakistan further away from us and confirm the already widespread conviction that Pakistan should also have the best of both worlds.

It is easy enough for me in Pakistan to make suggestions as to what we should do in India. Obviously, I am in no position accurately to evaluate the situation there and the prospects of any particular course of action vis-a-vis Nehru. Yet it does seem to me clear that, on the one hand, the tremendous advantages to be gained by some progress on Kashmir and, on the other hand, the dangers of increased and serious problems if no progress is made, render it advisable for us not to come to any firm conclusion that we should take no initiative at this time. I believe we should take some initiative, but the precise nature of it would have to be very carefully considered. Perhaps the recent assumption of power by the new United States administration which the Indians regard as very friendly towards them would provide an opportunity for some sort of review of the situation with Nehru for the purpose of urging him to advance discussions with Pakistan designed to settle the issue on a compromise basis.


P.S. I am enclosing an extra copy of this with the suggestion that it might be passed to George McGhee.

5. Telegram From the Embassy in Pakistan to the Department of State /1/

/1/Source: Department of State, Central Files, 611.90/2 - 1661. Secret.

Karachi, February 16, 1961, 1 p.m.

1374. Presidential Handling. President Ayub, who was in Karachi briefly en route to Dacca, telephoned last evening and asked me come to his house. Finance Minister Shoaib and Minister Fuel, Power and Water Resources Bhutto were with him (Bhutto is accompanying President to East Pakistan).

Ayub said he was thinking about asking Shoaib during his forthcoming visit in Washington to deliver personal letter to President Kennedy, and he wished talk about it informally with me and obtain my reaction. Letter would offer have Shoaib outline some of Ayub's thinking on US - Pakistan relations and his ideas concerning certain aspects of US policy. His purpose was to be helpful. He was convinced that if President Kennedy understood attitudes Pakistan and other Asian countries, particularly members of security alliances, he would be able to act appropriately to reverse present trend by which number of America's friends had begun to lose heart. President Ayub showed me text of letter which he proposed send and asked whether I thought President Kennedy would like to receive it and to have Shoaib elaborate his views. I responded I am confident President Kennedy would be happy to have President Ayub's views and, although I could not of course know whether it would be possible for him to do so, I had no doubt he would be willing to see Shoaib if his schedule permitted. Ayub asked me to seek appointment and our conversation then turned to substance of Ayub's concern re US - Pakistani relations.

Ayub reiterated that basic policy of GOP is predicated on belief that Pakistan's destiny lies in friendship with US. He had no doubt that US would continue to attach importance to this relationship on basis of alliance, and that there would be no shift in US policy inimical to Pakistan's interest. Nevertheless, he was frankly concerned that in pre-election speeches as well as in statements following assumption of office, administration leaders had on several occasions made warm statements concerning India and other neutrals and had not made such statements about Pakistan and other allies, except NATO. He said this had had disturbing effect not only in Pakistan but also in Iran, Thailand, Philippines and other countries. Also disturbing to United States Allies had been statements by President Eisenhower (to African representatives) as well as by new administration officials which gave impression that US welcomed neutralism. This connection, in responding to my comments context in which statements [made,] Ayub said he could well understand that US must say in effect that it did not insist upon countries joining security pacts against their wishes and that it desired them remain neutral if that was what they wanted, but impression unfortunately had been given that US actually encouraged neutralism and looked with greater favor upon neutralists than upon allies.

Ayub also made a point that he felt US friends, particularly in Asia, had been greatly weakened by extremely soft and almost frightened reaction of US Government to Khrushchev's bellicose threats at time of summit breakdown. When I explained again reasons for great restraint on part of US in responding to Soviet threats and bellicosity, President said while he understood this many Asians had not, and that this had weakened not only US but United States friends in Asia. "You cannot imagine how much this hurt us." He said US position in Asia should require firmness and courage, if US expected firmness and courage on part of anti Communist leaders.

In the course of this lengthy discussion it was recognized that present public speculation in Pakistan on course of Pakistani policies was due in part to concatenation of several circumstances, particularly (A) fear which President felt was unfounded, that attitude of newly installed US administration toward Pakistan would represent change and that Pakistan might be left in exposed position vis-a - vis Communist bloc, and (B) erroneous assumption that Soviet oil negotiations had implications going beyond actual purposes of GOP. President felt that as facts became clear and doubts removed, Pakistan public would be reassured. He reiterated several times what he has told me from the outset of negotiations with Soviets, i.e. that US had nothing to fear from this matter which he said was "relatively unimportant" and largely an effort on part of GOP to soften Soviets in their hostile attitude toward Pakistan particularly in connection with such questions as Kashmir and "Pushtunistan."

I sensed that President was somewhat in doubt as to whether he should give me a copy of the letter, since he assumed I would telegraph it in advance of Shoaib's visit. It was obvious that he attached great importance to the original being delivered to President Kennedy by Shoaib, so that latter would have opportunity to elaborate.

I strongly recommend that arrangements be made for Shoaib to call on the President as soon as convenient after his arrival in Washington February 24. I cannot exaggerate importance which I attach to President Ayub's being reassured at this time of our intention to continue to work with Pakistan as an ally, and encourage him to maintain his very strong pro-western and pro-American policies in context of collective security.

Text of letter copy in immediately following message./2/


/2/Document 6.

6. Telegram From the Embassy in Pakistan to the Department of State /1/

/1/Source: Department of State, Central Files, 611.90/2 - 1661. Secret; Presidential Handling.

Karachi, February 16, 1961, 3 p.m.

1375. Verbatim Text. Re immediately preceding telegram following is text of copy of letter given me by President Ayub:

Begin Text.

Dear Mr. President,

We in Pakistan are very happy on your election and on the excellent choice of your advisers. The wisdom and insight with which you are examining the problems of the world and the conviction with which you are giving expression to your views, give rise to the expectation that the Government of the United States of America will follow firm policies with courage and vigour. This is a heartening change for friends like us of America.

In the under-developed regions of the world today, two major forces are operating. The first is the force of communism with its fixed and unshakeable aim of world conquest and domination through whatever means might be considered effective in any given set of circumstances--subversion, instigation or aggression. the second is the growing feeling of resentment against the colonial powers. Somehow or other, this feeling has come to be crystalized as against The West. Of the Western Powers, their leader, namely, the United States of America is made the special target of antagonism. I may describe this second major force as anti-westernism and anti-Americanism.

The reaction to the spread of communism is different in different countries. In some, as in Pakistan, the government and the people are determined to keep this Godless creed out at all costs. We also fully believe that our destiny lies in friendship with the United States. It is therefore in the supreme interest of the West that this determination should be sustained. It cannot, however, be sustained fully if the attitude and policies in the West itself are calculated to undermine it or even create a sense of doubt in the minds of firm friends.

I have asked my Finance Minister, Mohammed Shoaib, who is visiting Washington in connection with a meeting of the World Bank, to deliver this letter personally to you. In case you would like to discuss the matter I have referred to in this letter, I am sure Mohammed Shoaib would be very happy to elucidate the point further.

With best wishes and very kind regards.

End Text.


7. Airgram From the Embassy in Afghanistan to the Department of State /1/

/1/Source: Department of State, Central Files, 789.5 - MSP/2 - 2161. Confidential.

Kabul, February 21, 1961.

G - 40. Following is text of letter I personally delivered Foreign Minister Naim February 21 setting forth current U.S. position on economic development aid to Afghanistan.

"American Embassy, Kabul, February 21, 1961.

"Your Royal Highness:

"During my recent visit to the United States, I took the opportunity to discuss with top officials of our new Administration the desire and plans of Afghanistan for economic and social development. During the course of my consultations, we reviewed the whole background and the pattern of American efforts to assist Afghanistan in carrying out its plans for development.

"At the outset, I should like you to know that I found great interest in and understanding of Afghanistan at high levels of the new Administration. On the basis of the Administration's review of the current world situation, I can assure you that it is the continuing desire and intention of the United States Government to assist Afghanistan in concrete, practical ways in its own development efforts.

"I know that Your Royal Highness' Government is now engaged in the complicated process of defining its goals and laying its plans for the years ahead in the light of the progress achieved in the years just past. With this in mind, it seemed to me that it might be timely and useful to examine in some detail the role of the United States in assisting in the economic and social development of Afghanistan.

"As you know, American assistance to Afghanistan began in 1949 when the Export - Import Bank made a loan of $21,000,000 for Helmand Valley development. Technical assistance began in 1952 with a small grant for an education program. From these beginnings, American assistance has grown over the succeeding ten years until, by June 30, 1960, approximately $162 million had been committed, including $23 million of wheat. During the current fiscal year, an additional $20 million has been committed, including $7 million of wheat, bringing the total to $182 million. Of this amount $51.7 million has been provided as loans while the bulk, or $130.3 million, has been in the form of grants.

"Equally important was the expansion of American assistance into wider fields. Whereas during the first five years aid was concentrated in the Helmand Valley project and technical assistance in the field of education, the succeeding years saw an expansion to include large-scale development assistance for the construction of roads, airports and educational buildings, as well as increased technical assistance in the fields of civil aviation, mining, agriculture and public administration.

"At present, all of these programs and projects are progressing. The landing field at Kandahar International Airport is in operation; Herat airfield is in an advanced stage of construction; paving is proceeding on the Torkham road and is about to begin on the Spin Baldak road while invitations to construction contractors to bid on the Kabul - Kandahar road will be issued about March 15 under the supervision of the Corps of Engineers. The new buildings for Kabul University are under construction.

"That is the situation at present. In considering the future, account should first be taken of the fact that all of these development projects and technical assistance programs will be carried forward into the period of the Second Five-Year Plan now being drawn up by Your Royal Highness' Government. In the course of the review undertaken in Washington during my consultations, a careful estimate was made of the probable future costs, during the next five years, of completing certain projects and continuing existing programs throughout the period of the next Five-Year Plan. It was calculated that this will require approximately $85 million in new funds during American fiscal years 1962 through 1966. In fact, taking into consideration the accelerating pace of our construction projects, our own provisional estimates, not as yet legislatively authorized, is that an additional obligation of some $30 million could be effectively used during our Fiscal Year 1962. I believe it safe for you to assume that continued aid is clearly implied by these estimates, subject of course to Congressional appropriations. Furthermore, in anticipation of completion of the draft Second Five-Year Plan, our technicians have been working with officials of the appropriate Ministries to identify and estimate requirements for U.S. assistance in certain fields, notably education, agriculture, public administration and specialized training abroad.

"In the specific field of education, the United States has made an exceptional arrangement, unparalleled anywhere else in the world, whereby Your Highness' Government has been assured that up to a specific sum (a little less than $17,000,000) can be made available, subject of course to Congressional appropriations, over the next five years for development and technical assistance in the field of education. This has been made possible by a special decision, approved at the highest level, in the hope that it would facilitate sound forward planning of development in this complex field, particularly at this time, when Your Highness' Government is preparing its plans for the next five years. We have been able to make this special arrangement in the field of education because of our long experience in this field in Afghanistan, our knowledge of your plans and the well-defined limits of the field, combined with the benefit of United States sponsored specialized studies of Kabul University and of the development of primary and elementary education.

"I had the opportunity while in Washington to make known Your Government's desire for a long term commitment to assist in the development of Your country under its Second Five-Year Plan to all the top officials in the new Administration who have responsibility in matters pertaining to foreign assistance. I found these officials greatly interested in being fully informed of this problem since they are now engaged in a searching review of our world-wide assistance program with a view to determining how legislation and procedures might be improved.

"The general desirability of longer term commitments is recognized and the possibilities of obtaining the necessary legislative authority are being carefully analyzed. This is a complex matter involving the legal distribution of authority between various branches of our Government. The outcome of these studies will naturally take some time. In the meantime the new Administration had to conclude that it was not in a position to make such long term commitments to any particular nation at the present time. Our inability to make such a decision at the present time of course in no way alters our desire to continue to assist your country to the limit of our ability, taking into consideration the total resources available to us for assistance to nations around the world in the development of their countries and improvement of the standard of living of their people.

"Furthermore, you may assume that my Government reaffirms its willingness to consider new projects, including design and feasibility studies therefor, submitted through normal aid channels for consideration by ICA, DLF, and other institutions. We remain as well willing to consider future requests for agricultural commodities to provide such supplies to your people and to assist in your efforts to raise local currency for further development. For the immediate future, I am authorized to inform you that we would consider without delay a request from Your Government for an additional 50 thousand tons of wheat under the same arrangements as concluded with Your Government on November 16, 1960.

"I am further authorized to inform you that we are prepared to furnish on a top priority basis the services of an economic advisory team to Your Government to work with Your Ministry of Planning in conducting reviews, not binding on either of our Governments, of development projects, resources, implications of development activities already going on, and feasible methods as to further future development. This is a normal approach which has been accepted by other countries to help provide the technical basis for decisions as to the future direction and extent of foreign assistance. You may be assured that such an advisory team would come to your country on a continuing basis, and with an open mind prepared to arrive at independent conclusions concerning levels and types of development, taking into consideration the availability of Afghan manpower and natural resources, and other economic considerations. The advisory team would be from a non-governmental institution and technical recommendations that they would make would not be under U.S. Government supervision or influence. I shall eagerly await word as to whether such a group of advisors is desired by Your Government.

"I am also authorized to inform you that my Government can make available an additional amount of $10 million for irrigation, drainage and other land and water development within the Helmand Valley. This amount will be obligated in segments over the next several years, and the first segment will be available for expenditure as soon as plans for its most effective utilization can be finalized with the assistance of our Bureau of Reclamation team now working in the Valley. It is my understanding that considerable progress has already been made in the development of such plans and we on our part hope that these plans will be finalized as quickly as possible through mutual agreement as to the best possible expenditure of these funds.

"While in Washington I was also able to secure approval on a previous request of Your Government that U.S. assistance be furnished to help in the establishment of a cartographic institute. Likewise the request of Your Government for assistance in establishing a film laboratory for the processing of film within Afghanistan was also approved. Appropriate officials from the Embassy, USOM, and USIS are prepared to discuss these matters in detail with appropriate members of Your Government.

"In addition, I am authorized to negotiate a $500,000 Educational Exchange (Fulbright) Agreement immediately, details of which I am submitting to Your Royal Highness separately.

"Finally, I should like to convey to Your Highness the sense of encouragement which I experienced in recently observing, at first hand, the intense efforts being made by the new Administration to make our world-wide assistance programs as effective as humanly possible with a view to advancing the world a little closer to the goals of peace, progress and freedom which remain a dedicated objective of my Government.

"Accept, Your Royal Highness, the renewed assurances of my highest consideration."/2/

/2/In telegram 789 from Kabul, February 22, Byroade reported that Naim expressed pleasure at the overall tone and content of the letter, but was disappointed that the United States was unable to make a long-term commitment regarding the type of economic assistance that would facilitate planning on the part of the Afghan Government. (Ibid., 789.5 - MSP/2 - 2661)


8. Memorandum of Conversation /1/

/1/Source: Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Countries Series, Pakistan, General, 4/59 - 4/61. Confidential. Drafted by Jones. According to the President's Appointment Book, the meeting was held in the White House. (Ibid.) Shoaib visited Washington February 24 - March 11. Additional documentation on the Shoaib visit is in Department of State, Central Files 611.90D, 790D.00, and 890D.00.

Washington, March 7, 1961, 11 - 11:45 a.m.

Call of Pakistan Finance Minister on the President

The President
Mohamed Shoaib, Finance Minister of Pakistan
His Excellency Aziz Ahmed, Ambassador of Pakistan
G. Lewis Jones, Assistant Secretary of State for NEA

The President opened the conversation by expressing the opinion that finance ministers had the most difficult of all jobs in any government.

Shoaib said that he was honored to be received by the President and then handed the President a letter from Ayub Khan./2/ The President read this and then said it was a "fine letter." So many communications between Heads of States consisted only of generalities. This letter had substance. He asked when Shoaib was departing Washington and when told that he would depart March 11 the President said that he would give Shoaib a reply to take back with him.

/2/See Document 6.

The remainder of the conversation consisted principally of the President very skillfully drawing out the views of Shoaib on a variety of subjects. The President twice made the point that Pakistan was the friend and ally of the United States in "good times and bad." He said the U.S. valued Pakistan's friendship and its stalwart posture in international problems.


The President remarked that it was curious that the United States, which had never held any territory in Africa, should be grouped with the colonial powers. Shoaib replied that he was afraid that this was the inevitable result of world leadership: it was the price the United States paid for its preeminent position. Shoaib said that the anti-colonialist theme had a deeper appeal to the people of Africa and the Middle East than did anti-communism. The truth was that in many of these countries the people had had no experience with communism but they had had experience with colonialism. He said in the Middle East the strongest appearance of communism had been in Syria but Nasser had stepped in and redressed the situation. The President said that there had been communism also in Iraq. Shoaib said that Iraq was tremendously isolated and did not have much influence but Nasser's influence was all-pervading. There was a tendency in the Near East and in Africa to believe that Nasser is leading an anti-colonialist campaign: anti-colonialism becomes anti-West as a result of the French, Belgian and Portuguese presence in Africa. Because these countries are the allies of the U.S., the U.S. unfortunately is considered to be in the same category.


The President asked about Pakistan's relations with Afghanistan. Shoaib replied that the GOP felt that Prime Minister Daud had accepted too much aid of all kinds from the USSR to pull back. GOP feared that Afghanistan had "passed the point of return". It did not believe that King Zahir wanted this: Daud was responsible. Shoaib said that relations between the RGA and the GOP were tense but "of course there is no military problem." He told how a tribal army coming from Afghanistan had been routed by the tribesmen on the Pakistan side. (Note: he did not mention Khrushchev's support for the Pushtunistan theory.)


The President said: "What about Iran?" Shoaib replied that Iran was the subject of constant concern on the part of the GOP. President Ayub stopped there whenever he travelled in order to talk to the Shah. He said that the GOP was convinced that the Shah was solidly pro-West. The country had, however, mismanaged its very considerable resources. The people had looked poorer to him the last time he had been there. The elections in Iran had not gone very well and the country was subjected to vitriolic radio attacks from the USSR. The Shah had a large body of ideas regarding his army and at one time had suggested he might become the Supreme Commander of CENTO. Shoaib repeated that he did not believe that Iran would turn neutralist.


The President asked whether Shoaib had any ideas with regard to Laos. Shoaib replied that he did not feel competent to talk on this complicated subject.

Aid Program

The President said that the administration was going to have difficulties with the Congress in getting through its aid program. It was difficult to go before the Congress year after year seeking money for foreign aid. The Congress had in mind "bad experiences" with foreign aid such as the $300,000,000 spent in Laos. However, the administration was going to fight hard.

Oil Prospecting Agreement with USSR

The President asked Shoaib about the $30,000,000 agreement recently reached between the GOP and the USSR for oil prospecting. He said he understood that American oil companies had prospected for oil in Pakistan but were thought not to have done a good job--not to have looked very hard. Shoaib said that this impression did not exist among Pakistanis who knew the real situation. Eight or nine foreign companies had spent between seventy and eighty million dollars prospecting for oil in Pakistan. Unfortunately, they had only found gas. Over three years ago the USSR had suggested that it could find oil in Pakistan and would like to try. The GOP considered long and carefully and finally decided to let the USSR work in the area not given as concessions to foreign companies. This was the result of a "change of attitude" towards the GOP on the part of the USSR: earlier the USSR had insisted that the GOP, if it wished to be helped by the Soviets, should withdraw from its alliances--now the USSR said keep your alliances, we will help you anyway. Shoaib said that in negotiating the agreement a very interesting fact had emerged. The Soviets had said that they had three rates of interest. For communist countries the interest was 2%; for neutralist countries the rate of interest was 2-1/2% and for Western committed countries the rate was 4%. The GOP replied that if the interest was to be 4% the deal was off whereupon the USSR quickly agreed to 2-1/2% interest on the $30,000,000 credit of which $25,000,000, approximately, would be in the form of drilling machinery and associated equipment. Only about $5,000,000 would be for technical assistance.

The President commented that if the Russians did find oil this would cause the American companies who had earlier looked for oil in Pakistan to lose face. Shoaib replied that the Soviet Ambassador had commented that if the USSR did not find oil the USSR would lose face.

Indian - Pakistan Relations

The President asked how relations with India were going. Shoaib replied that regrettably, since the Indus Waters Agreement, relations had not been improving. The outstanding question between the two countries was Kashmir. When Nehru had visited Karachi last fall Ayub had had a number of talks with him suggesting that a solution to the Kashmir problem should be found which would take account of the interests of the three parties: the Kashmiris, the Indians and the Pakistanis. Nehru had not followed up on this. Shoaib had spent two hours with him not long ago in Delhi and Nehru had not raised the subject. Every Pakistani in every walk of life felt very deeply about Kashmir. There could be no really close relations between the two countries until Kashmir was settled. (Note: Shoaib did not make the point that the United States should bring pressure on India to achieve a settlement.)

Relations with Communist China

The President asked whether Shoaib thought that the Russians would be able to restrain the Chinese Communists. Shoaib replied that he did not know. The ChiComs had recently made overtures to the GOP in connection with the delineation of Pakistan's northern frontier. The GOP was not sure what the ChiComs had in mind but they gathered that they were prepared to reach a settlement, if only to bring pressure on India (he laughed). He said that the ChiComs would say that they were able to reach an agreement on their border with Burma, Nepal, and Pakistan and that the Indians were at fault in not agreeing also.

Pakistan's Economic Development

The President gave Shoaib an opportunity to speak on the subject of Pakistan's economic development. Shoaib said that all countries make mistakes in their economic plans and execution but he was pleased to say that he thought the GOP is now on the right track and that it is moving forward with its plans to benefit the people of Pakistan. He mentioned the GOP desire to have more PL 480/3/ to increase the calorie intake. He said that Mr. Galbraith, shortly to be appointed United States Ambassador to India, had gone over the GOP plans and had found them good.

/3/P.L. 480 was formally entitled the Agricultural Trade Development and Assistance Act, enacted on July 10, 1954. For text, see 68 Stat. 454.

On the political side, Shoaib said that some progress was being made in connection with the Constitution but he did not dwell on this.

Communal Rioting

With regard to Indian - Pakistan relations Shoaib told the President that one reason why there had been a deterioration was the communal killings which had recently taken place in India. Resentment against this ran high in Pakistan and there had been some student rioting in Karachi. Shoaib said that according to "Dawn" about 1000 Moslems had died in India. Lewis Jones quoted the Embassy in Delhi as having estimated the actual number of deaths in the neighborhood of 100 or 200 to which Shoaib did not demur. Shoaib said that India and Pakistan both have approximately 11% minorities from the point of view of religion--Moslems in India and Hindus in Pakistan. However, the population of India being so much greater the actual number of Moslems is much greater and the concern felt for their welfare in Pakistan is understandable. Shoaib repeated that in a recent incident a whole family had been burned to death by the Hindus. He then told the story of his rescuing a Moslem family from a Hindu mob some years ago. (Note: It was interesting to see both Shoaib and Aziz Ahmed speaking on this subject with real emotion. Both of them are highly intelligent, Western-educated individuals but they were profoundly moved.)

The President accompanied his visitors to the door of the office and said goodbye. Shoaib and Ahmed asked Jones what might be said to the press waiting outside. Jones showed them a text of the Department's 1469 to Karachi/4/ and Shoaib said he would use the points therein which he did to a fairly large group of reporters.

/4/Telegram 1469 to Karachi, March 6, transmitted the text of the press release that the White House planned to release following Shoaib's meeting with the President. (Department of State, Central Files, 790D.00/3 - 261)

The Pakistanis took Jones back to the Department in their car. They were evidently greatly pleased by the reception they had received and Shoaib spoke of the President's "genius for putting people at their ease."


The visit was a great success and the publicity regarding it in Pakistan will be useful. It is interesting that Shoaib did not mention to the President Pakistan's hope for additional military equipment or the agreement in principle to prepare a four-year PL 480 program for Pakistan.

9. Telegram From the Embassy in Afghanistan to the Department of State /1/

/1/Source: Department of State, Central Files, 689.90D/3 - 1461. Secret; Priority. Also sent Niact to Tehran for Harriman. Repeated to Moscow, Karachi, and London for Harriman. Harriman was en route from Europe to the Middle East at the time.

Kabul, March 14, 1961, 1 p.m.

859. Believe Department should be fully aware possibility we approaching serious crisis in Pakistani - Afghan relations.

Pushtun problem goes back in history long before advent to power of any current leaders involved. It became more acute at time Indian partition when tribesmen in unadministered areas given choice of joining India or Pakistan. Seizing on opportunity presented by Abdul Ghaffar Khan's opposition to referendum and his cooperation with Congress, RGA has since maintained that tribes should have been given additional choices of independence or joining Afghanistan. Upon coming into power in 1954, Daud made righting this "wrong" a foremost policy of his government. In 1955 issue reached stage of "flag incident" and closing of border by Pak and severe chilling Afghan relations with West. At this time, Soviets started major initiative to penetrate country economically, undermine neutrality and independence through foreign aid program and through aid and trade to tie Afghan economy to Communist bloc.

US has publicly recognized Durand Line/2/ and throughout has felt merits of issue largely on side Pakistan. US refrained from taking sides publicly in hope being effective bringing two sides together. Our efforts have been futile for many reasons among which are: 1. Deliberate vagueness of Afghan position which makes it difficult understand what they really want; and 2. Pakistan's persistent efforts pretend no problem exists which makes serious discussion extremely difficult.

/2/The boundary line between British India and Afghanistan drawn up by a British mission under Sir Henry Durand and agreed to by Amir Abdur Rahman Khan of Afghanistan on November 12, 1893. For the text of the agreement, see British and Foreign State Papers, vol. 95, 1901 - 1902, p. 1049.

When Ayub came to power he apparently decided that handling RGA with kid gloves on this problem unwise. All evidence seems to indicate he has felt that blunt soldier-like approach was in best interests Pakistani.

He took lead in publicly calling Pushtunistan issue a "stunt" and otherwise showed condescending attitude towards Royal family and Afghan. He has justified his approach by saying he believed tough approach would drive Afghan to its knees and then it would come crawling to West. We have not agreed his approach but have been unable convince him otherwise.

Afghan position has correspondingly hardened, and preoccupation with this issue has become paramount over all others recently, including development, the other keystone to Daud's policy. It led him into abortive attempt to retain influence in tribal areas of Pakistan last fall when he sent large group of tribesmen across Durand Line. These were slaughtered in ambush by Pakistanis, resulting in great loss of face for Daud and serious challenge to him personally to remain head of government. Pak followed up quickly to take advantage of situation and extend its control by stationing political agents and para-military personnel throughout area to bring it for first time under effective control by any government. Winter came and activities largely ceased due to inaccessibility.

This consolidation of Pak control is direct challenge to RGA's avowed Pushtunistan policy and recognized as such by the government. Our estimate is that Daud and Naim see no course other than to bow in defeat or take some action on their own to recoup their position. We believe they will choose latter, even though aware that it may lead to the end of Afghanistan as independent country and end of Royal family itself. While this may appear irrational and suicidal in American eyes, it is not entirely unprecedented reaction in Moslem Middle East. Daud's present illness, if anything, may well encourage rather than retard this type of thinking.

For the present, Afghan agents are doing what they can to stir up trouble across border. The fact that the area [they are?] apparently as successful as they are leads us to conviction that there is considerable local resentment among tribes across border against Pakistanis for taking over area. Pakistanis have taken dramatic counter-measures including use of modern aircraft which would certainly seem to increase emotions and tensions. Our efforts to urge restraint upon part of Pakistanis not very effective as they take position we know little about tribal area and our advice therefore not very pertinent.

We believe the RGA will probably push situation to stage of guerrilla warfare as means of showing action on their part in support of tribes and in hopes of attracting enough attention to begin internationalization of dispute by introduction into UN. This is certainly highly dangerous as Pakistanis seem likely to react militarily, quickly and with vigor. Our view is that Daud probably no longer has strength to weather such a chain of events, at least as Prime Minister. Only apparent successors, Ali Mohammed and Naim, are probably not of sufficient strength to hold government together. Successors in Royal Family with capability are in much younger age bracket and without popular support. Opposition groups in process formation are as yet unequipped to take over government without apparent period of chaos. One can visualize segments of Pakistani opinion who would be gratified by downfall of Royal Family as worthwhile end in itself, but we can not share their sanguinity without some certainty as to what is to follow.

In event open armed conflict or other unmistakable crisis growing out of border troubles, it possible USSR would side with Afghanistan. In such case, we would seem to have no alternative but unstinting support Pakistan, while, if chaos in Afghanistan should result, Russians might seize opportunity to attempt installation pro-Soviet regime. However, it our guess Russians at this time would not want this issue to create a new crisis, one of East - West conflict, forcing them take sides either in UN or in field. They must feel they are doing well at present in Afghanistan and they have made a small but impressive beginning toward a more favorable position in Pakistan. We believe Soviets would prefer play long-term political game for assured route to sea rather than short quick showdown to absorb Afghanistan.

Thus Soviets might conclude their interests best served by adopting hands-off attitude in event outbreak border hostilities. By withholding support Afghanistan would be left isolated and it is doubtful if present RGA could long survive the stresses which conflict with Pakistan would entail. The Soviets could well decide that proximity plus the foothold already achieved would then enable them to exert a decisive influence in choice of any successor government which might emerge. In the meantime their refusal to back Afghanistan would have a highly favorable effect on government leaders and public opinion in Pakistan and greatly expand bridgeheads of neutralist sentiment which now seem evident there.

For the present, the Afghans are obviously trying involve US politically in dispute to maximum extent possible. This probably why Naim made his naive suggestion to me to go myself as observer across border or send someone from my staff. It also probably why they over-playing press [concerning] use of US equipment and US involvement in support of Pakistanis. Daud's request to Harriman that US extend its "good offices"/3/ must also probably be looked upon at least partially in that light, although we should not deny that certain amount of honest desperation about current situation may also have been a motive.

/3/Harriman met with Daud in Rome on March 11. The discussion focused on Daud's concern about the use of military equipment provided to Pakistan by the United States to maintain control over what Daud referred to as the "independent areas" of Pushtunistan. Harriman pointed to the dilemma that the Pushtunistan dispute posed for the United States in that it involved a seemingly intractable quarrel between two countries with which the United States had friendly relations. Daud suggested that it might prove useful for the United States to offer its good offices to try to facilitate a settlement to the dispute. (Telegram 3513 from Rome, March 11; Department of State, Central Files, 689.90D/3 - 1161)

The history of US efforts either with formal good offices or in more informal efforts at reconciliation has not been a happy one. Another effort would seem unlikely to succeed unless Afghan position could be more realistically defined and Ayub could be convinced honestly to try find some face-saving solution for RGA that did not prejudice Pakistan's vital interest.

On the other hand it difficult to sit idly by and face prospect not only loss of our considerable investment here but of this issue becoming active additional trouble spot in world situation. One immediate thought for Department to consider is whether Ayub could be informally induced see Daud in Rome en route back from London. In view his [garble] past efforts am hesitant to recommend that US formally urge Ayub to such a course. I discussed such a possibility with Pakistanian Ambassador recently, making clear that I not recommending such a course either to him or to Washington. He seemed to feel that it might be a good idea.

Department should consider whether Harriman should not see Ayub if possible when he returns to London. Harriman could inform Ayub directly circumstances of visit with Daud so as to lay any false suspicions that may arise, and of course hear directly Ayub's side of story. Occasion might arise for Harriman, in obvious personal manner and not under instructions of President, to query Ayub as to whether it would not be worthwhile for him to see Daud while enroute home in order try avert dangerous situation. Am encouraged in making this suggestion by fact that Bhutto in discussion with Rountree (Karachi telegram 216)/4/ did not rule out possibility of direct Ayub - Daud meeting. It admittedly hard to see what concession either party would or could make, although mutual cessation of propaganda and withdrawal military forces in and adjacent to sensitive areas immediately comes to mind.

Will continue study what US might usefully do and forward any new thoughts that come to us.


/4/Telegram 1533 from Karachi, March 11, repeated to Kabul as telegram 216, reported on a March 10 discussion between Rountree and Acting Foreign Minister Bhutto concerning relations between Pakistan and Afghanistan. Acting under instructions from Washington, Rountree expressed concern about the use of equipment provided to Pakistan by the United States under the military assistance program. Bhutto justified the use by noting that Afghan agents were actively fomenting unrest in the Pathan tribal regions along the border with Afghanistan. Pakistan had to use what means it had for internal security purposes, but he assured Rountree that military equipment provided by the United States would not be used in connection with the dispute with Afghanistan except within Pakistan. Bhutto concluded that the dispute should be susceptible to solution by personal diplomacy by Ayub and Daud. (Ibid.)

10. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Pakistan /1/

/1/Source: Department of State, Central Files, 611.90D/3 - 1561. Confidential; Priority; Limit Distribution; Verbatim Text. Drafted by G. Lewis Jones, cleared by Dungan (White House) and in draft by Office of Soviet Union Affairs Director McSweeney, and approved in S/S by Walter J. Stoessel.

Washington, March 15, 1961, 1:04 p.m.

1533. Deliver following message President Ayub, advising date time delivery:

"March 11, 1961

Dear Mr. President:

I appreciate your letter of February 15 /2/ which was handed to me by Finance Minister Shoaib on March 7. I like its plain speaking and directness. This is not a time when problems should be obscured by friendly generalities. I agree with you that the force of communism has the `fixed and unshakable aim of world conquest and domination through whatever means might be considered effective in any given set of circumstances--subversion, instigation or aggression.' As I see it, this is the force which we must stop throughout the free world and weaken within the Sino - Soviet bloc itself. I can assure you that the United States has the determination to do this.

/2/See Document 6.

I was interested in your analysis of the resentment felt in some underdeveloped regions--feelings which have become crystalized against the Western powers, particularly the United States. As you know, the United States is not a colonial power and there are not many colonial powers, at least as usually defined by history, left in the world. More often than not, demagogues whip this dead or dying horse for their own ends, and are prompted to do so by those with sinister motives. Most colonial areas, again using their historical definition, are well on the road to being decolonialized, and in most cases are being materially assisted by the West in the process. It is not too difficult to foresee a period when the only territories left that can be described as colonialized will be the Sino-Soviet satellites and the Chinese Communist and Soviet provinces, in the Central Asian Muslim areas and elsewhere.

I know that I need not reaffirm the friendship which we in the United States feel toward the people of Pakistan. Our common goals, and our mutual understanding of the motivations of anti-western forces serve only to strengthen the ties of friendship between our two countries. The United States is seeking world peace with justice for all nations and it will continue to do so. Fortunately, we have friends and allies, such as Pakistan, who are pursuing the same ends.

I want you to know how helpful and informative my conversations with Mr. Shoaib and Ambassador Ahmed were, supplementing as they did your very thoughtful letter.

Mrs. Kennedy and I look forward with much pleasure to seeing you in November. Meanwhile, I hope you will not hesitate to write me whenever you consider it useful. For my part, I find these exchanges most helpful and shall continue to keep in touch with you on matters of common concern.

With warm personal regards,

Sincerely, John F. Kennedy"

White House desires text this message not become public. Signed original being pouched.


11. Telegram From the Embassy in Pakistan to the Department of State /1/

/1/Source: Department of State, Central Files, 611.90D/3 - 2261. Secret; Limit Distribution. Harriman visited Pakistan March 19 - 22 as part of a fact-finding trip for President Kennedy, which included stops in Europe, Africa, the Middle East, and South Asia.

Karachi, March 22, 1961, 7 p.m.

1622. Reference immediately preceding telegram,/2/ following report of Ambassador Harriman's conversations with President Ayub:

/2/In telegram 1621 from Karachi, March 22, Rountree summarized Harriman's "highly successful" visit to Pakistan. Harriman met with Ayub for a total of 5-1/2 hours on March 20, beginning with a meeting at 11:30 a.m. and concluding in the evening in Rawalpindi, following a trip together from Karachi on Ayub's plane. (Ibid.) Telegram 1622 begins with a report on the 11:30 meeting, but is apparently a composite report of the discussions throughout the day.

At outset meeting and in accordance understanding with Ambassador Harriman, I delivered original of President Kennedy's letter March 11/3/ and text message March 18./4/ These were read by Ayub and provided excellent background for discussions. Harriman explained purposes visit, emphasizing U.S. interest in Pakistan and our appreciation of Pakistan as ally. He said President Kennedy desired share with Ayub views on matters of common interest, and was looking forward to Ayub's visit in November. Harriman spoke at some length on general aspects U.S. policy and atmosphere in Washington.

/3/See Document 10.

/4/Telegram 1567 to Karachi, March 18, transmitted a message from Kennedy to Ayub to be delivered by Harriman when he arrived. The message explained Harriman's fact-finding mission. The telegram also transmitted a similar message to Nehru, to be delivered by Harriman in New Delhi. (Department of State, Central Files, 611.90D/3 - 1861)

Ayub expressed sincere appreciation for letters and warmly welcomed Harriman. He said he had been tremendously impressed by President Kennedy and by energy of present administration, which he thought would take initiative in world affairs consistent with U.S. leadership role. He said that, speaking frankly, "people" had felt that speeches made in course U.S. election campaign had indicated there would be change in American attitudes toward Pakistan and other allies to their detriment, but he had never felt so himself. He knew U.S. needed Pakistan as Pakistan needed U.S. He had felt for some time that U.S. was losing its leadership; that previous administration lacked power of quick decision. He thought this situation would be greatly improved under new leadership. He said his government was trying to improve relations with other countries and had taken some steps to "normalize" Pakistan's relations with China and USSR. Nevertheless, focal point of Pakistan's policy continued to be friendship with U.S. and we could count on Pakistan as true friend and ally. He had no doubt as to intentions of Communist bloc to achieve world domination, and only way of preventing this was for free world to stand together.

[Here follows discussion unrelated to South Asia.]

Afghanistan: Harriman told Ayub of his talk in Rome with Daud, and Pak-Afghan relations discussed generally. Ayub reiterated his desire have good relations with Afghanistan, but expressed great annoyance with Afghan activities and fact country seemed becoming more under influence Soviet Union. He reviewed his talks with Naim January 1960 along lines previously reported, and described Bajaur operations of last September. He said this had resulted in trouble between Afghan tribes and RGA and said RGA had employed force, including Soviet supplied aircraft, against dissident tribal elements. He had hoped Afghans had learned lesson as result crushing defeat inflicted by Pakistan tribes upon intruders. However, current intelligence reports indicated substantial military build-up in Afghan territory across from Bajaur. He thought between five and eight brigades were in position. Afghan agents extremely active in Pakistan tribal area endeavoring foment revolt. Harriman mentioned Afghan complaint that Pakistanis using US military equipment, including planes for bombing in tribal region. He said while we recognized GOP right to maintain internal security, he concerned that use of US equipment had become issue in Afghanistan.

We were making efforts to avoid having Afghan turn more to Soviets and it was our hope that current troubles would be handled with restraint. Ayub responded that he sure Pakistan had enough equipment of its own to deal with Afghanistan intrusions into Pakistan. Although he did not say that American aircraft would not be used in future, he described reconnaissance operation and small-scale bombing of two houses and said those had been grossly exaggerated by Afghanistan. He said we could be certain Pakistan would behave in responsible manner.

In course this talk President said he understood why US extending aid to Afghan and stated our common hope was that Afghanistan would be saved from Soviet takeover. He was not optimistic as to prospects of success so long as Daud in control. Foreign Minister commented he thought US should continue its aid programs in Afghanistan and continue try talk sense into Afghan heads.

India and Nehru: Ayub told Harriman of his talks with Nehru in London. He had told Nehru of his earnest wish to come to agreement on water problems between India and East Pakistan arising from desire each country build dams on Ganges River which might affect the other. He had suggested that commission headed by Pakistani Minister go to India to negotiate with similar Indian commission. Nehru had been receptive to this idea and had asked Ayub write him letter setting forth his plan. Ayub encouraged to believe this problem might be worked out satisfactorily and had told Nehru so. He had gone on to say he wanted to work out all problems with India, particularly Kashmir. He had told Nehru solution to Kashmir problem would bring Indo - Pakistan relations to point where both governments could effect substantial savings in their defense budgets, and could concentrate upon defense matters affecting them both. Ayub said, however, that while he was talking about Kashmir Nehru assumed his "far away attitude" and did not respond.

Ayub set forth at length his views on importance of solution to Kashmir problem and his belief that US should do more to bring Nehru around to negotiation. He was concerned that if problem not settled while Nehru alive it would be extremely difficult to settle it later. This issue poisoned relations between two countries and made it impossible for them to make progress as otherwise would be the case.

In course discussion of India, Ayub again expressed fear that India would disintegrate in years to come and that portions at least would become Communist. Nehru and Congress Party were now cohesive force, but with departure of present leadership stresses and strains within country would greatly intensify under Communist pressure. He understood concept of US aid to India and recognized this in interest not only of US but of Pakistan and rest of free world. He felt objective of American aid would be greatly advanced and that future prospect of India would be improved if Kashmir problem worked out so that India and Pakistan could cooperate rather than live as enemies.

Communist China and border negotiations: Ayub and Harriman in course private talk discussed China and Chinese representation issue, in connection with which I understand Harriman will personally report. Harriman told me that during this talk question Pakistani willingness to negotiate with Chinese on border arose, and Ayub had followed line generally set forth Embtel 1483./5/ He had emphasized that negotiations based upon GOP desire to avoid trouble with China and not any desire to embarrass India. He had also recognized possibility of arrangement between Moscow and Peking in which Moscow giving impression of being sympathetic to India vis-a-vis China and Chinese giving impression sympathy with Pakistan vis-a-vis India. He had said he would not fall in that trap. This matter discussed further in presence of Foreign Minister and myself. In aside to me Foreign Minister commented that while original intention had been to confine negotiations to Hunza border, more recently it had been decided it would not be practical to do this. Thus GOP thinking of discussing with Chinese arrangement covering entire Sinkiang border from Afghanistan to a projection of cease-fire line. Arrangements would be entirely on de facto basis and would provide an understanding as to point beyond which Chinese military would not go in direction of Pakistani territory, and point beyond which Pakistani military would not go in direction Sinkiang, leaving aside legal question as to where border in fact exists. I asked whether he thought placing discussion on this basis would render Indians any less opposed and he replied that he did not know. He commented that at time of Nehru's visit last September GOP intention negotiate with China was discussed and each side showed other its maps. At that time Nehru had not seemed unduly disturbed over prospect of talks between China and Pakistan. (I might comment that this discussion left me confused as to what GOP now has in mind. I hope to obtain some clarification in near future.)

/5/In telegram 1483 from Karachi, March 3, Rountree reported on a conversation with Ayub on March 1 in which Ayub outlined what he said was the increasing threat to Pakistan's security posed by China. The best prospect for avoiding difficulties with China lay, he felt, in reaching agreement with the Chinese on the demarcation of the disputed border between Pakistan and China. (Ibid., 396.01 - VI/3 - 361)

Collective security and neutrals: Harriman explained to Ayub intention of US to continue strongly to support collective security. Secretary Rusk's plan attend CENTO and SEATO meetings was evidence of this. We valued our allies and intend continue work with them in spirit of alliances. Nevertheless, we considered it important to US and to free world generally that neutral nations be supported and helped, and it was intention of administration to do this. He pointed out that most so-called neutral countries were not in fact neutral in terms of their determination to preserve independence and to avoid being taken over by Communists. In order to do this they required assistance and we felt US, along with other western countries, must earnestly support them. President Ayub did not dissent from this philosophy and indeed seemed to understand and agree with it. His main point was that while helping neutrals US should maintain distinction between them and allies and pursue policies which would make it possible for nations to remain committed, undertaking risks which alliances entail. He spoke of importance of US having strong and effective atomic deterrent and mobile power, and also of having throughout world and particularly in Europe and Asia friendly armies equipped to undertake military action which might become necessary under concept of collective security. Without these friendly forces US could never hope to have enough military resources to prevent Communist expansion. He reviewed in this connection substance of his letter contained in Embassy despatch 700, March 6./6/

[Here follows discussion on collective security and developments in Africa, Europe, and the Near East.]

/6/Despatch 700 from Karachi transmitted copies of an exchange of letters between Ayub and Leiutenant Colonel Heath Bottomly of the War College at the Air University at Maxwell Air Force Base, Alabama. The correspondence dealt with the subject "Maxims for Limited War," and was initiated by a letter from Bottomly to Ayub dated December 20, 1960. Ayub replied on March 3, 1961. (Ibid., 711.551/3 - 661)

Internal: Discussion embraced Pakistan development program and Ayub expressed appreciation of US assistance without which Pakistan could do little. He identified major long-term problems as being rate of population growth and loss of agricultural land due to water logging and salinization. Flight to Rawalpindi provided opportunity observe at first-hand vastness of problem. Ayub said he had not yet seen Shoaib following latter's return Washington, but he knew generally of Shoaib's optimism as result talks with American officials. Harriman assured Ayub continued interest economic development and expressed particular interest in problem of lost cultivatable land.

Ayub mentioned briefly his desire hold down military expenditures and fact studies being made as to how this can be done without reducing fighting strength.

In discussing recent demonstrations in Pakistan cities, Ayub said trouble was caused largely by Communist elements on campuses. He said government determined to take appropriate measures against agitators. Nevertheless, Pakistani public had been shocked by anti-Muslim riots in India and murder of Muslims which had caused great resentment. He personally had felt that Indian Government had not taken appropriate measures to prevent riots or to bring them under control when started.


12. Telegram From the Embassy in India to the Department of State /1/

/1/Source: Department of State, Central Files, 791.13/3 - 2461. Secret; Priority.

New Delhi, March 24, 1961, 7 p.m.

2157. Eyes Only the President and Secretary State. From Harriman. /2/ I had two hours and one half with Nehru during our second meeting on March 23. /3/ After discussing policies of new administration, he said he had developed confidence and respect for President even before the inauguration and admired greatly the statements and actions taken since. I explained our opposition to admission of Red China to UN and determination to honor commitments to Formosa. He replied that he understood the background of position on Red China. He said he is greatly disturbed by Peking's aggressive attitude and believes the danger to world comes from Peking rather than Moscow. He thinks Khrushchev is having considerable difficulty with Peking as shown by the acrimonious exchange in November at Moscow. Sooner or later, he believes, the historic conflict between China and Russia will weaken the present alliance but not for some years; the Soviets must be worried about the aggressive policies of Peking. He agreed that disarmament or arms limitation was the most important subject for discussion with Moscow but that any agreement reached would need concurrence of Peking. He is convinced Khrushchev does not want war and would be ready to ease tensions if it were not for Peking. He recalled the Mohammedan crusades of the past. Today same words which led to "conversion by the sword" are spoken by Moslems but aggressive intentions are gone. Soviets, similarly, speak vigorously but their fire for converting others to Communism by force has lost much of its intensity. In reply, I pointed out that Berlin and other specific situations showed continued Soviet aggressive intentions and that they were practicing brinkmanship and would exploit any free world weakness.

/2/Harriman visited New Delhi March 22 - 24.

/3/Harriman's initial meeting with Nehru took place on March 22. Discussion was limited to the meeting that Nehru was scheduled to have that day with Laotian Prime Minister Souvanna Phouma. (Telegram 2114 from New Delhi, March 22; Department of State, Central Files, 751J.00/3 - 2261)

Nehru said the Chinese Communists were at height of their aggressive intentions and the situation is dangerous. He had tried to negotiate with Chou En-lai on the boundary question but had gotten nowhere. When I mentioned to him Ayub's statement that he would negotiate with Peking settlement on the undefined boundary in the Hunza area, Nehru said China has settled with Burma and might with Pakistan to show "unreasonableness of India."

He spoke at some length on Indian - Pakistan relations saying that Kashmir provided the basic division. He blamed Pakistani politicians for continuing to whip up the issue, stating he is prepared to settle on the boundaries as they now are.

We discussed Iran. He said it unfortunate US had backed unpopular governments and that aid had not in some cases gone to help the people; nevertheless, Shah seems to be the only one who could give stability at this time.

On Congo he said all trouble comes from Belgian interference. He admitted Soviets had also tried intervene last summer but they had been thrown out; Nasser's attempts to supply Gizenga had not been successful because of Sudan's attitude. In discussing Dayal, he said he hoped Dayal could return and be sent to Pakistan but he did not want to have him forced out under fire. I, of course, expressed appreciation for India's support of UN by supply of troops.

In speaking of Laos, Nehru said that no government could be successful without inclusion of the Pathet Lao. He contends that majority of Pathet Lao are not Communists but if opposition to them is continued they will be driven closer to Communists. He maintained that the only authority for intervention is the Geneva Agreement. It is up to Soviet Union and UK to decide whether the ICC is to be convened or something else. He did not seem to be familiar with the NNC concept and stuck to legalistic position that Soviet Union and UK as co-chairmen should take the lead./4/

We discussed possibility of his visiting Washington. He said that it would be inconvenient for him to contemplate a trip in near future but that he did want to see the President at a time when it would be mutually agreeable. This, he agreed, I should tell the press.


