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 You are in: Bureaus/Offices Reporting Directly to the Secretary > Policy Planning Staff > Secretary's Open Forum > Proceedings > 2001 - 2002

A Strategy for Stable Peace: Toward a Euroatlantic Security Community

Ambassador James E. Goodby, Senior Research Fellow: Massachusetts Institute of Technology and the Brookings Institution
Remarks to the Open Forum
Washington, DC
February 13, 2002

Opening Remarks and Introduction

Thank you very much, Alan, for that very, very nice introduction. I can't help but pause for a minute and recall a similar introduction that Brent Scowcroft gave about a year ago for Secretary Kissinger, Henry Kissinger. And he began by saying, "You know, I should say this is a man who needs no introduction." But in fact he said, "Henry lives and thrives on introductions." And I think we are probably all that way, and I do appreciate all the nice things you said.

Let me say to all my many, many friends here, and I see a very good turn out of my many friends -- I am pleased that you are here -- what an honor it is to be here speaking at the Open Forum. And let me say also it's a pleasure to be standing before you on the 50th anniversary of my entry into the U.S. Foreign Service. In fact, I'd say at this point in my life it's a pleasure to be standing anywhere.

So let me proceed to tell you a little bit about what this book is about. It has to do with what I consider to be one of the great unexamined propositions of U.S. foreign policy, one of the basic foreign policy planks of our nation, and that is to say a Europe, whole and free and at peace with itself. Or, as President Clinton used to say, a Europe that is peaceful, undivided and democratic.

Now, it may be that it is self-evidently the case that that is a good thing for us. But I submit to you that that has never really been examined in very great detail as far as the public is concerned, and I am certainly one of these people who have been following foreign affairs fairly closely for quite a long time. And I have found nothing in the literature or in public statements that explains why it is that three successive presidents -- President George Bush, President Clinton and the current president, President George W. Bush, have all favored this kind of a Europe, and yet they have not really defined it very well, explain where its limits are, what we have to do to achieve it, or why it is really in our interests. And that's what this book is about, in a nutshell.

The reason the book was written goes back several years now to 1997-98, when Max Kampelman, whom I think most of you know -- a great statesman, a great champion of human rights, former counselor of the State Department -- approached Dick Solomon, the president of the Institute of Peace, and he said, you know, we are not focusing on where we would like Europe and the United States to be together in the years to come. We are talking about this or that aspect of policy. We are talking about NATO enlargement or we are talking about closer ties with the European Union and how to reform Russia. But we are not saying, to the public at any rate, where we would like that relationship to be or what we think the Euroatlantic community should look like in 10 or 15 years from now.

He was joined in that appeal to the U.S. Institute of Peace by a man named Professor Alexander George, a great professor emeritus at Stanford University, professor of political science, who said the same thing, in effect that now we have a unique, unique opportunity in history to do something about the Russia-West European-U.S. connection. And we should not get bogged down on the specifics of individual policies that may or may not take us where we would like all to be a decade or more hence.

What Dick Solomon, I think to his great and lasting credit, agreed with that and established something that he called a "Future of Europe Working Group," and he enticed to co-chair that Future of Europe Working Group the current deputy national security advisor Steve Hadley, before of course Steve got into the business of government once again. He also enticed the former national security advisor, the honorable Tony Lake as the other co-chair. So for a year or two we had a whole series of working group meetings co-chaired by those two gentlemen, and I was the project director. And what we did was try to discuss among ourselves where would we like Europe to be. And we began gradually to take the theme of peaceful, undivided democratic Europe, or Europe whole and free as George Bush used to put it, and we tried to define for ourselves what did that mean. And to make a long story short, we don't have much time here this morning, what we basically wound up doing was trying to bound the problem by discussing possible models of what that kind of a Europe might look like. And we took as our basic building blocks what we thought might be the three major elements of such a system -- the United States of course, but also the European Union -- and we did not neglect the fact that the European Union is not yet a complete union, but consists of individual countries with individual policies. But we thought that was a reasonable way to sort of simply and bound the problem. And we took Russia, recognizing that Russia is no longer the great global power that it once was, but that in the next decade or two, assuming no great catastrophic damage to its internal development, it probably will be one of the great powers of Europe. So we essentially took those three elements: the European Union, the United States and Russia -- and said, Okay, you want a Europe that's peaceful, undivided and democratic. We concluded that it probably should include Russia; that it should not be limited simply to the United States and Western Europe. And so we then defined several option -- five of them, to be exact, recognizing again that none of these options or these models might develop as such. What we have now of course is a Russia that is not yet democratic, and a Euroatlantic community that still remains divided. But what we wanted to portray was what we would like to see out there. So one model was basically a model that we call U.S. dominance. That is probably the model that is the least departure from where we are now. But we stipulated that the United States would remain very much more powerful than the other two entities that we discussed, both in military and in economic terms; that the European Union would be moving along with a certain amount of hesitation, and doing the things it needs to do to create more unity; and that Russia is probably still in effect stumbling along reaching for democracy -- not quite there, but making a good show of it, and not doing very well economically. So that's probably the least departure from what we have now, a peaceful, undivided democratic Europe in which the U.S. is dominant.

