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 You are in: Under Secretary for Public Diplomacy and Public Affairs > Bureau of Public Affairs > Bureau of Public Affairs: Office of the Historian > Foreign Relations of the United States > Kennedy Administration > Volume VIII
Foreign Relations, 1961-1963, Volume VIII, National Security Policy
Released by the Office of the Historian
Documents 50-57

50. Draft Memorandum From Secretary of Defense McNamara to President Kennedy/1/

Washington, October 6, 1961.

/1/Source: Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Departments and Agencies Series, Department of Defense, FY 1963 Defense Budget 1/61-10/61. Top Secret. No final version of this memorandum has been found. It was McNamara's practice to circulate the final versions of budget memoranda in draft form. Concerning the role and significance of McNamara's Draft Presidential Memoranda, or DPMs, see Alain Enthoven and K. Wayne Smith, How Much Is Enough? Shaping the Defense Program, 1961-1969 (New York: Harper and Row, 1971), pp. 53-58.

SUBJECT
Recommended Department of Defense FY'63 Budget and 1963-67 Program

I recently completed a preliminary review of the Department of Defense FY'63 Budget and a projection of the Department's Programs for the years 1963-67. Based on this review, I have reached certain tentative conclusions regarding force levels. The detailed financial budgets for the Department are now being prepared, based on these conclusions, and will be submitted to you on December 1 for approval. In the meantime, you may wish to review the major elements of the budget which I propose to recommend--the purpose of this memorandum is to outline those elements for you.

We have divided the budget into the following nine programs corresponding to broad mission areas or to support areas that cannot be allocated to the forces:/2/

/2/Only the first six sections are printed.

I.     General War Offensive Forces (long-range delivery systems),
II.    General War Defensive Forces (continental air defense forces and warning systems),
III.   General Purpose Forces (forces primarily intended for overseas theater operations),
IV.   Sealift and Airlift,
V.    Reserve and National Guard Forces,
VI.   Research and Development,
VII.  Service-Wide Support,
VIII. Department of Defense (DoD agencies, OSD, etc.),
IX.   Retired Pay.

The budget has been prepared on the assumption that the Berlin Crisis will have eased by the beginning of FY'63. Alternative plans are being prepared on other assumptions.

The costs of the program I am recommending, and the difference between the costs of that program and those recommended by the individual Services are shown in the following table. As the table indicates, the Services proposals average about $15 billion per year, or about $74 billion over the period 1963-67, more than the programs I am recommending.

Department of Defense Financial Budget/a/
(Obligational Authority in Billions of Dollars)

 

FY 1962

 

FY 1963

 

FY 1964/b/

 

FY 1965/b/

 

FY 1966/b/

 

FY 1967/b/

 

 

I

II

I

II

I

II

I

II

I

II

I

II

Programs

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

General War Offensive

$9.26

+.62

$8.93

+1.46

$8.02

+1.62

$5.57

+3.04

$4.72

+2.16

$4.10

+1.41

General War Defensive

2.86

+.18

3.03

+.58

3.26

+.80

3.64

+1.05

2.87

+2.50

2.58

+2.10

General Purposes

17.21

-.06

18.81

+3.31

18.92

+3.74

19.85

+3.65

19.38

+4.17

19.96

+3.54

Sealift and Airlift

1.14

0

1.27

+.21

1.15

-.10

1.38

-.13

1.17

0

.87

-.11

Reserve & Natl. Guard

1.78

-.05

1.80

+.66

1.80

+.72

1.80

+.72

1.80

+.69

1.80

+.68

Research & Development

4.29

+.24

5.42

+1.72

5.96

+1.73

6.56

+2.36

7.21

+4.13

7.93

+3.99

Service-Wide Support

10.82

+.01

11.06

+1.97

11.06

+1.71

11.06

+1.55

11.05

+1.67

11.07

+1.63

Department of Defense

.56

0

.68

+.06

.64

+.06

.63

+.07

.61

+.06

.61

+.05

Retired Pay

.92

0

1.01

0

1.15

0

1.29

0

1.43

0

1.57

0

MAP

1.60

0

1.70

0

1.70

0

1.70

0

1.70

0

1.70

0

Miscellaneous

0

 

.50

 

.50

 

.50

 

.50

 

.50

 

Gross Total

50.44

+.94

54.21

+9.97

54.16

+10.28

53.98

+12.31

52.44

+15.38

52.69

+13.29

Net reduction to be obtained from refinement of cost estimates and elimination of non-essentials

0

 

-3.00

 

-3.00

 

-3.00

 

-3.00

 

-3.00

 

Net Total

50.44

+.94

51.21

+12.47

51.16

+12.78

50.98

+14.81

49.44

+17.88

49.69

+15.79

/a/Column I lists the amounts recommended by the Secretary of Defense. Column II shows the amounts by which the recommendations of the Services exceed those of the Secretary of Defense.

/b/The financial estimates for the proposed force levels for the years 1964 through 1967 may be understated because they do not provide for increases in military pay and allowances and they may not include adequate allowances for new projects to be initiated during these years. To some extent, such increases should be offset by savings from increased efficiency throughout the Department.

The FY 1963 manpower implications of the recommended forces are shown in the following table.

Authorized Strength

 

End-FY 1962                                                     End-FY 1963

 

Jan. Budget

As Amended/a/

Service  Proposals

Sec/Def Recommendations-

Army

870,000

1,008,000

1,092,700

929,000

Navy

625,000

657,000

685,000

640,600

Marine Corps

175,000

190,000

194,259

190,000

Air Force

822,900

881,307

886,000

848,000

Totals

2,492,900

2,736,307

2,857,959

2,607,600

/a/Does not include the 2 National Guard divisions and supporting forces, with a total strength of approximately 74,000 men, called to active duty on October 15, 1961.

As the table indicates, the manning levels I am recommending are lower than the Service proposals for FY 1963. In part, this is because my recommended programs for FY 1963 call for fewer combat units than the Service proposals. It also reflects my judgment that unit manning levels slightly lower than those proposed by the Services are adequate.

Because a program review of this character and the establishment of a five-year program is an innovation in the Department of Defense, many of the cost estimates used in arriving at these totals are approximate, and in some cases high. They will be carefully refined during the budget review in October and November, and I expect the totals to be reduced somewhat. Moreover, until the program is actually executed, it is to be considered as tentative and for planning purposes only, and I will recommend changes as circumstances demand. I believe, nevertheless, that it is important to have at all times a framework of realistic 5-10 year programs, however tentative, to insure that the Services and agencies of the Department are working on common assumptions in conformity with national policy and objectives.

In this memorandum, I discuss the force levels I am recommending, and the reasons for my decisions, program by program. The tables which introduce each section summarize my recommendations. In those cases in which the program I am recommending differ from those proposed by the Services, the latter are shown in red beneath mine./2/

/2/Printed in italics.

[Here follow a table and notes identical to the table entitled "Recommended Forces" in Document 46.]

In addition to these forces, I will recommend at a later date that the Air Force be authorized to procure and operate a secure command and control system for SAC. Except for 20 KC-135's which will be available for use as airborne command posts, the cost of this system has not been included in the figures on page 2.

The forces I am recommending have been chosen to provide the United States with the capability, in the event of deliberate Soviet nuclear attack to do the following: first, to strike back against Soviet bomber bases, missile sites, and other installations associated with long-range nuclear forces in order to reduce Soviet power and limit the damage that can be done to us by vulnerable Soviet follow-on forces; while, second, to hold in protected reserve forces capable of destroying Soviet urban society, if necessary, in a controlled and deliberate way. With the recommended forces, I am confident that we will be able, at all times, to deny the Soviet Union the prospect of either a military victory or of knocking out the U.S. retaliatory force.

The forces I am recommending will provide major improvements in the quality of our strategic posture: in its survivability, its flexibility, and its ability to be used in a controlled and deliberate way under a wide range of contingencies.

Over the five years 1963-67, the cost of the aircraft and missiles recommended by the Air Force and the Polaris recommended by the Navy exceeds the cost of the forces I am recommending by approximately $10 billion. However, the extra capability provided by the individual Service proposals runs up against strongly diminishing returns and yields very little in terms of target destruction. In my judgment, it is not an increment worth the cost of $10 billion over the five year period.

Because of the special importance of these forces, I am including a detailed analysis of their capabilities as Appendix I to this report./3/

/3/Document 46.

II. General War Defensive Forces

Recommended Forces and Programs

 

 

 

End

Fiscal

Year

 

 

1962

1963

1964

1965

1966

1967

Air Defense Interceptors

900

863

851

839

821

807

 

906

843

787

702

684

642

Nike-Hercules Battalions/a/

34

34

34

34

34

34

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

Nike-Zeus Batteries

--

--

--

--

--

12

Bomarc Squadrons

8

8

8

8

8

8

 

 

 

12

15

15

15

/a/Includes Army National Guard Battalions.

Moreover, I recommend the following program decisions:

a. Disapproval of an Air Force proposal to buy 200 additional F-106 interceptors, at a cost of more than $600 million, to replace 10 F-102 squadrons.

b. Continued operation of the Seaward Extensions of the DEW Line throughout the period. The Navy had proposed phase-out of the patrol aircraft and picket ships in 1964 and 1965.

c. Continuation of the Ground Environment (control and warning system), though with maximum reorientation to meet the defense problems of the mid-1960's. The cost of this program will be about $888 million in 1963, declining to $813 million in 1967.

d. Continuation of the BMEWS missile warning system as proposed by the Air Force.

e. Approval, for planning purposes, of a $400 million a year Civil Defense program.

Basis for Recommendation

The existing continental air defense system is based on a concept developed in the early 1950's and was designed to meet the threat anticipated in the mid and late 1950's, that is, mass raids of many hundreds of bombers. By itself, it is inadequate to defend the United States in the mid-1960's because it deals with only part of the threat. Moreover, two developments have rendered it inappropriate as an anti-bomber defense system for the mid-1960's--the mass bomber threat has failed to materialize, and the ICBM has become the major danger.

It now appears that the largest likely raid size that we might have to face will be on the order of 200 to 300 bombers. This is a consequence of several factors, including, first, the size of the Soviet bomber force which now comprises about 150 heavy bombers and about 1,000 medium bombers, many of which would have to serve as tankers; second, the problems facing the Soviets in avoiding giving us advance warning of attack by large-scale bomber activities; and third, the fact that we will have a large Minuteman force capable of destroying the Soviet bomber bases and the aircraft on them, thus cutting off follow-up attacks after the first wave.

The present anti-bomber air defense system is highly vulnerable to ICBM attack. Its control is centralized in 22 soft direction centers, 8 of which are on SAC bases. By diverting a small fraction of their ICBM force to defense suppression, the Soviets could effectively paralyze our air defense system. Moreover, of the 38 air defense interceptor bases in the U.S., 25 are co-located with SAC. Thus most of our air defense system would be destroyed as a by-product of a missile attack on SAC.

For these reasons, I believe the anti-bomber air defense system should be reoriented, to the maximum extent possible, to give it a capability to survive ICBM attack, by such means as back-up control and dispersal of interceptors, while sacrificing to some extent its capacity to deal with mass raids.

The existing air defense system does not defend against two major parts of the nuclear threat to the United States: fallout and ballistic missiles. Without adequate fallout protection, any attempt at active defense of the population of the U.S. is doomed to failure. For example, without fallout protection, even a missile attack on SAC that avoided cities would probably result in the deaths of 50 to 100 million Americans. Therefore, a major fallout protection program should have high priority, and we propose to utilize the major portion of the $400 million budgeted for Civil Defense for this purpose.

The problem of anti-ballistic missile defenses is complex and difficult. It is clear that an impenetrable defense is not feasible at any reasonable cost. There are too many advantages on the side of the offense. However, short of that unattainable goal, a limited anti-ballistic missile defense can achieve some very useful benefits for the United States, including improved protection of key decision centers from surprise missile attack, reduced vulnerability to accidental missile launching, etc. Therefore, I am recommending procurement and deployment of Nike-Zeus defenses for six cities, at a cost of approximately $3.5 billions over the period 1963-1967. The reasons underlying this recommendation are discussed in detail in Appendix II to this report./4/

/4/Document 48.

III. General Purpose Forces

My recommended force structure and procurement levels, and those proposed by the Services, are summarized in the following tables. The Service proposals would cost $3.3 billion more in FY `63 and $18.4 billion more over the FY `63-FY `67 period than the program I am recommending.

 

 

End Fiscal Years

 

1962 Pre-Berlin

1963

1964

1965

1966

1967

Army

 

 

 

 

 

 

Divisions

14

14

14

14

14

14

Brigades

5/a/

7

7

7

7

7

 

 

8

8

8

8

8

Air Force

 

 

 

 

 

 

Tactical Aircraft/b/

1179

1327

1498

1577

1588

1567

 

 

1302

1311

1329

1329

1254

Tactical Missiles

126

36

36

36

36

36

 

 

144

144

144

144

144

Navy

 

 

 

 

 

 

Attack Carriers (CVA)

15

15

15

15

15

15

 

 

16

16

16

16

16

ASW Carriers (CVS)

9

9

9

9

9

9

 

 

10

10

10

10

10

Other Ships

760

804

800

791

783

765

 

 

841

835

828

828

819

Operating Aircraft

2917

2816

2826

2862

2863

2877

 

 

3150

3216

3282

3299

3327

Marine Corps

 

 

 

 

 

 

Division/Wing Teams

3

3

3

3

3

3

Operating Aircraft

1123

1130

1098

1096

1132

1139

/a/Includes an armored-command and non-divisional battle group that will be reorganized as brigades in late FY `62 or FY `63.Tactical Fighters and Bombers, unit equipment aircraft only.

/b/Tactical Fighters and Bombers, unit equipment aircraft only.