/4/Harriman saw Nehru again on March 24 to deliver a letter from Kennedy, which was transmitted to New Delhi on March 23 in telegram 2616. Kennedy expressed concern in the letter about the dangerous situation in Laos, and he encouraged Nehru to take any diplomatic steps that might help stop the fighting between Pathet Lao and Royal Laotian forces. (Ibid., 751J.00/3 - 2361) Nehru responded that he would do everything he could to assist in obtaining an armistice in Laos. (Telegram 2153 from New Delhi, March 24; ibid., 751J.00/3 - 2461)

13. Editorial Note

On March 30, 1961, Secretary of State Rusk stopped briefly in New Delhi and met with Prime Minister Nehru. Rusk was returning from the Southeast Asia Treaty Organization Ministerial Council meeting in Bangkok, Thailand. Discussion over lunch focused on mutual concerns in Laos and the Congo. Rusk's memorandum of the conversation, which deals almost exclusively with the discussion concerning the Congo, is printed in volume XX, pages 114 - 115.

14. Memorandum From the Under Secretary of State for Economic Affairs (Ball) to President Kennedy/1/

/1Source: Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Countries Series, India, General, 4/16/61 - 4/30/61. Confidential.

Washington, April 19, 1961.

Proposed United States Aid Commitments to India and Pakistan

It is proposed that the United States indicate at the forthcoming Consortium of free world countries on India (April 25 - 27) a willingness to commit up to $1 billion in the next two years in support of India's external resource requirements in the Third Five-Year Plan period. It is also proposed that a United States commitment be indicated at the Pakistan Consortium meeting, now scheduled for late May to consider Pakistan's Second Five-Year Plan. While we cannot suggest with precision an appropriate amount for a Pakistan commitment, it would probably be of the order of magnitude of $250,000,000. Each commitment would include all United States dollar assistance but would not include food provided under P.L. 480. The commitments would be made explicitly subject (a) to the availability of United States funds, (b) to the provision of assistance by other advanced nations as noted in Section III of the attached study entitled Proposals for United States Aid Commitments to India and Pakistan, /2/ and (c) to other conditions noted in that study.

/2/The attached 13-page study is not printed.

These proposals have been agreed to in substance by the appropriate officials in the Department of State, the Department of the Treasury, the Bureau of the Budget, ICA, and the DLF. They have also been cleared in substance by the Task Force on Foreign Economic Assistance. The attached study has been reviewed by Dr. Max Millikan.

We believe it essential that the United States make a substantial commitment to the requirements of the Indian Plan in April and to the Pakistan Plan in May, recognizing that such commitments anticipate the new aid program prior to Congressional consideration of the program.

That you approve the recommendations in the attached document. /3/

/3/The recommendations in the conclusion of the study called for approval of 2-year commitment to India of up to $1 billion, approval in principle of a commitment to Pakistan in an amount to be determined before the Pakistan Consortium meeting, and authorization for Presidential messages to be sent to the other governments involved in the two consortia urging similarly substantial commitments. A note on a copy of the memorandum reads: "Approved per RDungan to FAMau 4/22/61." (Department of State, Central Files, 891.00 - Five Year/4 - 1961)

George W. Ball

15. Telegram From the Embassy in Pakistan to the Department of State /1/

/1/Source: Department of State, Central Files, 689.90D/4 - 2061. Secret. Repeated to Kabul and Peshawar.

Karachi, April 20, 1961, 6 p.m.

1832. In meeting last evening President Ayub said he wished discuss Afghanistan. His evaluation was that, following abortive Laskar intrusion last September, Daud had been under increasing pressure in Afghanistan including members of Royal Family who were becoming more concerned by his pro-Soviet policies. USSR saw in Daud willing tool for their purposes and were endeavoring support him. Thus they were willing to make public statements on Pushtunistan even though this set back their objectives to create better position for themselves in Pakistan. It could be expected that Soviets would continue give strong support to Daud, including economic and military assistance. Daud's tactics seemed focused in two primary directions. First, to obtain Soviet support to him personally and to his efforts to create a situation in tribal regions of Pakistan which would permit Afghans to take matter to UN in hope of building up sympathy for their position. Secondly, to work on the Americans in order to achieve continuation of American assistance to Afghanistan, but more importantly to bring Americans to press Pakistanis not to employ force in maintenance of internal security on Pakistan side of Durand Line.

President said he had had several reports of conversations which RGA had had with American officials in which they complained about use of American arms by GOP in tribal region. He had been surprised that there had been little indication that response to Afghan officials had included strong reaffirmation of US position on Durand Line, and that we had not pointed out to Afghans that Pakistanis had perfect right to take whatever measures were appropriate to preserve their internal security. Afghan demarches seem to have been based on assumption that Afghans had some right to intrude in Pakistani territory. It seemed to him that American officials had at times equated Afghan intrusions into Pakistan with Pakistani use of American arms for internal security purposes.

He said his concern had grown as result demarches which I had made to Bhutto (Embtel 1533)/2/ and others and comments which Ambassador Harriman had made to him concerning use of American equipment in tribal regions. He said he was keeping these representations secret since if Pakistan press and public should come to know that US had reservations about employment by GOP for internal security purposes of military equipment supplied under MAP, resentment would be tremendous and it would have an extremely adverse effect on Pakistani - American relations. He said American arms were provided to Pakistan for several specific reasons set forth in the agreement, principal one being for use in maintaining internal security. Pakistan forces were equipped with American arms and arms could not be changed depending upon purpose for, or area in, which they were to be employed. It so happened that forces most likely to come in contact with Laskar intrusion were not equipped by MAP but from GOP resources. Also, limited air bombings that had been carried out included only one American plane which had been used along with several old British planes. However, the region in question was extremely remote and it would be difficult and he thought unwise for Pakistanis to deploy forces in these remote regions in Pakistan when need for this now obviated by air reconnaissance and, if need be, action from the air.

/2/See footnote 4, Document 9.

President emphasized he felt US should be more frank with Afghans in citing right of Pakistan self-defense in connection with any intrusions across border. He said Afghans were pouring money and weapons into tribal area. Notorious Afghan agent Bacha Gul had been moving about widely in Bajaur region distributing largesse and arms, and endeavoring to foment revolt. Afghans should not be led to believe that US considered this to be normal and proper.

I told President that we of course recognized Durand Line as border and we also recognized that Pakistan had a right to defend itself and to preserve internal security. One of purposes of our military aid program was to permit GOP to preserve its integrity and stability. Nevertheless, we had been concerned about employment of American arms in this sensitive region and I had, under instructions from the Department, asked Pakistanis to endeavor to carry out their responsibilities without employing American aid weapons, and to act in this sensitive region with restraint. I had expressed this hope particularly in connection with air operations. President said Pakistanis did not want to start any trouble that could be avoided. Pakistan would have to defend itself, however, if attacked, and it could defend itself only with weapons in hands of its military personnel. We could be certain that they would only be employed for purposes specified in our agreement, and he hoped that situation would not arise.


16. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in India /1/

/1/Source: Department of State, Central Files, 791.5 - MSP/4 - 2361. Confidential; Priority. Drafted by Adams, cleared by Talbot and Battle and in substance by Dungan at the White House, and approved by Cottam (NEA).

Washington, April 24, 1961, 8:13 p.m.

3015. Eyes Only for Ambassador. Deptel 3003./2/

/2/Telegram 3003 to New Delhi, April 23, instructed Ambassador Galbraith, who had presented his credentials on April 18, to inform Prime Minister Nehru that President Kennedy had authorized substantial new aid commitments in support of the Indian development program. The commitments were subject to necessary Congressional action, and would be proportionate to contributions from other members of the consortium. (Ibid., 791.5 - MSP/4 - 261)

FYI: Commitment to India authorized by President is for maximum $1 billion for two-year period. In case of Pakistan, President approved commitment in principle, with size and period covered to be determined prior to Consortium on Pakistan scheduled early June. In addition to conditions mentioned first para reftel both commitments would be subject to understanding (a) procurement policies governing US assistance along lines contemplated President's February 6 balance of payments message to Congress/3/ and (b) US assistance obligations would be made after careful examination specific project and program proposals both countries.

/3/For text of this message, see Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States: John F. Kennedy, 1961, pp. 57-66.

President has despatched messages to Heads of Governments United Kingdom, Canada, Germany and Japan indicating US intention make very substantial commitment of aid to both India and Pakistan and expressing hope their governments able do likewise.

B.K. Nehru informed by Under Secretary Ball April 24 of fact US prepared make substantial commitment at Consortium meeting beginning April 25 subject above mentioned considerations. He was not informed of amount proposed US commitment for India.

It has now been decided there will be no public announcement of President's action prior Consortium meeting. End FYI.


17. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Pakistan/1/

/1/Source: Department of State, Central Files, 790D.5 - MSP/4 - 2561. Confidential; Priority. Drafted by Adams, cleared by Talbot and in substance with Dungan, and approved by Cottam.

Washington, April 25, 1961, 10:20 p.m.

1829. Eyes Only for Ambassador. Deptel 1819. /2/ FYI: President's decision in approving commitment of aid to Pakistan was taken in principle, with exact size and period covered to be determined prior to meeting Pakistan Consortium now scheduled early June. Current thinking is for commitment $250 million. Certainty this figure and its applicability to period of one year or more dependent upon detailed examination latest Pakistan submission to IBRD. In case of India President authorized commitment of up to $ 1 billion for two-year period to be indicated at Indian Consortium beginning April 25.

/2/Telegram 1819 to Karachi, April 23, instructed Ambassador Rountree to inform President Ayub that President Kennedy had authorized substantial new aid commitments in support of Pakistan's development program. The commitments were subject to necessary Congressional action, and would be proportionate to contributions by other members of the consortium. (Ibid., 790D.5 - MSP/4 - 2361)

In both cases commitments would be subject considerations mentioned first para reftel and also to understanding (a) procurement policies governing US assistance along lines US assistance obligations would be made after careful examination specific project and program proposals both countries.
contemplated President's February 6 balance of payments message to Congress and (b)
President has despatched messages to Heads of Governments United Kingdom, Canada, Germany and Japan indicating US intention make very substantial commitment of aid to both India and Pakistan and expressing hope their governments able do likewise. No figures mentioned these messages.

Ambassador Aziz Ahmed has been informed by Assistant Secretary Talbot of fact US prepared make substantial commitment to Pakistan at Consortium meeting in June, subject above mentioned considerations. No amounts indicated.

It has now been decided there will be no public announcement of President's action.


18. Memorandum From the Under Secretary of State for Economic Affairs (Ball) to President Kennedy/1/

/1/Source: Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Countries Series, India, General, 5/1/61 - 6/15/61. Confidential. The memorandum was sent under cover of note from Executive Secretary Battle to the President's Special Assistant, Ralph A. Dungan.

Washington, May 1, 1961.

Report on India Consortium Meeting

The subject meeting convened on April 25 to consider the amounts required by India both to meet its payments in 1961 - 62 and 1962 - 63 and to provide for the placement of new orders during that period.

On the opening day the United States made its offer of $1 billion of aid on the terms and conditions approved by you on April 21. Because proposed commitments by other countries, particularly Germany, were insufficient to total the needed remaining $1.1 billion believed by the U.S. to be required from these nations, the meeting recessed until May 31. In the interim, these other participants will, in the light of the large offer of the United States, reconsider their commitments. The press release on the adjournment of the meeting, however, merely stated that the participants had met, examined the Indian program, decided that it offered a reasonable basis for undertaking commitments, and adjourned to consider what each could do.

The true reason for the adjournment was the fact that commitments offered by others than the U.S. and the IBRD fell about $500 million short of what is generally believed necessary to move the Indian program ahead. While most other participants offered commitments close to our expectations, West Germany was about $300 million short in what we have believed it capable of providing. It offered to make available $331 million, about half of which would refund existing Indian debts to Germany. Furthermore, even this grossly inadequate contribution was to be extended on very hard terms rather than the softer terms and conditions considered necessary in the Indian situation.

The United Kingdom offered $204 million, the Japanese $80 million, and the IBRD $400 million. The Canadian offer of $36 million was not up to expectations but we believe it can be increased. It is also believed that the U.K. offer can be increased.

Before the Consortium reconvenes on May 31 the following actions are being undertaken:

1) We are instructing our Embassies in the Consortium countries to advise their host Governments at the highest levels of the importance we attach to a successful outcome for this meeting and of our interest in seeing that our large offer is matched by similar action on their part.

2) We shall endeavor to seek commitments from France, Austria, Denmark, Sweden, and Norway who now attend the meeting as observers rather than participants.

3) The IBRD will be urged to bring its influence to bear on officials in the participating countries. We are hopeful that Mr. Eugene Black will personally make the necessary contacts.

In addition we will recommend that you discuss both the Indian and Pakistan Consortium Meetings with the Prime Minister of Canada during your visit to Ottawa. We believe that such an approach may be an important element in influencing the Canadians to extend additional resources.

It is our hope that these actions will result in more adequate commitments by others and permit us to proceed with our offer.

George W. Ball

19. Letter From Prime Minister Nehru to President Kennedy/1/

/1/Source: Kennedy Library, President's Office Files, Countries Series, India, 1961. No classification marking.

No. 237 - PMO/16

New Delhi, May 13, 1961.

My Dear Mr. President, I write to thank you for the generous approach which the United States Government has made in regard to the assistance to India for her Third Five Year Plan. The United States Ambassador here has informed us that at the meeting convened by the World Bank, the United States Government offered a thousand million dollars by way of aid to India for the first two years of the Third Five Year Plan. This aid is in addition to the large quantities of wheat and rice which have already been promised under PL - 480. A special feature of the United States aid to India's development plans, which we appreciate greatly and which is of particular value to us, is that repayments in foreign exchange have been reduced to the minimum.

The United States Ambassador has pointed out to our Planning Commission the importance of allowing the recipient of aid the maximum flexibility in regard to the purposes for which the funds can be utilised. This is particularly welcome to us. In the past, credits from the Development Loan Fund have been available mainly for the purchase of capital goods in the U.S.A. We have, during the Second Five Year Plan, built up certain capital goods industries ourselves. These depend upon the import of raw materials and components not available from indigenous sources which we hope the D.L.F. will finance. There are also other needs of ours which we require for development and which are not in the nature of capital goods, e.g., fertilisers for our agricultural economy. We are anxious, therefore, to have as much flexibility as is possible in regard to the use of these funds.

May I thank you again, Mr. President, for your generous approach to our problems and also for exercising your country's great influence on the other participants of the aid programme so as to raise the quantum of aid to a level which will be commensurate with India's needs for the execution of her Third Five Year Plan.

With warm regards and good wishes,

Yours sincerely,

Jawaharlal Nehru

20. Memorandum of Conversation/1/

/1/Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, International Meetings and Travel File, Vice President Johnson's Trip to the Far East, May 61. Confidential. Vice President Johnson left Washington on May 10 for a 2-week tour of South and Southeast Asia, which included stops in Vietnam, the Philippines, the Republic of China, Thailand, India, and Pakistan.

New Delhi, May 18, 1961.


For India
Prime Minister Nehru
Shri M.J. Desai, Foreign Secretary
Shri R.K. Nehru, Secretary General, External Affairs Ministry
S.K. Banerji, Chief of Protocol

For the United States
Vice President Johnson
Ambassador John K. Galbraith
Stephen SmithCarl T. Rowan

Vice President Johnson opened the session by explaining that his party had come to India at the request of President Kennedy to deliver personally a letter from the President to India's Prime Minister/2/ and to engage in such discussions as might help the United States to take actions in South and Southeast Asia that would be beneficial to the peoples of that area and to the cause of human liberty. The Vice President said that he had come also because President Kennedy wanted the people of the area to know that the United States was aware of the need for economic progress in the area, and that the United States was determined to work in close cooperation with those nations attempting to raise the living standards of their people.

/2/In this letter, dated May 8, Kennedy expressed the hope that Nehru and Johnson would enjoy a fruitful exchange of views, and that Johnson would be able to observe and report on economic progress in India. Kennedy applauded India's efforts to promote such progress and noted that his administration was engaged in reorganizing its aid programs to be able to enter into longer-range commitments to better support such efforts. He also expressed appreciation for Nehru's support for the attempt to achieve a cease-fire agreement in Laos. (Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Countries Series, India, Nehru Correspondence, 4/1/61 - 10/31/61)

The Vice President said it was the belief of the Kennedy Administration that military force alone can never be a permanent bulwark against Communist activities which are leading to widespread discontent, and in some cases violent insurrection, in Asia. He warned that he was in no position to make specific commitments as to the degree of United States participation in any development program, because only Congress has authority to make the necessary appropriations. He said that he felt confident that, given a full understanding of the difficulties and challenges in the area, Congress would respond with the necessary boldness.

Prime Minister Nehru expressed great pleasure at this line of talk, asserting that economic development is "a subject that fills my heart and mind." He said that India is struggling to raise standards of living and develop the country's resources "without resorting to a doctrinaire approach."

The Prime Minister seemed emotionally touched when he referred to the letter from President Kennedy that Mr. Johnson delivered. He said that he and India "appreciate President Kennedy's concern and generosity." Mr. Nehru went on to express the opinion that poverty--the whole economic problem--is at the heart of the problems of Asia and Africa. "All other problems in India are secondary to the economic problem, and in many cases are affected by it." He continued, "We have a politically-conscious mass of people who think that they deserve everything--and they do--but India is unable to supply it."

The Prime Minister said that he was sure that Ambassador Galbraith and other Americans could understand the economic or surface aspect of this dilemma, but that he doubted that they could understand the emotional aspects of it the way Mr. Nehru did.

Vice President Johnson and the Prime Minister then discussed at some length India's third Five Year Plan. The Prime Minister said that progress under this scheme was aimed at aiding India's 16 million unemployed, and that about 13 million workers would be absorbed in the plan, but that the employment problem would probably be even more acute at the end of five years because the development program will not keep up with the population increase.

The two leaders then discussed education and necessity of spreading it throughout the population if the country is to make real progress against poverty, illiteracy and disease. Mr. Nehru said that currently only 60% of India's boys and 20% to 30% of her girls are in school, but that the hope is at the end of the third Five Year Plan free and compulsory education will be available for every boy and girl in the 7 to 11 age group.

The Vice President inquired as to the size and goals of India's third Five Year Plan. Ambassador Galbraith pointed out that the plan involves an investment of 102 billion rupees or almost 20 billion dollars, as compared with 67 billion rupees (13-1/2 billion dollars) in India's second Five Year Plan.

Mr. Nehru said that the external segment of the third plan, which includes private investments, is about 6 billion dollars.

Ambassador Galbraith pointed out that India's planning for economic development is greatly admired, and that India is representative of the nations the United States wants most to work with, because India's leaders are determined to see that the mass of the people benefit.

The Vice President then discussed the impact of reform programs and efforts to extend social justice in any movement to create political stability. He asked Mr. Nehru's advice with regard to South and Southeast Asia. The Prime Minister said that he was reluctant to talk about other countries but that he felt any progress must have impact on the people generally. He said that he was certain that people would be willing to wait, and would not fall for the lure of totalitarianism if they could see a trend of progress moving in their direction. He said that in the case of India it was absolutely essential to build up industry, because progress never could be sufficient as long as 80% of the people depended on agriculture for their livelihood. He said that India is decentralizing and giving more authority to village councils in order to get human beings interested in their country and its problems.

Vice President Johnson lauded those steps as a grass roots movement certain to have a remarkable effect.

The two then discussed farming cooperatives, land reform, irrigation and rural electrification. Mr. Nehru said that taking electric power to rural areas is one of the biggest revolutionary forces operating in less developed areas. Near the end of the discussion the Vice President asked the Prime Minister for his advice as to how situations such as that existing in Laos might be avoided, thus giving the peoples of the area the opportunity to make the progress of which the two leaders had spoken. Mr. Nehru said that he would reiterate that there must be social and economic approaches to the problems of Southeast Asia, because military solutions alone never did work. He said that land reform was vitally necessary, pointing to Iran as a good example of a country where poor land ownership policies make the country vulnerable to outside interference and agitation.

When the session was terminated because of another appointment of the Vice President, Prime Minister Nehru said that he would welcome further discussions.

21. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Afghanistan/1/

/1/Source: Department of State, Central Files, 789.5 - MSP/5 - 1361. Confidential. Drafted in NEA/SOA by Robert J. Carle and Adams, cleared in draft by Weil and with B/FAC and ICA, and approved by Armin H. Meyer (NEA).

Washington, May 18, 1961, 8:12 p.m.

715. Embtels 1048/2/ and 1053./3/ Policy guidelines for future foreign assistance and presentation to Congress this program developed by Presidential Task Force in accordance with President's message being pouched soon. These guidelines expected make clear U.S. prepared make long-term commitment those countries whose stage of development, planning and internal resources mobilization sufficiently advanced give promise self-sustained growth in foreseeable future. These concepts appear for present, at least, preclude long-term commitment in support Afghan Second Plan. There is thus nothing of substance which you may appropriately give Naim beyond that conveyed your letter February 21./4/

/2/In telegram 1048 from Kabul, May 12, Byroade asked for guidance on the future direction of U.S. economic assistance for Afghanistan. (Ibid., 789.5 - MSP/5 - 1261)

/3/Telegram 1053 from Kabul, May 13, reported on a conversation between Byroade and Foreign Minister Naim in which Naim referred to the fact that the United States was making long-term foreign assistance commitments to other countries. Naim professed to be confused in that he had understood from Byroade that the U.S. Government could not make such long-term commitments without prior Congressional authorization. Byroade responded that Naim's information was apparently based upon a newspaper account concerning a commitment to India, and he added that he did not believe that any such commitment had been formalized. (Ibid., 789.5 - MSP/5 - 1361)

/4/See Document 7.

U.S. currently contemplating commitment in support Indian requirements first two years its Third Plan, and Pakistan requirements second and third years its Second Plan. Both commitments would be subject necessary Congressional action on aid program and dependent on commensurate contributions from other free world sources. IBRD Consortium which met Washington April 25 - 26 to discuss Indian requirement reconvening May 31; Consortium on Pakistan convenes June 5. If questioned further regarding unconfirmed press reports of U.S. commitment made at either these meetings suggest you follow line taken with Naim as reported your 1053. In event U.S. commitment to either country is officially confirmed suggest you emphasize long period U.S. close association and fact detailed plans those countries have been available U.S. and other free world countries for study and discussion for some time. Commitments those countries taken in light advanced stage of development planning, execution, and internal resource mobilization.

Latin American program being developed under special authority recently approved by Congress for that area.

Since reports U.S. commitments these other countries may give rise to RGA misunderstanding U.S. position as conveyed your letter to Naim of February 21 you may wish reiterate assurances of continued U.S. close association with Afghan development plans without however exceeding instruction Deptel 541/5/ and Icato 1135./6/ You may also wish to indicate further study Afghan needs and capabilities would place U.S. in better position to assess specifically its overall relationship to Afghan development requirements and to determine what if any adjustments in present aid program would be warranted.

/5/Telegram 541 to Kabul, February 15, instructed Byroade to make the points concerning economic assistance for Afghanistan that Byroade made in his February 21 letter to Naim. (Department of State, Central Files, 789.5 - MSP/2 - 1561)

/6/Not found.


22. Memorandum of Conversation/1/

/1/Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, International Meetings and Travel File, Vice President Johnson's Trip to the Far East, May 61. Top Secret. Drafted by Rountree. The meeting was held at the President's House in Karachi.

Karachi, May 20, 1961, 12:30 p.m.

United States:
Vice President Johnson
Mr. Stephen Smith
Mr. Busby
Ambassador Horace Smith
Ambassador Rountree

President Ayub
General Burki, Minister of Health, Welfare and Social Affairs
Mr. Manzur Qadir, Minister of External Affairs
Mr. Mohammed Shoaib, Minister of Finance
Mr. Zulfikar Ali Bhutto, Minister of Information
Mr. Dehlavi, Foreign Secretary

Vice President Johnson began by stating that Pakistan was held in very high regard by the United States, which greatly valued its friendship. He mentioned in the context of his public life his interest in international affairs, and the various trips abroad which he had made on official missions since he assumed office as the Vice President. He described President Kennedy as a young and extremely vigorous man, hopeful and very confident. The Vice President fully shared President Kennedy's philosophy. President Kennedy had wanted him to visit nations of Asia, particularly allies, to talk about problems of common interest and to share views of how the strength of the free world might be increased. The United States was anxious to do everything it could to contribute to the strength of Asian nations, particularly in the fostering of economic progress upon which strength could be based. It felt that impoverished nations must be helped; in helping them we were in fact helping ourselves since those more fortunate must share the burden of improving the lot of the poorer if even the rich were to be secure. Continuing, the Vice President said United States had a particular fondness for Pakistan and President Ayub. Pakistan had convictions which it was willing to express. It was willing to support SEATO, including the contribution of forces in connection with the Laos problem, and we appreciated that commitment. The Vice President observed that he did not know where recent events in Laos left us. He wanted to exchange views with President Ayub on this subject.

The Vice President said that President Kennedy was eagerly looking forward to President Ayub's visit, during which many matters could be discussed; however, there was substantial business which would have to take place before the visit. (In this context he handed President Ayub a letter from President Kennedy.)/2/

/2/Kennedy's letter, dated May 8, underlined the importance of Johnson's fact-finding mission and the significance Kennedy attached to Johnson's discussions with Ayub. He pointed to the need to build military strength to resist Communist aggression in the area and noted that such strength rested upon economic development. He applauded Pakistan's efforts to promote economic development and noted that his administration was engaged in reorganizing its aid programs in order to better support such efforts. (Department of State, Central Files, 611.90D/5 - 861)

The Vice President said that in his visits to several countries of Asia he had found them all aware of the current danger and anxious to do their best to meet it. All the leaders believed they had inadequate means for accomplishing what they considered necessary. We were anxious to do everything that we reasonably could to help them. We recognized the need for additional defensive strength, but even more the need for economic strength.

Referring to Laos, the Vice President said we were prepared for the worst but hoped for the best. He would like to have President Ayub's view as to what would be the best course to follow. There were various alternatives. The United States could, for example, "go back to San Francisco," but we did not want to do that. On the other hand, our people did not want to get killed in unnecessary and fruitless fighting. He said we had relied on our allies to help train Laotians. This had not worked out well, and the other side seemed far more willing to fight than ours. In Viet-Nam 150,000 friendly forces were confronting 10,000 enemy. Yet they needed even more men and equipment to cope with the problem. In Thailand there were similar difficulties. The problem of the defense of free forces in South Asia would of course be far greater if the Chinese should come in. Yet Diem had said that if we gave him help he would stand up, and Sarit said he needed not nine but 15 divisions.

The Vice President said he would like to be able to inform President Kennedy of what we could expect from our allies if the United States was ready to do thus and so for the area. The United States did not want anything for itself beyond the preservation of the independence of the states of the region. The question was what would be necessary to prevent the communists from gobbling up the weaker nations. It was possible that we could equip them and help them fight properly. If they were not helped, they would be lost. It would be one or the other.

President Ayub responded that he agreed with the Vice President's summary of the problem. He said he would like to outline at length his views on the world situation, but in view of the shortage of time he thought it best for the Vice President simply to read his assessment which had been prepared in summary form for the purposes of the meeting. He handed to the Vice President his notes, which are attached./3/

/3/Not attached.

The Vice President agreed generally with President Ayub's views, but commented upon his remarks about American policy by saying that we sometimes might be "kindhearted but not wise." We did, however, know who stood up, and the difference between strong friends and neutrals. Regarding possible influence by the United States or India to bring about a solution of the Kashmir problem, he thought President Ayub attributed to us a capacity which the Vice President was not sure we had. We had tried some of these things, but had had little influence with Nehru on the question.

President Ayub responded that he knew Nehru would not listen if he did not feel compelled to. That did not mean that he should not listen, nor that the United States did not have the power to influence him. India's flexibility today was gone. With the pressure from the Chinese Communists, India relied even more heavily upon the United States. In fact, it had no alternative.

Continuing, the President said the United States was Pakistan's friend and anything going wrong with the United States hurt Pakistan. In Cuba, for example, a situation had been created which greatly damaged not only the United States, but also its allies, including Pakistan. He mentioned the conversation which he had had with Ambassador Rountree on the Cuban situation and the message which he had sent through the Ambassador to President Kennedy on the subject. /4/ Pakistan did not want to the United States to fail. It wanted it to win against the Soviets. Its battle was Pakistan's battle. If the United States did not use its power, it hurt Pakistan. The power of the United States was much greater than at times the Americans seemed to think. Its power to influence Nehru was very great indeed. Unless there were peace with India which would permit cooperation in the defense of South Asia, there would be a very great threat within a few years and that threat derived from the fact that the communists wanted to control the entire subcontinent. The Soviets were pressing Pakistan and would like to take over the country, but their interest was not in Pakistan itself but in the entire region. Thus, the threat to India was very great, both from the Soviets and from the Chinese Communists, and the Indians must come to realize that. The United States was spending a terrific amount of money in India. It was doing it because it sought Indian security. It could not, however, say that India really was secure. The Indians must do far more to achieve real security and this involved the creation of a situation in which good relations between Pakistan and India could be maintained. American diffidence about Nehru bothered the Pakistani. The United States should help India; but by the same token it should demand that Nehru help create security in the area around India. Thus India should make peace and cooperation with Pakistan possible.

/4/Transmitted in telegram 1831 from Karachi, April 19. (Department of State, Central Files, 737.00/4 - 1961)

The President was disturbed by the fact that the Communists gave support to any friend regardless of the merits of the case, but they assured themselves that the countries helped would not operate against their global policies or their world position. Failure of the United States to support its friends created a one-sided proposition that Americans seemed not to realize. Nehru only wanted American economic assistance, and the assurance of help if he should get into difficulties with the Chinese. He would never help the United States. His policies were in fact extremely harmful to the United States; yet America had not used its leverage to bring about a change in those policies, despite Nehru's very heavy reliance upon it.

The Vice President responded again that President Ayub attributed to us the capacity for greater influence with Nehru than we in fact possessed. He did not in fact think that Nehru would listen to us on the Kashmir question.

President Ayub remarked that he would listen if the United States should say that it would not otherwise give him all the help he asked. The Vice President remarked that President Ayub was suggesting the "quid pro quo" approach, to which President Ayub responded that he thought it would be a very good idea when dealing with that type of person. He said again that the United States had very great power and that it should use it. It should not be bluffed by Khrushchev; it should do in a straightforward manner what was necessary for the American and free world position.

Responding to the Vice President's question about what should be done about Viet-Nam and other Asian trouble spots, President Ayub said that if the present leadership in those countries could not run their affairs, they should get someone able to do so. It must be seen to that they were operated properly. If the leaders could not get that bulk of the people to resist communism, the United States should see to it that key people were in the right places to do so. He thought the situation in Laos was extremely bad. Militarily, it was a nightmare. The Thais were beginning to get the jitters. He thought American military people in Thailand, Laos and Viet-Nam should be in a position to assume command responsibilities.

President Ayub thought the Tibetan situation would have a considerable influence in India. Through Tibet, the Chinese Communists were already penetrating India, not physically but in influence, particularly in the Calcutta area. Fortunately the large communist party in India was presently split over the Chinese situation. If this were not so the problem would be even greater than it was today. Responding to the Vice President's question, President Ayub said that China's current economic problems were not substantially lessening Chinese activities in other countries. They were in fact even more aggressive in Africa than the Soviets. The Chinese were not likely, due to their own internal difficulties, to concentrate on a single part of the world, such as Laos, to the exclusion of others.

Responding to the Vice President's question about SEATO, President Ayub said no one seemed to want to fight "except us." The Vice President remarked that we appreciated Pakistan's willingness to contribute forces to which President Ayub responded, jokingly, that he thought however that the United States should come along with them. The Vice President observed that it still had not yet been decided what would be necessary in Laos. Considering what other countries were prepared to do and contribute, he doubted that much of a fight could be put up there. President Ayub thought that any sort of a fight by the Royal Laotians would mean that the army must be directly commanded by United States officers; otherwise they simply would not fight.

The President remarked that Thailand was relatively easier to defend, to which the Vice President responded that he thought we would have to make a stand much before Thailand was attacked.

President Ayub described the size and disposition of the Pakistani forces, in reply to the Vice President's question. He said that Pakistan had an excellent army but that it needed more equipment and more mobility. These needs had been described to the American authorities and he hoped that it would be possible for them to be met in light of the tremendous advantages to the United States and the free world of Pakistan having a strong military force capable of real help in meeting the threat in this part of the world.

The Vice President thought it would be an excellent idea if President Ayub could visit the leaders of other Asian nations and talk with them about some of these problems. The President remarked that he recently had visited several countries. He was, however, very busy at the moment and did not see how it would be possible for him to undertake other visits.

Turning to another subject, President Ayub and the Vice President discussed economic problems and development of Pakistan. The President and Finance Minister Shoaib described the magnitude of the five year program and its general content. Replying to the Vice President's question, they said the annual deficit in foreign exchange financing would be in the neighborhood of 500 million dollars, which it hoped could be financed through contributions by the nations soon to meet in the consortium group under the auspices of the International Bank.

The President expressed an interest in the Peace Corps and said he hoped that projects could be worked out so that specialists could be sent, particularly in the fields of health, education and agriculture.

The problem of water logging and salinity was discussed at some length. President Ayub handed to the Vice President copies of the Pakistan Program for Water Logging and Salinity Control in the Irrigated Areas of West Pakistan. The Vice President expressed a keen interest in the problem, and said he thought every consideration should be given as to what assistance the United States could render. The President said that Finance Minister Shoaib was leaving almost immediately for Washington and was taking copies of the report with him. He earnestly hoped the United States could provide substantial assistance in this matter. The program covered a 10 year period and would involve the annual expenditure of 110 million dollars.

Before proceeding to lunch (during which the talks were continued),/5/
President Ayub described on the map in his office the military problems confronting Pakistan and the necessary disposition of Pakistani forces related to the dispute with India over Kashmir. Settlement of the Kashmir problem would permit these forces to concentrate entirely upon defense against possible communist aggression. Another Pakistani interest in Kashmir was described by the President as being the need for controlling the headwaters of rivers flowing into Pakistan upon which Pakistan depended for its very existence. These were practical and immediate reasons why Pakistan must find a solution to these problems. There were other reasons, of course, relating to the desires of the people concerned in Kashmir and of a historical nature.

/5/Conversation over lunch dealt largely with programs for education and land reform and prospects for economic development in Pakistan. (Memorandum of conversation, May 20; Johnson Library, Vice Presidential Security File, VP Johnson's Trip, Far East, May 1961)

23. Telegram From the Embassy in Afghanistan to Department of State/1/

/1/Source: Department of State, Central Files, 789.5 - MSP/5 - 2261. Confidential; Priority.

Kabul, May 22, 1961, 11 a.m.

1066. For the Secretary from Byroade. Deptel 715/2/ comes as a great shock to this post--so much so that we wonder whether it was erroneously sent or if it failed to receive high level consideration. To us it seems inconceivable that our policy of trying preserve neutral nation on borders of USSR should be rendered ineffective and unresponsive to clear US interests in Asia by the application of pure economic theory alone, divorced from consideration of history our relations with this country and its neighbors as well as from the realities of the international situation or indeed, from the actual situation here as reported by the Embassy.

/2/Document 21.

I earnestly request that the policy enunciated in that message not be accepted as final until our comments thereon are received and given full consideration./3/

/3/Byroade elaborated upon his objections in telegram 1072 from Kabul, May 25. (Department of State, Central Files, 789.5 - MSP/5 - 2561) In telegram 739 to Kabul, June 2, Talbot responded that the policy outlined in telegram 715 to Kabul would have to stand as policy until there was a more substantial basis for the conclusion that a long-term commitment to Afghanistan's program for economic development was warranted. (Ibid., 789.5 - MSP/6 - 261)


24. Editorial Note

The fourth meeting of the India consortium, organized by the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development, reconvened in Washington on May 31, 1961. The meeting concluded on June 2, and the Bank issued a press release that indicated that members of the consortium had agreed to undertake commitments of aid to India totaling over $2 billion. The commitments covered fiscal years 1961/62 and 1962/63, the first 2 years of the third Indian 5-year plan for economic development. Contributing members of the consortium included Canada, France, Germany, Japan, the United Kingdom, the United States, the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development, and the International Development Association. A total of $2,225,000,000 was pledged by the members of the consortium. The U.S. commitment for the 2-year period was $1,045,000,000, including $45 million in loans made after January 15, 1961, by the Export-Import Bank and the Development Loan Fund. In addition, the United States agreed to assist India by making available surplus commodities in the amount of approximately $1,300,000,000. (Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Countries Series, India, General, 5/1/61 - 6/15/61)

25. Telegram From the Embassy in Pakistan to the Department of State/1/

/1/Source: Department of State, Central Files, 690D.91/6 - 261. Secret.

Karachi, June 2, 1961, 6 p.m.

2087. From Murree dated 1 June, Midnight. During meeting in Murree June 1, President Ayub again expressed great concern over US policies toward India and particularly with respect to Kashmir question.

It was obvious that President, like other Pakistani officials with whom I have spoken and like virtually all Pakistani press, was upset at reports of Vice President Johnson's statement following Asian tour indicating that President Kennedy and US administration wished Nehru's leadership to be extended over other Asian countries. Most of what President Ayub said about Nehru and Indian policies, and about need for US to support allies more and neutrals less, was repetition of what he told Vice President Johnson. His main point in our conversation was to emphasize his belief that US and US alone can prevent disastrous consequences of failure to arrive at solution to Kashmir problem. Ayub said that a year ago he had been hopeful that Nehru was beginning to see the light and things seemed to be moving in direction of talks to settle Kashmir. He felt several factors had served to make Nehru more intransigent, among these being US statements indicating vast support to India without mention of Kashmir, somewhat lessened pressures from Chinese Communists, and creation two new India divisions which should be adequate to handle immediate Chinese threat in difficult terrain of disputed territories. Latter factor rendered less attractive to India possibility of settling Kashmir question so that forces now concerned with Kashmir could be diverted.

Ayub said it not as though there was only one Kashmir solution which India would have to accept or reject. There were several alternatives which could be considered if Nehru willing to talk seriously. Issue was becoming far more inflamed in Pakistan and no Pakistani Government could fail to press matter and remain in power. Feelings on subject were rising, not diminishing. He, therefore, earnestly hoped that US was giving careful thought to question, and that following Vice President's return to Washington means would be found of exercising US influence upon India to seek a settlement. He had no doubt US recognized valid Pakistani concern and interest.

Comment: I personally believe time has come when we must seriously consider again what we can and should do in connection with Kashmir problem. I believe that at a minimum some approach should be made to Nehru on this subject, and I hope that Department will discuss this possibility with Ambassador Galbraith during latter's consultation there. I would appreciate Department's comments.


26. Memorandum of Conversation/1/

/1/Source: Department of State, Central Files, 398.14/6 - 861. Limited Official Use. Drafted by Adams on June 12 and approved in B on June 21.

Washington, June 8, 1961.

Results of the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development Consortium on Pakistan

Mr. Mohamed Shoaib, Finance Minister of Pakistan
Mr. G. Ahmed, Secretary, Planning Commission, Government of Pakistan
Ambassador Aziz Ahmed, Pakistan
Mr. Wazir Ali, Economic Minister, Embassy of Pakistan
Under Secretary George W. Ball
E--Mr. Edwin M. Martin, Assistant Secretary for Economic Affairs
NEA--Mr. Howard R. Cottam, Deputy Assistant Secretary for Economic Affairs
SOA--Mr. J. Wesley Adams, Officer in Charge, Economic Affairs

Mr. Shoaib opened the conversation by remarking it was no secret that Pakistan was disappointed with the results of the Consortium held under the auspices of the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development, June 5 - 7. Mr. Ball immediately rejoined that it was no secret that the United States was also disappointed with the results. We had hoped, he said, to be able to obtain a commitment by all members of the Consortium covering Pakistan's requirements for two years. This had not been found possible, and so it had been decided to announce initial commitments which would meet Pakistan's immediate requirements and maintain the momentum of its development. It was expected that a further meeting of the Consortium would be called later this year to consider further commitments.

Mr. Martin said that two considerations would determine the date of the reconvened meeting. The first was the German election scheduled for mid-September. The second was the time required for the Pakistanis to come up with firm revisions in their Second Plan figures. Mr. Shoaib commented that frankly he did not know what more the World Bank expected them to produce in the way of planning. It was true, he said, that the Plan had not been officially adopted by the Government of Pakistan. Formal adoption, however, was expected to take place around the middle of June. Except for this formality the Plan had been accepted by the Government. G. Ahmed reinforced this view, asserting that the Pakistan Plan in this respect was more firm than the Indian Plan.

Mr. Shoaib said that he now faced a political problem in how to present the results of the Consortium to his people, since the results were so unfavorable in comparison with those of the Indian Consortium. The people of Pakistan were bound to reason that as allies of the West they were entitled to more favorable consideration than neutrals such as India. They would inquire "What do we have to do to obtain equitable treatment?" Mr. Shoaib contrasted Pakistan's planning with that of the Indians, noting that the Pakistanis had not counted on Soviet aid for the financing of their Plan, and that they had not so over-committed themselves with respect to resources that they had to ask the rest of the world to bail them out, as had India.

Mr. Shoaib then went on to contrast results of the two Consortia meetings. With respect to commitments for the first year, he noted, Germany had agreed to commit $225 million for India compared to $25 million for Pakistan. Comparable figures for the United Kingdom were $182 million for India, $19.6 million for Pakistan; for the United States, $545 million for India and $150 million for Pakistan. With respect to the United States, he noted that in FY 1959 we had extended aid in the amount of $164 million, and only slightly less in the two succeeding years.

Mr. Ball commented that it was important for the Pakistanis to remember that these figures for Pakistan were not for a full year, and it was therefore a mistake to make the comparisons which Mr. Shoaib had just offered. So far as the United States was concerned, he reiterated, we were prepared to commit substantially more than the amount of $150 million. However, when the other participants had not been sufficiently forthcoming, we had felt it necessary to limit our commitment to $150 million (1) in order to preserve the integrity before the Congress of the principles of our new aid program which stress a sharing of development assistance by the capital exporting countries and (2) as the best strategy to maintain pressure on others to make more generous contributions in the future.

Mr. Shoaib said he recognized the force of these arguments. Nonetheless, his President would be disappointed with the results in view of President Kennedy's message/2/ which led him to believe that a substantial increase in U.S. commitments would be forthcoming.

/2/See footnote 2, Document 22.

Mr. Ball remarked that the problem for the Pakistanis was one of explanation, reiterating the point that the commitments at the Consortium meeting represented only an initial action, and that a further meeting was contemplated this year to consider possible further commitments. Mr. Martin said that in his press conference yesterday regarding the Consortium meeting he had stressed this point. Mr. Cottam noted that great care had been taken in the press release on the meeting to make clear that at the resumed meeting consideration would be given to Pakistan's requirements for both the second and third year of the Second Plan.

G. Ahmed said that since a further meeting was also contemplated in the case of India no particular point could be made of the fact that there was to be a subsequent meeting of Pakistan. Mr. Martin commented that so far as the United States was concerned we had made our full commitment in the case of India. Mr. Ball observed that the meeting on Pakistan was comparable to the first meeting on India which had been adjourned, the difference being that in the case of Pakistan we had made public the preliminary results. G. Ahmed suggested that it might have been better to have delayed announcing the results pending the second meeting. Mr. Ball replied that since there would necessarily be a considerable time before the second meeting, it was better, on balance, to announce the results.

With regard to the matching concept, Mr. Shoaib pointed out that the United States had traditionally supplied 80 - 85 per cent of foreign aid received by Pakistan. In the case of India the ratio between U.S. and other assistance was more nearly 4:4 or 4:3. He thought it not realistic to expect that the ratio in the case of Pakistan could be reduced at any early date to a 50:50 figure. Mr. Martin agreed, commenting that we were prepared for some years to see a gap in this respect.

Mr. Ball then urged that the Pakistan Government itself get in touch with the Germans to urge a larger contribution by that country. The U.S. Government, he said, was reaching a state of diminishing returns in its efforts to extract aid money from the Germans. He thought it would be better psychologically for the Pakistanis to make their own case with that government. Mr. Martin expressed his wholehearted concurrence, adding that this was not to say we had not made every effort to obtain a substantial German commitment to Pakistan. We had, but had not been particularly successful.

Mr. Shoaib agreed with Mr. Ball's suggestion, remarking that his government was sending M. Ayub as its Ambassador to Bonn specifically for this purpose. This, he said, was the "one and only reason for my letting him go from my Ministry." To the same end, his Government was also strengthening its staff in London.

Mr. Shoaib next remarked that he would have some difficulty stretching the immediate U.S. commitment of $150 million to cover current requirements. Pakistan, he said, needed to place immediate orders for commodity imports to a total of perhaps $120 million. This would leave only about $30 million to apply against development projects, whereas their requests of the Development Loan Fund greatly exceeded that figure. He wondered if perhaps they could proceed to place orders in excess of whatever might be allocated to DLF out of the $150 million on the understanding that they could be reimbursed by the DLF when additional money became available. Mr. Martin said this involved a legal problem for the DLF which would have to be explored. He also cautioned that an indicated willingness by the United States to exceed its commitment at the Consortium meeting might have an unfavorable influence on further European contributions. Mr. Ball said that subsequent reimbursement by the DLF of orders placed now was at least an idea which we could entertain in principle and which we would explore.

Mr. Shoaib next inquired as to the grant component of the U.S. commitment of $150 million. Mr. Martin said that we would not have the answer on this until the legislation had been passed. He would observe, however, that the Administration was under a mandate to reduce grant aid and that it was his guess that such aid, which in the case of Pakistan was described as Defense Support, would be less this next year than before.

Mr. Shoaib further remarked that commodity grant aid had in the past been an important source of local currency for financing plan projects. Mr. Cottam inquired if these could not now be replaced from the proceeds from the expanded PL - 480 program now in prospect. G. Ahmed replied that they had hoped not to use the PL - 480 proceeds for the Plan, but to conserve them for supplies and programs which would reach the common man and have a more immediate public impact than the larger Plan projects.

Finally, Mr. Shoaib inquired if it might not be possible to decide on a date for the resumed meeting. He remarked that it would not be desirable to have such a meeting coincide with a visit of President Ayub to Washington in early November, and it was accordingly agreed to try to arrange a meeting for late October.

27. Letter From the Deputy Secretary of Defense (Gilpatric) to the Under Secretary of State (Bowles)/1/

/1/Source: Washington National Records Center, RG 330, OASD/ISA Files: FRC 64 A 2382, India 400 - 702. Secret. Drafted on June 6 in ISA/NESA by Colonel Charles Rousek.

I - 14613/61
Washington, June 12, 1961.

Dear Chet: In a recent message (New Delhi's Embtel 1118 of 28 April 1961)/2/ Ambassador Galbraith emphasized the desirability of maintaining and strengthening the generally pro-Western orientation of India's military leaders. We understand that the Ambassador will be in Washington this week and hope that you plan to discuss this subject with him.

/2/This reference is error; the message has not been further identified.

The Department of Defense is concerned over indications of a trend in the Indian Ministry of Defense counter to the pro-Western orientation of India's senior military officers. These disturbing indications include: the recent Soviet emergence as a supplier of military type aircraft to India, a seeming preference on the part of Mr. V.K. Krishna Menon for Soviet rather than American sources of supply of such equipment, and the manipulations of senior officer assignments in favor of politically minded officers within the Indian Army and Air Force by Mr. Menon which may undermine the present strong, Western-oriented military leadership in favor of those more amenable to his personal political thinking.

We believe that this trend should be halted and that early practical steps should be taken to prevent further Soviet inroads which could lead to the exclusion of the United States as a supplier of military equipment to this country.

Since private American business cannot be expected to meet Soviet price competition it is necessary to agree upon procedures by which the United States Government can assume a part of the cost of supplying military equipment. It would also be desirable for us to offer long term loans at low interest rates and accept rupees in payment where necessary. There is legislative authority under the Mutual Security Act of 1954, as amended, for making such arrangements. Similar arrangements have been made with Burma and Indonesia. Once it is decided that aid to India should be granted in the United States' interest, the Presidential determinations and waivers which would be required under the Act should be sought. Because the actual prices charged by American manufacturers would not be affected, we can, as an internal matter, view the United States Government's participation in the sales arrangements as an aid to India. There would then appear to be no difficulty with the legal position. Once this is clear, such problems as demonstrations of American manufactured equipment could be worked out. It is recognized, of course, that any arrangements made must take account of Indian sensitivity associated with their firm policy of accepting no grant military assistance.

With regard to the security of classified material which might be involved in such sales, Defense recognizes both the provisions of the National Disclosure Policy with its requirement for an in-country survey and the undesirability of special arrangements or exceptions. We believe that the best approach to the security problem would be through our Ambassador's efforts to persuade the Government of India of our firm position and good faith.

It is recognized that problems may arise over Indian requests for equipment which we have not yet made available to our allies in NATO, CENTO, and SEATO. We believe that such problems, as is particularly the case with the C - 130 transport aircraft, must be handled on a case by case basis.

The Department of Defense proposes that early representations be made to the Government of India which would make it clear that the United States is prepared to offer military equipment on terms at least as favorable as those offered by any other source of supply. We further propose that State and Defense collaborate in the formulation of positive courses of action with a view to implementation soon after Ambassador Galbraith's return to India.


Roswell L. Gilpatric/3/

/3/Printed from a copy that indicates Gilpatric signed the original.

28. Telegram From the Embassy in India to the Department of State/1/

/1/Source: Department of State, Central Files, 690D.91/6 - 2861. Confidential. Repeated to Karachi.

New Delhi, June 28, 1961, 6 p.m.

