U.S. Department of State
U.S. Department of State
Other State Department Archive SitesU.S. Department of State
U.S. Department of State
U.S. Department of State
U.S. Department of State
U.S. Department of State
U.S. Department of State
U.S. Department of State
Home Issues & Press Travel & Business Countries Youth & Education Careers About State Video
 You are in: Bureaus/Offices Reporting Directly to the Secretary > Policy Planning Staff > Secretary's Open Forum > Proceedings > 2001 - 2002

The Independent Task Force Report on State Department Reform

Frank C. Carlucci, Chairman, The Carlyle Group; U.S. Secretary of Defense, 1987-1989; National Security Advisor, 1987
Washington, DC
February 23, 2001

Opening Remarks and Introduction by Alan Lang, Chairman of the Open Forum

Photo of Frank C. CarlucciThank you very much, Alan, for that nice introduction. Itís a pleasure to be back for the Secretaryís Open Forum. You do great work here at the Open Forum. Let me hasten to add, I didnít write the [Independent Task Force] report; I chaired the meetings. The report was actually written by Ian Brzezinski, who did an outstanding job, and I want to give him full credit.

The report, to my surprise, has received an awful lot of attention. I have made presentations on it before such groups as the Institute for Foreign Affairs, the Council on Foreign Relations, and the House International Relations Committee. I have several other appearances scheduled.

But in many ways this appearance is the most important, because you people can make it happen. Let me put it in the negative -- if you donít get behind it, it wonít happen. And Colin Powell understands this. Thatís why heís issued a call for leadership on the part of each and every employee of the Department of the State.

Last week I had a dinner with the Chief of Staff of the Army. At the end of the dinner, he said, "You know, I donít know where or when the next war will be fought, but I know there will be a next war and I know the Army had better be ready." As he was talking, I thought to myself, well, thatís an appropriate statement for the Chief of the Army to make in terms of our deterrence. But where and when the next war will take place -- or indeed, if it will take place -- is at least as much a function of our diplomatic skills as it is our military deterrent. In fact, the two go hand in hand.

Never was that more clearly illustrated than at the end of the Cold War during negotiations in which I was privileged to participate. Rebuilding our military strength, in my judgment at least, helped precipitate the collapse of the Soviet Union. But it was skillful diplomacy ably led by George Shultzís State Department team -- the Pentagon participated and, of course, the President was the ultimate leader -- that enabled us to negotiate a soft landing for what was then the Soviet Union. The military made it possible, but the State Department made it happen.

Since the end of the Cold War, we have cut our military establishment more than some of us think is wise. But at least there is a rationale for cutting our military establishment. There is no rationale for what we have done to our diplomatic establishment in a world that has become increasingly dangerous, complex, and interconnected. Jim Woolsey put it well when he said "We have slain the dragon only to find that the jungle is filled with snakes."

Here we are, though, closing posts, working with obsolete telecommunications, --, something that is dwelt upon in the article that Alan mentioned -- and frequently working in unsafe and unhealthy environments, with a dysfunctional personnel system, and with a lack of clout over other agencies in the field. You know the litany of problems; youíve heard them many times. Part of it is a resource issue, yes, but part of it is our long-term failure to manage ourselves. We in the Foreign Service -- and I speak here Alan as a former Foreign Service Officer -- have never put a premium on good management. I went up through the political cone, and that was the way to go up. Managers didnít go up as fast. Now I know all that is changing, and I know we are moving in the right direction, but we need to move faster. Few Secretaries of State have viewed themselves as managers; they have often regarded themselves as foreign policy innovators. Whatever the reason, it is very clear that our diplomatic establishment is in a state of disrepair. Thatís a disservice to the men and women who work in this building and in our many overseas establishments. It is also a disservice to our military.

It is not surprising, then, that the Council on Foreign Relations and the Center for Strategic and International Studies decided to do a study. When they called and asked me to chair it, my first reaction was, "No, we've had too many blue ribbon panels; I chaired one, thatís enough." But they said, "No, no, this is not a blue ribbon panel; itís to be an action-oriented document -- a roadmap to enable the incoming Secretary of State to jump start the process." And, indeed, that is what we have produced. If weíve been successful, if weíve attracted attention, it is due in large measure to the high-level, bipartisan nature of the group. It was very interesting to see how quickly the group came together on the disrepair of our diplomatic establishment and how quickly they decided that it wasnít just a resource issue or a management issue; it was reform and resources. The two go hand in hand.

