The Bush Administration and Nonproliferation: A New Strategy EmergesJohn R. Bolton, Under Secretary for Arms Control and International Security
Panel I of A Hearing of the House Committee on International Relations
March 30, 2004
11:06 A.M. EST
REP. HENRY HYDE (R-IL): The committee will come to order.
We live in a world and in a city where rumblings of warning blend into a familiar background, where fluency in the language of crises is widely shared, where doomsayers and Cassandras readily ply their trade. Some alarms are of an immediate nature and are drawn from the empirical world; others are distilled from more abstract projections. But I can think of no scenario more frightening, more disastrous, than that of terrorists acquiring weapons of mass destruction, of which nuclear weapons are the transcendent example.
Few would disagree that combating this threat must be among our highest national priorities. And yet that resolution has not always been matched by concrete action.
I speak here not as a partisan, for the successes and failures in this area can be widely distributed among parties, factions, individuals, and schools of thought. But none would maintain that all that could be done, all that should be done to avert this unparalleled disaster, has in fact been done.
Over the decades, a number of policies, actions, programs, and efforts have been advanced to address the many challenges of this hydra-headed problem. The collective result of these labors constitutes an enormous success, but, nevertheless, our current defenses remain far from perfect. And yet our goal must be perfection, for our vessel is a leaky one, where even a single hole can be an opening to the Apocalypse.
Our regime of safeguards has taken shape in piecemeal fashion, often in a reactive response to correct problems that have been unexpectedly unearthed. Perhaps the best example is the revelation, in the aftermath of the 1991 Gulf War, of the scale of Saddam Hussein's weapons of mass destruction programs, including the bone- chilling discovery that his nuclear ambitions were within an estimated six months from being realized. This and other providential discoveries underscored the gross inadequacy of the existing inspection procedures and led to the crafting of the so-called Additional Protocol, which mandates far more intrusive measures than those of the original Non-Proliferation Treaty.
But even these much-strengthened measures cannot compensate for other fatal shortcomings which may become evident only in retrospect. The sudden and recent exposure of Iran's longstanding efforts to acquire a nuclear capability, and its success in assembling key elements of a weapons program, have once again demonstrated the harvest of deadly consequences that complacency may sow.
This being an election year, the contest is joined on all fronts. To its detractors, this administration has been guilty of any number of sins in its foreign policy, a criticism that sometimes extends to the limits of geography and propriety. However, what I find most surprising is that little or no attention has been devoted by either detractors or supporters to what is undeniably a major success, namely the crafting of an innovative, comprehensive, and -- this is of crucial importance -- action-oriented strategy of preemptive nonproliferation.
Methodically, piece-by-piece, the Administration has reinvented the nonproliferation regime it inherited, crafting policies to fill gaping holes, reinforcing earlier patchwork fixes, assembling allies, creating precedents, setting new limits, changing perceived realities. It's an enormous achievement, worthy of universal praise. And it's still building.
To this administration must go the credit for many long-delayed but indispensable actions to reverse our slide toward the chasm. I will cite only a couple of examples, with counter-trafficking measures taking pride of place.
Among the most prominent innovations is the Proliferation Security Initiative, the cooperative arrangement among a growing number of countries that is aimed at taking direct action to intercept the illegal transshipment of weapons of mass destruction weapons, components and materials. This is a muscular enhancement of our ability to halt trafficking in the components of these weapons. I confess that once it was announced, my immediate response was, "Why weren't we doing this thirty years ago?" Nevertheless, I am very thankful that it is being done at last.
Despite this program's infancy, there have already been notable successes. It was the interception of a vessel loaded with nuclear components for Libya that helped convince Qadhafi that the days of his undisturbed accumulation of the instrument of destructions were over.
Much attention has been focused on the revelations of the stunningly extensive nature of the trafficking in nuclear technology and materials by members of Pakistan's nuclear programs. These revelations, combined with invaluable information from Libya's program, have torn the cover from the international black market in nuclear technology and know-how, which, prior to this inside information, had been only sketchily understood.
What's usually overlooked, however, is the administration's success in persuading the leaders of Pakistan to take active measures to interrupt the proliferation of nuclear materials and assistance that has metastasized unchecked from that country for many years. We're now in the process of unraveling that network and preventing the horrors its commerce would otherwise bring into being.
Despite its caricatured image of being oblivious to potential support from the international community, the administration will shortly announce success in its efforts to prod the UN to greater endeavors in nonproliferation, having crafted what is likely to be a unanimous resolution by the Security Council mandating that all member countries adopt effective measures to prevent the illegal trafficking in weapons of mass destruction-related goods, with the prospect of establishing universal adherence to these rules.
There are many other elements deserving mention. I'll refrain from doing so in order to focus on the central innovation which I believe is indispensable for any successful nonproliferation effort, namely the demonstrated credibility of action, for this represents nothing less than a transforming precedent.
Now making the rounds is the view that the United States has lost credibility around the world due to our policy in Iraq. I suggest the exact opposite is true: We, in fact, have gained enormous, immensely valuable and even decisive credibility from our actions there. For the next time the U.S., or at least this president, warns some foreign despot to cease actions that we believe are threatening to our security, my hunch is that he'll listen, and he'll listen carefully. The fact that we went into Iraq virtually alone, excepting our courageous partner Great Britain, not only without the sanction of the international community but in blunt defiance of its strenuous efforts to stop us, is far from the ruinous negative it is often portrayed as. In fact, it's all to the good, for it is unambiguous proof that absolutely nothing will deter us, that the entire world arrayed against us cannot stop us. The message on those on the receiving end couldn't be clearer, and unless they're suicidal, they'll understand that their options have been radically narrowed.