3122. As President Ayub bound to raise Kashmir issue in Washington, Embassy believes it timely to assess the prevailing climate and situation here in order to assist Department in reaching conclusions as to what lies within realm of the possible and therefore what course of action to pursue.

We perceive no flexibility in GOI rationalization of its position on Kashmir which has probably been reinforced by similar situation in respect of Chinese in Ladakh, i.e.: It is held there can be no disputing India's claims which rest on sound legal and political basis; if other party does not accept India's claim and desires peaceful political settlement, this can only be achieved when military occupation vacated and ties of friendship have begun to reknit; in any case, initiative and proposals for settlement must come from those who seek to repair damage done by infringement on India's territory. Thus, those Indians who have hoped for Indo - Pakistan rapprochement have concentrated on soluble problems with view to strengthening the climate and habit of cooperation on the theory that accommodation of positions on Kashmir, involving give and take, can more easily be justified to Indian electorate if it is among friends.

From this standpoint, Indo - Pak relations have to be considerably transformed before Kashmir problem can be tackled. Well informed non-Indian observers, with whom this matter has been discussed recently, do not consider any profitable step on Kashmir can be taken at this time, not only because of current state of Indo - Pak relations but also because it is an election year in India.

It is extremely doubtful Prime Minister Nehru, in the unlikely event he desired to, could gain parliamentary approval under present circumstances of any solution of Kashmir issue that would be acceptable to Pakistan. It must be remembered he is regarded by orthodox Hindus as too pro-Muslim.

These considerations, together with fact that what Nehru says even in confidence to Pakistan leaders seems to leak to press are probably why Prime Minister has greeted President Ayub's conversational overtures on Kashmir with "wall of silence."

Given present state of Indo - US relations, however, and obvious justification for new administration to have current reading of Indian views from authoritative source, Ambassador plans at a propitious and hopefully early date to discuss Indo - Pak relations with Prime Minister including Kashmir. Obviously no point should be made of this in advance.

If, as is generally believed, Prime Minister is found to consider that Kashmir is more a result than the cause of Indo - Pak troubles, which are basically due to the communalism that produced partition, then current period of renewed communal tension is likely to find Nehru, concerned as he is about communalism, unable to envisage any satisfactory solution and consequently unyielding in his public posture. But at least we shall perhaps be in a better position to gauge what course of action, if any, is open at this time to well wishers of both Pakistan and India.


29. Special National Intelligence Estimate/1/

/1/Source: Central Intelligence Agency, Job 79 R 01012A, ODDI Registry of NIE and SNIE Files, Box 184. Secret. A note on the cover sheet reads: "Submitted by the Director of Central Intelligence. The following intelligence organizations participated in the preparation of this estimate: The Central Intelligence Agency and the intelligence organizations of the Departments of State, the Army, the Navy, the Air Force, and The Joint Staff." All members of the U.S. Intelligence Board concurred in this estimate on July 5, except the Atomic Energy Commission representative and the Assistant Director of the Federal Bureau of Investigation, who abstained on the grounds that the subject was outside their jurisdiction.

SNIE 32 – 61

Washington, July 5, 1961.


The Problem

To estimate the prospects for Pakistan and the Ayub regime over the next year or so.

The Estimate

1. Field Marshal Ayub, President of Pakistan, took power by a bloodless military coup in October 1958. During the more than thirty months since that time he has grappled energetically with three fundamental problems: (a) how to give his government constitutional legitimacy and to make it more representative in character, and at the same time to infuse a spirit of national unity into his regionally-minded people; (b) how to encourage economic development in his resource-poor country; and (c) how to promote Pakistan's foreign policy interests in a complex and changing international scene.

The Political Problem

2. Ayub's personal authority in Pakistan is not under effective challenge. Despite some jealousies and dissensions among his top military and civilian advisers, he has managed to keep close control over them, to make them work effectively, and to retain their personal loyalty. The prestige of the army, on which Ayub's base of power rests, remains high. (The army withdrew from the day-to-day affairs of government after the first few months.) Ayub continues to enjoy wide support among the civil and military services generally. The old line politicians whom he displaced have been intimidated, their party organizations shattered, and many of them have been personally discredited by disclosure of their dishonest and inefficient conduct while in office. Some important politicians, however, may have won a degree of sympathy due to the government's moves against them; the Islamic zealots (Jamaat - i - Islami), the "Red Shirts" (Pushtun nationalists), and the underground Communist Party have retained at least a potential for organized opposition to the regime.

3. Ayub has attempted to bring to Pakistan a greater sense of cohesion and national entity than it has had since its very early days. He himself and most of his advisers are less affected by regional biases than many of their politician predecessors. By removing regional issues from the forefront of politics, Ayub has brought a period of stability and increasing centralization in which more effective national planning has been possible. He has not, of course, been able to eliminate the fundamental political and economic problems which arise out of the country's division into two parts or the very deep cultural and linguistic divisions between East and West Pakistan and within the latter. Indeed, in some cases his firm policy of centralization may have enhanced regional loyalties--especially in the North-West Frontier area. As far as the bulk of the people are concerned, Ayub's benevolent authoritarianism has not been particularly repressive. Although he still has fairly wide, albeit mostly passive, support in the country at large, significant elements still resent the fact that he is not a constitutionally legitimate and representative leader.

4. Ayub's greatest weakness has been his lack of confidence and support from many of the politically-conscious elements in the country. These range all the way from impoverished students and petty trade unionists to successful professional people and influential intellectuals. Most of these groups resent their virtual exclusion from the governing process by Ayub. Many believe deeply in the ideal of the rule of law and have been associated with the parliamentary system. They are unlikely to be satisfied with any limited representative forms, such as the "Basic Democracies" scheme, which Ayub is now implementing./2/ Though unorganized, their discontent has recently been manifested in student disturbances in Karachi and the locally famous "Snelson Case" in which the judiciary strongly repudiated what it construed as an effort by the executive to interfere in the traditional responsibilities of the courts.

/2/The "Basic Democracies" are a series of representative bodies beginning at the village level. Except at the village level, election is indirect and some members are appointed by the government. No party organizations are involved. [Footnote in the source text.]

5. We believe Ayub will continue to dominate the Pakistani scene for the next few years at least--although promulgation of a new constitution and full implementation of the "Basic Democracies" will change the forms through which his power is exercised and probably limit its extent. We anticipate that his regime will continue to be relatively honest and efficient, that he will be able to handle any dissension that develops among his advisers, and that his rule will not become unduly repressive. The period of constitution-making and elections (vaguely promised for 1962) will be a troublesome one, the more so the longer it is. In any event, Ayub is unlikely to win the trust and cooperation of most of the politically-conscious elements or to do more than make a start at weakening basic provincial antagonisms. However, he will probably continue to have a fairly broad base of primarily passive support.

6. The longerterm outlook is less clear. If Ayub is to consolidate his reforms and sustain their momentum, he will sooner or later have to broaden participation in the government and probably also provide some form of legitimate expression for regional feelings. We believe there is about an even chance that a workable form of limited representative government will evolve out of his constitutional experimenting.

7. However, it is going to be difficult for Ayub to share power. He is inclined by training and tradition to have little patience with civilian politicians and parliamentary government. He is still vigorous and relatively young (54); if he chose, he could probably go on for some time resting his power on his influence over the military forces and the lack of any satisfactory alternative to his own rule. In such a case, discontent would grow, narrowing the base of his support, and he would probably become more vulnerable to a coup by some other military leader or group--perhaps in alliance with particular civilian or regional interests. Should Ayub be killed or incapacitated, he would probably be succeeded by one of his senior military colleagues (perhaps General Azam, theGovernor of East Pakistan). In these circumstances, the problem of maintaining governmental stability would become still more complicated.

The Development Problem

8. At the core of Pakistan's development problem are the country's limited resources. Much of the land is desert, mountains, and jungle. Some useful minerals have been discovered, but with the exception of natural gas, their exploitation has lagged. The large population (93 million) is generally unskilled with a high percentage of illiteracy. The living standard is as low as that in any major country in Asia. Until recently, economic development has had a low priority and relatively little has been done to mobilize such resources as are available. The military force imposes a substantial burden on the country. Pakistan does, however, have two valuable, if not always dependable, cash crops (cotton and jute) and the potential at least for a substantial increase in agricultural production.

9. The President has selected honest and competent advisers in the economic field. He has restricted unnecessary imports, encouraged exports, and remedied the worst inequities of the land tenure and taxation systems without changing their basic structure. Fiscal policies have been reasonably successful in stimulating industrial production while restraining excessive inflationary pressures. Sympathetic economic policies and political stability have encouraged the private sector of the economy, and private as well as public industrial investment has risen significantly in the past two years. These developments have provided a tenable, though by no means solid, base for Pakistan's Second Five-Year Plan (1960 - 1965).

10. In general, the new plan appears to be sound, although in its present form it may tend to emphasize unduly long-term basic development programs at the expense of useful short-term projects with more direct impact on the economy. The plan calls for total investment in the neighborhood of $5 billion and is intended to achieve an increase of about 20 percent in national income and about 10 percent in per capita income. Recent indications that the rate of population growth may be somewhat greater (about 2.2 percent annually) than was previously believed may shave the latter figure somewhat. Nevertheless, successful implementation of the plan would make possible a modest increase in the standard of living, though mainly in West Pakistan. This may prevent for the next few years at least the economic pressures on the political structure from becoming significantly stronger. It would also provide a broadened base for future economic development and encourage greater public interest and participation in the development process.

11. Execution of the plan, however, is dependent not only on the mobilization of domestic resources but on the receipt of large-scale foreign aid; an estimated $2.3 billion in aid (not including PL 480 surplus food grain imports) will be required for the 1960 - 1965 period, or about double the annual rate of recent years. /3/ This foreign aid is more likely to be forthcoming if domestic planning and mobilization of resources are handled effectively. If the pace of development is to be maintained beyond the plan period, substantial aid will need to continue, as it will be many years before the Pakistani economy is self-generating even under the best of domestic conditions. Thus President Ayub will continue almost indefinitely to be in the unpleasant position of being responsible for an economic development program the success or failure of which will be determined by external factors over which he can at best exert only limited influence.

/3/Approximately $1.8 billion is required for specific projects in the plan and $500 million for imports necessary to keep the economy operating at a reasonably high level. [Footnote in the source text.]

International Position

12. The need for external assistance looms large in Ayub's approach to foreign policy. He has made it clear that Pakistan relies for a major portion of its required aid, economic as well as military, on the US, that as an ally it should have a special right to such aid, and that the aid it has received to date has not fulfilled its expectations. At the same time, he has permitted his aggressive Minister of Fuel, Power, and Natural Resources, Z.A. Bhutto, to arrange for a $30 million oil exploration assistance project with the USSR and is now investigating the possibility of Soviet help in dealing with Pakistan's serious water-logging and salinity problem.

13. Pakistan's foreign policy problems are not just a question of obtaining external assistance, however. Ayub's government is under considerable pressure from the Communist Bloc. The USSR has long been frank about its hostility toward Pakistan's alliance with the West, and since the U - 2 incident Pakistanis have been acutely aware of the threat of Soviet power. (The plane took off from Peshawar.) Soviet pressure has also been manifested in the growing Soviet presence in Afghanistan with which Pakistan is prone to connect the increasing unrest on its border with Afghanistan. In addition, the USSR has openly supported India and Afghanistan against Pakistan on the Kashmir and "Pushtoonistan" issues.

14. These issues are of themselves of immediate and highly emotional concern to Pakistan and there is a growing sense of concern over failure to cope with them adequately. The "strong" policy toward Afghanistan which the Ayub government adopted when it came to office has in fact increased Afghan intransigence and intensified unrest on the North-West Frontier. The cooperative policy toward India did facilitate a settlement of the Indus waters question, but it did not lead India to take up Ayub's offer for a joint defense effort in South Asia, and most importantly, it failed to achieve any progress on Kashmir. Pakistan's membership in CENTO and SEATO has not brought from the US the support on regional issues for which Pakistan hoped, nor have Ayub's several trips abroad won any new support from the neutrals. Indeed, many Pakistanis fear that the US desire to maintain amicable relations with Afghanistan and to support strongly a major economic development effort in India are manifestations of an increasing partiality toward the "uncommitted" nations. A resulting frustration has tended to increase the existing neutralist sentiment within the country. On the other hand, a sense of growing crisis over external issues tends to increase national unity.

15. In this situation, more complex than any Pakistan has faced in the international field for some years, Ayub's foreign policy is likely to seek greater independence within the framework of its pro-Western orientation. Additional technical and economic agreements with the USSR are possible, as are more comprehensive negotiations with Communist China on Himalayan border questions. Pakistan has already indicated its intention to favor Communist China's membership in the UN; other shifts on emotional Afro-Asian issues and the establishment of closer ties with Tito and Nasser may follow. Ayub's vigorous policy on the "Pushtoonistan" issue will probably continue. In addition, he will try to focus international attention on the Kashmir problem again, perhaps even by provocations or agitation in the disputed area.

16. Pakistan's relations with the US will probably continue to be judged to a considerable degree in the light of US relations with India and Afghanistan. There are likely to be fairly persistent expressions of dissatisfaction with US aid and repeated requests for demonstrations of US confidence and support. In this atmosphere, the possibility will remain that foreign policy problems, especially if they are coupled with unfavorable internal developments, could seriously erode Pakistan's close association with the US.

17. We believe this to be unlikely, however, at least for some time to come. Pakistan is firmly committed to the pro-Western alignment implicit in its SEATO and CENTO memberships, and short of a radical change in government it would be difficult for it to find a congenial place among the neutralist nations. In addition, Ayub and many Pakistanis have a genuine fear of communism. Moreover, Pakistan is heavily dependent on the US for both military and economic aid, and, despite occasional recriminations and manifestations of greater independence, Pakistan will probably continue to place its basic reliance on the West and to cooperate actively with it within the established framework of the alliance. Indeed, a major effort to demonstrate Pakistan's loyalty and to win increased US support and commitments will almost certainly be made during Ayub's visit to the US in July 1961.

30. Memorandum of Conversation/1/

/1/Source: Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Countries Series, Pakistan, Subjects, Ayub Visit, 7/61. Secret. Drafted by Talbot. According to the President's Appointment Book, the meeting was held at the White House. (Ibid.)

Washington, July 11, 1961, 3 - 5 p.m.

Kennedy - Ayub Talks

President Ayub
External Affairs Minister Qadir
Finance Minister Shoaib
Ambassador Aziz Ahmed
Foreign Secretary Dehlavi

President Kennedy
Vice President Johnson
Secretary of State Rusk
Ambassador Rountree
Asst. Secy of State Edwin M. Martin
Asst. Secy of State Phillips Talbot
White House Asst. Rostow (Deputy Special Asst. to the President for National Security Affairs)

President Kennedy opened by expressing a warm welcome to President Ayub on his arrival in the United States./2/ Vice President Johnson and President Kennedy's sister had taken great pleasure in seeing President Ayub in Pakistan. We had greatly appreciated his sturdy support of SEATO's Plan 5 at a most dangerous period. Now we wanted to give him our thinking and to get his views on subjects of common interest. For all these reasons, we were glad he could come in July rather than waiting until November. Another reason was that some of the Congressmen who have been least enthusiastic about the American aid program were particularly friendly to President Ayub's country, and when they heard him tell the advantages of the aid program, perhaps they would see it in a better light.

/2/President Ayub arrived in Washington on July 11 and returned to Pakistan from New York on July 18. He spent the first 3 days in Washington and was Vice President Johnson's guest during a 2-day trip to the LBJ Ranch in Texas.

Observing that in these talks the two presidents could begin anywhere, President Kennedy started with his recent visit to Vienna. In 1914, in 1939, and in Korea troubles had arisen in part because there were many misunderstandings. To avoid miscalculation based on misunderstanding, he had wanted to get to know Khrushchev, whose January 6 speech had sounded as if it could lead only to war. He had wanted to know what was really meant. Unfortunately he got little enough satisfaction out of the talks. Khrushchev was courteous, but made it very clear he intended to follow the course he had set out.

On Laos, Khrushchev had said the right words about neutrality, but the President had come away unclear as to what meaning he attached to them. On nuclear testing they got nowhere. On Berlin Khrushchev had said what he had since stated publicly, that he expected to sign a peace treaty, then announce that both the USSR and the Western Powers had thereby lost sovereignty in the area. If this were done, East Germany might or might not take action immediately. All in all, we were faced with a difficult situation, which could end in disaster. We might have to strengthen our military establishment. The extra $4 - 5 billion would hurt us in the foreign aid field and in other activities although we would do it if necessary. One of our problems was that we did not have as large forces as the USSR and had relied on nuclear weapons as a deterrent. Thus the situation had the dangerous capability of escalating rapidly. We would hope Khrushchev would give way, and we supposed Khrushchev hoped we should.

On the question of Laos, President Kennedy said that in March, when it appeared the Pathet Lao might capture Vientiane, he had gone to see Prime Minister Macmillan. We had heard that the British would not intervene, nor would the French. Macmillan agreed to a limited plan, but the French would not. Then came talk of a cease-fire, and we were faced with a new situation. We had just been through the Cuban episode--which was a mistake, at least in implementation--and he had taken a fresh look at the U.S. military situation. There was the problem of getting troops into Laos, which had no seaport. The U.S. concluded that it might be difficult to go in. Viet-Nam was another country that troubled President Kennedy. President Ayub knew that it was easier to get into these situations than out of them. In many ways this was one of our most anxious problems, because we should not want to make a mistake which would leave us fighting in an Asian situation where we could not win without using nuclear weapons and forfeiting the support of peoples of Asia.

President Ayub responded with general comments about conditions in Southeast Asia. Much of the problem, he said, arose because most of the rulers were princes and others wanting mainly to protect their own interests. Unless they were prepared to identify themselves with their own people, no amount of aid would save them. If the U.S. wanted to help them, it should insist that they undertake reforms. It should also be prepared to take active leadership of local armed forces, including use of weapons, training, and operations. To President Kennedy's comment that the U.S. did not even put Southeast Asian soldiers into uniform, President Ayub agreed that there were many problems. The French would not fight in Southeast Asia, he thought, nor had the British now much interest in the area. Would it not be better, therefore, to detach the French and the British from SEATO? It would give more flexibility. Pakistan had been asked to prepare to send a battalion to Laos, President Ayub said, but he had concluded a battalion could do nothing but get itself lost. He had decided therefore that it would be better to send a brigade group so it could fight well as a more integrated group.

President Ayub then turned to Pakistan's security situation. Displaying a map showing Pakistani information on the deployment of Indian forces, he said that of one-half million troops in the Indian army, 15 per cent were deployed against China and 85 per cent faced Pakistan. Displaying a second map on which Afghan military formations were indicated, President Ayub referred to an Afghan army of 80,000 to 90,000 men on paper but said he didn't know how effective they were. The Russians had poured in $450,000,000 worth of military equipment, though perhaps the Afghans could not yet use the equipment effectively. The Pakistan Army, he added, showing a third map, was necessarily deployed against India and Afghanistan. That was why he kept harping on the Kashmir question. Until it was settled, the armies would face one another. Should the Afghans get properly trained, moreover, Pakistan would be up the gum tree if an attack came from either India or Afghanistan.

President Kennedy believed the Indians are not going to march. They already had what they wanted in Kashmir. To President Ayub the point was that India wanted to neutralize all Pakistan. In answer to President Kennedy's question how that would help India, President Ayub said that it was clear from the Indian Army deployments that they regarded Pakistan as enemy no. 1. To them the Chinese problem was just an aberration, a misunderstanding. President Kennedy observed he could understand India's desire, especially Nehru's, to hold on to what they had in Kashmir. He could also understand India's force being placed there to keep out Pakistan, which had irredentist feeling. President Ayub responded that Kashmir was a test; if India should settle with Pakistan on Kashmir, it would mean India wanted to live at peace with Pakistan.

President Kennedy explained that the U.S. had supported India not with the expectation that India would support U.S. policies, but because we felt it in the interest of us all that India should not collapse. He perceived difficulties in dealing with Nehru, who had been around a long time, and he did not know what the U.S. could do. We could not even bring Chiang Kai-shek, whom we had helped more than anyone, to do what we saw was in his own interest.

President Ayub thought that what the U.S. wanted in South Asia was an area of stability. He wouldn't say that the U.S. should threaten to withhold aid to India, but surely the U.S. had the right to demand responsible action from Nehru. President Ayub acknowledged that the U.S. wanted to do good and to assist India in order that it should not go Communist, but at the back of its mind the U.S. surely thought India would support the U.S. To the contrary, President Kennedy explained, he did not expect Nehru's support on the items that were vital to the U.S. The U.S. had supported the Indian Consortium even when Nehru was strongly attacking U.S. actions in Cuba. President Ayub agreed that Nehru would not support the U.S.; he wanted to keep open his channels to Moscow, also.

One clue to the understanding of India in President Ayub's opinion, could be found in the peculiar patterns in underdeveloped countries wherein central governments collected funds which were then spent in the states. Since demands were always greater than the funds, wrangling resulted of which the Communists could take advantage. Regional wrangling had already started in India for this reason and because of other divisions such as caste, with the result that local regionalisms were growing stronger. So far Nehru's personality and the unity obtained in the fight against the British had held India together, but these could not carry on indefinitely. Meanwhile the Chinese Communists had an army of one-half million troops in Tibet ostensibly to control a population of two million. Actually these troops were not too far from Calcutta, which was the base of Communism in India. In his view India was bound to break up in 15 to 20 years. If it were said that the key to the defense of the rim of Asia was India, he would add in these circumstances that the key to the defense of the subcontinent was Pakistan.

President Kennedy wondered what his guest would feel Nehru could agree to in the Kashmir dispute that Pakistan would also agree to. Describing on the map their respective locations, President Ayub replied that Nehru had shown no disposition to yield anything beyond the cease-fire line in Kashmir. Pakistan would have no objection to India's taking Jammu. To protect its resources Pakistan would have to have some miles on the other side of the River Chenab. But he didn't wish to come down to details now; only to point out the necessity of the two nations coming to negotiate. Pakistan's people were getting fed up. This is why they sometimes talked of working more closely with China, though they didn't want China to come in. What then did Pakistan want of China, President Kennedy wondered. President Ayub wanted nothing of China; he'd like to see it go to hell. But the Pakistani people were anxious to do something about Kashmir.

President Kennedy could understand why a settlement was important, but didn't know whether the U.S. could influence Nehru. In President Ayub's opinion, however, Nehru now had to come to the U.S. He had no maneuverability left. The Chinese did not like him, so he had to turn to the U.S. Why could the U.S. not see that? President Kennedy felt the U.S. to be not all that influential with Nehru on Kashmir. It was a bone-deep issue. Even so, President Ayub felt that the U.S. need merely tell Nehru it was concerned about the waste of its money that occurred because the Kashmir issue was not settled. President Kennedy still believed one should not underestimate the strength of feeling about such issues. He recognized, for example, that Pakistan could not understand why the U.S. should feel so strongly about the admission of Communist China to the U.N., but it did. He supposed that Nehru had the same kind of feeling about Kashmir. Even if this were true, President Ayub commented, many people of India did not agree with Nehru. They would like to get outstanding issues settled. When a number of boundary issues had been settled, many people were joyful. Looking ahead strategically, the U.S. should remember that anything it gave was wasted until the Kashmir issue was solved. Summing up this part of the discussion, President Kennedy wanted President Ayub to understand that (1) the U.S. gave aid to India not to get that country's support but to help it stay free; (2) it was in the vital interest of the United States that this issue be solved; and (3) when Nehru came to Washington in November President Kennedy would make a major effort with him. He wanted President Ayub to know that even if he did not succeed, he would have tried. Unless this effort succeeded, President Ayub believed that Pakistan would have to bring the case again to the U.N. Would the U.S. then support Pakistan? Yes, President Kennedy said, the U.S. would support the U.N. resolutions. President Ayub thanked him for this statement.

Secretary Rusk asked whether there was any chance for a broader consideration of the problem. Could the Kashmir issue be put into the context of the security of the entire subcontinent, for example? Expressing doubt, President Ayub described Kashmir as the manifestation of India's hostility toward Pakistan. No government of Pakistan, he added, could stand by dealing with other problems while ignoring Kashmir.

President Kennedy said that if the U.S. was to be involved in the Kashmir case again, Pakistan should at least wait (to raise the question in the U.N.) until after he had seen Nehru. If after that, Pakistan finally decided to bring the question to the U.N., the U.S. would vote with Pakistan. (Comment: In later discussion with Messrs. Rountree and Talbot, the President made it clear that at the proper time the U.S. should appraise the possible consequences of renewed consideration of the Kashmir question in the U.N., and should counsel the Pakistanis strongly if the prospects were negative. End comment) President Ayub noted that the past U.S. position on Kashmir in the U.N. was known, and that President Kennedy could use this record in his talks with Nehru. Secretary Rusk observed that in the communique of the present meetings, it would be important to emphasize the past record, not talk of the future.

Saying he also wished to talk about Afghanistan, President Ayub recalled that during all the time Afghanistan had served as a buffer between Russia and Britain (British India) it had never had good roads. Now three excellent road systems being built in Afghanistan by the Russians would enable the Russians to bring 9 to 12 divisions to bear on Pakistan if they wanted to. The U.S. was obligingly building lateral roads for them. When this complex was completed, the Russians would be in a position to intimidate Pakistan militarily. Their goal was to intimidate Pakistan and to knock it out of SEATO and CENTO. To reduce this pressure was one reason that Pakistan made its oil deal with the USSR.

President Ayub believed our ability to act in Southeast Asia to be now completely curtailed. Because they were a liability, he felt the protocol countries should be detached from SEATO. President Kennedy reminded him that in Viet-Nam the U.S. had taken on almost unilateral responsibility. Yes, President Ayub responded, and now the U.S. was getting somewhere. The Communists were creeping in all the time, so nothing but direct action could stop them. He doubted that Thailand would last long. As the U.S. was giving the Thai equipment it should ask them to give it the controls so the soldiers would fight.

In President Kennedy's judgment the threat posed by the Soviet Union was not overt war in that region. If it wanted war, it would attack the U.S. He would think the threat that Pakistan might confront in Afghanistan was the possibility of guerrilla warfare and Communist party control. The question was the strength of the border forces in Afghanistan and of the Communist Party influence in both Afghanistan and Pakistan. Things along the border went on, President Ayub responded. There were attacks in the area, and Pakistan hit back hard. The Afghans believed the Russians would prevail. They wanted to get all the support they could from them, but at the same time to keep them at arm's length. They did this by getting U.S. support. Yet the Royal Family in Afghanistan did not want to commit suicide. The U.S. could therefore tell the Afghans it would give aid when their actions justify it. President Kennedy wondered whether it was then President Ayub's opinion that the U.S. should not want to give aid to Afghanistan. Ambassador Byroade had taken another view--that the Afghans should not be allowed to be smothered, and that the U.S. should give them support. President Ayub felt nevertheless that if the U.S. wanted Afghanistan to behave, it should pull back a bit. Answering President Kennedy's observation that at least Afghanistan was not yet a satellite, President Ayub suggested this was true because the Soviets didn't want it yet. In essence he felt Afghanistan was a satellite; the Royal Family was no longer free. But the USSR did not yet have the Communist Party cells in Afghanistan to take over.

Mr. Qadir thought the United States should endeavor to place the Afghans in a position of seeking our aid. If the United States did not give assistance so freely, the Afghans would come to realize the danger of losing it altogether, and this they did not want.

President Kennedy observed that no amount of American aid would make a country want to preserve its independence. Unless there was a will and determination in this regard, assistance rendered was wasted. We should therefore always consider the attitude of the government toward independence as a criterion in determining aid uses. He mentioned Guinea as a country in which the determination of the leaders to preserve their national independence seemed in doubt, and therefore a country in which the utility of American aid was also doubtful.

President Ayub commented that Sekou Toure was a Communist. However, he might be replaced by someone else who would pursue other policies. The difficulty in Afghanistan was that in present circumstances the rule was confined to only one family.

President Kennedy mentioned the problem of judgment involved in such matters. For example, the extension of aid to Yugoslavia had lessened Yugoslav dependence upon the Soviet Union and had helped to bring about a greater degree of independence. There were other such places where we should use economic assistance to avoid, in effect, turning the country over to the Soviet Bloc.

President Ayub said many countries were exploiting American anxiety to help them. This was particularly true in Afghanistan. If, however, the Royal Family should feel itself in danger of losing American aid and thus of increased reliance upon the Soviet Union, their attitude might change. If the United States should pull back a bit they would feel naked and might become more sensible in their foreign relations. He thought in any event it would do no harm to try this tactic. Certainly Pakistan did not want to suggest any course which would increase the danger of the Communists taking over in Afghanistan. Their interests were exactly to the contrary and it was the President's belief that the "shock treatment" would be more successful than the course currently followed by the United States.

President Kennedy said the Pakistanis might have an exaggerated idea of the magnitude of American aid to Afghanistan. The program now was quite limited--we had spent only $22 million in FY 1961 and $165 million in FY 1951 - 60--and he felt we could not withdraw completely without running a real danger.

Mr. Qadir commented that Secretary Rusk had observed at Bangkok that the United States was sometimes thought of as a cow with milk but with no horns. He thought we should develop a few horns and become a bit tougher in dispensing aid.

President Kennedy referred to the matter of Pakistan's using U.S. equipment on the Pakistani border against Afghan tribal incursions. Recalling that some had thought the situation similar to that in Algeria, where we had come in for criticism because the French had used U.S. equipment, he said that here the situation was different. We had no objection to Pakistan's using U.S. equipment to protect its national security if it felt action vital; it was a question of how best to get into position to settle differences with Afghanistan. President Ayub said that military equipment was not the sort of thing one used unless there was need. Pakistan had no intention of attacking the Afghans. But if they came at Pakistan, it would hit them hard.

Explaining Pakistan's reactions to U.S. policies, President Ayub said that whenever the U.S. had a success anywhere, Pakistan shared in the success. When the U.S. suffered reverses, Pakistani morale went down. U.S. power was the only cover available to Pakistan and other countries. Thus it was not that Pakistan was criticizing U.S. policies, but that if any policy failed, there were repercussions on Pakistan's security. Sometimes a firm stand was necessary. The Russians, for example, used to play a trick on Pakistan. They would give Pakistan very short notice of overflights of their planes to Delhi, and then take unauthorized routes. Finally he had had to tell them that if they again took an unauthorized route, their plane would be shot down. That worked. Pakistan faced that sort of thing quite often. It was living in the midst of tricksters--Russians, Chinese, and those bloody Hindus.

President Kennedy pointed out that if the U.S. were not involved all around the world it could easily maintain military control in limited areas, say the Caribbean. By the same token, so could the USSR over areas near its territory. If the Americans seemed less assertive in some areas, it didn't mean we were fainthearted. But while chances remained in Afghanistan, we'd like to be in a position to move forward with them.

Returning to the subject of Indo-Pakistan relations, President Ayub repeated Pakistan's desire to settle the disputes. He sometimes wondered what sort of statesmanship Nehru had. He had been neither impressed nor inspired by Nehru, who could not see what a fatal mistake he was making in not seizing the chance to settle the disputes.

President Kennedy asked about transportation arrangements across India between the two wings of Pakistan. Mr. Qadir explained that after having agreed to permit transit of some trains each week, Nehru found some objections in his Parliament and as a result India had now made clear this would not be implemented--even though Pakistan had permitted Indian trains to cross parts of East Pakistan between Bengal and Assam.

President Ayub spoke of having hoped that things would ease up, but this was the sort of people they were. These chaps had no intention of fighting China, either. They were spending $700 million on armed forces, shoving the money down the drain. He couldn't understand why they should continue doing so, instead of settling the disputes. But he found Indians a very trigger-happy people. In 1951 they had got on the move, for no apparent reason. President Ayub went on to say that there was a great deal of concern in Pakistan over the spreading scope of American military aid. His people wanted to know whether there was any intention to give India more arms aid.

President Kennedy replied that there was no intention to give India any arms aid.

If this should happen, President Ayub continued, the Pakistani people would force his country out of the pacts and alliances and everything.

President Kennedy explained that when in the new aid bill changes were made in the political qualifications that countries must meet to be eligible for American military assistance, India was not even discussed. If sometime a situation, such as impending war with China, should arise that would cause the Indians to come to the U.S. for military aid, we would talk with Pakistan and see what was the best course of action. However, there was no intention now to give India military aid. If there should be a change in U.S. policy, President Kennedy would talk with President Ayub first.

Mr. Qadir was worried mainly about the public relations angle. Indian newspapers had carried these stories of change in the American law and had suggested India might get U.S. military aid, and Pakistani newspapers had picked them up. As a result, the Pakistani people had become alarmed. The Pakistan Government could not repudiate the story, and if there were no repudiation on this end, people would think the story true.

To President Kennedy the best course seemed to be to try to let the issue pass. It would be wrong to issue a statement. We would get into a fight about something that was not a fact. The best thing therefore was just to let the whole thing pass. Mr. Qadir agreed that that would be best, but felt the people of Pakistan would not let it pass. President Kennedy suggested that all should think about what to do about this in the common interest.

President Ayub concluded the meeting by repeating that he found it a great pleasure to see President Kennedy. He wanted him please to remember that Pakistan genuinely regards him as a friend./3/

/3/Presidents Kennedy and Ayub continued their discussions on July 12 and July 13. The conversation on July 12 dealt largely with economic issues. The conversation on July 13 opened with a discussion of the question of Chinese representation in the United Nations before turning to the issues of economic and military assistance for Pakistan. Ayub had an additional discussion of military assistance with Johnson on July 15 during the flight to Texas. Memoranda of the two conversations with Kennedy are in the Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Countries Series, Pakistan, Subjects, Ayub Visit, 7/61. A memorandum of the conversation with Johnson is ibid., Pakistan, General, 5/61 - 7/61. Additional documentation on the Ayub visit is in Department of State, Central Files, 790D.11 and ibid., Conference Files: Lot 65 D 366.

31. Memorandum of Conversation/1/

/1/Source: Department of State, Central Files, 790D.00/7 - 2161. Confidential. Drafted by Talbot and approved by the White House on July 31. According to the President's Appointment Book, the meeting was held at the White House. (Kennedy Library)

Washington, July 21, 1961.

Conversation between the President and Ambassador Maiwandwal of Afghanistan

The President
His Excellency Mohammed Hashim Maiwandwal, Ambassador of Afghanistan
Phillips Talbot, Assistant Secretary of State for NEA

Ambassador Maiwandwal gave a long, historical account of Afghan and Pushtun occupancy of various areas east of the Durand Line and of British determination for several generations to keep Afghanistan a backward buffer state. He said that when the British established the Durand Line in 1893 they knew that it cut through the land of the Pushtuns. Before Britain left India in 1947 it promised that on its departure the Pushtuns east of the Durand Line would have freedom to determine their future. However, after a referendum which was boycotted by the Pushtun nationalist leader, Khan Abdul Ghaffar Khan, Pakistan claimed it had the sanction to incorporate the Pushtun areas into the new Pakistani state. Afghanistan does not want these areas for itself but Afghans do feel that their Pushtun brothers must have a chance to determine their own destiny.

In the course of the Ambassador's statement the President called for a map. When it came and the President asked the Ambassador what area he was talking about, the Ambassador swept his hand over nearly half of West Pakistan.

Of late, the Ambassador said, Pakistan has been taunting the Pushtuns with American arms. In response to the President's question, the Ambassador confirmed that he was still talking about the areas east of the Durand Line. These actions greatly disturbed Afghans and reemphasized the problem confronting Afghanistan when the United States gives Pakistan sophisticated weapons. The President commented that he had heard that Afghanistan had weapons from the Soviet Union. Agreeing that this was true, the Ambassador said that Afghanistan had turned to the Soviet Union only after the U.S. had given weapons to Pakistan and after Afghan requests for arms from the United States and other Western countries had been refused. He added that the Afghan military and economic relations with the Soviet Union did not mean that Afghanistan was pro-Communist or pro-Russian. If the Pakistanis complained that Afghan roads would enable Soviet forces to reach the Pakistan frontier with ease, their reply would be that they would get there over the dead bodies of the Afghans.

The Ambassador asked for a definition of the U.S. policy toward use of American-provided military equipment in the border areas. At the President's request Mr. Talbot explained that the bilateral Pakistan - U.S. Agreement permits the use of MAP equipment for internal security purposes and that since the U.S. recognizes the Durand Line as Pakistan's frontier there can be no legal objection to Pakistan's use of this equipment to meet vital internal security needs in that area. However, this did not mean that the United States could not counsel Pakistan against such uses as might exacerbate relations between Pakistan and its neighbors.

The President observed that disputes among nations that are friends of ours create difficult problems for the United States. Obviously we cannot settle all of these disputes. We do hope, however, that the parties can find peaceful solutions to them.

The President said that the United States continues to desire friendly relations with Afghanistan. We had been able to help Afghanistan to some limited extent in its economic development programs and he hoped we could do more. He asked the Ambassador to come and see him again when the Ambassador returns to Washington.

32. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Afghanistan/1/

/1/Source: Department of State, Central Files, 789.5 - MSP/6 - 2161. Secret. Drafted in SOA by Carle, cleared by Talbot and Perkins (S/S) and with B/FAC and ICA, and approved by Bowles.

Washington, July 22, 1961, 6:16 p.m.

35. Joint State/ICA Message. Embtels 1130 /2/ and 1131. /3/ You may at your discretion convey substance of following which represents our carefully considered present position to RGA. While aware this falls short proposals reftels more specific response not now practicable or possible.

/2/In telegram 1130 from Kabul, June 20, the Embassy proposed a detailed program of assurances regarding the estimated magnitude of economic assistance that could be provided to Afghanistan over a 2-year period. (Ibid.)

/3/In telegram 1131 from Kabul, June 21, the Embassy requested that the program of assurances outlined in telegram 1130 be given serious consideration. In light of public commitments made to India and Pakistan, and with indications that similar commitments would soon be made to Iran, the Embassy considered that it was "virtually necessary" to reach an understanding with Afghanistan on future foreign aid. (Ibid.)

1. US is prepared, as we have already demonstrated by our actions to date, to assist Afghanistan in efforts move forward with pressing economic development needs.

2. We plan give first priority successful completion of projects in which we are already engaged. While exact phasing and costing not certain, present estimates are that they will require about $50 million in next two years.

3. We are prepared continue provide wheat under the Food for Peace Program to help meet Afghan food needs. Sales proceeds will help finance agreed development projects.

4. We are willing study in detail Second Five-Year Plan when made available to us with view to determining extent to which we can associate ourselves with it. We havemade advance aid level commitments, subject to fund availability, only on very limited basis (India, one year plus conditional commitment for second year subject to review; Pakistan, part of one year) and only after we have had prolonged and detailed review with government of country concerned and with other interested governments covering soundness of plan, feasibility of specific projects included in plan, priorities as between projected requirements, adequacy of the self-help measures being taken by country, including raising domestic revenues, and all other relevant factors.

5. We are prepared to consider undertaking new projects and/or expansion existing activities of high priority to the RGA which will help meet Afghanistan's urgent development needs. In January we offered to provide grant aid ($17 million) for expanded education programs which the Afghan Government still has under consideration. We are prepared to consider grant financing for technical assistance and for capital costs of educational and other social infrastructure projects. In view of general US policy of increased reliance on loan financing, bulk of future industrial, transportation, irrigation, power and other economic infrastructure project proposals will primarily be considered for development loan financing; if the long-term borrowing authority is enacted we will be able to commit funding for specific projects over a period of years more readily than in the past.

6. When considering new project proposals we will wish study carefully their technical and economic priority, adequacy and soundness of design and plans for implementation, adequacy of Afghanistan's provision for financing share of costs, consistency of financing plans with financial stability, and soundness of financial and administrative arrangements for continuing operations.

7. We are prepared, as illustrated by Nathan Contract, to assist Afghanistan to improve its capacity to formulate and execute a sound long-term development plan.


33. Letter From Secretary of State Rusk to the Ambassador to India (Galbraith)/1/

/1/Source: Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Countries Series, India, General, 6/16/61 - 7/31/61. Secret.

Washington, July 31, 1961.

Dear Ken: I was much interested in your effort, reported in Embtels 3123 and 8, /2/ to impress upon our Indian friends the stake which neutrals have in support of the genuine independence of other neutrals. I sought to make the same point to Ambassador Chagla by indicating that the United States presence in Southeast Asia had not been sought by us and that we would be happy to see the day when the countries there would be able to maintain their own independence.

/2/Dated June 28 and July 2. (Department of State, Central Files, 751J.00/6 - 2861 and 751K.5 - MSP/7 - 261, respectively)

As indicated in Deptel 68,/3/ while we are not reaching out for additional allies, we do and must take our existing commitments seriously. Our problem is to sustain the solidarity and morale of our alliances while working toward a growing recognition by the neutrals of their basic interest in a secure independence for those not aligned. In this connection, I think Khrushchev's January 6 speech/4/ (the full text of which has been sent to all our Embassies) can effectively be cited as evidence that as far as Communist strategy is concerned the world is divided in two, i.e. the Communist bloc versus all the rest of the countries whether they be aligned or non-aligned.

/3/Dated July 6. (Ibid., 611.90/7 - 661)

/4/Extracts of Khrushchev's speech are printed in American Foreign Policy: Current Documents, 1961, pp. 555 - 558.

I agree with you that there is advantage in your talks with Indians in staying out of debates over our existing allies and alliances. At the same time it should always be clear to them that we are not down-grading our commitments. Indeed we seek to strengthen them in the prospect of such trials as Laos and Berlin.

With warm personal regards,

Dean Rusk/4/

/4/Printed from a copy that bears this typed signature.

34. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in India/1/

/1/Source: Department of State, Central Files, 790D.5622. Secret; Priority. Drafted by Meyer (NEA), cleared by Kitchen and U. Alexis Johnson, William Bundy (DOD), and Rostow (White House), and approved by Acting Secretary Ball. Rostow sent a copy of this telegram to the President, under cover of a handwritten note that reads: "This is how the Department is handling Ken Galbraith's great blast on the F - 104's." (Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Countries Series, India, General, 8/1/61 - 8/31/61)

Washington, August 4, 1961, 1:09 p.m.

457. Eyes Only for Ambassador from Acting Secretary. Bombay's 33./2/ Fully understand your deep concern re Indian reaction to F - 104 deliveries and regret that easier answer could not be found to this problem. GOP's turndown of our request to inform GOI in confidence inevitably means even greater GOP aversion to public announcement. Under circumstances believe only course is to seek to allay GOI reactions if and when news of F - 104 deliveries breaks.

/2/In telegram 33 from Bombay, August 2, Galbraith protested the arrival of F - 104 aircraft in Karachi without prior notification to the Indian Government. He argued that no issue caused such deep concern in India or called for more sensitive handling than the supply of advanced weapons to Pakistan. He suggested that the policy of doing so be reassessed. The costs, in his view, far outweighed the gains. (Department of State, Central Files, 790D.5622/8 - 261)

If subject F - 104's comes up in conversations with Nehru or in Nehru - Bowles talks, you should emphasize: a) we informed GOI year ago that we would supply F - 104's to Pakistan (Embtel 3441, April 13, 1960);/3/ b) number being supplied is such as not to be serious threat to India; c) there are no present plans for increasing this number. If it is useful, you might note that one factor in decision to supply F - 104's was to counter incursion of advanced-type aircraft over Pakistan from north. You may also wish to re-emphasize that it is threat from north which has from beginning been and continues to be basic motivation for US military aid program in Pakistan.

/3/Not printed. (Ibid., 790D.5612/4 - 1360)

Secretary's response to Indian concern re F - 104's and Sidewinders reported in Deptel 378./4/ His views re broad question our relationships to neutrals and allies contained in his personal letter to you dated July 31./5/

Trust there will be lively and fruitful discussion these and kindred subjects at forthcoming Delhi conference.


/4/Telegram 378 to New Delhi, July 28, summarized a conversation that day between Rusk and Indian Charge D. N. Chatterjee. Rusk responded to the concerns Chatterjee expressed about the provision of sophisticated military equipment to Pakistan by noting that military aid to Pakistan was balanced by sizable economic aid to India, which freed Indian resources to meet military needs. He added, however, that the United States did not want to encourage an arms race on the subcontinent. (Ibid., 762.00/7 - 2861)

/5/Document 33.

35. Memorandum of Conversations/1/

/1/Source: Department of State, Central Files, 611.91/8 - 961. Secret. Drafted by Bowles and approved in U on August 17. Bowles was in New Delhi August 7 - 10 to chair a regional conference of U.S. Ambassadors accredited to South Asian countries.

New Delhi, August 8 and 9, 1961.

Berlin, China, Tibet, Belgrade Conference, Congo, Latin America

Prime Minister Jawaharlal Nehru (India)
Under Secretary Chester Bowles

During my four days in New Delhi I saw Nehru on three occasions: once in his office with Ambassador Galbraith, that same night at a small dinner at his home with Mrs. Bowles, Ambassador and Mrs. Galbraith, Mrs. Indira Gandhi, and Foreign Secretary Desai; and, finally, at a small dinner given by Ambassador Galbraith the night before we left for home.

On all three occasions the Prime Minister was in excellent spirits. It was clear that his relations with Ambassador Galbraith were more than normally cordial and that he has already developed great respect for the Ambassador's judgment not only on foreign policy questions but also on matters of India's economic development. This relationship will be invaluable to us in the future.

As Ambassador Galbraith has undoubtedly reported, our first visit dealt largely with Berlin but also touched on a variety of other subjects.

I underscored the vital importance we attach to the right of the people of Berlin to self-determination and our concern over the willingness of the Soviets to provoke a crisis on this issue. I stressed that the Russians had been considerably more threatening in private than in public and described two difficult personal meetings with Menshikov, whom Nehru knows as a former USSR ambassador to India whom he dislikes.

I expressed surprise that the Indians showed so little public interest in Berlin. Nehru suggested that this was partially due to a sense of fatalism in that the decisions rested with the great powers over whom India could exercise but little influence and partly because the situation was geographically remote as well as complex.

I expressed the view that two quite different dangers flowed from the Berlin situation:

1. Through a miscalculation in Moscow we might stumble into a nuclear war.

2. The likely intensification of the Cold War growing out of a prolonged Berlin conflict would have implications both for U.S. and Soviet policy all over the world, with destructive results for everyone concerned.

I suggested that the difficulties which Khrushchev faced in central Europe stemmed in large measure from the utter failure of the East German government under Ulbricht.

Khrushchev has repeatedly asked for a peaceful competition between two economic systems, a competition in which he has assured the world the Communists would eventually triumph. Actually such a competition had been in effect between the two zones of Germany for the last fifteen years and anyone who has visited these knows that the Communists have suffered a disastrous defeat. Right now 5,000 of their ablest people are fleeing the socialist "paradise" of East Germany each week to live in the capitalist Western zone.

I believe we were able to convince Nehru of our determination not to be pushed out of Berlin, that the struggle there is for self-determination of the people of Berlin and not purely to assure our legal rights, that if we should abandon our commitment the implications would become global and that India would be deeply affected and finally that while standing firm on the Berlin question itself, we were willing to negotiate in good faith on the many open questions which involve U.S. and Soviet interests in Central Europe and throughout the world.

We then touched on a variety of subjects including a discussion of African problems, particularly Angola, the progress India has made since my last visit, etc.

That evening after dinner I talked with Nehru alone for forty minutes in his living room. This conversation turned immediately to the question of China. The following points emerged from this discussion.

1. Nehru stated that China was in an arrogant mood and the greater her internal difficulties the greater her arrogance was likely to become. He described with considerable bitterness Peking's refusal to negotiate the border question in spite of the fact that Chinese forces had pushed 150 miles within Indian territory. As in my talk with him last September in New York he referred with considerable awe to Mao Tse-tung's boast that China could absorb 300 million casualties in a nuclear war and still survive as a nation.

Nevertheless, Nehru felt as did U Nu that the Chinese Communists were unlikely to provoke a war in Mao's lifetime. They would press forward wherever possible, but it was unlikely that they would undertake any massive military moves.

2. We discussed for several minutes the crucial differences between the Chinese and the Indian agricultural problems. With roughly double the arable land per family, India is producing only half as much per acre. This means that China has far less elbow room in which to expand her food production than India.

Moreover, as a free nation India is able to secure food in large quantities from abroad through P.L. 480 or by direct purchase. China, on the other hand, is inhibited not only by the lack of foreign exchange but also by her reluctance to become dependent on capitalist wheat and powdered milk.

3. I suggested that during the coming years the U.S. might be faced with a critical choice between two courses of action:

If the climate permitted:

A. We could relieve the Chinese agricultural shortages by making food available in considerable amounts. Although this would relieve much of the pressure on the Chinese economy it would also help assure the success of the Communist industrial program.

B. We could deny the Chinese such food supplies on the gamble that acute and continuing shortages might bring about the collapse of the Peking regime. If this gamble failed, we could expect a massive movement into Southeast Asia to seize control of rich, relatively underpopulated areas from which China's food deficit could largely be met.

After pondering these alternatives at some length, Nehru while admitting that the question was a difficult one said that on balance the wisest course of action would be to help China to close its food gap, if the Peking government gave us the opportunity to do so, in return for an agreement not to indulge in either overt or covert acts of aggression against their neighbors. Although such an agreement might not be adhered to, it offered whatever hope there might be for a greater measure of stability.