We didnít call it a bargain or a contract. We emphasized that we need both. Without resources you canít do what is needed, and without reform, youíre not going to get the resources from the Congress. Our resources-for-reform strategy has three components:

1. A strong presidential mandate;

2. A clear tasking of responsibilities and authority among the principal national security departments; and

3. Immediate steps to renew our Department of State.

Let me take each of those in turn. With regard to the presidential mandate, we think there should be a presidential directive declaring reform of our foreign policy establishment to be a national security priority and spelling out the steps the President intends to take. We think the President ought to use his bully pulpit on this subject. It ought to be at least a topic of one of his early speeches to the nation or to the Congress. We think the President himself needs to reach out to the Congress. He has to emphasize that there is going to be a new partnership, that weíre going to walk hand in hand down the reform and resources road.

Secondly, the President needs to clarify interagency responsibilities. There should be a Presidential directive reasserting that the Secretary of State is the Presidentís principal foreign policy adviser, spokesman, and implementer. The same directive could spell out that the National Security Council is a coordinating body.

Third, the President needs to take steps to strengthen the authority of the ambassador. Every incoming president reissues the well-known Kennedy Letter. I know itís going through the process right now. But there are steps that can be taken to put some teeth in it. The ambassador could be given stronger authority over agenciesí budgets in the field; agencies could be instructed to pay attention to the ambassadorís evaluation of their people in the field. The ambassador ought to have total authority to send people home when they step out of line.

We think there should be an integrated national security budget. The rejoinder is "Well, the Congress isnít organized to handle such a budget." But at least the Administration can display the budget in such a way as to show what the tradeoffs would be, comparing State with Defense and the other national security agencies rather than comparing it with the Department of Justice.

With regard to reinvigorating the State Department, the first step is to create a chief operating officer, somebody who can bring together program and budget, which have been bifurcated in the State Department far too long. Frankly, I can think of nobody better to do that than Rich Armitage. He worked for me in the Pentagon, and heís absolutely first-rate.

We think there should be an overhaul of the human resources programs. This was particularly emphasized in the Kaden Commission. The current system is clearly dysfunctional. Recruitment takes far too long, the up or out procedure has the unintended effect of forcing some very good people out. We donít have adequate training. The other day I was in a meeting with Marc Grossman and Colin Powell. The Secretary asked Marc how much training he had received over the course of his Foreign Service career, which spans more than two decades. Marc said that he had about 2 weeks of training. Secretary Powell said that in his military service he had 6 years of training -- a stark contrast. A lot more can be done to upgrade our training. With regard to spousal assignment policies, Marc Grossman has done a lot along those lines, and there is still more to be done.

We need flexible grievance mechanisms and an improved process for filling critical specialty positions. Some of us think we need to reinvigorate the old FSR [Foreign Service Reserve] system or have some system that allows us to bring in the special skills that the Department requires. We think it necessary to change the culture. Now this is perhaps the most controversial of our recommendations. The press corps thinks itís terrific, because what weíre saying is that the State Department needs to be more open.

The FSO corps becomes a bit defensive. They say, "Well, we have changed," and thatís true. Itís a very different building than it was when I came in and the emphasis was on government-to-government relations. Our people in the field now recognize that they have to interact with the totality of the society to which theyíre assigned -- with the press, with the NGOs, with nonprofits, and with the business community. But more needs to be done. This process needs to be accelerated. We need to engage others here in Washington, reaching out in particular to the Congress and our constituencies. We have to create a constituency back home.

We need to rationalize and renovate the infrastructure. That, as Alan said, is dealt with in the article in todayís Washington Post. Security is a given. When I testified before the House [International Relations] Committee they said, "Weíll give you the money for security, if we think you can spend it properly." A lot of people have come to the conclusion that changes need to be made in the State Departmentís real estate business. FBO is just not up to the job; it doesnít have the tools or the people to do the job. The Kaden Commission came up with the idea of an overseas facility authority, a federally chartered buildings operation overseas which could charge rent, which would raise money by borrowing from the federal financing bank against the revenue stream as it charges other agencies for rent and that could engage in the business practices of the real estate industry.