This isn't theory. Already, the administration has won another victory in Muammar Qadhafi's decision to surrender his weapons of mass destruction programs in direct consequence of our actions in Iraq. And it's a powerful precedent, for the -- it's the first time that a state has surrendered these weapons without a regime change. If Qadhafi makes good on his promise, and if we can in confidence readmit him fully to the international community, the effect on others cannot but be salutary. For we can then offer offenders a stark choice of the sword or the olive branch, of destruction or the rewards of cooperation, with all ambiguity torn away, and thereby refocus their cold calculations of self-interest away from ambition and toward survival.
Our intervention in Iraq has made this seminal message both possible and credible for the first time. Can anyone cognizant of the threats we face doubt its value?
The benefits of this new mode of interaction are evident in the current stand-off with Iran. The recent and unexpected exposure of Iran's massive nuclear weapons program has startled that regime into a hastily constructed policy of stalling and superficial cooperation. Only a fool would believe that the Iranians will voluntarily abandon their nuclear ambitions, but their coerced cooperation has been helpfully motivated by their fear of U.S. action against them. Here as well, Iran's adherence to the deal it cut with Britain, France and Germany for a suspension of its programs has been made more likely by the existence of the U.S. threat, a source of real-world leverage that even the Europeans privately acknowledge to be useful. That situation is far from resolved, but does anyone actually believe that the possibility of halting Iran's march would even exist without Saddam's sobering example?
None of this has been lost on the North Korean regime. Our demonstrated willingness to use force to remove a threat, paired with the possibility of reward for cooperation, provides the decision- makers in Pyongyang with useful instruction in the rules of this new world. Once again, this bracketing of the regime's options was made possible by our actions in Iraq.
Clearly, the administration's actions regarding nonproliferation are of a sweeping nature. But even with all that has been done, much more remains, as the administration is the first to point out. In his recent speech, the president laid out an agenda listing several areas in which additional action is urgently needed, including addressing the proliferation problems inherent in countries seeking to acquire the complete nuclear fuel cycle and the need for expanded export controls worldwide, among others. Some of these problems have no ready solution and will require increased attention. Each of these many actions and policies should be celebrated in themselves. But their true importance emerges only when they are arrayed together and seen as a whole, for they demonstrate the extraordinary effort by this administration to craft and put in place a far-seeing, comprehensive and action-oriented strategy focused not merely on the limited task of defense, but on preempting our annihilation.
Of course, the administration inherited some very valuable initiatives, such as the Nunn-Lugar program that continues our massive effort to secure the vast weapons of mass destruction arsenal left in the wreckage of the Soviet empire. But its strategy moves well beyond merely embracing and modifying this inheritance to aspiring to nothing less than a dramatic and ambitious reinvention that seeks to address all areas of this fatal menace, and to do so for the first time. If there is fault to be had with this administration in this area, it is that they have been remiss in not shouting their success from the rooftops.
Action long dreamed of is finally being taken, but there is much more to do. We must make up for decades of stillborn plans, of wishful thinking, of irresponsible passivity. We're already late, but we are no longer bystanders wringing our hands and hoping that somehow we will find shelter from gathering threats, no longer dispirited by difficult problems that have no immediate answer, no longer waiting for some international court to issue a reluctant warrant or grudging permission to allow us to take measures to protect ourselves.
This president has begun to lay the foundation for a comprehensive, multi-layered, root-and-branch approach to the mortal danger of the proliferating instruments of our destruction. A global system of overlapping levels of international, multilateral, and unilateral measures is being erected, each using different tools and methods, but all sharing a common purpose: the putting in place of a strategy of preemptive nonproliferation.
We are only at the beginning, but it is an extraordinary beginning. Everyone in this room, everyone in this country, owes this administration thanks for the fact that we are not only meeting this ultimate of threats on the field, but we are advancing on it, battling not only aggressively, but successfully. For the outcome of this battle may be nothing less than a chance to survive.
I now turn to my friend and colleague Tom Lantos for such remarks as he may wish to make.
REP. TOM LANTOS (D-CA): Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Let me first commend you for holding this very important hearing.
REP. HYDE: Of course.
REP. LANTOS: I also want to welcome the distinguished secretary who has contributed so much to our national security.
Mr. Chairman, Libya's decision to give up its nuclear weapons development program has made an unprecedented contribution to the security of the Middle East and North Africa, and to a broader region. The potentially destabilizing presence of nuclear weapons in Libya is no longer a threat. But perhaps more importantly, the documents and materials turned over by Tripoli to the United States brought to light the shadowy truth behind the massive international nuclear black market.
Using this evidence, we were finally able to prove that Pakistan was the key player in the international nuclear trade. Using this black market, the leadership of Iran, North Korea and other rogue regimes aggressively pursued their nuclear ambitions at the expense of international stability and American national security.
