Organization of Foreign Policy; Information Policy; United Nations; Scientific Matters|
Released by the Office of the Historian
Documents 78 through 91
78. Editorial Note
In the fall of 1959, the Bureau of the Budget proposed, and President Eisenhower approved, a study of the intelligence agencies. The Joint Study Group on the Foreign Intelligence Activities of the United States Government was chaired by Lyman B. Kirkpatrick, Jr., Inspector General of the Central Intelligence Agency. Other members were Lieutenant General (Ret.) Graves Erskine, Special Assistant to the Secretary of Defense; Allan Evans, Deputy Director of the Bureau of Intelligence and Research, Department of State; James Lay, Executive Secretary of the National Security Council; Robert Macy of the Bureau of the Budget; J. Patrick Coyne, Executive Secretary of the President's Board of Consultants on Foreign Intelligence Activities; and Brigadier General Jesmond Balmer, Assistant to the Director of Central Intelligence for Interagency Coordination. The Group submitted its 141-page report on the deadline date, December 15, 1960. (Eisenhower Library, White House Office Files, Project Clean Up, 1960)
The National Security Council addressed the report of the Joint Study Group in the waning days of the Eisenhower administration, at its meetings of January 5, 12, and 18, 1961. For the memoranda of discussion at the January 5 and 12 meetings, see Documents 80 and 84. The NSC approved most of the 43 recommendations in the report on January 18. (Memorandum of Discussion at the NSC meeting of January 18; Eisenhower Library, Whitman File, NSC Records)
The Kennedy administration subsequently adopted many of the Joint Study Group's recommendations. One of the most far-reaching was the need for modernizing and streamlining the military intelligence system, which led to the creation of the Defense Intelligence Agency in August 1961 (see Document 89).
79. Memorandum of Meeting With President Eisenhower/1/
Washington, January 3, 1961, 2:35 p.m.
/1/Source: Eisenhower Library, Records of the Special Assistant for National Security Affairs, Meetings of the President. No classification marking. Prepared by Gordon Gray on January 4.
[Here follows discussion of the manned space flight program.]
2. I then said that General Goodpaster and I wished to discuss in general terms the Intelligence Study Group report and procedures to be followed from this point on./2/ I reported that the Committee of Principals had met in the morning and that it was apparent that whereas there was agreement with respect to a great many of the recommendations, there were some which would be in controversy, particularly recommendations with respect to reorganization within Defense, in the USIB and the role of the DCI. There then followed a discussion between the President, General Goodpaster, and myself about the report but centering particularly on the main policy question of whether the President wished to take action with respect to any of the recommendations before he leaves office and particularly as to whether he would wish immediately to give authority to the Secretary of Defense to begin to take steps within the Defense Department. The President indicated that as a matter of policy he would wish to move in those areas where it was wise. Therefore he approved the following guidelines.
/2/See Document 78.
(1) The NSC in its meeting on January 5 should consider any recommendations of the Secretary of Defense with respect to amendment of the NSCID's as might affect Defense responsibilities.
(2) The Committee of Principals should identify those recommendations with respect to which there is no disagreement with an indication as to those which should be put into effect immediately and those which would be better to pass along to the new Administration.
(3) An identification of those recommendations with respect to which there is disagreement with the understanding that a smaller group would meet with the President to advise him as to the areas in which he should move notwithstanding dissenting viewpoints.
(4) Identification of those issues which were important but which should not be acted upon in this Administration. (The President had in mind any recommendation with respect to which the JCS were completely opposed feeling that their support was needed to accomplish the purposes of the recommendations.)
I explained to the President that this process was in train, the principals having agreed substantially upon this procedure at their meeting and that we expected to be in a position to deal with this matter in the NSC meeting of January 12.
At this point I departed the President's office and General Goodpaster remained to take up other matters with the President.
80. Memorandum of Discussion at the 473d Meeting of the National Security Council/1/
Washington, January 5, 1961.
/1/Source: Eisenhower Library, Whitman File, NSC Records. Top Secret; Eyes Only. The meeting took place from 9 to 10:40 a.m. (Ibid., President's Daily Appointment Book)
[Here follows a paragraph listing the participants at the meeting.]
There follows a summary of the discussion at the Meeting and the main points taken.
1. National Security Council Intelligence Directives
Mr. Gray said he wished to bring up first a matter which was not on the formal agenda. The Joint Study Group on Foreign Intelligence Activities, composed of representatives of the Director of Central Intelligence, the Secretaries of State and Defense, the Director, Bureau of the Budget, and the Special Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs had submitted its report and was now preparing a list of recommendations on which the Principals had agreed, as well as a list of recommendations which had not been concurred in./2/ A question had arisen whether a revision of the NSCID's would be necessary as their provisions affect the authority of the Secretary of Defense in the intelligence field. At the present time, the NSCID's refer to the Military Services, not to the Secretary of Defense. The suggestion had been made that the Secretary of Defense be given authority by amendment of the NSCID's to proceed with reorganization of military intelligence within the Department of Defense.
/2/See Document 78.
Secretary Gates said this matter would affect the next Secretary of Defense. The first issue involved in the report of the Joint Study Group was the one Mr. Gray had mentioned, namely, the question of amending the NSCID's. Another issue, however, was also involved, namely membership on the U.S. Intelligence Board. The report by the Joint Study Group recommended that the Secretary of Defense and the Joint Chiefs of Staff rather than the Military Services be represented on the USIB. Secretary Gates was in favor of this recommendation but understood the Military Services were opposed. Mr. Dulles said he was also opposed to this recommendation. Secretary Gates said this matter affected the NSCID's since the organization of the USIB was covered in the NSCID's.
The President said he had been told that about $1.4 billion was being spent for the intelligence function in the Department of Defense. He believed we were not good administrators if we could not perform this function at less expense. He also believed that we were not doing everything that could be done to implement the concept of integrated strategic planning unless military intelligence could be placed under the Joint Chiefs of Staff. He was unable to understand why the antiquated system of separate intelligence organizations for each Military Service was retained.
Mr. Dulles pointed out that the Military Services at the present time had the personnel, the competence, and the background in intelligence. Until this situation was changed, he would rather deal with representatives of the Military Services, who know intelligence, than with the representative of the Secretary of Defense, who would not have the experience, the personnel, and the background judgment required. When organizational changes were made so that the representative of the Secretary of Defense had competent collectors and analysts working for him, then Mr. Dulles would not disagree with the recommendation for a change in the membership of the USIB, but at present, he repeated, the change suggested would merely result in putting on USIB representatives with inadequate intelligence support.
The President believed that the Services should collect battlefield intelligence but did not see the necessity for strategic intelligence in the Services. He wondered what intelligence officers in the Services could do to get information from the center of the USSR and correlate it with intelligence on the rest of the world. He said when he supported the establishment of the Central Intelligence Agency in 1947, he did it on the basis that the function of strategic intelligence should be in CIA and that duplication should be eliminated. General Lemnitzer felt that the acquisition of technical intelligence, e.g. information about enemy nuclear submarines, required officials who know nuclear submarines. The Services would be very much concerned if they were not represented on USIB. The President believed that the information referred to by General Lemnitzer was battlefield intelligence, whereas the discovery of the shipyards where nuclear submarines are being constructed was the business of CIA. He did not see why four intelligence services should attempt to find out where the submarines were made. He believed it was the function of CIA to acquire strategic intelligence. General Lemnitzer believed that each Military Service was working on a different intelligence target.
Mr. Gray pointed out that a substantive discussion of the material in the Joint Study Group report seemed to be underway. The President said that perhaps the membership of USIB could not be changed at once but that a different type of intelligence board could be organized once military intelligence within the Department of Defense was re-organized. Secretary Gates did not agree that the membership of USIB could not be changed immediately. A Defense representative on the Board could do his homework in the Pentagon and bring the Defense position to the Board in the same way a Defense representative on the Planning Board reports the Defense position. The President felt that changes in the membership of USIB must be correlated with changes in the military intelligence organization. Mr. Gates said that thus far intelligence has not been affected by reorganization of the Department of Defense. Mr. Dulles said when changes were made in the organization of military intelligence, there would be a reason for changing the membership of USIB, since there would then be one high-ranking official who knows intelligence representing the Department of Defense. The President said that there would in any case remain the need for technical intelligence gathered in connection with the normal deployment of forces.
Mr. Dulles said the figure of $2 billion had been mentioned occasionally as the sum spent by this government on intelligence activities. He wished to point out, however, that this figure included support of the radar station at Thule, support of SAMOS, etc., all of which were really early warning functions.
The President said he had read a summary of the report by the Joint Study Group. He felt that up to now we had not accomplished all it was possible to accomplish in integrating all our intelligence activities. Secretary Gates said there was no review in the Department of Defense of intelligence requirements. General Lemnitzer said the JCS agreed on the need for Defense review of intelligence requirements.
Secretary Gates believed the policy question before the Council now was, how far would this Administration wish to go in reorganizing intelligence during its last two weeks in office. The President said he felt a directive on agreed matters could be issued and that he could pass on to his successor his views on other intelligence questions. Mr. Dulles said he would like to see the matter of the pictorial center worked out soon.
The President then remarked that soon after Pearl Harbor, he was engaged in an operation which required him to have certain information which he was unable to obtain from the Navy, i.e. the strength the Navy had left in the Pacific. The President also noted that the U.S. fought the first year of the war in Europe entirely on the basis of British intelligence. Subsequently, each Military Service developed its own intelligence organization. He thought this situation made little sense in managerial terms. He had suffered an eight-year defeat on this question but would leave a legacy of ashes for his successor.
Mr. Gray said language would be prepared to permit agreed recommendations from the report of the Joint Study Group to be put into effect.
The President pointed out that in military history a single man usually dominates the intelligence service of a country at any given time. He felt that a strong central position with respect to intelligence was necessary. The Joint Chiefs of Staff should not be required to consult individually each of the Services, as well as CIA, in formulating their strategic plans; they should have their own intelligence service.
The National Security Council:
a. Discussed the question raised by the Secretary of Defense as to revising the National Security Council Intelligence Directives in the light of the recommendations relating to the military intelligence organization within the Department of Defense and to the membership of the U.S. Intelligence Board, submitted on December 15, 1960, by a Joint Study Group on Foreign Intelligence Activities, composed of representatives of the Director of Central Intelligence, the Secretaries of State and Defense, the Director, Bureau of the Budget, and the Special Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs.
b. Agreed that the Secretary of Defense should submit his recommendations for appropriate revisions in the NSCID's directive to the authority of the Secretary of Defense over the military intelligence organization within the Department of Defense in consonance with the Defense Reorganization Act of 1958.
c. Noted that the recommendations of the Secretary of Defense pursuant to b above, together with the views of the Principals of the Joint Study Group regarding the Group's report which are being consolidated by the Director of Central Intelligence, would be considered at the next NSC meeting on January 12, 1961.
Note: The actions in b and c above, as approved by the President, subsequently transmitted of the Secretary of Defense and the Director of Central Intelligence.
[Here follows discussion of the remaining agenda items.]
81. Memorandum of Conference With President Eisenhower/1/
Washington, January 5, 1961.
/1/Source: Eisenhower Library, Records of the Special Assistant for National Security Affairs. Secret. Prepared by Andrew Goodpaster on January 7. This meeting was held immediately after the NSC meeting; see Document 80.
General Hull made an oral report to the President from a text which he said he would send to me./2/ The President said he not only agreed with the observations of the group, he agreed so strongly he might have written them himself. He said he hoped that the new administration would continue a board such as this one, but was loath to make a suggestion since this might prove "counter productive."
Regarding intelligence organization in Defense, he said he favored the recommendation outlined by General Hull. As a second solution, however, he would center all intelligence about foreign military matters in the JCS with a strategic intelligence group concerned with broader matters, feeding in worldwide intelligence, in the CIA.