4. I then said that although he did not believe the Chinese Communists would move militarily under present circumstances, the possibility of such a move in the next ten years could not be denied. Although India and America might be unable to cooperate fully in planning to cope with such a possibility, we should at least be able to discuss the subject in confidence and to understand each other's limitations and potentials.

I assured him that if China sought to expand into South or Southeast Asia by military power we would oppose this effort with whatever allies we could persuade to cooperate with us. At least we could count on the Australians, New Zealanders, British, Canadians and those Asians under direct attack.

However, in Southeast Asia the military advantages we had in the Korean war, where we were fighting on a narrow front with a strong and powerful base at our rear, were lacking. Moreover, it would be wishful thinking to assume that the Chinese would limit their attack to a force which we could block with our readily available resources.

If, as we must assume, the Chinese should bring their full military resources to bear, we would be forced to choose among using all our available weapons, including nuclear power, an ignominious defeat, or withdrawal.

I stressed that it was important that this situation be clearly understood not only by India but by Japan and other Asian nations so that they could calculate their own most effective course of action.

The only other long range hope of controlling Chinese pressure that I could see was through the development of an indigenous Asian power balance which would depend only indirectly on the United States military. Such a balance, as I had suggested to him on other occasions, could be provided over the long haul only by India, Pakistan and Japan.

I agreed that it was no more possible for the Indians and the Japanese under the present circumstances to accept a formal alliance with us than it would have been for the United States to accept the alliance with the British which Lord Canning proposed in 1823 at the time of the Monroe Doctrine.

Moreover, I recognized the almost insurmountable problems that grew out of India's differences with Pakistan, India's reluctance to expand her military commitments beyond Nepal, Bhutan, Sikkim, and possibly Burma, the built-in pacifism of many Japanese, and the restrictions of the Japanese constitution.

Nevertheless, the subject was critically important, the threat was great and likely to grow, and it seemed to me essential that he carefully consider its implications.

I stressed that we were keenly sensitive to his own difficulties and those of other neutral states in Asia and that we had no desire to embarrass him or them publicly or in any other way. Nevertheless, there were certain hard facts which must be faced and I hoped in future years that progress could be made in developing the necessary Asian power balance which would enable U.S. military forces to remain more unobtrusively in the background.

I added that I had covered this subject in detail with U Nu who said he would discuss it further with Nehru in Belgrade.

5. I asked Nehru about Chinese progress in Tibet. He replied that he had mixed reports, but that he was inclined to feel that the Chinese hold had been pretty well established, that the Khamba revolt had largely been suppressed, (although sporadic fighting continued in some areas) and that there had been some relaxation in regard to the Chinese control of the monasteries.

He said the Chinese had built a network of roads which had greatly improved their military position. Nevertheless, he doubted that the Chinese would attempt to break through in this area. If this should occur, he felt that the Indians and the Pakistani (who regardless of present differences would be forced into some degree of cooperation) could provide formidable opposition.

The much greater danger, he agreed, came from the East. On India's northeast frontier a well developed line had been created with heavily guarded check points at relatively frequent intervals.

After dinner the following evening, a similar exchange began with the Belgrade conference. Nehru told me that he had not wanted to go, but had felt that if he and a few others failed to attend the conference would be taken over by "extremists." He questioned me about Tito and seemed hopeful, although by no means confident, that he might help provide a moderating force, particularly in regard to Berlin.

I suggested relative to the Belgrade conference that we were now witnessing a unique development in foreign affairs, the dim beginnings of what might be called a world conscience. Evidence of this could be seen in the reluctance of the nuclear powers to embark on further tests in the atmosphere which would create fall-out over large areas of the earth. I added that while many Americans often disagreed with him, it was felt that he had contributed more than any other individual to the development of this new power of world opinion.

I then suggested that the conference in Belgrade would indicate the extent to which this new force could bring effective pressure to bear on a given situation. For instance, certain kinds of resolutions would further increase the present tension, create bitterness in the United States, and strengthen the elements which are most opposed to a rational, responsive American foreign policy in Asia, Africa, and Latin America.

On the other hand if a majority of the conference members showed a sober awareness of the complexities of the problems we face, those forces in the Western world which were constructively working to create partnership with the peoples of the under-developed areas would be greatly strengthened.

Although Nehru was noncommittal as to specifics, he appeared interested in this line of discussion.

I then congratulated Nehru on the crucial role India had played in regard to the United Nations. In the Congo following Lumumba's death there had been a rush by several nations to withdraw their troops and indeed many were actually being pulled out. If this trend had continued, the whole United Nations effort in the Congo would have collapsed. Nehru retrieved the situation, however, by his offer to send 4,500 additional Indians.

History may record this act as the crucial turning point in our efforts to build the United Nations into a positive instrument for world stability. The importance of what he had done was now demonstrated by the marked improvement in the Congo situation which would have been impossible without Nehru's timely assistance.

As Nehru rose to leave he remarked that he had never been to Latin America, that he was considering a very brief visit there following his trip to Washington, and did I have any suggestions.

I replied that a visit could be most helpful but that Latin America was big and complicated and a visit to one country such as Brazil would bring heavy pressures to visit others. The most practical way out if his time was really limited would be to fly from Washington to Mexico City and spend a few days there. This would give him something of the flavor of Latin America with a minimum of complications.

Moreover, he could then return to India via Japan, where he might find it profitable to discuss India's and Japan's common interest in creating a more favorable Asian power balance.

He smiled and remarked that no one could charge us with lack of perseverance, since I had been pressing this same point ever since we first met in 1951.

Comment: Nehru seemed in excellent spirits, confident, ready and anxious to exchange confidences, very favorably inclined toward the United States, while frankly concerned that we would again become so absorbed in Europe that Asia would receive less attention.

I had assumed that the question of Pakistan - India relations would come up naturally. But it was not mentioned, and I did not think it wise to introduce the explosive question of Kashmir.

In discussing our efforts to persuade the USSR to agree to a nuclear test ban and our concern that the Soviet might already have resumed testing under ground, Nehru expressed surprise and even disbelief that under-ground testing unlike atmospheric testing would create no fallout problem.

Since Nehru has a keen interest in science and is normally very well informed, this suggests both the difficulties and the importance of our informational program on this subject.

36. Telegram From the Embassy in Afghanistan to the Department of State/1/

/1/Source: Department of State, Central Files, 789.5 - MSP/8 - 2261. Confidential.

Kabul, August 22, 1961, 2 p.m.

127. In conversation with Talbot, RGA officials from Prince Daud on down raised question future of American foreign aid to Afghanistan.

Daud himself made no special plea except on timing of the American decision. He said that RGA could not press US for assistance, as obviously this purely American decision which we would have to make, weighing all factors involved. He stressed the need for an early answer, regardless of whether affirmative or negative, so that their planning process could be complete.

Prince Naim was far more explicit. He described at some length his feeling that entire future of country depended on outcome this question. He said that RGA simply could not stop development. On other hand the dangers of excessive dependence upon USSR, particularly as it was neighboring state, were fully realized. He felt that far more than development alone was at stake, as in some ways their whole social structure could eventually be changed by over-dependence upon Russia. He said he saw little hope for the future except through assistance from US and

West Germany. He described German assistance as very welcome and now very important but looked upon US assistance as far more important for obvious political reasons. He dwelled upon importance of some type of long term assurance, giving example of difficulties caused in past by short term arrangements.

Abdul Hai Aziz, as was to be expected, was even more emphatic, sometimes emotionally so, of the vital necessity of future US assistance, and critical time element involved.

Talbot explained philosophy of new administration and present status legislative process. He explored as deeply as time would permit important questions such as extent of their self-help, limitations imposed by local currency, local skills, et cetera. He told officials he aware of problem prior to his departure from Washington and would study it intensively during his stay here. He said he realized and appreciated keen interest of RGA on this question and hoped it would be possible reach decision in Washington in the not too distant future.

Comment: Naim was more forthcoming on dangers of over-dependence on Russia than ever before to me. This perhaps logical in connection with argument for future US aid commitments. I believe it somewhat more than that, however, in view of recent indications from many sources that RGA not as satisfied as it was a year ago with Russian aid and is more aware of dangers involved.


37. Memorandum From Robert W. Komer of the National Security Council Staff to President Kennedy/1/

/1/Source: Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Countries Series, Pakistan, General, 9/1/61 - 9/14/61. No classification marking. A marginal notation on the source text, in an unknown hand, reads: "Pres. noted. Sept 4, 1961."

Washington, September 2, 1961.

Another Afghan - Pakistani Crisis

The long-sputtering Afghan - Pakistani dispute has boiled up into what may become a serious crisis. Phil Talbot says we "may have only 3 - 4 days to avert what could turn into a major calamity."

Ayub, perhaps overconfident from what he regards as a highly successful US trip and frustrated over his inability to get any movement from Delhi on Kashmir, is in one of his periodic "get tough with Kabul" moods. Justifiably annoyed at continued Afghan pecking on the Pushtunistan issue, he suddenly decided last week to close all their consulates in Afghanistan,/2/ and asked Kabul to close its own within two weeks./3/ Daud has retaliated by saying he'll sever diplomatic relations if Ayub doesn't withdraw his threat by 6 September.

/2/The Pakistani Consulates in Jalalabad and Kandahar were closed on August 22. (Telegram 333 from Karachi, August 24; Department of State, Central Files, 689.90D/8 - 2461)

/3/Afghanistan was requested to close its Consulates in Peshawar and Quetta and its trade agencies in Parachinar and Chaman. Pakistan charged that the Consulates and trade agencies were centers for subversion and hostile propaganda. (Memorandum from Talbot to Bowles, September 2; ibid., 689.90D/9 - 261)

What might happen if we get into an ascending spiral here is anybody's guess; we could even have a minor border war. Of course the Soviets, who've been egging Daud on over Pushtunistan, might choose to pour on some oil to raise tensions a little more.

State has reacted with promptitude and vigor. It has offered our "good offices",/4/ and is trying to cool both sides off. It contemplates that we may have to go next to a public statement deploring the crisis and in effect telling both sides to relax. This won't go down well with the Paks; they have long disagreed with our mediatory efforts, feeling they know how to deal with Afghans better than we do, i.e. be tough. (Which we fear will just drive them further into the bear's embrace.) The hell of it is that Talbot (just in Kabul) and Byroade feel that the Afghans are just now coming around to realize what we've been telling them for years--that they're dangerously close to becoming Soviet prisoners--and that we may have a new opportunity, with skillfully applied economic baksheesh, to keep them from becoming completely dependent upon Moscow.

/4/On August 31, the Department instructed the Embassies in Karachi and Kabul to offer U.S. good offices to mediate in the dispute that had developed between Pakistan and Afghanistan. (Telegram 411 to Karachi and 85 to Kabul; ibid., 689.90D/8 - 3161)

State feels that no Presidential intervention is yet required. I strongly concur. This fill-in is only because if our current efforts to cool off the contestants do not succeed, we may want early next week to suggest something like a strong prod from you to Ayub.

R. W. Komer/5/

/5/Printed from a copy that bears this typed signature.

38. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Afghanistan/1/

/1/Source: Department of State, Central Files, 689.90D/9 - 361. Confidential; Niact. Drafted by Weil and approved by Talbot. Also sent to Karachi.

Washington, September 3, 1961, 7:19 p.m.

88. Reftel Karachi 406;/2/ to Kabul 43. Karachi 407;/3/ to Kabul 44. For Kabul: You are authorized request audience with King. While Department wishes avoid conveying impression of undue excitement over Afghan actions, it believes that in absence of Daud its views should be brought to attention of King.

/2/In telegram 406 from Karachi, September 3, Rountree reported on conversations with Ayub September 1 - 2. Ayub welcomed the offer of U.S. good offices and indicated that he did not intend to sever diplomatic relations with Afghanistan, nor to close the borders between the two countries. He was prepared to work out arrangements to facilitate transit across the borders, but was not prepared to reconsider his decision to close the Consulates. (Ibid.)

/3/Rountree assessed his conversations with Ayub in telegram 407 from Karachi, September 3. He concluded that Ayub was firm in his refusal to reconsider the decision to close the Consulates in Pakistan and Afghanistan. He thought that Ayub felt equally strongly about closing the Afghan trade agencies. But, in light of the importance Afghanistan attached to trade, Rountree hoped to persuade Ayub to use the trade agencies as bargaining counters to prevent a break in diplomatic relations. He planned to explore the possibility with Foreign Secretary Dehlavi on September 4. (Ibid.)

You may discuss Pak - Afghan relations along following lines:

1. As result USG offer of good offices President Ayub has told US Ambassador he is agreeable to USG informing RGA that GOP does not intend to interrupt transit; that GOP does not desire severance diplomatic relations; that he does not intend to close borders. Furthermore Ayub has expressed willingness to work out appropriatearrangements tokeep traffic moving. This is clear evidence that GOP is not trying to destroy the Afghans economy or to interfere with Afghan development projects.

2. In light of dangers to both countries generated by the recent exchange of notes, and in light of President Ayub's willingness to continue transit agreement and to work out pertinent arrangements, the USG ventures to ask His Majesty whether he would not be justified in conveying to President Ayub through USG channels his government's willingness to discuss at the working level ways and means keeping traffic moving.

3. With a view to creating an appropriate atmosphere for working level exchanges, the USG believes the RGA would have nothing to lose and much to gain if it responded to President Ayub's gesture by at least extending the deadline for abreach in diplomatic relations. Modification of this unilateral action would indicate to Ayub the good faith of the RGA and encourage the GOP to make a genuine effort to cooperate.

4. The USG has been impressed by the RGA's recent assurances that it wishes to remain independent, and does not wish to be dominated by any foreign power. An impasse in relations with Pakistan could lead to only one ultimate result--dependence on the Soviet bloc and eventual absorption by the bloc. President Ayub's position offers an opportunity for the RGA to avoid this danger without loss of prestige. The USG devoutly hopes that His Majesty will appreciate the fact that a favorable response to President Ayub's gesture will be in the national interest of the RGA.

If for any reason you do not obtain immediate audience with King you should discuss foregoing with Foreign Office.

For Karachi: Department gratified your success in obtaining some assurances from Ayub which may open way for eventual GOP - RGA accommodation; and concurs in your proposed approach to Foreign Secretary (Your 407).


39. Memorandum From the Assistant Secretary of State for Near Eastern and South Asian Affairs (Talbot) to Secretary of State Rusk/1/

/1/Source: Department of State, Central Files, 689.90D/9 - 661. Confidential. Drafted by Weil.

Washington, September 6, 1961.

U.S. Offer of Good Offices to Afghanistan and Pakistan

In your telegram to Karachi and Kabul dated August 31,/2/ our Ambassadors were authorized to offer good offices in connection with the dispute brought to a head by the Government of Pakistan's decision to close its consulates and trade agencies in Afghanistan and the Government of Afghanistan's announcement that unless the Pakistan Government reconsidered its decision, the Afghans would regard diplomatic relations as terminated within a week (Sept. 6).

/2/See footnote 4, Document 37.

On the day the telegram was dispatched, the Afghan and Pakistani Charges were called in and informed of the offer of good offices. Ambassador Rountree informed President Ayub of our offer on Sept. 2. President Ayub expressed "sincere gratitude" for your interest and your willingness to be of assistance, and said he hoped you understood fully the reasons for closing the consulates and his feeling that the consequences of this action need not have been the Afghan decision to terminate diplomatic relations. While recognizing the fundamental difference of opinion between the Government of Pakistan and the U.S. as to the best means of dealing with Afghanistan, he went to some lengths to justify his policy of dealing firmly with the Afghans. He said he had no objection to our telling the Afghans that Pakistan did not seek a break in diplomatic relations, nor had it any intention of setting aside the transit agreement. He said his Government was prepared to work out appropriate arrangements to keep traffic moving, but did not agree that we should suggest to the Afghans the possibility of re-opening the consulates.

Upon receipt of Ambassador Rountree's report, the Department authorized Ambassador Byroade to inform the King (in the absence of Prime Minister Daud) of President Ayub's willingness to work out transit arrangements and to suggest that, in response to Ayub's gesture, the Afghans at least postpone their deadline for termination of diplomatic relations. In his reply to this instruction, Ambassador Byroade expressed the opinion that the suggestion to postpone the deadline would be regarded as a request for unilateral action on the part of the Afghans and would have an adverse effect if it were proposed to the King. He suggested that he be authorized to inform Prince Naim of Ayub's willingness to work out arrangements to continue the transit agreement, and to convey to Naim our offer of good offices--which he apparently had not done previously. In a cable sent last night, Ambassador Byroade was authorized to talk to Prince Naim along these lines.

I believe further action on our part should await a report on Ambassador Byroade's talk with Naim. Factors contributing to Ayub's cocky attitude are his apparent belief that if the Afghans are treated roughly they will come to heel (despite possible Soviet backing), and his realization that we are eager to maintain certain facilities in Pakistan. Many Afghans apparently believe we are conniving with the Pakistanis, but continue to exploit our interest in keeping Afghanistan neutral--in the hope of obtaining increasing aid from us.

As of today diplomatic relations between the two countries have, for all practical purposes, been terminated./3/ I therefore doubt that a Presidential message could have the effect of preventing the break in relations generated by the Afghan note. The desirability of such a message might well be considered when it appears that the President's personal representatives in Kabul and Karachi have had an opportunity to make the maximum possible use of the current offer of good offices.

/3/On September 6, Pakistan and Afghanistan broke relations and closed their respective Embassies in Kabul and Karachi. (Telegram 164 from Kabul, September 7; Department of State, Central Files, 689.90D/9 - 761)

40. Memorandum of Conversation/1/

/1/Source: Department of State, Central Files, 689.90D/9 - 1261. Secret. Drafted by Spielman on September 14 and approved in U on September 19.

Washington, September 12, 1961.

Transit Problems Between Afghanistan and Pakistan

His Excellency Aziz Ahmed, Ambassador of Pakistan
Mr. M. Masud, Second Secretary, Embassy of Pakistan

The Under Secretary
SOA--Henry W. Spielman

Mr. Bowles began by mentioning the fact that two days earlier Ambassador Byroade had discussed the Pakistan - Afghanistan problem with Foreign Minister Naim and this morning had called upon Prime Minister Daud. The United States was particularly interested in the continued flow of traffic into Afghanistan. If the border remained closed for any length of time most of our programs in Afghanistan would come to a halt because of a shortage of supplies including asphalt and motor fuels. Mr. Bowles pointed out that our aid to Pakistan had been significant because Pakistan had a well-planned program for economic development. He said it was our understanding that Afghanistan has just completed its development plan and that the planners were hopeful that about one-half of the foreign exchange requirements would come from the West. If the door to the outside world were slammed shut, the Afghans would have to turn to the Soviets.

Mr. Bowles said the Soviets will use the struggle between Pakistan and Afghanistan for their own ends, which could easily bring the Red Army to the Pakistan border and thus jeopardize the whole region of South and Southeast Asia. The Red Army had been an important factor in contributing to the effectiveness of Communist control as witnessed by the fact that Communism had made little progress in areas where it was not assisted by military strength. The Communists had lost ground in Africa, in the UAR, and in Iraq, and were able to maintain their position in East Germany, Hungary, and Poland only with the assistance of the Red Army. Aziz Ahmed replied that his Government was aware of the Soviet threat to South Asia and had mentioned this fact several times in the past but the State Department had not agreed. He said he was referring to the previous Administration.

Mr. Bowles said that in thinking of various possibilities for Afghan windows on the outside world it had occurred to him that it might be worth reviving the idea of a route from Kabul through Iran to the sea involving the construction of a road as well as a port. Such a facility might be rented on a 99 - year lease.

Aziz Ahmed said that such an idea suggested that Pakistan had stopped the traffic, which was not true. Also, such a route would shift the problem from one trade route to another but would not solve the real problem, "Paktoonistan." He asked if there were a historical precedent for such a leasing arrangement. In reply the Suez Canal was suggested.

Mr. Bowles said that if this impasse continues for another thirty days we may be in trouble. He then asked if the trade offices might be reopened. Aziz Ahmed said that he did not see how this would solve the problem unless the required personnel were permitted to operate.

Mr. Bowles reiterated that he was trying to visualize a mechanism for solving the transit problem and if a likely solution could be found he would be willing to discuss it with Daud provided there were a chance of success and provided the Pakistanis were agreeable.

Aziz Ahmed remarked that President Ayub was a Pathan; he understood the Pathan mind and he understood the thinking of the Royal Family in Afghanistan. He was of the conviction that the only effective means of dealing with the Afghans was by following a tough line. Aziz Ahmed suggested that if the United States held back, and gave the Afghans time to cool off, the Afghans would be more likely to take steps to solve their problems. He thought that if Ambassador Byroade said to Daud, "If there is anything we can do, please let us know," this would be the most effective way to encourage the Afghans to solve the transit problem.

Aziz Ahmed said that he did not believe the Afghans would walk into a Russian trap. Likewise, he thought it unlikely that the Afghans would substitute free world trade routes for Soviet transport. He said if Ambassador Byroade has given Daud the impression that the State Department is disturbed by the transit problem, such an impression would give the Afghans confidence to take a strong line with both the Pakistanis and the United States. Then, he thought, Daud in talks with Americans would try to exaggerate the seriousness of this situation.

Aziz Ahmed wondered whether we had any information on the degree of support the people of Afghanistan were giving the Government on this problem. He thought Daud was the person taking the strong line and that the King and Naim probably were not supporting it fully.

Mr. Bowles said that on this question we were all guessing, but that one thing certain in his mind--the Soviets were going to make the most of this situation, and would develop this opportunity into a diversion action to their probable losses in the Berlin issue.

Mr. Bowles asked if the Ambassador could think of a mechanism that would permit the transit traffic to flow into Afghanistan.

Aziz Ahmed said that he would ask his Government for its suggestions, adding that he would also like to ask the State Department to ask Ambassador Byroade for his suggestions as well.

41. Telegram From the Embassy in Afghanistan to the Department of State/1/

/1/Source: Department of State, Central Files, 689.90D/9 - 1361. Secret; Niact; Eyes Only.

Kabul, September 13, 1961, 4 p.m.

192. Had conversation last night with Abdul Hai Aziz as predicted my telegram 187./2/ He advised me take what I had told him to Daud personally as quickly as possible. Accordingly I saw Daud briefly again this morning.

/2/Dated September 12. Abdul Aziz was the interpreter during a conversation between Byroade and Daud on September 12. Byroade saw Aziz after the conversation to make certain that the U.S. offer of good offices had been fully understood by Daud. (Ibid., 689.90D/9 - 1261)

Told Daud I had not come for answers but wanted to give him three additional points for consideration.

(1) I wanted make certain that he and Naim had not misunderstood our offer good offices in connection with transit traffic. Explained I had not had in mind simply formal meaning of term or just using our facilities to get Pakistanis and Afghans together to talk about problems. We had in mind far broader concept whereby not only our channels of communication but American personnel and facilities on both sides of the border were available to assist both sides if any way possible to keep goods moving.

(2) Then told Daud had received personal message from Bowles./3/ After expressing concern for developing situation, Bowles had indicated to me that he willing launch serious consideration Washington of opening up feasible transit route through Iran port. This would of course take some time, but it would mean that, if Afghan did not now cut itself off from sea, there was hope of being able to look forward to alternate lifeline in the future.

/3/Transmitted in telegram 100 to Kabul, September 11. (Ibid., 689.90D/9 - 1161)

(3) Also I said that Bowles had expressed to me his hope that further aid assurances might be given to Afghan if our present lifeline of supply not cut. I explained carefully to Daud that I was not giving him at this stage formal assurances by US Government, but rather the intention of Bowles to start working on these things if we could make arrangements to keep things going in interim.

Daud said he much appreciated what he had been told. Even though he understood informal nature of what I had relayed he would consider it carefully and discuss with Cabinet. He said, however, even though what I had said of great importance, he afraid Washington did not quite understand problem. Daily movement of goods, even though extremely important, was not as important as cause of tension between Afghan and Pakistan, which had resulted in present situation. Grateful though he was for our present efforts, he wished we could devote equal energy to core of problem itself. He said "the Pakistanis think that if they are given free hand they can settle Pushtunistan problem by force. As sincere friend of US I wish tell you that if Pakistanis are proceeding on this basis this is greatest mistake you can imagine, and if they persevere in this policy it is certain to cause disaster for whole area." He went on to say that world apparently knows very little about Pushtunistan problem while it sometimes seemed to him that concerted effort was made to keep veil of silence on it. World opinion knew nothing of Afghan side this issue. What little was known all came unilaterally from Pakistan side. Said in his own view RGA had never asked anything inconsistent with UN or US principles. He referred to Kennedy's statements on self-determination. He said Afghans had always looked to US as country which had greatest desire to protect weaker countries in freedom and important principles such as right of self-determination. He did not feel RGA position unreasonable. Pakistanis say Pushtun tribes happy under Pakistan domination. RGA maintains they are not. All he asks is that Pushtuns be given chance express their honest view. If it were proved that Pushtuns wished to be under Pakistan rule, he would give me his word of honor that RGA would abide willingly by their decision.

Under circumstances did not wish give appearance no consideration would be given Daud's views. On other hand did not feel could remain silent. Therefore general discussion followed with effort on my part make him understand difficulty his position from US point of view, along lines general principle self-determination one thing, but US support to one of its friends attempting apply principle inside territory of another was quite another. Also made reference, as had to Naim, of lack of evidence available to us to indicate a real indigenous independence movement.

Comment: It obvious Daud's preoccupations are not primarily on such subjects as consulates and trade agencies. He must be concerned Pakistanis will, as Shah Wali predicted, occupy frontier area in force right up to Durand Line, and quickly extend Pakistan administration thereto. Do not know whether Pakistanis are about to do this, but there no doubt in my mind that if they do, Daud will fight with everything he has, regardless of consequences.

Believe you and Department now in best position decide whether trip to this area by Bowles would be good idea or not. He would of course be welcomed here. Seems to me key factor to consider is what assurances for future he could get from Ayub under these circumstances, and whether these could be in form which Daud would believe, even if he could secure them.


42. Letter From the Deputy Secretary of Defense (Gilpatric) to the Under Secretary of State (Bowles)/1/

/1/Source: Department of State, Central Files, 791.56/9 - 1361. Secret.

Washington, September 13, 1961.

Dear Chet, The impending visit of Prime Minister Nehru to Washington in November and recent events of considerable importance cause me to reopen, at this time, the question of possible military sales to India.

Although I recognize fully the reasons for deferring action on this subject, as stated in your letter of 22 July 1961,/2/ it would appear that we must have a firm governmental position prepared for any high level discussions with Mr. Nehru. In this respect, the discussion contained in my letter of 12 June/3/ is still valid.

/2/Not found.

/3/Document 27.

Recent events emphasize the necessity for early reconsideration of our position.

a. The announcement of the provision of new items of military equipment to Pakistan has, on the one hand, had a slight degrading effect on Indian - U.S. relations; and, on the other, has impressed the Indian military establishment with the necessity, within their limited budget, of purchasing military equipment on a qualitatively comparable basis to that of Pakistan.

b. Defense Minister Menon continues to show a predilection for the purchase of Soviet equipment, particularly aircraft. Currently this includes the possible purchase of high performance aircraft to counterbalance the F - 104s received by Pakistan, and the search for a jet engine suitable to the Indian-designed HF - 24.

c. In response to our continued efforts to interest them in U.S.-manufactured helicopters, IAF officers advise that they have been forced to make "other arrangements" for the purchase of light and medium helicopters. However they are still actively interested, among other things, in the purchase of C - 130 aircraft, heavy helicopters, Sidewinder missiles, the MK - 44 torpedo, radar and engineer bridging equipment.

d. Most importantly, certain senior members of the Indian military have made informal and unsolicited approaches to representatives of the U.S. Department of Defense with specific proposals for circumventing what they consider to be the negative policies of Defense Minister Menon toward the purchase of U.S. equipment. In general, they appear to be willing to move for closer ties with the United States and consider it essential that some means be found whereby India could purchase U.S. equipment at prices competitive with those offered by Russia. Specifically, an Indian general officer currently in this country for medical treatment has advised that he will contact the Indian Ambassador in Washington to persuade him to take this matter up with the Prime Minister in connection with his forthcoming visit. In effect, the desire and interest of the Indian military is to bring about, if possible, a high level discussion of this subject between President Kennedy and Prime Minister Nehru.

You will appreciate the extreme sensitivity of these conversations, the details of which and the names of the individuals concerned are known to you and are therefore not mentioned in this correspondence.

Our understanding, at the time of Ambassador Galbraith's last visit, was that the next move was his. It was made clear to him that any sales whatever of classified material to India (this would include Sidewinder notably) would necessarily entail some form of SD/MICC over-all check on Indian security practices; and that any sale on favorable terms which would require an element of grant aid would have to be revealed to the Congress (through the medium of a Presidential Determination) and would also inevitably become known in India so that it could not be represented for other than what it was. The Ambassador realized that these two problems would pose extremely serious obstacles from the Indian standpoint, and so far as we are aware, he has not indicated that they can be surmounted, or even that the chances are sufficiently likely for us to warrant making the effort.

On the question of SD/MICC requirements, this is a matter on which the Department of State has the leading role. We cannot, I should suppose, adopt any policy toward India that is inconsistent with our over-all policy on these clearances. The essential point is that we have insisted on them in the past for our close allies so that it is most difficult to relax in the case of nations not allied to us. However, the more limited problem of releasing classified equipment should not be allowed to block the formulation of a general policy for some form of subsidized sales to India, the advantages of which would be substantial.

Despite recognized problems, the Department of Defense continues to recommend that a U.S. Government position be established whereby military equipment may be offered to the Indian Government on monetary terms at least as favorable as those offered by any other source of supply. It appears most urgent that a firm position be established on this in consultation with Ambassador Galbraith and well in advance of Mr. Nehru's visit; and that such a proposal be made to him by the President at that time.

Ros Gilpatric

43. Memorandum From Robert W. Komer of the National Security Council Staff to President Kennedy/1/

/1/Source: Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Countries Series, Afghanistan, Subjects, King Zahir Correspondence, 1961 - 1963. No classification marking. Rostow noted on the source text that he concurred, and Kennedy initialed his approval.

Washington, September 16, 1961.

Presidential Message to King Zahir

State believes that the time has come to bring your prestige to bear in the potentially dangerous Afghanistan - Pakistan dispute, initially by a letter to King Zahir. Naim's visit to Moscow lends new urgency to this move.

I have certain reservations as to the wisdom of engaging you personally in repeating a plea for the Afghans to reopen transit trade which Byroade made successively to Naim and Daud, with turndowns from both. However, I defer to the State experts who feel that the chief impact to be sought at this juncture is the fact of your intervention itself, and that we should avoid premature revealing of any further moves we contemplate. Your letter would also serve as a peg for a presentation by Byroade.

State's intent is to start a dialogue. They feel Zahir will reply in effect that they want to reopen transit but cannot do so unless the Pakistanis reopen trade agencies, etc. Then State hopes you could write Ayub, telling him of the Afghans' reply and urging him to do so. (Meanwhile, we are informing Ayub of your personal concern over the crisis and the letter to Zahir.)/2/

/2/See Document 46.

I recommend that you approve State's draft, but bear in mind that quite a [lot of] correspondence may be required if our "good offices" are to succeed. Both sides are playing for our intervention on their behalf. Neither is willing to give as yet, so the thankless job of suggesting a way out and selling it will probably be ours.

State feels the sooner we get the letter out the better, so request immediate approval.

R. W. Komer

44. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Afghanistan/1/

/1/Source: Department of State, Central Files, 689.90D/9 - 1761. Secret; Niact. Drafted by Meyer, cleared by Spielman and Deputy Director of the Office of Soviet Union Affairs David H. Henry II and by Komer in substance, and approved by Talbot. Repeated to Karachi and Moscow.

Washington, September 17, 1961, 2:29 p.m.

112. Presidential letter to King Zahir/2/ being transmitted separately. In delivering letter, you should speak along following lines:

/2/See Document 45.

1. Despite thousands of miles of geographic separation, USG as King must know has consistently gone to considerable lengths to be friendly and helpful to Afghanistan and its people. USG in particular has recognized difficulties inherent in Afghanistan's geographic isolation and has done its best to assist in establishment and maintenance of effective outlet to the sea.

2. Specifically, after unfortunate developments of 1955 had been resolved through statesmanship both in Kabul and Karachi, USG went to great trouble, diplomatically and financially, to assure permanent arrangements for Afghan trade and transit to and through Pakistan. Pak - Afghan transit agreement of May 29, 1958, was an historic achievement. USG subsequently supported this agreement with substantial sums to insure that port, rail and road facilities would be available to implement the agreement. USG sincerely hopes King and his government will agree that this great investment of effort and money will not be lightly brushed aside.

3. USG fully aware of fundamental political differences existing between Pakistan and Afghanistan but is convinced that trade and traffic between two countries can and should be continued with or without resolution of those fundamental differences. In this connection, we believe assurances USG has received from Pak authorities of their desire to maintain free flow of trade and traffic is hopeful element in otherwise bleak picture.

4. Afghans must know that Paks are no less sensitive to "political strings" on aid, or "pressures" from aid-giving countries, than are Afghans themselves. It is therefore unfair and unreasonable to expect USG because of its aid relationships to Pakistan to control Pakistan's policies. We knew nothing in advance re GOP's announcement re closure of Afghan consulates. We are, on other hand, gratified that we have at least been able to receive Pak assurances re upholding of transit agreement and transit arrangements.

5. We fully realize that Afghanistan can turn to north for immediate relief and its northern neighbor will be only too pleased to exploit Pak - Afghan impasse. We are convinced, however, that motivation for that northern cooperation would not be pure love for Afghans but ultimate political domination. We would like to believe that RGA and particularly Royal Family would appreciate unwisdom of over-dependence upon a ruthless neighbor whose historic designs on Afghanistan are now augmented by Communism's imperialistic philosophy.

6. With foregoing as background, President has dispatched letter to King expressing his personal interest and engaging his personal attention to Afghanistan's trade and transit problems. It is his sincere hope that his letter will provide element which RGA needs to reverse recent trend in its relationships with its Pakistan neighbor. U.S. President's personal interest in this matter will we hope enable King and his government to feel sufficiently confident to permit prompt and normal restoration of Pak - Afghan traffic.

7. What "practical steps" might be taken is a question which is best determined by RGA authorities. Obviously both sides have publicly taken positions which must be taken into account and extreme demands by either side should be avoided. One possibility might be that at least for a beginning necessary documentation could be handled by Afghan bank officials in Pakistan. Another possibility might be third-country handling of documentation. RGA might itself have even better suggestions.

8. USG and its President sincerely hope King and his government will find means for reversing recent unfortunate trends. Our basic desire is to see Afghanistan remain free and develop prosperity. That is purpose of USG assistance programs, which, given a resolution of transit problem, will we trust become increasingly effective in months and years ahead.

In addition to oral presentation to King, you may wish to leave aide memoire containing foregoing. This might be particularly useful if Daub and Naim do not have benefit of your oral presentation. In aide memoire reference to Royal Family in para 5 should be omitted.

In transmitting letter, Dept recommends no publication. This is in line with USG belief that there has already been too much publicity both by Kabul and Karachi which reduces maneuverability both disputants. Dept believes resolution of transit problem can best be handled through confidential diplomacy


45. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Afghanistan/1/

/1/Source: Department of State, Central Files, 689.90D/9 - 1761. Secret; Niact. Drafted and approved by Meyer and cleared by Weil, by Bowles in substance, and by Bromley Smith at the White House. Repeated to Karachi.

Washington, September 17, 1961, 2:30 p.m.

113. Please deliver following message to the King, /2/ reporting time and date of delivery:

/2/In telegram 213 from Kabul, September 18, the Embassy proposed three amendments to the letter, to prevent it from having a "deleterious rather than benefical effect." (Ibid., 689.90D/9 - 1861) The Department accepted two of the proposed amendments, as noted in footnotes 2 - 3 below. It did not approve a revision of the last sentence in the third paragraph to make reference to exploring possible additional transit routes. Such a change, the Department concluded, might have the effect of raising false hopes. (Telegram 116 to Kabul, September 18; ibid.)

"September 17, 1961. Your Majesty: I cannot but be deeply concerned over the break in diplomatic relations which has resulted from the recent exchange of notes between Your Majesty's Government and the Government of Pakistan. As a friend I am distressed to know that Your Majesty's efforts to bring the fruits of progress and freedom to your people may be seriously curtailed, and that the United States efforts to be of assistance may be severely hampered.

While I realize that a variety of factors is involved in the present tensions between the Royal Government of Afghanistan and the Government of Pakistan, I wish to take the liberty of expressing the view that if the normal flow of traffic between Afghanistan and Pakistan were to be resumed under the existing transit agreement, an immediate source of tensions might be removed. As Prime Minister Daud and Prince Naim have been informed by Ambassador Byroade, we have received assurances from the Pakistan authorities of their desire to maintain the flow of traffic to and from Afghanistan under the transit agreement. This to me is an element of hope.

As Your Majesty knows, the shipment of equipment and materials through Pakistan is essential to the continuation of United States aid projects in Afghanistan and to the planning of future projects./3/ I therefore venture to inquire whether Your Majesty will be willing to take steps to permit the resumption of shipments from Pakistan to Afghanistan./4/ It is my understanding that this can be accomplished if Your Majesty's Government adopts measures to provide incoming vehicles with the necessary documentation. In this connection I should like to reaffirm the offer of good offices made to Your Majesty's Government through Ambassador Byroade, and to underline my desire to provide practical assistance in working out the transit problem.

/3/The first sentence of this paragraph was changed to read: "As Your Majesty knows, vast quantities of equipment and materials essential to the continuation of US aid projects in Afghanistan have been and are being shipped to Pakistan."

/4/The last clause of this sentence was changed to read: "to take steps to permit the movement of these shipments through Pakistan to Afghanistan."

I earnestly hope that Your Majesty will take steps to continue the operation of the transit agreement--a move which I would hope might pave the way for improvement in relations between Your Majesty's Government and the Government of Pakistan. This would be in keeping with the call being made to many of us in these critical days to resolve differences through patience, negotiation and peaceful purpose.

Please be assured, Your Majesty, of my deepest personal interest in the solution of this problem and in the well-being of the Afghan people.

Respectfully yours,
John F. Kennedy"

President plans no publicity of this letter. Department believes in interests of progress on problem no publicity desirable.


46. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Pakistan/1/

/1/Source: Department of State, Central Files, 689.90D/9 - 1761. Secret; Niact. Drafted and approved by Meyer and cleared by Weil, by Bowles in substance, and by Smith at the White House. Repeated to Kabul.

Washington, September 17, 1961, 2:31 p.m.

534. At earliest opportunity you should see Ayub and speak along following lines:

1. President deeply concerned by recent trend in Pak - Afghan relations and has followed closely reports of your conversations with Ayub. President welcomes Ayub's assurances of Pakistan's desire to maintain normal Pak - Afghan transit arrangements and considers this an element of hope in an otherwise bleak picture.

2. Mindful of Ayub's agreeability to our informing Afghans of GOP's readiness to maintain normal transit facilities, President is dispatching confidential letter to King Zahir/2/ expressing his concern re recent developments, noting GOP wishes tocontinue normal flow of traffic, reiterating our willingness to provide good offices, calling attention to unfortunate repercussions interruption of traffic will have on Afghan development in general and our aid program in particular, and urging practical steps to restore normal traffic, including bilateral traffic, which could pave way to general improvement Pak - Afghan relations.

/2/See Document 45.

3. While we realize there some differences in Pak and USG views re tactics, we believe our aims vis-à-vis Afghanistan are identical, i.e., preservation of Afghan independence and forestalling of further Soviet penetration. While holding no brief for Afghan incitement of frontier USG believes continuation Pak - Afghan rupture can only defeat this common aim. Free World already facing major crisis with Communist bloc, centering on Berlin. These tensions likely to increase. At same time likelihood exists that Communists might find it useful to mount diversionary efforts in other areas. Alreadythere have been attempts to bluff Greece over NATO Checkmate maneuvers, to embarrass Turkey by publicly displaying CENTO documents in Soviet Consulate in Istanbul, and to intimidate Iran via strong diplomatic demarches re Iranian membership in CENTO. Little doubt Communists will welcome opportunity exploit Pak - Afghan impasse.

4. We realize element of exciting Americans may be included among Afghan motivations and we have taken this fully into account. Previous experience--e.g. 1955--shows Afghans for reasons of pride are fully capable of falling into the Soviet trap. We will strongly resist any efforts by Afghans or any others to drive wedge in Pak - U.S. relations. In our view, best means of achieving our objective is earliest possible finding of practical means to restore normal Pak - Afghan trade and transit. We of course hope Zahir's reply may lead to steps in this direction which can be acceptable to both sides. It is President's belief that Pak cooperation in this endeavor will prove best demonstration of unbreakable U.S. - Pak friendship.


47. Telegram From the Embassy in Afghanistan to the Department of State/1/

/1/Source: Department of State, Central Files, 689.90D/9 - 2061. Secret; Priority. Repeated to Karachi.

Kabul, September 20, 1961, 11 p.m.

225. Audience with King, with Deputy Prime Minister Ali Mohammed as interpreter, lasted one and one-half hours, with King taking initiative prolong discussion. Presented personal message from President, /2/ stating that in presentation I also instructed to make certain remarks. I then presented contents Deptel 112 /3/ orally, with Ali Mohammed interpreting, basing my remarks on text aide-memoire /4/ (being pouched). At end of presentation told King I would like add few personal remarks and gave him short summary status freight shipments and wastage being brought about by present situation. Had thought that perhaps he not fully informed these practical matters but it became apparent he was quite up-to-date.

/2/See Document 45.

/3/Document 44.

/4/Not found.

His Majesty said his reply would be preliminary as he wished study carefully text of President's letter before formal reply. He had one general thought however wished give me right away. He wanted express his appreciation for good intentions our President. This motivation on part our President was apparent not only in this crisis but in many others around world. He hoped I would express his appreciation for this sign personal interest of President.

He hoped President would understand that, in view present state of high feelings and emotions arising out of strained relations with Pakistan, practical aspects of movement of goods which we naturally considered so important. [sic]

King said he regretted that we could not be effective in compelling moderation on part of Pakistanis. Said this not only because recent Pakistan actions had been aimed at damage to Afghan, but because he thought policies of present military government of Pakistan would prove unbeneficial, not only for this area, but for people of Pakistan themselves. RGA looked upon recent premeditated (he indicated his intelligence quite good on this point) actions of Pakistan as designed divest Afghan of right of transit that existed for so many years. This unilateral act, aimed at what was an inherent right of Afghanistan, was such that they could not close their eyes and go to Pakistanis seeking new arrangements.

King then spoke bitterly of Pakistan decision close, as practical matter, their borders this year to nomadic tribes. This was inhumane act of great importance causing him great anxiety. It gave further proof of real intentions Pakistan and was significant added factor in total picture.

King said he had listened carefully to my remarks about their northern neighbor. He had only one thing to say in this regard. The most basic of all national policies of Afghan was to retain independence and Afghan would never sell that independence nor would any amount of pressure ever change that basic policy.

King said he would like talk to me as private person and not as King. He asked that I not take notes as his only reason was impress upon me depth of his feeling. He talked at some length on Pushtunistan issue, illustrating with frequent examples distortion he felt we received from general lack of knowledge of area and misinformation given us by Pakistan. The long history of tribal area could not be washed out by imposition of an artificial border. He spoke of an attempted revolution in northern Afghanistan many years ago. RGA, in time of his father, had practically no armed forces at all. Tribal elements from areas across what is now called Durand Line, came at great distances in middle of winter to help Afghanistanis put down this revolt. What was he now to say to people of Bajaur when they ask for Afghanistan help, and what was he to say to his own bodyguard which contained many sons of tribesmen who had once fought shoulder to shoulder with Afghanistanis? He wished we could take deeper look at what is actually going on. For instance, we probably believed over-simplification by Pakistanis in painting Bacha Gul as Afghan agent. If we really studied history of resistance of Bacha Gul's father against British, and of Bacha Gul's own efforts during years he attempted to work in close cooperation with Pakistanis and the Moslem League in an effort find solution Pushtunistan problem, we would find it a distortion to label him simply an Afghan agent.

However, of most importance he considered policies of Ayub dangerous in extreme, even to people of Pakistan itself. We should study more deeply what is happening even in areas as accessible to us as Peshawar area. There, people were being beaten by sticks, exiled and thrown into prison in manner almost unbelievable in present age. Effects of this on minds of people even in Pakistan were very unfortunate.

King wanted me to know that he personally felt their Pushtunistan policy was right one for Afghanistan to follow. He even felt we would agree in the end, as coming events would undoubtedly remove cover of secrecy over events in that area. Afghanistanis could not compel others to see things as they saw them, just as they could not always see things as others do. Even if Afghanistanis were suffering many losses at the moment this probably not as important in long run as losing a basic principle. However, he wanted me to report that the friendly relations between our countries, which included sentiments of the people themselves, were real; even if Afghanistanis complained to us at present he wanted me to know that this was not an important indication of real feelings of he and his people for America and Americans.

Comment: There nothing particularly new in substance of above. Had not of course expected, nor did I get, any indication of RGA relaxation its present policy. I was surprised King went to effort he did to show his personal feelings as being quite similar to those expressed by Daud. This perhaps designed put to rest any suspicion of exploitable differences between King, Daud and Naim. Also was impressed by his apparent sincerity in talking about mistakes Pakistanis are making in tribal areas. In this connection it interesting that British Ambassador told me yesterday that, while complete evidence lacking, he was beginning to feel Pakistanis headed for more trouble on their side of border than they had anticipated. We of course without information on which to form any judgment.

Would not anticipate reply from King to President's message until King, Daud and Naim (returning from Moscow this evening) have made some very basic decisions.


48. Letter From the Ambassador to India (Galbraith) to the Assistant Secretary of State for Near Eastern and South Asian Affairs (Talbot)/1/

/1/Source: Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Countries Series, India, General, 9/1/61 - 9/13/61. Secret; Official - Informal.

New Delhi, September 21, 1961.

Dear Phil: Last night I had a long and exceedingly interesting conversation with Nehru about the arms aid to Pakistan, non-aggression and, less expectedly, Kashmir. In accordance with our arrangement on communications I am passing this on to you by letter with the understanding that you will inform the Secretary. I don't need to persuade either of you of the importance of holding these matters closely for the time being and I hope I have persuaded the Indians of the need for doing so. I say Indians because I thought it wise to try the subject out first with Desai. He provides useful guidance on approach and, since he warns the Prime Minister, one is assured of a more stable reaction there.

I began by cautioning Nehru on the delicacy of the subject I was about to take up and the fact that were it to become public knowledge in any inconvenient way Washington would be at liberty to dismiss it as purely personal talk. I then said that we were far from satisfied with our present relations with the subcontinent and mentioned my recent talks with the President and Secretary. Our arms aid to Pakistan could doubtless be explained to Indian officialdom. We could not hope to explain it to the Indian public; the arming of the Muslims by the Americans would forever be a fertile breeding ground for anti-American agitation, something which did not please us for its own sake. The most plausible occasion for changing the policy would be a rapprochement between India and Pakistan--a declaration of non-aggression and of their common concern for the defense of the borders of the whole subcontinent. (These were my precise words; one needs to be very cautious about using such military terms as a mutual defense pact.) I added that this was no naive excursion nor were we searching the world for disputes to mediate. We were fully aware of the history and its rich yield of difficulty but our aid involved us inevitably in the problem. So long as things were wrong one should beware of the easy course which is to shut his eyes and say nothing can be accomplished. Finally I asked if there were any way of preventing the discussion from becoming immediately a discussion of Kashmir.

Nehru's response was warm and sympathetic. He said it would be a mistake to assume that nothing could be done. But he said that as a practical matter, especially from the viewpoint of the Pakistanis, it was impossible to avoid Kashmir. One cannot think realistically of a settlement which puts aside the major subject of dispute. Then he talked in a relaxed and, indeed, rather amusing fashion of the history of the Kashmir dispute. Nothing, he said, has so taxed his pacifist spirit as sending soldiers into the Valley though he had found considerable moral support in the discovery that Gandhi was agreeable. There was a good deal more detail of this sort including discussion of the military campaign, much of it known, which brought him down to the present Indian position: the ceasefire line presents the only possible settlement. He has people who insist that Azad Kashmir is part of India. The Pakistanis lay their claim on all of Kashmir and Jammu. Neither side can dislodge the other; the only thing is to accept the line as it exists.

This, of course, leaves India in possession of the most desirable piece of real estate, namely, the Valley. I asked Nehru if he would be averse in the interest of a settlement to giving Pakistan rights in the Valley. I noted that after the Republic of Geneva had joined Switzerland a tributary area had been left in economic union with Switzerland but under the political administration of France and had so remained to this day. If the Valley were to remain under Indian administration, why not give both countries free trade with and population access to the Valley? This would mean that communications could again flow up the traditional route from Rawalpindi and the Muslim population of the Valley would have free intercourse with that of Pakistan. Nehru was not specifically averse to the idea. He asked if this would involve some control posts on their roads out of Kashmir to India; I pointed out that the French had them outside of the Zone. He also noted that there would be a danger of a heavy migration from Azad Kashmir and Pakistan to the Valley because of the higher standard of living there. But then he added: "If there were a general settlement we wouldn't have to worry about troublemakers."

After a little discussion of the possibilities of Pakistan acceptance of some such development we left the subject with the observation by the Prime Minister that to settle this problem would remove one of the worst causes of communalism in India. He noted, incidentally, that in his view Hindu communalism was more vehement and troublesome than the Muslim version.