The sad state of telecommunications in the Department has been documented in many reports. The one I chaired a couple of years ago estimated that we would need about $400 million to improve telecommunications, and the Congress set up a pilot program. I would say, go for broke. In the area of telecommunications -- and I happen to be chairman of a telecommunications company -- we know what needs to be done. You can negotiate a contract and put in a good system through a whole series of subcontracting arrangements.

We need to rightsize our establishments. This is [mentioned] in both the "Equipped for the Future Report" and the Kaden Commission Report. And by rightsize, I donít necessarily mean downsize. There are areas where we ought to be increasing our presence, and there are others where we ought to be downsizing our presence. There are a lot of innovative ways one could look at embassy structures, and some of those are contained in the various reports.

We need to upgrade the [Bureau] of Legislative Affairs so that we really can put our very best people there. And the [Bureau] of Legislative Affairs ought to reach out to the Congress; it ought to have an office on the Hill. It ought to look upon itself as a facilitator of those contacts, not a funnel through which all the contacts have to go. There ought to be regular meetings with the congressional leadership. We need to find ways to bring them closer to the process.

What did we do with our report? We delivered it to the Secretary. It was the first appointment Colin had had after his swearing-in. And while, obviously, he didnít say, "I accept every sentence in the report," he embraced its overall thrust and indicated that he intends to be a manager of the building -- and I know heís told you that. In fact, in a meeting the other day, someone said, "I have a personnel matter; whom do I take it up with?" He said, "You take it up with me, Iím the Chief Personnel Officer around here." I think thatís typical of Colinís approach.

Why will [reform] work this time when it hasnít worked before? I got that question the other day from an editorial writer at a Texas newspaper. I said, "Well there are a couple of things that are different now." First of all, you have a Secretary of State with unique public prestige who has managed large organizations and who is completely at ease with them. As many of you know, I have worked with Colin many times throughout the years, and I can assure you he is somebody who does what he says. He is a person of extraordinary ability and absolute integrity, and you will get from him very clear goals. And heíll be ably assisted by the team he is bringing in. He has signaled that he intends to depend on the professionals which is another very good omen.

Finally, the Congress is waiting to be helpful. I was pleasantly surprised during my testimony in the House. And Iíve got another one coming up in the Senate. Everybody on the committee, Democrats and Republicans alike, said, "We want to help; what can we do?" So you have a Congress standing at the ready.

Reform is not easy. It is disruptive in many ways, but it is necessary. Youíve got the right leadership. Youíve got the right Congress. Itís the right time. And what is needed is for everybody, now, to put their shoulder to the wheel.

Thank you very much.


Alan Lang: Mr. Carlucci, on behalf of the Open Forum, I want to thank you for that superb presentation. Please give him another warm round of applause. [Applause]

I will begin this segment of the program by posing the first question.

Q: Assuming that the State Department succeeds in obtaining additional resources, could you tell us a little bit more about discussions among members of the task force on how funding decisions are made at State? How additional resources should be distributed across functional and geographical areas? Implicit in this question is whether State has a handle on strategic planning, whether our national interests and strategic objectives are aligned with our priorities, policies, programs, performance measures, and resources.

Mr. Carlucci: Well, there was a feeling on the task force that this is an inadequacy. Program and budget never seem to meet each other in the State Department, unlike, say, the Pentagon. In the Pentagon, budget is program; itís automatic there. You have to force it a bit more in the State Department. But this is why one of our principal recommendations is that you have a Chief Operating Officer. The logical person to carry out that function is the Deputy Secretary of State. It has happened in the past, but all too frequently, Deputy Secretaries become super desk officers. They take areas where theyíve got particular expertise and make a valid contribution, but somebody has to pull the Department together. The task force did not see anybody doing that at the current point in time. Rich Armitage, once he is confirmed, will have a big burden. But as I said, Iím sure that he is capable of carrying it out.

Q. I work in the Bureau of Information Resource Management here at the Department of State. Your report called for an "information-providing culture" as opposed to an "information-policing culture," and also noted congressional criticism of the State Department as overly secretive. And weíve heard you speak very eloquently today about the need for more openness. Some have suggested that this isnít something that is wholly our fault or wholly within our control. For instance, it was George Kennanís view that the diplomatic mission should not be a center for espionage. George Shultz made similar observations. I would like to hear your perspective on how the State Department, as a national security department, should address this issue.