Selected Items of Procurement
Fiscal Years (Millions of Dollars)

 

1962

1963

1964

1965

1966

1967

Army Equip. & Matériel/b/

2609

2600

2600

2600

2600

2600

 

 

3500

3500

3498

3382

3224

Navy Ships

 

 

 

 

 

 

Oblig. Authority

1407

1998

1907

2570

2219

2311

 

 

2721

2945

3482

3405

3435

No. of New Ships

21

22

29

50

56

59

 

 

38

60

67

80

80

No. of Conversions

21

32

36

18

1

1

 

 

29

12

5

 

 

Naval & Marine Aircraft

 

 

 

 

 

 

Oblig. Authority/c/

1219

1391

1363

1453

1566

1472

 

 

2366

2425

2214

2128

2000

No. of Aircraft

783

897

872

931

974

914

 

 

1486

1471

1458

1389

1330

Air Force Tactical Fighters& Bombers

 

 

 

 

 

 

Oblig. Authority/c/

382

565

485

299

290

382

 

335

468

473

496

 

 

No. of Aircraft

262

461

383

116

132

191

 

192

251

239

226

 

 

/b/Army procurement includes that required for Reserve and National Guard, and a small amount for Continental Air Defense.

/c/Flyaway costs only.

The recommendations shown above assume that the immediate danger of conflict over Berlin will have moderated by next summer and the reserve units called to active duty for this contingency can be returned to inactive status.

To meet the Berlin crisis, it was necessary to increase the forces by calling-up reserves and by retaining weapon systems previously scheduled for phase-out. Often only small improvements in effectiveness resulted from these increases. For FY 1963 to FY 1967, effectiveness can be increased more efficiently by improving quality rather than increasing quantity. Furthermore, reserve units returned to inactive status will be available for another emergency with improved readiness resulting from their current tours of active duty, and from the "reserve readiness improvement program".

In reviewing the Service proposals, one of my objectives has been to direct effort towards the creation of more effective non-nuclear forces that will widen the range of military actions open to the United States in future international crises.

The broad policies I propose for strengthening our conventional capabilities are as follows: (1) to concentrate on improving the equipment of the Army and the readiness of Selected Army reserve forces rather than undertaking a major increase in size of the active Army; (2) to strengthen our land based tactical air, which is now seriously inadequate for support of the ground forces; (3) to maintain a Navy which, together with the Naval forces of our allies, will continue the effective control of the seas we now possess--especially in a non-nuclear conflict.

The following sections summarize my major recommendations for the General Purpose Forces of each Service.

Army

The Army proposed a force of 16 divisions, 8 brigades, and an end fiscal 1963 active personnel strength of 1,092,700. I recommend 14 divisions, 7 brigades, and a 1963 personnel strength of 929,000. The force proposed by the Army would cost approximately $860 million per year more than the strength which I recommend. While the number of divisions in my recommended force would be the same as in FY 1961, Army personnel would be 52,000 greater. This increase would permit three major changes.

First, the three active divisions which, prior to the Berlin crisis trained recruits, would remain free of these duties and be retained in a combat ready status. As a result, there would be six Army divisions in the U.S. available for immediate deployment, rather than the pre-Berlin three, and all 14 active divisions would be combat ready. In my judgment, the six U.S. based active divisions and the priority National Guard divisions would provide an adequate strategic reserve for deployment to limited war theaters or for initial augmentation of our NATO forces.

Second, two separate airborne brigades, one for the Pacific and one for Europe, will be activated to provide increased theater reserves.

Third, recent increases in the training establishment will be maintained to provide a basis for the rapid future expansion of the active Army. In addition, the Army will be reorganized under the ROAD 65 concept to increase its flexibility for meeting a wide variety of combat situations throughout the world.

With regard to the procurement of Army equipment, I recommend a level of $2.6 billion. This is about the same level as in the post-Berlin FY `62 budget, and about $1 billion more than in the FY `62 budget proposed by the previous administration. It is, however, $900 million less than the amount requested by the Army and supported by the Joint Chiefs.

The $2.6 billion I recommend reflects three judgments. First, the procurement of nuclear systems for the Army should be maintained at approximately the level of recent budgets rather than increased as the Army proposes. Second, all non-nuclear items of equipment representing a significant advance in performance can be procured at reasonable rates within a $2.6 billion funding level. Third, Army inventories should be maintained at a level adequate to support 88 division-months of combat operations, as will be discussed further on page 15./5/

/5/Reference is to the section below entitled "Logistic Guidance."

As noted in the discussion of the Research and Development Program, I recommend large increases in the research program for non-nuclear weapons. These increases should result in substantial progress in this critical area. The guidance issued to the Army indicates that the level of $2.6 billion for materiel will be increased if required to procure markedly superior items when they become available.

Navy and Marine Corps

For combat ships, I recommend returning to the pre-Berlin force levels. This will mean a force of 15 rather than 16 attack carriers and 9 rather than 10 anti-submarine carriers, and a return to inactive status of the aircraft and destroyers called from the reserves. The Joint Chiefs also recommend a force of 15 attack carriers, but otherwise favor retention of the FY `62 force levels for FY `63. My recommendation reflects the view that these additional Naval forces, which would cost $200 million in FY `63, would provide only a small increase in the combat effectiveness of our Armed Forces.

For logistics and amphibious ships, however, I recommend (as do the Navy and Joint Chiefs) that the ships added to the active fleet/6/ in FY `62 be retained for FY `63. The 13 additional logistics ships will permit a much needed increase in the flexibility of fleet operations. The 26 amphibious ships will continue to provide transport and an assault landing capability for one Marine division in each ocean. By late FY `63 the Marines also will have in each ocean a capability for landing 1/3 of a division by helicopter. This represents a considerable increase in mobility from the pre-Berlin period when amphibious lift was limited to one division in the Pacific and 1/2 of a division in the Atlantic, and included much less capability for helicopter landings.

/6/These ships were obtained either by recommissioning from the Reserve Fleet or by retaining ships previously scheduled for phase-out. [Footnote in the source text.]

With respect to shipbuilding, my recommended program includes a conventionally powered attack carrier to be funded in FY `63. This ship will replace one of the smaller carriers in FY `67, and will provide a considerably improved capability for operating high performance aircraft. The Joint Chiefs did not reach an agreed position on building this carrier. The Chiefs of Staff of both the Army and Air Force questioned the advisability of funding a carrier in FY `63.

The Navy proposed that this carrier and a number of other large surface combatant ships in its FY `63-`67 building program be nuclear powered (the incremental construction cost of nuclear power for a carrier amounts to about $100 million). I recommend nuclear power for only one of these ships, a frigate to be funded in FY `63. This ship, together with the nuclear powered ships built or building, will provide a one-carrier all-nuclear task force to meet occasional specialized needs for increased endurance. With this exception, I do not believe the extra expense of nuclear power for surface ships is justified at this time. At present, a nuclear powered surface ship costs on the average about 1-1/2 times as much to build and to operate as a conventionally powered ship and offers only relatively minor increases in effectiveness over its conventional counterpart. This is in contrast to submarines where nuclear power has made possible an entirely new mode of operations.

I am also recommending that conversions be substituted for some of the new construction proposed by the Navy and amphibious ships and small destroyers. These conversions offer an inexpensive way of obtaining an early increase in capability. In contrast with the three to four year lead time for new ship construction, conversions can be completed in a year or less.

My recommendations for procurement of Naval and Marine aircraft in FY `63 represent an increase of $172 million over the FY `62 level. It represents, however, a reduction of $975 million from the Navy FY `63 proposal. In my judgment, the increase over FY `62 that I am recommending will provide an adequate level of Naval air power.

Air Force

Neither the Air Force nor the Joint Chiefs propose retaining in FY `63 the Air National Guard tactical squadrons now on active duty. These squadrons have aircraft of lower performance than regular Air Force squadrons and are generally less effective relative to their cost. I recommend that these squadrons be released from active duty after the Berlin issue has been resolved.

The Air Force proposes adding only 150 aircraft to the pre-Berlin levels of 1,179 squadron aircraft./7/ This is not enough aircraft. One of the weaknesses revealed by the Berlin crisis has been a shortage of tactical aircraft in a non-nuclear conflict. The 1,329 aircraft proposed by the Air Force would provide about 80 aircraft per division (or its brigade equivalent) for the Army's 14 divisions and 7 brigades. In contrast, Marine Division-Wing Teams have about 180 tactical aircraft. Furthermore, Marine aircraft have only close support of ground troops as their primary mission, whereas Air Force fighter-bombers have three major missions: air superiority, long-range interdiction, and close support. Finally, aircraft have long lead times so that procurement cannot be postponed until a crisis. I recommend, therefore, a procurement program that will raise the total in squadron service by FY `66 to about 1,580 aircraft, 250 more than proposed by the Air Force.

/7/Numbers cited in this section are for squadron aircraft only. In addition, aircraft would be procured for command support, training, test and attrition. [Footnote in the source text.]

The number of aircraft required is closely related to the type of aircraft to be procured. The Air Force favors exclusive reliance on the multi-purpose fighter-bomber. This aircraft type costs at least twice as much to buy and operate as the single-purpose close support type. Substituting single purpose aircraft on a two for one basis for some of the multi-purpose types would provide a larger mixed force for the same over-all cost. It is important, however, that a mixed force of this kind contain sufficient aircraft capable of air superiority and deep interdiction missions, as well as close support. With these considerations in mind, I recommend a force of about 1,580 tactical aircraft, consisting of 400 single purpose close support aircraft and 1,180 multi-purpose fighters (738 of which are F-105's, the newest of the multi-purpose aircraft). The Air Force program would have provided only 1,330 multi-purpose aircraft including 882 F-105's.

For aerial tactical reconnaissance and surveillance, I recommend that the funds proposed by the Air Force be included in the FY `63 budget. However, I am directing the Air Force to submit a new program which will better meet the needs of both the Army and Air Force for reconnaissance and surveillance.

Logistic Guidance

I have also directed that revised logistic assumptions be used by the Services in preparing their budgets. The new general planning base for all three Services is designed to provide logistical support for an average of 6 calendar months of a major conventional war. For the supply of the forces beyond six months, we shall rely largely upon industrial production.

We now have a serious imbalance in the inventories of the three Services and among the items of any one Service. The six calendar month objective will be consistently applied to all items and all Services, but with modifications to reflect the deployment patterns of each. Because of time required to commit the entire force, six calendar months of combat requires fewer months of full combat support.

For the Army, the new guidance of 88 division months of combat operation is based upon a 22 Division force engaged for four combat months in a conventional war.

For the Marines, a force of 4 Divisions would be provided logistical support for 20 division months of combat operations.

In the case of the Navy, the comparable support for 6 calendar months assumes an average of approximately 50 per cent of the active fleet engaged in combat during the same period.

A serious imbalance has existed between the logistic planning for the ground forces and their necessary tactical air support. The logistic guidance for tactical air support is now to be consistent with that for the ground units they should support. As an interim objective for FY `63, the Air Force is being directed to acquire a minimum on hand capability of at least three months of combat support. In view of the grave deficiencies in non-nuclear ordnance for tactical aircraft, I am recommending the specific inclusion of $500 million in the FY `63 Air Force budget for non-nuclear ordnance.

IV. Sealift and Airlift Forces

The force structure I am recommending is summarized in the following table.

End-Fiscal Year

 

1962

1963

1964

1965

1966

1967

Airlift ( No. of UE Aircraft)

 

 

 

 

 

 

C-97

48

-

-

-

-

-

C-118

95

80

48

-

-

-

 

 

 

 

32

 

 

C-121

60

56

32

-

-

-

 

 

60

 

32

 

 

C-123

80

64

-

-

-

-

C-124

300

216

216

216

120

36

 

 

220

220

167

76

 

C-130

240

320

448

448

448

384

C-133

44

44

44

44

40

40

C-135

42

42

42

42

42

38

Cargo Jet

-

-

-

48

96

144

 

 

 

 

0

0

0

C-141/a/

-

-

-

-

48

96/b/

 

 

 

 

32

80

128

Troop Carrier

492

456

520

520

648

612

 

 

444

444

408

412

420

MATS

417

366

310

278

146

126

 

 

386

390

390

274

206

Total

909

822

830

798

794

738

 

 

830

834

 

686

626

Sealift (No. of Active Ships)

 

 

 

 

 

 

Troopships

16

-

-

-

-

-

 

 

16

16

16

16

16

Roll-on/Roll-off Cargo Ships

1

1

1

2

3

4/c/

Other Cargo Ships

59

58

58

57

56

55

Tankers

24

24

24

24

24

24

Total

100

83

83

83

83

83

 

 

99

99

99

99

99

/a/The difference between my recommended C-141 program and that of the Air Force in 1965- 1967 reflects a more conservative estimate of date of availability, not a difference in program objectives. The eventual total I am recommending is lower than that proposed by the Air Force because I am including a fleet of Cargo Jets in my program.

/b/Increases to 144 in FY 1968.

/c/Increases to a total of 6 in FY 1969.

The Services have developed the following general deployment objectives, which I have approved, for use in estimating our sea and airlift requirements for limited war in remote areas:

a. One airborne brigade with essential combat equipment to any employment area within three days (by airlift).
b. One division (including the above brigade) within seven to ten days (by airlift).
c. One additional division within four weeks (by airlift).
d. The complete equipment of the two-division force within forty-five days (by sealift).
e. Three fighter bomber squadrons and support units to any employment area within one week (by airlift).
f. Seven additional fighter bomber squadrons within four weeks (by airlift).
g. Logistic support for air and ground forces until surface resupply is established (by airlift).

In addition, continued logistic support of the permanent theatre forces would have to be provided. (A two division amphibious lift for the Marine Corps was provided in Package III.)

At present our potential military response is constrained by the limited capability of the current airlift forces and by the current basing and support posture, and is not able to meet the above objectives. My recommendations for meeting this deficiency are to increase both the airlift forces and the theatre stocks of vehicles and consumables.

Pre-stocking of theatre supply points, and airlift directly from the United States, are close substitutes in terms of providing quickly the equipment and supplies needed for combat operations in remote areas. Current deployment concepts, implicit in the Service objectives, specify the airlift and sealift of the above forces from the continental United States. While there are advantages to this concept, an airlift force with four times the current capability would be needed to meet our requirements.

By using theatre stockage, however, we can greatly increase the effective capabilities of the airlift and sealift forces. Nevertheless, for a variety of reasons we cannot afford to rely completely on this approach. The airlift and sealift forces I am recommending, therefore, reflect a choice to use theatre stocks whenever possible, but also to provide a substantial capability for deployment from the United States in the event those stocks cannot be used or have not been established. The cost of this pre-stockage program would be only about 10 per cent of that needed to procure and operate the additional aircraft required under an all-United States deployment concept.