As a result of these profound and eye-opening developments, the administration recently announced seven proposals to begin the process of shutting down the nuclear black market. While I am pleased with this interest in nonproliferation policy, it is somewhat disconcerting that this important initiative is being launched three, four years into the administration's tenure, particularly since we have known from day one that nonproliferation policy had to be a top national security priority.
I'm also troubled somewhat that these latest proposals are somewhat vague and undefined, when clarity and action are required. Nevertheless, it is critical that we move forward aggressively on these and other nonproliferation initiatives, because we must encourage Iran and North Korea and Syria to follow Libya's path.
Mr. Chairman, the acceleration of the Iranian and North Korean nuclear programs over the last several years is appalling. They have received much of their equipment and technology from the same nuclear black market that supplied Libya with equipment and nuclear weapons designs. And all of this occurred despite the carefully-constructed system of deterrence put in place by the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty.
Mr. Chairman, how do we reform the incentives and the sanctions of the global nuclear nonproliferation regime so that they not only prevent new Irans and North Koreas, but also move these countries to roll back and to eliminate their nuclear programs?
First, the international community must immediately take stronger action against countries such as Iran that are abusing the right to peaceful nuclear energy, even when such action imposes some cost and lost investment opportunities. We must make it clear to such countries that they have forfeited the right to produce nuclear material for reactors, and they must be deprived of new nuclear- related trade, investment and trade agreements until they permanently and verifiably cease all suspect nuclear activities and dismantle any fuel production facilities.
To address the new nuclear black market, the United States and other countries must toughen their export control laws to sanction individuals, banks, corporations -- foreign and domestic -- for engaging in trade in nuclear-related equipment and materials. I'm gratified that the United States has proposed a United Nations Security Council resolution that asks for such measures.
Mr. Chairman, I'm putting the finishing touches on legislation that I will introduce shortly entitled Nuclear Black Market Elimination Act which updates U.S. laws to make the environment less permissive for people or companies who deal in the nuclear black market. My bill will empower the president to halt all U.S. business and financial transactions with any individual or company that engages in black market nuclear trade, and reports on foreign companies that undercut U.S. sanctions. This legislation will offer assistance to countries to improve their export controls and monitor nuclear trade activities of their citizens and corporations.
Mr. Chairman, we must expand the proliferation security initiative launched by the administration in order to increase its effectiveness. The administration needs to work overtime to negotiate a new treaty at the United Nations, the International Maritime Organization, to give the global community the ability to interdict shipments of suspected weapons of mass destruction in international waters or airspace.
We have pursued bilateral agreements, but we need to move beyond that level. The threat posed to the international community by the nuclear black market is clear. The United States must take every possible action before or our allies suffer the unimaginable consequences of letting the world's most dangerous weapons fall into the wrong hands. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
REP. HYDE: Let me commend to the people listening an op-ed article in today's San Francisco Chronicle on this subject, non- proliferation, written by Tom Lantos, an invaluable asset to this committee.
The chair will entertain opening statements -- hopefully brief -- and I understand Mr. Sherman has been waiting. Mr. Sherman?
REP. BRAD SHERMAN (D-CA): Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I sought out my position as the ranking member on the Nonproliferation Subcommittee, because I believe those are the most important issues that face our country.
I join you, Mr. Chairman, in praising the administration for an aggressive approach to protecting the United States from terrorism and proliferation. But the administration is using the wrong tactics against the wrong targets. There's been this discussion of weapons of mass destruction, but let's be clear it is nuclear weapons that dwarf everything else. And the programs of Iran and North Korea dwarf anything Saddam Hussein ever envisioned. We need to go after the right targets, and the tactics ought to be to use our very powerful economic situation, and to use it aggressively. Unfortunately, the administration has been all too willing to risk American lives and to use our very effective military; but utterly unwilling to use tactics that might inconvenience corporations or our trading partners.
As to Korea, North Korea, that government relies on subsidized energy and other aid from the Chinese regime. The Chinese regime would prefer that North Korea abandon its nuclear weapons program, but is unwilling to do anything very substantive -- except to hold talks -- and we will talk, and we will talk and we will talk until the "mushroom cloud" interrupts those talks, as Condoleezza Rice might say.
But we have been unwilling to hint to China that just maybe a slight portion of their $130 billion access to our markets might be imperilled for a day, as long as they insist on continuing to subsidize North Korea. We're willing to risk the lives of our troops, but not one container of tennis shoes.
Likewise, when it comes to Iran, the secretary of State sat where Secretary Bolton is sitting right now, and told this committee he would investigate the fact that we allow $150 million of non-energy imports into this country from Iran. And yet it seems we're unwilling to tell American gourmets that they might have to make do with Russian caviar. And the caviar from Iran keeps coming here, whether Iran develops nuclear weapons or not.
More economically significantly, Japan was going to lend and invest $2.8 billion in Iran. We objected. Then they sent 550 troops to Iraq. An administration, a public and a press absolutely preoccupied with Iraq, said, "Oh, isn't that wonderful? We're getting 550 troops." And as a result, it appears as if the United States has given the green light to send $2.8 billion to the nation who is most likely to be the culprit if a nuclear weapon is smuggled into the United States.
And Secretary Bolton, I will be wanting to ask you about the quotation in the Kyoto World News Service quoting you as saying, "I'm not concerned about the decision of Japan" to send $2.8 billion to this country that is developing nuclear weapons and, as I said, could very well smuggle them into American cities.