The second model we thought about we call a "stable triad," and there we envisaged a European Union that had succeeded in becoming more of a federal entity -- I don't mean by that a United States of Europe, but a bit beyond where it is now. And we envisage a Russia that was being successful economically, that had moved solidly into the democratic camp, and had recovered its health internally, and was therefore a power to be reckoned with within this Euroatlantic community.

The United States, we postulated, would be more or less dealing with these others as equals -- not dominant, not by any means weaker than these others, but restrained perhaps a little bit in its dealings with these other entities. So that was the second model.

The third we called European Union dominance. The idea there is not that the European Union suddenly becomes much more powerful than the United States, but that the United States may be distracted elsewhere, that we may perhaps be more interested in issues in Asia. Today we would probably say distracted by the war on terrorism, and therefore not as heavily involved in European affairs as might be the case. And the same for Russia. Russia preoccupied with its own internal reorganization, economic difficulties, again may not be playing the role in Europe that it could play. So you have, as partly by default, a situation in which the European Union is basically dominant within this Euroatlantic community.

A fourth option or model we talked about we described as a western commonwealth. And what we had in mind there was that Russia may not progress very much at all beyond where it is now, a democracy in form but not in practice; an economy that is still not really doing very well; a Russia preoccupied in other words with its own problems and rather suspicious of the West; whereas we stipulated -- stipulated -- that there could be a drawing together of the United States and of the European Union -- even closer ties than we have now, more institutional linkages, closer kind of free trade area, let's say, that sort of thing, in which case you have something that I think fairly could be called more of a dyad; use that as to say you have a Western commonwealth very closely linked with a Russia that is out there on the periphery somewhere.

And the fifth model we talked about we described as U.S.-European competition. Now, that could evolve from the kind of situation we now find ourselves in. But the idea there was that the United States failed to take the steps necessary to develop a close and cooperative working relationship with Russia, drifted apart a bit from the European Union; and in response Russia and the European Union began to form liaisons, began to develop temporary at least alliances in opposing the United States on this or that issue. So you have a situation -- unlikely I think, but we did think about it -- where you have a kind of quasi connection between the European Union and Russia, which basically was designed to oppose the United States and oppose hegemony as the French in particular like to call it.

So those are the five models that we discussed. All of them peace, undivided, democratic up to a point. And yet in our discussion of those we concluded they didn't quite perform on the global scale as well as we might want. And so we concluded that -- and here I am again speaking about this working group headed by Tony Lake and Steve Hadley, mainly Americans, but we also had some international conferences -- one that my friend Fred Hill helped us organize out at the Foreign Service Institute, another in Berlin, another in London. We basically concluded that in addition to peaceful, undivided democratic, you needed some other characteristics of this Euroatlantic community. And these other characteristics were two in number. One was we felt that it should be self-sustaining. That is to say it shouldn't be there simply because the U.S. is a very powerful state and the other people find it useful to line up behind us. And it should be cohesive; that is to say, should be able to operate on a global scale in a way that is not competitive; that is to say there should be not only a self-sustaining quality to this Euroatlantic community, but also a cohesion that makes them operate more or less the same way on the world stage.