The President said he will endorse the Board's recommendation and will give it to Mr. Gates with a request that he pass it on to his successor in the new administration. He repeated that he wants to avoid any fatherly or professorial manner toward his successor. General Hull commented that the report had been prepared so that it could be provided to the new administration.
Governor Darden said he was convinced from the work he had done with the Board that reorganization would result in substantial savings in the intelligence field (or at any rate, better use of the resources now being made available). Mr. Lovett said he agreed but thought the resources should go toward better use. Admiral Conolly supported this judgment, stating that organization is now the root cause of excess costs, and that better organization can bring better efficiency.
82. Report From the Chairman of the President's Board of Consultants on Foreign Intelligence Activities (Hull) to President Elsenhower/1/
Washington, January 5, 1961.
/1/Source: Eisenhower Library, Records of the Special Assistant for National Security Affairs. Top Secret. Following the creation of the President's Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board to replace the Board of Consultants on May 4 (see Document 87), a copy of this report was transmitted to Bundy for President Kennedy under cover of a May 18 memorandum from J. Patrick Coyne. (Eisenhower Library, Records of the Special Assistant for National Security Affairs)
We appreciate the opportunity of again reporting to you on the continuing review of the U.S. foreign intelligence effort which we have been making pursuant to your Executive Order (#10656) of February 6, 1956./2/
/2/Executive Order 10656, signed by President Eisenhower on February 6, 1956, established the Board of Consultants on Foreign Intelligence Activities. (21 Federal Register 859)
Since we have all submitted our resignations to you, and because this will be our last meeting with you as members of your Foreign Intelligence Board, we propose this morning to give you a brief accounting of stewardship, as well as a few impressions concerning the present status and future trends of the U.S. foreign intelligence effort.
If agreeable to you, we will limit our briefing to a few of the more significant aspects of our association with, and our views concerning, the foreign intelligence effort.
Since you created the Board five years ago, we have held 18 full-scale meetings covering a total of 31 working days. In between these meetings continuity in the work of the Board has been provided by the Board's Executive Officer (on detail from the NSC staff) who has worked on a full-time basis in furtherance of the business of this Board. Additionally, in between these meetings individual members of the Board and the Board's Executive Officer have made periodic on-the-scene reviews of the foreign intelligence activities of the Central Intelligence Agency, the Departments of State and Defense, the Joint Chiefs of Staff, the Unified and Specified Commands, the Army, the Navy, the Air Force, the National Security Agency and its three supporting cryptologic services. These reviews have been made at the Seat of Government, elsewhere in the Continental United States, and in a great many countries in Europe, Asia, the Middle East, Africa and South America. In addition, at varying times, review has been made in all those locations of selected major cold war activities conducted by CIA's Clandestine Services.
In the past 5 years we have made 7 written and 6 oral reports to you, consisting of 37 major recommendations covering the most significant phases of the foreign intelligence and covert action business. From time to time, on subjects of lesser importance we have made observations and recommendations directly to member agencies of the Intelligence Community.
Of the 33 recommendations approved by you, action has been completed on 15. The remaining 18 are in varying stages of consideration or implementation by the agencies concerned. (We will comment on these pending matters later in this briefing)
At your direction 9 of the 18 pending recommendations have been made the subject of specific, continuing review by this Board and/or the subject of future reports (annual, semiannual, etc.) to the President and to the President's Foreign Intelligence Board (if there is to be such Board in the future).
As you appreciate, our foreign intelligence effort is a very large one when measured in terms of manpower and money. As of June, 1960, an estimated [3 lines of source text not declassified]. As of December, 1960 the cost of the effort was estimated to range between [less than 1 line of source text not declassified] a large fraction of these dollars going to the procurement of the very expensive intelligence hardware involved.
To reduce undesirable duplication and to improve coordination, integration, direction and control of the entire foreign intelligence effort (including the manpower, dollars and related assets just referred to), we proposed and you approved 16 recommendations in this area. Among the noteworthy actions which resulted were: (a) the abolition of three committees, and the establishment of a single forum, the United States Intelligence Board (USIB) which is now utilized on a regular basis (at least weekly) by the heads of all intelligence agencies for the collective consideration of important foreign intelligence matters; and (b) a re-examination of all National Security Council Intelligence Directives (NSCIDs) leading to the issuance of revised NSCIDs (reduced in number from 17 to 7) which clarified the basic duties and responsibilities of the member agencies of the Intelligence Community and which placed increased emphasis on several critical aspects of foreign intelligence organization and activities.
While we recognize that these results are noteworthy, we are of the view that there is still considerable room for improvement in the coordination, integration, direction and control of the intelligence effort.
We believe that, in the months ahead, consideration should be given to: (1) further revising pertinent NSCIDs to reflect the increasing intelligence role of the Joint Chiefs of Staff under the Department of Defense Reorganization Act of 1958; and (2) reducing ultimately the size of the USIB membership to provide the Director of Central Intelligence with a more efficient mechanism to assist him in carrying out his mission of coordinating all foreign intelligence activities. (At present USIB is composed of 6 Defense agencies [OSO, J-2, NSA, G-2, ONI, A-2], 2 civilian agencies [State, CIA] extensively engaged in foreign intelligence, and 2 additional civilian agencies [AEC, FBI] which are engaged in the foreign intelligence effort in only a marginal way.)/3/
/3/Brackets in the source text.
In addition to our recommendations on USIB and the revised NSCIDs, we have made some 14 other recommendations (40% of all our recommendations) pertaining to coordination, integration, reduction of duplication and strong centralized direction of the foreign intelligence effort. Because we consider this to be one of the most significant problem areas confronting the Community, and since this problem is tied inextricably to the role of the Director of Central Intelligence, we next address ourselves to that subject.
We are pleased that the unique capabilities of the present Director will continue to be utilized by the next administration, thereby providing continuity in this important area. However, we continue to be concerned by the great burden of work involved in the assignment to one individual of the two-fold responsibility of serving simultaneously as administrator of the Central Intelligence Agency, a large and complex organization, and as Director of Central Intelligence with responsibility for coordinating all foreign intelligence activities of the ten agencies comprising the Intelligence Community. We believe that the present incumbent has made progress in the direction of increased integration of the total Community effort, but that this progress has not proceeded with sufficient speed, because he has been preoccupied in the main with commanding the work of the CIA. Further, we believe that his effectiveness as Director of Central Intelligence is impaired somewhat by the feeling on the part of several member agencies of the Intelligence Community that he is "both umpire and pitcher" in that he is, at the same time, the coordinator of the entire Intelligence Community and the head of an operating agency which in many quarters is looked upon as a competing element of that Community.
We do not believe that this situation would be materially improved by the recommendation of the Joint Study Group (Recommendation #29) that the DCI establish a coordinating staff to assist him in carrying out his duties as coordinator of all intelligence activities. Rather, we believe that the situation would be bettered substantially if the DCI would divest himself voluntarily of many of the functions he currently performs in his capacity as Head of CIA and by assigning such duties elsewhere within CIA. To accomplish this purpose we again recommend that he be provided with a Chief of Staff or Executive Director to act for him, together with the Deputy Director, in the management of the CIA, thereby relieving him to perform the even more important duty of coordinating, integrating and directing all U.S. foreign intelligence activities.
After a reasonable trial period, if this course of action does not accomplish its intended goal, serious consideration should be given to complete separation of the DCI from the CIA.
We have made 8 recommendations on various aspects of the COMINT-ELINT business. Significant actions which have resulted in this area include the following: (a) the issuance of a new NSCID (No. 6) calling for the fusion of COMINT and ELINT activities under the Director, NSA; (b) a detailed study and constructive proposals to the NSC by Dr. Baker and his associates [2-1/2 lines of source text not declassified] and (c) periodic assessment and guidance by the Office of the Secretary of Defense with respect to NSA's plans, programs, and allocation of resources.
Although there has been some improvement in the fusion of COMINT and ELINT, we feel that it has been too slow and that much more can be done to improve their coordination by: (a) requiring positive operational and technical control of COMINT and by the Director, NSA, rather than the practice of yielding to individual service claims, and (b) actually combining COMINT and ELINT planning in USIB, rather than present handling of this in separate committees of USIB.
You have approved the four recommendations we have made on the vital matter of strategic warning. We are pleased to report that, as a result of your action, highly commendable progress has been made by the Department of Defense in perfecting the CRITICCOMM System to assure rapid transmission to Washington of critical intelligence data.
Apart from the communicating aspects of this matter, however, we continue to have misgivings as to whether USIB's Watch Committee and its National Indications Center are organized, supported and operated in such manner as to (a) assure timely receipt, processing and evaluation of all available information pertaining to strategic warning, and (b) assure timely transmission to higher authority of significant information bearing on the early warning problem.
In the Intelligence Community we believe that there is no subject more deserving of continuing attention, if the President and the National Security Council are to place reliance on USIB's Watch Committee and its National Indications Center to supply them with timely, strategic warning of enemy attack. Accordingly, we would urge that the DCI and USIB re-examine the current organization and functions of the Watch Committee and, particularly, its National Indications Center, to assure that both are properly organized and supported in such a way as to carry out their vital mission in the most effective manner possible.
You have approved the 4 recommendations we made on various aspects of CIA's covert action programs. As a result, we are pleased to report that at present the Special NSC 5412/2 Group appears to be better organized and to be functioning with greater effectiveness than was the case in earlier times./4/ However, we continue to have concern as to whether the Clandestine Services of CIA are sufficiently well organized and managed to carry out covert action programs. Further, we have been unable to conclude that, on balance, all of the covert action programs undertaken by CIA up to this time have been worth the risk or the great expenditure of manpower, money and other resources involved. In addition, we believe that CIA's concentration on political, psychological and related covert action activities have tended to detract substantially from the execution of its primary intelligence gathering mission. We suggest, accordingly, that there should be a total reassessment of our covert action policies and programs and that the Head of CIA should devote continuing attention to improving the organization and management of CIA's Clandestine Services.
/4/The NSC 5412/2 Special Group was established pursuant to the issuance of NSC 5412/2, December 28, 1955, to review and approve covert action programs initiated by the CIA. See William M. Leary, ed., The Central Intelligence Agency: History and Documents (The University of Alabama Press, 1984), pp. 63, 146-l49.
We have reviewed the recommendations recently submitted by the Joint Study Group (established to study the organization and management of the foreign intelligence effort). We believe the report is an excellent one and that it is deserving of most careful study by USIB and the responsible agency heads concerned./5/
/5/See Document 78.
Except for Recommendations #29 and 30 and the additional recommendations which pertain to the intelligence element of the JCS, we concur generally in the recommendations of the Group. We have previously expressed our views on #29 (dealing with the coordinating role of the DCI).
As to Recommendation #30 (which calls for a very substantial reduction in the membership of the USIB, we would make the following observations. Military intelligence should be brought into conformity with the Defense Reorganization Act of 1958, as recommended by the Group. However, the recommended reduction in USIB should not occur until the J-2 element of the JCS develops the vitality, experience and capability which are prerequisite to a meaningful fulfillment of the recommendation. Army, Navy, and Air Force Intelligence should not be removed from USIB until the J-2 (JCS) and the Secretary of Defense's Office of Special Operations are capable of serving as effective substitutes.
As to the recommendations pertaining to the intelligence element of the JCS we do not believe that the JCS, with its present composition and activities, can provide intelligence direction of the sort proposed by the Joint Study Group.
By way of summation, we would like to express the following convictions based on our 5-year Board activity: (a) the Intelligence Community has made substantial progress in several significant areas and is more productive than at any time in the past; (b) we foresee no reduction in the vital role which intelligence must play in support of the Nation's security, or in the cost of an intelligence program adequate to meet the ever increasing threats to our national security; (c) we will continue to experience serious intelligence deficiencies due to rigorous Soviet bloc security measures, but these can be overcome in large measure if our Nation is prepared to meet the challenge and the costs involved; and (d) we feel that maximum utilization must be made of scientific and technological know-how because positive intelligence and counterintelligence will rely increasingly on sophisticated scientific techniques.