I would very much appreciate your reaction to this conversation. You will see that I have moved at least a little in the way of a joint tenancy--hardly a condominium--in the Valley. I left the way open for another talk with Nehru with a view to firming up our thoughts prior to his trip to Washington and we should consider what might be said in Washington. It will occur to you that the conversation if it accomplished nothing else has substantially eased the way for anything that the President might wish to say on this subject.

Especially I would like your suggestion as to the next step. Much as I like Bill Rountree personally he is not committed to an escape from the military arrangements of which, indeed, he was one of the authors. Therefore, there is no chance that he would be a good avenue of approach to the Paks. It is my view moreover that this should be part of a much larger approach which includes the waterlogging and salinity problems--we say among other things that we are seeking a settlement which eases tensions between the two countries in order to concentrate resources on saving the Punjab. One possibility might be to get Dave Lilienthal, who did a good job on the Indus settlement, to try his hand again on this one. Or perhaps I might ask the President and Secretary to enlarge my charter in the region to see what could be worked out. Of course, if the Laos conference were ever to end Harriman would be the ideal man. Indeed I would rather trust it to him than anyone else. What is needed is someone who is a master of all the ingredients--our military commitment to the Paks, our needs there, the salinity and waterlogging problem, the need of India for a settlement and an imaginative view of the concessions she might make--who could work out a package that both could conceivably buy.

Yours faithfully,
John Kenneth Galbraith/1/

/1/Printed from a copy that bears this typed signature.

49. Telegram From the Embassy in Afghanistan to the Department of State/1/

/1/Source: Department of State, Central Files, 689.90D/10 - 361. Secret: Niact. Repeated to Karachi.

Kabul, October 3, 1961, 5 p.m.

274. Etemadi of Foreign Office has just given me copy King's letter to President. Inasmuch as he said he did not know time of delivery, but thought it would be tomorrow, am sending text immediately without comment in hope it arrives prior to Maiwandwal's appointment with President. Full text, with minor words omitted, quoted below:

"Kabul, September 26, 1961.

Your Excellency: I sincerely appreciate Your Excellency's expression concern over severance diplomatic relations between my country and Pakistan. But I must herewith clarify this undesirable state affairs brought about solely by Pakistan's unilateral action on basis imaginary pretext. It therefore evident development this unfortunate situation is contrary to policy Afghan Government.

Government Afghan convinced transit to and from sea-ports through territory sub-continent, which divided today into India and Pakistan, has been inherent traditional right this country in traditionally accepted form implementation by responsible Afghan offices such as consulates, trade bureaus in different parts area.

Government Afghan has always been convinced that right transit and its means implementation is completely apart from any political differences between two countries.

Unfortunately however, Government Pakistan has continuously interfered in matter, by creating handicaps in application our right and even by having blocked transit, obviously with view bringing political pressure upon this country.

Government Afghan does not consider historical indisputable right transit as mere facility or favour accorded Afghan, and any unilateral decision to deny these rights wholly or partially, or to depart from their traditional forms, will be unacceptable to Afghanistan. Otherwise it becomes evident these basic rights are to be left to whims fancies of Pakistan Government.

Your Excellency fully aware how deeply Government Afghanistan aspires to develop country and bring progress prosperity our people, and how it has made every possible effort attain these aims. Accordingly, government, people Afghan greatly appreciate efforts US help us in development our country and have always tried facilitate implementation your friendly aid for assurance better future for our people.

Pakistan's unilateral decision expressed in her note August 23 to close Afghan consulates, trade agencies which existed for no other purpose than the application our transit rights--implementation of which was their recognized accepted duty, has posed fait accompli which Government Afghanistan cannot ignore. We consider this unilateral action of Pakistan Government as blatant and unlawful violation our rights.

In note delivered Pakistan 30 August, Afghanistan formally requested reconsideration Pakistan's decision close Afghan consulates, trade agencies.

Government Afghanistan reiterates its views that restitution transit possible only when pertinent Afghan offices can render their services normally as of before.

If Government Pakistan persists in its position we have no other alternative than propose to US Government continue her friendly aid to Afghan via Iran, transit goods through Iran being by no means impracticable.

Although Government Afghanistan deplores latter development tension in our relations with Pakistan, we confident that this tension created only by Pakistan Government.

Government Afghanistan hopes Your Excellency's government, friendly as it is to both parties, will make every possible effort for re-establishment Afghan offices responsible for implementation our transit rights through Pakistan, and thus help return normal conditions and reduce tension between two countries.

Your Excellency's personal interest in matter will be deeply appreciated and it expected that continued American effort will make it possible to bring situation back to normal."


50. Memorandum of Conversation/1/

/1/Source: Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Countries Series, Afghanistan, Memoranda of Conversation, 7/61 - 9/62. Secret. Drafted by Gatch. According to the President's Appointment Book, the meeting was held at the White House. (Ibid.)

Washington, October 4, 1961.

Letter from King Zahir Concerning Pakistan - Afghanistan Controversy

The President
His Excellency Mohammed Hashim Maiwandwal, Ambassador of Afghanistan
Assistant Secretary of State for Near Eastern and South Asian Affairs - Phillips Talbot

The Ambassador delivered a letter from King Zahir of Afghanistan in response to the President's letter of September 17. /2/ He then outlined the Afghan view of the crisis between Pakistan and Afghanistan. Afghanistan believes Pakistan set off the present difficulty by taking advantage of Afghan dependency on the consulates and trade agencies in Pakistan. The Ambassador admitted that there had been fault on both sides in connection with the activities of consulates, but said that steps had been taken to open discussions with Pakistan with a view to rectifying the situation. Meanwhile, Afghanistan had feared that the Ayub visit to the United States would result in a lessening of United States regard for Afghanistan. The Ambassador was in fact in Kabul during August arguing on the basis of reassurances from the President and Mr. Talbot that there had been no change in United States policy toward Afghanistan. It thus came as a surprise to the Ambassador that Pakistan suddenly levied its demand concerning the consulates and trade agencies. The Ambassador concluded by expressing his gratitude for United States interest in Afghanistan's welfare.

/2/See Documents 49 and 45.

The President said he thought King Zahir's letter was a good one. He promised to see what the United States can do, and concluded by saying that Afghanistan would be hearing from the United States very shortly.

51. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Afghanistan/1/

/1/Source: Department of State, Central Files, 689.90D/10 - 461. Secret; Niact. Drafted by Gatch and Weil, cleared by Meyer, and approved by Rusk. Also sent to Karachi.

Washington, October 4, 1961, 3:30 p.m.

141. Eyes Only Ambassador. Deptel 135 to Kabul, 647 to Karachi./2/

/2/Telegram 135 to Kabul, also sent as telegram 647 to Karachi, October 2, noted that the Department had received advance information that King Zahir's reply to President Kennedy's September 17 letter would indicate that Afghanistan, in effect, was prepared to accept U.S. good offices, and was also prepared to discuss a solution to transit difficulties without reference to political issues. (Ibid, 689.90D/9 - 261)

1) King Zahir's letter delivered to President October 4 confirms advance information that King for practical purposes accepts USG good offices and that RGA may be willing work out transit arrangements without direct reference to "Pushtunistan" issue. President promised early reply.

2) Pakistan Ambassador at his request called on Secretary October 4 to say GOP would not permit re-opening Afghan consulates or trade agencies on ground these were centers of subversive activities--including sabotage and attempted assassination; but there was no reason why other arrangements should not be made such as using Afghan bank branches for documentation. Ambassador also said there would be no problem in making special arrangements so long as RGA refrained from introducing subject of "Pushtunistan."

3) I continue believe overriding consideration is danger to free world security posed by actual and potential Soviet involvement in Afghan - Pak relations. Possibility USSR planning diversionary effort in this area cannot be ruled out. Loss to USG involved in stoppage of transit traffic and possible termination of US aid projects in Afghanistan constitute other major considerations. While there is no prospect of resolving emotion-laden dispute over status of Pushtuns in foreseeable future, I believe resumption of transit traffic if accepted in good faith by both parties might reduce tensions and in any case would serve USG national interests.

4) For Byroade: You should seek appointment with King at earliest opportunity. Express President's gratification at King's letter. As US understands position, RGA has asked US make every possible effort for reestablishment of transit trade. For this purpose, President requests King's reaction to following proposal: In framework offer good offices President prepared send special representative to Pakistan and Afghanistan to help both sides work towards restoration transit traffic. You should inform King similar offer being made in Rawalpindi. If both sides agreeable, US will at once make available services distinguished senior official. You should impress on King that President attaches utmost importance solving transit problem and hopes King will give this proposal his immediate and most serious consideration. You should coordinate with Ambassador Rountree in order make approaches to two governments as nearly simultaneous as possible. Preferably two Heads of State should be seen on same day, although Amb. Rountree may wish consider whether it might be wiser ascertain Ayub's reactions before King Zahir is approached.

5) For Rountree: You should seek appointment with Ayub at earliest opportunity. You should recall to Ayub your discussions in Rawalpindi and Murree September 1 and 2 in which Ayub said he had no objection to US telling Afghanistan inter alia that "GOP was prepared work out appropriate arrangements to keep traffic moving." You should add that US understands GOP concern at previous Afghan insistence on considering "Pushtunistan" issue as integral part of dispute and GOP refusal consider any discussions with RGA on such basis. US can now report an encouraging development. Ayub will recall that President sent letter to Zahir on September 20 /3/ requesting him make every effort restore transit traffic to normal and reiterating US offer good offices. Zahir's reply delivered to President October 4 confines itself to transit problems and makes no mention of "Pushtunistan." We interpret this as RGA acceptance US offer good offices. In view this statement and Ayub's previously expressed willingness work out appropriate arrangements, President would like his reaction to following proposal. You should then describe US intentions in same way Byroade instructed using same emphasis.

/3/The reference is incorrect; the letter was dated September 17.

6. Both Ambassadors should indicate that it would be greatly helpful to success of this endeavor if respective governments could begin immediately to tone down hostile propaganda against each other and to keep public statements re this subject to minimum.

7. Both Ambassadors requested report respective reactions soonest./4/


/4/Rountree saw Ayub on October 7 and reported that he was prepared to welcome a presidential emissary sent to help both sides work toward the restoration of transit traffic. Ayub made clear that his agreement did not extend to broader political issues, and he emphasized that he could not agree to reopening the consulates and trade missions. (Telegram 655 from Karachi, October 7; Department of State, Central Files, 689.90D/10 - 761) Byroade reported on October 9 that Zahir was also prepared to welome a U.S. emissary, but he indicated that the reestablishment of Afghan offices in Pakistan was essential to any transit agreement. (Telegram 289 from Kabul, October 9; ibid., 689.90D/10 - 961)

52. Memorandum of Conversation/1/

/1/Source: Department of State, Central Files, 689.90D/10 - 1661. Secret. Drafted by Merchant and approved at the White House on October 19. According to the President's Appointment Book, the meeting took place at the White House. (Kennedy Library)

Washington, October 16, 1961.

Transit Difficulties Between Pakistan and Afghanistan

The President
The Honorable Livingston T. Merchant, United States Ambassador to Canada

After a short opening discussion on Canada, I referred to my mission to South Asia. I said that the more I examined the problem the less optimistic I was over the possibilities for an early solution. I spoke of the irreconcilable public positions already adopted by the two governments. The President agreed that the problem was difficult and complicated. He added that if a solution were soon found, he would be both surprised and pleased.

I went on to say that the sole ingredient for success lay in the President's prestige and personal interest since there were obviously no benefits nor sanctions which could be applied or offered to either side with profit.

The key appeared to be whether or not there existed with both parties a desire for a solution and I said that I thought this would become apparent quite quickly. Under these circumstances I said that I hoped to restrict my presence in the area to about two weeks and had already laid the ground work for this. To risk cooling my heels for an extended period I felt would be damaging to the President's own prestige and render more difficult the future task of Ambassadors Byroade and Rountree. The President agreed.

Finally I said that whereas there were many ideas produced by the Department for a practical formula to start the trade moving, I believed that I would have to rely principally on our people on the ground for the exact formula or formulas which might work.

Finally I said that whereas my bias was naturally in favor of a stout ally, I fully appreciated the strategic importance of a genuinely neutral Afghanistan and hence we could not lightly contemplate abandoning our effort to achieve this objective. The President expressed himself as being in full agreement on both points.

As I was about to leave I asked the President whether I could hold out to the King of Afghanistan the possibility of his making an official visit to the United States in 1962, if this appeared to be a necessary inducement to arriving at an agreement on transit trade. The President said he saw no reason why I should not do this but said he would like to check the matter with the Secretary of State who was about to enter the room with another group for a meeting on another subject. The Secretary agreed that if this in fact seemed to be the necessary final clincher for a successful outcome, I should be authorized to indicate that an invitation from the President would be forthcoming.

The President then gave me the signed letters for me to bear to the King of Afghanistan and to President Ayub. /2/ I told him that I was leaving with Mr. O'Donnell, as I did, a copy of my briefing book for Mr. Komer of the White House staff. I said the President himself might at some point desire to scan the documents.

/2/Copies of these letters, dated October 16, which introduced Merchant as President Kennedy's personal representative, are ibid., National Security Files, Countries Series, Afghanistan, Subjects, King Zahir Correspondence, 1961 - 1963, and ibid., Pakistan, General, 10/61 - 12/61.

The President wished me good luck and success on my mission.

53. Memorandum From Robert W. Komer of the National Security Council Staff to President Kennedy/1/

/1/Source: Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Meetings and Memoranda Series, Staff Memoranda, Robert W. Komer. Secret.

Washington, October 26, 1961.

First Round of Merchant Talks

Merchant has seen both the top Pakistani and Afghans. Now he will attempt to devise some compromise for sale during second round of talks. He is not very optimistic about "securing agreement both governments at this time to any arrangement enabling traffic promptly to move again."

Initial round showed no give in either government's position. Ayub was cordial, admitted Paks had exercised "a bit of bluff" and reiterated Pak willingness reopen transit but not consulates or trade agencies. Daud and Naim in turn also want transit reopened but insist that it be on basis of restoring status quo ante (i.e. consulates).

Both say they are willing to leave aside political issues, but in fact Pushtunistan is the real bone of contention. It remains hard to see how a solution can be achieved without getting into this thorny problem. If Merchant can pull this one off in a few weeks, no one will be more surprised than he.

R.W. Komer/2/

/2/Printed from a copy that bears this typed signature.

54. Telegram From the Embassy in Pakistan to the Department of State /1/

/1/Source: Department of State, Central Files, 689.90D/10 - 2761. Secret; Niact; Limited Distribution. Also sent to Kabul.

Karachi, October 27, 1961, 5 p.m.

772. For Ambassador Byroade from Merchant. I returned by air from Kabul evening October 25, having spent two days there consulting with Ambassador Byroade and talking to King, Daud and Naim. /2/ I also had opportunity on social occasions to talk to four or five Afghan Cabinet Ministers. October 20 I had spent in Rawalpindi in company Ambassador Rountree after devoting day of arrival to consulting with him and having extended talk with Foreign Secretary Dehlavi in External Affairs Karachi. In Rawalpindi I talked with Ayub twice and had extended discussion with Qadir /3/ supplemented by less formal contact with several other Ministers. Between Rawalpindi and Kabul I spent Sunday /4/ in Peshawar inspecting railroad yards, storage facilities and condition US wheat and other US aid shipments. I also viewed Afghan border and rail line from top of Khyber Pass (see Peshawar's airgram A - 28, October 25). /5/ Foregoing completed my first round exploratory talks during which I floated no possible formulae for settlement transit problem but sought frank expression each government's policies and attitudes while taking occasion myself to underline the President's deep personal interest this matter and elements in situation which led US to see urgency in arrival at some arrangement under which transit traffic would again move. Reception and atmosphere both capitals cordial. Pakistanis, while showering me with good wishes, did not conceal their belief timing good offices premature and hence seriously in error tactically. Afghans repeatedly stated appreciation my presence even if mission failed.

/2/The Embassy in Kabul reported on Merchant's conversations with Zahir, Daud, and Naim in telegrams 314, 317, and 318, October 24, 25, and 28. (Department of State, Central Files, 689.90D/10 - 2461, 689.90D/10 - 2561, and 689.90D/10 - 2661) Memoranda of the conversations were transmitted in despatch 282 from Karachi, October 27. (Ibid., 689.90D/10 - 2761)

/3/The Embassy in Karachi reported on Merchant's conversation with Qadir and the first of his conversations with Ayub in telegrams 737 and 738, October 21. (Ibid., 120.1590/10 - 2161 and 689.90D/10 - 2161) Merchant reported on the second of his conversations with Ayub in telegram 768, October 26. (Ibid., 120.1590/10 - 2661) A memorandum of the conversation reported in telegram 768 was transmitted in despatch 281 from Karachi, October 26. (Ibid., 689.90D/10 - 2661)

/4/October 22.

/5/Not printed. (Department of State, Central Files, 689.90D/10 - 2561)

As you are aware from my earlier reports each government maintained with no significant modification or even nuance public positions already taken with same intensity of feeling as reported in detail in past weeks by Ambassador Rountree and Byroade respectively.

Ayub stated he desired friendly relations with Afghans and restoration diplomatic relations. He furthermore reaffirmed in precise terms Pakistani intent to abide by 1958 transit agreement and desire to see traffic resume, attaching however as conditions (A) no reopening Afghan consulates in Pakistan, and (B) no venturing Pakistani trucks and drivers across Afghan border in view Pakistan inability protect them against mistreatment.

Afghan Government, notably Daud who excelled Naim in frankness, stated Afghans desired friendly relations with Pakistan and resumption diplomatic relations. He denied Afghans in effect blockaded themselves on transit route through Pakistan but stated flatly reopening of Afghan consulates and trade agencies in Pakistan was sine qua non for freight to move once more on transit route.

In effect Ayub hoped I would "beat some sense into bloody minds of Afghan Royal Family", while Daud quite plainly said Pakistanis were people to whom I should talk since they had unilaterally blocked transit and Afghans the injured party.

First round my talks confirmed public positions two governments are diametrically opposed with little in common save reciprocal professions of desire to improve relations. Despite my emphasis in both capitals on limited terms my mission, greater part my listening time was spent on Pushtunistan, which is black background of their relations with each other and makes extremely difficult devising solution to transit problem, resumption of which is of such vital importance to Afghan and of some economic benefit to Pakistanis in Peshawar region. Being now on the ground, I feel even greater urgency attached to effort restore transit traffic. Every week which passes will I believe increase Afghan's already substantial economic dependence on Soviet Union and lead ultimately to its total loss of freedom. Delay in reopening Karachi route will make it daily more difficult for us to justify to ourselves continuing forward programming and procurement for present US economic aid program to Afghan. On latter, however, I recommend no negative decisions be taken in Washington at least until outcome my mission clear.

I have in mind a formula to present early next week separately to both governments. In essence it would entail successive unilateral declarations by Pakistan and Afghan Governments in that order which would include statement intention of each to appoint liaison officer provided for under transit agreement but never appointed. Afghan liaison officer with "additional liaison officers" (latter posted in Peshawar, Chaman and Karachi respectively) would operate with appropriate facilities and immunities in Pakistan to facilitate transit services. This would be portrayed in presentation by me hopefully as first in series of steps, last of which would be renewal diplomatic relations and thereafter negotiation re establishment such consulates in each country as might then be agreed as necessary to meet legitimate needs.

At Chaman Afghan trucks would enter Pakistan for distance necessary to load at storage area located at present rail head. In Peshawar Pakistani trucks would carry goods from storage areas to border point on Pakistan side Tor Kham (at foot Khyber Pass) and transfer loads to Afghan vehicles. Pakistanis would start promptly construction necessary storage and related facilities at Tor Kham. As interim measure pending provision minimum facilities at border Afghan trucks would be admitted to Peshawar to load food, medicine and diplomatic shipments now there. Pakistan and Afghan liaison officers would be charged to undertake urgent study repairing present rail line in Khyber area to actual border, thereby in long term future enabling shipments from Karachi direct to Afghan customs on both border crossing points. Finally, each government's declaration would contain certain preambular recitals of desire restore good neighborly relations, and suitable reference to US good offices, to convention high seas, to transit agreement of 1958 and hopefully some innocuous salad dressing mixed to recipe of each party. I would also seek Pakistan agreement promptly to ratify and deposit instrument high seas convention dealing with rights of land-locked countries, which conventions both countries have signed but only Afghan ratified.

I will reduce foregoing formula with more precision and detail to draft declarations. My plan thereafter is to return Rawalpindi and Kabul in that order first of next week. In this second, and I assume final pair of visits, I will explain these are not negotiating documents in usual sense but represent my best effort find road out of impasse. Naturally, I will consider any constructive counter-proposals or amendments not affecting key elements but I believe it would be great mistake for me to become entangled in protracted talks placing us in the middle. I will use my best efforts at persuasion and as agreed before my departure will hold out no hope of reward or threat of reprisal to either party. I will, however, be franker than by design I was during first round in delineating consequences which I foresee would follow failure achieve early resumption transit traffic.

I am deeply impressed with dangers inherent in present situation to Afghanistan's continued freedom and non-alignment. I am also aware emotional depth of Pak commitment to policy of firmness on northwest frontier. The latter attitude renders it dangerous to our own national interest to apply what Paks would regard as excessive pressure on them, with resultant harm to our relations with an ally which is staunch and now cooperates in area vital to our own security. Realistically, I believe odds are against successful achievement purpose my mission, but I am by no means devoid of hope. One more week I judge will determine success or failure and thereafter I believe it would be unwise for me to remain in area.

This is my own message. Ambassador Rountree, however, has read it and concurs in assessment, formula and tactics. Ambassador Byroade's comments to me repeated to Department are urgently requested. /6/

Department please repeat to other posts including Tehran as it determines.


/6/In telegram 179 from Kabul to Karachi, October 28, repeated to the Department, Byroade stated that he was concerned that the formula outlined in telegram 772 would not be accepted by the Afghan Government as it contained no specific proposal for the restoration of the consulates. Byroade suggested that, if the restoration of the consulates was impossible, the reopening of the trade agencies, with different personnel and assurances concerning their activities, might provide an acceptable middle ground. (Ibid., 689.90D/10 - 2861)

55. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Pakistan/1/

/1/Source: Department of State, Central Files, 689.90D/11 - 361. Secret; Niact; Limit Distribution. Drafted and approved by Veliotes (S/S). A note on the source text indicates that the text of the letter was received from Bromley Smith at the White House. Also sent to Kabul.

Washington, November 3, 1961, 12:25 a.m.

860. For Ambassador Merchant. Following message approved by President for delivery to Ayub by Embassy Karachi at discretion Ambassador Merchant. /2/

/2/The letter was proposed by the Department of State in light of reports received from Merchant that his second round of discussions with the Pakistanis had not gone well. (Memorandum from Battle to McGeorge Bundy, November 2; Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Trips and Conferences Series, Merchant Trip to Pakistan and Afghanistan, 10/61 - 11/61) Merchant reported on his October 31 conversation with Foreign Minister Qadir in telegrams 790 and 798 from Karachi, November 1 and 2. Merchant found Qadir firmly opposed to the concept of liaison officers, and to stationing additional Afghan officials in Pakistan positioned to conduct the same type of activities that had caused the closure of the consulates and trade agencies. (Department of State, Central Files, 120.1590/11 - 161 and 689.90D/11 - 261)

"November 2, 1961

Dear Mr. President:

I am sending you this personal note because of my deep conviction that only your statesmanship can point the way to a resolution of the serious situation which now exists between your country and Afghanistan. I have been grateful to you for receiving Ambassador Merchant, and I hope you will understand this more personal message.

The factors involved in this difficult problem are of course more familiar to you than to me, and it is not in the spirit of our alliance for me to attempt to press my judgment upon you. Nonetheless, I do venture to put before you the thought that your own stature as a statesman, and the strength of your country, may both make it possible for you, in this situation, to take the large-minded and forgiving course, without any risk that such a decision would be misinterpreted as weakness. Can you not take the lead, as a strong neighbor, secure in his power and sure in his judgment, by authorizing the re-establishment of consulates--or other arrangements of comparable significance--which would assure the early resumption of trade and traffic between your country and Afghanistan?

You must be concerned, I know, with serious questions of opinion among your own people, and I understand the complexities which attend your relations with Afghanistan. But from the point of view of our common interest in limiting the further spread of Communist influence, there does seem to me to be real danger in sustained interruption of Afghan freedom of transit. Your country and mine, accustomed to our access to the sea, do not face the problem which land-locked states so sensitively feel. It would be dangerous for all of us if Afghanistan, in a search for alternatives, were forced into excessive dependence on its northern neighbor.

Let me repeat, in closing, that I write quite personally, on the strength of our friendship and understanding. I understand and respect the fact that the authority and responsibility here are yours. Needless to say, if your judgment takes you on a different course it will have no effect on our very warm friendship. I have wanted, however, to share with you in this private way my sense of the opportunity which your personal qualities make possible, at a time of serious difficulty.

Ambassador Merchant remains at your disposal for the exercise of our good offices in whatever way may be effective.

With the warmest personal regards,

Sincerely, John F. Kennedy"

If delivered, President desires message treated as privileged communication between heads of state with no publicity. /3/

/3/In telegram 333 from Karachi, November 3, Merchant indicated that he felt the decision concerning whether to deliver the letter to Ayub should await the outcome of his talks in Kabul on November 4. (Ibid., 689.90D/11 - 361)


56. Telegram From the Embassy in Afghanistan to the Department of State/1/

/1/Source: Department of State, Central Files, 689.90D/11 - 361. Secret; Niact; Limit Distribution. Repeated to Karachi.

Kabul, November 3, 1961, 3 p.m.

331. From Merchant. I shall certainly bend every effort to keep Kabul door open (Deptel 17 November 2) /2/ but for reasons developed below I doubt useful purpose Presidential message to Ayub at this juncture though naturally I will make no final recommendation till text received.

/2/In telegram 176 to Kabul, the Department instructed Merchant to make every effort to keep the door open in Kabul. If, however, the Afghan Government found the watered down version of Merchant's formula unacceptable, the Department felt that Merchant should "have another go at Ayub." (Ibid., 689.90D/11 - 261)

Kabul's next telegram digests my talk with Prince Naim shortly after arrival from Pindi November 2. /3/ I also talked to him at Ambassador's dinner same evening but nothing new developed. He was gracious but unwilling to discuss transit or in fact any topic more recent than a millenium ago. He confirmed my appointment with him Saturday morning but in reply my expression eager willingness meet with him or any colleague November 3 he replied being holiday he foresaw no such need. From Ambassador's he left for weekly meeting of Royal Family at Palace and of course it is possible new attitude will emerge from that conclave.

/3/In telegram 332 from Kabul, November 3, Merchant reported that he had presented his revised draft formula to Foreign Minister Naim, but since it did not meet the minimum Afghan requirement of reopening the consulates and trade agencies, Naim saw no possibility that his government would agree to it. He agreed to review the proposal with his colleagues "as a matter of routine," and would meet again with Merchant on November 4 with their response, but he anticipated that the meeting would only be a "matter of form." (Ibid., 689.90D/11 - 361) Merchant's meeting with Naim on November 4 bore out Naim's prediction. The Afghan Government's conditions for an acceptable settlement constituted essentially the status quo ante. (Telegram 338 from Kabul, November 5; ibid., 689.90D/11 - 561)

At moment my judgment which Ambassador Byroade shares is that however illogical in terms of simplified transit procedures and Afghan own national interest in avoidance greatly increased dependence on Soviets, RGA at this point in time are unwilling lift finger to enable transit shipments to enter Afghan via Pakistan unless and until Pakistanis agree reopening Afghan consulates or as possible final fall back trade agencies. It is only barely conceivable Ayub might agree to latter.

Naim's reaction November 2 to my draft statement ("does not meet RGA position") agreement see me November 4 "as matter of form" and no provision of opportunity to see Daud or King foreshadows confirmation flat rejection with thanks my efforts on November 4. Less likely possibility is counterproposal emerging from Palace meeting last night.

If latter occurs I will of course in consultation with Ambassadors Byroade and Rountree consider best tactics and my present travel plans together with Department's guidance already received.

If first alternative is confirmed November 4 as carefully considered RGA position, I intend:

1. Refuse take "no" as final answer and insist Afghans keep my formula under study assuring them no intention to publish or give any public indication good offices have failed or assign blame as between two parties for lack success so far in arrival at modus vivendi for transit resumption.

(2) Tell Naim here and Pakistanis in Karachi (where both Ayub and Qadir will be over weekend though heavily engaged in ceremonial opening new bank building with foreign dignitaries) that owing need my return to Ottawa and fact my stay in area already considerably longer than originally contemplated, I plan to depart Karachi for Washington November 6, where I will report my conversations and present status proposal to the President whose good offices will continue to be exercised through Ambassadors Byroade and Rountree.

(3) Assure both Paks and Afghans of President's deep continuing personal interest in this matter and my genuine personal confidence that by exercise ingenuity and passage of time way will be found, though I am realistically cognizant that US aid program to Afghan cannot continue in present form and dimension very much longer if US supplies continue to pile up as result paralysis Pakistan transit route.

My own view is that time rather than ingenuity is more important ingredient in any solution. I consider Afghans for reasons of fate [face?] and very possibly overconfidence in own ability hold Soviets off short of national disaster are entirely capable of continuing for some time to mutilate their own nose. Despite Ambassador Byroade's and my efforts they may understimate difficulties USG would face in restarting any suspended or sharply reduced country aid program. In this connection, I am satisfied that a significant US aid program with substantial though less effective presence of US advisors and technicians could and should be maintained in Afghan even if (as might be unavoidably decided by Washington) end came to projects dependent on bulk imports delivery of which possible currently only though Karachi. Not all the reasons for Afghan stubborness are openly stated or acknowledged.

Pakistan position likewise not entirely on top of table. Ayub frankly has told me my good offices mission prematurely timed. Reopening transit traffic promptly would no doubt in his view relieve very pressure on Afghans which his hard policy is designed to apply. Accordingly I believe his present purpose vis-a-vis US is to give enough to avoid our being able exclusively to blame him for intransigeance but not enough in any formula to enable Afghans in their pride to accept.

My consequent conclusion is that it is best to leave matter as it stands (assuming I can prevent final and flat Afghan "no") and personally to depart area making every effort by my departure statement (which when drafted I will cable) that no legitimate basis will exist for public assumption good offices effort has failed or ended. To try to push Ayub further right now by any means I believe would be unproductive. We must bear in mind his importance as an ally and recognize he has in fact already made some distasteful concessions in my present formula in order to meet part way our concern and sense urgency which he decidedly does not share. Similarly I do not believe non-US influence (such as by sympathetic third country ambassadors in Kabul) will help with Afghans at this point. Ambassador Byroade can and will work unrelentingly on Royal Family and other personalities in Kabul, but basically I think passage of time with (1) more evident disastrous effect on trade and economic development from loss German as well as US imports resulting from what is substantially self-imposed blockade of Pakistan route and (2) increasing feeling of nakedness with Russians must do its essential work before any formula falling short of their currently stated demands will prove acceptable. On this point Ambassador Byroade is far from convinced of validity my estimate Afghan reaction to pressures of time will be rational.

Foregoing paragraphs are premised on no change in present Afghan attitude as stated to me November 2 before I depart for Karachi.

I wish to repeat that formula I brought here from Pindi in my judgment would enable immediate movement immobilized freight in Pak with prospect of longer term arrangements logistically more sensible and do so with barely sufficient facesaving elements to permit Afghan acceptance. Ambassador Byroade believes RGA could survive acceptance formula in present form though it might entail or require Daud's departure from present office.

Incidentially Ambassador Byroade believes and I now agree that dangling invitation to King for official visit to US 1962 would not at this time be of utility, although he continues believe early visit to US unrelated to good offices on transit would valuably contribute to relationship.

Finally, all tactics and my travel plans will need new look if Afghans in next day or two indicate any flexibility in their position. I believe this message responds to all points in recent Deptels including 174 /4/ and 176 to Kabul. I also want to say Ambassadors Byroade and Rountree have been invaluable in their wise advice which in each case has reflected broad and not parochial interests. Spengler has been indispensable.

/4/In telegram 174 to Kabul, October 31, the Department of State relayed various suggestions for consideration in the event that Merchant's proposed formula was not adopted by the two sides in the course of the second round of discussions. If there was some hope that a revised formula might eventually be accepted, the Department asked Merchant not to rule out a third round of discussions. Assuming a third round materialized and the Afghan Government remained to be convinced, the Department suggested that Ambassadors of other Moslem countries might provide useful support. Finally, the Department suggested that, if an immediate solution was not in prospect after the second round, the problem be left as fluid as possible. (Ibid., 689.90D/10 - 3161)

Needless to say I regret deeply fact my efforts so far have produced no tangible result.

I have just received word Naim desires postpone my November 4 appointment from morning to afternoon which may well presage some shift Afghan position. I have, of course, agreed.


57. Letter From the Pakistani Ambassador (Ahmed) to President Kennedy/1/

/1/Source: Department of State, NEA/SOA Files: Lot 64 D 566, The President. No classification marking. The salutation and closing are handwritten.

Washington, November 4, 1961.

Dear Mr. President, I have today received by cablegram the following message from our President for immediate communication to you:

"My dear Mr. President,

I understand that Mr. Nehru proposes to ask for military aid from the United States during his forthcoming talks with you. You will undoubtedly recall our discussions on this subject. You were good enough to assure me that at no time had your government had any intention of giving military aid to India and that if at any time you should come to the conclusion that it had become necessary to do so we would be consulted before a decision was taken in the matter. I do not need at this stage to do more than recall those assurances.

You were also good enough to assure me during our meeting that you would do your best to persuade Mr. Nehru to see the necessity of an early settlement of the Kashmir dispute in view of current developments in South Asia. Considering that the United States is assisting India massively in her economic progress in order to help promote stability in this region, I hope it may be possible for you to suggest to Mr. Nehru that he too has a responsibility to pursue policies that would help strengthen, not undermine, the free world position in Asia.

Very sincerely yours, Mohammad Ayub Khan."

With warm personal regards, Yours sincerely,

Aziz Ahmed

58. Telegram From the Embassy in Pakistan to the Department of State/1/

/1/Source: Department of State, Central Files, 120.1590/11 - 761. Secret; Niact; Limit Distribution. Repeated to Kabul.

Karachi, November 7, 1961, 1 p.m.

828. For the Secretary from Merchant. Appreciative your 881 /2/ which crossed my 826 /3/ in code room. I naturally accept your judgment which has taken into account my severally expressed reasons for believing risk in delivery letter to Ayub is considerable but if in your view delay possible I would appreciate opportunity to discuss its content on my return.

/2/In telegram 881 to Karachi, November 6, for Merchant, Rusk concluded that the November 2 Kennedy letter to Ayub (see Document 55) should be delivered despite the fact that it was unlikely to persuade Ayub to reestablish normal diplomatic and consular relations with Afghanistan. Rusk reasoned that it was important "to use President's prestige to make clear to Ayub our views on desirability of GOP's adopting a less recalcitrant line to avoid pushing Afghanistan completely into Sino - Soviet orbit." (Ibid., 120.1590/11 - 661)

/3/Telegram 826 from Karachi, November 7, reported that Merchant's departure statement had been released to the press at midnight on the previous night. It was featured in the morning newspapers under such headlines as "Merchant Mission Fails." (Ibid., 120.1590/11 - 761) Merchant had transmitted the text of his departure statement to Washington from Kabul following the failure of his second round of talks with the Afghan Government. The statement expressed regret that his efforts had not led to a solution to the dispute, but indicated that U.S. good offices toward that end would continue to be exercised through diplomatic channels. (Telegram 337 from Kabul, November 4: ibid., 689.90D/11 - 461)/2/

Ambassador Rountree in next following telegram gives his estimate which consistent with this message.

In light release my departure statement last night and planned take-off early this morning (in accordance discretion given me in Deptel 875), /4/ my position so long as I remain in Karachi is certainly confused and probably compromised. In any event I would therefore consider myself poor agent for personal delivery any letter to Ayub.

/4/Dated November 5. (Ibid.)

I honestly believe that from last night onward good offices can more effectively be exercised by our two Ambassadors than by myself. If you agree, I would appreciate by clear telegram Niact your approval my departure early morning November 8 which in absence any PAA flight will require my use foreign airline as far as Rome, Paris or London where I plan to overnight for rest which I can use.


59. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Pakistan/1/

/1/Source: Department of State, Central Files, 120.1590/11 - 761. Secret; Niact; Limit Distribution. Drafted by Meyer and Gatch, cleared by Weil and Manfull, and approved by Meyer. Also sent to Kabul.

Washington, November 7, 1961, 6:36 p.m.

890. Embtel 829. /2/

/2/In telegram 829 from Karachi, November 7, Rountree supported Merchant's conclusion that, in light of the prior release of the departure statement, any subsequent good offices effort should be made through the Embassy. Rountree felt the proposed delivery of a Presidential letter by Merchant would be seen, in the circumstances, as a last minute attempt to force a solution, and would be resented by Ayub and his government as such. (Ibid.)

1. Dept concurs your judgment delivery letter be withheld. Hope had been that Ayub's response to letter might have enabled Ambassador Merchant inject more positive note into departure statement. Under circumstances this objective obviously not feasible.

2. Question of letter to Ayub will be reviewed with Ambassador Merchant here.

3. Dept welcomes indication (Embtel 829) that Qadir appeared to be bit more forthcoming in last interview particularly on subject of reopening consular offices. This may be one of positive elements on which we can build in future discussions, perhaps even in Presidential letter.

4. Dept has appreciated diligence which Embassies Karachi and Kabul have accorded this problem and particularly your unstinting assistance to Ambassador Merchant. Although his mission lacked successful outcome, we believe it demonstrated clearly USG continuing interest in welfare of both Afghanistan and Pakistan. Hopefully with this background, USG's continuing efforts may make some progress in near future in facilitating neighborly relations between these countries both of which we number among our friends.


60. Memorandum of Conversation/1/

/1/Source: Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Countries Series, India, General, 11/21/61 - 11/31/61. Secret. Drafted by Talbot; approved in S on November 26; and approved in the White House by Rostow according to a note on a November 29 covering memorandum from Battle to Bundy. The meeting was held at the White House.

President Kennedy welomed Prime Minister Nehru and his party on November 6 in Newport, Rhode Island. The visit continued in Washington November 7 - 9. Battle's memorandum noted that Galbraith was the only Department of State official present during or informed of the other meetings during the visit between Kennedy and Nehru, and indicated that Galbraith would prepare memoranda regarding those meetings. No such memoranda have been found.

Washington, November 7, 1961.

The President
Secretary of State
Ambassador J.K. Galbraith, U.S. Ambassador to India
Mr. Walt Rostow, Special Assistant to the President
Assistant Secretary of State Phillips Talbot
Prime Minister Nehru
Foreign Secretary Desai
Ambassador B.K. Nehru, Indian Ambassador to U.S.

[Here follows discussion of tension between the United States and the Soviet Union over Berlin.]

Turning to another subject, the President acknowledged the importance India places in its geographic situation in relation to its foreign policy. He also recalled that the United States had been neutralist for a long time. Nevertheless he wanted to say that we would like India to oppose us on issues when we were wrong and to support us on those occasions when we might be right. The Prime Minister welcomed the opportunity afforded by this comment to explain the Indian approach to international issues. Indians naturally seek to act on the merit of each matter, the Prime Minister said, but he attaches importance to the manner of approach as well. He wants to create the feeling that India wants to be friendly and wants to cooperate with other nations even though it does not necessarily agree with each of them on a particular point. It is not a question of finding a midway position between the United States and the Soviet Union; that would have no meaning, really. The worst of the cold war is that it makes everyone rigid in mind and in spirit and so it becomes difficult for either side to deal with the other side. If the way to war is obstructed, then a feeling will come that matters can be dealt with in other ways, and the approach becomes easier.

The President described the foreign policy of the United States as, of course, to support countries with democratic systems, but even more basically to support national sovereignty. Sometimes this means, unhappily, that we support governments not fully supported by their own people. Yet it is not always easy to withdraw. In some places we believe that if we should withdraw communism might take over by subversion. This is the problem that faces us; we don't object when communists take over by electoral means as Jagan did in British Guiana.

The Prime Minister asked why communism has an appeal to many people. Mainly, he felt, it develops in poor and underdeveloped countries. The President pointed out that in many areas communism takes over by force and subversion. The Prime Minister agreed that no one would view with approval terroristic tactics, adding, however, that military actions bring unfortunate results. The very act of meeting a situation militarily may make it worse. For example, with the help of United States forces a situation may be cleared but it is very likely that the position of the leaders then becomes weaker because of their dependence on an outside power. Thus the problem is not settled.

President Kennedy explained that we are faced with a situation in which we are making efforts to settle the Laos problem but at the same time there are serious attacks on South Vietnam, some of them via Laos. If these should succeed, it would look as if by our willingness to negotiate on Laos we had lost both Laos and Vietnam. That would discredit our efforts and make it impossible for us to negotiate on other issues, including Berlin.

Ambassador Galbraith interjected that several members of this Administration have had the view that truly neutral countries offer opportunities for us to help economically to build them up. If in Laos or in any other country neutralism becomes merely a stage which precedes a communist takeover then the whole concept of neutralism will become a stench in the nostrils. The question is what India and other countries can do about this.

Agreeing that there is a question of what to do, Prime Minister Nehru observed that the whole idea in the Geneva Conference of 1954 was to create international commissions to meet this situation. To some extent it has been the failure to live up to these commitments that has led to later difficulties. If the commissions had not been there he was convinced that trouble would have come much sooner in Vietnam. In Laos, indeed, trouble did come after the commission was closed down. These things don't always happen according to plans or our decision. We can affect them sometimes but not always. The Prime Minister said he realized the position of the United States is difficult because the United States is tied up in many matters from which it is difficult to come out.

On Laos the President said that the United States will try to persuade the three Princes to come together promptly, in this month of November. But, he added, we don't want our efforts in Laos to end in a collapse in South Vietnam.

Turning to the question of nuclear testing, President Kennedy began by assuring the Prime Minister that the United States had not prepared for testing during the test ban negotiations. Since those negotiations broke down we have had about three small underground tests. This is in sharp contrast to what the Soviets have done. We are now faced with what to do in the future. A few days earlier he had announced that we would now prepare for testing in the atmosphere. This does not mean we will necessarily conduct tests in the atmosphere. We will examine the Soviet tests. If they have done something that would really change the balance of power--such as making a genuine anti-missile missile or a way of disrupting radar--we could not ignore that. Obviously, however, the President would prefer not to have tests. The U.S. will not have them unless we must. The President wished that the Soviets would agree to ban atmospheric testing. If they do not agree either to that or to inspection, we will face a difficult decision. It is hard to be optimistic when after three years of negotiations the Soviets will not agree to the kind of inspection the British and we think necessary. In fact, Secretary Rusk added, they have interjected the troika concept into the inspection process. We cannot accept the veto inherent in that.

The Prime Minister, agreeing that these are difficulties, asked how then are we to deal with these problems? Presumably the present drift can land the world in a nuclear war. This is a terrible prospect. The moratorium by itself does stop the testing. That could allow the treaty to come in. The treaty has been discussed for three years; it need not require too much further discussion.

President Kennedy observed that it seems obvious the Soviet Union made the decision to resume testing some months ago, perhaps last February or March. This Government made a major effort to get an agreement with the Soviet Union and he is very disappointed that it has not been achieved. He quite agreed that the drift goes on. The Chinese are going to start testing. The French already have done so. In the absence of an agreement, testing will be started by one country after another.

How then to stop this, the Prime Minister asked. It will be a very dangerous situation if the Chinese start testing. In India people rather pooh poohed that prospect but the Chinese are proceeding with it, probably more for prestige reasons than otherwise. The hope in the situation lies in the fact that it is to the advantage of the Soviet Union not to have war. If some treaty can be obtained fairly soon it may be possible for the Soviet Union to forestall testing by China.

President Kennedy suggested that perhaps the Soviet Union resists a test ban either because it feels that China would not agree to this or because it really does not want an inspection process operating within its borders. Secretary Rusk commented that if Khrushchev believes secrecy of the Soviet system to be of very large strategic value then it is very difficult to see how we can proceed into another moratorium without running the risk of being duped. Prime Minister Nehru agreed that the Secretary had correctly described the Soviet position on secrecy. The problem will remain as long as there is a danger of using nuclear weapons. If an assurance can be obtained that they will not be used then the fear does not arise. If disarmament can go that far there is some hope. Anyhow the big question is how one can deal with the situation with its risks of accidents and all.

President Kennedy observed that the records of the 1914 war, the second world war and the Korean war, each of which started in quite distinct circumstances, make it rather hard to see which course will succeed in preventing a future war. Possibly the best course is to indicate with precision where our vital interests lie--and then (he added with a smile) hope that India can be effective as a peacemaker.

President Kennedy went on to say that one matter that had been discussed with President Ayub when he was in Washington was the problem of Kashmir. The danger to the peace is obviously of deep concern to us and to others. We hope our role can be as helpful as possible. In this spirit, the President wondered whether the Prime Minister could see any line of settlement that would be acceptable both to India and to Pakistan.

Responding, the Prime Minister noted that the Kashmir case is now in its fourteenth year. The matter arose in October 1947. At the end of 1948 after fifteen months of fighting a cease-fire was arranged. Since then, apart from occasional troubles, the cease-fire has functioned. Naturally, he said, India's desire has been to settle the issue. India has discussed the problem directly with Pakistan and there have been several UN mediators--good people--but without result.

Recalling in some detail the history of the Kashmir case, the Prime Minister added that basically the Indian position is that no settlement is possible except on the basis of the situation as it now exists--with minor modifications. India cannot accept the Pakistani theory that because the majority of the people in Kashmir are Muslims, Kashmir should go to Pakistan. That theory would crack up India which has 45,000,000 Muslims and is the third largest Muslim state in the world. Without any fault of theirs, the 45,000,000 Muslims in India have become associated with the religious argument that Pakistan puts forward, and would suffer.

The Prime Minister noted that in Kashmir there had been two general elections and economic progress and land reform. Nothing like this had occurred on the other side. Probably if India allowed people from the other side to come into Kashmir, there would be considerable inward migration.

The Prime Minister observed that one Pakistani Prime Minister, before General Ayub, had accepted the idea of the status quo in Kashmir. This man had thought it better to let the Kashmir issue simmer down while India and Pakistan were solving their other problems. Toward this end there had been resolution of the canal waters issue, with India contributing many tens of millions of dollars. Various frontier matters had also been settled. In the last year or so, however, there had been renewed agitation over Kashmir. This was a matter of surprise to India, which thought the Kashmir situation settling down.

The Prime Minister pointed out that the partition of India left tens of thousands of families with members on both sides and many emotional ties between people in the two countries. It is a most extraordinary situation, which now needs to be allowed to quiet down. Perhaps later the two countries could have some form of confederation or something else. Kashmir is not a matter of the territory--actually, the territory is a burden on India--so much as it is a matter of life. The Prime Minister recalled that his own ancestors had come down from Kashmir nearly 300 years ago and that Kashmir has been one of the biggest centers of Indian culture for the past 2000 - 3000 years; thus the Kashmir question is a largely emotional issue. As a practical matter, raising the Kashmir issue now would uproot all the Indians have done. In three months India is going to have general elections (something Pakistan does not have) and if this problem is touched off now there will be huge troubles. People would be migrating with all their bitterness. That would not be a solution--just more upheavals. With Pakistan developing a conservative Muslim outlook (although Ayub is not a religious figure, but a Sandhurst product) practically speaking the present situation cannot be changed. No government of India could function, certainly not his government, if this were to happen. Possibly a narrow vindictive government might then function, but only that kind. It would be a difficult enough matter to get the Indian Parliament and people to accept the status quo. They certainly would not accept a revision of boundaries to India's detriment.

Ambassador Galbraith asked whether, while the two parts of Kashmir remained, a much more relaxed access could be arranged from one side of Kashmir to the other. Could this be a possible alternative to the narrow territorial debate? The Prime Minister responded that if the territorial claims were dropped all other questions could be resolved easily. He then recapitulated the history of the military action in Kashmir, concluding that India is now again threatened by tribal invasion. Although nothing is officially stated, there are reports of 100,000 tribesmen coming. That is a very difficult situation.

The President asked whether in the Prime Minister's judgment it would then not be feasible to anticipate a solution to the problem that both India and Pakistan could accept. The Prime Minister replied that he had felt a little before Ayub came in that the two countries would settle on the basis of the status quo, with some modifications of the cease-fire line to make it a proper international frontier. However the difficulties remain. Another difficulty is that in part of Kashmir, Ladakh, the Chinese have committed their aggression. To annoy India, the Pakistanis started to flirt with the Chinese on this matter.

Returning once more to the question, the President observed that there would be a somewhat better use of resources if India and Pakistan were at peace and asked whether there is anything the United States can do to help the situation. Responding, the Prime Minister said that even now the bitterness of partition is dying down. While it can again be whipped up by exploiting religion he felt and hoped it would settle down. The Prime Minister noted some important differences between the leaders of India and Pakistan. When independence came the Indian group had been leaders and they came naturally into the government and then stayed on through elections. Pakistan, however, was a negative proposition based on hatred of India and the feeling of landlords to exploit Islam. Its only policy was hatred of India. Persons who came to the front had actually opposed freedom. They all came from top landlord families. A nation could not be built, however, just on hatred of India and Pakistan found that out. When Ayub came to power he had some following at the beginning because he got rid of the unpopular people who had been in charge. Once that was done Ayub, with his rather limited military mind, could think of nothing but cleaning up the streets of Karachi under martial law. Ayub is no stranger to Indians. Every senior officer in the Indian Army knows Ayub well and has his judgment of him.