The recommended program is designed to meet all of the objectives listed above. A capability is provided to deploy one airborne division to the Middle East or Southeast Asia within seven days, if a one brigade force from this division plus resupply for the full division is airlifted from the theatre. Alternatively, one division can be deployed from the United States to any area within ten days, with no support from theatre resources.

In addition to these general conclusions, certain aspects of the recommended forces deserve special comment:

The recommended program brings into the force at a relatively early point substantial numbers of additional transport aircraft.

Airlift squadrons are shifted from the high utilization-high cost air transport force where they are surplus to our requirements to the lower cost troop carrier force. Peak short-response readiness is thereby improved while appreciable savings in operating costs are achieved.

Construction of 5 Comet roll-on/roll-off ships at the rate of one a year is begun in FY `63. When deliveries begin in FY `65, each will replace one general purpose cargo ship now in the active fleet. This will give us a new and valuable capability for rapid loading and unloading of vehicles, particularly where port facilities are limited.

With respect to the balance of the cargo, tanker, and troop ship fleet, I see no need at this time for the construction of replacement vessels. The marginal gains which might be achieved because of their faster cruising speed are completely outweighed by the very substantial expenditure involved. When needed, the service life of the existing vessels can be extended by a "FRAM-type" overhaul program.

I have been unable to identify a military contingency for which the strategic sealift of troops would be necessary or desirable. In an emergency our commercial air fleet alone could airlift more troops than our forces are prepared to deploy. Deployment by air would also provide a faster initial response and shorter transit time.

In routine peacetime operations the movement of almost all personnel overseas by air could result in direct financial savings. Furthermore, the effectiveness of our forces would be augmented by providing the equivalent of 10-15,000 more man years through reduced transit and collection time. I am considering therefore, the retirement of all 16 troop ships now in the active fleet.
 

 V. Reserve and National Guard Forces

My recommended Program, and the Service-proposed programs for FY `63 are summarized in the following table:

 

                                     Fiscal Years

Army

Navy

Marine Corps

Air Force

1962

1963

1962

1963

1962

1963

1962

1963

Annual Obligational Authority (Millions of Dollars)

911

911

218

228

115

129

531

531

Paid Drill Strength (Thousands of Men)

700

700

125

125

  46

  51

136

136

For the Navy, I recommend an increase of $10 million above the 1962 level for operation and maintenance of the ships to be returned from active to reserve status. The Marine Corps program provides an increase of 5,000 in paid drill personnel to strengthen the Reserve Marine Division/Wing Team and to provide general augmentation of the active Fleet Marine Forces during a crisis. With these expectations, the program I recommend continues the FY `62 levels of obligational and paid drill strength.

The recent Reserve call-ups have prevented my making decisions on the details of the Reserve and National Guard programs for FY `63 or developing a firm program for FY 1964 to FY 1967. I recommend, however, the placing of greater emphasis on the readiness of high priority units needed for immediate augmentation of the active forces during periods of increased international tension. Furthermore, I intend to ensure that the improved readiness of units released from active duty is maintained.

VI. Research and Development

The programs I am recommending, and those proposed by the Services, are summarized in the following table:

Total Obligational Authority
($ Billions)

 

FY 62

FY 63

FY 64

FY 65

FY 66

FY 67

Basic Research

0.179

0.200

0.220

0.242

0.266

0.293

 

 

.250

.266

.281

.301

.313

Applied Research & Adv. Technology

1.059

1.355

1.477

1.515

1.555

1.647

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

Space (Including National Space Programs)

1.025

1.428

1.610

1.787

2.201

2.406

Advent

.072

.090

.090

.050

.025

.010

 

 

.056

.016

-

-

-

Transit

.023

.046

.023

.016

.013

.011

 

 

.048

.019

.014

.011

.009

Midas

.201

.100

.160

.095

.060

.040

 

.206

.432

.370

.285

.250

.226

Samos

.287

.332

.280

.210

.160

.160

 

 

.402

.380

.360

.360

.360

Dynasoar

.100

.125

.125

.121

.083

.018

 

.176

.191

.145

 

 

 

Saint

.026

.040

.007

-

-

-

 

 

.051

.037

.143

.479

.286

Discoverer

.055

.055

.055

-

-

-

Atlantic & Pacific Missile Ranges

.339

.407

.327

.336

.365

.382

 

.332

.420

.427

.398

.423

.428

Other

.094

.284

.337

.266

.173

.101

 

.086

.644

.616

.927

1.581

1.520

Total Space

1.197

1.479

1.404

1.094

.879

.722

 

1.263

2.299

2.065

2.248

3.187

2.847

Missiles

 

 

 

 

 

 

Mauler

.028

.050

.013

.006

-

-

 

 

.114

.106

.220

.151

.025

Shilleagh (Incl. Back-up)

.019

.044

.034

.024

.010

.008

 

 

.019

.009

.014

 

 

Typhon

.045

.072

.052

.038

.019

.014

 

 

 

.077

.124

.195

.316

Follow-on/Polaris

.010

.015

.040

.150

.300

.300

 

-

-

-

.070

.110

.130

Mid-Range Ballistic Missile

-

.040

.125

.160

.050

.050

 

 

.041

.154

.274

.236

.190

Other

.129

.192

.267

.306

.352

.286

 

.131

.352

.661

.894

1.636

1.784

Total Missiles

.231

.413

.531

.684

.731

.658

 

.273

.598

1.007

1.596

2.338

2.453

Aircraft

 

 

 

 

 

 

B-70

.220

.171

.076

.034

-

-

 

.450

.594

.538

.818

1.423

1.875

VTOL Utility Act

.018

.036

.030

.021

.004

.004

 

 

.016

.026

.014

 

 

Aerial Crane

-

.020

.025

.020

.015

.015

Other Aircraft

.014

.046

.094

.096

.122

.141

 

 

.040

.079

.098

.142

.216

Total Aircraft

.252

.273

.225

.171

.141

.160

 

.482

.670

.668

.950

1.584

2.110

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

Command & Control, Com- Munications & Intelligence

.146

.228

.309

.312

.252

.234

 

.143

.368

.444

.404

. 303

.295

Conventional War Armaments

.346

.415

.539

.546

.402

.456

 

.340

.404

.543

.590

.423

.476

Remote Area Limited Warfare (Special OSD Add-On)

-

.100

.100

.100

.100

.100

Management & Support

.875

.956

.974

.971

.981

1.001

 

 

1.126

1.087

1.060

1.016

1.019

OSD Development Planning Increment

-

-

.182

.922

1.906

2.663

Total R&D

4.285

5.419

5.961

6.557

7.213

7.934

 

4.530

7.413

7.690

8.910

11.353

11.919

My recommendations are based on the following principles:

1. Space-oriented system projects, as contrasted with component development projects, must have either an immediate military use or a reasonable and foreseeable possibility must exist for such use. In addition, DOD must support the National Space Program, according to the NASA-DOD agreements.

2. The B-70 has not been approved as a full weapon system.

3. A substantial R&D effort should be aimed at insuring the safety and the flexibility of employment of nuclear weapons, and at reducing dependence on vulnerable parts of the weapon systems during and after an enemy attack.

4. Joint Army, Navy, Air Force R&D, as exemplified by the agreements reached in connection with the VTOL, VAX and TFX aircraft, should be encouraged; high-altitude drones should be considered from a similar joint point of view.

5. The Army should be given a sharp increase in funding for limited and sub-limited warfare to improve an existing situation that is very unbalanced.

6. It is not possible to support prudent R&D funding levels four or five years hence solely on the basis of those projects which have sufficient validity to warrant even tentative approval at this time. Accordingly, an OSD Development Planning Increment should be added in FY 1964 through FY 1967 to arrive at realistic R&D resource demand levels. As R&D planning progresses this item should be reduced, reaching zero for the annual budget under review in each future year.

7. Basic research is important and the amount of money devoted to it should be increased.

8. The distribution of funds between the Exploratory Development and Systems has been reviewed and the funds devoted to Systems have been decreased in order to delay initiation of large programs until the necessary technology is established. For this reason, among others, a number of proposed new systems, such as extended Pershing, Field Army Ballistic Missile Defense, Typhon II (a Navy anti-aircraft anti-missile system), Space Counter Weapon System, and others have been eliminated. On the other hand increased effort should be placed on technologies required for such items as penetration aides, guidance for mobile ballistic missiles, reconnaissance-strike aircraft, anti-tank weapons, communications, command and control, etc.

The following are some of the highlights of the R&D program.

Space (Including DoD participation in the National Space Program.)

About 20 percent of the total DoD R&D dollars are currently programmed for space projects and systems through FY 1964. Although the levels appear to decline beyond FY 1964, new developments or success in current programs could actually result in increases. Funds for DoD support of the National Space Program are included in these areas.

The costs for the Atlantic and Pacific Missile Ranges comprise about one-quarter of the space R&D funds. Large current R&D programs are Discoverer, Midas, Samos and Advent, a communications satellite. Navigational satellites similar to Transit, an outgrowth of the satellite interceptor program and man in space projects evolving from NASA programs and Dynasoar might become quite important militarily. In the event that military requirements for manned spaced vehicles were to appear substantial, increases in R&D funding could be required during the latter half of this decade.

Missiles

In FY 1962 and FY 1963 R&D for missiles of all types represents about 30 per cent of the total R&D budget. The fraction of the R&D budget allocated to missiles may be reduced in FY 1964 and subsequent years but the funding levels will probably not drop as low as indicated. Some OSD Development Planning Increment funds will undoubtedly be programmed into this area.

Strategic missile R&D will decline rather sharply after FY 1963 reflecting the comparatively small number of new programs anticipated in this area. Conceivably this decline could be reversed if unexpected Soviet developments indicate much greater vulnerability of, or lack of penetrability by our missiles. Current R&D programs include funds to improve the penetration capabilities and reliability of those missiles still in development. R&D funds are also included for an improved longer range Polaris and possible follow-on, for increased flexibility in Minuteman, to retain the option of a decision for early deployment of mobile Minuteman, and to begin development of a highly accurate, fast reacting, mobile, Mid-Range Ballistic-Missile. The MRBM would cost approximately $500 million to develop. Such an expenditure appears warranted in view of:

1. The "range gap" in our present missile program between the Pershing, with a range of 350 miles, and our long-range ICBM's.

2. The possible need to replace the nuclear armed fighter-bombers with a missile as the aircraft become more vulnerable to attack, both on the ground and in the air.

3. The large number of Soviet missiles with ranges between 300 and 2,000 miles.

Funds are programmed for a family of tactical missiles ranging from the Shillelagh (and a back-up anti-tank missile) to Pershing. Air defense missiles include a forward area self-propelled missile (Mauler) and several air-to-air missiles; Typhon is a ship-launched missile with a surface target capability. A number of other missiles of all types are being studied extensively within the three Services.

Aircraft

The B-70 continues as a development program with an estimated development cost of $1.3 billion. A tri-Service fighter which is to be used for interdiction, air superiority, reconnaissance and fleet defense is to be developed in lieu of two single-service fighters, at a savings of $1 billion. A tri-Service close-support aircraft is being studied. At least one (and perhaps as many as three) design of a vertical take-off and landing utility aircraft is being planned in a tri-Service program to evaluate the VTOL concept.

R&D is proceeding on a surveillance aircraft and a light observation helicopter; other aircraft and helicopters such as the Aerial Crane are under study. A number of projects in advanced technology, e.g., the X-15 and the laminar flow research aircraft are directed toward improving our capabilities in conventional aeronautics.

[Here follow Sections VII-IX.]

 

51. Memorandum From Secretary of Defense McNamara to President Kennedy/1/

Washington, October 7, 1961.

/1/Source: Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Departments and Agencies Series, Department of Defense Budget 63, 1/61-10/61. Secret.

In a memorandum to you on 16 August 1961/2/ I recommended that the $514.5 million for additional long-range bombers, the $180 million additional for the B-70, and the $85.8 million additional for Dynosoar, appropriated by the Congress for FY 1962 not be spent. Since that time, I have received and given careful consideration to the report of the Senate Preparedness Subcommittee. I have also completed a review of U.S. requirements for long-range nuclear delivery systems, and for military space research and development, as a part of a review of the Defense program for the period 1963-1967. I remain convinced that the additional appropriations should not be spent.

/2/In this memorandum McNamara stated briefly many of the arguments set forth in the memorandum printed here. In a memorandum for the record, dated August 21, Ewell reported that Taylor discussed with McNamara Congressional increases in funds for the B-52 bomber and other programs, and informed him that the President hoped that McNamara could "find some formula by which the money could be usefully employed" because Kennedy "was under heavy political pressure to be forthcoming in this regard." McNamara had indicated to Taylor that he was "very firmly of the opinion that the money should not be spent for the purposes in the bill, and that he could see no reason at this time to change his position at a future date." (National Defense University, Taylor Papers, #11 Miscellaneous (H) 8)

Let me make clear that my reason for recommending against the procurement of an additional wing of long-range bombers is not a simple belief that bombers are becoming obsolete, either because ballistic missiles are based on more advanced technology, or because of prospective improvements in enemy air defenses. Indeed, as the Stennis Committee report pointed out, bombers can do things that missiles cannot do. As for enemy defenses, I am confident that the capability for defense suppression provided by the 1,000 air-launched missiles to be carried by alert B-52's in my recommended program will be more than enough to enable the bombers to penetrate. My main reason for recommending against more bombers is that they are soft, concentrated, and vulnerable to ICBM attack, whereas I am convinced that most of our long-range nuclear delivery forces must be either hard and dispersed or continuously mobile in peacetime, both in order to be protected from surprise missile attack and to have adequate survival potential in the wartime environment. We plan to protect the bombers by warning and alert response. Besides its "hair-trigger" aspects, this mechanism has other limitations, even if successful. First, it leaves the non-alert half of the force unprotected. Second, it leaves us no alternative but to commit essentially all of the surviving bombers to attack in the first few hours of the war or to lose their capability as they run out of fuel and as their soft bases are destroyed. Moreover, the bombers have to penetrate enemy defenses in large numbers and after "rolling back" the defenses with missiles. They cannot be used in a selective and controlled way.