Finally, we refrain from commenting concerning the desirability or need in the future for a Presidential Board of Consultants on Foreign Intelligence. We feel that you are in a much better position than we to assess the value of an activity of this sort.
However, we would urge a recommendation to your successor that, if he does not find the need for such a Board, a staff officer of the NSC be assigned full-time responsibility to maintain a continuing review of these subjects and to report periodically thereon to him. Until a decision is made on the aforementioned matters, we suggest that, as an interim arrangement, it be recommended to your successor that our present Executive Officer be continued on detail from the NSC staff to provide necessary continuity with respect to the handling of the variety of previously mentioned matters which, at your direction, are scheduled to be the subjects of future reports by the Intelligence Community.
Finally, Mr. President, the other members of the Board and I appreciate the trust and confidence you reposed in us by appointing us to this Board, and we wish to record our pleasure at being permitted to serve you.
John E. Hull/6/
/6/Printed from a copy that bears this typed signature.
83. Memorandum From Director of Central Intelligence Dulles to the President's Special Assistant for National Security Affairs (Gray)/1/
Washington, January 9, 1961.
/1/Source: Eisenhower Library, Records of the Special Assistant for National Security Affairs. Secret.
/2/The report is not printed.
1. In compliance with your request I submit the following self-contained compilation of my previous reports on the various steps which have been taken in response to the two recommendations made by the Board on October 30, 1958 and May 24, 1960. As you requested, the following compilation is so arranged as to identify those actions which were taken or considered in connection with the Third Report of the Board as distinguished from actions which were taken or considered in connection with the Sixth Report of the Board./4/
/4/The Board's Third Report is not printed.
2. The Third Report to the President by the President's Board of Consultants on Foreign Intelligence Activities, dated October 30, 1958 and presented to the President on December 16, 1958 contained the following recommendation:
"The present mission of the Plans Group of the CIA be reviewed with consideration given to relieving that Group of, and placing elsewhere in the Agency, the responsibilities (1) for the review of (i.e., reporting on and evaluating) the Political, Psychological and Para-Military operations of the Agency, and (2) for the formulation of the intelligence estimates and recommendations upon which the plans for such operations are based."
3. The text of the report of December 16, 1958 to the President explained some of the reasoning of the Board resulting in this recommendation. This report referred to "some of the virtually autonomous functions assigned to this Group", and states, "From evidence we have seen, it is our feeling that within this frame of reference, the Plans Group (for the Agency) may be incapable of making objective appraisals of its own intelligence information as well as of its own operations when it is involved in Cold War activities which are the subjects of its own reports. We are concerned about the implications of this not only because of possible impacts on the programs of the Agency but, more importantly, because of the influences which may be brought to bear on foreign policy determinations which, in large measure, may be based upon Agency reporting."
4. The Board of Consultants may have felt that there was a greater degree of autonomy or independence possessed by the Deputy Director for Plans (Plans Group) than actually existed. Final responsibility and authority for all activities of the Clandestine Services rest with me as Director of the Central Intelligence Agency. It is a fact that the DD/P may take action on behalf of the Director, but in the case of operations under NSC 5412 only after the necessary policy guidance has been obtained from the 5412 Committee.
5. It is particularly important to note that before CIA Cold War (5412) activities are initiated all available intelligence, including National Intelligence Estimates, which are produced by the Intelligence Community, is taken into account. Further, while it is true that in covert operations a major source of information on the accomplishments of the project may be clandestine, we analyze all available information from all sources to guard against subjectivity or self-serving reports.
6. The present Deputy Director (Plans) assumed his position on January 1, 1959, shortly after the Third Report was submitted to the President. He at once undertook a complete review of the mission and organization of the Clandestine Services. In concert with this the Inspector General of the Agency was engaged in reviewing the overall organization of the Clandestine Services. As a further measure I initiated a Program for Greater Efficiency within the Agency as a whole in order to ensure a continuing effort to improve its organization and methods of operation. This program and other aspects of the Board's Third Report were discussed at the meeting of the Board on July 17, 1959. As a result of these several reviews a number of organizational changes were made and many others were considered but rejected for various valid reasons. The main objective of these changes was to improve the efficiency of the Clandestine Services. A new Assistant Deputy Director (Plans) for Psychological and Paramilitary Operations was appointed to assist the DD/P in the operational direction of activities in these functional fields. An Operational Services grouping was created, combining and centralizing the direction of several elements which perform functions of common concern to all the Operating Divisions and Staffs. The Inspection and Review Staff, DD/P was abolished and the Inspector General of CIA made solely responsible for the comprehensive review of the activities and operations of the Clandestine Services, reporting directly to me.
7. The planning system within the Clandestine Services was revised so that a greater distinction is made between operational planning directives and budgetary estimates. The revised system calls for an initial DD/P operational plan containing guidance and direction for the operating divisions and staffs for the forthcoming fiscal year. From this the divisions and staffs can prepare their more detailed Operational Programs which go forward for review and approval by the Project Review Committee which reports directly to me. The budget and fiscal requirements are generated as a by-product of these Operational Programs. Finally, Related Mission Directives, also based on the Operational Plan and Programs and the particular situation in the area concerned, set forth more precise and realistic objectives and tasks for each field station.
8. In addition to the above these reviews of the mission and organization of the Clandestine Services highlighted the following aspects of its work which merited further attention and study and on which action has been or is being taken:
a. the Agency's responsibility for the coordination of U.S. clandestine activities abroad
In this major effort to improve the organization of the CS but most especially the methods and procedures-the way business is transacted-the DD/P and his Staff have kept in mind the recommendation of the Board quoted above. Several of the changes made are responsive to this recommendation.
9. The second part of the Board's recommendation was concerned with the location of responsibility for the formulation of intelligence estimates and of recommendations upon which plans for operations are based. It suggested that such responsibility not be located in that portion of the Agency which is responsible for planning operations.
10. The problem of insuring the provision of a valid and unbiased intelligence base for operational planning purposes has been given much consideration within CIA during the development of the Clandestine Services planning cycle. The Board's concern, I feel, has been met by the procedures described below.
11. Planning for Psychological, Political and Paramilitary operations is not based on intelligence provided solely by the DD/P. The primary source of intelligence for planning purposes is the Office of National Estimates (ONE). Present DD/P procedures provide for the use of ONE guidance throughout the entire planning cycle. The Clandestine Services General Plan, DD/P's basic planning document, derives from current NIE's the contingencies against which clandestine activities must be directed. Moreover, specific projects are tested against pertinent NIE's or, if a current or relevant NIE is not available or time is sufficiently urgent to make a coordinated NIE impossible, an ONE estimative memorandum is obtained.
12. There are further independent checks of PP/PM projects internally within CIA. Such projects are generally reviewed by the Project Review Committee which is presided over by the Director or Deputy Director of CIA and is widely representative of the Agency as a whole, including the Deputy Director for Intelligence, the Deputy Director for Support, and the Inspector General.
13. Significant PP/PM projects having political import and involving substantial expenditures receive a thorough review and concurrence by the Department of State and by the 5412 group, before final approval by the Director. Such concurrence is sought on the basis of relevant intelligence available to the Agency as a whole. While PP/PM projects may be recommended by the DD/P, action thereon in all significant cases is not possible until internal and external procedures, as described above have been satisfied. Thus action is not taken on intelligence or recommendations from the DD/P alone.
14. The Sixth Report to the President by the President's Board of Consultants on Foreign Intelligence Activities, dated May 24, 1960, included the following comments and recommendation:
"Organization and Management of CIA's Clandestine Services
"Based upon an exchange of correspondence between the National Security Council and this Board in November, 1959, we have continued to follow developments relating to needed improvements in the organization and management of CIA's Clandestine Services. Although a few significant changes have been made in this area in recent months, we believe that a way can be found to organize these Services along more simplified and efficient lines. While we appreciate that the missions assigned to the Clandestine Services are complex, we are hopeful that, through the continuing studies being made by CIA's Deputy Director/Plans, these Services will be organized in such manner as to eliminate unnecessary duplication of effort and achieve increased effectiveness."
15. I concurred with these comments of the Board and reaffirmed that the continuing studies being made by the DD/P of the organization of the Clandestine Services and the methods and procedures employed in carrying out the mission of the CS had as principal objectives the elimination of unnecessary duplication and the achievement of increased effectiveness. As noted by the Board and as reported above in this paper significant changes in the organization and management of the CS were made. [2 lines of source text not declassified]
[1 page of source text not declassified]
Through these organizational changes, revision and simplification of certain basic procedures, and clarification of the functions and responsibilities of both staff and line components we made progress toward our objectives. It is important to realize that this is a continuing process and one which must be carried out on a progressive basis with the least possible disruption of current activities.
16. The CS accomplishes its mission through components responsible for a prescribed geographical area and through other components responsible for a prescribed function without geographical limitations. This approach is required because of the complexity of the tasks and broad interests of the CS. Under these arrangements it is inevitable that some duplication exists but it should not be inferred that all such duplication is unnecessary. We make every effort to reduce duplication to that which is unavoidable if we are to assure that all our responsibilities are discharged in a competent and secure manner.
17. The roles of the Special Staffs recently have been further clarified and delimited with the objective of eliminating duplication and relieving the staffs of the responsibility for any activity which can properly be performed in the operating divisions. I am satisfied that the Special Staffs have unique and important functions of common concern and world-wide application, that cannot be accomplished in the operating divisions. It is of course essential that these functions are carefully identified and that all officers of the CS clearly understand precisely which activities are the responsibility of the Special Staffs. To accomplish this the Deputy Director (Plans) is now revising the functional statements of the Staffs which will concentrate on their four basic functions, viz.:
a. Services of common concern such as liaison with other agencies and with other components of CIA, screening of requirements, and certain specialized activities [3 lines of source text not declassified].
b. Support activities including certain forms of research, the promulgation of doctrine, development of new ideas and the provision of expert advice and guidance in the several functional fields.
c. Developing plans for and assisting in the coordination of functional programs involving activities in two or more geographic areas.
d. Participating in the evaluation of the production and accomplishment of the CS.
18. As an additional measure to prevent possible duplication the Deputy Director (Plans) further modified the staff organization in the area divisions to eliminate separate Foreign Intelligence, Counter Intelligence and Covert Action sections. These divisions now have centralized operations staffs.
19. [10 lines of source text not declassified]
20. In order to make the most effective use of our resources in the performance of certain important functions the Deputy Director (Plans) is developing standing operating procedures which will be followed for specific activities. Planning, for example, will be a joint endeavor of the Projects and Programs Group, the Special Staffs, and the Operating Divisions under the general supervision and guidance of the Senior Planning Officer. This planning community will insure that the talents of appropriate officers and the capabilities of all interested components of the CS are brought to bear on specific problems. Similarly, appropriate operating procedures will delineate the capabilities of properly qualified officers and components in the research and evaluation functions. This is an economical way to do the job since it will permit effective planning, research, evaluation, etc. without requiring a number of small units formally established for these functions.
21. The Deputy Director (Plans) believes the changes he has made in the past two years in the organization structure and the way of doing business in the CS have corrected deficiencies and that the situation in this regard is now satisfactory. I concur in this belief. This does not imply that we have achieved such perfection in these important matters that no future modifications will be desirable. We may require further adjustments to meet new situations. We must strive progressively to improve our methods and simplify our structure where feasible. To meet these requirements the Deputy Director (Plans) will continue to study the organization and procedures of the Clandestine Services and take such action as may be required to contribute to our goal of greater efficiency in the Clandestine Services.
Allen W. Dulles
84. Memorandum of Discussion at the 474th Meeting of the National Security Council/1/
Washington, January 12, 1961.