We can stop World Bank loans to Iran. We can stop this Japanese investment in Iran. We can enforce the 'I' in ILSA with the same effectiveness as we've enforced the 'L' in ILSA, the Iran-Libya Sanctions Act. Those sanctions were successful with Qhadafi. They can be successful with Teheran, but only if we are willing to risk our trade relationships with the same level of aggressiveness that we have risked American lives. And until corporate power can be enlisted and corralled and told that sometimes there's more important things than profits, sometimes there's more important things than trade, we will continue to go day by day, telling the world that America is safer because Saddam is not in power and having years go by while Iran and North Korea make further steps in developing nuclear weapons.
I yield back, and I thank the chairman.
REP. HYDE: The gentleman's time has expired. There are two votes pending. The committee will recess and resume following the second vote, if the members would return.
REP. HYDE: The committee will come to order.
The chair recognizes Ms. Ros-Lehtinen for an opening statement.
REP. ILEANA ROS-LEHTINEN (R-FL): Thank you so much, Mr. Chairman. I have a fuller version of my remarks that I'd like to include in the record. But I'd like to commend you, Mr. Chairman, and President Bush and his administration for their commitment and their dedication to rid the world of threats posed by dictators such as Libya's Qhadafi.
In looking to our future relations with Libya, however, is the U.S. going to require continued U.S. verification and compliance beyond the removal of current equipment and material?
Unfortunately, Iran's actions and statements indicate that the regime in Teheran has failed to heed the lessons of Iraq and Libya and the contrasting responses from the U.S. to the two. So beyond reporting the Iran case to the UN Security Council, what is the overarching U.S. strategy with respect to Iran's proliferation efforts?
The Russian minister of atomic energy continues to indicate that Russia may soon deliver thousands of fuel rods to the Iranian nuclear reactor, and we're interested in knowing what we are doing to ensure that the Russian Federation does not transfer this material.
I commend the administration's efforts at imposing penalties on entities and individuals engaged in this illicit activity. So I would appreciate hearing the undersecretary's views on the implementation of the Iran-Libya Sanctions Act that would deny Iran the funds to pay for this threatening activity.
And turning to Syria, given reports about efforts by the Syria regime to enlist the assistance of Australia to intercede with the U.S., does this indicate Syrian interest in following Libya's lead? And would we trust such an overture from the Syrian regime, given its decades of manipulation of U.S. policy?
And turning to one more rogue state just 90 miles from our shores, I wanted to ask Undersecretary Bolton about the problems with existing intelligence reporting on Cuba. And I noticed in your written testimony you addressed these issues. I wanted to know if the intelligence community is addressing them and is coordinating. Further, are Cuba's activities being evaluated within the context of the Cuba-Venezuela-Brazil access and within the growing operations of the Middle East terrorist groups that are operating in our own hemisphere?
And just in closing, Mr. Chairman, I'd like to underscore my support for President Bush's counterproliferation initiatives and for Mr. Bolton's efforts in promoting and implementing this critical component of the president's vision of a more secure America and a more secure world. And I'm interested in some of the details concerning the proposals to close loopholes in the NPT and about the UN Security Council resolution, given the negotiations between the three EU foreign ministers in Iran, negotiations which, in my opinion, undermined our efforts to sanction Iran for its breaches and non- compliance. And what steps are we taking to safeguard ourselves against countries clinging to the lowest common denominator rather than taking concrete steps to counter proliferation?
So Mr. Bolton, welcome again to our committee, and I thank you for your proud service to our country.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
REP. HYDE: Thank you. Mr. Ackerman.
REP. GARY ACKERMAN (D-NY): Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.
I would just like first to make a friendly amendment to the chairman's opening statement concerning the statement that Libya is the only nation that turned over and closed down its nuclear program absent regime change.
I believe that the apartheid regime in South Africa abandoned, dismantled and destroyed their program absent a regime change and prior to leaving office after much pressure from the international community.
That being said, Secretary Bolton, I'm truly astonished by Secretary Powell's announcement two weeks ago that the president would designate Pakistan as a major non-NATO ally. I've always recognized Pakistan's support for us in the war on terror; realize that President Musharraf has taken great risks to fight al Qaeda and the Taliban. But I think that the consistent waiver of our democracy-related sanctions against Pakistan and the provision of over $2 billion in assistance in the last two years, plus the president's request for another $700 million to Pakistan for Fiscal Year 2005, clearly already demonstrates our great support.
What is truly amazing is that, in addition to giving Pakistan a pass on democratic development, the administration is also giving them a pass on proliferating nuclear technology. It is clear to me, and I think it should be clear to anyone else, that Pakistan sold nuclear technology and probably nuclear weapons designs to terrorist states, even those in the evil axis.
Is it not the administration's view that one of the gravest threats to our national security is that terrorist organizations will acquire weapons of mass destruction to use against us? And wouldn't one of the chief sources of such technology be by state sponsors of terror? Isn't this why we went to war in Iraq?
But nary a word of condemnation has passed our collective lips when it comes to Pakistan's nuclear proliferation activities. And instead of getting to the bottom of A.Q. Khan's nefarious enterprise, the president proposes to make it easier for Pakistan to acquire sensitive U.S. technology. Hasn't Pakistan already demonstrated that they can't control their own technology, let alone ours?