For these reasons, I believe that we should concentrate our procurement funds for long-range nuclear delivery systems on hard and dispersed and mobile missiles.

This is not to say that we should not have a bomber force. Because of the special things bombers can do, we should have a mix. But we already have a large bomber force. In mid-1965, it will include 630 B-52's, 80 B-58's, and, if we do not decide to phase them out sooner, 225 B-47's. The alert B-52's and B-58's alone will be able to carry about 1,500 gravity bombs plus 1,000 air-launched missiles. The alert B-47's will be able to carry another 200 bombs. The B-52 and B-58 force will be able to be maintained substantially intact at least until 1970. These bombers can give us more than enough capability to perform the specialized tasks for which bombers are particularly well suited.

Furthermore, an examination of the target system shows that most targets, including all those of highest priority are best attacked by missiles, for several reasons. First, the existing targets are soft, fixed, and of known location, and therefore vulnerable to missile attack (though often well defended against bomber attack). Second, in the case of military targets, the missiles get there faster than do bombers, and therefore would be more effective in catching enemy bombers and missiles on the ground. Third, in the case of attacks on Soviet cities, it is clearly desirable to have the option to delay commitment, perhaps for many hours. For example, Polaris, which can be held in reserve for days if necessary, is much better than a bomber for this task.

Moreover, bombers are expensive particularly if kept on air-borne alert. The total system cost over the next five years to which we would be committing ourselves if we bought the extra B-52 wing plus supporting tankers and air-launched missiles, would be approximately $1.4 billion (assuming ground alert only). The extra 1962 appropriation would cover only the initial procurement of the bombers themselves.

Many of the same considerations apply to the B-70. It was conceived and designed in a period in which we had no ICBM or Polaris. Its design, in effect, duplicates rather than complements the ICBM force. It is predicated on the assumption that high speed is the best way to penetrate enemy defenses. This speed has made the system very expensive and quite ineffective for the special tasks for which bombers are well suited. Ironically, it now appears that prior defense suppression with missiles (e.g., B-52 with Skybolt) is a much more effective way than speed to assure penetration. The B-70 weapon system as presently designed would not really have a capability to search for targets of unknown or uncertain location, or to seek out and attack mobile targets. The Air Force is examining the use of the B-70 in a strike-reconnaissance role. However, even if it can be modified for this purpose, the changes in subsystems and doctrine would be so extensive that it does not appear reasonable to commit it to production at this time. Moreover, the problem of adequate pre-launch survival potential for bombers in the wartime environment has not been solved.

The B-70 funding request to the Congress totaled $220.0 million. This is the required 1962 budget amendments. I know of no justification for obligating an additional $85.8 million in FY 1962. There is no known military requirement for Dynosoar. There is at most merely a possibility that something of this character may be required at some time in the future. Under the circumstances, it seems to me to be best to concentrate on reducing lead time against the day when such a system might be required. The best way to do this is to reorient the project to solve the difficult technical FY 1962 increment of a $1.3 billion program extending through FY 1965 to provide and test three prototype aircraft, one of which will be equipped with a Bomb Navigation System. Under this program, flight tests of the first aircraft will begin in December 1962, with the other two aircraft to follow at nine month intervals. The program permits the continuation of essential technological development and retains the option to proceed with the development of a complete weapon system at a later date, should it be determined to be necessary. In view of the uncertainty about the need for additional long-range bombers and the suitability of the B-70, I believe that the scope of the B-70 program as contained in the FY 1962 budget request adequately meets our defense needs. To spend the extra money in 1962 would be to restore the B-70 to the Air Force proposed full scale weapon system development program. The extra cost of the Air Force program over the cost of the program I am recommending would be not only the $180 million FY 1962, but also $3 to $5 billion over the period 1963-1967.

In the case of Dynosoar, we added $30 million to expedite development in the first set of FY  problems involved in boosting a body of high lift into orbit, sustaining man in it, and recovering the vehicle at a designated place, rather than to press on with a full system development program. It has been so oriented in the past and has tended to become a full system development program of unspecified objectives. I am studying the reorientation now, and when this study is completed, I shall be able to estimate appropriate funding requirements. Until then, I believe that we should hold the extra $85.8 million. Indeed, it is not clear now that more money for Dynosoar would result in any advancement of the date of first successful manned flight.

Your approval of the above recommendations is requested./3/

/3/In an October 28 memorandum to McNamara, McGeorge Bundy reported to McNamara "what you already know," Kennedy's approval of these recommendations. (Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Departments and Agencies Series, Department of Defense Budget 63, 1/61-10/61)

Robert S. McNamara

 

52. Paper Issued by the Joint Chiefs of Staff/1/

Washington, undated.

/1/Source: Washington National Records Center, RG 330, OSD McNamara Files: FRC 71 A 3470, SIOP. Top Secret. This paper forms the appendix to an October 27 memorandum signed by Rear Admiral F. J. Blouin, Secretary of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, which distributed it for implementation to the Joint Chiefs, major commanders, and to CINCSAC in his capacity as Director of Strategic Target Planning.

National Targeting and Attack Policy For General War: Guidance For the Preparation of the Single Integrated Operational Plan (SIOP)

I. Purpose

To provide guidance for the annual preparation of capabilities plans for employment of United States nuclear offensive forces in that range of contingencies in which the United States would execute major nuclear attacks against the Sino-Soviet Bloc.

II. Scope

The Single Integrated Operational Plan (SIOP) will provide for the optimum integration of committed forces of the unified and specified commands and for coordination with appropriate external commands, for all preplanned attacks on targets the destruction or neutralization of which will accomplish the objectives enumerated in Section III, below. It will determine the DGZ's to be attacked, and the weight of effort against each installation consistent with its worth and the capabilities of committed forces.

III. Objectives

a. United States plans for nuclear offensive operations in the event of general war will be designed to achieve, in concert with other US and Allied offensive and defensive operations, the following objectives:

(1) To destroy or neutralize the military capabilities of the enemy, while retaining ready, effective and controlled US strategic capabilities adequate to assure, to the maximum extent possible, retention of US military superiority to the enemy, or any potential enemies, at any point during or after the war.

(2) To minimize damage to the US and its Allies, and in all events to limit such damage to a level consistent with national survival and independence.

(3) To bring the war to an end on the most advantageous possible terms for the United States and its Allies.

b. SIOP will contribute to the achievement of these objectives by accomplishment, as directed, of the following three tasks:

Task I: [11-1/2 lines of source text and footnote in the source text (4 lines) not declassified] Task I will also include penetration attacks essential to the accomplishment of the above. [1 line of source text not declassified]

[1 paragraph (4 lines of source text) not declassified]

Planning for accomplishment of Task I will provide for the possibility of selective withholding of all attacks [2-1/2 lines of source text and footnote in the source text (2 lines) not declassified].

Task II: The destruction or neutralization of other elements of [7 lines of source text and footnote (4 lines) in the source text not declassified]. Task II will be accomplished in such a way as to [1-1/2 lines of source text not declassified].

Planning for accomplishment of Task II will provide for the possibility of selective withholding of all Task II attacks [1 line of source text and footnote in the source text (2 lines) not declassified].

Task III: The threat or execution of controlled, deliberate, attacks [4 lines of source text not declassified] the destruction of which will most effectively reduce Sino-Soviet wartime and postwar capability and will to continue the war.

Task III attacks are to be programmed primarily for [3-1/2 lines of source text not declassified].

IV. National Strategic Target List

a. A National Strategic Target List (NSTL) will be developed and maintained by the Director of Strategic Target Planning. It will include all target installations in Tasks I, II and III.

b. The NSTL will be developed from the Target Data Inventory without regard to the magnitude of US and Allied forces available for the execution of nuclear offensive tasks in general war.

c. The NSTL will identify the target installations corresponding to Tasks I through III and indicate those programmed for attack in the SIOP.

d. The NSTL will encompass all of the targets which may require attack under any of the varying circumstances of general war engagement. There is no single combination of targets which will represent the task of nuclear offensive forces under all circumstances. The strike task to be accomplished in initial operations will depend upon the specific circumstances attending initiation.

V. Target Priorities and Expected Damage/2/

/2/Priorities in this section are to be understood in the sense of allocation of limited forces, not in the sense of time urgency. [Footnote in the source text.]

a. Expected damage, or an expectation of damage, is the average of damage that would be achieved if the attack were run many times.

b. In achieving the damage levels prescribed below, plans will take into account all pertinent operational factors including pre-launch survivability (appropriate assumptions described below), and cumulative damage effects from adjacent nuclear detonations. Expectation of damage against individual installations should be allowed to vary freely in order to take advantage of differences in target hardness and worth, enemy defenses, yields and CEP's of available weapons, and other factors. The total reduction in enemy strength from all attacks against the categories of installations listed below should approximate what would have resulted if the established expectation had been achieved against each installation.

c. Available forces will be used to maximize the achievement of the objectives of the plan. The order of target categories prescribed in d(1) below are chosen to indicate relative priorities. The expected damage levels prescribed below are neither maximum nor minimum limits to the damage to be inflicted. If programmed capabilities will not permit the achievement of the prescribed levels of damage, lower levels will be accepted, with due regard for the indicated order of priority. If programmed capabilities will permit, higher expectancies of damage against the prescribed targets and the destruction or neutralization of other targets will be achieved in such a way as best to accomplish the strike tasks.

d. In the programming of forces under all options, priority will be given to the achievement of damage as follows:

[7 paragraphs (24 lines of source text) not declassified]/3/

/3/Severe and significant damage as used throughout this document is defined in JCS Publication No. 5, 1 December 1960. [Footnote in the source text.]

(2) Programming of forces for (1) above will be done in a manner that will permit assignment of forces to Task III which are adequate to inflict significant damage./4/ [1-1/2 lines of source text not declassified]3 DGZ's for these forces will be selected in such a way as best to achieve Task III. (Floor space as such is introduced only to define the size of the forces to be allocated to Task III, not to define the targeting objectives.)

/4/Built up area may be used when tract data is not available. [Footnote in the source text.]

e. Programming of available and capable forces to other urban targets in Tasks I and III will be divided between destruction or neutralization of other military targets, and reassignment to reserve forces, in such a way as best to achieve the objectives and Tasks defined in Section III, above.

VI. Options and Flexibility

a. SIOP will be prepared in consideration of the following alternative circumstances of outbreak of war:

[2 paragraphs (14 lines of source text) not declassified]

The following pre-launch survival probabilities are provided to give an approximate quantitative expression to the intent underlying the contingencies defined above for the FY 1963 time period.

[headings not declassified]

Air Alert Aircraft and Polaris on/near Station

1

1

1

Minuteman, Titan II

1

.95

.80

Hard Atlas

1

.95

.75

Alert Carrier Aircraft (At Sea)

1

.95

.70

Ground-Alert/*/ Land-Based Aircraft (ZI)

1

.85

.50

Ground-Alert/*/ Land-Based Aircraft (Forward Area)

1

.50

.05

Titan I, Medium Atlas

1

.80

.40

Soft Atlas

1

.40

.10

Non-Alert/*/ Carrier Aircraft

.90

.70

.30

Non-Alert/*/ Land-Based Aircraft (ZI)

.80

.15

.05

Non-Alert/*/ Land-Based Aircraft (Forward Area)

.80

.05

.05

/*/Refers to normal peacetime readiness.

The Director of Strategic Target Planning will evaluate these factors in the light of the changing threat, changing composition and readiness of US forces, and the experience resulting from the Joint Strategic Target Planning Staff analyses and war gaming, and other sources, and report any changes made, with the reasons therefore, to the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

b. SIOP will provide for execution, when directed by competent authority, of the following:

Attack Option I. Execute Task I under conditions of [less than 1 line of source text not declassified] while withholding for possible subsequent use forces programmed for Tasks II and III.

Attack Option II. Execute Tasks I and II under conditions of [less than 1 line of source text not declassified] while withholding for possible subsequent use forces programmed for Task III.

/5/Attack Option III. Execute Task I under conditions of [less than 1 line of source text not declassified] while withholding for possible subsequent use forces programmed for Tasks II and III.

/5/Chances of using this Attack Option are remote and it is, therefore, to be programmed as a last priority. [Footnote in the source text.]

Attack Option IV. Execute Tasks I and II under conditions of [less than 1 line of source text not declassified] while withholding for possible subsequent use forces programmed for Task III.

Attack Option V. Execute Tasks I, II, and III under conditions of [less than 1 line of source text not declassified].

SIOP will also provide for selective withholding of attacks [less than 1 line of source text not declassified] under each Attack Option, as indicated in Section III.b., above. (For example, there should be provision under Attack Option II for selective withholding of Task II attacks from [1-1/2 lines of source text not declassified].)

c. Any conflicts which arise in force programming for the various attack choices will be resolved in favor of optimization for Attack Option V.

VII. Role of Theater Forces

a. Subject to the requirements of contingency plans and other theater requirements, unified and specified commanders will [2-1/2 lines of source text not declassified]. SIOP tasks will be the first priority commitment for SAC and Polaris under all circumstances.

b. [13-1/2 lines of source text not declassified]

c. [8-1/2 lines of source text not declassified]

VIII. Constraints

a. All plans will minimize civilian casualties and civil destruction in friendly, neutral, and satellite areas (i.e., all countries except the USSR [less than 1 line of source text not declassified] to the extent that military necessity permits.

b. In attacks to accomplish Tasks I and II, surface bursts, weapon yields and damage to population and industry will be held to a minimum consistent with military necessity.

c. Maximum permissible "expected doses" in key areas, computed as specified in "d" below are as follows:

[List (15 lines of source text) not declassified]

d. Expected doses from individual surface bursts will be determined as specified in Supplement No. 3 to WSEG Staff Study No. 46 and the mean annual templates referred to therein, which have been forwarded separately to DSTP and the commanders of unified and specified commands. The total expected dose at each key area will be determined by the following:

First obtain the expected dose from each programmed surface burst by interpolation using the mean annual templates referred to above. Then multiply each expected dose by the probability/6/ of detonation of the weapon in the target area. (This is the "probability weighted expected dose"). Finally, add all the probability weighted expected doses together to obtain the total expected dose.