The Prime Minister added that throughout he himself has been popular with people in Pakistan, even though some of his closest friends have been jailed for their political activities there. The situation is such a pity.

Ambassador Galbraith observed that the Prime Minister was being somewhat severe in describing Pakistani policy as only hatred of India. The Ambassador had worked with their planning people and Pakistani planning, while not up to the standard of India, has been quite good. The Prime Minister agreed that of course there are some people interested in helping the country.

President Kennedy then turned to the question of American aid to India and Pakistan. Many Americans, he said, believe that we would do better to give actual funds to Pakistan and let them decide what they want to spend on military aid and what on economic aid. The difficulty is that it is easier to get funds from Congress for military assistance than for economic assistance. The military assistance enables the Pentagon to sell second-hand equipment to other countries and in effect to use the proceeds to get new equipment. Nevertheless, if giving only economic assistance to Pakistan is the right thing to do, we should look into ways to do it.

Ambassador Galbraith added military assistance to Pakistan still makes big headlines in India. The United States gave India a half billion dollars for economic aid and gave Pakistan twelve airplanes. There were twelve times as many questions in the Indian Parliament about the planes as about the aid. The Prime Minister responded that no one in India except communists want to run down the United States. Indians do not doubt the intentions of Americans, but Pakistan is still a military dictatorship and Indians doubt what it might do.

Mr. Rostow intervened to suggest to the Prime Minister that in talking of "minor border adjustments" in Kashmir the Prime Minister had used the same phrase that President Ayub had used when he discussed the Kashmir issue with President Kennedy. President Kennedy observed, however, that we did not know exactly what President Ayub had had in mind when he spoke of "minor border adjustments."

The President then asked the Prime Minister what, as a student of personality, is his estimate of Nkrumah in Ghana. Does the Prime Minister think Ghana is a good investment for the United States?

Ghana itself is a good investment, the Prime Minister responded. However, Nkrumah is rather paranoic and does think of himself as the leader of Africa. He asked Indian help in training their Air Force. The Indian officers did go and ultimately he turned them out and handed the job to the British. Now he has turned them out. Some Israelis have had experience there too. The Prime Minister himself had not been to Ghana nor indeed to Africa, except Egypt and Sudan.

The President said he had also wanted to ask the Prime Minister about Tito, i.e. does the Prime Minister think Tito is likely to tie into the Soviet Union more closely? The Prime Minister responded that the Yugoslavs have done rather well. He does not think they will change their basic policies. In foreign policy the Yugoslavs are basically anti-German. Thus they will agree with the Soviet Union on German questions though not really on others. He must admit that he was rather surprised at the Soviet position at the Belgrade Conference. There were many countries there. Non-aligned countries are so non-aligned that they do not agree even among themselves. Africa, of course, is in a state of turmoil. This is a fascinating and dangerous time. There are many Indians in Africa and the Prime Minister advises them to be friendly and helpful. In spite of everything Africa is a confident nation, full of vitality.

Returning to Tito, the President explained that our ambition has been to see Tito's Yugoslavia succeed as a national communist state which we have felt does not constitute a threat to the free world. Our task has, however, been made more difficult by the Belgrade Conference and the Yugoslav position there.

On this note the day's session closed.

61. Memorandum of Conversation/1/

/1/Source: Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Trips and Conferences, Merchant Trip to Pakistan and Afghanistan, 10/61 - 11/61. Confidential. Drafted by Merchant on November 13. According to the President's Appointment Book, the meeting was held at the White House. (Ibid.)

Washington, November 10, 1961, 4:30 p.m.

Conclusions and Recommendations Resulting from my Visit to Pakistan and Afghanistan from Oct. 19 to Nov. 8, 1961, as the Personal Representative of the President of the United States for the Exercise of his Good Offices in Connection with the Stoppage of Transit Traffic to and from Afghanistan through Pakistan

The President
NEA--Phillips Talbot
Livingston T. Merchant

I reported orally to the President on the results of my mission to Pakistan and Afghanistan along the lines of my reports earlier in the day to Mr. Talbot and to the Secretary. The views I expressed and the recommendations I made are contained in my memorandum to the Secretary of November 11, 1961. /2/ The President expressed the keenest interest in the problem and its present status. While the President made no decisions in the matter, I received the impression that he was generally in sympathy with my recommendations. In the matter of the future economic aid program to Afghanistan, he indicated to Mr. Talbot that he would like to have relevant recommendations prepared for his consideration. Mr. Talbot said that these were already under way in consultation with Mr. Gaud of AID. At the conclusion of my report, the President thanked me for undertaking the mission.

/2/Neither this memorandum nor any record of Merchant's meetings with Talbot and Rusk has been found.

62. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Afghanistan/1/

/1/Source: Department of State, Central Files, 689.90D/11 - 1361. Secret; Priority. Drafted by Meyer; cleared by Merchant and Gaud, and McGeorge Bundy in substance; and approved by Talbot. Also sent to Karachi.

Washington, November 13, 1961, 7:51 p.m.

192. Joint State - AID. Pursuant to discussions with Ambassador Merchant, Dept has reached certain tentative conclusions re future course our policy vis-a-vis both RGA and GOP with respect Pak - Afghan transit problem and on practical steps to be taken to overcome difficulties caused by continuing impasse. Basic conclusion is that since resolution of transit impasse is not an immediate prospect, adjustment of USG aid program to Afghanistan is unavoidable due to sheer physical circumstances. At same time, it is USG desire to maintain substantial US presence in Afghanistan and cordial relations with both RGA and GOP.

A. For Kabul:

Unless you perceive objection, you should at early date see Naim and speak along following lines:

1. President and USG deeply disappointed that mission of Ambassador Merchant did not result in prompt resumption of Pak - Afghan transit and beginning of new trend toward neighborly Pak - Afghan relations. In USG view, diametrically opposed public positions taken by both sides was key factor in inability to break impasse.

2. While realizing that formula proposed by Ambassador Merchant lacked number of elements which RGA considered essential, Merchant and USG felt that formula might have served as basis for making satisfactory start toward resolution of transit issue. Thus we particularly disappointed RGA found itself unable agree to this small step or any reasonable modification thereof.

3. Despite Merchant's lack of success in resolution transit difficulties, USG wishes maintain most cordial relations with RGA. Despatch of Presidential emissary should in itself have demonstrated this USG desire.

4. USG believes situation is not without hope. Merchant mission at least discovered and affirmed certain basic elements which can serve as basis for future progress on this question: a) both sides declared their desire to develop and maintain friendly relations; b) both sides adhered to their desire to see free and assured transit for Afghan goods through Pakistan; and c) both sides agreed Afghanistan should not become Soviet satellite. USG continues willing to use its good offices in building on these elements.

5. With respect to US aid in Afghanistan, USG intends to continue its programs to extent possible consistent with physical capabilities and cost factors. We would thus hope to continue most programs except those such as Kabul - Kandahar road project which because of heavy equipment and materiel involved and unfeasibility of alternate transit routes must be held in abeyance. We shall hope to keep in close touch with RGA to assure minimum disruption of other aspects of USG aid program. /2/

/2/Byroade presented an aide-memoire based on telegram 192 to Naim on November 16 and discussed it with him. Naim said that he saw no reason to alter the U.S. aid program in Afghanistan unless there was a political motive for doing so. He stated that Afghan Government studies indicated that it would cost no more to ship the materials involved through Iran than through Pakistan. Hence, the only purpose for altering the aid program must be to put pressure on Afghanistan to settle the dispute. Byroade denied that any such intent underlay the proposed changes in U.S. aid to Afghanistan. He stated that U.S. information indicated that the costs involved in shipping through Iran would be considerably greater than through Pakistan. (Telegram 359 from Kabul, November 16; ibid., 689.90D/11 - 1661)

6. Finally, we deeply appreciative for all courtesies and assistance rendered to Ambassador Merchant. We remain undaunted in our dedication to the improvement of Pak - Afghan relations and will welcome any formal or informal suggestions by RGA as to how we might make further attempts to be helpful.

B. For Karachi:

Unless you perceive objection, you should at early date see Ayub or Qadir and speak along following lines:

1. (Insert para A - 1 above).

2. While realizing that GOP made several gestures with view to achieving mutually acceptable formula for resumption Pak-Afghan trade and transit, we could not help but be disappointed by GOP's inability to be more forthcoming with respect to restoration of normal diplomatic and consular relations. In view of fact that GOP's closure of consulates and trade agencies was immediate cause for present impasse, GOP offer to resume normal diplomatic and consular relations might well have permitted at least slight movement toward resolution of transit problem.

3. (Insert para A - 4 above).

4. With reference to precluding Afghanistan's becoming Soviet satellite and thus bringing direct risk of Soviet military power to Khyber Pass, USG has welcomed GOP indications that USG aid program to Afghanistan should continue. In view of likelihood of lengthy delay in resumption Pak-Afghan transit route, USG program in Afghanistan will of course be seriously handicapped. Certain projects, which we consider important in preventing Afghanistan from falling to Soviets, like Kabul - Kandahar road will of necessity be suspended or cancelled. Meanwhile, it is USG intention that other projects such as education, aviation, etc. will be maintained to extent possible, utilizing air transport and existing trade routes via Iran. /3/

/3/Rountree saw Qadir according to instructions on October 19. Qadir reiterated Pakistan's established position concerning the resumption of diplomatic relations and the reopening of consulates and trade agencies. But he felt strongly that the U.S. assistance program in Afghanistan should continue, by whatever means possible. He suggested that the transit problem could be eliminated by having the United States assume full responsibility for the delivery of aid materials to the Afghan border. Pakistan would do everything possible to assist the flow of the goods. (Telegram 891 from Karachi, November 19; ibid., 689.90D/11 - 1961)

5. President deeply appreciates courtesies and assistance rendered Ambassador Merchant. While GOP and USG policies vis-à-vis Afghanistan may have some differences, it clear our objectives are the same. We remain undaunted in our dedication to improvement of Pak-Afghan relations and will welcome any formal or informal suggestions by GOP as to how we might make further attempts to be helpful.

In order avoid future misunderstanding both Kabul and Karachi might wish to record suggested points above in form of aide-mémoire to be left with respective governments.


63. Memorandum of Conversation/1/

/1/Source: Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Countries Series, India, General, 11/21/61 - 11/31/61. Secret. Drafted by Talbot on November 24 and approved in the White House on November 30, according to a note on a November 29 covering memorandum from Battle to Bundy. The meeting was held at the White House.

Washington, November 21, 1961.

Krishna Menon's Call on the President--Discussion of the U.N., Laos and Vietnam

The President
His Excellency, Krishna Menon, Defense Minister of India
His Excellency, B.K. Nehru, Ambassador of India to U.S.
NEA--Phillips Talbot

The President received the Indian Defense Minister to fulfill informal commitments that had arisen in a brief encounter between them at the United Nations last fall and in the course of the President's recent meetings with Prime Minister Nehru. The role of the United Nations and the situation in Southeast Asia figured prominently in their talk, which exposed significant differences in their views. In particular they debated whether the external penetrations are responsible for current troubles in South Vietnam. Countering the President's analysis, Krishna Menon asserted he would have to see the evidence to support any view but the domestic opposition to the Diem regime explains South Vietnam's difficulties. After their meeting Krishna Menon met the press before leaving the White House. Without saying what he had discussed with the President, in response to questions he extensively restated his known views on many issues.

In response to the President's inquiry about the Defense Minister's health following his recent operation, Krishna Menon said he was feeling quite well now apart from headaches and pains along his left side and his left arm and leg.

The President mentioned Prime Minister Nehru's meeting in Cairo with Tito and Nasser. Commenting that these meetings are not as important as the press makes them out to be, Krishna Menon observed that the meeting was possibly useful to Nasser, who had been somewhat shaken by the loss of Syria (which of course he had not wanted in the first place) and had encountered some opposition to his new land reform and other economic programs--opposition not among the people, but among the more privileged groups.

Krishna Menon told the President he had suggested that disarmament discussion at this session of the U.N. General Assembly be terminated, as continuation would only generate more bitterness and reduce the chance of an agreement between the great powers. The United Nations cannot write contracts between countries, he said; it can only formulate principles. After they have been formulated, the next step is to find modalities by which the affected parties can negotiate agreements. The President observed that if this argument were carried far the U.N. might sink to merely urging that disputing powers meet bilaterally and solve their problems. In his view the U.N. has a more important role. Krishna Menon replied that the United Nations cannot do everything. It has no sanctions. It is not a parliament of man. It is a place where people come together to talk and to that extent it is a concert of nations. Its effectiveness is in laying down certain principles, as when the U.S. and USSR agreed on principles of disarmament which had grown out of last year's twelve-power resolution. If the great powers agree on any motion, it will go through. The President noted that, whereas in 1945 the U.N. had been built on the presumption of accord among the great powers, the situation had changed since then and the U.N. could not ignore these changes.

The President raised the question of Vietnam. He urged the importance of doing an effective job in Vietnam now, else that country will disintegrate into an arena of actions and counter-actions that could have serious consequences. There have been problems about the International Control Commission, but if the ICC could function effectively now and identify the forces from the North that are operating in South Vietnam, that would help the situation. Krishna Menon asserted that effective operation of the ICC in Vietnam has been jeopardized not by its own actions or by positions taken by its Polish or Canadian members but by Diem, who had refused to let the ICC function freely. As to the presence of forces from North Vietnam in South Vietnam, Krishna Menon was skeptical. He would like to see the evidence. He believes that North Vietnam does not have the forces to send south. Even when the Viet Minh were fighting the French their forces were in a bad way. What South Vietnam has in fact is a lot of locally-based Communists who are adherents of Vietnam by day and of the Viet Minh by night.

Without impugning Krishna Menon's approach to the problem, the President stated that we would be delighted to participate in any objective examination of the facts in the situation and in any real observance of the Geneva accords. Indeed, we ourselves had observed the Geneva accords on entry of personnel into South Vietnam until the last few days. Krishna Menon asserted that the Geneva accords had allowed a certain number of French to remain in South Vietnam, but had not transferred this allowance to other countries. Rightly or wrongly, India had subsequently agreed to let Americans be substituted for French, even though India had been criticized by some for taking this position. What is really needed, Krishna Menon added, is the neutrality of all areas in Indochina. In Laos it is a question of the three Princes. Souvanna Phouma knows that his future depends upon his not being absorbed by either the left or the right. The sooner he gets a government functioning, the better it will be. Souphanouvong is not a Communist but rather a "left-nationalist" like some of India's progressive former Maharajahs. Phoumi is just a vagabond, though of course he must be included in the government. The three Princes are brothers and aristocrats and they ought to be able to get along. Once the government is set up, the ICC in Laos can be helpful, though it can only function with the good will of the government and as India has said from the beginning cannot become a super-government. That conception is not practical. If Laos can be settled, that will be a factor of stability in the whole area. The President agreed that the latter point was correct and that we would have to rely on Souvanna Phouma. He made it clear he did not share Krishna Menon's estimate of Souphanouvong.

Returning to the question of South Vietnam, the President explained that he would like to see the United States out of that area, but would not want its withdrawal to leave control to the North. If South Vietnam should fall under the Viet Minh in the next few months, a wave of domination by Communist China could then sweep over South East Asia. Krishna Menon, without commenting on this point, urged the President to recognize that the United States can deal with the Russian Communists, who have been in office for fifty years and are settling down. Unless the U.S. settles the Indochinese issues while the Russians are still there, however, it will have the Chinese to deal with and that would be much worse.

Krishna Menon said that India is sending a new man as Chairman of the ICC in Vietnam and that the Chairman had told him he is quite clear that the North does not want to unify Vietnam by warfare. Like Germany, Vietnam will remain divided for a long time to come. The President observed that under present circumstances the best thing is for Vietnam to remain divided. Our interest is to get a neutral government in Laos and to avoid an unfavorable shift of power in Vietnam.

There followed a further exchange on the role of the North in South Vietnam's troubles. Krishna Menon insisted he had no evidence of penetration from the North into South Vietnam, although he had heard that some people from the South had gone North for training and then returned South. He felt that the troubles in Vietnam result from popular discontent with Diem's government and from militaristic opposition in the South. The President agreed that in some parts of the world there are popular movements against governments, as originally Castro's campaign represented a popular movement against the Batista government. Such movements do not, however, need to rely on terrorism, mutilation and assassinations of the sort now going on in South Vietnam. This is not just popular opposition to the Diem regime; this is a calculated attack intended to undermine and destroy the South Vietnam Government. Our judgment on this does not depend merely on Diem's reports; our intelligence on these points is hard.

With the allotted half-hour overrun, the President saw the Indian Defense Minister out of his office with the comment that if time allowed they could obviously go on discussing these matters for a good deal longer.

64. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Afghanistan/1/

/1/Source: Department of State, Central Files, 689.90D/11 - 2161. Secret. Drafted by Meyer and Gatch; cleared by Gaud and William R. Polk of the Policy Planning Council; and approved by Meyer. Also sent to Karachi, Jidda, and Tehran and repeated to London.

Washington, November 29, 1961, 7:14 p.m.

212. Karachi 887 /2/ 1 to Dept; Kabul 370, /3/ 364 /4/ to Dept (none rptd London, Jidda, Tehran).

/2/In telegram 887 from Karachi, November 18, Rountree suggested that a revised version of the formula drafted by Merchant be used as a basis for a settlement of the transit issue. (Ibid., 689.90/11 - 1861) Rountree sent a draft of the revised formula to the Department in telegram 888 from Karachi, November 18. (Ibid.)

/3/Telegram 370 from Kabul, November 24, reported that the Saudi Ambassador to Afghanistan had recommended that his government consider mediating the dispute between Afghanistan and Pakistan. (Ibid., 689.90D/11 - 2461)

/4/Telegram 364 from Kabul, November 21, noted that the revised formula proposed by Rountree in telegram 888 from Karachi would have no chance of acceptance by the Afghan Government, and would have a counter-productive effect upon the U.S. position in Afghanistan. (Ibid., 689.90D/11 - 261)

1. Assessment

Reviewing Pak - Afghan situation in wake Merchant Mission, Dept draws following conclusions:

a. Understandably annoyed by Afghan propaganda and provocations, Paks are deliberately applying pressure (closure of consulates and denying entry to Powindahs)/5/ to bring Afghans to knees in belief this will cause Afghans to abandon "Pushtunistan stunt." Mindful of similar previous pressures from Paks as well as historic pressures by British, proud Afghans determined resist this Pak pressure.

/5/The Powindahs were a Pushtu-speaking nomadic tribe who moved seasonally with their livestock back and forth across the border between Pakistan and Afghanistan. In the spring of 1961, the Government of Pakistan announced that the Powindahs would have to produce the usual international travel documents when they entered Pakistan that fall. The Embassy in Karachi noted that the tribe had no passports or health cards, and would be faced with the prospect of starvation of both animals and people or fighting their way into Pakistan unless the Pakistani authorities relaxed the requirement and allowed the usual migration. (Despatch 275 from Karachi, October 25; ibid., 689.90D/10 - 2561)

b. Afghans believed USG could produce change in Pak policy. GOP is extremely sensitive to assumption that, because of substantial aid USG is supplying, GOP policy can be influenced by USG, and is determined not to appear responsive to USG "pressure." (Earlier [less than 1 line of source text not declassified] reports as well as Merchant's talks with Qadir clearly indicate GOP intends give USG appearance of cooperating but not to point of seeing Pak - Afghan impasse resolved as direct result of USG endeavors.)

c. Neither Afghan Royal Family nor GOP wishes Afghanistan to become Soviet satellite but both greatly underestimate extent to which Soviets can exploit present impasse.

d. Soviet power on Pakistan's border would be serious threat for free world, including Pakistan and USG. Accordingly, USG cannot relax efforts to break Pak - Afghan impasse and facilitate neighborly relations between those two countries.

e. View conclusion 1(b) further dramatic USG efforts, e.g. Merchant Mission and Presidential letters, suggest over-anxiety by USG and likely increase Pak (and Afghan) intransigence. More subtle diplomatic efforts are required. In any case, given other factors in US - Pak relationships, GOP will resist such direct pressure which USG willing to apply.

f. Our goal should be restoration of status quo ante. There is no likelihood of disposing of "Pushtunistan" concept. It is political horse which RGA will ride when useful but which RGA can also bridle as it has in past when it suits RGA purpose. In addition there is little likelihood RGA will consent to any tampering with previous arrangements for handling shipments at Peshawar since shift to Tor-Kham involves political implications unacceptable to RGA.

g. Some time may have to elapse before a long-range solution to Pak - Afghan transit problem is possible. Merchant Mission is still too recent and neither side has as yet felt full economic and political impact of their folly.

2. Courses of Action

In light of foregoing assessment, Dept favors following courses of action:

a. To extent feasible USG will continue its aid program to Afghanistan. Purpose is to assure RGA that it need not be exclusively dependent on Soviets. At same time fact that Afghanistan has Iranian as well as Soviet outlet should cause GOP to realize that it cannot bring Afghanistan to its knees. Dept will: (1) look sympathetically into possibility of providing maintenance assistance Meshed - Herat route; and (2) without mounting major airlift seek step-up of Ariana and other air-ferrying services from Beirut to Kandahar and Kabul.

b. In discussing with RGA USG's desire to proceed in accordance with 2(a) above, USG will address further appeal to RGA requesting RGA permit an American forwarding team to arrange for movement to Afghanistan (perhaps via Chaman) of aid supplies now in Pakistan but not any new shipments. Text of proposed demarche presently being prepared will include reference to Congressional interest in efficient delivery of these supplies. If RGA indicates willingness, request might be broadened to include all diplomatic supplies, perhaps even commercial goods, now in Pakistan. Meanwhile, USG request would be directed to GOP not in any case to auction any of these goods.

c. Dept hopes measure of type described Deptel 1018 to Karachi/6/ might help persuade GOP to restore normal access to Powindahs.

/6/In telegram 1018 to Karachi, November 25, the Department instructed the Embassy to express concern that the Powindah problem was potentially explosive. With the onset of winter, the tribe could be expected to fight rather than starve, and the fighting could lead to an escalation of force on both sides of the border. To avoid that danger, as well as for humanitarian reasons, the United States urged that Pakistan consider relaxing the regulations affecting the Powindah migration. (Ibid., 689.90D/11 - 2561)

3. Possible Long-range Solution

Dept considering two possible new approaches:

a. Noting increasing interest of Saudis (Kabul 370), whose intervention unlike that of USG unlikely be considered by GOP as "pressure," Dept believes Saudis should be encouraged attempt patch up this quarrel between two Muslim countries. Specifically, suggestion might be made that King Saud address personal letter to Ayub. Dept has been impressed by solution proposed several times here by Afghan Ambassador Maiwandwal (probably with RGA concurrence). It calls for reopening of Afghan consulates and/or trade agencies but in deference to Pak charges against previous RGA officials would authorize only RGA personnel who have never before served in Pakistan. If Saud made this suggestion, of course unattributed to Maiwandwal, it might find some favorable response from Ayub. Coming from "Keeper of Holy Places," Saud letter might stress interest in Muslim brotherliness and perhaps contain additional suggestion that feast marking end of Ramadhan would be appropriate time for magnanimous gesture by Ayub and for public announcement resolution Pak - Afghan difficulties. Dept believes letter might be sent some time in January assuming Saud has left US by that time. If Ayub accepted this simple proposal, Dept foresees no great difficulty on part either GOP or RGA working out orderly process leading to relatively speedy resumption full diplomatic relations.

b. If Saud letter not successful, or if for any reason it not sent, Dept would consider new approach by respective US ambassadors no later than February. While it is too early spell out exact details because of imponderables over course next several weeks--e.g., details of how Soviet Union will attempt exploit situation, Dept thinks Merchant's last talk with Qadir not without some hope that differences could eventually be reconciled. According present thinking here, approach thus might be suggested involving following steps in consecutive order:

1. Appointment of Afghan liaison officers in Pakistan equipped to document shipments and arrange forwarding, coinciding with joint public statement that both governments looked forward early resumption diplomatic and consular relations.

2. Agreement privately by both governments to continue use moderation in press and radio.

3. As traffic volume increased, transfer of liaison officers into reopened Afghan trade agencies in Pakistan.

4. Assuming trade agency personnel demonstrate by example intent stick to business over reasonable period of time, say six months, two governments would open discussions leading to reopening consulates in both countries under clearly understood ground rules. RGA could help re-establish its bona fides by refraining from using trade agencies as distribution centers for propaganda or literature of any description.

5. Resumption diplomatic relations.

If made in above-described order, this approach would serve to meet RGA demands for restoration previous facilities and at same time permit GOP be reassured that consulates and trade agencies would not be used in manner for which they not intended. Dept would contemplate saving any Presidential letter to Ayub for this critical juncture.

Dept would appreciate views Kabul /7/ and Karachi /8/ on foregoing courses of action and proposed approaches. Jidda requested comment on suggestion involving King Saud. /9/ Teheran requested comment on anticipated Iranian reaction to possibility US assistance maintain Meshed - Herat route. /10/

/7/In a long assessment of the transit impasse and the courses of action and new approaches proposed by the Department, the Embassy in Kabul generally concurred with the steps outlined to move the impasse toward solution. The Embassy warned that a relaxation of the U.S. good offices effort would open the door to Soviet exploitation of the situation. (Telegram 390 from Kabul, December 6; ibid., 689.90D/12 - 761)

/8/Rountree's assessment of the steps proposed by the Department was more pessimistic than that offered by the Embassy in Kabul. He felt that the positions taken by the Ayub government were grounded in the conviction that Afghan agitation on the Pushtunistan issue constituted a threat to the state, and those positions would not be easy to alter. He noted, however, that Ayub was concerned about the risk of Soviet power expanding to Pakistan's border, and concluded that Ayub's concern might lead to opportunities for a break in the impasse. (Telegram 965 from Karachi, December 2; ibid., 689.90D/12 - 261)

/9/Telegram 359 from Jidda, December 13, reported that the Saudi Government had not responded to the suggestion from the Saudi Ambassador in Kabul that Saudi Arabia play a mediatory role in the dispute between Afghanistan and Pakistan. The Embassy felt that, given the longstanding Saudi policy of avoiding foreign entanglements if possible, it was unlikely that the government would respond positively to the Ambassador's suggestion. (Ibid., 689.90D/12 - 1361)

/10/Telegram 430 from Tehran, December 7, reported that the Iranian Government was anxious to facilitate arrangements to transship U.S. aid supplies to Afghanistan. (Ibid., 689.90D/12 - 761)


65. Memorandum From the Director of the Office of South Asian Affairs (Weil) to the Assistant Secretary of State for Near Eastern and South Asian Affairs (Talbot)/1/

/1/Source: Department of State, NEA/SOA Files: Lot 64 D 240, Goa - Internal Memoranda. Secret. Drafted by Weil and Rogers B. Horgan.

Washington, December 6, 1961.

U.S. Action regarding Indian-Portuguese Tension over Portuguese Overseas Territories on Indian Sub-Continent

Embassy New Delhi's telegram No. 1611 of December 5, 1961 /2/

/2/In telegram 1611 from New Delhi, December 5, Galbraith argued for a "bolder and more dramatic" U.S. stand on the Goa issue. He saw the Portuguese colony as an anachronism, and felt that the United States should anticipate logical change and be prepared to accept and publicly endorse the incorporation of Goa into India. (Ibid., Central Files, 753D.00/12 - 561)

1. There has been mounting pressure on the Government of India to take positive steps to incorporate the remaining Portuguese Overseas Territories on the Indian sub-continent (Diu, Daman, and especially Goa) into India. Indians generally are unable to accept any differentiation between these territories and those already given up by the British and the French.

2. The pressures on the Government of India stem principally from:

(a) Goan "nationalists" resident in India, especially in Bombay, who keep the agitation alive on a national scale, who regularly raise the issue in the central Parliament, and whose demands for positive action are reaching a crescendo in this period before the general elections in February 1962.

(b) African nationalists, generally, and Angolans particularly, who have been questioning India's professed anti-colonialism because of India's do-nothing policy in relation to Goa.

(c) The opposition parties in India, who are attacking the Government of India for a weak foreign policy in relation to Chinese Communist occupation of Indian-claimed territory in Ladakh, and the do-nothing policy in Goa.

3. After calling off the "satyagraha" campaign of 1955, the Government of India was able to resist the pressures of the Goan nationalists, and to maintain a stance of peaceableness regarding Goa. Time has been running out on this policy, as Portugal has shown no sign of weakening its hold on Goa. Action in Africa for freedom for Angola has made the Indian Goan policy appear comparatively pusillanimous. Indian influence on the new African states appears to be weakening, as was evidenced at Belgrade. India would like to correct this situation. The Indian Government lacks the force to drive the Chinese Communists from Ladakh. Thus the Government is tempted to answer its foreign policy critics by making at least a demonstration of force against Goa.

4. It is likely that the Indian Defense Minister, Krishna Menon, now running for Parliament, personally feels all the above pressures keenly; but the pressures exist and would be felt by the Indian Government quite apart from his personal involvement.

5. A widespread press campaign is now underway in India for government action on the Goan issue. Two recent incidents off the Portuguese island of Anjidiv (just south of Goa) have been widely publicized; Portuguese military reinforcements are alleged, as well as Portuguese "atrocities" against Goan "patriots." It is public knowledge that troop movements from Northern India to the vicinity of Goa are being organized. We have learned that a movement of at least a division is being planned and the logistics for this move were being arranged as of Dec. 1.

6. It should be our objective to counter these pressures for military action, and to get the military activity halted well short of the possibility of a full-scale military action. It can be argued with Nehru that to attempt to resolve the Goan issue by force will do enormous damage to Indian prestige and friendship where India most needs friends (among the developed nations) to further the Indian economic development drive. Such a resort to force would only tend to promote further chaos in Africa, where India has done so much to try to restore order, as in the Congo.

7. At the same time, public pressure is so great in India, and the less-publicized international pressure so strongly felt, that purely private U.S. counter-pressure is likely to be ineffective. Should such U.S. pressure take a purely negative form (e.g., "please stop your military moves") it will put the U.S. in the position of defending reaction and, insofar as it becomes known, will provide highly emotionally-charged ammunition to the Indian Communists and other left-wingers in India with which they will attack U.S. policy.

8. Maximum possible U.S. public support for ultimate freedom for Goa from Portuguese rule will be required to enable the Indian government to respond favorably to U.S. pressure to resume a peaceable policy on the Goan issue. Ambassador Galbraith has outlined the nature of such support.

9. Without addressing the question of the desirability of the Ambassador's suggested position from the viewpoint of history, NEA believes public U.S. support of the principle of self-determination in Portuguese overseas territories would be adequate to enable U.S. representations to Nehru to have some effect, and might dull the edge of the expected left-wing attack on the U.S. in India. U.S. public support should come from the President, and it should contain clear support at least for a greater degree of self-government as the immediate goal the U.S. favors for Goa, and the other Portuguese territories in South Asia.

10. We recognize the possible disadvantages, vis-a-vis the Portuguese, of taking a public position in support of self-determination for a Portuguese territorial unit, and we recognize the difficulties inherent in equating our NATO relationship with Portugal with this phase of our relations with India. Nevertheless, it may be argued that recognition of the principle of self-determination, and practical application of this principle to the extent of granting a greater degree of self-government or at least holding a plebiscite, could rebound to the advantage of the Portuguese. Since Nehru undoubtedly realizes that his government does not possess a God-given right to take over Goa but is supporting the ideal of freedom from colonial rule, Portuguese measures to grant a greater degree of self-government should relieve Nehru of the necessity of yielding completely to the extreme agitators. This in turn would place the Portuguese in a more nearly tenable position. While the Portuguese will undoubtedly condemn a U.S. Government statement as intervention in their internal affairs, such action may be defended on the ground that it is part of the peace-keeping process.

11. It must be remembered that a declaration in support of self-determination for Portuguese territories in the subcontinent would undoubtedly have repercussions throughout the Portuguese empire in other parts of Asia and Africa. On this point, however, we are inclined to agree with Ambassador Galbraith that the time has come to deal with this issue as a whole.

66. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in India/1/

/1/Source: Department of State, Central Files, 753D.00/12 - 561. Confidential; Niact. Drafted by Horgan, cleared with EUR/WE, and approved by Talbot. Repeated to Lisbon, Paris for the Embassy and USRO, London, and USUN.

Washington, December 8, 1961, 8:28 p.m.

1962. Re Delhi 1611 Dept, /2/ Lisbon 606 Dept. /3/ Assistant Secretary Talbot called in Ambassador Nehru to discuss Goa morning eighth. He said current situation re Goa has caused Portuguese Government to express deep concern to US. Within USG queries also have been coming to Talbot as to whether GOI would use force to settle issue.

/2/ See footnote 1, Document 65.

/3/ In telegram 606 from Lisbon, December 6, the Embassy reported the concern of the Portuguese Government over the build-up of Indian military forces in the vicinity of Goa. Foreign Minister Nogueira referred to an earlier assurance that the United States would use its diplomatic and political resources to oppose attempts to annex Portuguese territories. On behalf of his government, Nogueira formally appealed to the United States to express its attitude on the question to India. (Department of State, Central Files, 753D.00/12 - 661)

His own position has been to assume GOI would not use force because it has said it would not; it would be contrary to its basic policy; it would do such harm to Indian image. We have noted troop movements but assumed they were not prelude actual invasion. He hoped Ambassador could confirm these assumptions correct. Talbot pointed out US position to oppose use force and that were troops to move across juridical frontier we would expect matter to come to Security Council where US would be forced to take a position against military action.

Ambassador Nehru accepted strength of arguments against use of force but stated he was not in position say what his Government intended do. He noted pressures on Indian Government to act after 14 years in which Portugal has made no movement towards resolving issue. He noted continuing Portuguese oppression in Goa and recent Portuguese military reinforcements. He noted that Mexico December 6 had offered in Delhi to use its influence to organize Latin American countries to persuade Portugal "relieve tensions." Prime Minister Nehru had replied only way relieve tensions was de facto transfer Goa to India.

Talbot indicated Indian argument that it no longer possible wait for solution Goa problem was understandable but actually situation not static. He noted pressures building up on Portugal over past year and changing Portuguese policies in some of its overseas territories.

Ambassador asked what US is telling Portugal. Mr. Talbot replied we have said our position is to oppose use of force but Portugal knows Stevenson statement March 15 (i.e., on self-determination) still valid.

Ambassador noted Goa situation different from Angola. Asked what US prepared to do if we advised India not to go to war.

Talbot replied he could not now speak on this for USG. Only answer he could give was to repeat his own conviction time would see progress on this issue.

Ambassador promised to convey US concern to his Government.

Dept suggests you talk to Nehru along foregoing lines. Do you have reason to believe that Nehru's delay in receiving you (urtel 1629) /4/ might also be calculated to hold off US representations re Goa?


/4/In telegram 1629 from New Delhi, December 7, Galbraith reported that Nehru was busy and it was difficult to make an appointment to see him. (Ibid., 656.9813/12 - 761)

67. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Pakistan/1/

/1/Source: Department of State, Central Files, 791.56/12 - 861. Secret; Priority; No Distribution Outside Department. Drafted in NEA/NR by Marvin C. Kettelhut and Edward A. Padelford on December 6; cleared by Weil and with G/PM and AID; and approved by Talbot. Also sent to New Delhi.

Washington, December 8, 1961, 10:24 p.m.

1122. For Rountree and Galbraith Only. Subject US sale military equipment to India discussed in position paper prepared Nehru visit follows: "US sympathetic towards India's efforts to strengthen itself against increasing ChiCom military strength and aggressive inclinations. US prepared to consider Indian requests for certain items of dual-purpose military equipment such as transport aircraft, high-altitude helicopters, radar, engineer bridging and construction equipment, and to supply such items if desired on terms as favorable as circumstances permit."

Dec. 4 letter from Defense /2/ states Nehru visit position paper on military equipment sales "appears to provide sufficiently flexible basis for further action," and that President "while not stating exact text of this position with Nehru did discuss matter of continuing US aid to India in terms which left opening for future discussion on this specific subject." Citing various AIRA and Embtel New Delhi messages indicating Engineer /3/ moving towards showdown with Menon also possible imminent arrival Soviet military sales mission to India, Defense believes positive action required now, that US should take steps convey substance our agreed policy sales military equipment to GOI either through Indian Embassy Washington or Embassy New Delhi.

/2/A copy of this letter from William Bundy to Talbot is in the Washington National Records Center, RG 330, OASD/ISA Files: FRC 64 A 2382, India 440 - 702.

/3/Air Marshal A.M. Engineer, Air Force Chief of Staff.

As you aware President has also given personal commitment Ayub to discuss with GOP prior USG decision provide military aid to GOI. We believe Ayub would probably not object USG supplying GOI with dual-purpose military equipment (he had relatively mild reaction to USG supply C - 119s in 1960 although this military sale) but we believe Ayub would object strongly USG supply F - 104s or Sidewinders. Supply these two items complicated by classification although understand Defense may be able make unclassified version available Indians.

Dept understands Indians prefer pay rupees rather than dollars for US equipment and would probably consider rupee transactions as not inconsistent with India's "neutralist" foreign policy. However, such transactions in US administrative procedures are considered MAP and India would undoubtedly be classified publicly along with US allies and others who receive US military assistance.

FY 1963 MAP now in initial stages preparation for Congressional presentation, and therefore time important.

Before taking decision on dual-purpose supply Department desires you discuss entire problem during your Dec 11 - 13 mtg and forward your recommendations. Particularly desire comments and recommendations on (1) advisability; (2) method of approach; (3) timing; and (4) possible repercussions. /4/

/4/Galbraith and Rountree responded in joint telegram 1038 from Karachi, December 16. The Ambassadors agreed that it was inadvisable to inform the Pakistani Government about the policy concerning the sale of military equipment, as proposed in this telegram. The principal objection was the conviction of the Embassy in Karachi that to do so would cause major damage to U.S. relations with Pakistan. The Ambassadors disagreed on the desirability of indicating to the Indian Government U.S. willingness to receive military aid requests from India. Rountree felt strongly that to accede to such requests would have a similarly adverse effect upon U.S. relations with Pakistan. (Department of State, Central Files, 791.5/12 - 1661)


68. Telegram From the Embassy in India to the Department of State/1/

/1/Source: Department of State, Central Files, 753D.00/12 - 1061. Confidential; Niact. Repeated to USUN, Lisbon, London, and Paris (USRO for Finletter; Embassy pass Dean Brown).

New Delhi, December 10, 1961, 9 p.m.

1664. Reference 1962 December 8. /2/ Will see Nehru Monday evening and urge avoidance of force in Goa and also, if climate allows, stress damage that manufactured dustup could do to India abroad. Will emphasize importance of keeping up the threshold to marching armies given present state of the world. /3/

/2/Document 66.

/3/Galbraith saw Nehru December 11 and argued against the use of force in Goa. Nehru responded by citing Portuguese provocations, and Galbraith observed that it was an odd time for Portugal to initiate a conflict over Goa. (Department of State, Central Files, 753D.00/12 - 1161)

The foregoing is our strongest line of argument. It remains my view that no decision has been taken for land action and that with second thoughts on relation of action to Indian traditions, danger will if anything recede. However, I keep an escape clause on the effect of some incident, real or contrived and the possibility of some form of sea blockade.

The following points bear emphasizing.

1. We must sharply separate our case against the use of force, which is valid, against any suggestion that we are responsive to pressure by Portuguese. This commits us to support of Portuguese Empire since everyone knows this is the interest of the Portuguese Government. In this connection statement to Ambassador Nehru that we are approaching him at the behest of the Portuguese was ill-advised. Gore - Booth notes that British also anxious to avoid giving impression they are responsive to Portuguese.

2. In asking Indians to forego force on this issue question remains as to what brings the Portuguese to settle. Talbot's implied suggestion that the apple is bound to fall soon anyway along with our UN stand and known attitudes of President and administration are helpful. A much stronger declaration of non-support to Portugal on colonies would do more to persuade Indians to be patient though I realize practical problem of timing.

3. Any NATO involvement with this issue would, of course, be disastrous. It would do nothing to restrain Indians, would inflame local sentiment, identify us uselessly with antagonism toward erstwhile European colonialism, would damage European powers anew, raise the question of NATO arms in Goa which local enthusiasts are already mentioning.

4. We are surprised by suggestion Portugal will take issue to UN and will have some support from us. It is hard to imagine that Portugal regards UN as a good forum for protecting her colonial possessions apart from some such gesture as the memorandum. In any case, at USUN as here, any support we give to exclusion of force must be rigorously separated from support to Portuguese rule.

Delay in discussion with Nehru unrelated to Goa. Goa was not on my original docket and I later told him that in light of pressures of Parliament and Frondizi visit my need to see him not urgent.


69. Memorandum From the Assistant Secretary of State for Near Eastern and South Asian Affairs (Talbot) to Acting Secretary of State Ball/1/

/1/Source: Department of State, Central Files, 753D.00/12 - 1261. Secret. Drafted in NEA by Horgan and in EUR by Starrs.

Washington, December 12, 1961.

Goa Situation: Situation Report as of Morning of December 12

1. Our latest reports from India indicate there has been an Indian Government decision at least at the Cabinet Defense Committee level to proceed with an armed attack on Goa. The Indian military forces appear to be very nearly in position for such an attack which could be made this week. The reports stress that the final decision has not yet been made and Prime Minister Nehru is capable of calling off the action at the last minute. However, the build-up for an attack has already gone so far that it would create a morale problem among the public as well as in the armed forces if the attack were to be withheld without any progress being made towards freeing Goa from Portuguese control.

2. On December 8 I called in Ambassador Nehru and made clear to him the United States opposition to the use of force by India in the Goan situation. On that day Secretary Rusk, at his press conference, made the same point and added that we welcomed the indications then evident that both sides wished to avoid force. Ambassador Galbraith spoke to Prime Minister Nehru yesterday afternoon, urging him not to use force in the Goa situation, emphasizing that in the present state of the world we felt it would do a serious disservice to peace for India to put its armies in motion. He reports that the Prime Minister gave no impression as to any effect of this plea. Yesterday afternoon I made a similar plea to Ambassador Nehru when the latter called on me to report the answer he had received from New Delhi in response to his transmittal of my conversation with him on December 8. This morning Ambassador Galbraith made a further, written statement to the Indian Government. As a result of these actions we believe the Indian Government is fully aware of the U.S. position.

3. The United Kingdom has also seen to it that the Indian Government is aware of its opposition to the use of force through conversations of their High Commissioner in New Delhi with the Secretary General of the Indian Ministry of External Affairs. The U.K. feels that because of their close relationship with Portugal they are unable to do more.

4. The Brazilian Government has made a public plea to the Indian Government to avoid the use of force.

5. We do not have hard information as to the situation within Goa but our best estimate is that the majority of Goans are relatively passive in the present situation. There are a small number of members of Goan activist groups within Goa who are capable of some subversive action although they appear to be poorly armed.

6. As of this morning it appears there is a real possibility that pressures on Prime Minister Nehru from various services (including communist-influenced "Goan Nationalists" and Krishna Menon, who is running for Parliament) will prevail and that an armed attack may take place if there remains no indication that Portugal is willing to consider any change in status for Goa.

7. Meanwhile, the Portuguese have been in close touch with us in Lisbon and here. The Foreign Minister told us on December 9 of his proposal to have impartial international observers (not under UN auspices) go to the border area to examine the situation and report, presumably publicly. We indicated this appeared to be a constructive step. The Portuguese press reports that the Indian Foreign Office rejected this proposal out of hand. The Portuguese have indicated they would like our public support for their international observer proposal, but we have not yet given an answer. The proposal may be a dead issue.

8. The Portuguese Government sent an information communication to the President of the Security Council on December 11, but stopped short of asking for a meeting on the Goan situation. The Portuguese Ambassador said they wished to see how the situation developed. (Probable Soviet support of India in the Security Council and the general anti-colonial tendencies of the UN, as well as the fear of establishing a precedent that would apply to Angola and Mozambique, will make Portugal wary of taking Goa to the UN.)

70. Telegram From the Embassy in India to the Department of State/1/

/1/Source: Department of State, Central Files, 753D.00/12 - 1261. Secret; Niact. Repeated to Paris for Secretary Rusk and USRO, London, Lisbon, and USUN.

New Delhi, December 12, 1961, 1 p.m.

1690. Department pass Defense - Army, Navy, Air. Embassy telegram 1681 /2/ and Department's telegram 1980. /3/ In view of the overnight developments, I decided to make one more effort this morning to persuade India against armed action on Goa. I accordingly delivered letter quoted next following telegram to Nehru and M.J. Desai this morning. /4/ To be at all persuasive you will understand it was essential to suggest sympathy for anti-colonial aspect and some alternative. Hence The New York Times extract which avoids official commitment and the reference to UN and world support. Portugal will not like but presumably will appreciate armed action less.

He still felt, however, that there was some possibility that Nehru was undecided or capable of changing his mind. (Ibid., 753D.00/12 - 1261)

/2/In telegram 1681 from New Delhi, December 12, Galbraith reported that information available to the Embassy indicated an increased likelihood of Indian action against Goa. He still felt, however, that there was some possibility that Nehru was undecided or capable of changing his mind. (Ibid., 753D.00/12 - 1261)

/3/Telegram 1980 to New Delhi, December 9, reported that the Department had received information that a journalist in India had filed a story alleging that an Indian attack upon Goa was imminent, and that India had been assured that if the attack took place the United States would not support Portugal. The Department emphasized that no such assurance had been given and reiterated its opposition to the use of force in the Goan dispute. The Embassy was instructed to make the same points clear to the reporter who filed the story. (Ibid., 753D.00/12 - 961)

/4/In his letter, Galbraith pointed out that India's leading role as a champion for the peaceful settlement of international disputes would be seriously compromised by armed action against Goa, and a dangerous precedent set for similar action in disputes festering elsewhere. He cited The New York Times editorial that noted that colonialism was dying in Africa and Asia and U.N. resolutions calling for an end to colonialism, as evidence that India was not without resources in seeking a peaceful settlement to the dispute over Goa. (Telegram 1691 from New Delhi, December 12; ibid., 753D.00/12 - 1261)

I had a long and urgent talk with Desai afterwards impressing on him the stake which India had in the avoidance of armed solution. He noted the shooting on border and adjoining waters. I also said they surely realized the world would not believe that Portugal was attacking India and that what India was calling a naval concentration consisted of a couple of antique gunboats. I have a feeling that Desai admitted the force of my argument but he made it clear that the matter was passing rapidly beyond his hands. At the end of the discussion he said specifically that unless the Portuguese made some major concession within the next couple of days, he believed action would go forward. My estimate of the likelihood of such action is now getting rather high. Some vague indication of U.S. acquiescence to action was picked up by B.K. Nehru in Washington. I told Desai this had no standing.


71. Telegram From the Embassy in India to the Department of State/1/

/1/Source: Department of State, Central Files, 753D.00/12 - 1361. Secret; Niact. Repeated to Paris and Lisbon.

New Delhi, December 13, 1961, 4 p.m.

1730. Following telegram 145 from Karachi repeated for your information:

For Timmons.

Would you deliver to Nehru's office the following letter to Nehru signed by you as Charge:/2/

/2/The substance of the President's message was sent to Galbraith in Karachi, where he was meeting with Rountree and Ayub, for his concurrence. (Telegram 1154 to Karachi, December 12; ibid., 753D.00/12 - 1261) Galbraith drafted the text of the letter and forwarded it to New Delhi.

"Dear Mr. Prime Minister:

The President has asked the Embassy to tell you of his concern over the spreading rumors that India will resort to force to solve the Goa problem. He is strongly hopeful that India will not follow such a course with its grievous example for the world.

The President has expressed his approval of Ambassador Galbraith's letter /3/ with the importance it attaches to separating the use of force from the colonial issues involved in the Portuguese presence."

/3/See footnote 3, Document 70.

Advise Washington and Karachi when message delivered and repeat exact text to Washington.


72. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in India/1/

/1/Source: Department of State, Central Files, 753D.00/12 - 1461. Secret; Niact. Drafted by U. Alexis Johnson and McGeorge Bundy; cleared by Talbot, Deputy Assistant Secretary for European Affairs William R. Tyler, Director of the Office of United Nations Political and Security Affairs Joseph J. Sisco, and President Kennedy; and approved by Johnson. Repeated to Paris for the Secretary, to Lisbon, and to London.

Washington, December 14, 1961, 5:40 p.m.

2041. Embtel 1754 /2/ (not repeated info addressees). We appreciate great efforts you are making to stop Indians from a decision to use force against Goa and we wish we could help with Portuguese. Unfortunately, unanimous estimate here is that Portuguese will not give an inch on this in any time span that would help you, and an approach from us would only bring recriminations and bitter comparisons to our consistent stand on negotiating in face of threat of force in Berlin and elsewhere. So we have few cards to give you.