Mr. Carlucci: Iím obviously not going to comment on the espionage question, particularly in light of the some the news that has come out recently. I recognize that it is not easy to change the culture of any institution. And I spent time at the Department of Defense; it was not easy to change their culture either. The task force, both Democrats and Republicans, thought this change in culture was absolutely necessary. I donít mean to beat the drum for Colin Powell, but he is one of the most open people you can get. So you have somebody up at the top who is very open. He will set the tone; so will Rich Armitage. I think youíll find that it may come very easily, that people will be able to interact with the different components of our society. There will be a much more open attitude toward the Congress, and I think the Congress will reciprocate. All of this assumes that there is not a deterioration on the Hill into partisan bickering for reasons not related to our foreign policy establishment. If we can maintain a bipartisan approach, I think there is a unique opportunity here for collaboration.

Q: Iím with the Middle East Bureau. One of the things that disturbs me the most has been the adversarial relationship between Congress and the Department. Many State Department officials assume that any information provided to Congress may be used against us, whether for partisan or local purposes. Many seem to feel that the safest thing to do is not to tell them anything. How would you address that issue?

Mr. Carlucci: You appeal to leadership. Iíve given information to the Congress that has been used against me. I would continue to give information to the Congress, because I know the consequences of not providing information are worse than the consequences of providing information.

[The Congress is] an equal branch of our government. We have to deal with them. Without their support, you are going nowhere in your reform efforts, your efforts to get modern telecommunications, your efforts to upgrade your embassies, and your efforts to reform your personnel systems. It just wonít happen without their collaboration. With 535 people in Congress, all of them may not share your concerns; some are partisan, and I discovered that. [Laughter] This may happen, but itís part of the process. I mean you experience setbacks when you deal with countries overseas. But you plow ahead because you have to do it.

Q: First of all, I want to thank you for chairing the task force. I think you did a terrific job of keeping a lot of different voices on track, and you achieved a good result. We at AFSA certainly support the recommendations. I would like to ask you today to go a little bit beyond what the task of the task force was. Iíd like to ask you for your thoughts on professional diplomacy. Today, more and more people are getting into the act. There are more and more actors on the international stage. At our embassies and consulates overseas it is not just the Department of State and the Foreign Service; many agencies have roles in the international arena. There is a perception in many places that just about anybody can do this job, and I wonder if you could give your view on the need for a professional diplomatic service. Thatís the first question: Why do we need a professional diplomatic service like the Foreign Service?

Secondly, if you believe we need a Foreign Service, what is needed to improve it? What areas should the profession focus on at this juncture? What should individuals like us focus on in terms of improving the profession and our individual performance?

Mr. Carlucci: Thank you. Todayís diplomat is very different from the diplomat who was prominent when I came into the Foreign Service. We had some great ones like Loy Henderson. One of my first jobs was to serve as an assistant to Ellsworth Bunker, a terrific diplomat. I worked with David Bruce at NATO. These were diplomats in the traditional mode. Todayís diplomat has to be able to grasp the totality of a society; it is not something that comes easily. Itís a skill that has to be learned over a period of years. Itís one thing to learn on CNN that Portugal is in flames; itís quite another to deal with the Portuguese on a face-to-face basis and make a personal assessment of what is happening in that country or where the prime minister or president may be going on various issues. When you do that kind of analysis in todayís world, youíve got to analyze the broad structure of a society, you canít just look at one individual or one governmental institution. So I think we are moving in the right direction. My concern is that weíre not moving fast enough. We are becoming a broader and much more inclusive Foreign Service, and that is exactly what is needed to deal with the totality of the societies we are relating to overseas.

Q: In terms of what weíre missing today, do you have any suggestions for individuals in the Foreign Service?

Mr. Carlucci: Itís clear from the various studies that youíve got a great need for more specialists in all fields whether youíre talking about scientists, information specialists, security specialists, etc. The Foreign Service has not shown itself to be flexible enough to accommodate the influx of specialists that you need.