Now, how do you do that? Well, this is what led us to call this book "A Strategy for Stable Peace," and led us to talk about a security community. In political science thinking there are different qualities to peace. We are in a -- have been in a conditional -- conditional peace with Russia for a very long to say. That is to say war isn't very likely, but it's always there and still is there, at least in a deterrence sense as a possible way of dealing with an issue. That's a conditional peace. A precarious peace might be one like in the Middle East where a major war could be just around the corner. But a stable peace is one in which the relationship is more or less like the relationship between countries within the European Union, or more or less like that between the United States and Canada, or more or less like that between the Scandinavian countries. So that is a stable peace. What it means is that value systems begin to converge; that Russia and its value system doesn't look too different from the United States or Western Europe and their value systems.

It may also mean a rather similar sense of self-identification. That is to say instead of Russia thinking of itself as a Eurasian nation with deep an abiding ties in Asia that may sometimes conflict with and offset links with the West, that Russia begins to identify itself very firmly and clearly as a nation that if not part of the West is at least of the West, and that the United States and Western Europe are basically the same idea.

Now, the reason that we also talked about a European security community is that at least in our thinking you progress very, very slowly towards this kind of a common value system. We are talking probably decades before we get to that point; where as a security community conceivably is one in which you take off from where we are now, in which the United States has a certain influence let's say over other countries -- value systems may not be the same or identical, but there is enough common interest here so that you could say that the relationship between Russia and the United States is rather similar to that between the United States and Western European countries, even though value systems may not be alike. So, to sum up, we thought about the need to have foreign policies which support not only a peaceful, undivided democratic Europe, but a Europe in which the value systems are more or less similar. And we did think it was going to take a very long time to do it, and that a security community was perhaps the first stage, even that probably taking a decade; and beyond that another decade beyond that at least probably common value systems, and the kind of stable peace that we would like to see develop.

Well, all of that of course means very, very substantial changes. It means more democracy in Russia, great internal changes. It means on the part of the European Union almost certainly a tighter kind of governance than now exists. And for the United States it probably means a bit of a stepping back from dominance in Europe to a position where we think of ourselves more or less as the equals of these others, and taking decisions in a way that is not one that is imposed by us but more or less reached by consensus. All of those things require very big changes.

Now, let's do a reality check on that. And here I would like very, very much to have your views. But in the book, and now I am talking more of the book, because my colleagues -- a Russian named Dmitri Trenin, who is currently the deputy director of the Carnegie Moscow Center, and my Dutch colleague, retired Dutch diplomat who served as ambassador to Moscow and Stockholm, and served in NATO and Washington -- the two of them and us basically felt that the outlook was pretty good for the kind of development that we wold like to see happen. We looked at the underlying trends. We looked at globalization; we looked at technological changes. We looked at the way the economy was going. And we thought that probably those trends were consistent with, and might even support, the kind of a Europe that we would like to see happen. And so underlying trends quite independently of governments seem to be moving in the right way. We understood of course, and stipulated in the book that there could be all kinds of things that go wrong -- economic turndowns or global depression, things that have to do with xenophobia springing up in Russia or somewhere else. So a lot of things would go wrong. But there are some things that are going right too.

As we took a look at Russia we thought we could be guardedly, guardedly optimistic about what was happening. We did conclude that Putin, even before September 11th, was moving towards a relationship with the West that was beginning to dump this idea of Russia as one of the poles in a multi-polar world that would be shifting allegiances and alliances, depending upon what advantage there was for Russia. We felt that Russia under Putin was beginning to want to establish itself as a European nation -- not necessarily one connected to the United States quite as firmly as it was going to be in Putin's view connected to Europe, but nonetheless moving in a Western direction. We felt that even before September 11th, and we felt even more so afterwards.

So the policy leadership of Putin was right. We thought that the underlying political situation in Russia was positive. If you look at polls that show what the younger people in Russia are thinking about, it's pretty clear that they want some kind of a democracy. And so we have something going for us there. Now, working against that of course Putin's well-known use of the legal framework to deal with enemies is something that we did comment on, and think that is very dangerous. And we certainly need to have a strengthening of the legal system in Russia so that they can be more independent. That is even perhaps a greater problem than what he has been doing with the media.

But by and large it seemed to us if you look at the economy, you look at Russia's openness to trade, you look at what they are doing with regard to travel for the citizens, night and day difference between what it used to be, and the trends look pretty good.