This double standard with regard to Pakistan makes a mockery of our nonproliferation efforts around the world.
Mr. Chairman, I've introduced legislation that would change the way the president can designate major non-NATO allies by requiring that he certify that the designee is a democracy, and that the country participates with the United States in specified international agreements or arrangements that restrict the export of chemical, biological, nuclear and other weapons, delivery systems and related dual-use components. And I would urge our colleagues to take a look and see if they'd be willing to co-sponsor that bill.
I do have a series of questions, and I'll wait for the appropriate time and look forward to hearing from Secretary Bolton, who is to be praised for his exemplary public service.
REP. HYDE: Thank you, Mr. Ackerman. Without objection, Ms. Berkley's full statement will be made a part of the record. And I would suggest to my good friend Mr. Ackerman that South Africa involved a regime change -- Libya did not. That is the essential difference.
REP. ACKERMAN: If I might, Mr. Chairman, not wanting to bicker certainly with the chairman, but the dissolution of the nuclear program and destruction thereof took place before the regime actually did change, because the apartheid government didn't want to turn their nuclear people to "those" people that were going to run their own country.
REP. HYDE: Well, we'll take this up on the History Channel. (Laughter.)
REP. DELAHUNT: I can confirm Mr. Ackerman's version.
REP. HYDE: Oh, Mr. Delahunt is confirming Mr. Ackerman. What a surprise. (Laughter.)
REP. DELAHUNT: I hope it's a pleasant surprise.
REP. HYDE: Always. Always pleasant.
There being no further opening statements, we shall introduce our first witness. I'd like to welcome Undersecretary John Bolton, who was sworn in as undersecretary of State for arms control and international security on May 11th, 2001. Prior to his appointment he was senior vice president of the American Enterprise Institute, and his record includes service as assistant secretary for international organization affairs at the Department of State, assistant attorney general at the Department of Justice, and assistant administrator for program and policy coordination at the U.S. Agency for International Development. We're honored to have you appear before the committee today.Mr. Secretary, if you would proceed with a five-minute summary, the full statement that you have produced will be made a part of the record. Secretary Bolton?
UNDER SECRETARY BOLTON: Thank you very much. It's a pleasure to appear before the committee today. I'd like to start with a discussion of Libya, because it's rare in international affairs that you have a -- in effect -- a controlled experiment, the ability to look at the application of particular policies and to discern results from those policies in as clear a fashion as we've recently seen with Libya.
Libya has made a strategic decision that its pursuit of nuclear weapons, chemical weapons and other weapons of mass destruction over the years in fact had made it less secure, not more secure. And the Libyan government concluded that its long-term future was going to depend on its renunciation of its pursuit of weapons of mass destruction and long-range ballistic missiles, and made a cold national interest calculation, but it made a calculation that came to the right conclusion, and that was the renunciation of these programs.
Last year, shortly before the commencement of hostilities in Iraq, the government of Libya approached the government of the United Kingdom to ask about the possibility of pursuing this approach. That was the first major occasion on which the Libyans entered into discussion with us on that subject, with a seriousness not previously attendant to other conversations they had had.
The second major development last year occurred shortly after the diversion of the ship, the BBC China, which was carrying nuclear centrifuge equipment bound for Tripoli. Up until that time, the Libyan government had not engaged in a serious conversation about the importance of verifying exactly what their WMD programs involved. But when it became apparent to the government of Libya that that ship was not going to dock, and that that equipment was not going to be offloaded, discussions on what became a very extensive series of inspections and visits by intelligence officials from the governments of the United Kingdom and the United States proceeded.
And the third major event in the sequence last years was the resolution of the final issues before the announcements by the governments of the U.K., the U.S. and Libya on December the 19th -- discussions that speeded up dramatically after Saddam Hussein was captured in Iraq. So the chronology is very clear, I think. First the pending onset of hostilities in Iraq brought the Libyans to the table. Second, the diversion and offloading of the equipment from the BBC China brought the necessary transparency to the Libyan programs. And, third, the capture of Saddam Hussein brought the discussions to fruition.
I think that the actions by the government of Libya provide a very clear example to other rogue states, like North Korea and Iran, about how a country can give up its weapons of mass destruction without regime change in a manner that gives international confidence that they are serious about what they are doing.
Now, the course of the events in Libya relate very closely to two other major accomplishments. The first was the work of American and other intelligence agencies in the careful observation over the years of the A.Q. Khan network, something that engaged officials of the Bush administration at the very highest level on a real-time basis again and again and again. The work of our intelligence agencies that President Bush laid out in quite unprecedented detail I think in his recent speech at the National Defense University, is a triumph of American intelligence and of some of our close allies, reflecting great ingenuity on the part of the intelligence community and great bravery at times.
The work that is going on to continue the unraveling of the Khan network and learning additional information is proceeding even as we speak -- obviously a matter of great sensitivity. But I think that the impact of what the administration and the United Kingdom and others have done to the Khan network will have a dramatic impact on the international black market and WMD trafficking. It certainly will not resolve the problem entirely -- the problem is too grave, too deep, too widespread. But I think that it shows that with diligence and with effort and with persistence we have an outstanding clandestine capability to use in this struggle.