/1/Source: Eisenhower Library, Whitman File, NSC Records. Top Secret; Eyes Only. Prepared on January 13.
[Here follows a paragraph listing the participants at the meeting.]
There follows a summary of the discussion at the Meeting and the main points taken.
[Here follows discussion of agenda items 1-3.]
4. Foreign Intelligence Activities (NSC Action No. 2367; Memo for NSC from Executive Secretary, same subject, dated January 9, 1961, Special Limited Distribution Only)/2/
/2/Regarding NSC Action No. 2367, see Document 80. The Executive Secretary's January 9 memorandum presumably transmitted Allen Dulles' January 9 memorandum (Document 83) to the NSC.
Mr. Gray introduced this subject to the Council. (A copy of Mr. Gray's Briefing Note is filed in the Minutes of the Meeting and another copy is attached to this Memorandum.)/3/
After indicating that the 43 recommendations of the report of the Joint Study Group on Foreign Intelligence Activities and the recommendations by the Department of Defense for revision of the National Security Council Intelligence Directives (NSCIDs) were before the Council,/4/ Mr. Gray turned to the recommendations of the Joint Study Group in the order in which they appeared in the January 9 memorandum of the Director of Central Intelligence on the subject.
/4/See Documents 78 and 82. The Department of Defense recommendations have not been further identified.
The first category of recommendations consisted of those, 28 in number, on which all of the Principals of the Joint Study Group were in agreement. The Council concurred in these 28 recommendations.
Mr. Gray then turned to the second category; namely, 7 recommendations on which the Principals were in substantial agreement with the exception of dissents or reservations on each such recommendation by single agency head (See Paragraph 5 of the Briefing Note). Recommendations 21, 22 and 23 called for the establishment of a central requirements facility by the U.S. Intelligence Board (USIB). Defense felt that these recommendations should be given further study. Secretary Gates said he had not had time to thrash this matter out with the Joint Chiefs of Staff. He felt that he would personally be able to agree to Recommendation 21 at least, but the JCS felt that a problem was involved concerning the general relation of military influence to operational intelligence. General Lemnitzer said the JCS were not so much in disagreement with the objectives of the recommendation as they were inclined to feel the need for further study in the field. He added that problems as to where the central requirements facility might be located, etc. had been raised. Secretary Gates said the purpose of the recommendation was to remedy the present situation in which intelligence requirements can be issued without being checked in a central clearing house to see whether someone else has the same requirements. Mr. Dulles noted that a great volume of requirements were issued. The President wondered why the JCS objected to this recommendation. He felt finding out the exact requirements in intelligence was the road to efficiency. Secretary Gates said the JCS had lumped Recommendations 21, 22 and 23 together. He believed their dissent was a matter of the details rather than the philosophy. Mr. Dulles suggested that the three recommendations be accepted in principle and referred to the USIB for implementation and consultation with Defense and the JCS. Secretary Gates endorsed this proposal and the Council adopted it.
Mr. Gray then turned to Recommendation 24 which would place on U.S. Mission Chiefs overseas the responsibility for coordinating all overt and clandestine intelligence requirements in their area. Mr. Gray said he suggested granting an exception in instances where State and CIA agreed that the Chief of Mission should not exercise this responsibility. Mr. Dulles said Mr. Gray's exception vas acceptable to him. The President agreed.
Mr. Gray then suggested that Recommendation 31 be passed over until Recommendation 29 was taken up. Mr. Gray then turned to Recommendation 34 which would require that military agencies intelligence instructions to components of unified commands be transmitted through the JCS. Mr. Dulles said he concurred in this recommendation, subject to the proviso that it did not include NSA communications to the service cryptographic agencies in the field. General Lemnitzer said this recommendation involved a problem because of the vast volume of requirements in the technical intelligence field. The JCS were not organized for transmission of this vast volume of requirements. He felt there must be some middle ground; perhaps broad operational requirements as distinct from technical requirements could be transmitted through the JCS. The President pointed out that the recommendation referred to "instructions". Mr. Dulles suggested that the recommendation be amended to indicate that instructions be transmitted through the JCS or as the JCS may direct. General Lemnitzer and Secretary Gates and the President agreed with Mr. Dulles' suggestion.
Mr. Gray next took up Recommendation 37 which would continue the responsibility of CIA stations abroad to coordinate clandestine activities but would relieve CIA case officers of the authority to veto proposed clandestine operations of another agency. Mr. Dulles said he believed this recommendation unnecessary and distinguished between the final decision to approve and the final decision to veto. He said if a military service wishes to appeal the veto of a CIA case officer, the matter could be decided in Washington by the Director of Central Intelligence and the Chief of the Military Intelligence Service. He pointed out also that if a field commander considers an operation essential to the security of his command, he can go ahead with the operation pending Washington's decision regardless of the objection of the CIA case officer in the field. General Lemnitzer said the JCS agreed with this recommendation. Mr. Dulles said he had no further objection to the recommendation.
Mr. Gray then turned to a category of recommendations, two in number, on which there is disagreement but with respect to which the DCI recommends a decision at this time. The first recommendation in this category was No. 16 which called for the issuance of a new NSCID No. 8 establishing a National Photographic Intelligence Center./5/ Mr. Gray pointed out that the Secretary of Defense and the DCI were in disagreement on this recommendation, each feeling that his agency should have responsibility for administering the proposed Center. General Lemnitzer believed the Center should operate under the general direction of the Defense Department because the vast amount of the in-put would be produced by the Military Services. Moreover, the Military Services would be required to provide training for and would be the principal customers of the Center, which would be especially important in time of war. He recognized the need of other agencies for photographic intelligence and such intelligence would be made available. He gave assurance that the Center would not be removed from Washington if it were placed under the Department of Defense. Vast quantities of photographic intelligence were now being acquired. No photographic center was available at the present time and the Joint Chiefs of Staff wished to avoid duplicate centers. The Chiefs feel that the center could most effectively be operated by the Department of Defense with the participation of CIA. Secretary Gates added that Mr. Dulles had agreed that the Center should be operated by Defense in time of war but he (Mr. Gates) felt the need of continuity in the quick transition from peace to war which might occur in the future. This problem was not one of intelligence interpretation but was one of management. Every user agency could interpret the intelligence. Secretary Gates added that the existing Center would have to be expanded in the near future.
/5/National Security Council Intelligence Directive (NSCID) Nos. 1-14 are printed in Foreign Relations, 1945-1950, Emergence of the Intelligence Establishment, Documents 422-435.
Mr. Dulles said some misinterpretation appeared to exist on this subject. The present photographic Center was a joint enterprise consisting of 140 CIA officials, 100 Army officers, and a small but competent Navy contingent of 10 and 7-15 Air Force officers. The Center had been a joint operation for five years and had handled mostly U-2 photography under the management of CIA. The President asked whether the Defense suggestion was that the Center be under J-2. General Lemnitzer replied, no, under the Department of Defense. Secretary Gates added, directly under the Secretary of Defense just as NSA is. The President thought the three Military Services should not be separately involved in this Center. Since the basic danger to be detected by the Center is military, he believed it would be satisfactory for the military to give central direction to the operation.
Mr. Dulles said the information obtained through this Center was chiefly military only in the targeting field. Photographic intelligence had tremendous political significance and was a matter of common concern to the Washington agencies. The matter was one which fell within the field CIA was established to coordinate. In its five years of operation the Center had developed a group of career officials who intended to make photographic intelligence their life work. If the Center were placed in the hands of the military, rotation of personnel would be the principle followed, if past practice is any guide. The President felt rotation would be fatal to an operation of this kind. Secretary Gates said that if the Center were placed under Defense, a career staff would be retained and developed. Mr. Dulles said abandonment of rotation was a new idea for the military. He added that the Center had been operated for five years without a leak. Preliminary analysis of photography is made by the Center and information is then disseminated to user agencies. Some of this information is vital to the Department of State. Mr. Dulles felt it would be very damaging to morale to disrupt this going concern at the present time. The President said he would like to inquire into the time element. While some of the information coming from the Center might be vital to the Department of State, he wondered whether it was not the military rather than the State Department which had an instant need for the information. Mr. Dulles said the information developed by the Center was important to the military but was also important to other agencies such as State because of its effect on policy. The President said the information was important but need not reach State as soon as it reached the military. The information might be needed in a matter of seconds by the military.
Secretary Gates said the Center would be considerably expanded in the future and the operation would be different from the U-2 operation. The President believed that the Center must be operated by an expert career staff. This was a question of management which, perhaps, should be studied before being decided so quickly. If he had to decide at the present time, however, he would say, since the present Center is doing well, let it alone except for its enlargement. He understood that the Department of Defense and the JCS had no complaints about the operation of the Center.
Mr. Stans said one difficulty was that the Air Force was establishing its own Center. Secretary Herter said he understood that the film was processed by the Air Force before it went to the Center. Mr. Dulles said this understanding was erroneous. The film is developed by a private company, which has the greatest competence in this field. This company has been developing this film for five years in the greatest secrecy. The film goes to a special branch of the company and is then flown to Washington. The Air Force gets the film at the same time as the Center.
The President said there should be only one Center and that no Service should establish a separate center. Matters of this kind were placed under CIA by the National Security Act because of their common usefulness. Secretary Gates said Mr. Stans was correct in his statement that the Air Force intended to have its own center. When great masses of photographic data were involved, there was a question of what should be looked at first and how soon. Mr. Gray said he felt the discussion was getting on to very sensitive grounds. The issue was whether there should be a single center or not. The President said there must be a single photographic center. Since CIA was the principal user and collector, he believed the center should be under CIA management as a principle of organization even though the time element still bothered him.
On being called on by the President, Dr. Kistiakowsky said that the existing photographic Center under CIA provided copies of its material without delay to all Services which concentrated on tactical intelligence. The Center does not retain the matter until it makes an exhaustive analysis; it passes it on immediately. Dr. Kistiakowsky felt the existing Center was a revolution in photographic techniques. In a year we would be able to obtain as much information from photographs taken 200 miles above the earth as we were able to get from our best reconnaissance plane in World War II. Operation of the Center required expertise. CIA had taken the lead in managing and developing this Center in the past. Dr. Kistiakowsky felt it would result in delay and loss of progress to disturb the Center at the present time. From the technical point of view, he would much prefer an expansion of the present Center to a transfer of the Center away from CIA management.
Mr. Stans raised the possibility of joint CIA/DOD management. The President said he disliked divided responsibility. He believed Defense had not shown any unhappiness with the existing Center. While he knew how important the time element was, he believed the present Center should be kept under CIA management and expanded. The DOD should state its requirements for photographic intelligence. There should be a single center and no Service should be allowed to set up its own center. Mr. Dulles pointed out that the draft NSCID No. 8 provided that the Director of the Center would be chosen by agreement between the DCI and the Secretary of Defense.
Mr. Gray then turned to Recommendation 29 which would provide the DCI with a Coordinating Staff. The sole dissent on this recommendation was that of the Secretary of Defense who feels that the DCI should be separated from the CIA without further delay. Mr. Gray also mentioned the views of the Hull Board on this matter (bottom of Page 3 of the Briefing Note). Secretary Gates said the Defense view mentioned by Mr. Gray was the view of the Defense representative on the Joint Study Group. He (Mr. Gates) did not feel that he should comment on the organization of CIA; accordingly, he would take no strong position on this recommendation. The President believed the Defense Department should be interested in getting the best administration possible in this field and therefore should take a position. Secretary Gates said the Department of Defense had taken a position favoring the separation of the DCI from CIA. The President said he had believed for some time that the structure of our intelligence organization was faulty. He thought the Services should confine themselves to gathering combat intelligence while strategic military intelligence should be collected by an organization under J-2. He was convinced that better intelligence would be obtained by a centralized intelligence organization. Such an organization, however, needed to be streamlined.