The European Union -- we actually were a little bit more worried about them than we were about Russia, because the European Union as we see it is up against a major, major decision within the next two or three years. They propose to enlarge the European Union in 2004. To do that they all understand that they have to change dramatically their internal decision-making mechanisms. And their first attempt at doing that at Nice, at an inter-governmental conference a couple of years ago, was pretty much a failure, as most people would see it. Major countries unwilling really to cede the kind of authority to a European Union that would be needed -- majority voting, for example, on important issues -- very, very difficult to come by. And yet if that very difficult hurdle is not crossed, if they don't solve that problem, then it becomes very difficult to consider enlarging the community as they would want to do. So it's clear that these statesmen, states persons in Europe have a major problem before them. It is not at all clear that they are going to succeed in doing what they have to do. So we are a bit in this book a bit concerned about that. We do mention a possibility that was discussed at Nice, and which has been a part of European thinking for quite a long time, a smaller group of EU countries could proceed to develop more fully the kind of federal union that some of them would like to see. That's rather dangerous. It's divisive. But it may be the only way to proceed, and it may be a way of essentially bringing along the reluctant countries.

The United States we were I think fair to say fairly optimistic. We felt that for us it was probably mainly a matter of leadership, of public understanding, of a willingness to be a little more restrained in foreign policy than some of us would like to be. And so we felt the outlook both from the underlying trends, from the Russian point of view, from the EU point of view, it's a little shaky there, but from the U.S. point of view very positive.

Now, this leads me to ask the question that Henry Kissinger asks in a book he wrote not too long ago: Do we need a foreign policy? And I say that because many of the things I've talked about may be happening anyway. If the global trends are going right, fine, just stand back and let them happen. If it's a question of internal development in both the European Union and in Russia, fine, let it go. So why do we need a foreign policy to deal with this kind of thing? Why don't we just leave it as a kind of nice aspiration -- sounds good to be in favor of a Europe whole and free and at peace, and maybe that will happen anyway. So what do we have to do about it?

Well, our feeling very strongly, the three of us who wrote this book, was that this kind of a Europe we are talking about isn't just going to happen. Things may go the right way, but they may not. And one can foresee all kinds of difficulties in the way. And one can understand that unless you give history a nudge here and there that the kind of Europe we want may not happen. So therefore we basically said what we need is a kind of harmonized broad grand strategy, if you will. And what we need is a lot of practice in working together as three entities wanting to move in the same direction.

I won't go into, for a lack of time, all these various issues, but I would like to just mention a few of the ideas that we listed in this book under the heading of a targeted trilateral agenda. And that term I want to emphasize to you was coined by our co-leader, Steve Hadley. I won't hold him to any of these ideas, but his notion was basically that it's time for the United States and the European Union and Russia to work together in some way that leads them to solve concrete problems. And so we borrowed that idea -- picked it up from him -- even quoted some of his ideas. And let me list just a few -- this is not a complete list -- but just to give you an illustration. We did feel under the heading of a targeted trilateral agenda -- most of these, by the way, are going to focus on Russia because our view is that we need to promote democracy in Russia. This is not a case of our just thinking about this as kind of external international relations. We definitely feel that an American interest is the process of democracy in Russia, and we react that way in this book.

We did feel that a summit meeting of the Permanent Joint Council -- that is to say the NATO-Plus-Russia group that was established a few years ago, ought to be held sometime prior to NATO enlargement or discussions about NATO enlargement at Prague in November, which means we'd like to see a summit meeting of the Permanent Joint Council sometime later this year, and its purpose would be to review -- of course all of this would be done before the summit meeting ever took place -- but we'd like to review the underlying agreement that was reached between Russia and NATO a few years ago. We think it can be updated, made more powerful in terms of the kinds of issues it talks about. It's more or less the equivalent of what Secretary of State Powell has been calling discussions of NATO at 20. We don't foresee in this book any early membership of Russia in NATO, but we do think a close connection with NATO on decision-making is a good idea. And so therefore we do think there should be an interest in doing these things -- not just at the ministerial level with all due credit to the secretaries of state and others that will be attending the meeting in Reykjavik this spring; but we also think there ought to be a summit meeting to really pin this down that this is an important, a very important issue.

A second idea is that we felt there should be a NATO-Russia program. By that I mean a program of research, a program of development, a program of deployment, focusing probably in the first instance on theater missile defense, but using the same techniques that NATO has used for many years in terms of bringing together countries who are willing to contribute to joint weapons programs. We think it would be important to do that. We are inclined to think it would be a useful thing to do, quite aside from the political implications of it.