/2/In telegram 1754 from New Delhi, December 14, Galbraith reported on a conversation with Nehru that evening. He found Nehru weighing a heavy decision. Galbraith felt that he could still influence that decision if he had "a card to play." A strong card would be knowledge of a U.S. approach to Portugal in support of India's position on Goa. (Ibid., 753D.00/12 - 1461)

Moreover, we believe you should make it clear to Nehru now that, if Indians attack Goa, issue will certainly be brought to UN and we would, to our great regret, be forced to take a position against India just as we took position against UK and France in Suez matter.

Nevertheless, the USG recognizes that Goa is a colonial issue, and recognizes that colonial age is passing, and has and will continue to urge Portugal to recognize this fact (for example, Deptel 532 to Lisbon, /3/ repeated New Delhi 1977).

/3/Telegram 532 to Lisbon, December 9, instructed the Embassy to stress to the Portuguese Government that U.S. diplomatic support in the emerging crisis over Goa was tied to the position that Portugal must accept and proclaim self-determination as a goal for its overseas territories. The United States was not prepared to assume the posture of appearing simply to protect the status quo. (Ibid., 753D.00/12 - 961)

FYI: Foregoing message has been discussed with and approved by the President, who specifically commends your efforts and expresses his regret that we cannot offer any more help. He did not create Portuguese intransigence. End FYI.


73. Telegram From the Embassy in Pakistan to the Department of State/1/

/1/Source: Department of State, Central Files, 690D.91/12 - 1361. Secret; Limited Distribution. Received in the Department of State on December 14 at 7:15 p.m. Repeated to New Delhi.

Karachi, December 13, 1961, 6 p.m.

1019. Ambassador Galbraith and I met with President Ayub at 7:30 P.M. last night and stayed for private dinner attended also by Foreign Secretary. Ayub obviously pleased to renew acquaintance with Galbraith, and relaxed discussions ranged over variety of subjects. This summary report relates only to Kashmir and Indo - Pak relations.

Galbraith told Ayub President Kennedy, when he had learned of Ayub's invitation for Galbraith to visit with him in Pakistan, had suggested that he personally give him background of talks with Nehru in Washington and also review substance of Galbraith's own talks with Nehru on subject Indo - Pak relations. Galbraith did so, reviewing Kashmir problem as Nehru sees it. He told Ayub that he had advised Nehru of intention and had latter's full approval.

With respect Washington talks, Galbraith said President Kennedy had had in mind his promise to Ayub that he would make strong effort to encourage Nehru undertake discussions with Ayub to settle issue. He also had had in mind Ayub's letter on question of military assistance to India. /2/ He said military aid had not to his knowledge arisen in course of talks. President Kennedy had pursued Kashmir question at some length and had urged effort to settle problem. Nehru had responded in considerable detail.

/2/See Document 57.

Galbraith emphasized U.S. belief some way around impasse should be found which would result in improvement in relations between India and Pakistan, so that both countries could concern themselves more fully with other problems. If settlement not reached at time when Indian and Pakistani officials in office who had previously served together and had basic friendship, difficulties in future would be greatly enhanced. He thought Nehru would like to settle Kashmir. Latter had indicated his concept of settlement as being partition at cease-fire line with some adjustments. Moreover, Indians now preoccupied with forthcoming elections and this did not seem propitious time to press negotiations. U.S. Government was, however, hopeful that progress might be made after elections and would continue to do what it could in line with President Kennedy's discussions with Ayub.

Ayub expressed gratitude that President Kennedy had discussed matter with Nehru and that he had arranged to have him informed of developments. He then outlined his position on Kashmir and emphasized that settlement this issue indispensable to good relations between India and Pakistan. Until settlement reached, large portions of their armies would be facing each other and nations could not collaborate in such matters as defense against common external threat to the subcontinent in which they both should be vitally concerned.

When Galbraith reported Nehru's comment that settlement with Pakistan would help internal communal situation in India, Ayub said this was a point he had previously stressed to Nehru and seemed pleased to hear it affirmed. Ayub said important thing in any talks with Nehru was for them to come together with a view to working things out. Talks not predicated on desire on both sides for solution would not improve matters.

Galbraith talked generally of line of settlement he had mentioned to Nehru which avoided direct clash on territorial question by mutual access arrangement to Vale. Ayub listened with interest but did not comment specifically.

Although Ayub was not specific in indicating his view of elements of settlement, he again referred particularly to importance of Pakistan controlling headwaters of rivers flowing from Kashmir upon which its economy depends. In describing dangers of possible future diversions, he emphasized only Chenab river and included territory considerably below Srinagar in the Vale of Kashmir as important for Pakistan to control. He said while problem related also to other rivers, this would not concern Pakistan greatly since possibilities of diversion were small.

Question of GOP taking matter to Security Council or UNGA did not arise. I am inclined to believe GOP will not do so at this juncture, in view indication U.S. continued interest in encouraging bilateral negotiations perhaps after Indian election


74. Telegram From the Embassy in India to the Department of State/1/

/1/Source: Department of State, Central Files, 753D.00/12 - 1561. Secret; Priority. Repeated to Lisbon, London, and Paris for the Secretary.

New Delhi, December 15, 1961, 5 p.m.

1767. I saw Prime Minister at 10 a.m. for half an hour. I told him we could not honestly promise to move Portugal in immediate future, and if issue came before SC we would be obliged to take stand against India, not with a view to embarrassing him but consistent with our opposition to use of force. I then said I had done all that persuasion could accomplish and would not reiterate previous arguments. We then had a long discussion in which I went back over previous arguments and several new ones. Latter included impression of grave weakness conveyed to all, including ghost of Gandhi, if India, having removed the British and French without fighting, should now have to resort to it for mere Portuguese. I noted age of Salazar and indications of internal dissent in Portugal as harbingers of change emphasizing the obvious time limit on the Portuguese colonial empire in Africa and all that meant. Nehru noted situation deteriorating rapidly and that many innocent people were likely to suffer or be killed in this situation. I pointed out that most of the shooting so far had been in newspapers, he himself had said the casualties were negligible, and that my research indicated that only one unfortunate seemed to have got in front of bullet. Why then should a strong government with a well-disciplined army anticipate disorder and bloodshed that had not occurred.

The conversation throughout was friendly even on the tough points like the UN and the newsprint atrocities.

It is my feeling I may have moved him a bit, that he was even looking for arguments. Would also note he was very sensitive to the reactions of the President. It is still my feeling that the decision is to act on Goa or conceivably other enclaves probably tomorrow, but possibly we may have produced one more pause for reflection and pressure from Krishna Menon.

FYI, reference Department telegram 2041. /2/ I confess I had no real hope you could make progress with the Portuguese but thought you should ask.

/2/Document 72.


75. Telegram From the Embassy in India to the Department of State/1/

/1/Source: Department of State, Central Files, 753D.00/12 - 1761. Secret; Niact. Repeated to Lisbon, USUN, and London.

New Delhi, December 17, 1961, 11 p.m.

1783. Eyes Only for the Secretary. Reference: Department telegram 2081. /2/ On receipt of reference telegram 4:00 this afternoon I sought appointment with Prime Minister and got to him at 8:00 for an hour. I used every resource at my command for acceptance of proposal but so far as I can presently tell without success. It wasn't a bad card but it was too late. In might-have-been department, last week might have worked. Nehru was still very angry over Portuguese refusal to accept part of U Thant letter specifying UN resolutions. /3/ I argued this not known to the world and at this moment Salazar's response looked better than his. The six months also set him back a bit. He said that once the pressure was off Portuguese would sit still as before. I provisionally modified the six-month period to sufficient period to give time to put the arm on the Portuguese but without effect. He also asked what success we had had in budging Portuguese so far. Both question of what Portuguese would do in six months and effect of our approach so far exceedingly tough to handle. Then we got to the gut issue which is he believes they have gone beyond point of no return in public involvement. This reinforced by assertion that volunteers are about to move in, internal disorder is imminent along with accounts of Portuguese firing this morning. I repeated my argument that none of this had yet involved serious bloodshed and I referred finally to effect on American public opinion and mentioned West New Guinea and again Congo. I asked if I should report there was no chance, then fuzzed my question to keep issue open. He virtually told me there was none. I said our offer stood and asked him to call.

/2/Telegram 2081 to New Delhi, December 16, reported on a meeting that day among Acting Secretary Ball, Under Secretary McGhee, and Ambassador Nehru. Ball and McGhee warned that an Indian invasion of Goa would trigger a reaction in the United States that would force the Kennedy administration to oppose the Indian action in the United Nations and make it difficult to maintain Congressional support for assistance to India. Ball suggested that if Prime Minister Nehru would announce a suspension of action for 6 months, the United States would be willing to undertake a serious effort to help bring about a peaceful solution to the problem. (Ibid., 753D.00/12 - 1661) A memorandum of this conversation is ibid., Secretary's Memoranda of Conversation: Lot 65 D 330.

/3/On December 14, Acting U.N. Secretary-General U Thant addressed identical letters to Indian Prime Minister Nehru and Portuguese Prime Minister Antonio Salazar. He urged them to "ensure that the situation does not deteriorate to the extent that it might constitute a threat to peace and security," and to enter into negotiations to seek a solution to the problem. (Public Papers of the Secretaries-General of the United Nations, Vol. VI: U Thant, 1961 - 1964, p. 74)

I would now guess they are going to move and my estimate in fact is for tomorrow morning. This confirmed by a heavy propaganda briefing by MEA this afternoon, a report this morning that a police official of Diu had asked for a peaceful takeover and departure of Gen Kaul without cancelling a Monday dinner in my honor. Vice President who is much opposed to action also reported to have said it is imminent. However I don't entirely exclude the thought that they are keeping up a very high level of tension on the theory that this is the only thing that really gets results. Sorry not to have better news. If they move I will wire suggestions on Washington reaction for which I urge close attention.


76. Editorial Note

At midnight December 17 - 18, 1961, an estimated 30,000 Indian troops, under the command of Lieutenant General J.N. Chaudhury, marched into Goa and the smaller neighboring Portuguese territories of Damao and Diu. Portuguese forces were heavily outnumbered and surrendered in all three territories on December 19.

In Washington, Secretary of State Rusk reacted to the first reports of Indian troop movements by calling Indian Ambassador Nehru to protest against the resort to force. (Department of State, Rusk Files: Lot 72 D 192, Telephone Conversations)

In response to an urgent request from the Portuguese Government, the U.N. Security Council met on December 18 to consider the Indian invasion of the Portuguese territories. (U.N. Document S/5030) Adlai Stevenson, U.S. Representative to the United Nations, criticized the Indian military action as a violation of the principles of the U.N. Charter. (U.N. Document S/PV.987) In the course of the debate, Stevenson submitted a draft resolution that called for a cease-fire, withdrawal of Indian forces, and the resumption of negotiations. The resolution was cosponsored by France, Turkey, and the United Kingdom. (U.N. Document S/5033) The resolution failed by a vote of 7 to 4, in that the negative vote cast by the Soviet Representative constituted a veto. (U.N. Document S/PV.987) For text of Stevenson's statement in the Security Council and the draft resolution he submitted, see American Foreign Policy: Current Documents, 1961, pages 956 - 960.

77. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in India/1/

/1/Source: Department of State, Central Files, 753D.00/12 - 2361. Secret; Niact. Drafted by Talbot and approved by Ball. Repeated to Lisbon.

Washington, December 23, 1961, 2:21 p.m.

2168. Acting Secretary Ball called in Ambassador Nehru today on American reaction to Goa. Said he hoped Ambassador informing his government fully of American views so there would be no misunderstanding of problems we face following Indian action. In response to Ambassador's question Ball said he not distinguishing between US Government's views and non-official opinion because our ability achieve our governmental goals greatly influenced by Congressional and public opinion. Full effect of Goa action on American opinion yet to become evident but we particularly concerned about impact on many facets U.S. policy, notably our support of UN including Congo operation and our foreign aid program. Additionally, we fear "chain reaction" on thinking of other nations on disputed territories elsewhere, as in West New Guinea. Forces in US opposed to present policies would cite Indian action as further argument we on wrong track. Added personal view that Krishna Menon visit to New York just now further complicates the situation. Looks as if by sending or allowing Menon come straight to New York GOI flaunting its action in Goa rather than, as it has argued, cleaning up a "necessary" situation as quickly and tidily as possible.

Ambassador stated he had already reported many of these points [and] would restate them to his government as views of USG. /2/

/2/On December 29, Prime Minister Nehru sent an 8-page letter to President Kennedy justifying India's absorption of the Portuguese colonies. (Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Countries Series, India, Nehru Correspondence, 11/1/61 - 1/14/62)


78. Memorandum From Robert W. Komer of the National Security Council Staff to the President's Special Assistant for National Security Affairs (Bundy)/1/

/1/Source: Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Meetings and Memoranda Series, Staff Memoranda, Robert W. Komer, 11/61 - 12/61. Secret. Copies were sent to Schlesinger and Rostow.

Washington, December 28, 1961.


Ayub's reported decision to bring Kashmir dispute before SC in January bodes nothing but trouble. Paks are seizing opportunity created by Goa.

But a tendentious debate in UN will move us away from Kashmir settlement rather than toward it. It will also put us in painful spot of having to say something which will offend one side or the other.

Hence, we ought to head off SC debate if possible. For example, if Galbraith could talk Nehru into giving private assurances that he would discuss problem with Paks after the February elections, we might use these to get Ayub to backtrack.

I have mentioned the above to Phil Talbot, who has a working group just starting on Kashmir. We'll also want Galbraith's opinion when he gets here. I am cluing you mainly because we may want to make a louder noise to State.

Bob K

79. Telegram From the Embassy in India to the Department of State/1/

/1/Source: Department of State, Central Files, 690D.91/12 - 2861. Secret; Priority; Limited Distribution. Repeated to Karachi and USUN.

New Delhi, December 28, 1961, 11 p.m.

1918. I had extremely important meeting with Nehru this afternoon on which I urge most prompt followup. /2/ Following Shafqat's statement to Rountree a couple of days ago that Pakistanis were planning to take Kashmir issue to SC, the Indian newspapers this morning carry stories of this intention. I went in to see Prime Minister this afternoon ostensibly to say goodby but in fact to urge direct discussion along lines of Ayub - Rountree - Galbraith talk. I concentrated on this for an hour. At first he was disinclined and a bit distant. I pictured unhappy consequences of a SC debate on this issue for all concerned. I asked him directly if he were attracted by idea of a verbal slugging match between Zafrullah Khan and Krishna Menon. He said no. I pointed out that it would revive Goa antipathies, transfer them to Kashmir and have a further bad effect on American public opinion. I reminded him that he was being unfaithful to the comradeship of democratic leaders by making matters worse for the President. He said he had no desire to do this. I then asked him to consider the affirmative gains. By taking the lead in asking Pakistan to discuss the question India would rehabilitate her moral position, affirm her support of orderly process and persuade her critics she had generosity of spirit. He asked what could be talked about and here I improvised, noting that all problems including canal water dispute had seemed impossible until the effort was made. Ingenuity and imagination might partly modify, partly circumvent the territorial question, give the Pakistanis firm guarantees on the river sources, provide access to the valley, make it a free trade area, so forth and so on. I noted I had made same points to both Nehru, Ayub without explosion. He said he was attracted by these ideas and I then pressed him on the shortness of time involved. He then said he was leaving town for two weeks, very soon thereafter would be out campaigning and noted that the discussions were difficult while an election was going on and his need to prepare public opinion including Kashmir Government. I said Rountree and I had pointed out to Ayub the improbability of progress before the Indian elections. But the important thing was to get a clear manifestation of will to act and any case preparatory discussions were essential for success. I urged that a prompt invitation go to General Burki with a view to laying the ground for a Nehru - Ayub meeting. This would affirm Indian willingness to move further on the matter.

/2/McGeorge Bundy sent a copy of this telegram to General Clifton on December 30 for President Kennedy. He described it as "Galbraith at his formidable best," and noted that the Department of State was instructing Rountree to take the same line with Ayub. He added, however, that Talbot was afraid that "Ayub won't play." (Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Countries Series, Kashmir, 1/61 - 1/62)

The foregoing will give the flavor of a much longer discussion. In the end in response to a pin-down question, he said I could cable affirmation of his sympathy for the idea and went on to say he would try to put steps in train about General Burki's visit before leaving tomorrow and take matter up on his return.

Comment: I feel it very important that the Pakistanis know confidentially of this effort and respond agreeably to any initiative while holding their fire on the SC. There is some chance that by real effort we can get Nehru to negotiate after the election and give an earnest of progress. SC debate would be bad for the Indians as well as ourselves and while doing nothing real for Paks would of course harden all lines. It would also be opportunity for another Soviet intervention on behalf of India which one sector of Indian public opinion will cheer. Would urge that Rountree indicate discussion and make these points to President with request for total discretion until I can do more here. Pakistanis will be aware that having asked for a strong "intervention" with Nehru on the Kashmir issue, they have had it. We have right to hope accordingly they will take advantage of it and not pursue the unpromising course of the New York debate.

I told Nehru that the matter was of so much importance that I would plan to remain in Delhi rather than proceed to Switzerland as planned and on to the States. He queried as to why since my absence would coincide roughly with his. (I had previously told him reasons for journey.) Accordingly, I will plan to leave as scheduled tomorrow evening but will remain available next week through Martin, Geneva.


80. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Pakistan/1/

/1/Source: Department of State, Central Files, 690D.91/12 - 2861. Secret; Priority; Limit Distribution. Drafted in SOA by Weil, Horgan, and Henry W. Spielman; cleared with Sisco and McGeorge Bundy; and approved by Talbot.

Washington, December 29, 1961, 9:58 p.m.

1280. New Delhi's 1919 /2/ repeated Karachi 144 and USUN 102. In view of GOI's expected invitation to GOP to hold discussions as a first step toward Nehru - Ayub meeting Department believes GOP has good reason reconsider intention to take up Kashmir question in UN January 17. If GOP's reason for taking Kashmir issue to UN is to pressure India into bilateral talks (Karachi's 1096 to Department, /3/ 32 to USUN and 176 to New Delhi) this apparent willingness by India to initiate bilateral discussions presumably removes need for such pressure.

/2/In telegram 1919 from New Delhi, December 28, Galbraith reported that the arrangements to initiate direct discussions between India and Pakistan, which were outlined in telegram 1918 from New Delhi (Document 79), had been confirmed by the Ministry of External Affairs. (Department of State, Central Files, 690D.91/12 - 2861)

/3/Dated December 28. (Ibid.)

You should see Ayub soonest and, referring to Ayub's conversation with President, President's conversations with Nehru, and Rountree - Galbraith conversations with Ayub, inform Ayub Galbraith has had further conversations with Nehru and Desai which give us reason believe Indians intend take initiative leading to bilateral Ministerial discussions.

You may tell Ayub that as friend of Pakistan we are taking it upon ourselves to relay our understanding that Indians are prepared hold discussions because we believe if initiative materializes this would be most promising means starting bilateral negotiations. We also wish suggest that if Kashmir case is introduced at UN January 17 prospects of successful talks may be seriously affected. You may also wish to remind Ayub that in our opinion he cannot expect any constructive action out of SC. Therefore we are constrained to inquire whether, in light of Ambassador Galbraith's report, he would re-examine his intentions to go to UN in January.

In conclusion you may wish point out that expected move by GOI appears to be result of efforts made by President Kennedy following Kennedy - Ayub talks in July; and you may express our earnest hope that Ayub will take full advantage of this welcome development.


81. Telegram From the Embassy in Afghanistan to the Department of State/1/

/1/Source: Department of State, Central Files, 689.90D/12 - 3061. Confidential; Niact. Repeated to Karachi and Tehran.

Kabul, December 30, 1961, 6 p.m.

429. Reference: Embassy telegram 428 to Department. /2/ Following is text Foreign Office note re movement aid goods now in Pakistan; short unnecessary words omitted:

/2/In telegram 428 from Kabul, December 30, Byroade reported that on December 28 he had discussed an earlier draft of the note conveyed in telegram 429 with Etemadi of the Foreign Office. The draft had stipulated that the border would be opened for a period of 6 weeks. Byroade stated that the time frame proposed was insufficient. On December 30 he discussed the note again with Naim and Etemadi, and Naim indicated that he would extend the border opening to eight weeks. (Ibid.)

Complimentary opening.

"Have honor refer talks December 23 between Foreign Minister Naim and Ambassador Byroade. /3/

/3/This conversation was reported in telegram 418 from Kabul, December 23. (Ibid., 689.90D/12 - 2361)

"In these talks, American Ambassador expressed his government's desire and decision continue American aid Afghanistan and gave assurance his government's willingness bring in equipment material for implementation American aid projects Afghanistan through transit channels other than Pakistan, while transit through Pakistan blocked. Use transit facilities through Iran was especially mentioned.

"Taking note American Government's agreement as expressed by Ambassador Byroade, Minister Foreign Affairs reiterates expression by Foreign Minister Naim regarding RGA agreement to transportation equipment material bearing title USG and destined for different aid projects Afghanistan, at present blocked in Pakistan and at Peshawar, Quetta and Chaman because of Pakistan's illegal and unilateral decision August last.

"RGA agrees to importation American Government aid material and equipment presently blocked in transit through Pakistan on following lines:

1. Importation transport equipment material defined above can be implemented through American offices and the facilities at their disposal.

2. Responsible authorities of RGA at Torkham and Spin-Baldak will duly execute customs formalities on above mentioned equipment and material.

3. Transportation and import above mentioned equipment material will be accomplished in 8 weeks beginning 15 January 1962.

4. This temporary arrangement shall be considered exceptional special case and will by no means affect declared Afghan stand regarding Afghanistan's right of transit through Pakistan in its traditional and established form, a right which is fully reserved by RGA. On receipt confirmative reply this note, Ministry Foreign Affairs will duly inform pertinent offices Torkham and Spin-Baldak to facilitate customs procedures for duration set forth in numbered paragraph three above."

Note concludes with complimentary closing.


82. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Afghanistan/1/

/1/Source: Department of State, Central Files, 689.90D/12 - 3161. Secret; Niact. Drafted by Talbot, cleared in substance by Gaud in AID, and approved by Talbot. Also sent to Karachi and repeated to Tehran.

Washington, December 31, 1961, 7:46 p.m.

245. Ref: Kabul 432. /2/ Following is revised Text Note.

/2/In telegram 432 from Kabul, December 31, the Embassy transmitted a suggested draft reply to the December 30 note from the Afghan Government relating to the movement of AID goods stored in Pakistan. (Ibid.)

Begin Verbatim text:

"Embassy presents compliments and has honor refer to arrangements proposed by RGA for movement into Afghanistan of US aid goods presently in Pakistan.

"The Embassy notes that the RGA is prepared to make arrangements for the movement of US financed goods and desires to cooperate fully in this effort. The USG agrees to utilize its facilities to complete the movement of these goods. The Embassy would welcome the early designation by the RGA of a particular office or officer with whom all arrangements should be made.

"The USG is concerned that it may not be possible to complete the operation within eight weeks. Success depends, inter alia, on expeditious documentation procedures, the timely availability of trucks and drivers and the maximum practical extension of the operating hours at all transfer and documentation points. USG welcomes assurances which His Royal Highness, the Minister of Foreign Affairs, gave Ambassador Byroade with respect to these matters.

"As Ambassador Byroade has informed his Royal Highness, The Minister of Foreign Affairs, it is the intention of the United States to continue its assistance program in Afghanistan and the US is willing to utilize, as far as is practical and financially feasible, the transit route running through Iran. The US must, however, for reasons of cost and feasibility, regard this route as a temporary alternative to the traditional route through Pakistan. The US will continue to make available its good offices in the effort to achieve the goal of resumption of normal transit through Pakistan." End Verbatim text. Complimentary close.


83. Letter From President Ayub to President Kennedy/1/

/1/Source: Department of State, Central Files, 690D.91/1 - 262. No classification marking. The salutation and closing of the letter are handwritten.

Rawalpindi, January 2, 1962.

My Dear President, The forcible taking of Goa by India has demonstrated what we in Pakistan have never had any illusions about--that India would not hesitate to attack if it were in her interest to do so and if she felt that the other side was too weak to resist. Krishna Menon, in fact, blatantly said as much in his statement of the 23rd of December.

The inability of the United Nations to prevent aggression has added to the loss of public confidence in its efficacy.

We had decided to take our Kashmir case to the Security Council after the Indian elections. In view of the recent developments, however, I have come to the conclusion that to re-affirm our continued faith in the United Nations, as the only force which might provide an alternative to naked aggressions of the kind we have just witnessed, it is imperative that the Kashmir question be raised now.

It is not our intention to ask the Council to discuss the substance of the question at this stage. Our Permanent Representative will ask in the first instance for a directive from the Security Council to the United Nations Representative for India and Pakistan, Dr. Frank P. Graham, to set forth his own views of what needs to be done by Pakistan and by India to comply with the relevant resolutions of the Security Council and of the United Nations Commission for India and Pakistan. My Government regards this step as an essential preliminary move without which the deadlock in the Kashmir question cannot be broken. We are asking for this step to be taken about the middle of this month.

It is my understanding that a directive of the above kind can be given to Dr. Graham without the adoption of a formal resolution by the Security Council and the attendant risk of a Soviet veto, provided a clear majority of the members of the Security Council express themselves in favour of a directive for the reason that Dr. Graham's recommendations would enable them to appraise the present status of the case correctly.

The details of this procedure will be explained by Ambassador Zafrulla Khan to your Delegation in New York and by Ambassador Aziz Ahmed to the State Department.

I have been advised that the Presidency of the Security Council in February 1962 will be held by the United States. In view of the crucial role of the President of the Council in the scheme of things that I have mentioned, Pakistan places the utmost reliance on his goodwill and support to surmount the initial procedural difficulties that may be raised by the Soviet Union and Romania in the course of action of the Security Council.

I am confident, Mr. President, that you will appreciate the reasons for my decision and that I may rely on your sympathetic understanding and fullest support.

I cannot end this letter without expressing the gratitude of the people of Pakistan, of their Government and my own sincere appreciation for the consistent and unwavering support that has been extended by the United States Government to Wilsonian principle of self-determination of peoples, whether strong or weak, and for upholding the Purpose and Principles of the Charter of the United Nations in the observance and implementation of which alone rest all our hopes for the future.

With kindest regards, Yrs Sincerely,

M.A. Khan

84. Memorandum of Conversation /1/

/1/Source: Department of State, Secretary's Memoranda of Conversation: Lot 65 D 330. Secret. Drafted by Weil and approved in S on January 15.

Washington, January 3, 1962.

Post-Goa Situation: Pakistan's Fears of Indian Intentions

The Secretary
H.E. Aziz Ahmed, Ambassador of Pakistan
Mr. Mohammad Masood, Minister, Embassy of Pakistan
Mr. Salman Ali, Counselor, Embassy of Pakistan
SOA - T. Eliot Weil
NEA - Mr. Phillips Talbot

At the beginning of the conversation the Secretary informed the Ambassador that he had just received a message from Ambassador Rountree stating that he had informed the Pakistan Foreign Minister of Ambassador Galbraith's report that the Indians planned to approach the Pakistanis with a view to arranging bilateral talks on the subject of Kashmir, and that President Ayub had appeared receptive to the idea.

The Ambassador mentioned his Government's plans to raise the Kashmir question in the Security Council later in the month and said President Ayub had appointed him a Special Representative to visit Venezuela and Chile [whose representatives are scheduled to preside over the Security Council in March and April]. /2/ The Ambassador said he was planning to depart on the evening of January 9 but [if this new development resulted in postponement of Pakistan action in the Security Council] he might now be able to delay his departure.

/2/All brackets are in the source text.

The Secretary remarked that no serious talks were likely to occur during the Indian elections, but that India and Pakistan had two almost legendary debaters who would probably clash if the Kashmir matter were brought to the Security Council. Smiling, the Ambassador said he did not know whether Sir Zafrullah would like being compared with Krishna Menon, but his Government had no desire to embarrass Nehru during the Indian elections.

The Ambassador then said his Government had instructed him to discuss with the Secretary the post-Goa picture in South Asia as set forth in an aide-memoire which he handed to the Secretary (copy attached). /3/ The Ambassador offered "a few words in explanation" of certain portions of the aide-memoire. He emphasized India's inconsistency in using one justification for its occupation of Junagadh and another justification for claiming all of Kashmir and for occupying Hyderabad. He stressed his belief that India had no intention of fighting Communist China and asked why, if India does intend to fight Communist China, it does not settle its differences with Pakistan and seek Pakistan's assistance. With reference to the United States military sales agreement with India, the Ambassador said Pakistan did not want to take an obstructionist position, and that Pakistan would go along with the United States provided the United States and Pakistan were satisfied with the bona fides of India's requests for military supplies and with India's foreign policy. He said his Government believed there might be a reconsideration of the quantum of aid if India is diverting most of its foreign exchange for arms and is not making a proper effort to develop its economy. He said India must be deterred from foreign adventures. He then referred to the two requests in the aide-mémoire--for a public statement by the United States, and for steps to increase Pakistan's strength--and added that there might be "other courses".

/3/The aide-mémoire is summarized in Document 88, but not printed.

The Secretary asked the Ambassador whether he could comment further on his impressions of agitation in India to take over Pakistan. The Ambassador said "numerous statements" had been made and that extremist organizations, such as the Jan Sangh, were gathering strength as Congress strength declined.

The Secretary said he would like to comment in a very preliminary way on the very important questions raised by the aide-mémoire. He said Goa and a possible attack on Pakistan were two quite different things. He said if the question of Goa had been taken into the General Assembly we would have almost certainly have failed to succeed in our objective. As Ambassador Stevenson had pointed out, it was true that the case involved "a double standard." It was a muddled issue, involving the question of colonialism, the U.K.'s commonwealth tie with India and alliance with Portugal, and the obvious unwillingness of any UN members to fight India over Goa. The Secretary pointed out that the case of Pakistan was quite different. There was no colonial issue, Pakistan had allies, and there was a United States military presence in Pakistan. The situations were as different as night and day.

The Ambassador said that in the case of Goa, where the use of force was the issue, India was able to get the sympathy of the Afro-Asian group. In the case of Kashmir, the Soviets had said Kashmir belonged to India. The Pakistanis feared they were no match for the Indians in the propaganda field, and that the Indians could even make a case for an attack on Pakistan. He said that in 1950 Indian troops were "poised for an attack on East Pakistan" and it might have been just providential that the attack did not materialize; but that when the Indians wanted "to make propaganda" they told the Hindus in East Pakistan to move out as refugees, and the Hindus followed these orders.

The Secretary said he could not imagine that the Government of India would try to confuse people on the issue of an attack on Pakistan, or that the Afro-Asian bloc would support India in this matter. The Secretary also pointed out that the U.S.S.R. attitude on Goa had nothing to do with the United States position. The Ambassador replied that if India decided to attack Kashmir or Pakistan, the U.S.S.R. would welcome the confusion and would presumably encourage India.

In this connection the Secretary observed that the Goan development might well mean that India would be forced to consider how to work things out with Pakistan. He asked the Ambassador to let him give the aide-memoire some study and said he would see the Ambassador again.

85. Telegram From the Embassy in Afghanistan to the Department of State /1/

/1/Source: Department of State, Central Files, 689.90D/1 - 362. Secret; Niact. Received in the Department of State on January 4 at 12:41 a.m. Repeated to Karachi and Tehran.

Kabul, January 3, 1962, 7 p.m.

436. Deeply appreciate quick and helpful holiday response by Department and Rountree on question moving US supplies out of Pakistan. It is therefore with more regret than usual that I report we have run into difficulties as result Foreign Ministry refusal accept text of note proposed by Department as basis for proceeding with movement goods.

Thinking it best we reserve a level for final negotiations, I asked DCM give proposed note to Etemadi and explain its contents. Etemadi, after much shuttling back and forth to Naim, finally gave us four points on which our text was not acceptable. These were as follows:

1. Failure of our note to refer specifically to their note.

2. Objection to word "proposed" in first sentence.

3. Change from "US owned" to "US financed" goods in first sentence, second paragraph.

4. Use of phrases "as far as is practical and financially feasible" and "for reasons of cost and feasibility," last substantive paragraph of note.

It quite clear that RGA concern on all four points based not on question of substance but upon their public position, with eye on future Pakistan propaganda. It seemed, therefore, that points two and three could be easily met, while points one and four presented more difficulty. Use of word "proposed" was unfortunate. While it is true that RGA note appears to "propose," yet we should not forget that this arises out of our previous proposal to move US goods out of Pakistan with use American teams. Similarly, the difference between US "owned" and "financed" goods is a technicality presenting no real problem. RGA simply desires that no goods under Afghan title be brought in under this agreement. This could be handled by defining goods intended more specifically.

With Hannah, I saw Naim and Etemadi this morning in effort resolve these difficulties and explained our disappointment that RGA had not seen fit accept simple text note which I convinced Washington thought to be helpfully drafted. Told him I was ready recommend Department drafting changes on points two and three which I thought he would find satisfactory, adding, however, I had no leeway on point one. If RGA insisted upon direct acknowledgment their note, it would be incumbent upon us to take exception to some of the phraseology of Afghan note. This I thought would not be helpful, either in problem of immediate movement of goods, or toward eventual solution transit problem. I therefore proposed, with understanding it on ad referendum basis, the following substitute paragraph to meet first three Afghan points, explaining that closest link I could make between our note and theirs was a reference in our note to same conversation mentioned in introductory paragraph Afghan note: "The Embassy of the USA presents its compliments to the Royal Afghan Ministry of Foreign Affairs and has the honor to refer to the understandings reached between His Royal Highness, the Minister of Foreign Affairs, and Ambassador Byroade on December 23, regarding the movement into Afghanistan of US aid goods, presently in Pakistan, and under the title of the Government of the USA or American or other foreign contractors."

Naim said he would accept this redraft to meet their first three points.

Discussion on point four above lasted about an hour. It was difficult for some time to determine real basis his objection on this point which obviously he considered important. It eventually became quite clear to both Hannah and myself that his only valid objection was based on public impression and fear of Pakistan propaganda. He reasons that the language in US note would imply to Pakistanis that US applying pressure on Afghan by a partial or veiled threat to limit its aid program as result use Iranian route. This would be used by Pakistanis to Afghan disadvantage so as to weaken Afghan position vis-a-vis Pakistan. He made one additional point in this discussion. He said he had received report from Afghan trade delegation in Tehran which indicated their negotiations so successful that he doubted cost factors through Iran would henceforth be real problem for US. I said I hoped this correct, but could not base today's negotiations upon this factor. Nor could I accept it myself without substantiation.

When it became apparent that Naim would accept none of the drafting compromises I suggested in effort meet his problem re publication while still retaining our qualifications on use Iranian route, and that further discussion along this line could only lead to complete stalemate, I made what I had previously decided would be my final fallback position for recommendation to Department. I asked for and received, again, Naim's assurance that there was no misunderstanding in substance between us and that his concern stemmed from public relations considerations. I then said I would propose to Washington deletion these particular phrases from notes provided he would agree with me to formal secret minute which would make it absolutely certain there was no actual misunderstanding between governments. Believe this procedure a new one for him, but he said he would entertain idea and seek clearance his government as well if we could agree on wording. Two hours later Hannah gave Etemadi a suggested text which I felt satisfactory for negotiating purposes. Text follows with small words omitted:

"Following secret understanding reached connection exchange notes between Royal Afghan Ministry Foreign Affairs (No. 3180 dated December 30, 1961) and Embassy USA (No. 24, dated January 2, 1962):

"In discussions between His Royal Highness, Minister Foreign Affairs and Ambassador Byroade January 3, 1962, American Ambassador explained it is intention USG continue assistance program Afghanistan and, in doing so, to utilize route through Iran, giving due consideration factors which, in absence actual experience, cannot yet be fully defined. These factors concern question cost and question feasibility based on practical and physical nature that line communication. His Royal Highness, Minister Foreign Affairs stated he understood this to be position USG.

"It was further understood by both parties that this understanding would remain secret but would become part of record in connection exchange notes described above."

Upon receipt above draft, Etemadi said he had no authority discuss text but would deliver to Foreign Minister. It was agreed that if Foreign Minister found text satisfactory, he would present to his government and I would propose to Department. Etemadi gave his personal opinion that RGA would not approve the whole idea of secret minute. Two hours later Etemadi telephoned Hannah to say Foreign Minister had concluded that text had only the barest minimum chance of being accepted and that therefore I should not propose it to Department. Etemadi made no proposals for modification, and in answer to question replied that Foreign Minister did not feel he could recommend acceptance to Afghan Govt. Subsequently, Hannah phoned Etemadi at my instruction to ask him relay my deep disappointment to Foreign Minister, my belief that we had come more than half way to meet RGA legitimate points particularly re publicity but had observed very little inclination understand our problems, and finally that I was at loss how to proceed since I had no new suggestions to offer.

It is too early to form final conclusions as to meaning this encounter. I would not recommend at this time that US accede to Afghan demand. It is possible that upon more mature consideration Foreign Minister will modify his view and adopt more tractable attitude. I am not hopeful that this will happen quickly since I suspect that his sudden change of action on the secret minute concept resulted from a lunchtime consultation with Daud.

Etemadi's remarks to Hannah expressing fear that Pakistanis might obtain access to secret minute suggest Naim may fear a leak to GOP. Perhaps significantly, Naim suggested at one stage this morning that we await return Afghan delegation from Tehran in hope that terms brought back from Tehran would suffice to obviate necessity for US to make any qualifications re cost and feasibility.


86. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Afghanistan/1/

/1/Source: Department of State, Central Files, 689.90D/1 - 362. Secret; Niact. Drafted in SOA by Gatch, Naas, and Metcalf; cleared by Gaud; and approved by Talbot. Repeated to Karachi and Tehran.

Washington, January 5, 1962, 2:03 p.m.

247. Re Kabul's 436. /2/ Dept disappointed turn events but does not wish lose this opportunity for first break in impasse. Concur your redraft para one in order take care of first three objections of RGA. With respect fourth objection you should state following to Naim:

/2/Document 85.

By being explicit on our qualifications we are not motivated by desire exert pressure on RGA. On the contrary, US efforts have been directed towards ameliorating situation for RGA. However, since exchange of Notes constitutes formal agreement, Dept must not make commitment which in fact it may not be able fulfill. For example, if Iranian route were to prove impracticable for sustained heavy truck traffic, USG would not wish to be accused of bad faith. Furthermore Dept must consider Congressional reaction to unqualified commitment. Talbot made above points Jan. 4 to Amb. Maiwandwal who presumably will cable FonMin. We are willing compromise and delete "as far as practical and financially feasible" but must include qualifications in next sentence in order cover ourselves legally and with Congress.

However Dept has concluded it could not agree publication our Note along with RGA Note unless second para latter revised to delete "illegal" and to substitute "Karachi, Peshawar, Chaman and Quetta" for "Pakistan and . . ."

Dept understands reasons for RGA desire make public explanation its decision. Since differences over language of Notes could cause lengthy wrangle, Dept suggests press statement be issued by RGA in lieu of RGA and proposed US Note which would remain as confidential exchange. If press release issued by RGA, and US not associated with it, Dept would be more relaxed on language concerning Iranian route since US not bound by RGA statement.

Suggested draft follows.

"In recent discussions between the Royal Afghan Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Ambassador Byroade, the American Ambassador reaffirmed the desire of the USG to continue its aid programs in Afghanistan. The Royal Afghan Government is prepared to make arrangements for the movement of all US aid goods under the title of the USG or American or foreign contractors which have been consigned to Afghanistan through the port of Karachi and have been held up since the break in diplomatic relations between Afghanistan and Pakistan on September 6, 1961. The USG agrees to utilize its facilities to complete the movement of these goods. The US stated that it is willing to utilize temporarily the transit route running through Iran.

"The RGA wishes to emphasize that this temporary agreement in no way prejudices the RGA position that it has an inherent right to free access to the sea through Pakistan."

You may draw on additional following points as appropriate:

I. US is confident Pakistan will cooperate in these arrangements to move goods into Afghanistan.

II. US does not anticipate that GOP will make use this agreement for adverse propaganda purposes, but, if RGA wishes, US prepared inform GOP we would look with disfavor on any attempt use agreement to which we are a party for propaganda purposes.

III. US wishes remind RGA that Merchant's terms of reference still apply US offer good offices--i.e. offer confined to helping both sides seek ways resolving transit impasse without reference to any political disputes involved. We believe Afghan Note contains unnecessary references to political matters and, if made public, might cause Pakistan adopt uncooperative attitude. /3/


/3/In telegram 444 from Kabul, Byroade reported that he had met with Naim and had carried out the instructions outlined in telegram 247 to Kabul. Naim agreed to put the Department's revised proposal before the Afghan Cabinet, but indicated that he felt there was little prospect that it would be accepted. (Department of State, Central Files, 689.90D/1 - 862)

87. Memorandum From Robert W. Komer of the National Security Council Staff to the President's Special Assistant for National Security Affairs (Bundy)/1/

/1/Source: Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Meetings and Memoranda Series, Staff Memoranda, Robert Komer, 1/62. Secret. Copies were sent to Kaysen and Rostow.

Washington, January 6, 1962.


A New Look at Pakistani Tie

The offensive Pakistani demarche to Rusk on 3 January (State to Karachi 1294) /2/ and presumably Ayub's letter to the President, /3/ which in effect lecture us on how we ought to conduct our policy toward India, crystallize my latent feelings that we ought to consider a new tack in our relations with Pakistan. Our basically different views on how to deal with the Afghan, Kashmir, and Indian problems have been apparent in the series of exchanges the New Administration has had with Ayub.

/2/Telegram 1294 to Karachi, January 3, summarized the conversation on that day between Rusk and Ahmed and the aide-memoire presented to Rusk by Ahmed. (Department of State, Central Files, 753D.00/1 - 362) For a memorandum of the conversation, see Document 84.

/3/Document 83.

Ayub's main concerns are Pakistan's position versus Afghanistan and especially India--he isn't really much interested in the larger conflict in which we are involved. He patently views his alliance with the US primarily as insurance against Indian and Afghan threats, and as a means of leverage vis-à-vis Nehru and Daud.

One can understand and sympathize with Ayub's preoccupations. As the weaker power on the subcontinent, fearful of eventual Indian attempts to reunify it, he sees a need both for an aggressive stance and for an outside counterweight to India. One can also sympathize with the Pakistan case on Kashmir and Pushtunistan. But to the extent Ayub uses his alliance tie to push us into supporting his forward policies vis-à-vis India and Afghanistan, he forces us into a position which runs contrary to our larger strategic interests in the area.

And this is what he is trying to do. His "post-Goa" letter makes this abundantly clear. I am well aware that we always try not to fall into this trap, but in our very forthcoming policy toward Pakistan, and in our concern lest we offend a staunch ally, do we lean over too far? I fear that in the Ayub visit last July, and the many exchanges since, we have failed to get across to him the limitations on, as well as the benefits from our support. Instead he seems to have gotten the feeling that we are so attached to him as an ally that he can pursue his own aims with renewed vigor, and drag us along with him. Whatever the merits of the Pak case on Pushtunistan and Kashmir, it is Ayub who has taken the tactical initiative on both issues. Now he wants us to lower the boom on India. Meanwhile, we continue to shower him with favors (the latest a forthcoming $500 million commitment to the consortium supporting his new development plan).

What do we get from our Pak alliance? True, we get some highly important facilities, and I am the last to deprecate their value. However, I'm not sure that we've gotten a lot else from it so far, except a paper commitment to SEATO and CENTO on which it is hard to see how Ayub could effectively pay off in more than peanuts.

I would presume that, broadly speaking, our strategic interest lies in having a strong and stable subcontinent as a counterweight and counter-influence to the Communists in Asia. Essentially, this goal requires us to ameliorate and eventually dissipate the tensions between the countries within the subcontinent, not only in our long-range interest but in the interest of their own survival against a much larger threat. Thus, our aim must be to resolve such disputes as Kashmir and Pushtunistan which essentially distract and divert these countries from the goal we have in mind.

But if we must choose among these countries, there is little question that India (because of its sheer size and resources) is where we must put our chief reliance. True, the Ayub regime is far more "pro-Western" than the Indians (though it is questionable whether most Pakistanis are really less neutralist than Indians). In any event, are we more interested in a Western-oriented weak ally or a strong neutralist India able to defend its own national interests (which happen to broadly coincide with ours).

What has moved India toward us in the last few years? Essentially it isn't our policy or our increasing generosity in supporting India's ambitious five-year plans. It is the Chinese pressures on the northeast frontier. Over time, the conflict of interest between Peiping and Delhi will almost certainly grow rather than decrease. And sooner or later the Indians will come to realize that the arena of conflict is not only along the Himalayas but in Southeast Asia as well.

On the other hand, Pakistan's chief preoccupation will long remain India. Ayub's whole policy is built around this central theme (as his post-Goa letter makes abundantly clear). I question whether it is in our strategic interest to cater even indirectly to his concerns, beyond reinsuring him against Indian attack.

Would Ayub go neutralist if we were tougher with him? I wonder. As the weaker power on the subcontinent he needs external support. And where can he get it? The Russians, no more than we, are going to give Pakistan priority over India. Could the Chinese help much? In the last analysis, Pakistan needs the U.S. connection more than we need it.

What I am leading up to is my growing conviction that we had better take a new tack in our approach to Ayub. Instead of showering him with consortium aid, instead of using kid gloves on the Pak/Afghan transit issue, instead of letting ourselves be dragged along on Kashmir, and instead of allowing him to think that he can continually get more military aid from us to use against India, perhaps we had better give him a clear idea of the limitations on our ability to come to his support. Otherwise, we are simply storing up more and more trouble. If the objective of our policy is to achieve compromise solutions on Pushtunistan, Kashmir and related intra-SOA disputes, we are going to have to start leaning a bit more on one side or the other. Whatever the merits of either side in the dispute, it is pretty clear where we'll have to lean.

We should guard against regarding such disputes as Pushtunistan and Kashmir as intractable quarrels which only time will solve. History suggests that more often they flare up eventually into serious crises, especially when agitated by an activist like Ayub.

In sum, so many problems are piling up in our relations with Pakistan that before we approve a new consortium which will involve some $500 million in U.S. cash, perhaps we had better take a new look at our Pakistan relationship and ask whether we are giving too much and not getting enough in return. I urge we do this before we have played a hole card in firmly committing ourselves to massive development aid.

R.W. Komer/4/

/4/Printed from a copy that bears this typed signature.

88. Paper Prepared by the Bureau of Near Eastern and South Asian Affairs/1/

/1/Source: Department of State, Central Files, 611.90/1 - 1062. Secret. The paper was transmitted to the White House under cover of a memorandum from Battle to Bundy dated January 10. The Secretary approved the paper for discussion with the President on January 11 at 5 p.m.

Washington, undated.


I. Basic Problems and Strategy

In the wake of (a) Goa, (b) intensified Indo-Pakistani and Pak-Afghan disputation and (c) growing Chinese Communist and Soviet capabilities to press southward our basic interest still calls for policies that will:

(1) Vigorously support the growth of viable non-Communist governments;
(2) Reduce intra-area tensions and
(3) Increase participation by both India and Pakistan in causes beneficial to the Free World.

Our political and economic policies are well-charted and reasonably successful in strengthening the domestic structures of these countries. Similarly, within the bounds of current capabilities, our general posture of defense against Soviet bloc pressures in this region are not per se an immediate cause of concern. The chief proximate threat to the success of our policies in South Asia arise from the pervasive, corrosive intra-regional disputes. In the end these troublesome controversies probably cannot be greatly ameliorated either bilaterally or mainly through the influence of the United Nations or other nations such as Britain; the United States must continue to play a major role. The problem is what additional instruments we should use to influence the governments concerned.

The policy issues we face immediately include the Afghan - Pakistan trade impasse, the Pakistani intention of raising the Kashmir dispute in the United Nations, the recent Pakistani requests and suggestions to the United States that we restrict aid to India and give additional positive reaffirmations of the U.S. - Pakistan alliance, suggestions emanating from India that American arms would be welcome to increase India's capabilities vis-a-vis the Communist Chinese, and the aftermath of the Goan invasion.

Compared with most states in Southeast and Southwest Asia, India and Pakistan enjoy a relatively high degree of political stability and sustained economic growth. India's size and strength, plus its historic role in the vanguard of Asian nationalisms, give it the political influence with other countries that can be damaging to the United States when India and the United States are at cross purposes (as in some colonial issues) or extremely helpful when we can cooperate (as in the Congo or, hopefully, in achieving peace and security in Southeast Asia). India stands sometimes on the side of the Bloc, sometimes on our side and always on its own side (Goa, Kashmir).

Pakistan, though less than a quarter as populous as India, politically and economically behind the Indian pace and less influential with other countries, ranks as another country of major importance to the United States because of its location, size and policies. Its most important policy is its alliance with the United States. From this it expects a place at the councils of the free world, military and economic strengthening beyond the usual level of aid for an unaligned nation of its size, and assured American protection against India. We expect the alliance to give us Pakistan's general support in the United Nations, a South Asian anchor position for our system of pacts around the rim of the Communist Bloc, and certain special facilities.

In general political terms India's weight in international affairs can do more to help us or harm us than can Pakistan's. To have to choose between the two countries would, however, be a failure of policy: we need both.

Afghanistan is a traditional buffer area between Russia and South Asia. While less important to the Free World than either India or Pakistan, for it to come under Communist domination would greatly aggravate the problems of defense for Iran as well as India and Pakistan. Its conflicts with Pakistan over "Pushtunistan" and related problems are the single greatest threat to its retention in the Free World.