Mr. Dulles said a great deal had been accomplished in the intelligence field over the past ten years. He believed coordination and cooperation was now better than it had ever been. He noted that no country had succeeded in achieving complete intelligence coordination, not even the U.K. and certainly not Germany under Hitler. Mr. Dulles was compelled to dissent from the Hull Board proposals because they were illegal until the law is changed. The DCI was responsible under the law for intelligence coordination and he could not delegate that responsibility. A body floating in thin air could not be created for the purpose of intelligence coordination until the statutes were amended. He doubted that such a body could accomplish coordination even if the law were amended to permit it to try. The President said he was convinced that some streamlining of our intelligence organization was needed. The streamlining probably should have been undertaken three years ago rather than at the last minute. Mr. Gray said the recommendation of the Joint Study Group was for a Coordinating Staff under the DCI. If the Secretary of Defense did not wish to press the proposal for a complete separation of the DCI from CIA, then a first step could be taken by adopting the Joint Study Group recommendation. Mr. Dulles said he concurred in the Joint Study Group recommendation. General Lemnitzer said the JCS agreed with the Secretary of Defense; they felt a separation of the DCI from CIA was to be preferred. Mr. Dulles said the objective of the Defense Department would be accomplished to a considerable extent by adopting the Joint Study Group proposal, particularly if Defense would assign a top-level official with real authority to the Coordinating Staff. Mr. Gray said the recommendation was not intended to fix intelligence organization for all time but would be a step forward.
Mr. Gray then proposed that the Council turn back to Recommendation 31 which would establish a management group under USIB. The President wondered whether the Coordinating Staff would not have to manage. Mr. Gray referred to the complicated committee structure under USIB but said no committee was charged with management problems. The Joint Study Group felt the need for a group which would deal with management matters. The DCI had suggested that this function be performed by the Coordinating Staff called for in Recommendation 29, which had just been discussed. The President wondered whether there was a difference between intelligence coordination and management. He felt that two separate bodies might clash. Mr. Dulles pointed out that he proposed a single group, namely, the Coordinating Staff. Secretary Herter suggested that the Coordinating Staff under the DCI be charged with management problems for six months after which the matter could be reviewed.
Secretary Gates referred to a new coordinating board which would be responsible for intelligence planning and estimating. Mr. Dulles felt that Secretary Gates was confusing two things, the membership of USIB and the recommendation of the Joint Study Group for a management group. Secretary Gates said he favored a change in the membership of USIB. He believed Defense, not the Services, should be represented on USIB and that the Defense representative should have a Defense position in the same way he has a Defense position when he comes to an NSC meeting. Mr. Dulles said that as soon as the necessary intelligence reorganization took place in the Pentagon, he would concur in a reorganization of USIB but not before.
Mr. Gray asked whether the Council agreed to give the Coordinating Staff referred to in Recommendation 29 the management function. The Council, including the President, indicated that it did agree with this proposal.
The President said the job of streamlining intelligence had not yet been seriously tackled. He had received a body blow when he learned that USIB consisted of ten people. Mr. Gray asked whether the Secretary of Defense wished to speak further on the membership of the USIB. Secretary Gates said he had recommended a change in USIB membership and he believed this change could be made at the present time. Accordingly, he had submitted proposed amendments to the NSCID's. The President asked why Defense could not effect the necessary reorganization without the blessing of the Council. Secretary Gates replied that the NSCID's had been adopted by the Council. The President said that the Council was only advisory to the President and that he (the President) as Commander-in-Chief looked to the Secretary of Defense to effect proper organization of intelligence in the Pentagon. The President added, however, that until intelligence in the Pentagon was reorganized, Defense would have to go along with the idea of changing the membership of USIB in phase with changes in Defense. Secretary Gates said he believed the changes he had proposed would force the Department of Defense to do its homework in intelligence. Mr. Dulles said if the Secretary of Defense wanted to assume the task of coordinating Army, Navy, and Air Force views on such a subject as missiles, he would be delighted. He felt, however, that such coordination would consume a great deal of the time of the Secretary of Defense. He believed he had more time than the Secretary of Defense to attempt this coordination. Secretary Gates said that USIB with Army, Navy, Air Force, DOD, and JCS representatives was a discussion board. No Defense position and no ironing out of Service positions was possible. The whole Defense position was turned over to USIB by default. The President said we were groping toward improvement in our intelligence organization. However, he wondered where the Services obtained the information which Mr. Dulles found so important. He did not believe the Services could find out how many missiles the Soviets have. Mr. Dulles said a distorted estimate would result if it were not for all the Services. For example, the Army had a great deal of experience in the amount of factory floor space required for the building for particular numbers of missiles. An acceptance of an Air Force point of view without regard to this Army experience would result in distortion. The President said he was talking about the views of the Secretary of Defense. He believed technical and tactical intelligence should be in the hands of the Services but broad strategic matters were different. He felt a better definition of the responsibility of each Service as to collection was needed, after which coordination should be less difficult. He believed military strategic intelligence should be centralized in Defense or JCS. General Lemnitzer said intelligence was different from other matters since intelligence estimates were based on a wide variety of information. He pointed out that the proposal by the Secretary of Defense would result in two Defense representatives on USIB, one from the Office of the Secretary of Defense and one from J-2. These two Defense representatives might have a difference of opinion. Moreover, the Secretary of Defense did not have an intelligence staff to help him resolve differences of view. Secretary Gates said he did a great deal of homework on NSC papers before a Council meeting. He believed it should be part of his job to spend time also in resolving intelligence differences. The President said he could not agree more. His inclination would be to put Pentagon intelligence under the JCS and let the latter send one man, not two, to USIB. Secretary Gates said his recommendation involved setting up one intelligence organization in the Pentagon. The President said that nevertheless, the present system, even it if worked creakingly at present, could not be radically changed until the necessary people were trained. The President, therefore, felt that the language in the Joint Study Group recommendations as to phasing was correct with respect to the membership of USIB. He hoped, however, that the phasing would not require eight years.
Mr. Gray turned next to another category of recommendations, six in number, on which there were differences of view among the Principals and on which the DCI recommends deferral of action. The first recommendations in this category were Nos. 1, 2 and 35 which would require a reorganization of intelligence within Defense and in field commands, with particular reference to the role of the Joint Staff and the unified commands in relation to military intelligence services. The Secretary of Defense approves these recommendations in principle but feels that Recommendation 35 should be deferred until experience is gathered in implementing Recommendations 1 and 2. The DCI objects to Recommendation 1(b)(2), which would require the JCS to coordinate intelligence views within Defense. Secretary Gates said this was a matter of internal directives within the Department of Defense and was related to the discussion just concluded. He felt the matter should be deferred.
The President said he was impressed by Recommendations 1 and 2 but felt that Recommendation 35 should be deferred. Mr. Gray then referred specifically to Recommendation 1 (b)(2). Mr. Stans said that there was no need for three military medical services, three military procurement services, or three military intelligence services. He believed a single military intelligence service should be achieved ultimately and the sooner the better. The President thought this matter would be settled by the reorganization of military intelligence which the Secretary of Defense would undertake. However, he thought intelligence direction by the JCS would have to be phased; such direction could not be accomplished until the intelligence organization in the Pentagon was changed. Secretary Gates said the amendments he had proposed to the NSCID's would permit a reorganization of intelligence in the Pentagon.
At this point Mr. Gray asked the Council to consider the amendments to the NSCID's proposed by the Deputy Secretary of Defense. Mr. Gray explained these proposed amendments.
In connection with NSCID 3, Mr. Stans noted that the Secretary of Defense proposed that Defense undertake the collection of economic information pertinent to the Department of Defense. Mr. Stans thought it would be possible to interpret this provision as including almost any type of information; accordingly, he felt the provision should be eliminated or limited. The President said that Military Attachés would inevitably collect some economic information. If an attempt were made to put intelligence in rigid compartments, some information would be lost. He was ready to admit that the primary responsibility for economic intelligence rested with State and CIA, but he believed the Military Services could not be denied the right to get any information they could obtain. Secretary Gates said his proposal merely updated the language of the existing NSCID, which permitted the three Services to collect economic intelligence. General Lemnitzer pointed out that the Military had to gather certain types of economic intelligence; for example, in order to evaluate Soviet missile capabilities, it was necessary to analyze the floor space of factories. Mr. McCone thought it would be unwise to exclude the Military from economic intelligence activities. Mr. Stans said Budget officials feared that each Military Service would attempt to collect all the economic information it was possible to collect. Mr. Gray pointed out that if the Defense proposals were adopted, Mr. Stans would need to deal only with the Secretary of Defense, rather than the three Services, in attempting to keep intelligence collection within bounds. The President said we should be content with the progress represented by the Defense amendments to NSCID 3. Mr. Stans suggested that the word "directly" be inserted in the provision under discussion so that Defense would collect "economic information directly pertinent to the Department of Defense." Mr. Gates said he would not argue over an adverb and the President approved Mr. Stans' suggestion.
In connection with NSCID 5, the President saw no reason to object to designating the Secretary of Defense as the agent with whom the DCI would negotiate coordination of espionage and clandestine counter-intelligence activities in active theaters of war. He felt, however, that while the JCS should not be held responsible, the Secretary of Defense should lean on them for advice in this field.
Secretary Herter said that the Defense proposals for amendment to NSCID 6 were worded in such a way as to exclude the Department of State, the FBI, and AEC from COMINT and ELINT activities. In response to a question from the President, he indicated that State negotiated international agreements for ELINT stations, for example. Secretary Herter suggested that NSCID 6 might be amended simply by indicating that "only the Secretary of Defense shall exercise or delegate this authority within the Department of Defense." Mr. Dulles concurred in Secretary Herter's suggestion.
Mr. Gray then reverted to the two remaining Joint Study Group recommendations. He said that Recommendation 5 would have military intelligence agencies develop a capability for war-time clandestine intelligence collection, to be carried out under coordination of the DCI. The President said he could speak with the authority of a former theater commander in time of war in saying that the theater commander could not be responsible to anyone but the Joint Chiefs of Staff. Secretary Herter believed Recommendation 5 required further study. The President said that rather than providing for coordination by the DCI, the recommendation might say that the DCI would be kept completely informed. Mr. Dulles pointed out that Recommendation 5 referred to peace-time, not war-time. The President said he was inclined to agree with Recommendation 5, on the understanding that it applied to peace-time activities only. He did not wish to see developed the theory that a theater commander could be interfered with in time of war.
Mr. Gray then noted that Recommendation 18 would have the DCI focus the attention of the intelligence community on counter-intelligence and the security of overseas personnel and installations with periodic reports to USIB. Secretary Herter said this matter was under intense study at the present time. He believed it would be premature to take action on this recommendation until study and research had been completed. The President said the report referred to in Recommendation 18 could be made through channels. Secretary Herter noted that State Department officials did not wish State Department research activities in this field curtailed as a result of a directive for a joint operation. Mr. Dulles said he hoped some action would be taken on Recommendation 18. He believed coordination was important in this field. The recommendation was not meant to upset the research and study already under way. Mr. Gray suggested that the agencies concerned should make periodic reports to the agency heads.
The President said he hoped this Administration would recommend to the new Administration that the Hull Board be kept in existence. Mr. Dulles concurred. The President added that in his view, the recommendation for continuance of the Hull Board should be made to the new Administration by the DCI and the Secretary of Defense rather than by him (the President) in view of the apparent tendency of the incoming Administration to downgrade the record of the outgoing Administration. Mr. Gray said that in a conversation with his successor, Mr. McGeorge Bundy, he had formed the impression that Mr. Bundy agreed that the Hull Board should be retained. Mr. Bundy's only question about the Board seemed to be concerned with its relationship to the President. The President said a great many relationships which had been working satisfactorily for a long time were now being questioned by people new to the job.