Third, perhaps obvious, but we wrote this, you may remember, probably a year ago -- we feel that weapons of mass destruction, terrorism, this complex of issues also needs to be addressed by Russia and NATO, and we argued that there should be a kind of a permanent group set up within the Permanent Joint Council to deal with weapons of mass destruction terrorism. So an institutional response.

We also feel that there should be an increase in funding for the custody -- improving the custody of fissile material in Russia, the so-called Nunn-Lugar program. We recommend an increase of about 50 percent of spending on the part of the United States, which would bring it up over a billion dollars. And I think actually things are beginning to move that way as I understand things here in Washington.

Enlargement of NATO. I want to come to NATO in another minute, talk about it. But we agreed -- all three of us -- that NATO enlargement probably should happen. What we did think, however, was that there ought to be more of a coordination between the enlargement of the European Union and the enlargement of NATO. We saw these as two Western institutions serving in a sense the same purpose. And we felt there could be some utility -- at least in a sense of timing -- of having the enlargement take place with some coordination. In particular, it was our view that it would be useful to have an enlargement of the European Union first into the Baltic States, for example; followed thereafter, very soon thereafter, by membership in NATO for the Baltic States. It makes quite a bit of difference, the sequence now. I frankly don't expect that to happen, but that's our recommendation.

On the economic front -- because, remember, what we are advocating is not just a security thing, but a very broad approach to Russia -- we felt that we should set up as a target date membership for Russia in the World Trade Organization not later than 2005. The Russians of course would like to be in even earlier -- 2005 may be a bit optimistic. But we thought some target date by which we meant seriously the United States and the EU would work to get them in would be useful as a kind of an objective out there.

We also felt we should take a look at restructuring the Russian debt to the Paris Club -- $40 billion is going to be a heavy drag on the Russian economy. Now, this is a little difficult case to make, because the Russian economy has been doing very well, thank you, in the past year, and may next year, thanks to oil in particular.

But it is nonetheless a drag. And there are some quid pro quos that it might be useful to stipulate. There's an interesting idea not in our book that people are talking about in town about forgiving some debt in return for more Russian cooperation on pinning down these loose nukes as they call it. But there are other things you can do too, Russian reform, legal reform, expedited there and so forth. So a lot of things could be done. We wouldn't do it without some very clear and beneficial quid pro quo. But there are such things we think.

On what I might call the human dimension, Russian health care is in a state of crisis, and we felt that there could be at relatively low cost to the West an improvement, an increase in support for the Russian health care system. We would like to see it done more or less at the grass-roots level, because at the Moscow level there had been some problems more or less of a nationalistic type. But there are some very good cases of local improvements in health care that we think we ought to be able to support.

Another area is trying to improve the exchange of students -- surprisingly low numbers of Russian students go abroad and relatively few Americans and Westerners go to Russia. We'd like to see a tripartite fund to try to stimulate the exchange of students probably at the graduate school level.

And finally in this category of trilateral things, things to do to sort of get the ball rolling, support for Russian non-governmental organizations. Civil society in Russia is one of the most fundamental things that's needed to promote democracy and to entrench democracy. And a lot of that actually is being done. A lot of our own NGOs are supporting Russian NGOs doing so very well. But we have learned lessons. We have learned, among other things, that a lot of effort is needed still. And so we would like to see more of an effort on that.

Let me just say a few words -- I am going to close in a minute -- I spoke a bit longer than I thought I would. Why do we need NATO? With a book like this, you would think, well, perhaps we can dismiss it. Well, our view -- and this is the view of all three of us, the Russian and the Dutchman and myself -- we think that a Europe-based joint military structure -- and I choose those words fairly carefully -- they were the words we used in the book -- will be needed for quite a long time -- a Europe-based military structure. We think such a structure is going to be needed to deal with intrastate problems. We have seen them in the Balkans in particular already. We think that the Balkans will remain a sensitive and divisive issue for quite a long time, and we are going to need some kind of a military component to deal with some of those issues. We think that terrorism, weapons of mass destruction, those kinds of issues, will need some kind of a joint military structure based in Europe for a long time to come. And we think there are enough extraregional disputes that one can foresee that exist already that will probably need that kind of a military structure.