/6/This is the product of a prelaunch survivability, reliability and probability of penetration to the target area. Any "dead-man fuzed" weapons should be assumed to surface burst if the delivery vehicle penetrates into enemy territory. [Footnote in the source text.]

e. In order to calculate total expected doses, it is necessary to know the detailed plans for all programmed surface bursts. This knowledge is not available until SIOP and the commanders' plans have been prepared. Initial planning for surface bursts will be based on SIOP forces not exceeding 90% of the total expected doses (see c. above) and the other forces not exceeding 10% or the difference between allowed dosage and those expected to result from SIOP strikes.

IX. Responsibilities

a. Joint Chiefs of Staff

(1) Prepare annual guidance for the SIOP which will be incorporated in the Joint Strategic Capabilities Plan.

(2) Review and approve annually the NSTL, the SIOP and the plans of the commanders of unified and specified commands.

(3) Provide a permanent JCS liaison group with the DSTP.

b. Director of Strategic Target Planning (DSTP). The DSTP will be responsible to the Joint Chiefs of Staff for the following actions:

(1) Maintain a Joint Strategic Target Planning Staff (JSTPS) according to an approved manning table and the guidance provided by the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

(2) Develop and maintain the NSTL and SIOP in conjunction with the commanders of the unified and specified commands.

(3) Resolve differences that occur during the development of SIOP; and highlight them when presenting the NSTL and SIOP to the Joint Chiefs of Staff for review and approval.

(4) Submit the NSTL and SIOP to the Joint Chiefs of Staff for approval.

(5) During the effective period of the SIOP, advise the Joint Chiefs of Staff as appropriate of any temporary inability to attain the levels of destruction or neutralization approved in the SIOP.

(6) The foregoing responsibilities of the DSTP do not include command authority over forces committed to SIOP.

c. Commanders of Unified and Specified Commands. The commanders of appropriate unified and specified commands shall:

(1) Provide permanent senior representation with the DSTP for participation in the preparation and maintenance of the NSTL and SIOP and for liaison purposes.

(2) Advise the DSTP of those forces of their commands which have an appropriate capability and which are available for commitment to the SIOP and which should be included therein.

(3) Commit forces to the SIOP, in consonance with this guidance.

(4) Program no attacks against SIOP targets unless provided for by SIOP.

X. Analysis and Review

a. DSTP will perform a set of Monte Carlo damage runs for each Attack Option and selected withholding provisions, using all pertinent operational factors, determining AGZ's, and will report the following:

(1) Destruction achieved against military targets, by target category.

(2) Destruction (casualties, fatalities, floor space)/7/ in friendly, neutral, [less than 1 line of source text not declassified] and the Soviet Union.

/7/See footnote e on page 6. [Footnote in the source text. Reference is to footnote 4 above.]

(3) Fallout radiation levels in the cities listed in Section VIII.c, above, and in the [1 line of source text not declassified].

b. DSTP will prepare an analysis of the impact on penetration and target destruction of the exercise of the option to withhold selectively penetration attacks against [less than 1 line of source text not declassified].

c. All data used in the preparation of the NSTL, SIOP, and their analysis, will be available for analysis and review by the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

XI. Effective Period

a. To the extent that there are any conflicts with other guidance, this guidance represents national policy and supersedes all other SIOP guidance.

b. The SIOP will be prepared and reviewed annually, and amended as necessary to keep the plan current.

 

53. Letter From Secretary of State Rusk to the President's Military Representative (Taylor)/1/

Washington, October 29, 1961.

/1/Source: National Defense University, Taylor Papers, T-357-69. Top Secret. A copy of the attachment to this letter is in the Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Departments and Agencies Series, Defense Budget FY 1963 1/61-10/61. According to a November 6 memorandum for the record by Major William Y. Smith of Taylor's staff, the attachment was drafted in S/P. (National Defense University, Taylor Papers, FY 63 Budget #1)

Dear Max:

I have given Bob McNamara certain comments on his excellent Memorandum to the President of September 30, 1961,/2/ dealing with FY '63 defense budgetary requirements. As I pointed out to Bob, though his memorandum adequately provides for a considerable portion of the requirements which I can foresee arising out of projected foreign policy developments, and which I referred to in my letter to him of February 4, 1961,/3/ there are still a number of questions which trouble me. I think it would be useful for you to have copies of the comments I am providing him (Attachment A), so that we might all have the opportunity to consider them further.

/2/Apparent reference to Documents 46, 48, and 50.

/3/Document 10.

I am sending identical letters to Mac Bundy and Dave Bell.

Sincerely,

Dean

 

Attachment/4/

/4/Top Secret.

General

We fully support the proposition that the U.S. should seek improvements in its strategic force which would increase its survivability, its flexibility, and its ability to be used in a controlled and deliberate way under a wide range of contingencies. This has been assured by the planned Defense program. If there is any imbalance, it would appear to be weighted on the side of strategic needs as compared with likely requirements for conventional forces arising out of potential foreign policy developments during the period covered by the budget.

If a reallocation of resources between these alternative needs seems militarily inadvisable consideration should be given to some increase in the total planned Defense budget.

Program I: General War Offensive Forces

1. Command and Control. It is strongly in our foreign policy interest that the plans and capabilities of our strategic forces be sufficiently flexible so that they could be used with discrimination in any one of a number of alternative ways, as circumstances may dictate. To this end, it is of vital importance that our command and control arrangements be sufficiently effective and well protected to permit continuous civilian control over the use of these forces during grave crises and during actual hostilities.

It is also desirable that use of tactical nuclear forces be subject to centralized effective control, both because limited use of these forces may be a significant form of political bargaining and pressure short of general war and because any such use would clearly involve a very high risk of general war. We will want to ensure that use of these weapons is not initiated without a political decision and that any such use is subject to constant and specific political control if it is begun.

We are especially interested, from this standpoint, in ensuring effective control of such front-line weapons as the Davy Crockett which we understand are to be deployed to Europe. Our concern is the greater since we doubt it will be possible to deploy these weapons to U.S. forces there, without also generating European demands for these weapons which it would be difficult to resist. (We have never been able to resist such pressures in the past.) We would suggest that you appraise the military significance of delaying deployment of these weapons to Europe until the institution of effective arrangements for their control, e.g., by means of the "permissive link," to ensure that these weapons will not be used without proper authorization by U.S. or allied front-line units.

Program II: General War Defensive Forces

2. Need to limit Soviet opportunity for exertion of diplomatic pressure by enhancing our defenses against strategic attack. As the program indicates, all available information suggests that the "Soviet efforts in the field of ballistic missile defense appear to be more ambitious than our own." /5/ Current intelligence estimates predict that this high level of Soviet effort will result in an initial operational anti-missile capability during the 63-66 period. Should the Soviets achieve an effective operational system by that time, it would afford them an opportunity for exerting immense pressures on the Western Alliance. The initial psychological impact on allies and even conceivably on the U.S. public of claiming a defense against U.S. strategic striking power would be adverse.

/5/The quotations are from Document 48.

Of even greater importance, such a capability, if not offset by U.S. technological advances, could provide a military advantage to the Soviet Union sufficient to encourage it into launching increasingly aggressive policies. Under such circumstances, the ability of U.S. foreign policy to maneuver successfully and with the necessary flexibility required to keep the U.S. out of a war while at the same time protecting U.S. vital interests, would be limited.

(a) Anti-Missile-Missile Program. As set forth at considerable length in Appendix II to the DOD Budget, /6/ Defense has decided on a limited program of Nike-Zeus production which will provide 12 batteries of such weapons, enough to defend six or seven cities, by 1967. A program of such limited size seems largely to result from serious reservations concerning the weapon's effectiveness. Despite these reservations the program is justified at least in part on the grounds that "the existence of a deployed defense may substantially increase the uncertainty at the Soviet decision making level."

/6/Document 48.

We seriously doubt that so limited a program, coming into operation as much as four years after the Soviets may have their own much more ambitious program operational, satisfactorily meets our objective. Either a substantial increase in this program should be decided upon or other alternatives explored. A much larger program, such as the 70 battery program recommended by NORAD, might considerably enhance the possibility of sowing uncertainty in the Soviet mind. Whether so ambitious a program is warranted given the added expense, largely revolves around the question of the weapon's effectiveness. The judgment as to the effectiveness of the weapon system is of course one for the Department of Defense to make. However, if the weapon is deemed not militarily effective we would seriously question the advisability of investing some $3.6 billion in the limited program of 12 batteries on the assumption this will have any appreciable effect of creating uncertainty at the Soviet decision making level. In fact I fear, quite to the contrary, the limited, time-lagging effort cannot help but be viewed as a clear indication of U.S. impotence in this field.

As to whether other avenues are open to us to offset this serious potential Soviet advantage, we take it that all current alternative missile systems are being fully explored with no current prospect of a more reliable system in sight. We would hope that no reasonable effort in this field is being restricted by virtue of budgetary unavailability.

(b)Civil Defense. There is one area, other than in the development of an effective U.S. anti-missile-missile, where we could achieve a significant neutralizing impact on any Soviet anti-missile successes. The Defense budget recognizes that an effective anti-missile system presupposes an effective civil defense, fallout shelter program. For this purpose $400 million is included in the budget. If our objective, as in the case of the anti-missile-missile, is at least in part designed to impress the Soviets with our ability for a second-strike effort in the event of a general nuclear war our effort must be large enough manifestly to provide for the survivability of significant portions of our population, war-making potential and second-strike force.

Though we are aware that a rapid increase in our previous level of civil defense activity would pose practical problems of ability to obligate funds effectively, we strongly suggest that we consider whether it is not possible to step up the level of our efforts substantially beyond the modest increase proposed in the FY '63 DOD budget. For the reasons previously stated, having an effective offset to Soviet strategic attack, will become an increasingly vital requirement for a successful future pursuance of our foreign policy objectives.

Program III: General Purpose Forces

3. Need for building an adequate level of military forces to deter non-strategic attack. U.S. preparedness efforts of prior years appear to have been inadequate in deterring limited and ambiguous Communist pressures. The prospects for the future suggest a continuance and even intensification of these limited pressures. From a foreign policy standpoint, therefore, it is desirable to remedy the past imbalance in our defense preparedness: to increase the level of resources going to deter Bloc non-strategic attack, while maintaining the present sufficiency of our strategic forces. We need readily available military force which can not only cope with actual hostilities but also serve as a clear and positive deterrent to limited aggression. In this connection, the DOD budget raises certain serious questions.

(a) Adequacy of force levels. The DOD budget actually projects a cutback in force levels, principally in the Army, below those currently approved. This is presumably based on the assumption that the Berlin crisis will have eased thereby permitting such a cutback. While not unmindful of the qualitative and even to some extent quantitative improvements which will result from the current buildup and which are maintained in the FY '63 DOD budget, we would argue that the surest method for preventing further Berlin crises, if indeed our current effort is successful, is to maintain no less than the present level. As we noted in our letter to the Secretary of Defense of June 27, 1961,/7/ the Communists have entered on a period of over-confidence. We must disabuse them, if there is not to be a risk of serious miscalculation on their part. An increase in the levels of our non-strategic forces would surely impress the Soviet government, particularly given its traditional preoccupation with ground strength. This would be due not only to the actual increase in U.S. military capability which would result but equally because it would create doubts as to the validity of Communist dogma concerning the unwillingness of democracies to shoulder long-term burdens and to accept risks as Communist states are prepared to do. Finally, and equally important, the higher the level of U.S. force capability which the crises leaves the Soviets to cope with, the more likely the Soviets are to be impressed with the disadvantages of stirring up crises, in the future.

/7/Reference is to Document 35, which was drafted on June 27.

(b) Dependence on Reservists. To some extent reliance upon call up of reservists in the event of emergency is inevitable. However, it is entirely likely that the Soviets, appreciating the difficulties inherent in the democratic process of raising forces and marshalling public opinion to meet emergencies, will periodically create crises which will present the U.S. government with increasing political difficulties in attempting to effect large-scale reserve call-ups. From a foreign policy standpoint, we must count on a continuing series of such pressures. It, therefore, seems important to plan for a higher level of available general purpose forces. It is strongly urged that consideration be given to this course of action, which would have important implications for our tactical air--as well as ground--forces.

(c) Capability to conduct Guerrilla and Counter-Guerrilla Operations. We have been concerned for some time over the need to develop a U.S. capability (i) to give advice and training and assistance to indigenous elements and (ii) to conduct guerrilla operations. Progress in this area has suffered in the past from inadequate funds as well as from a reluctance to accord a sufficient priority to such unconventional type of military activity. We are therefore delighted to see that the Department of Defense has included a special allocation of $100 million for such operations in the 63 budget. This is a move in the right direction but it leaves open the question of whether this amount, primarily to be devoted to research, is sufficient to meet the need. Our current experience in Southeast Asia demonstrates, at least in part, our inability to cope effectively with the type of ambiguous guerrilla military threat presented. We must expect an increase in such Communist activity, not only there but elsewhere--Latin America, the Middle East and Africa--and the need to combat these efforts rapidly and effectively should be given a high priority. We suggest that the Department of Defense reassess this item in light of the above with a view to substantially increasing the priority and funds accorded to it.

Program IV: Sealift and Airlift

3. Need for a Flexible and Highly Mobile Troop Delivery Capability. As suggested in our letter of February 4, 1961, increasing opportunities for the Soviets to exert military pressure along the extensive periphery of free-world borders have created the necessity for a military posture capable of rapid response to such threats. Only with such a capability can we conduct effective political negotiations without the threat of the Communists being able to bring overriding military force to bear as a means of resolving any issue in their favor. The DOD budget attempts to improve our ability to more forces rapidly to any trouble spot. However, the resultant capability, on the surface, still appears to be quite modest:

(1) one airborne brigade to employment area in 3 days,

(2) one division (including the brigade) within 7 to 10 days,

(3) a second division in 4 weeks, and,

(4) the complete equipment for this 2 division force in 45 days.