The National Security Council:
a. Discussed the views of the Principals of the Joint Study Group regarding the Group's report, as consolidated by the Director of Central Intelligence (transmitted by the reference memorandum of January 9, 1961); and took the following actions with regard to the recommendations of the Joint Study Group:
(1) Concurred in Recommendations Nos. 3, 4, 6, 7, 8, 9, 10, 11, 12, 13, 14, 15, 17, 19, 20, 25, 26, 27, 28, 29, 32, 33, 36, 37, 38, 39, 40, 41, 42 and 43.
(2) Concurred in Recommendations Nos. 1, 2 and 30, provided that:
(a) Implementation of Recommendations Nos. 1 and 2 should take place after study by the Joint Chiefs of Staff and in a manner to be established by the Secretary of Defense.
(b) The implementation of Recommendations Nos. 1, 2 and 30 with respect to the organization and functions of the USIB should be taken in phase with the carrying out of the related internal adjustments within the intelligence components of the Department of Defense.
(3) Concurred in Recommendation No. 5, with the understanding that this recommendation did not modify the arrangements in this field under wartime conditions.
(4) Concurred in Recommendation No. 16 and approved draft NSCID No. 8 as submitted, with the provision that the National Photographic Intelligence Center (NPIC) should be under the Central Intelligence Agency; and noted the President's statement that there should be no other center duplicating the functions of the NPIC, and that the military services and other departments and agencies should state clearly to the NPIC their particular requirements.
(5) Concurred in Recommendation No. 18, subject to the deletion of the words "and assign responsibility for periodic reports to the United States Intelligence Board'' and the addition of the words "and the agencies concerned should make periodic reports to their agency heads."
(6) Concurred in principle with Recommendations Nos. 21, 22 and 23, and referred them to the USIB for implementation in consultation with the Secretary of Defense and the Joint Chiefs of Staff.
(7) Concurred in Recommendation No. 24, subject to the addition of the words "except in situations with respect to which the Secretary of State and the Director of Central Intelligence may agree do not warrant such allocation of responsibility."
(8) Agreed that, in lieu of establishing the management group proposed in Recommendation No. 31, the functions recommended for that group should be performed by the coordination staff proposed in Recommendation No. 29.
(9) Concurred in Recommendation No. 34 subject to the addition of the words "or as the Joint Chiefs of Staff may direct, subject to the understanding that National Security Agency communications to service cryptologic agencies in the field are excepted from the provisions of this recommendation."
(10) Deferred action on Recommendation No. 35.
b. Discussed the recommendations of the Deputy Secretary of Defense (transmitted by the reference memorandum of January 9, 1961), and adopted the following amendments to National Security Council Intelligence Directives:
(1) NSCID No. 1, paragraph 4-a, 3rd sentence: Delete the words "with intelligence production responsibilities."
(2) NSCID No. 2. paragraph 3: Delete this paragraph and substitute the following:
"3. The Department of Defense shall have primary responsibility for, and shall perform as a service of common concern, the collection of military intelligence information. Owing to the importance of scientific and technical intelligence to the Department of Defense and the military services, this collection responsibility shall include scientific and technical, as well as economic, information directly pertinent to Department of Defense missions."
(3) NSCID No. 3, subparagraph 7-b: Delete this subparagraph and substitute the following:
"b. The Department of Defense shall produce military intelligence. This production shall include scientific, technical and economic intelligence directly pertinent to the missions of the various components of the Department of Defense."
(4) NSCID No. 5, subparagraphs 8-a, -b and -c: Substitute the words "Secretary of Defense" for the words "Joint Chiefs of Staff".
(5) NSCID No. 6, paragraph 2: Add the following words: "except that only the Secretary of Defense shall exercise or delegate this authority within the Department of Defense."
c. Noted the President's conviction that further streamlining of the entire foreign intelligence organization still needs to be accomplished.
Note: The action in a above, as approved by the President, subsequently transmitted to the Director of Central Intelligence, the Secretary of State and the Secretary of Defense for appropriate implementation.
The amendments in b above, as approved by the President, subsequently incorporated in revised NSCID's.
85. Briefing Paper by A. Russell Ash of the National Security Council Staff/1/
Washington, January 13, 1961.
/1/Source: Eisenhower Library, Records of the Special Assistant for National Security Affairs. Secret.
BRIEF FOR DISCUSSION WITH THE PRESIDENT
1. In memorandum of December 16, 1960, Mr. Gordon Gray requested the DCI to furnish a self-contained, current compilation of actions which have been taken to implement two Hull Board recommendations made in 1958 and 1960 (and subsequently approved by the President) which called for improved organization and management of CIA's Clandestine Services. The DCI's response is set forth in his memorandum dated 1/9/61 (attached)./2/
2. The first recommendation was made in a report of the Hull Board dated October 30, 1958. The Board noted that the CIA's Plans Group was responsible for supervising, administering and reviewing the clandestine activities of CIA, including covert foreign intelligence activities and Cold War operations-and the Board questioned whether the Plans Group was capable of making objective appraisals of its own intelligence information and its own operations, when it is involved in Cold War activities which are the subject of its own reports. The Hull Board was concerned about this not only because of possible impacts on the programs of the CIA, but because of the influences which might be brought to bear on foreign policy determinations which, in large measure, may be based on CIA reporting. Accordingly, the Board proposed a review of the CIA's Plans Group and that consideration be given to placing elsewhere in CIA the following responsibilities of the Plans Group: (1) the responsibility for reporting on and evaluating Political, Psychological and Para-Military operations, and (2) the responsibility for the formulation of intelligence estimates and recommendations upon which the plans for such operations are based.
3. In the second recommendation, made on 5/24/60, the Board noted that some changes had been made toward improving the organization and management of CIA's Clandestine Services, but the Board felt that a way could be found to organize them along more simplified and efficient lines so as to avoid unnecessary duplication of effort and to achieve increased effectiveness.
4. The DCI's Response: In his report dated 1/9/61, the DCI refers to corrective actions and indicates reasons why the responsibilities of the Plans Group are not placed elsewhere in CIA as suggested by the Board. Highlights of the DCI's report include the following:
(1) The Hull Board may have felt that the Plans Group possessed a greater degree of autonomy and independence than actually existed.
(2) Although the Deputy DCI for Plans may take action for the DCI, operations under NSC 5412 are conducted only after the necessary policy guidance has been obtained from the 5412 Committee.
(3) Before Cold War (5412) activities are initiated, all available intelligence, including National Intelligence Estimates produced by the Intelligence Community, are taken into account-and while it is true that in covert operations a major source of information on the accomplishments of a project may be clandestine, CIA analyzes all available information from all sources to guard against subjectivity and self-serving reports.
(4) In 1959 the Deputy DCI for Plans reviewed the mission and organization of the Clandestine Services, in concert with a review by the Inspector General of CIA, and the DCI initiated a Program for Greater Efficiency within CIA as a whole.
(5) A number of organizational changes were made with respect to the Clandestine Services, including the appointment of a new Assistant Deputy DCI for Plans; an Operational Services grouping was created to combine and centralize certain elements.
(6) The Inspector General of CIA was made solely responsible for the comprehensive review of the activities and operations of Clandestine Services, reporting directly to the DCI.
(7) Operational Programs go to a Project Review Committee which reports directly to the DCI, and Mission Directives set forth objectives for the field stations.
(8) Action has been or is being taken with regard to such aspects of the Clandestine Services as coordination of activities abroad, delegation of more authority to the field, more emphasis on political action in underdeveloped areas, increased records mechanization, etc.
(9) The DCI has reaffirmed that continuing studies by the Deputy DCI for Plans of the organization, methods and procedures of the Clandestine Services be directed toward elimination of unnecessary duplication and the achievement of increased effectiveness--objectives which were set forth in the Hull Board's recommendations. As a result, CIA has made such organizational changes as the establishment of a Division to direct and coordinate sensitive air operations, and the pending revision of functional statements of responsibilities of the Special Staffs.
(10) Other organizational steps have been taken to promote efficiency, as detailed in the DCI's report.
(11) As previously indicated, the DCI feels that steps have been taken to meet the Hull Board's concern over the problem of insuring a valid and unbiased intelligence base for operational planning purposes in the Clandestine Services. The DCI points to procedures calling for guidance from the Office of National Estimates throughout the planning cycle, and the use of current NIE's in deriving contingencies against which clandestine activities are to be directed. The DCI refers to further independent checks on Psychological, Political and Para-Military projects in CIA, including review by components of CIA as a whole. The DCI also refers to the fact that such projects which have political import and involve substantial expenditures receive thorough review by State and by the 5412 Group before final approval by the DCI.
(12) Finally, the DCI concurs in the belief of the Deputy DCI for Plans that changes made in the past two years in the organization and procedures of the Clandestine Services have corrected deficiencies, and that the situation is now satisfactory. The DCI recognizes that future modifications may be desirable, and he asserts that the Deputy DCI for Plans will continue to study the organization and procedures of the Clandestine Services and take such action as is required to contribute toward greater efficiency.
5. Observation: The organizational changes and procedures which have been made, or are contemplated, in CIA's Clandestine Services should continue to be periodically reassessed to insure that the objectives of the two Hull Board recommendations are being met in this critical area of Foreign Intelligence activities. Whether or not there is to be a continuation of the kind of scrutiny which has heretofore been afforded these matters by the President's Board of Consultants on Foreign Intelligence Activities, it would seem desirable that the DCI be asked by the President at this time to maintain a continuing review of CIA's Clandestine Services.
6. Accordingly, it is recommended that the President be briefed on the highlights of the DCI's memorandum dated 1/9/61, and that the President approve an action along the following lines:
The President (a) noted the memorandum dated January 9, 1961 to the Special Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs from the Director of Central Intelligence, on the status of implementation of recommendations made by the President's Board of Consultants on Foreign Intelligence Activities on October 30, 1958, and May 24, 1960, concerning the CIA's Plans Group and the organization and management of CIA's Clandestine Services, and (b) requested that the Director of Central Intelligence continue to review the action being taken with a view to meeting the objectives of the recommendations, and as the basis for the submission of a further progress report at an appropriate time.
Washington, January 18, 1961, 2:40 p.m.
/1/Source: Eisenhower Library, Records of the Special Assistant for National Security Affairs, Memoranda of Meetings with the President, January 1961. Secret. Drafted by Gray on January 19.
Mr. Allen W. Dulles and General Goodpaster were present for Item 1.
1. I indicated to the President that the purpose of the meeting was to discuss precisely what he felt he required in the way of records with respect to 5412 actions taken during his Administration. Mr. Dulles then explained to the President the status of the records which has varied from time to time during the Administration. After some discussion, the President gave Mr. Dulles instructions which Mr. Dulles indicated were clear and with which he would comply.
Mr. Dulles reported to the President that Admiral Jerauld Wright had joined the CIA Board of Estimates. At this point Mr. Dulles and General Goodpaster withdrew.
2. I took up with the President three Hull Board Reports. The first was the Sixth Report to the President by the President's Board of Consultants on Foreign Intelligence Activities dated May 24, 1960/2/ (Recommendation on "Status of CIA Station Chiefs in [less than 1 line of source text not declassified]"). I reported to the President that I had monitored negotiations between Dulles and Mr. Loy Henderson over a period of time on this subject. The President wondered why CIA people in the field wished to get more visibility through more status. I pointed out to the President that this recommendation involved station chiefs and that there were many human and personal relationships involved. I recommended to the President that on his behalf I would request the Department of State and the Director of CIA to continue their joint efforts in connection with the subject. He agreed. (A briefing note is attached.)/3/
/3/Dated January 17; not attached. A copy is in the Eisenhower Library, White House Office Files, Project Clean Up, Meetings with the President.