Now, we asked ourselves in this book, What would you do if you wanted that sort of thing? Would you invent something wholly new? Would you try to graft it onto the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe? Or perhaps why don't we just adapt NATO? And we concluded that since NATO exists and is adapting -- changing very, very rapidly -- more so than most people know -- that we should build on NATO as that structure we want. Now, we said in this book that in the long term we would not exclude Russian membership. But before that time by involving Russia in decision-making, as Secretary Powell I think is trying to do, and as we recommend, and by a greater emphasis on the Partnership for Peace, the creation that the Russians have tended to snub over the years because they felt it was kind of a put-down, I guess, and because of whatever reasons, there could be almost everything that we would like to do under this joint military structure based in Europe could be done with Russia included through the Partnership for Peace. And we would like to see a much greater emphasis on that.

So we've described I think in the book what we see as the core functions of a NATO in the future. We describe why we think it is going to be needed. We describe the kind of a program for associating Russia with it. So that is our view on Russia.

Let me just conclude very, very briefly by saying I think what we need is an alliance with the American public to bring these things about. It's fine to say our aspiration is a Europe that is whole and free. But if it becomes, as we recommend and hope the administration accepts this, a serious guide to policy, then it has a lot of consequences and implications, some of which I spell out here. You don't just say we'd like to go there. What you do if you take this seriously is hold up a Europe whole and free as a kind of template by which policies are tested and by which you either adopt or reject policies. And that I think is the big missing element so far as we in the public see this. And so that's what we are recommending basically. And that does have many, many implications. It means for the United States doing things it might not otherwise choose to do, for example.

Now, in this book we cite quite a few of the polls that have been taken both in Russia and more especially in the United States. And it turns out that the American public has for years and still remains a strong supporter of Russian involvement in European affairs to a greater extent than at present; strong supporters of partnership between the European Union and the United States. And so the groundwork really has been laid already. The American people seem to support the general gist of what I'm saying. In addition to which since September 11th the polls indicate that the American people are much more trusting of their government than has been the case for many, many years. And so there is really in my view an opportunity for the administration to go to the public, hold up this idea of a Europe whole and free and at peace, explain its implications in some detail. I think the president made a good beginning at Warsaw last year, but much more of that is needed in the United States and around the country. And so I think you would have basically a good American support for a positive goal in our foreign policy. You know the nice thing about the anti-terrorism thing, if there is any nice thing about it at all, is that it does show you how important it is for governments and nations to act together to defeat what I tend to call the new medievalism. And I think what we need in addition to an anti-something is a pro-something. And what I am arguing -- we argue in this book -- is a pro-European, Euroatlantic community policy would be well received and well worthwhile.

President Bush said something in Warsaw also about this alliance as he put it between Russia, the European Union and the United States is, and I quote, "history's greatest united force for peace and progress and human dignity." And I think that's a very strong case to be made, and I think we need to follow through on that.

I'll conclude. Thank you very much.

Question and Answer Segment:

Mr. Lang: Ambassador Goodby, on behalf of the Secretary's Open Forum, I would like to thank you for that superb, very thoughtful presentation. Please give him another round of applause.

Ambassador Goodby: I didn't think it was so good I deserved two, but anyway, thank you very much.

Mr. Lang: At this point I would like to open the floor to your comments and questions. As a courtesy to Ambassador Goodby, please come to one of the microphones and activate it before stating your question. I'd like to open this segment of the program by asking you to, Ambassador Goodby, to tell us what further advice would you have for the president of the United States and the secretary of State as we seek to educate the American people about what's really at stake for the United States and Europe. And I am thinking more in terms of public outreach.

Ambassador Goodby: What I see is a policy that is well described by the administration, both the president and the secretary of State have talked about it. But it generally is sort of an afterthought or subordinated to something else. And what I am saying is if indeed this is history's greatest force for human dignity, then that probably deserves a little higher priority than it is usually given in public statements. And that's what I am arguing for, and I think that occasionally there ought to be a speech in the United States and not just in various foreign capitals about why it is that it is very much in American interests to have a Europe described as I just have, because all the good things they can do. And if you want to say yes that it's a bulwark against terrorism -- absolutely. But it does many, many other things too. It tends to eliminate the need for finding makeweights for example, if you have that kind of a Euroatlantic community you have fewer tendencies within that community to go looking around the world for allies against one another. And so I really do see this as having enormously beneficial results just simply in terms of global peace as well as in the Euroatlantic community. And I think that kind of thing needs to be said very frequently as a matter of top priority, and not as a sort of subordinate clause.