The questions we have are three-fold. First, in terms of the magnitude of force which could quickly be brought to bear by the enemy in remote areas, e.g., Southeast Asia, Korea and Iran, are we making sufficient provision to provide us with an alternative to the immediate employment of nuclear weapons (or acceptance of defeat)? Second, as we mentioned in our letter to the Secretary of Defense of June 27, 1961, assuming that the Communists choose to exert pressure in two places simultaneously, e.g., Iran and Southeast Asia, do our plans provide sufficient conventional force to meet such a contingency? Third, will it be possible to commit forces to distant, underdeveloped areas even in the magnitude contemplated by DOD almost solely through airlift? For example, will not the paucity of adequate airfields in the less-developed areas of the world limit our ability to respond effectively?

All these questions raise questions about the adequacy of projected sealift. For example, we note that Defense plans to build only one of the newly developed, and we gather highly efficient, roll-on/roll-off ships a year. In light of the importance of having an effective and flexible force available for deployment to remote areas, we suggest that the Department of Defense reexamine its lift plan to assure that within the limits of production feasibility they provide adequately for our needs.

Program VI: Research and Development

6. MRBM's. It is highly desirable that the proposed $500 million MRBM development program explore possibilities for sea-based, as well as land-based, deployment.

Sea-based deployment could more readily be reconciled with the April 21 NSC policy toward NATO and the Atlantic nations/8/ than land-based deployment.

/8/ For text, see Foreign Relations, 1961-1963, vol. XIII, Document 100.

That policy precludes deployment of MRBM's to the forces of individual European countries (whether or not these forces are committed to SACEUR), calls for commitment of U.S. sea-based missiles to NATO, and holds out the long-term possibility of a multilaterally owned and controlled sea-borne NATO missile force, such as the President discussed in his Ottawa speech.

It is in the U.S. interest to hold to this policy. Deployment of MRBM's to the forces of individual countries would be a major step toward creation of de facto national strategic nuclear capabilities. This would create peacetime tensions and divisions within the alliance, as well as greatly lessen our ability to follow a non-nuclear strategy or a centrally controlled nuclear strategy in event of hostilities. On the other hand, deployment of MRBM's to U.S. forces only would probably be politically infeasible. The NSC policy of initial deployment to U.S. forces while holding out the possibility of a multilateral force thus seems the most useful course.

It is difficult, however, to conceive of carrying out this policy with land-based MRBM deployment. Multilateral deployment would be clearly less feasible on land than at sea, since missiles would be vulnerable to seizure by the countries on whose territory they were to be deployed. And, as for deployment to U.S. forces only, the European countries on whose soil the U.S. MRBM's were to be deployed would insist on securing some of these missiles for their own forces as a pre-condition to giving us deployment rights.

These considerations suggest that sea-based deployment is greatly preferable from a foreign policy standpoint. At a minimum, they make it desirable to avoid allowing the question of land-based vs. sea-based deployment to be foreclosed by the nature of development work which is planned within the DOD FY '63 budget./9/

/9/In his November 6 memorandum (see the source note above), Major Smith discussed the defense budget process. He stated in part: "The impact of the SecState paper evidently was diminished by a Rusk-McNamara conversation, Rusk saying he did not feel strongly about the remarks." Smith reported also that Henry Owen of S/P and Seymour Weiss of G/PM were among those at the Department of State arguing most strongly for an increase in conventional forces.

 

54. Memorandum From the Joint Chiefs of Staff to Secretary of Defense McNamara/1/

JCSM-802-61

Washington, November 17, 1961.

/1/Source: Washington National Records Center, RG 330, OSD Files: FRC 65 A 3464, Atomic 471.61 29 Aug 61. Top Secret.

SUBJECT
Recommended Long-Range Nuclear Delivery Forces 1963-1967 (C)

1. Reference is made to:

a. JCSM-620-61, dated 11 September 1961, subject as above./2/

/2/In this memorandum, the Joint Chiefs recommended to McNamara for FY 1963 funding 100 KC 135 tankers and 92 Skybolt, 18 Titan, 300 Minuteman H&D, 50 Minuteman mobile, and 128 Polaris missiles. They also supported expenditure of the FY 1962 appropriations for 45 B-52 bombers. (National Archives and Records Administration, RG 218, JCS Records, JMF 7000 (6 Mar 61) Sec 5, Pt 1)

b. JCSM-657-61, dated 21 September 1961, subject as above./3/

/3/In this memorandum to McNamara, the JCS set forth the reasons for the size of their recommendations in JCSM-620-61, including growing Soviet confidence in their military strength as evidenced in the Berlin crisis. Producing more of the latest model of the B-52 was the quickest way to improve the retaliatory force. Regarding Minuteman, the JCS maintained that since the Soviet missile force was superior in total yield, the United States had to offset this capability with a greater number of ICBMs. (Ibid., Sec 6)

2. The Joint Chiefs of Staff have examined Appendix I to your draft memorandum for the President,/4/ subject as above, with particular attention to the target system and the operational factors employed therein as the basis for your force level recommendations.

/4/Document 46.

3. The Joint Chiefs of Staff are in full accord with your objective of improving the US strategic posture with respect to survivability, flexibility and the capability of being used in a controlled and deliberate way. They also agree on the general validity of the target system and the survival, reliability and penetration factors used as the basis for your force recommendations, subject to the views expressed below.

4. With respect to the list of target destruction requirements, this agreement has been possible because of the broad range of uncertainty presented. In terms of total numbers of targets, the Joint Chiefs of Staff believe that the list provides an adequate representation of the threat. In terms of categories, they note that although this target list was derived from studies by the staff of the Net Evaluation Subcommittee, it is not clear whether certain categories of targets listed in the report of the Subcommittee/5/ have been included, e.g., primary military control centers and primary logistic support installations. Since a final report of General Hickey's group is expected in December,/6/ it is assumed that a more definitive exposition of target destruction requirements can thereby be expected.

/5/See footnote 4, Document 46.

/6/"A Study of Requirements for U.S. Strategic Systems: Final Report," December 1. This study concluded that controlled response strategy could not be implemented until late in the 1960s because a number of necessary advanced weapons systems such as Advanced Minuteman and a manned reconnaissance strike aircraft would not be available until then. (National Archives and Records Administration, RG 218, JCS Records, JMF 4700 (1 Jun 61) Sec 1A) With a December 22 memorandum to McNamara, Charles J. Hitch, Assistant Secretary of Defense (Comptroller), enclosed a 17-page evaluation of the Hickey Report. In the memorandum Hitch stated that his evaluation concluded that the requirements for a controlled response strategy were exaggerated in the Hickey study, and its feasibility underestimated. "I see no reason why we cannot have a satisfactory posture for a controlled response strategy by 1964 if not sooner. I reject the suggestion implicit in the Hickey Study that all of these advanced capabilities must be achieved before it makes sense to abandon the spasm war concept." There was nothing in the Hickey study necessitating "a change in the decisions you have already made for FY 1963 procurement." (Washington National Records Center, RG 330, OSD Files: FRC 65 A 3463, 381 Hickey Report 19 April 61)

5. Similarly, within the rather wide range resulting from taking the optimistic-pessimistic approach, the Joint Chiefs of Staff are able to accept the validity of the operational factors used. It would be impossible to accept the low numbers of weapons delivered on target by the recommended forces in the pessimistic case, since the factors therein are generally so adverse as to be quite unlikely; on the other hand, it would be imprudent to count on the results obtained by application of the optimistic factors throughout.

6. In the references set forth in paragraph 1 above, the Joint Chiefs of Staff provided you with their agreed views on long-range nuclear delivery forces and their rationale wherein this structure was at variance with your recommendations. It is noted that the figures used in your analysis for purposes of force level comparison are those initially submitted by Services. A comparison of the levels recommended by the Joint Chiefs of Staff for FY 63 projected for the years FYs 64 through 67 with your forces would have shown smaller differences than appear in the analysis. In terms of five year system costs, for example, the difference would have been approximately $3.3 billion instead of the $9.7 billion resulting from comparison with the Service submissions. The essential point of difference in arriving at the two force levels is that while your analysis estimates that the situation at the outset of war would be characterized by intelligence and operational factors between the optimistic and the median cases, the Joint Chiefs of Staff consider the median case more likely. To illustrate the degree of increased assurance attained by the higher level of forces, application to them of the median factors for 1965 produces additional alert weapons on target on the order of 100-125. The question becomes one of increased costs versus reduced risk.

7. The subject of long-range nuclear delivery force objectives is one which must be kept under constant scrutiny with a view to refining the factors involved in determining optimum force levels. The analysis contained in Appendix I to your draft memorandum is an important addition to the body of study on the subject. Pending more precise resolution of the factors bearing on the problem, the Joint Chiefs of Staff continue to believe that the force levels they have previously recommended for FY 63 would offer the advantages of increased capability for retaliation in the period considered, and earlier achievement of optimum readiness.

For the Joint Chiefs of Staff:

L.L. Lemnitzer
Chairman
Joint Chiefs of Staff

 

55. Editorial Note

In a memorandum for the record dated November 20, 1961, Colonel Julian J. Ewell of Taylor's staff reported on the White House daily staff meeting that day. The memorandum reads in part:

"A procedural discussion was conducted on country and regional guideline papers. The policy and planning shop in State is preparing these papers, which are approved in principle by Mr. Bowles, circulated to the other Departments for comment, and then approved for final policy by Mr. Bowles or Mr. Rusk. State then requests NSC to rescind the old NSC policy paper on the area. The State guideline paper then becomes the substitute for an NSC-type paper on the area involved. Rostow observed that he had told the NSC staff not to bother with these papers, that they can't afford to waste time on them. Bundy agreed, saying that the actual policy was determined by adding up actions that the President had approved on the country concerned or by asking the White House staff how the President felt about a particular country. Bromley and I pointed out that the low level staff officer was not always aware of the decisions or White House thinking, and tended to rely on the guideline paper regardless of whether it was good or not. Bundy recognized this aspect and directed that the NSC staff would do a quick check on such papers before they were finally approved, for substance, not for style." (National Defense University, Taylor Papers, Daily Staff Meetings 9-12/61) "Bromley" refers to Bromley Smith, Executive Secretary of the National Security Council.

 

56. Special National Intelligence Estimate/1/

SNIE 11-14-61

Washington, November 21, 1961.

/1/Source: Central Intelligence Agency Files, Job 79-R01012A, ODDI Registry. Top Secret; Formerly Restricted Data. A note on the cover sheet indicates that the special estimate was submitted by the Director of Central Intelligence and prepared by the intelligence organizations of the Departments of State, Defense, the Army, the Navy, and the Air Force, the Joint Staff, the Atomic Energy Commission, and the National Security Agency. The members of the U.S. Intelligence Board concurred except the Assistant Director of the Federal Bureau of Investigation, who abstained because the subject was outside his jurisdiction.

THE SOVIET STRATEGIC MILITARY POSTURE, 1961-1967

The Problem

To reassess the broad outlines of the USSR's military doctrine and posture in the light of recent information on Soviet strategic thinking, present military capabilities, and R&D in major weapon systems, and to estimate future trends in Soviet military strategy and force structure./2/

/2/Detailed estimates of the present and future strengths and capabilities of the Soviet and Bloc armed forces can be found in Annexes A and B of NIE 11-4-61, "Main Trends in Soviet Capabilities and Policies, 1961-1966," dated 24 August 1961, in NIE 11-8/1-61, "Strength and Deployment of Soviet Long Range Ballistic Missile Forces," dated 21 September 1961, and in NIE 11-2-61, "Soviet Atomic Energy Program," dated 5 October 1961.

It should be noted that the present estimate does not touch on Chinese Communist military developments or possible actions. There might come to affect Soviet military policies and programs during the period under consideration. [Footnote in the source text. For NIE 11-8/1-61, see Document 45.]

The Estimate

Current Trends In Soviet Military Thought

Basic Principles

1. Soviet thinking about military policy has proceeded from a general outlook which stresses that historical forces are moving inexorably in the direction of communism. This movement is carried forward by the struggle of "the masses," led by the Communist parties, to overthrow the existing social-economic order, rather than by the direct use of the military power of the Communist Bloc. These beliefs lead the Soviets to view their armed forces as a means to deter Western military action against the Sino-Soviet Bloc, to inhibit the West from intervening militarily in other areas, to maintain security within the Bloc, to lend weight to their political demands and to demonstrate the success and growing power of their cause. At the same time, they wish to have the forces to fight a war effectively should one occur. However, their political outlook, their military programs of recent years, and intelligence on their current intentions, all suggest that the Soviet leaders do not regard general war as desirable or a Western attack on them as probable.

Strategies and Forces

2. Within this general framework, the specific concepts which underlie Soviet decisions about force goals and strategic planning are difficult to discern. These principles can only be deduced, and incompletely at that, from overt Soviet statements, which are carefully framed with an eye to both security and propaganda; from such classified Soviet information as can be obtained; from the choices reflected in the actual military programs undertaken by the USSR; and from the strategic situation which objectively confronts them.

3. It is worth noting that, while the Soviets have made impressive advances in modern weapon systems, a number of factors have hampered the process of integrating these advances into their strategic doctrine. One of these factors is the influence of a long military tradition, strongly reinforced by their experience in World War II, stressing massive movement, protracted campaigns, and the paramount significance of ground combat and the occupation of enemy territory. Another is security barriers within the military establishment, which appear to be far more stringent than in the US. Perhaps the most serious fetter, however, has been the rigid politico-military concepts which Stalin dogmatically imposed upon military thought. It was not until the mid-1950's, for example, that Soviet doctrine began to relax the principle that strategic surprise and the force of the initial blow are relatively unimportant to the outcome of a war between major powers, a position Stalin took in order to divert attention from the USSR's nearly catastrophic unpreparedness at the outset of World War II.

4. The pace of military thought, however, has quickened sharply in the last two or three years, primarily at the initiative of Khrushchev. At about the time when he set in motion a modernization of the Soviet force structure, including a substantial reduction in personnel, the regime began deliberately to encourage controversial discussion among senior officers in an effort to spark original and creative thought. As a result, strategic doctrine is a lively and argumentative field of professional study in the USSR today.

5. Such high-level discourse as we know about does not revolve around the questions of alternative attack strategies and target systems which are at the center of US military attention. Instead, the chief argument ranges "conservative" against "modern" views. Adherents to the first view assert that, despite the advent of new weapons, general war is likely to be protracted, ground combat on a mass scale will continue to be of major importance, and victory will require the combined action of forces of all types, including a multimillion man army. Adherents to the second view charge that their opponents are making only minimal and inadequate adaptations of earlier doctrine to accommodate new weapons. This group argues that a general war is likely to be short, with victory decided primarily in the initial nuclear exchange. Current official doctrine, as it appears in statements by the Minister of Defense, appears to be an amalgam of both these views.