Q: Frank, thatís a very good presentation, you have a high reputation here... My question relates to how the United States Government organizes itself. What I found striking, over my long career, is that the Department of State, until World War II, had responsibility for foreign affairs. The domestic departments were focused on their own responsibilities. What has happened in the last 50 years is that the domestic departments have identified a growing interest in international affairs. In a major embassy in western Europe, there were 27 agencies representing most of our government, and their functions were perfectly legitimate, including that of the FBI. The question is, and you mentioned having specialists here, whether the Department of State can ever develop specialists who can compete in terms of expertise and experience with those in the domestic departments on technical issues. And technical issues have now become the substance of most negotiations worldwide. How do we organize the government in these circumstances? The White House has increased in size over the last 30 years and will continue to do so because it is the locus where decisions can be made for the entire government. The State Department canít make decisions that involve Agriculture and Labor and all the domestic departments. So how do we fit in? The Department of State canít look at itself in isolation from the other departments.

Mr. Carlucci: Thank you. Weíre not going to roll the clock back. You canít get those agencies to withdraw their people; they will all make their case to OMB and to the Congress. But we can try to keep a lid on it. In fact, the Kaden Commission recommends that there be an overseas presence panel consisting of the various agencies that are operating overseas, chaired by the Secretary of State. And thatís one suggestion.

Some of you who are old enough may remember Operation Topsy in Brazil. Jack Tuthill cut back on the size of the establishment. I happened to have been the hatchet man for Operation Topsy. It was a full time job. We ended up cutting the agencies by one-third, but we had to engage every agency directly in Washington in order to do it. But we got their attention. I think what we have to do is to find ways of increasing the authority of the ambassador. Itís a presidential issue, as you pointed out.

Q: But the ambassador has responsibility; he or she also must have the will to act.

Mr. Carlucci: Some ambassadors do, some donít. For example, when I was in the CIA, a lot of people at State complained that they couldnít control the CIA. I very seldom got complaints from strong ambassadors. If youíve got a strong ambassador, he or she will find ways of asserting himself or herself at the embassy. So, I guess the first rule is pick good people to be ambassadors. And the second rule is to give them support out of Washington, from the White House, and only then would I consider setting up organizational mechanisms, because leadership is far more effective than moving boxes around.

Q: I work in Management Policy and Planning. I have a question about the balance of power and authority between the executive, the military, and the State Department, the diplomatic corps of the United States. Do you have any suggestions on how to make it so that the diplomatic process is not leapfrogged in situations where there is a military attack, so that itís not short-circuited? It seems that the executive and the military have the ability to make unilateral decisions without properly exhausting all of the diplomatic options.

Mr. Carlucci: I would quarrel with that hypothesis. At least in my experience, when I was Secretary of Defense, I would never make a unilateral move that affected our diplomacy without consulting George Shultz. And, on occasion, heíd say, "Please donít do that." [Laughter] I wanted to close our bases in the Philippines. I thought we didnít need them. He wanted to keep them open for diplomatic reasons. So he prevailed on that. When he started his negotiations with the former Soviet Union, the Soviet Defense Minister came to me and asked if I would start negotiations with him. Well, the first thing I did was to pick up the phone and call George Shultz. I asked if he had any objections and he said, "No, thatís a good idea. Letís work in tandem." George would come over to the Pentagon at least once a week and meet with the Joint Chiefs [of Staff] whether I was there or not. So you had that kind of close cooperation.

Q: There are also the politically motivated actions, perceived as distractions from domestic situations -- the political aspects of making these decisions without looking at their impacts not only in a given country but in a region.

Mr. Carlucci: I know both your Secretary of Defense and your Secretary of State very well. These are people who will not be motivated by political considerations. They will not sacrifice our national interests for the sake of politics. That wonít happen, I can assure you.

Q: Iím in the Corporate Information Systems Security Office. I came over to State from DoD in June 1999. What I often see at the State Department reminds me of an observation by Dean Acheson. "The State Department canít be run by meetings [alone]; if you see a problem, make a decision and do it, fix it." Fifty years later, thatís been my main observation here, that when a problem is identified we have endless [meetings.] When I came in June 1999, in terms of computer security, I was extremely enthusiastic about being able to help fix an acute problem which is still here, and we are still having what seems like the same meetings over and over to talk about this, that, and the other thing. How can we get Secretary Powellís leadership to break down that inertia?

Mr. Carlucci: He told me the other day that one of the things that I had taught him was the importance of short meetings. At the Pentagon, I had a 15-minute staff meeting three times a week, and we covered everything we needed to address. His meetings are typically, I think he said, about 30 minutes. You will find that his style is to conduct short, effective meetings. And, hopefully, that will trickle down.