Mr. Lang: Thank you.

Question: I was very struck by your use of the analysis of convergence taking place between NATO and the European Union perhaps and with possible future convergence with the World Trade Organization even. But the alliance with the American public is obviously one of the major needs. And it occurs to me perhaps what would you think of trying to get a little posse of other deputies to help? I am thinking of modalities like the travel agents who are aware that everybody in America has roots elsewhere, often in Europe, and to have them for their own self-interests also focus with Americans of European extraction on their roots in Sweden or Germany or France or Greece or wherever. Would that -- are there modalities like that that you are thinking of to help?

Ambassador Goodby: Well, I hadn't thought about that. I do think that grass-roots approach is needed and is useful, and that might well be a good idea. I should mention that Charlotte Beers is the undersecretary for public affairs spoke at the Foreign Service Institute not too long ago and participated in a working group. And I was very impressed by her approach to these kinds of problems. And I frankly would be inclined to pass this problem on to her and ask if she would construct a public program that would do these kinds of things that I think you and I would like to see done.

By the way, I should mention that this book was published by the U.S. Institute of Peace, and my friend Dan Snodderly, who was the director of public relations, also was instrumental in bringing this book to life. But we also did it with the Association for Diplomatic Studies and Training, which is located, as you probably know, at the Foreign Service Institute. And they were both wholeheartedly behind this book, and I do thank all of them that were involved.

Question: How do you think this cross-Atlantic security alliance is going to be affected with the new focus on what's now being called the axis of evil? That seems to be the standard or the main thing that is being talked about in foreign policy circles right now. I'd like to hear your thoughts on that, sir.

Ambassador Goodby: Well, you are getting beyond the scope of this book, but I suppose having written the book one should be able to describe how one deals with problems like that. I think that what the president talked about was a problem that all of the Europeans and Russians included in that are concerned about -- namely weapons of mass destruction and what to do about it. And when I said we should not only have a negative approach in foreign policy but also a positive approach, what I would recommend to you is that you do take a positive approach to dealing with these three states, by which I mean we need a more active program in dealing with weapons of mass destruction in North Korea. I do think we need to reactivate the discussions with North Korea. The secretary of State has said he is ready to meet any time, any place, without any prearranged agenda. Maybe it's just impossible to get the North Koreans now to sit down with us. But that kind of policy is what I have in mind -- something that the secretary I think is also thinking about with regard to Iran -- some kind of positive approach to dealing with that. That will bring along the Europeans in my view, and I think that's essentially what we should be doing.

Question: Ambassador Goodby, last summer a group -- a trio of Europeanists -- German, French and British -- came here with a much smaller book called Europe's Military Revolution, which suggested at least a direction for EU planning that might conflict with some of the recommendations that you've made, especially those that emphasize the military. And my question is, are you going to be able with your colleagues to go to Europe and bring your book along and make the same kinds of statements there?

Ambassador Goodby: Well, yes, of course. What we are hoping to do is get the book there first. And I can tell you just this morning I had a faxed letter from Moscow from a publisher there saying he was ready to bring the book out in the Russian language. He would have it ready in fairly short time, and that he felt it will be very well received. So -- and I do visit Moscow from time to time -- probably will be there in June. And so, yes, I would expect to do that with my Russian colleagues. He's, as I said, the director -- the deputy director of the Carnegie Moscow Center. So the two of us would probably use that as a forum.

My Dutch friend has been spreading the word within Western Europe, has had one or two things like this already. So, yes, we are doing that. I think it's important to do that. The audience in Europe and in Russia is equally important to this American audience in terms of getting things done like this. Bear in mind these policies we're recommending are not just some things the U.S. government ought to do, but we are saying the European Union needs to do certain things, and Europe-Russia needs to do certain things. Some things that in fact are much more difficult than what we are talking about here.