The success in Libya also relates directly to the president's proliferation security initiative announced last year in May in Krakow, Poland. It was in fact through the use of the recently developed PSI channels, and using long-standing liaison relationships, that we were able to involve the governments of Italy, Germany and the United Kingdom for the successful diversion of that ship. And it really reflects the achievement of several PSI goals: first, the clear interdiction of a WMD-related shipment; but, second, the broader political implications that we hope will flow from PSI at work, the dissuasion effect that it manifestly had on the government of Libya. And we hope the deterrent effect that this very dramatic interdiction will have on the calculations of other rogue states that are pursuing weapons of mass destruction.
So, as I say, the example of Libya really gives us a dramatic contrast to the behavior of two other rogue states in particular, Iran and the DPRK, who at this point manifestly have not made the strategic decision to give up their pursuit of weapons of mass destruction.
And in my testimony I lay out in some detail in the case of Iran the program of denial and deception that the Iranians have pursued over the years, all of which is now fully documented -- not just by our say-so, but in the reports of the International Atomic Energy Agency. We continue to pursue diplomatic efforts on Iran with the Europeans, with the Russians, with the Japanese, as we continue to pursue in the case of North Korea the six-party talks hosted by China. This is part of an effort by President Bush to seek a multilateral peaceful diplomatic solution to the North Koreans' unrelenting pursuit of a nuclear weapons capability, and is a diplomatic initiative that we continue even as we speak here today.
But in addition to the pursuit of the particular programs of rogue states -- Syria, Cuba, others -- the president in his speech at the National Defense University laid out a broader framework that we need to pursue, building on some of his existing initiatives, and proposing additions as well. He proposed expanding the Proliferation Security Initiative, even though it's less than a year go, to go beyond interdiction and seek the disruption of the WMD financial networks, their laboratories, their production facilities -- in addition simply to stopping shipments.
He proposed the expansion of the global partnership against the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and WMD-related materials that the G-8 leaders adopted Kananaskis in Canada two years ago to bring in additional donors and to expand the focus of that program beyond the former Soviet Union, to pick up the problem of weapons scientists in countries like Libya and Iraq.
The president proposed closing the grievous loopholes in the nuclear nonproliferation regime to prevent technologies of enrichment, uranium enrichment and plutonium reprocessing and other sophisticated technologies from getting into the hands of countries that would not use them for peaceful purposes. He proposed far- reaching reforms in IAEA governance to strengthen the hand of the IAEA in its work in the NPT regime. And he proposed in his NDU speech concluding the work that he had begun in his speech to the General Assembly last fall to get an effective Security Council resolution to require member governments to increase the efficacy of their own national controls against trafficking in WMD.
So this is in fact a very ambitious agenda. It's one that requires broad support here in the Congress, and certainly we seek that support, and I'm happy to address your questions, Mr. Chairman, or the questions of anyone on the committee.
REP. HYDE: Thank you very much, Mr. Secretary. Mr. Ackerman?
REP. ACKERMAN: Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. Mr. Secretary, has the president made a determination of whether or not the Symington or Glenn sanctions under the Arms Export Control Act apply for the government of Pakistan generally, whether it applies to specific officials of the government of Pakistan, or entities in Pakistan?
UNDER SECRETARY BOLTON: In connection with what transactions, congressman?
REP. ACKERMAN: With A.Q. Khan.
UNDER SECRETARY BOLTON: The decision about the policies the government of Pakistan is pursuing on A.Q. Khan is one that we have been considering very carefully, and I would say, Mr. Ackerman, to go back to your opening statement, this turns on a fundamental evaluation as to who in Pakistan was responsible for A.Q. Khan's activities. Based on the information we have now, we believe that the proliferation activities that Mr. Khan confessed to recently -- his activities in Libya, in Iran and North Korea, and perhaps elsewhere -- were activities that he was carrying on without the approval of the top levels of the government of Pakistan. That is the position that President Musharraf has taken, and we have no evidence to the contrary. I don't --
REP. ACKERMAN: Mr. Secretary --
UNDER SECRETARY BOLTON: I don't -- maybe I can just finish, because I think it's important to have the factual record out here as we know it. I don't have any doubt that there were officials in the employ of the government of Pakistan -- perhaps at Khan Research Laboratories, perhaps in the military -- who participated in Khan's network and probably enriched themselves just as Khan himself did. But the issue is the extent to which, if at all, the top levels of the government of Pakistan were involved in his activities. And, as I say, we have no evidence to that effect. And that is why, if I may say so, Khan's activities are more frightening than if they had been backed by the government, because it shows that independent of state sponsorship or approval, element of this black market in weapons of mass destruction can nonetheless be extraordinarily successful.
REP. ACKERMAN: Well, I thank you for answering your question. I'll repeat my question. But, in response to your answer, I would just like to say you question whether or not government officials in Pakistan were complicit in the actions of A.Q. Khan or the laboratory. It seems to even the most casual -- or should -- most casual of observers that you cannot use the military transport plans of Pakistan to deliver that kind of materiel and program to North Korea and others without the implicit support of the army of Pakistan. And it seems to me that we know the name of the guy who was the head of the army of Pakistan then.
I can understand the reluctance in this issue, which, you know, we're damned if we do and damned if we don't. We want to make sure that we have a government and an administration in Pakistan which is supportive of us and our efforts against terrorists and terrorism, and we do right now, in now President Musharraf, and we don't want to do anything that destabilizes him.