Q: Itís not [just] the length of the meetings but the months stretching out without a decision. [Laughter] [Applause]

Mr. Carlucci: Iíll tell you what the solution in business would be for that -- you would take layers right out of the establishment. Now, unfortunately, with the Civil Service system, you canít do that. One thing we avoided in this report was telling the Administration how to organize the State Department. I think the Secretary ought to have flexibility on that score, but Iíd be very surprised if he doesnít start to look at layers of management if youíve got that kind of constipated system [Laughter]. That may be one way to take care of it.

Q: Iím a Public Diplomacy Officer currently assigned to the Bureau of Human Resources. Your report discussed public diplomacy and how the State Department needs to emphasize that more. Many of my colleagues feel that when USIA was merged with State and people lost things that they had been accustomed to such as access to the Internet at their desktop, and the ability to take action quickly without 50 clearances. Much of that has not changed. It has been only a year since the merger, but Iíd appreciate your observations on the effectiveness of the merger -- what has happened and what should happen.

Mr. Carlucci: Iíll be honest, I donít feel qualified to answer that question. Itís not an issue we addressed in our report. Bob Hunter wrote an addendum to the task force report saying that it had been a failure. He was very critical of it. But this was not discussed in the entire group, and I donít think Iím qualified to offer a personal opinion on it.

Q: I work in the Bureau of European Affairs, in the Strategic Planning and Policy area, which sometimes can be pretty frustrating, because it seems like we get a lot of frustration from the field and only a little bit of support from the senior levels. I think itís great that we have a Secretary and Deputy Secretary of State-designate who are interested in being Chief Operating Officers, but Iím not sure thatís going to do it. When you look at the senior levels, and the policy mechanisms, and the attitude that leaders have toward resources and management probably range from dismissive to disdainfulÖ [In addition to a strong Secretary and Deputy Secretary] weíre going to need Assistant Secretaries, Deputy Assistant Secretaries, and Ambassadors who view management issues as priorities on par with policy issues. What kind of institutional changes can we make to offer rewards to these people for paying attention to management issues? What long-range changes in our structure can we make that might change those attitudes?

Mr. Carlucci: I think I mentioned, at least in passing, in my earlier comments that this is a culture that has never prized management. I went up through the political cone -- that was the way to go. Maybe it still is. I think you have to structure promotions in such a way that good management is rewarded. You have to tailor your recruitment process to bring in people who are interested in management. It is possible to do this without undervaluing political or economic skills. There are all kinds of people in business with economic and political skills who are good managers, too. Managers can be grown. Iíve watched Colin Powell since 1972 grow his management skills through a step-by-step process, through training and various assignments. In fact, one of the things that the State Department does not do, that the Pentagon does very well, is work force planning. I was at a board meeting of a company yesterday where we have very clearly identified our top performers, our top managers, and our bottom performers. We sent letters to the top managers and letters to the performers at the bottom. And there is a huge difference in pay, even for what might theoretically be the same function. If one person is better than another they get much more compensation -- variable compensation. I would love to see that kind of thing introduced in government. Right now, thatís probably wishful thinking. There are things you can do to take your most talented people and move them through a series of training programs and assignments that will enable them to grow managerially. Itís not going to happen overnight. Itís a tough process, but it needs to be done.

Q: Iím an intern in the Bureau of Educational and Cultural Affairs. I just have a few general questions. The first, regarding your comment, "We have a Congress at the ready, a Secretary who is proreform." And the burden, it seems is on [us]. Is that assumption correct? Is the reform bottom-up, in that sense? If so, because the Secretary has said that he is looking for leadership from all of us, what specific suggestions can you give those of us here in this auditorium?

Mr. Carlucci: I donít intend to produce a mad scramble for everybody to do their own thing in terms of leadership. Obviously, you have to relate to the goals that the Secretary of State will set. And as I commented at one point, he will set clear goals. He is used to doing that. He speaks in very unambiguous terms. You could block, it but you could also help enormously to make it happen.

Q: How?