3. Next was the Sixth Report to the President by the President's Board of Consultants on Foreign Intelligence Activities dated May 24, 1960 (Recommendation on "Organization and Management of CIA's Clandestine Services"). I reminded the President that many times he had addressed himself to this general problem. He said that he had long since concurred in principle with the various recommendations of the Hull Board on this subject. However, as long as Mr. Dulles was the DCI he had to hold him responsible and would not order him to take organizational steps which the DCI resisted. The President approved my recommendation that the record show that the President noted the memorandum and requested that the DCI continue to review the action being taken with a view to meeting the objectives of the recommendations and as the basis for submission of a further progress report at an appropriate time (briefing note attached)./4/
4. Next was the Seventh Report to the President by the President's Board of Consultants on Foreign Intelligence Activities dated October 4, 1960 (Recommendation on "Duplication (Publications)"). I conveyed to the President the substance of the attached briefing note and recommended that the action show that he had noted the memorandum and requested that the DCI (a) continue to follow the progress made by the member agencies of the intelligence community in implementing the recommendation and (b) submit a report thereon as of June 1./5/
/5/The Seventh Report is not printed. Ash's January 6 briefing paper on this recommendation is in the Eisenhower Library, Records of the Special Assistant for National Security Affairs.
5. I then took up with the President the Record of Actions of the NSC meeting of 12 January./6/ As to paragraph 4 a (1) in the draft record it seemed necessary to add a new 4 a (2) on the basis of various comments from the agencies concerned. I pointed out to him that the AEC questioned whether any decision was made on Recommendation #30. Upon examining Recommendation #30 the President recalled that he had clearly decided that it should be approved inasmuch as it called for changes in the USIB in phase with reorganization actions taken in Defense. Next I pointed out that Defense and JCS wanted the record to show that implementation of Recommendations #1 and 2 should take place after study by the JCS and in a manner to be established by the Secretary of Defense. The President approved this qualification. I then pointed out to the President that the DCI wished to have the records show that the decision to implement Recommendations No. 1, 2, and 30 with respect to the organization and functions of the USIB should not be taken prior to the carrying out of the related internal adjustments within the Department of Defense. The President felt that he would not wish to delay decision on this matter and thought the record should show that these recommendations with respect to the organization and functions of the USIB should be taken in phase with the carrying out of the related internal adjustments.
/6/See Document 84.
With respect to paragraph 4 a (8) I indicated to the President that Defense and JCS would like to provide that the carrying out of Recommendation #29--that is to say, establishing a coordinating staff under the DCI-would only be on the basis of a six months' trial after which the matter would be reconsidered. I reported to the President that the CIA objected on the ground that with this provision the staff would never have a chance to demonstrate its worth. The President agreed that approval of the recommendation should not be on a six months' trial.
As to paragraph 5 b (2) of the draft record of actions, I pointed out to him that despite the confusing brackets, OCDM and HHFA were in agreement as to how the paragraph should be worded and he authorized me to record it in accordance with the agreement. I also pointed out to him that in paragraph 5 b (4), OCDM and Budget had reached agreement and I would make the record reflect that agreement.
As to paragraph 5 c, I pointed out that the BOB preferred language noting the President's statement that the Congress should be asked to consider the desirability of requiring that all new housing construction include fall-out shelters. I said to the President that I had a question about the constitutionality of such legislation and recommended that he approve language which would note the President's statement that legislation should be sought as appropriate to support the principle that all new housing include fall-out shelters. I pointed out that this would include State as well as federal legislation and could be applicable to public and also private housing. The President approved this language.
6. I then took up various NSC matters which had been dealt with by other members of the Council by vote slip in accordance with the attached briefing note. The President approved each of the 12 items, No. 11 being subject to the concurrence of the Secretary of State, which has not yet been obtained.
/7/Printed from a copy that bears this typed signature.
87. Editorial Note
Executive Order 10938, May 4, 1961, established the President's Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board (PFIAB) in the wake of the failed Bay of Pigs invasion of Cuba and increased attention to the role and activities of the intelligence community. The proposed order was prepared in the Bureau of the Budget from a draft submitted by the Special Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs and was forwarded to President Kennedy by Attorney General Robert Kennedy on April 27. A May 4 White House press release announced the issuance of the new executive order and listed the members of the President's Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board as follows: Chairman Dr. James R. Killian, Jr., of the Massachusetts Institute of Technology; Dr. William O. Baker, Vice President of Research of Bell Laboratories; Lieutenant General (ret.) James H. Doolittle; Dr. William L. Langer, professor of history at Harvard University; former Under Secretary of State Robert D. Murphy; and General Maxwell D. Taylor (ret.). J. Patrick Coyne, Executive Secretary of the President's Board of Consultants on Foreign Intelligence Activities, PFIAB's predecessor, continued to serve as Executive Secretary. Documentation is in the Kennedy Library, White House Central Subject Files, FG 732 (Executive), President's Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board, Box 205.
The text of Executive Order 10938 signed by President Kennedy reads as follows:
"By virtue of the authority vested in me as President of the United States, it is ordered as follows:
"Section 1. There is hereby established the President's Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board. The function of the Board shall be to advise the President with respect to the objectives and conduct of the foreign intelligence and related activities of the United States which are required in the interests of foreign policy and national defense and security.
"Sec. 2. In the performance of its advisory duties, the Board shall conduct a continuing review and assessment of all functions of the Central Intelligence Agency, and of other executive departments and agencies having such or similar responsibilities in the foreign-intelligence and related fields, and shall report thereon to the President each six months or more frequently as deemed appropriate. The Director of Central Intelligence and the heads of other departments and agencies concerned shall make available to the Board any information with respect to foreign intelligence matters which the Board may require for the purpose of carrying out its responsibilities to the President. The information so supplied to the Board shall be afforded requisite security protection as prescribed by the provisions of applicable laws and regulations.
"Sec. 3. Members of the Board shall be appointed from among qualified persons outside the Government and shall receive such compensation and allowances, consonant with law, as may be prescribed hereafter. Such compensation and allowances and any other expenses arising in connection with the work of the Board shall be paid from the appropriation appearing under the heading 'Special Projects' in title I of the General Government Matters Appropriation Act, 1961, 74 Stat. 473, and, to the extent permitted by law, from any corresponding appropriation which may be made for subsequent years. Such payments shall be made without regard to the provisions of section 3681 of the Revised Statutes and section 9 of the act of March 4, 1909, 35 Stat. 1027 (31 U.S.C. 672 and 673).
"Sec. 4. Executive Order No. 10656 of February 6, 1956, is hereby revoked." (26 Federal Register 3951)
According to Clark Clifford, who was one of the original members of PFIAB and its Chairman from April 1963 until the beginning of 1968, PFIAB met for the first time on May 15, 1961, under Killian's chairmanship. Thereafter PFIAB met regularly during President Kennedy's administration, holding 25 meetings between May and November 1961 and presenting to the President 170 formal recommendations, of which the President approved 125, rejected 2, and deferred action on the remainder. Clifford recalled that 85 of the 125 approved recommendations were implemented. President Kennedy met at length with the PFIAB on at least 12 occasions. Clifford's account of his service on PFIAB under President Kennedy emphasizes the President's objective of seeking a Board membership of diverse backgrounds and expertise. Clifford recalled that for him the two most valuable members of PFIAB were scientists Dr. Edwin Land, inventor of the Polaroid Land camera, and Dr. William Baker, who brought to the PFIAB the most recent scientific knowledge and discoveries bearing on the technical acquisition of intelligence information. (Counsel to the President: A Memoir, New York: Random House, 1991, pages 350 ff.)
The editors of this volume researched the historical records of PFIAB for the purpose of documenting the Board's main lines of activity and its major recommendations to the President. PFIAB subsequently suspended the research access for Department of State historians for security reasons, and at PFIAB's request the Department's Office of the Historian returned to PFIAB all copies of documents obtained from PFIAB files, before declassification of any of those records was approved by PFIAB.
Documentation on the President's Board of Consultants on Foreign Intelligence Activities established by President Eisenhower's Executive Order No. 10656, February 6, 1956, is scheduled for publication in a volume of the Foreign Relations series documenting the development of the intelligence community beginning in 1950 through 1955.
88. Telegram From Director of Central Intelligence Dulles to All Chiefs of Station/1/
Washington, August 10, 1961.
/1/Source: Central Intelligence Agency, DCI (Dulles) Files, Dispatch and Book Dispatch, 1963, Box 6, Folder 11. Top Secret. Drafted by W. Lloyd George of the Deputy Directorate of Plans, Central Intelligence Agency.
DIR 05454. Rybat.
1. President Kennedy's letter to Ambassadors of 29 May 1961,/2/ affirms their responsibility "to oversee and coordinate" all programs or activities of the United States in their particular areas, whether of the diplomatic mission or of other US agencies. Further, he made clear he expects Ambassadors to be fully informed of these programs or activities.
/2/See footnote 2, Document 30.
2. As you are aware you have always carried the responsibility for reviewing with the Ambassador covert action matters growing out of our responsibilities under the 5412 directive of the National Security Council. Furthermore, most of you have arrived at relationships with Ambassadors in the past which have made you conscious of the need to keep the Ambassador informed so that he may judge the political risks inherent in any activity, whether deriving from "5412" or developed in pursuit of our statutory responsibility in the field of espionage and clandestine counterintelligence. However, the feeling had developed over the past few years within diplomatic missions around the world that Ambassadors are not sufficiently well informed properly to protect them in their responsibility as the principal United States officers in their respective areas who bear the brunt of any covert or clandestine activity that inadvertently becomes known to and represents a serious affront to the local government.
3. Where espionage and clandestine counterintelligence are concerned we have always been aware of the possible political risks inherent in our activities. This is the reason for the language of NSCID 5, paragraph 6, which states Ambassadors will be kept "appropriately informed."/3/ However, it is clear today that many Chiefs of Mission feel that our officers' interpretation of this phrase has not produced sufficient information.
/3/National Security Council Intelligence Directive No. 5/2, September 15, 1958. See footnote 5, Document 84.
4. Therefore, you will take steps to insure that the Ambassador is informed of your espionage and clandestine counterintelligence programs in addition to your covert action projects. With relation to these operations, he should be made sufficiently aware of them so that, in his capacity as principal officer responsible for the United States position in the country to which he is accredited, he is enabled to make an informed judgment as to the political risks involved.
5. In advising him of your various programs, you should pay particular attention to clarifying in his mind their general nature, scope, and purpose. Review with him, for example, the categories of covert action such as psychological warfare, black and gray propaganda, political action and economic action in pursuit of approved 5412 programs. Present your clandestine intelligence activities in categories such as scientific, political, technical, economic and military information objectives carried on against approved requirements, through working relationships with local intelligence and security services and through independent activities. Review your clandestine counterintelligence objectives to acquire knowledge of all other intelligence organizations and membership, to manipulate some members of these to a U.S. advantage, to obtain information by counterintelligence activities, as well as espionage, about all Communist Parties and to counter their objectives through local services and independent activities, and to develop higher capability through training the so-called friendly services.
6. In many of your activities there are involved sensitive source identities and sensitive techniques, which it is desired that you safeguard. The Ambassador at times will feel he needs to know these and, in some instances, has a right to know. Judgment with respect to these, however, may have to be made ultimately in Washington. If you are in doubt about passing these ultimate details, the matter should be referred to Washington where decision will be made after consultation between the Director of Central Intelligence and Chief ODACID as to whether you should give the Ambassador these details.
7. There will be occasions when an objectively discussed problem will result in an honest difference of opinion between you and your Ambassador regarding whether an operation should be carried on. President Kennedy's letter makes clear that you have your own channels of communication and may use them to refer your problem to higher levels here. While the Ambassador also has his own channels to Washington, he will normally expect you to convey his views on such matters via your channels.
8. You should consider this instruction to be of interim nature, pending review of the 1957 agreement between this Headquarters and ODACID (STACIA)./4/
9. ODACID has seen and concurs with this message and is requesting all its chiefs of missions and certain principal officers to confer with you regarding it. They may, of course, see it.
89. Letter From the Deputy Secretary of Defense (Gilpatric) to President Kennedy/1/
Washington, August 21, 1961.