6. The high-level discussions of which we are aware are remarkably deficient in sophisticated analysis of such concepts as first and second strike capability or counterforce strategy. The problems of attacking hardened and mobile strategic forces go completely unmentioned in such information as we have on Soviet targeting for long range attack. While most recommended target lists include nuclear retaliatory forces and control centers, they generally give equal importance to strikes against urban centers and their enemy's broad warmaking potential.

7. We think it certain that the strategic thought which underlies operational planning in the long range striking forces themselves is more sophisticated than this. But we have not acquired detailed Soviet discussions of doctrine for the operations of long range missile and bomber forces. Planning in these forces has certainly been obliged to consider such factors as warning and reaction times and the specific characteristics of different weapon systems and enemy targets. [1 line of source text not declassified] indicates that at least some of these factors have been taken into account, but not in ways that suggest very advanced concepts for dealing with the problems involved.

8. On the whole, the information we have suggests that Soviet military thought generally is still preoccupied with the problems of integrating nuclear and missile weapons into general doctrine and is only beginning to cope with the detailed comparative analysis of alternative strategies and force levels. Nor is this preoccupation completely surprising, since the achievement of an ICBM capability, even in the early stages of its deployment, represents to the Soviets a profound change in their strategic situation. For over a decade, they confronted an opponent who possessed a formidable strategic capability but against whom their own long-range striking capabilities were relatively limited. Now, for the first time, they have a weapon system capable of delivering nuclear attacks against the US with little warning by a means against which there is no present defense.

9. The USSR probably has not elaborated any comprehensive doctrine covering the contingencies of limited and local war between Soviet and Western forces. Public Soviet statements regularly insist that such wars would quickly and inevitably expand into general nuclear war. These statements are clearly intended to deter the West from embarking upon conflict on the Bloc periphery or attempting penetrations of Bloc territory; they are not necessarily to be taken as expressions of Soviet military policy. Confidential sources do not reveal what detailed contingency plans the Soviets have for such a case. We believe, however, that the USSR would wish to avoid direct involvement in limited combat on the Bloc periphery and, if such conflict should occur, would wish to minimize the chances of escalation to general nuclear war. Consequently, it would not in most circumstances take the initiative to expand the scope of such a conflict. Although the degree of Soviet commitment and the actual circumstances of the conflict would determine their decision, we believe that in general the Soviet leaders would expand the scope of the conflict, even at greater risk of escalating to general war, only if a prospective defeat would, in their view, constitute a grave political reverse within the Bloc itself or a major setback to the Soviet world position.

10. Soviet doctrine apparently does not contemplate conflict with Western forces in areas of contention at a distance from Bloc territory. Conflicts involving local anti-Western or Communist forces are treated under the rubric of "national liberation wars." Such forces are credited, on ideological grounds, with the inherent strength to overcome "imperialist" attempts at military intervention. The Soviet support rather vaguely proffered is intended to be of a general deterrent character, but does not envisage overt Soviet military involvement. Despite the Soviet tendency in recent years to adopt an aggressive political stance in conflicts all over the world, the Soviets have not developed the naval forces and other special components which would give them a capability for military operations at great distances from the Bloc.

Current Strategic Posture

11. The strategic nuclear force the USSR has developed in recent years could permit the launching of large-scale initial attacks on short notice against a large number of Eurasian targets and a more limited number of North American targets. However, the Soviet leaders cannot at present have any assurance that their own nation and system could escape destruction from retaliatory Western attacks even if the USSR struck first. The Soviet leaders evidently believe their current strategic forces provide a strong deterrent against Western initiation of general war and are sufficient to support a more assertive foreign policy, particularly by virtue of the threat they pose to allies of the US in Europe and Asia. But there is no implication in Soviet behavior that they consider themselves in a position deliberately to attack the West, or to undertake local moves which carried with them a serious risk of bringing on general war. These views do not exclude Soviet use of available strategic attack forces to launch a preemptive blow should they conclude that the West was irrevocably committed to an imminent attack.

12. There have been considerable improvements in the Soviet air defense establishment, primarily through the widespread deployment of surface-to-air missiles at major cities and other key installations. Soviet defenses are now reasonably adequate against medium and high-altitude attack by subsonic Western bombers. We believe that the system as a whole, however, is far less adequate to cope with sophisticated penetration tactics, low altitude penetrations or supersonic cruise-type missiles. It has no present capability against ballistic missiles. Most important, because of the susceptibility of their defenses to saturation and degradation, the Soviet leaders almost certainly cannot be confident of the degree to which they could cope with the diverse types and scales of attack the West could direct against the Bloc.

13. In addition to forces designed for long-range attack and for defense against such attack, the USSR continues to maintain large theater field forces. The Soviets regard these forces as part of the deterrent to general war, and their military doctrine considers such forces as essential to the conduct of general war should it occur. The Soviet theater forces now in being could institute large-scale attacks in peripheral areas, but the success of such operations in a general war would depend heavily on the outcome of the initial nuclear exchange. The Soviet leaders also regard these forces as a deterrent to any limited action against Bloc territory or on its periphery, serving at the same time as an essential means of maintaining Communist regimes in the Satellites.

14. Based on the current Soviet naval posture and available writings on doctrine, we believe that the mission of the Soviet Navy is to carry out a variety of tasks in a protracted war, including the support of theater forces in such a war. The USSR has developed some capability to deliver nuclear attacks against land targets, including some in the US, by means of short-range submarine-launched missiles. However, the bulk of the Soviet submarine forces, predominantly torpedo attack types, would engage in interdiction operations in a long war in which the US attempted to maintain extensive logistic support to overseas areas. The Soviet Navy would also conduct defense against hostile naval forces possessing long-range attack capabilities, which the Soviets evidently regard as a major strategic threat. Its capabilities against US missile submarines in the open seas remain severely limited.

Military Research and Development

15. The Soviets are engaged in intensive efforts in weapons research and development to acquire new systems which, by their psychological, political, and military impact, would shift the world relation of forces to their advantage. In making their decisions, Soviet planners will have to consider such problems as rapid technological change, long lead times, developments in opposing forces, and increasing costs of weapon systems. Despite the rapid growth in Soviet economic resources, there will continue to be competition among military requirements as well as with the demands of important nonmilitary programs. Over the last two years, for example, Khrushchev has apparently linked his military arguments for reducing the size of Soviet forces with a further argument that additional funds could in this way be made available for raising living standards. Nevertheless, the USSR is allocating funds generously to military R&D, concentrating major efforts on improving the forces for long range attack and for defense against such attack by the West.

16. Much of the military R&D about which we have recent evidence is designed to fill obvious gaps in the Soviet strategic posture. In the field of long range delivery systems, an intensive program of test firing has been underway to develop second generation ICBM systems, which we believe include missiles of reduced dimensions and lighter weight, more easily deployed than the massive first generation Soviet ICBM. Some of the recent ICBM testing may represent development of systems for delivering warheads with yields on the order of 100 MT. Both a 2,000 n.m. ballistic missile and a supersonic "dash" medium bomber have been developed, and there is some evidence of R&D efforts in follow-on heavy bombers.

17. The principal current Soviet R&D program for strategic air defense, and perhaps the major Soviet military developmental program, is a large-scale effort to achieve defenses against ballistic missiles. It has been clear to us for more than a year that the Soviets are assigning very substantial resources to this effort. In October 1961, Marshal Malinovsky stated that the USSR had "solved the problem" of intercepting a ballistic missile in flight. From intelligence sources, we believe that the Soviets are making good progress in development work for an antimissile system. This effort has resulted in the acquisition of important data, including data on high altitude nuclear effects, and has also involved the testing of at least some system components. Other known R&D in the air defense field over the recent past has included improved radars for early warning and fighter control, a surface-to-air missile system for use against low-altitude penetrators, and new fighter interceptor systems.

18. Soviet research and development activities also reflect efforts at qualitative improvement in the theater field forces and naval forces. The emphasis has been on mobility and fire-power for theater forces, and short and medium-range missiles are now available for their support. Soviet field forces, at least in East Germany, have been allocated surface-to-air missiles for defense against medium and high altitude air attack. Within the next two or three years they will probably also have available missiles for defense against low flying aircraft as well as against ballistic missiles of short ranges. With the advent of US missile submarines, the Soviet Navy has recently placed increased emphasis on new weapons and techniques to extend ASW capabilities to the open seas. We believe, however, that over the next five years, the USSR will have only a limited capability to detect, identify, localize and maintain surveillance on submarines operating in the open seas.

Recent Nuclear Tests

19. The preliminary information now available indicates that the 1961 nuclear test series has given the Soviets increased confidence in current weapon systems, advanced their weapon design significantly, added greatly to their understanding of thermonuclear weapon technology, and contributed vital weapon effects knowledge. Soviet thermonuclear weapon technology in particular appears to be sophisticated and advanced. The 1961 test series will permit the Soviets to fabricate and stock pile, during the next year or so, new weapons of higher yields in the weight classes presently available.

20. Of the 44 shots detected in the 1961 series, 5 to 10 appear to have been proof tests of complete weapon systems, many of them with yields in the megaton range. We believe the Soviets have proof-tested weapon systems of the following types: short or medium range ground-launched ballistic missiles with yields up to about 2 MT and short-range submarine-launched ballistic missiles with yields of about 3 MT. In addition, they have proof-tested bombs with yields up to about 6 MT and have probably delivered more than one such bomb on a single bomber mission. The warheads tested in these various weapon systems are believed to be in stockpile. Those few proof-tested warheads thus far analyzed appear to reflect 1958 technology.

21. Weapon effects test were apparently conducted underground, underwater, near the surface of the water, and at various altitudes up to 100-200 n.m. Those at very high altitudes will contribute valuable effects information needed for Soviet development of antiballistic missile defenses, but were probably not complete systems tests.

22. The majority of the 1961 shots were developmental tests aimed at improving future Soviet nuclear weapons capabilities. Some of the fission weapons tested revealed extensive Soviet efforts to increase efficiency, and to reduce weapon size and weight. Two very large yield tests in this series are particularly significant in that they indicate a high degree of sophistication in weapon design.

a. [2-1/2 lines of source text not declassified] Preliminary estimates give [2-1/2 lines of source text not declassified]. If the actual weight is 10,000 pounds, a 25 MT warhead could be delivered by the first generation Soviet ICBM to a range of about 5,500 n.m.

b. The 58 megaton device probably was actually a 100 MT weapon tested at reduced yield. Used as tested, the device could be of value to a Soviet strategy designed to minimize the fallout from very high-yield weapons. Weapons of this size and weight (probably 20,000-30,000 pounds) could be delivered by aircraft such as the Bear, or could be emplaced offshore. If the actual weight is 20,000 pounds, such a warhead could be delivered by the first generation Soviet ICBM to a range of about 3,500 n.m. We believe that a more powerful vehicle than the first generation ICBM would probably be required to deliver such a warhead against most targets in the US.

c. A few handmade versions of these very high-yield weapons could be available now or in the near future, but series production would probably require a year or more. However, if they are to be employed as first generation ICBM warheads, we would expect tests of ICBMs with modified dummy nosecones prior to operational deployment.

23. Tests of other thermonuclear weapons, which apparently comprised the bulk of the shots in the recent series, indicate a continuing and highly successful Soviet effort to improve efficiencies, improve yield-to-weight ratios, and reduce fissionable material requirements. These tests show a concentration on weapons with yields between about 1.5 and 5 MT (corresponding to weights between about 1,000 and 3,500 pounds), which are suitable for delivery by all Soviet bombers and offensive missiles. The preliminary analysis indicates that, [3 lines of source text not declassified] significant progress in thermonuclear weapons design has been achieved.

Probable Major Developments in Soviet Forces to the Mid-1960's

24. Major Soviet concern will continue to focus on the strategic weapons balance. In this area, a critical question is whether or not the Soviet leaders will consider it feasible and desirable to: (a) seek a capability to destroy the US nuclear delivery forces prior to launching, by means of a first strike; (b) seek no more than a capability to deliver nuclear attacks on population and industrial centers; or (c) seek nuclear attack forces of a type and size which will be somewhere between these two concepts.

25. We believe the Soviets already view the first of these concepts as no longer practicable. This is partly because of the thousands of Soviet missiles and launchers that would be required to destroy all the fixed bases of the US nuclear force programmed for 1963-1967, especially the hardened US ICBM sites. Equally important, US warning capabilities, fast reaction times, and mobile forces such as airborne bombers and missile submarines already tend to offset Soviet capabilities to attack fixed bases. These latter factors would compound the uncertainties inherent in any Soviet strategy for destroying US nuclear forces prior to launch, regardless of the size of Soviet long-range striking forces.

26. As to a capability to attack cities alone, there is evidence from recent statements and writings that some Soviet military men regard destruction of population and industry, not merely as something to be threatened for purposes of deterrence and intimidation, but also as a major determinant in the outcome of a general war. In view of the weight of nuclear attack the US can launch and the impossibility of achieving a fully effective defense, however, we believe that the Soviet leaders have decided that a capability to destroy only urban and industrial centers, while a powerful deterrent, would be inadequate should general war occur.

27. Consequently, we believe that the Soviets will seek a large strike capability. This will probably be one large enough to bring under attack the SAC bomber bases and other soft and semihardened US military installations against which their ICBMs are an efficient weapon system. Further, in determining force goals, they may also wish to provide themselves with an ICBM force large enough to permit them to attack some hardened US targets, and to have a more substantial residual striking capability after a US attack. Although the Soviets would probably not regard a capability on this order as adequate for deliberate initiation of general war, it would put them in a position to strike pre-emptively at an important segment of the US nuclear delivery forces should they reach a decision that such action was required.