Mr. Carlucci: It is a team effort. When the Secretary says, "This is the direction that weíre going," for example, if we going to have a federally chartered building agency, support it -- even if youíre in FBO. Donít fight it like it was fought last time when the original recommendation was made. Recognize that change will be disruptive. It will impact you. It will impact a lot of people here and overseasÖBut in the long run it will be good for the institution and for the individuals. I guess what Iím saying is that you can exercise leadership by responding to his leadership.

Q: Iím a State Department Officer, currently the Consul General in Kinshasa, the Democratic Republic of the Congo. Iíd like you to comment on the task forceís lack of emphasis on diversity issues, both in the text of the report or as an issue which would merit an action plan.

Mr. Carlucci: We did not try to incorporate every previous recommendation into this report. For instance, I mentioned rightsizing the Department -- that is not in our report. Diversity is highlighted in some of the other reports, including the "Equipped for the Future Report," which I chaired, and the Kaden Commission Report. It is embodied in the underlying reports, but more significantly, the Secretary of State has indicated quite clearly that he intends to improve diversity in our State Department establishment. And that is far more important than what you will find in any report. Your point is well taken.

Q: I'm the Science and Technology Adviser to the Secretary of State: Iíve been here for 5 months in this new position which really derives from a study by the National Research Council's examining the Departmentís weakness in the areas of science and technology. My mandate is to show some leadership in strengthening this whole enterprise, and it fits well with what you talked about in terms of broadening the agenda and engaging the whole society. When we look at various components of national security, whether one talks about intelligence, diplomacy, or defense, every one of them is underlain by strong elements of science and technology (S&T.) I was wondering whether you had any more specific comments on science and technology in general as a piece of the foreign policy pie. One thing that weíve begun to do is to build a partnership with the scientific and technical community outside, and the response has truly been fantastic from the National Academy of Sciences, from the American Association for the Advancement of Science (AAAS) organizations, and from the universities. We did an emergency call for interns as part of the regular State intern program this year, focusing on people with S&T backgrounds. In 45 days we received 32 applications, and we are trying to place them now as volunteers here and in embassies abroad.

Mr. Carlucci: Sounds like you have a pretty good handle on things and are answering your own question. The only thought I would add, as one who has been in the private sector for 10-12 years, is that I assume you are reaching out to some of the private sector companies. One I chair, Nortel Networks, has fantastic technology. And in the pharmaceutical industry, the technology is growing by leaps and bounds. There is a lot these companies can do overseas to be helpful to you. So I would encourage you to reach out to them as well.

Q: Iím with the Executive Office of the Bureaus of Near Eastern and South Asian Affairs. You said that one of your main recommendations was that there be a presidential mandate for reform of this Department. Have you had any indications as to whether such a mandate will be forthcoming from President Bush?

Mr. Carlucci: I have not, but Iíve not asked the question. I have delivered the report to Secretary Powell, we sent a copy to [National Security Adviser] Condi Rice. [The Secretary] indicated that he intends to follow through on a lot of the recommendations. I know that he is in active discussions with the President about State Department reform. Exactly what they are going to do, I donít know, nor is it appropriate for me to try to find out. Iíll let them manage it.

Presentation of the Open Forumís Distinguished Public Service Award to Mr. Carlucci

Mr. Lang: When I think about Frank Carlucciís laudable career in government, his notable contributions in the private sector, and his work as Chairman of the Task Force on State Department Reform, the words of President Ronald Reagan come to mind: "To grasp and hold a vision, that is the very essence of successful leadership, not only on the movie set where I learned it," he said, "but everywhere." And so, on behalf of the Open Forum, I want to commend Mr. Carlucci and his colleagues on the task force for grasping and holding a clear vision of the State Departmentís role in meeting critical challenges and opportunities in a rapidly changing world.

Mr. Carlucci: Thank you; Alan, very nice. Thank you all.

  Back to top

U.S. Department of State
USA.govU.S. Department of StateUpdates  |   Frequent Questions  |   Contact Us  |   Email this Page  |   Subject Index  |   Search
The Office of Electronic Information, Bureau of Public Affairs, manages this site as a portal for information from the U.S. State Department. External links to other Internet sites should not be construed as an endorsement of the views or privacy policies contained therein.
About state.gov  |   Privacy Notice  |   FOIA  |   Copyright Information  |   Other U.S. Government Information

Published by the U.S. Department of State Website at http://www.state.gov maintained by the Bureau of Public Affairs.