On the other hand, it seems to me that the good work which the chairman appropriately cites, and you have reiterated, and I have previously called the whipping boy theory -- you grab Iraq by the collar and go "whack, whack, whack," and turn to some other regimes and say, "Let that be a lesson to you." And Libya has fallen into the camp of "Oops, we don't want to go through that." But the good work that that has produced, seems to me, gets completely wiped out by saying we will turn a blind eye to anybody who has or does these kinds of things and supplies this -- this program, weapons, to rogue states or nations. My question --
UNDER SECRETARY BOLTON: Well, that might be the case --
REP. ACKERMAN: -- let me just -- let me just repeat my question, in case you missed it, the question was, has the president made a determination of whether Symington or Glenn, applied to Pakistan in general, officials or entities thereof?
UNDER SECRETARY BOLTON: At -- with respect to the Khan transactions, the answer to that is no. And at this point, the evidence is not there to support it. You know, you have to --
REP. ACKERMAN: When can we expect --
UNDER SECRETARY BOLTON: You have --
REP. ACKERMAN: -- that such a determination to be made?
UNDER SECRETARY BOLTON: Well, we are continuing to seek information about exactly what Khan's activities were over time --
REP. ACKERMAN: Do you think that -- do you think that the --
UNDER SECRETARY BOLTON: -- because it's extremely important --
REP. ACKERMAN: -- designation of Pakistan as a major non-NATO ally should wait until we've made that determination?
UNDER SECRETARY BOLTON: No, because I think that determination was based on other factors. I mean, we have been saying to the Pakistanis for quite some time that --
REP. ACKERMAN: So, let me just --
UNDER SECRETARY BOLTON: Can I finish my answer this time? We believe --
REP. ACKERMAN: Yeah, but try my question.
UNDER SECRETARY BOLTON: Okay. I did answer your question. We believe that it's very important in the case of Pakistan or others to act on the basis of what we know to be the case. You can make assumptions about the use of military aircraft in Pakistan. Those assumptions at some point have to be grounded in facts. And the understanding we have is that Khan research laboratories had extraordinary autonomy and quite likely could use military aircraft for purposes that others in the military would not necessarily know the purpose of because of compartmentation of the information -- (inaudible) --
REP. ACKERMAN: I think --
UNDER SECRETARY BOLTON: If we had --
REP. ACKERMAN: I think --
UNDER SECRETARY BOLTON: Excuse me -- may I just finish, because I think this is important. If we had information --
REP. ACKERMAN: Would the chairman allow us one more minute so that we could complete this thought?
REP. HYDE: Yes, I -- without objection.
UNDER SECRETARY BOLTON: If we had information about complicity of top levels of the government of Pakistan, we would act on it. At this point, there's no such information.
REP. ACKERMAN: So, with charges out there, with allegations made, with the international community watching this very carefully, with those who we want to put on notice that we will not tolerate nuclear programs, with the verdict and the jury still out on whether or not Pakistan and entities thereof were complicit in this, and prior to our knowledge, as you say, of all of the facts being on the table as yet as to whether or not we are going to impose sanctions on Pakistan, under either Symington or Glenn, the president nonetheless should declare them a major non-NATO ally absent the facts?
UNDER SECRETARY BOLTON: I think -- I think it's entirely appropriate to declare Pakistan a major non-NATO ally for reasons unrelated to this issue.
And I just want to say this one more time -- and I can't say anything more in an open session -- we have watched the Khan network carefully. It has not escaped us that Khan is a Pakistani, and we have watched his actions inside Pakistan carefully as well. We have no information that contradicts what President Musharraf has assured us, and that is that the top levels of the government of Pakistan are not implicated in these transactions.
Now, one of the things that President Musharraf made clear was that his pardon of Khan was conditional. It was conditional on two things. First, that all of Khan's proliferation activities stop. And second, that he cooperate fully with the government of Pakistan in its ongoing investigation. We believe those conditions are currently being met.
REP. ACKERMAN: I'll -- I'll wait until the second round, Mr Chairman.
REP. HYDE: Mr. Smith.
REP. CHRIS SMITH (R-NJ: Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. And I want to welcome Undersecretary John Bolton to the committee again, and say that -- how much I respect him personally and professionally. I remember we worked so well together when he was chairman of the International Organization -- or assistant secretary of the International Organizations Committee -- or department over at the bureau -- (inaudible) -- and did an outstanding job in that -- in that capacity.
I apologize for being late, Mr. Chairman. I was at that meeting on anti-Semitism at the Holocaust museum. We're working on plans for the Berlin conference, and so I did not get to hear your -- your testimony, Mr. Secretary.
I do have one question, and again, coming in late, I'm not sure if this may have been asked -- but with regards to China, the People's Republic of China, we know that they have been involved with Iran, with North Korea to some extent, and perhaps you might want to speak to that, but also how China itself may represent a very significant threat in the area of -- of chemical, biological and nuclear. I know we do everything humanly possible to try to mitigate that threat, and certainly dialogue is important. Obviously, there were concerns just recently with the elections in Taiwan, the ever-present saber-rattling that we see in Beijing vis-a-vis Taiwan.