The bitterest of the regional disputes in South Asia arises out of events in the late 1940s. In the 1960s South Asia will face new and profoundly different situations which can be met only if Afghanistan, Pakistan and India perceive the necessity of much closer cooperation than they have ever yet achieved. With economic development village economies are giving way to regional cash economies; these can ripen far more effectively when trade and exchange flow freely across the sub-continental borders. Economic cooperation will also be essential to successfully meeting the competition of the European Common Market. The advantages of close political cooperation are self-evident. In military defense, joint or coordinated policies in the face of the threat from the north will greatly strengthen each country, and therefore the Free World generally.

Moreover, it is essential to our interests that these countries find ways of compromising their bitter disputes. Hundreds of millions of dollars of our aid to India and Pakistan are in effect dissipated by their feud over Kashmir. The stability and strength that we need in South Asia as a condition of our global defenses against Communist pressures is also jeopardized. To overcome these difficulties and to settle these disputes it may be necessary for the United States to undertake further new initiatives. It is also essential to United States global security interests that we maintain in these countries an image of strength, and of determination to support their efforts to maintain independence in the face of Soviet and Communist Chinese pressures.

In our dealings with South Asian governments we must bear in mind the fact that individual leaders and oligarchies can exert tremendous influence on millions of constituents. The importance of personal diplomacy cannot be overestimated. In our discussions with South Asian leaders it is important that we keep them aware of United States interests in the area; that we impress them with our disapproval of their self-destructive squabbles; and that we constantly remind them of the grave consequences of their failure to cooperate in the face of the growing danger of Sino-Soviet expansionism.

II. Our Stake in South Asian Intra-Area Disputes

The intra-area disputes confront us, with several direct, immediate policy issues. These are discussed in the following paragraphs:

A. Pakistan - Afghanistan Disputes

1. "Pushtunistan"

The "Pushtunistan" question continues to affect directly every aspect of Afghanistan - Pakistan relations and United States relations with both countries. Pakistan flatly rejects the Afghan claim that for historical, ethnic, cultural and linguistic reasons Afghanistan has a special interest in the four to five million Pushtu-speaking peoples in Pakistan and that these people should be given the right of self-determination. In the last two years the Government of Pakistan has dealt increasingly firmly with Pushtun tribal unrest and relations between the two countries have correspondingly worsened. There is little likelihood of a solution of the "Pushtunistan" question in the foreseeable future. Pakistan has a strong legal position. Most nations, including the United States, recognize the Durand Line as the international boundary.

Policy Issue: Whether the United States should seek to establish conditions of mediation for this dispute.

We recommend that we not do so, but continue to work toward the obsolescence of this problem through resolution of the associated transit trade issue, on which we may have more leverage.

2. The Afghan Transit Trade Issue

The complex of actions and counter actions which led to the disruption of the traditional transit trade route through Pakistan into Afghanistan in September has opened the door for rapidly and sharply increased Soviet influence in Afghanistan. Because a substantial part of the transit trade consists of United States aid supplies and equipment (which we ship to Afghanistan with ample political as well as economic justification) we believe we have some leverage with Afghanistan, though very little with Pakistan except at the possible cost of a degeneration in our relations with Pakistan.

Policy Issues: (a) Whether we should make efforts to keep the aid pipeline open to Afghanistan if it can be done at moderate extra costs for shipments by a temporary alternative routing through Iran.

We believe this should be done and that it is desirable to add the necessary amount to the Afghan aid bill to continue the movement of selected aid goods to Afghanistan. This will indicate to the Afghans our intention of continuing a portion of our aid programs while the Pakistan route is closed. At the same time we recommend that after the Afghans and Pakistanis have had an opportunity to realize the dangerous consequences of their stubborn positions, we make a new diplomatic approach.

(b) Whether the United States should be prepared to support the development at substantial cost of a permanent alternative transit route through Iran for Afghanistan.

This issue will become acute if the trade impasse shows no significant prospects of improvement over the next one or two years. We recommend no immediate action in support of the development of a permanent alternative route for the reason that it would release Afghanistan from pressures for seeking a resolution of its issue with Pakistan.

B. India - Pakistan Disputes

1. Kashmir

If Pakistan, as it now intends, raises the Kashmir issue in the Security Council in January we can expect a deterioration in the relations between the two countries and a setback in prospects of progress toward the resolution of this overriding issue between Pakistan and India. Possibly even more important, the United Nations debate and the position the United States takes with respect to the issue in that forum probably could lead to a noticeable deterioration of United States relations with one or the other of the two countries.

Tension between India and Pakistan over Kashmir has risen markedly in recent weeks. India's seizure of Goa by force, and the inability of the UN to prevent this, has raised Pakistan fears that India may have in mind the eventual forceful seizure of Pakistan-occupied portions of Kashmir. The Goa action has also served to embarrass India internationally with Western nations. The initial Pakistan reaction to Goa was to advance the prospective date for presentation of Kashmir in the Security Council to mid-January. At the same time, Indian leaders, in the normal course of their election campaign, have been calling for the return to India of the portion of the state of Kashmir which Pakistan now occupies.

Meanwhile, following Ambassador Galbraith's initiative, he and Ambassador Rountree have been quietly attempting to stimulate ministerial-level talks between India and Pakistan which would hopefully lead to Nehru-Ayub talks after the Indian elections in February. (If Pakistan adopts a constitution this winter, the top-level talks would probably have to follow Pakistan elections in the spring.) At the same time we have been making representations in both Karachi and New York with the Pakistan representative in New York and giving the reasons why we believe submission to the Security Council would be of no value to Pakistan.

No progress toward a solution of the Kashmir problem is seen possible through Security Council action. Any resolution putting pressure on India would receive a Soviet veto. This the Pakistanis know, but they seem to feel that drawing UN attention again to the problem would at least draw world attention to India's intransigence and might serve as a form of pressure on India towards concessions in eventual bilateral talks.

Clearly no final political solution of the Kashmir dispute is presently possible or in view in the near future. At the same time, other aspects of the Kashmir problem--hydrological, economic, humanitarian, military--appear as possible subjects of bilateral talks in the present context when it seems impossible totally to avoid consideration of the Kashmir issue.

Policy Issue: Whether the United States should continue its active efforts to reduce Indian - Pakistan tensions over Kashmir and, if so, how far we should go. We do not believe that the size and pace of the economic assistance program should be used directly as instruments. It is possible our efforts may result in some impairment of the alliance relationship with Pakistan in view of Ayub's original expectation of full United States support in the Security Council.

We should continue intensive diplomatic efforts with the objective of leading to bilateral negotiations and of discouraging Pakistan from raising the issue in the Security Council.

We should impress upon both parties that their failure to settle traditional problems is not only diverting their attention from problems of greater importance to their future security and that of the Free World, but also jeopardizing the interests of countries outside the area desiring to assist them.

2. Recent Requests and Suggestions Made by the Pakistanis

Pakistan professes to fear that India's success in Goa will lead to aggression in Kashmir. Against this background the Pakistanis presented an aide-memoire to the Secretary on January 3, 1962 /2/ which took the following positions:

/2/Attached to Document 84; not printed.

(a) That the 1951 U.S. military sales agreement with India should be terminated and that India should not receive military equipment until it renounces "aggressive intentions and needs the equipment only to fight the Chinese";

(b) That U.S. economic aid to India should be limited to a level that would prevent India from diverting an "unduly large part of its own resources to build up its military machine";

(c) That the U.S. take action to "deter India from committing aggression against Pakistan" by a public statement to the effect that the United States would come to Pakistan's assistance if attacked--an undertaking similar to that contained in a confidential assurance given to the Pakistanis in 1959; and

(d) That the United States increase military aid to Pakistan.

Policy Issue: Whether we should restrict aid to India and give addition reaffirmations of the US - Pakistan alliance in both a material and public form.

We do not recommend acceding to the Pakistani suggestions except with respect to providing official reassurances that the United States guarantees to Pakistan are still in force. With respect to each point:

On point (a), we should observe to the Pakistanis that the President promised Ayub during his visit here that the United States had not changed its policy with regard to military assistance to India and that Ayub would be consulted prior to any contemplated change.

On point (b), we should point out that the United States provides no hard currency support to India which she could directly apply to military purchases and that all of our economic assistance is involved in specified projects or commodity purchases. In our opinion India would spend approximately the same amount of its own resources on its armed forces, in the light of its security interests as it sees them, regardless of the level of United States and other aid. The sacrifice would fall in the economic sector.

On point (c), we recommend that Ambassador Rountree be authorized to assure President Ayub that United States guarantees to Pakistan are still in force, including the undertaking contained in our note of April 15, 1959, /3/ to which the Pakistanis specifically referred. Apart from the request for this assurance contained in the Pakistani aide-memoire of January 3, President Ayub very recently separately asked Ambassador Roundtree for such an assurance, though not necessarily to be publicly given. The Department is opposed to publicly reaffirming at this time the assurances we have given to Pakistan.

/3/See Foreign Relations, 1958 - 1960, vol. XV, pp. 708 - 709.

On point (d), we believe the Pakistanis should be informed that the level of the United States commitment for military aid for the next five years has been settled upon between the two governments and that we intend to fulfill the commitment. The prospects of our increasing the level of military aid in the forseeable future is not favorable.

C. Country Problems

1. India

Economic Aid

In our effort to help India achieve economic and social development as a basis for a viable political structure and defense against Bloc pressures, we utilize massive economic aid programs and technical assistance.

Our economic aid programs serve, inter alia, to prevent India from depending on Bloc countries for a major portion of its foreign aid.

As a result of India's forcible occupation of Goa, we have postponed the signing of certain agreements pertaining to our aid program, but have proceeded with normal program planning within the United States Government.

Policy Issue: Whether to show our displeasure over Goa by cutting our future economic aid, a recommendation which may emanate from Congress.

We recommend, in view of our important security interests in South Asia, that we continue the announced policy of continuing aid at intended levels; and that at some time in the near future--taking into consideration the climate of opinion in the United States, and the behavior of the Indian Government--we resume signing agreements without undue publicity.

Military Sales

Since 1951 we have sold to India relatively small quantities of military equipment--mainly consumable or replacement items. The Indians have recently shown an interest in the purchase of aircraft, missiles and electronic devices, the sale of which would generate protests from Pakistan, and at the same time help to prevent the Indians from turning to the Bloc for similar items.

Since Goa we have informally suspended active consideration of possible sales of major military items to India. This question, of course, involves agreement among a number of Departments and agencies.

Policy Issue: Whether to sell major military items to India.

We recommend that in the near future we resume consideration of such sales on a case-by-case basis--taking into account all political and military factors such as the military situation on the Tibetan border.

2. Pakistan

In addition to far-reaching questions discussed elsewhere in this paper, the only immediate issue requiring decision is the extent of United States participation in the Pakistan Consortium for 1962 - 63. This is set out below. Because of their sensitive nature, problems relating to our special facilities and installations in Pakistan are dealt with in a separate paper.

Extent of U.S. Participation in the Pakistan Consortium

At the IBRD Consortium on Pakistan in June 1961, $320 million in aid was committed toward Pakistan's development requirements for FY 1962. Out of this total the United States committed $150 million. President Ayub has protested this result as entirely inadequate to meet Pakistan's needs. A further meeting of the Consortium is scheduled for January 24 - 26 in Washington where commitments to meet Pakistan's requirements for the two years, 1962 - 63, estimated at $945 million, will be sought.

Policy Issue: Since this is a multi-year commitment, a Presidential commitment will be required. This recommendation is being forwarded through normal channels.

We recommend that the United States offer to commit up to $500 million of this total of $945 million--the exact amount to depend on the commitments of other members of the Consortium and availability of U.S. funds.

3. Nepal

U.S. Posture

In the face of intensive Bloc efforts to detach Nepal from India's sphere of influence, the United States extends economic aid and technical assistance, and endeavors to persuade the King to reestablish a representative government, dissolved in December 1959. Recent press reports of disturbances in Nepal have not been confirmed.

Policy Issue: Whether to continue our efforts to influence the King to reach an accommodation with the Nepali Congress Party, or to support a rebellion intended to destroy the King's power and to establish a new government.

In view of the inevitable chaos which would be exploited by the Communists, and in view of the Nepali Congress' presumed inability to establish a viable government, we continue to favor efforts to bring about an accommodation between the King and the Nepali Congress.

89. Editorial Note

On January 11, 1962, Pakistan requested a meeting of the U.N. Security Council to consider further action concerning the dispute between India and Pakistan over Kashmir. In a letter to the President of the Security Council, Pakistan stated that it was forced to request the meeting because efforts to develop direct negotiations with India on the issue had failed, and recent public statements by Indian officials had exacerbated the dispute. (U.N. Document S/5058)

India responded, in a January 16 letter to the President of the Security Council, that the Council should refuse to comply with Pakistan's request. India stated that, contrary to Pakistani allegations, avenues for direct negotiations concerning Kashmir were always open. Pakistan, India argued, was trying to exploit the Council as a propaganda forum on the eve of India's general elections. (U.N. Document S/5060)

Pakistan repeated its request for a Security Council meeting in another letter to the President of the Security Council on January 29. (U.N. Document S/5068) The Security Council met in response to Pakistan's requests on February 1. After listening to divergent statements on the Kashmir issue by Sir Muhammad Zafrulla Khan, Pakistan's Permanent Representative to the United Nations, and Chandra S. Jha, India's Permanent Representative to the United Nations, the Council decided to postpone further consideration of the problem until after the Indian general elections. (U.N. Document S/PV.990)

90. Memorandum From Robert W. Komer of the National Security Council Staff to the President's Special Assistant for National Security Affairs (Bundy)/1/

/1/Source: Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Regional Security Series, South Asia, 1961 - 963. Secret.

Washington, January 12, 1962.


South Asia Issues Decided at Meetingwith President 11 January 1962

1. Kashmir Dispute. Upon the Acting Secretary's proposal, the President agreed that we should propose to both sides a high-level mediator. It was agreed both sides looked to us on this issue. An effort will be made to get Eugene Black right away, with second choice David Lilienthal. To justify Black's use, we could say that Kashmir dispute jeopardizes IBRD stake in Indus Waters settlement.

2. With respect to Pakistani Resolution in SC, the President felt that in view of his commitment to Ayub, we would have to vote for relatively innocuous Pakistani resolution in SC, and had better tell Nehru if necessary However, we should attempt to persuade Paks against SC, arguing that it would undermine our other commitment to Ayub to get Indians to negotiate. State is to get a letter off pronto to Ayub urging him to call off SC action.

3. Upon State's recommendation, President approved going ahead and starting to release aid to India into the pipeline, after waiting a week. A small DLF loan for $5 - 6 million which had been pending for a long time would be a good thing to start with.

4. Military Sales to India. We should hold up action until after the Indian election to avoid helping Krishna Menon. In any case, even then we should hold off on big items like C - 130s. The President wanted it emphasized to both India and Pakistan that their "arms race" was ruining our economic aid program by diverting their assets from economic development.

5. Commitment to Pakistan Consortium. The President was concerned about so much aid going to India and Pakistan, in contrast to Latin America, for example. He directed a restudy to determine whether we could tighten up and increase interest rates on long term development loans. The purpose would be to make it easier to sell larger aid programs on the Hill, recognizing that we wouldn't actually get the money back anyway in many cases. However, we shouldn't worry about problems which wouldn't be upon us until ten years from now. The President did agree to go ahead on the $500 million commitment to Pak consortium, contingent upon remainder of $945 million being found elsewhere.

6. Pakistan and Transit Trade. The President was very reluctant to agree to the extra outlays ($150 a ton as opposed to $50) required to ship aid goods to Afghan over temporary Iranian route. He could not see why we should pay extra to ship what was after all aid to the Afghans. He agreed to the eight week moratorium proposal permitting US aid goods already in Pakistan to go forward by the direct route but reserved judgment on the Iran route. When Assistant Secretary Talbot pointed out that Afghans would not accept moratorium proposal unless we agreed also to go ahead with subsequent shipments via Iran route, the President's inclination was to let them stew, and tell them that Congress would not accept such a huge increase in transport costs. However, he reluctantly accepted Talbot's plea that we take a gamble for a few months, using a quarter of the estimated $2 million it would take to ship the remainder of our aid over the Iranian route during 1962.

Bob K.

91. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Afghanistan/1/

/1/Source: Department of State, Central Files, 689.90D/1 - 1262. Secret; Niact. Drafted by Weil and Naas; cleared by Talbot, McGeorge Bundy, Assistant Legal Adviser for Near East and South Asian Affairs Warren E. Hewitt, and with AID; and approved by Rusk. Repeated to Karachi and Tehran. An attached handwritten note from the Secretary's Special Assist-ant Emory Swank to Rusk indicates that this telegram arose out of the previous evening's meeting with President Kennedy.

Washington, January 12, 1962, 9:47 p.m.

255. From Secretary. Department appreciates your strenuous efforts to accomplish temporary opening border but believes if Afghans are serious in desire receive aid goods they will withdraw demand that political propaganda in their note be included in joint publication. We must bear in mind following:

1) Whatever their motives, Pakistanis have consistently given assurances they continue to honor transit agreement.

2) Afghans closed border.

3) Despite offer of practical assistance in clearance processes, Afghans have refused cooperate in opening border to normal traffic and have caused USG substantial inconvenience and expenditures in importing items for official use.

4) When Afghans offered USG opportunity move its aid goods proposal was based on amount which could be moved in fixed time rather than on total amount then in Pakistan.

While not condoning GOP's arbitrary action designed retaliate against Afghan subversive activities in Pakistan territory, Department considers it damaging to US interests to associate USG with objectionable Afghan references to Pakistan in publication of exchange of notes. Receipt of King's letter /2/ re US offer good offices which omitted any reference to political aspects transit traffic problem was taken by USG as acceptance President's terms of reference--i.e., transit traffic problem would be handled separately from over-all political disputes. Department clearly recognizes joint publication notes now under consideration would inevitably associate USG with any statements appearing in Afghan note. To do so would not only constitute sign of weakness which would increase difficulties in future dealings with Afghans, but would provide GOP with legitimate basis for protest, and reduce possibility early settlement transit trade problem.

/2/See Document 49.

USG has made substantial concession to squabbling governments by indicating willingness move certain aid goods through Iran to Afghanistan while Kabul and Rawalpindi maintain adamant positions. It is hoped this concession can be justified on ground it is in our interest to give Afghans evidence of willingness to continue aid in face of Soviet exploitation of impasse. On other hand to yield to Afghan insistence on introduction propaganda into joint publication of notes might well destroy future usefulness USG good offices in dispute and provide Pakistanis with justification for withdrawing promised cooperation in moving aid goods during temporary opening of border.

Fact Afghans have insisted on inclusion propaganda despite US insistence on dealing with transit problem without bringing in political issues as such, raises question as to sincerity their intentions. Afghans should be reminded of terms of references for USG good offices. Political clauses in their note constitute built-in time bomb which seriously threatens implementation of RGA proposal.

Department suggests you talk with appropriate officials using as much of foregoing as you deem appropriate and use best efforts convince them that publication note in present form would prove counterproductive. Remind them of flexibility and friendly cooperation manifested by USG since border closed and reiterate US willingness cooperate in moving goods from Pakistan into Afghanistan on condition that RGA note, which has not been officially accepted in toto by USG, confine itself to transit traffic problem as such.

Department would accept following in place of existing third paragraph in RGA Note (Kabul tel 429) /3/

/3/Document 81.

"Taking note American Government's agreement as expressed by Ambassador Byroade, Minister Foreign Affairs reiterates expression by Foreign Minister Naim regarding RGA agreement to transportation of aid goods procured under US program and consigned Afghanistan through Karachi and held up since the break in diplomatic relations September 6, 1961."

If RGA accepts this modification in its Note you authorized agree exchange and publication.

Department recognizes possible public reactions in US if Afghans refuse alter their note, and aid goods now in Pakistan are held up indefinitely. Nevertheless Department reiterates belief that yielding to Afghan demand to publish political propaganda in these circumstances would increase difficulties of future dealings with Afghans and understand-ably affect GOP willingness cooperate in moving goods.


92. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Afghanistan/1/

/1/Source: Department of State, Central Files, 689.9OD/1 - 1262. Secret; Niact. Drafted by Talbot and Weil; cleared by Hewitt, Gaud, and McGeorge Bundy; and approved by Rusk. Repeated to Karachi and Tehran.

Washington, January 12, 1962, 10:56 p.m.

256. Eyes Only Ambassador. President, who considered transit trade impasse January 11, desires USG should continue maximum efforts to assist resolution this dispute. He is agreeable using some funds meet commitment in US draft note to Afghans re utilization Iranian route. However in view fact Afghans have capability of permitting entry aid goods via cheaper traditional route, President is opposed to use of Iranian route at added costs over extended period.


93. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in India/1/

/1/Source: Department of State, Central Files, 690D.91/1 - 1562. Secret; Niact; Limit Distribution. Drafted by Talbot, cleared by Ball and McGeorge Bundy, and approved in S/S by Melvin L. Manfull. Repeated to Karachi.

Washington, January 15, 1962, 6:14 p.m.

2383. Deliver following to MEA soonest for Nehru.

Begin verbatim text:

"Dear Mr. Prime Minister: You know of my deep concern over relations between Pakistan and India and my firm conviction that peace and progressive development for the people of Asia require a resolution of problems as between these two countries. These problems, and particularly that of Kashmir, are difficult. But in the last fifteen years numerous and important issues between Pakistan and India have been resolved. It would surely be a tragic error of pessimism to assume that nothing can ever be accomplished on the one major problem that now remains. Above all it would be a misfortune if the search for solution by the statesmen most concerned were at any stage to be impeded by the desire of anyone else to exploit controversy for its own sake.

In recent months I have talked with the leaders of both countries. It is my sincere belief, influenced I do not doubt by my feelings of friendship for both heads of state, that a real possibility of accommodation does exist. This possibility will not be served by public debate and recrimination. It can be served by patient and continuing discussion and negotiation. In this effort the United States willingly proposes the services of a good and sympathetic friend. We have a deep and active concern for the peace and development of both countries and we cannot be without interest in the external dangers which they face in common. So I am writing to inquire whether you would be willing to request a trusted friend of both countries--I have in mind Mr. Eugene Black of the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development, who would be prepared to respond to such a request--to explore with each head of government the outlines and prospects for negotiations and discussions which hopefully might lead to a final resolution of this troubled and contentious matter. If you agree to this approach, I would, of course, expect that other steps which would work against, rather than for, a solution--including an appeal to the Security Council of the United Nations--would be suspended. And I would also hope that, in a spirit of reconciliation, responsible leaders on both sides might avoid work or action that would be prejudicial to the settlement we seek.

I am sending a letter in similar terms to President Ayub. /2/

Sincerely, John F. Kennedy"


/2/Transmitted in telegram 1398 to Karachi, January 15. (Ibid., 711.11 - KE/1 - 1562)

94. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Afghanistan/1/

/1/Source: Department of State, Central Files, 689.90D/1 - 1462. Secret; Niact. Drafted by Naas, Gatch, and Talbot; cleared by Hewitt, Gaud, Ball, and Bromley Smith; and approved by Rusk. Repeated to Karachi.

Washington, January 15, 1962, 8:09 p.m.

260. From the Secretary. Kabul's 452. /2/ I understand how difficult your official and personal position has become as result events past three weeks and I appreciate your willingness delay departure. Before getting to specifics regarding your meeting with Naim, I believe following observations may help remove any misunderstanding our position.

/2/In telegram 452 from Kabul, January 14, Byroade expressed himself as "gravely disappointed" in what he saw as a change in the Department's position as outlined in telegram 255 to Kabul (Document 91). He felt that to demand new changes in the Afghan note would be to risk the loss of an opportunity for a breakthrough in the transit impasse, and would encourage the Afghan Government to maintain a rigid position. (Department of State, Central Files, 689.90D/1 - 1462)

In our strenuous efforts serve Afghan and American interests by keeping aid flowing to Afghanistan despite troublesome Pak - Afghan dispute, we have never been willing to let Afghanistan use these efforts for propaganda advantage against Pakistan or vice versa. We object to being associated with publication of Afghan note only because terms "illegal" and "Pakistan and Peshawar, Chaman and Quetta" carry legal meaning which we cannot accept. Afghanistan's insistence on retaining these terms has increasingly suggested to us Afghans intend use them propagandistically. Therefore we cannot now agree to joint publication notes if these terms remain.

We have no other objection to the Afghan note. We would agree publication of notes jointly if these terms deleted or we would agree to other alternative procedures specified below. Our prime immediate object remains to get border open so aid goods now in Pakistan can be moved directly into Afghanistan.

FYI. At time President authorized some funds for added costs transit reported Deptel 256 /3/ to honor our pledge to use Iran route as a temporary alternative to the traditional route through Pakistan, the subject of authorizing funds for backhauling of aid goods via Iran or India was not raised. However he takes firm position we have made all advisable concessions to Afghan's sensibilities and if these insufficient to move stalled aid goods we will reconsider aid program. End FYI.

/3/Document 92.

In view foregoing US prepared follow any one of following three courses of action in conjunction with RGA. Latter two are successive fall-back positions if first proposal not acceptable RGA.

A. The US will agree to the publication of exchange notes if para 3 RGA note revised to remove political content. We do not regard our language Deptel 255 as sacrosanct as long as political allusions mentioned para two above omitted.

B. The US will agree to confidential exchange of RGA note as presently phrased and revised US draft (Kabul tel 451) /4/ with subsequent RGA press release along lines suggested Deptel 247. /5/ US also willing, if you believe it might be helpful, agree associating itself with RGA in joint communique along same lines as press release--i.e. without reference political issues. Within these limits you authorized use your discretion in agreeing on language press release or communique.

/4/Telegram 451 from Kabul, January 12, transmitted the text of the U.S. note, as revised in accordance with instructions from Washington. The Embassy also confirmed that the Afghan note remained identical to the note initially transmitted in telegram 429 from Kabul (Document 81), except for the substitution of January 22 for January 15 as the date on which the border would be opened for the transit of U.S. aid material. (Department of State, Central Files, 689.90D/1 - 1262)

/5/Document 86.

C. Failing obtain agreement on either above proposals, you may tell Naim US will not object to RGA publication by itself of RGA note as originally drafted. In this case either Embassy or RGA could issue press release (preferably before publication RGA note) acceptable to you stating that negotiations have been held, and that the border will be temporarily reopened. Mention of Iran route in this release also authorized if necessary Under this procedure RGA accepts our note which remains confidential and basis of agreement.


95. Letter From President Kennedy to Prime Minister Nehru/1/

/1/Source: Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Countries Series, India, Nehru Correspondence, 1/15/62 - 3/31/62. No classification marking.

Washington, January 18, 1962.

Dear Mr. Prime Minister: I appreciate your writing me at length and in personal vein on the Goan matter. /2/ Your letter, incidentally, was delayed in transmittal and it reached my desk only in the last few days.

/2/See footnote 1, Document 77.

You have my sympathy on the colonial aspects of this issue. There is, I am sure, a feeling in your part of the world that this is a matter we do not quite understand. I believe we do understand. Sometimes, perhaps, we are inclined to talk a little too unctuously about the colonial origins of the United States, now nearly two centuries in the past. But, like many others, I grew up in a community where the people were barely a generation away from colonial rule. And I can claim the company of most historians in saying that the colonialism to which my immediate ancestors were subject was more sterile, oppressive, and even cruel than that of India. The legacy of Clive was on the whole more tolerable than that of Cromwell.

But I should like to say a word about the more immediate issue, that of the effect of the Goan episode on the relations between our two countries. It has not been good, but there may be useful lessons from the experience.

One difficulty was, of course, that the action followed so soon after your visit. I had naturally hoped that the candor of our exchange might have extended to all of the problems with which we were mutually concerned. I confess to a feeling that we should have discussed this problem; it is at least possible that if we had talked about it, our efforts to help prevent a solution by force could have been more helpful.

I have also been disturbed by the chain effect of this action on other parts of the world. Public opinion does not easily differentiate between the use of troops for good and bad purposes. And all countries, including of course the United States, have a great capacity for convincing themselves of the full righteousness of their particular cause. No country ever uses force for reasons it considers unjust.

Probably we should be glad of the existence of this adverse reaction, discriminating or otherwise, to the setting of armies in motion. We both want a world in which disputes are settled and oppression is ended by alternative means; it is good that on this matter opinion is with us. I fear that the episode in Goa will make it harder to hold the line for peace in other places.

But my major concern was and continues to be the effect of the action on our joint tasks, especially in terms of its impact on American opinion. Unfortunately the hard, obvious fact for our people was the resort to force--and by India. This was a shock to the majority who have admired your country's ardent advocacy of peaceful methods, and a reinforcement to those who did not enjoy what they called "irresponsible lectures." Moreover, the action occurred at a time when our joint efforts in the Congo were subject to especially harsh criticism here and it added a new dimension of criticism. Critics asked how we could claim to work with you for peace in the Congo while force was being used by you in Goa. The action brought also some setback for our efforts to develop the strength of the United Nations and confidence in its effectiveness. In the next few weeks, as we seek authorization by the Congress to purchase the bonds of the United Nations, I fear we shall hear a good deal about the failure to find a non-violent solution in Goa. Yet the finances of the UN depend upon this action in our Congress.

There is also the problem of aid appropriations. This, I should make clear, is not a question of strings; nothing could be farther from my thought than to make our assistance to India Contingent on her acceptance of our particular wishes in foreign or domestic policy We seek to help develop independence, and independence exists to be used. Still we must both weigh the effects of action by one country on public opinion and political action in the other. We both lead countries that are not easily governed. You are justified in asking that American action be considerate of the problems of Indian democracy. I should not willingly do anything to make your problems more difficult--shall hope, when something bears on Indian public opinion, to consider this closely, and to be informed if I am ever indifferent. Similarly I think it is reasonable that American public opinion should be a subject of concern to you. Each year our appropriations to help, not India alone, but also the other developing countries of the world, involve our most difficult political battle. This aid is of prime importance--to help countries to independence, to show compassion for the less fortunate, to ease the strains and passions that arise from poverty. I hope that you will agree that we have a common concern in maintaining the political atmosphere and the public attitudes that are sympathetic to this effort. If India had large-scale aid programs to other countries, would you not face a similar problem if one of those countries should adopt a course of armed action? And what is worse is that these difficulties spread out and affect not just one country, but the whole principle of disinterested aid.

You and I stand for cooperation and understanding, but not all our countrymen agree with us--and some of them would like nothing better than to see our hopes disappointed. It is not an accident that the men who are taking most advantage of the Goa matter here are the same men who are already attacking our aid programs and our support of the UN. They are also the men who would noisily advocate certain armed adventures by the United States. I hate to see our common purposes impeded in this way.

I feel, Mr. Prime Minister, that you would wish me to write you candidly of matters as I see them. I do so in no mood of self-righteousness, and with no feeling that our own policy is above reproach. Indeed, I trust that you will continue to make clear in equal candor your views on matters of common concern. Meanwhile, you can count on me to do all that I can to ensure that any damage to our common interests is temporary. Good and fruitful relations with India have been a matter of great concern to me for many years, and I have taken satisfaction in the progress we were making together before this episode. I believe we can and must get back on this high road, and I shall work steadily toward this end. /3/



/3/Nehru responded on January 30 with a letter in which he reiterated his position with respect to Goa. He wrote that his government had weighed many of the considerations put forward in Kennedy's letter of January 18 and had taken a necessary action which was "the lesser of two evils." Nehru's letter was delivered to the White House on February 6, under the cover of a note from the Indian Ambassador. (Kennedy Library, President's Office Files, Countries Series, India, Security 1962)

/4/Kennedy's initials appear in an unidentified hand, indicating Kennedy signed the original.

96. Telegram From the Embassy in Afghanistan to the Department of State/1/

/1/Source: Department of State, Central Files, 689.90D/1 - 1862. Secret; Niact. Repeated to Karachi and Tehran.

Kabul, January 18, 1962,5 p.m.

459. For the Secretary. Your helpful message (Deptel 260) /2/ encoded Washington Monday night arrived at this post on Thursday morning. Hannah and I saw Naim and Etemadi at noon today.

/2/Document 94.

Certainly agree that first alternative proposed by Department preferable solution and ordinarily would have been prepared stick at this as negotiating tactic in first meeting. However, in view of several local factors, including deplorable state situation as regards our contractors, decided to seek complete agreement today if at all possible. Following Naim's negative reaction successively to proposals contained in paragraphs A and B of Deptel 260, I therefore proceeded to that of paragraph C. Based on broad authority given me by your telegram, I have reached agreement with RGA along following lines: RGA note will be published and our reply will remain confidential. In finally agreeing to this alternative, I insisted upon change in last substantive paragraph of RGA note, as felt we should not accept phrase "on receipt of confirmative reply to this note" as this would imply that confirmation reply to entire contents had been made on behalf USG, whether privately or publicly. Naim agreed to following substitution: "on receipt of confirmation of the above mentioned statements made by Ambassador Byroade, the Royal Ministry, etc." It seems to me that this is acceptable from our point of view as it in effect excludes our association from objectionable phrases RGA note and does not even indicate our reply given in write up. Of far less importance, the words "the traditional route of" were inserted between the words "through" and "Pakistan" in second paragraph Afghan note. The commencement date in numbered paragraph three was changed to January 29.

The text of our note remains in substance the same except for slight modification first sentence paragraph 2 which now reads as follows:

"The Embassy notes that the RGA agrees to make arrangements for the entry of the above mentioned goods, and to cooperate fully in this effort."

No other changes made except minor ones without substance for grammatical reasons or for assistance in translation. Order that exact text be available, Embassy will cable complete text to addressees this message. Both Afghan and Embassy notes will be dated January 18. Publication date for Afghan note was set for evening January 21, Kabul time.

Naim and I had rather confusing discussion on subject separate press release by US. This, of course, would merely be placed in USIS bulletin here and would not have normal significance in view absence International Press. It might, of course, be carried locally and picked up by Pakistanis. I agreed to wording given below for such possible statement. RGA does not care whether we use it or not. Will therefore leave decision up to Department, with comment that I would prefer to drop press release idea rather than try to renegotiate [garble]. It would not be published here until next Monday and would appreciate early guidance to post as to whether to use or not. Text follows:

"In recent discussions between the Royal Afghan Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Ambassador Byroade, the American Ambassador reaffirmed the desire of the US to continue its aid programs in Afghanistan. The US has also stated that it is willing to utilize the transit route running through Iran while continuing to hope for resumption of transit via the traditional route through Pakistan.

"The Royal Afghan Government has decided to admit all US aid goods under the title of the USG or American or other foreign contractors, which are destined for the different aid projects in Afghanistan and which have been consigned through the port of Karachi but have been held up since September 6,1961. The USG has indicated its willingness to utilize its offices and its facilities to move these goods. The RGA has indicated its willingness to allow 8 weeks, beginning January 29, 1962, for the movement of these goods."

I depart Kabul tomorrow morning /3/ convinced it was in our overall interest make this particular agreement, and greatly appreciate under-standing and help of Department to make agreement possible. I am sorry my clients seem so difficult to get along with. One can, perhaps, understand them a little more easily if he lives here but not much.


/3/Byroade was replaced as Ambassador by John M. Steeves, who was appointed on February 7 and presented his credentials on March 20.

97. Telegram From the Embassy in Pakistan to the Department of State/1/

/1/Source: Department of State, Central Files, 690D.91/1 - 1862. Secret; Niact; Eyes Only; Limit Distribution. Repeated to New Delhi and USUN.

Karachi, January 18, 1962, 9 p.m.

1221. Foreign Secretary Dehlavi called me to Foreign Office 6 p.m. today and handed me following message dated January 18 from President Ayub now in Sibi to President Kennedy. Comments contained immediately following message:

Begin Verbatim Text:

"Dear Mister President,

Please accept my sincere thanks for your message of January 15, /2/ on the Kashmir issue.

/2/See footnote 1, Document 93.

I would also like to express to you my gratitude for the deep concern and interest that you have shown over the relations between Pakistan and India and the efforts that you have been personally making to bring about negotiations between the two countries to relieve the dispute, which is, as you have truly said, the one major problem that now remains between the two countries.

I entirely agree with you that it would be a tragic error to assume that this problem cannot be settled. I do not think I should tire you by setting forth the efforts that I have been making during the last three years to persuade Prime Minister Nehru to enter into direct negotiations with me, to find an equitable and realistic solution of the Kashmir dispute. At no time, however, have I had any assurance that the Indian leader was ready to enter into discussions with me except on his own terms.

You have inquired whether I would be willing to request a trusted friend of both India and Pakistan--Mister Eugene Black--to explore with Mister Nehru and myself, the prospects for negotiations and discussions which might lead to a final solution of the problem. I am deeply grateful to you for this constructive initiative and I welcome it as yet another manifestation of the deep concern of the United States and yourself personally for the peaceful existence and well-being of the peoples of the sub-continent.

I know Mister Black to be a man of high stature in international life and as a statesman who has given proof of his talents for mediation and conciliation.

While my final answer to your inquiry must necessarily be formulated after taking into consideration Prime Minister Nehru's reactions, I consider your offer to assist in negotiations between Pakistan and India by making available the good offices of a trusted statesman of international prestige as one that I could readily accept.

You have said that if I agree with the approach to the Kashmir problem suggested by you, you would expect that the appeal of Pakistan to the Security Council would be suspended. I must, of course, attach the utmost weight and importance to any suggestion that you feel it necessary to make. At the same time, may I assure you that the decision of my government to make the appeal has been prompted solely with a view to ending the intolerable impasse in which the question of self-determination of the people of Kashmir has become embedded for the past 13 years.

There is another consideration of a basic nature which is at the back of our appeal to the Security Council. The political independence and territorial integrity of Pakistan, and indeed its very existence, have never been free from threat by India. Confident of its growing strength and encouraged by the failure of the world to thwart its successful recourse to force in the past, our colossal neighbor has become more emboldened than ever to proclaim its aggressive intentions towards Pakistan. Since the danger of an armed attack by India is real and ever present to us, Pakistan is under the obligation and has indeed the right to invoke the political and moral protection of the United Nations. in the attempt to safeguard its security. It would be neither wise nor statesmanlike, for comparatively small countries like Pakistan, to discard the instrumentality of the United Nations whenever they feel themselves threatened by more powerful neighbors. Therefore, our motivation in appealing to the Security Council flows from our deep concern for the future of our country, and from our anxiety to guard against a mounting threat to its very existence. That this threat has become more grave and imminent is manifest not only from the recent statements of the Indian Prime Minister, the Defense Minister, Mister Krishna Menon, and the President of the Ruling Congress Party, Mister Sanjiva Reddy, but also from the fact that 85 percent of the Indian Armed Forces, including their armoured formations, are now concentrated within striking distance of our borders. This situation is causing grave concern in Pakistan.

I hope you appreciate that in the circumstances suspending our proposed action in the Security Council at this stage would shock public opinion in Pakistan and provoke severe criticism as [of] the value of our present alignments. This is scarcely desirable, particularly at this time when we are about to introduce our constitution.

The Permanent Representative of Pakistan to the United Nations is an eminent statesman and I have no doubt that insofar as his interventions in the Security Council are concerned, they will rise above the level of mere controversy and recrimination.

Yours sincerely
Mohammed Ayub Khan."

End Verbatim Text.

98. National Security Action Memorandum No. 125/1/

/1/Source: Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Meetings and Memoranda Series, NSAM 125. No classification marking. Copies were sent to the Secretary of State, the Director of the Bureau of the Budget, and the President of the Export - Import Bank.

Washington, January 22, 1962.

The Honorable Fowler Hamilton
Agency for International Development

Pakistan Consortium

I have made the determination requested by you in your memorandum of January 18, 1962 /2/ with respect to the Pakistan Second Five-Year Plan. In it you are authorized to make a pledge at the forthcoming Pakistan Consortium meeting which would bring our contribution up to $500 million out of the $945 million needed by Pakistan, subject to a number of conditions. One of these conditions is that pledges from other Consortium members must be sufficient to assure that the target will be substantially met. /3/

/2/Not found.

/3/The conditions established by President Kennedy were met when the Pakistan consortium reconvened in Washington on January 24, under the auspices of the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development. The consortium, which had initiated consideration of Pakistan's development plan in June 1961, endorsed Pakistan's request for $945 million in aid for the years 1961/1962 and 1962/1963. Of the $945 million, the United States committed to provide $500 million. (Telegram 1496 to Karachi, January 26; Department of State, Central Files, 890D.00/1 - 2662)

I am concerned at the prospect that the total amount of the pledges as indicated so far may be insufficient to meet the agreed upon target, since a failure to provide what competent analysts have determined to be Pakistan's needs would seriously weaken the image of the United States and the West as determined to advance the development of our staunchest partners. In the event that a shortfall threatens, therefore, I would like you to consult with me immediately in order to determine what steps may best be taken.

John F. Kennedy/4/

/4/Printed from a copy that indicates Kennedy signed the original.

99. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Pakistan/1/

/1/Source: Department of State, Central Files, 690D.91/1 - 2662. Confidential. Drafted by Talbot, cleared by Kaysen, and approved by Talbot. Also sent to New Delhi.

Washington, January 26, 1962, 2:46 p.m.

1495. Following based on uncleared memcon:

During call on President Jan 24 Amb Ahmed expressed Pakistan's heightened fears of India's aggressive intentions against Pakistan-held portions Kashmir and Pakistan itself. Citing recent statements by Jha, Menon, Reddy, Nehru and in GOI booklet "Kashmir and United Nations," Amb argued GOI believes that prospective Soviet veto would protect it against adverse Security Council action and that Allies would be fearful of coming to Pakistan's aid if latter attacked lest general nuclear war result. Emphasized that Pakistan has always felt India to be aggressive. President, questioning validity of these views, pointed out that for India Pakistan is very different matter from Goa. Goa action over in 24 hours; no one thinks India could deal with Pakistan that way.

Speaking along lines of aide-memoire presented Dept January 3 (Deptel 1294 to Karachi), /2/ Amb said Pakistan asking USG to consider how GOI can be deterred from aggressiveness.

/2/See footnote 1, Document 87.

Pak had suggested (1) US terminate 1951 military sales agreement with India, since India violated agreement by Goa aggression; (2) US review quantum of aid to India, which at present levels (along with aid from other Western countries) frees India's entire foreign exchange earnings for military purchases and other domestic needs outside development program; (3) public restatement of past assurances that US would come to Pakistan's aid if it attacked; and (4) stepped up military assistance to strengthen Pakistan against Indian threat. Amplifying these requests, Amb said Pak would not oppose future US military aid to India if USG convinced India sincerely proposing oppose ChiComs but Paks doubt India seriously intend take on ChiComs. He urged importance of deterrent actions because any new fighting over Kashmir would not be localized. To contrary, it would become total war between India and Pakistan involving not only armed forces but massacres of Muslim minority in India and doubtless reprisals against Hindu minority in Pakistan. Ambassador said Pak recognizes subcontinent will stand or fall as whole since neither India nor Pakistan can withstand Sino-Soviet Bloc pressures alone. Pak does not regard itself as unduly pessimistic in appraising apparent Indian intentions since it is going by what Indian leaders themselves say.

President replied he not persuaded that likelihood of an attack by India was demonstrated by Goa action or by statements cited by Amb, even though we all know Krishna Menon and what he is like. Our concern with Indo - Pak dispute has led us, however, to suggest that Eugene Black might make helpful contribution. If both countries accept him, we hopeful of results though unlikely Black could do much till after Indian elections. Amb responded that Pakistan welcomes this suggestion though not very optimistic about its success because of India's apparent lack of desire to settle Kashmir issue.

Amb told President Pakistan public has noticed that USG has repeatedly given public assurance to India of American support if Pakistan should attack India but has given no comparable public assurances to Pakistan. Talbot intervened to explain assurances to India based on condition that if US aid to Pakistan is misused and directed against another country in aggression US would take appropriate action to thwart such aggression. Amb agreed this initial official USG statement but said some US spokesman in years past had omitted that condition and given India full assurances. He added Pakistan knows USG acting from highest motives and that Pakistan and US desires are the same, but believed public assurances to Pakistan now would have helpfully deterrent effect on Indian leadership.

President expressed our deep concern that full effects US aid siphoned off into disputes between two countries. Said we feel our aid goes down drain; that is why we suggested Black mission. Added we have no evidence that Indo-Pak situation now likely to degenerate into war.

President referred Pakistan consortium meeting. Said he had received Ayub's letter /3/ and answered it. /4/ USG bringing maximum effort to bear on other contributors to consortium as he hoped Pakistan aware; but USG would not make up any deficiency in their contributions. Other donors have their problems, so does USG. Amb acknowledged that Pakistan aware of and grateful for USG efforts in this consortium.

/3/In a message delivered to Kennedy on January 16 through the Pakistani Embassy, Ayub referred to his discussions with Kennedy concerning economic assistance during his visit to Washington in July 1961. He recalled the understanding reached at the January 1962 meeting of the Pakistan consortium that the U.S. contribution would be a minimum of $500 million. Ayub noted that Pakistan had used what influence it had with the other members of the consortium to try to ensure that they would collectively provide the remaining $445 million, which he considered essential to Pakistan's economic development plans for fiscal years 1962 - 1963. If those contributions fell short of that amount, Ayub requested U.S. assistance in bringing the combined contributions to a total of $945 million. (Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Countries Series, Pakistan, Subjects, Ayub Correspondence, 1/30/61 - 1/16/62)

/4/On January 20, the Embassy in Karachi was instructed to inform Ayub, in response to his January 16 message, that Kennedy had instructed U.S. officials to make every effort to assure a successful consortium meeting, but the United States could not make up any shortfall in contributions from other members of the consortium. (Telegram 1440 to Karachi, January 20; Department of State, Central Files, 711.11 - KE/1 - 1662)

President commented further on dimensions our aid programs in India and Pakistan, which larger than whole Alliance for Progress this year. This true even though whole development assistance effort this hemisphere falls on US: no European nations contribute as they do to aid programs in subcontinent. Thus extremely important our aid be well used. US extremely disappointed at Indo - Pak troubles. We know how Krishna Menon, for example, exploits them, but from the point of view of the world as well as the two countries a last great effort should be made to resolve the Kashmir dispute. Otherwise, we could see that the fighting that might occur in the subcontinent would be except for a nuclear war the worst kind of war involving millions of people.

Ambassador expressed concern at reports that USG "would not take sides" on Kashmir issue. Said Pakistan not asking USG to take sides but only to support right of self-determination of peoples and let that right be exercised in Kashmir. Pakistan fully aware of the need to settle disputes with India and anxious to do so. Pakistani people uneasy, how-ever, because impression been given that US reaction to Goa was a directive to New Delhi saying that because India vital to US there will be no change in US policy toward India. Pak public also worried by reports US pressing Pakistan not go to Security Council. President said he is not aware of any special directive but of course we wish to continue friendly relationship with India as well as with Pakistan. As for Security Coun- cil hearing of the Kashmir case the Pakistan Govt knows our attitude full well.

On self-determination of peoples President commented that we don't have power to enforce UN resolutions unilaterally nor would Pakistan expect us to. On Goa, he said, US opinion is clear and will have an effect on our relationship with India for a long time. He thought Goa action could affect our entire aid program. Ambassador commented that consequences of Goa not merely economic, though that could be important Graver situation is fact that bulk of both India and Pakistan's armies are concentrated against each other and consequently immobilized against greater threat from north.

President noted that Ambassador had been somewhat critical of USG policies, at least by implication, but he sure Ambassador recognizes we are not always able to persuade others to do the things we wish, as for example our difficulty in persuading Pakistan of the rightness of our views on such matters as Red China, Afghanistan and Security Council action. Amb answered that on Chinese representation Pakistan had virtually eaten its words, despite promises to support Chinese Communist admission this year. Ayub had instructed Pakistan delegation at our request to vote for Chinese representation as "important issue." President said he was thinking specifically of over-all issue of Chinese representation, but in generally merely wanted to point out that even its friends do not always see eye to eye with US, though US and Pakistan do pretty well together. Expressed his pleasure that Amb had come to see him and said he would consider Amb's comments though he thought Amb now pretty well understood his feelings.


100. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Pakistan/1/

/1/Source: Department of State, Central Files, 711.11 - KE/1 - 2662. Secret; Niact; Verbatim Text. Drafted by Gatch; cleared by Hewitt, McGhee (in substance), and Bromley Smith; and approved by Talbot.

Washington, January 26, 1962, 6:36 p.m.

1500. You authorized transmit following letter from President to Ayub:

"Dear Mr. President:

I have given close and sympathetic consideration to your several recent messages on developments in South Asia. Ambassador Rountree has Is reported fully to me on your conversation with him on 7 January, 1962. /2/ In turn, I have just personally discussed the many issues mutually confronting us with Ambassador Aziz Ahmed.

/2/Rountree returned to Washington on January 7 and presumably reported directly to Kennedy on his conversation with Ayub. No record of Rountree's meeting with Kennedy has been found.

As a firm ally, Pakistan is entitled to the reaffirmation you have requested of the prior assurances given by the United States to Pakistan on the subject of aggression against Pakistan. My Government certainly stands by these assurances. I trust that you will agree, however, that a public statement to this effect would not be fruitful at this juncture.

In closing, let me reiterate my confidence in the ability of our two nations, working closely together, to achieve our common goals.

With warm personal regards, John F. Kennedy"

Inform Dept transmittal date.

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