28. Taking these considerations into account, we believe that the USSR will have an ICBM force of several hundred operational launchers in the period 1964-1967. The deployment complexes presently in operation and under construction, while protected by concealment from ground observation, some dispersal, and surface-to-air missiles, are unhardened and vulnerable to overhead observation. In view of Soviet concern for US reconnaissance and attack capabilities, we believe that the Soviets will move to increase the survivability of their ICBM force. In the mid-1960's, the bulk of the force will probably be protected by greater dispersal and possibly by semihardening, and some of the later launchers will probably be fully hardened. More than one missile will probably be available for most launchers.

29. In addition, through 1967, we forecast that the USSR will retain a mix of long range weapon systems. This will include a heavy bomber force which will probably remain relatively small but increase in quality, and an expanding force of missile submarines. Medium bomber strength will probably drop to a few hundred by the mid-1960's, but a considerable portion of these will be supersonic "dash" types, perhaps equipped for standoff missile delivery and for armed reconnaissance. After about the next year, ballistic missile forces other than ICBMs will be characterized by shifts to improved, longer range systems rather than by sheer numerical expansion.

30. In addition to strengthening defenses against manned bombers and cruise-type missiles, we believe that a major Soviet objective of the mid-1960's will be to achieve defenses against long-range ballistic missiles before the US has acquired a comparable capability. In Soviet eyes, this would enable them to claim an important advantage over the US. For political as well as military reasons, the Soviets probably would wish to deploy antimissile defense in at least a few critical areas even if the available system provided only a limited, interim capability. Considering these factors and the present status of the Soviet research and development program, we estimate that in the period 1963-1966 the Soviets will begin at least limited deployment of an antimissile system. Soviet cities will probably have priority for deployment of any AICBM defenses available through 1967. We believe that throughout this period, the Soviets are likely to have only a marginal capability for interference with US satellites.

31. We believe that the Soviet leaders will continue to retain large theater and naval forces. The extent to which these forces are reduced in the next few years will depend in part on the prevailing international situation, but we now believe it may rest equally on the course of the internal Soviet discussion regarding the nature and duration of a large-scale war fought with nuclear weapons. In general, we believe that economic and political factors, together with the further growth of nuclear capabilities, will at some point persuade the Soviet leaders to revert to the military manpower reductions begun in 1960 but suspended in 1961. Ground divisions and tactical air forces will probably be reduced and older ships retired or mothballed, but the USSR will retain sizable forces calculated to be sufficient for all types of warfare, nuclear and conventional, limited and general. Moreover, the Soviets will not abandon the reservist and mobilization system designed to augment their forces rapidly should the need arise.

32. The recent nuclear test series does not in itself provide clear guidelines as to possible changes in force structure or strategic concepts. We believe that long-range striking forces have been given priority in the allocation of available nuclear materials, and that limitations in the Soviet stockpile have consequently restricted the nuclear capabilities of other forces. The broad range of proof tests, weapon effects tests, and developmental tests in the 1961 series suggests an effort to improve the nuclear capabilities of all arms of the Soviet military establishment. We had anticipated that in any event the limitations on allocation of nuclear weapons to air defense, theater, and naval forces would have eased by the mid-1960's and this trend may be hastened by the recent tests. These forces will then have a greater variety of nuclear weapons at their disposal.

33. It now appears that the trend in nuclear weapon yields of long-range missile and bomber systems will be upwards. The use of higher yield weapons would tend to reduce Soviet numerical requirements for delivery vehicles to accomplish given objectives, although for attacking military targets the accuracy and reliability of the Soviet weapon systems are generally more critical than warhead yield. Warheads in the 25 MT class, which could probably be made available in quantity within a year or so, would enhance the capabilities of the first generation Soviet ICBM against hardened targets. It is reasonable to believe that some of the new ICBMs now under intensive testing are designed to carry warheads of very high yield. Nevertheless, we continue to believe it unlikely that the Soviets would try to acquire the very large number of ICBM launchers needed for effective attack on all the hardened ICBM sites planned by the US. For the present, the very high yield devices are probably intended to support deterrence and psychological warfare, although we have no doubt that military uses are also intended.

Policy and Strategies to the Mid-1960's

34. From the developments likely to occur in Soviet forces, and from implications found in current discussions of military doctrine, we conclude that, over the next five years or so, the Soviets are unlikely to develop a military strategy and posture aimed at the deliberate initiation of general war. They are likely to continue to believe that their policy goals cannot be achieved by this means. Therefore, their first priority, since they evidently do intend to pursue forward policies involving some level of risk, will be to have a credible deterrent against initiation of war by the West. They will recognize that deterrence may fail, and if completely convinced in some situation of high risk that the West was about to launch a general nuclear attack, would attempt to pre-empt. Their strategy for the conduct of general war will probably call for delivering large-scale nuclear blows against Western striking forces and national centers of power, protecting the Soviet homeland against nuclear attack to the extent feasible, and subsequently committing their remaining forces to extended campaigns probably aimed initially at the occupation of Western Europe.

35. The Soviets will want a formidable military posture primarily to prevent such a war, but they will also want it as a support to vigorous policy initiatives short of war. These latter will include in particular the sponsorship of revolutionary activity directed at advancing Communist or pro-Soviet groups to power in any part of the world where the opportunity exists or can be created. It is this sort of struggle below the level of direct military engagement with the major Western Powers which will almost certainly continue to be the Soviets' principal reliance in seeking the expansion of their power.

36. It is conceivable, however, that by the mid-1960's the Soviets will come to regard the deterrence which they can exert upon the West as strong enough to permit them, without excessive risk, to use their own forces in local military actions. They will certainly continue to have field forces on a scale to permit this in areas peripheral to Soviet Bloc territory, and these will be forces of increased mobility and flexibility. They are also capable of acquiring the naval strength, air transport, and special forces to conduct local military action in more remote areas. On the whole, however, we believe that the Soviets are unlikely to adopt such a course as a matter of general policy, in part because of the risks involved but also because in their view there is likely to be increasing opportunity to advance their cause by nonmilitary means.

37. The use of Soviet forces in local military actions outside the Bloc, if attempted, would be unlikely to take the form of naked military aggression. Instead, any use of Soviet forces outside the Bloc would take the form of support to revolutionary actions by local Communist or pro-Soviet forces, where a pretext could be made that Soviet intervention was intended to forestall intervention by the "imperialists." We believe there is some possibility that such a strategy will emerge by the mid-1960's and will be applied to vulnerable areas bordering on the Soviet Bloc. We think it more likely, however, that the Soviets will continue to rely on local political revolutionary forces, operating without overt Soviet military support but under the protection of an increasing deterrent power, to achieve a more gradual expansion of the area of Soviet control.

 

57. Memorandum From the President's Deputy Special Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kaysen) to President Kennedy/1/

Washington, November 22, 1961.

/1/Source: Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Departments and Agencies Series, FY 1963 Defense Budget 11/61-12/61. Top Secret. Forwarded to the President with several other documents, including Document 58. In a November 22 covering memorandum, Bundy commented that this memorandum "sketches the argument for a much smaller strategic force than McNamara is arguing. This is well worth attention because the argument is not developed anywhere else in your papers." (Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Departments and Agencies Series, FY 1963 Defense Budget 11/16-12/61)

SUBJECT
Force Structure and Defense Budget

1. The major issue which was presented by Secretary McNamara's memorandum on the Defense budget/2/ is that of the balance between the long-range strategic striking force and the general purpose (limited war) forces. Speaking broadly, the Secretary's proposed Planning Guidelines resolved the inevitable doubts and uncertainties on the high side with respect to long-range striking forces, and, on the low side with respect to the general purpose forces. The purpose of the following is to present a case for a different force structure which would resolve these issues the other way.

/2/Document 50.

2. The two elements of the strategic striking force which show rapid growth in the Secretary's memorandum and proposed Guidelines are the hardened and dispersed Minuteman and Polaris missiles. The B-52 force remains constant, and, while the Atlas and Titan both show substantial growth, the new sites involved are now under construction and the missiles have already been bought. The proposed Minuteman and Polaris forces grow as follows:

 

1962

1963

1964

1965

1966

1967

Polaris

 

 

 

 

 

 

Submarines

6

9

18

30

35

41

Missiles

96

144

288

480

560

656

Minuteman

 

 

 

 

 

 

Missiles

--

150

600

700

800

900

These forces were proposed on the basis of the old estimates of the probable development of Russian missile strength. If we take into account the newer estimates (shown in comparison with the estimates underlying the DOD calculations in Annex I attached), we find we can accept a significantly smaller force as follows:

 

1963

1964

1965

1966

1967

Minuteman (HD)

150

300

400

500

600

Polaris

 

 

 

 

 

Missiles

144

288

464

464

464

Submarines

9

18

29

29

29

The proposed Polaris force represents the submarines we have already bought, coming into service on the present schedule. The proposed Minuteman deployment involves postponing the achievement of the planned 4th wing from the end of FY 1963 to the end of FY 1967.

The rationale for these lower forces is two-fold. First, as will be explained in the paragraph immediately following, they can do the job. Second, if they can do the job the risks of having higher forces are considerable. In setting the level of our strategic force, we must always consider the possibility of interaction between the size of our force and the size of the Soviet force. It is dangerous for us to seek to achieve a full first strike capability, because such a goal will almost certainly provoke a Soviet reaction in the same direction. Both sides will spend more of their resources on larger forces and neither will gain in security. The present plan provides for an extremely sharp increase in our strategic striking power between July 1963 and July 1964. Our total long-range missile strength, which is now in the neighborhood of 120, will by July 1963 have grown to over 500 and by July 1964 it will have more than doubled again to over 1100. Will not such a sharp increase present the appearance of our seeking a first strike posture, and thus have a high probability of provoking a response in kind by the Soviets? They are perfectly capable of such response. At present, the most sensible interpretation of their own missile deployment is that it rests on the concept of finite deterrence. It is certainly to our advantage to have them continue to hold that concept. The Air Force has in the past equated national security with an ever increasing strategic striking force, and this position has wide popular appeal and support. This view is filled with dangers; to the extent that the best evidence indicates it lacks justification, it is important to move our military planning away from it as soon as possible.

3. We can safely rely on the proposed smaller force for two reasons: First, the number of missiles we expect the Russians to have is lower than that on which the plans were made. On this basis alone, the task the Memorandum shows as requiring 700 Minutemen in the force (Median assumptions, 1965, column I), could be done by some 550. This involves not only a smaller number of targets for us to strike at, but also a higher survival rate for our forces under the Russian first strike, on the basis of which the calculations are made. Second, the targeting concepts underlying the calculations in the Secretary's memorandum are unnecessarily conservative. No targets are assigned to the theatre forces. Only Polaris strikes against cities are taken into account in estimating casualties and destruction in built-up areas. At least the medium-range bomber and recovery airfields and the medium-range ballistic missiles could be assigned to the theatre forces. Some of the surviving SAC B-52's would be available for strikes on cities. The missiles we program against Soviet military targets would cause considerable casualties all over the Soviet Union, which are not taken into account in the casualty estimates from fallout presented in the memorandum. When all these adjustments are made in the calculations, the proposed smaller forces become adequate for the defined goal: to maintain a survivable second strike capability which can both blunt the further Soviet threat and provide a reserve force capable of threatening attack on Soviet cities on a large scale.

4. The Secretary's memorandum offers no explicit rationale for fixing the size of the Army at 14 divisions comparable to the analysis contained in Appendix I on long-range striking forces,/3/ and the Secretary pointed out in our staff discussions that as yet no such analysis has been made. Nonetheless, the recommendation is similar to that contained in the Secretary's memorandum to the President of May 10, 1961,/4/ on the reappraisal of the capabilities of conventional forces. That analysis rested on two doubtful assumptions: First, that we would not be engaged in a conventional war on a scale greater than that of the Korean conflict (250,000-300,000 men); second, that we would not be engaged in more than one such war at any one time. If in fact it is our policy to raise the nuclear threshold in the NATO area, as well as in the rest of the world, the first of these assumptions may be inappropriate. The appropriateness of the second one is also open to question, although here a policy question is involved as to the circumstances in which we would be willing to commit U.S. troops in other theatres, that is as yet unsettled.

/3/Document 46.

/4/Document 27.

5. The planned 14-division army raises the question of whether or not the extra forces provided by calling up the reservists and National Guardsmen in connection with the Berlin crisis should be retained on active duty. The Secretary's proposal calls for the return of these men to reserve status and a consequent reduction in the active duty strength of the Army to 920,000 men. This reduction raises a number of questions. It may make it more difficult for us to convince our Allies to increase their conventional war capabilities in NATO. It may diminish significantly the message conveyed by our other military preparations to the Soviets, who are impressed by ground force strength. Further, there is an important efficiency question involved. If there is any substantial probability that future re-examination of the ultimate size of the Army would lead to a higher requirement than 14 divisions, it would seem wasteful to reduce and then increase its size in the course of the next year or two. This in turn raises the question of the extent to which, in fixing the ultimate size of the Army, it is wise to rely on calling up and then demobilizing reserves as crises arise, if, as seems likely, crises will occur with fair frequency in the future.

6. With respect to the size of the Army, the proposed alternate program is to recommend that the Berlin augmentation be maintained in FY 1963 and that otherwise the Secretary's program for strengthening the logistic support and tactical air complement of the present force be carried out. This would involve not only keeping the Army at the level of 16 divisions with 970,000 men. Further, the proposed Planning Guidelines should not now be issued, and the Department of Defense should be instructed to produce an analysis and proposed Planning Guideline for the period 1964-67 early next year. At that point, the question of phasing down can be examined in the light of a clear conception of what our ultimate goals are.

Carl Kaysen

 

Annex I/5/

/5/Top Secret.

ESTIMATES OF FUTURE SOVIET MISSILE STRENGTH
Projected Number of Launchers

 

 

 

DOD Planning

Guide

USIB

Estimate (9 November)

Type of Site

Launchers per Target

Median

Range

Median

Range

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

1965

 

 

 

Soft

2

400

200-600

125

100-150

Dispersed

1

-

-

210

150-275

Hard

1

350

200-500

a few

a few

Total Missiles

 

750

400-1100

340

250-325

Total Targets

 

550

300-800

275

200-325

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

1967

 

 

 

Soft

2

250

100-400

125

100-150

Dispersed

1

-

-

300

200-400

Hard

1

750

400-1100

100

50-100

Total Missiles

 

1000

500-1500

525

350-650

Total Targets

 

875

450-1300

465

300-575

 


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