/1/Source: Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Departments and Agencies Series, Department of Defense, Defense Intelligence Agency, 1961. Top Secret. A copy was sent to Bundy.
Dear Mr. President:
To determine how the Department of Defense could best implement the approved recommendations of the Joint Study Group Report on Foreign Intelligence Activities of the United States Government applicable to the Department, I initiated an intensive analysis of the organization and management of Defense intelligence activities last January. This analysis is continuing in specialized areas of Defense intelligence activities with participation by all major components of the Department, and where appropriate, by other organizations in the national intelligence community.
The major product of the first six months of study has been the creation of the Defense Intelligence Agency, or DIA, which will be activated on October 1, 1961, and whose first Director, Lieutenant General Joseph F. Carroll, USAF, was appointed on August 12, 1961./2/
/2/The Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA) was established as an agency of the Department of Defense by DOD Directive 5105.21, August 1, under provisions of the National Security Act of 1947, as amended, to operate under the direction, authority, and control of the Secretary of Defense. The chain of command ran from the Secretary of Defense, through the Joint Chiefs of Staff to the Director. Under its Director, the Defense Intelligence Agency was responsible for: (a) The organization, direction, management, and control of all Department of Defense intelligence resources assigned to or included within the DIA; (b) Review and coordination of those Department of Defense intelligence functions retained by or assigned to the military departments; (c) Supervision of the execution of all approved plans, programs, policies, and procedures for intelligence functions not assigned to DIA; (d) Obtaining the maximum economy and efficiency in the allocation and management of Department of Defense intelligence resources. A copy of Department of Defense Directive 5105.21, August 1, 1961, is ibid.
Fundamental to the decision to establish this new Defense Agency was the conclusion that only through the establishment of such an organization could the majority of the Joint Study Group recommendations applicable to the Department be most effectively achieved. Furthermore, we concluded that only through a DIA would the over-all capacity of the Department of Defense to collect, produce, and disseminate military intelligence information be greatly strengthened and greater unity of effort achieved among all components of the Department in the development of military intelligence information.
In determining the specific intelligence functions which will be directly controlled by DIA, we were guided by the Joint Study Group recommendations. Similarly, the Joint Study Group recommendations were carefully considered in ascertaining what intelligence functions should be retained in the military departments but made subject to DIA's supervision (as distinguished from DIA's direct control).
The Defense Intelligence Agency will also achieve a more efficient allocation and management of Defense intelligence resources as it becomes operational. The assumption of specific intelligence functions by DIA, however, will be on a graduated basis with each step carefully planned and executed so as not to degrade any existing Defense intelligence capability. It probably will take at least two years for the DIA to become fully operational.
One of the principal recommendations of the Joint Study Group was that the intelligence functions of the Department be brought into consonance with the Defense Reorganization Act of 1958. The integration of Defense intelligence activities under DIA will, we believe, obtain this objective. Through the establishment of DIA the Department of Defense will be able to provide better intelligence support not only to you but also to the national intelligence community as a whole.
With the exception of those Joint Study Group recommendations applicable to the activities of the National Security Agency, I have specifically charged General Carroll with the expeditious implementation of all Joint Study Group recommendations falling within the functional responsibilities of his new Agency and with monitoring all other recommendations applicable to the Department. Furthermore, I have directed General Carroll to develop all activation plans necessary for the establishment of DIA.
A far reaching reorganization of the National Security Agency (NSA) was approved by me and is now being put into effect. This will facilitate accomplishment of the Joint Study Group recommendations relating to that Agency, in particular those which strengthen the control of the Director, NSA, over Defense ELINT and cryptologic resources. Detailed steps to implement these recommendations are now being examined by the Director, NSA.
Implementation of those Joint Study Group recommendations jointly applicable to the Department of Defense and to other organizations in the national intelligence community must await completion of studies now under way, and, in some cases, the activation of DIA.
Finally, for certain specific intelligence problems incident not only to the establishment of DIA but also to full implementation of all Joint Study Group recommendations applicable to the Department, I have appointed one of my civilian staff advisors to prepare within 90 days recommendations thereon and to monitor for me, on a continuing basis, the establishment of DIA.
For your information, I am enclosing three attachments to this report. The first is the Department of Defense Directive establishing DIA, and the second and third are memoranda detailing procedures and assigning responsibilities for implementing the reorganization of Defense intelligence activities./3/
/3/Not attached. Regarding the first attachment, see footnote 2 above. The other attachments were not found.
As the Defense Intelligence Agency becomes operational, I shall keep the Director of Central Intelligence and your Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board continually abreast of the status of implementation of DIA and of all approved Joint Study Group recommendations.
/4/Printed from a copy that bears this stamped signature and an indication that Gilpatric signed the original.
90. Letter From the Deputy Secretary of Defense (Gilpatric) to Director of Central Intelligence Dulles/1/
/1/Source: National Reconnaissance Office, P&A/PR Library/104-1/DOP. Top Secret; Special Handling. An attached chart entitled "Single Management for National Reconnaissance Program" is not printed.
Washington, September 6, 1961.
Dear Mr. Dulles:
This letter confirms our agreement with respect to the setting up of a National Reconnaissance Program (NRP), and the arrangements for dealing both with the management and operation of this program and the handling of the intelligence product of the program on a covert basis.
1. The NRP will consist of all satellite and overflight reconnaissance projects whether overt or covert. It will include all photographic projects for intelligence, geodesy and mapping purposes, and electronic signal collection projects for electronic signal intelligence and communications intelligence resulting therefrom.
2. There will be established on a covert basis a National Reconnaissance Office to manage this program. This office will be under the direction of the Under Secretary of the Air Force and the Deputy Director (Plans) of the Central Intelligence Agency acting jointly. It will include a small special staff whose personnel will be drawn from the Department of Defense and the Central Intelligence Agency. This office will have direct control over all elements of the total program.
3. Decisions of the National Reconnaissance Office will be implemented and its management of the National Reconnaissance Program made effective: within the Department of Defense, by the exercise of the authority delegated to the Under Secretary of the Air Force; within the Central Intelligence Agency, by the Deputy Director (Plans) in the performance of his presently assigned duties. The Under Secretary of the Air Force will be designated Special Assistant for Reconnaissance to the Secretary of Defense and delegated full authority by me in this area.
4. Within the Department of Defense, the Department of the Air Force will be the operational agency for management and conduct of the NRP, and will conduct this program through use of streamlined special management procedures involving direct control from the office of the Secretary of the Air Force to Reconnaissance System Project Directors in the field, without intervening reviews or approvals. The management and conduct of individual projects or elements thereof requiring special covert arrangements may be assigned to the Central Intelligence Agency as the operational agency.
5. A Technical Advisory Group for the National Reconnaissance Office will be established.
6. A uniform security control system will be established for the total program by the National Reconnaissance Office. Products from the various programs will be available to all users as designated by the United States Intelligence Board.
7. The National Reconnaissance Office will be directly responsive to, and only to, the photographic and electronic signal collection requirements and priorities as established by the United States Intelligence Board.
8. The National Reconnaissance Office will develop suitable cover plans and public information plans, in conjunction with the Assistant Secretary of Defense, Public Affairs, to reduce potential political vulnerability of these programs. In regard to satellite systems, it will be necessary to apply the revised public information policy to other non-sensitive satellite projects in order to insure maximum protection.
9. The Directors of the National Reconnaissance Office will establish detailed working procedures to insure that the particular talents, experience and capabilities within the Department of Defense and the Central Intelligence Agency are fully and most effectively utilized in this program.
10. Management control of the field operations of various elements of the program will be exercised directly, in the case of the Department of Defense, from the Under Secretary of the Air Force to the designated project officers for each program and, in the case of the Central Intelligence Agency, from the Deputy Director (Plans) to appropriate elements of the Central Intelligence Agency. Major program elements and operations of the National Reconnaissance Office will be reviewed on a regular basis and as special circumstances require by the Special Group under NSC 5412.
If the foregoing is in accord with your understanding of our agreement, I would appreciate it if you would kindly sign and return the enclosed copy of this letter.
Roswell L. Gilpatric
C.P. Cabell, General, USAF/2/
/2/Printed from a copy that bears these typed signatures and an indication that both Gilpatric and Cabell signed the original. Despite Cabell's concurrence, the letter did not address differing objectives and fundamental disagreements between CIA and the Air Force over the entire satellite reconnaissance program. In particular, the Air Force did not want to relinquish control over what it regarded as one of its primary missions. On July 24 Under Secretary of the Air Force Joseph V. Charyk had sent a memorandum to Secretary of Defense McNamara, which forwarded drafts of two CIA-Defense memoranda of understanding with differing solutions to the problem of management of the National Reconnaissance Program. Solution B, which was prepared by Deputy Secretary of Defense Vance, placed the entire responsibility for the program in the Department of Defense. (National Reconnaissance Office, NRO Office of Policy Files) The memorandum and its attachments are available on the Internet, National Security Archive (www.gwu.edu/~nsarchiv), Electronic Briefing Book No. 35, "The NRO Declassified," Documents 1-4. For a summary of this issue, see Gerald K. Haines, NRO: The National Reconnaissance Office, Its Origins, Creation, and Early Years (Washington, National Reconnaissance Office, 1997), pp. 19-22. Although the letter of September 6 laid the groundwork for the National Reconnaissance Program Agreement signed by McCone and Gilpatric on May 2, 1962 (ibid., pp. 21-22), the NSC 5412/2 Group and the 303 Committee recommended against a co-directorship concept, and the agreement never went into effect. Charyk was named the first Director of the National Reconnaissance Office in September 1961, serving until March 1963. Additional documentation on this issue is scheduled for publication in Foreign Relations, 1964-1968, volumes X and XXXIII.
91. Memorandum From the President's Special Assistant for National Security Affairs (Bundy) to President Kennedy/1/
Washington, September 28, 1961.
/1/Source: Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Bundy Memoranda to the President, 8/22/61-9/30/61. Secret.
1. The McCone appointment is the big news here./2/ I, for one, underestimated the strength of the opposition in the second and third levels of CIA and State. It appears that most of the people involved in intelligence estimates on atomic energy matters thought McCone was highly prejudiced. He also had a reputation, in these circles, as an "operator" whose loyalty to Administration policy was doubtful. So there is a significant problem in working out a pattern of strong cooperation and support for him.
/2/President Kennedy appointed John A. McCone to the position of Director of Central Intelligence on September 27.
Less important in the long run, but more urgent at the moment, is the unrest in the President's Board of Consultants on Foreign Intelligence./3/ Killian has made noises about resigning, and indicates that he thinks one or two other members of the Board may also withdraw. In part this is because they feel they were not consulted, but more deeply it arises from the fact that several of them--Killian, Gray, and Baker--have had sharp disagreements with McCone in the past. General Taylor has talked to Bobby about this and probably is trying to calm Killian down. I am planning to have a talk with Allen Dulles about it with the same purpose in mind, and I think I can also do something with Baker and the scientific community generally. I have also talked to Joe Alsop, and I think we will got a helpful column from him, aimed in part at this same problem. He thinks it is the best possible appointment and says he will try to say so in terms calculated to encourage sensible scientists and bureaucrats. (I have some doubt whether he will succeed-Joe's feeling is that anyone who is against McCone is a proven follower of twaddley, and I doubt his ability to be gentle with people whom he views in this light--unfortunately his diagnosis is wrong, and some very good men are disquieted.)
/3/The former President's Board of Consultants for Foreign Intelligence Activities was replaced on May 4 by the President's Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board; see Document 87.
[Here follow paragraphs 2-6 concerning other subjects. Paragraph 2 deals with the defense budget. Paragraph 3, concerning foreign aid legislation, is printed as Document 75; paragraph 4, concerning Chester Bowles, is printed as Document 43. Paragraphs 5 and 6 deal with Syria and Berlin, respectively.]
/4/Printed from a copy that bears these typed initials.
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