Question: Jim, thank you very much, and congratulations on an important intellectual effort. There are several things spring to mind, but the immediate one is that of course you don't discuss the better part of the world. And it is conceivable how Russia and Europe and the United States could work together. But it is hard to imagine how the Middle East and China, Japan, Asia, would sit still while this was happening neatly. And I just wondered what you -- what consideration you gave to the foreign reactions -- notably China and Japan and the Middle East.

Ambassador Goodby: Well, we did discuss that in at least two or three places in the book. What we said was this, that if a stable peace in Europe is a good thing then it's equally true that a stable peace in Asia and the Middle East and Africa too for that matter also is a good thing. Now, we said one of the reasons for focusing on the Euroatlantic community is that we are fairly far along, at least in a big part of that continent, in developing a stable peace. We thought the prospects are pretty good for involving Russia in that, and the stakes were so high that we should give some priority to that. Now, we said in Asia we think we can probably describe U.S.-Japanese and U.S.-Korea and maybe other bilateral relationships as a stable peace rather than a conditional peace. But in Asia as a whole we said probably we're a little further away from this kind of a stable peace that we are talking about, and probably the best we can do in the next say decade in Asia as a whole, including China, would be what we call a benign form of conditional peace. That is to say the military element is still there as a conceivably usable option, even though very remote, and that we ought to vigorously work at that. So we did have a policy. We talked a bit also about whether one could have this kind of a community. And if you had Russia involved, for example, in some kind of border conflict with China, what would that mean? And we kind of explained how there could well be extraregional conflicts -- some of them could be in the Middle East -- that could pull apart this kind of community we are talking about. And that was one of reasons we thought we shouldn't stop just at a kind of a broad security community, but needed really to move on to the kind of community that is based on innate values, if you will, which would be much more difficult to pull apart by this external conflicts.

But these conflicts are going to be a very real problem, a serious problem, and one of the major impediments to this whole progress we are hoping to see over the next several years.

Mr. Lang: Yes, sir. You had your hand up?

Question: Ambassador Goodby, thank you for all your ideas. I almost heard you saying at the end of our remarks that there needed to be, in addition to an axis of evil, an axis of Goodby. (Laughter.) One thing that was absent from your remarks though was any mention of Ukraine, or for that matter -- and I haven't read your book, so I don't know if you address some of the other post-Soviet states. But given the degree to which Russia is diminished after the collapse of the Soviet Union, when of course Russia was the leading nationality there, considering that Russia's GDP now is about on a part of the Benelux, and has a state budget about the size of Austria's, and so on -- shouldn't there be consideration of thinking of that part of the world not only as Russia but as a number of partners, not necessarily to try to -- certainly not to reconstruct the Soviet Union, but to think about those relationships there, and in particular the key one is Ukraine, because of its enormous industrial strength. There is also the odd duck of Belarus that has to be factored in there. And I just wonder if you have given any thought to that?

Ambassador Goodby: I couldn't agree more with you. We do need to bring Ukraine especially into these arrangements. And we did talk about this in the book. We actually have a section in which we talk about Belarus, the Baltic States, and Ukraine, all of these former Soviet republics. And one of the reasons for defining the Euroatlantic community as we did, as I said in the beginning, we are trying to bound the problem, because this is just an enormous issue. And to try to deal with all of the nuances that go into this policy in the real world would just get too complex. So we simplified matters by talking about what I call sometimes kind of a lumpy triad of countries, or entities even. But that does not by any means mean that I consign Ukraine to the dominance of Russia or anything like that. No, indeed, I think Ukraine needs to be brought into this, as indeed does Belarus ultimately. And that's one of the reasons for saying democracy is essential. We can't have any foreign policy in my view that excludes that as one of the planks in the platform. So I completely agree with you, John, and I assume in your new job you are going to help us do these things. Thank you very much.

Mr. Lang: I'd like to thank you all for your comments and questions. At this time it gives me great pleasure to present to Ambassador Goodby the Open Forum's Distinguished Public Service Award. In doing so, I am reminded of the words of John W. Gardner. He said, "Societies are renewed, if they are renewed at all, by people who believe in something, care about something, and stand for something." Well, this afternoon the Open Forum is very pleased to recognize someone who believes in, cares about and stands for excellence in public service. Congratulations.

Ambassador Goodby: Thank you very, very much. Very nice of you to say that. What he just said now touched my heart more than anything I've heard in a long, long time. So I thank you for that.



Released on October 30, 2002

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