Over the last 10 years, if I'm not mistaken, there has been a very significant technology transfer from the United States, some of it wittingly, some of it unwittingly, and I wonder if you might qualitatively and quantitatively talk about the issue of China. Do they represent a threat? We know that there has been, as Secretary Powell said most recently talking about the human rights situation, a significant deterioration when it comes to those rights. And, you know, I've spoken to people like Wei Jingsheng and others who continue to admonish those of us in the West and in other countries -- whose father is, as you know, the father of the air force in China, and the democracy (wall ?) leader being what he is, when he speaks we ought to listen, that they have designs, long-range, inter-mediate range.
I read Steven Mosher's book called "Hegemon", talking about how we so often misconstrue what their long-term prospects are. They go back, and still has scores to settle that go back to the Opium Wars. And there is a mind set that we don't fully understand our -- and it could play out in a disastrous way when you talk about weapons of mass destruction and the like.
So, if -- you might want to touch on China.
UNDER SECRETARY BOLTON: Thank you very much. The -- the record that China has developed in the past several years I think is mixed. I think they have done certain things, such as promulgate export control regulations, although they're not as complete as we feel they should be. They have taken some steps to enforce those regulations, although not as completely as they should. They have cooperated with us in some cases in stopping the transshipment of WMD related materials and dual-use chemicals, although not as frequently as we would like. And we would continued to discuss in the strategic dialogue that President Bush and President Jiang Zemin agreed to at Crawford some time ago, to -- to encourage the Chinese to -- to do more in the field of stopping their own outward proliferation.
Where there is sufficient evidence for purposes of the administration -- of the sanctions laws that Congress has passed, or the executive order that the president has under his authority -- we have imposed sanctions on China. We have imposed sanctions that have both political and economic impact on China, and we will continue to enforce those laws vigorously.
I don't have a breakdown with me of sanctions that we've imposed on China, but I would say that if you look at the range of activity in the sanctions area by this administration over its time in office so far, the average number of sanctions we have imposed on a global basis, many of which involve China, has been about 32 times a year during the years 2002 and 2003, compared to the average per year during the Clinton administration, which is about eight times a year. So, our use of sanctions overall has increased by about 400 percent. A variety of reasons for that, and as I say, not all of that applies in China.
But I do want to say, since Mr. Sherman raised the point earlier, that there's no reluctance to enforce the law. There's no reluctance whatever to use the authority that we have both from statutes Congress has enacted and from the president's own executive order, to impose sanctions where the information that we have requires us to do so.
So, I think with China, I think there are pluses and minuses. I think the risk of outward proliferation from China is unfortunate not only in its own right because it is a serious problem, but because it encourages others that -- that if China can continue to engage in outward proliferation, so can they. So, that's one reason why our efforts with China have the priority that they do -- not simply because of the risk that China's own WMD-related exports play, but because of the impact that their activities have on others.
REP. HYDE: Mr. Sherman.
REP. BRAD SHERMAN (D-CA): Thank you. Condoleezza Rice told us that the first sign that an enemy has a nuclear weapon could be a mushroom cloud, or if that mushroom cloud occurs, it probably will be from a nuclear weapon from Iran or North Korea. A big chunk of the blame has got to go to the American people and the American press, who have been so obsessed with Iraq, at the invitation of the administration, that they failed to notice that Iran and North Korea are the countries that are hostile to us that are developing nuclear weapons. And so an administration desperate for reelection will take 550 soldiers from Japan, which provide the veneer of international support and credibility for our relations in Iraq, which is the preoccupation of the electorate, and give the green light to $2.8 billion going from Japan to Iran.
Mr. Secretary -- and I alluded to this in my opening statement, you are quoted as -- under the headline of "Washington untroubled by Teheran-Tokyo oil contract" of saying you're just not concerned with this $2.8 billion. Let me give you a chance to express what concerns you have. Is it just find that $2.8 billion is going from Japan to a government that would smuggle nuclear weapons into our cities if they thought they could get away with it?
UNDER SECRETARY BOLTON: Could I first address the point about whether we're desperate for reelection? I really -- I don't -- you know -- I don't --
REP. SHERMAN: But perhaps -- why -- well, what else would explain the green light?
UNDER SECRETARY BOLTON: -- engage in politics at the State Department.
REP. SHERMAN: Maybe you're not desperate for reelection, but why the green light to $2.8 billion going from Japan to Iran?
UNDER SECRETARY BOLTON: I think I can say with a high degree of confidence that our policies at the State Department are not directed with partisan or political objectives in mind. I think --
REP. SHERMAN: You know, the prior administration rolled over on all this stuff, too. You're in good company.
UNDER SECRETARY BOLTON: Okay. To come to your question. To come to your question.
REP. SHERMAN: (Inaudible) --
REP. HYDE: Would the gentleman yield for a brief second?
REP. SHERMAN: Yes.
REP. HYDE: Does the gentleman agree that an appropriate amount of anthrax could kill as many people as a nuclear bomb?
REP. SHERMAN: I think the capacity to deploy such anthrax on a practical basis is nil. The use of anthrax has killed perhaps a dozen people. The use of nuclear weapons has killed hundreds of thousands. And I do not see anthrax as anywhere close to the risk -- it is a risk -- I mean, in terms of the likelihood of it killing a hundred people, or a thousand people, it could happen.
REP. HYDE: A couple of envelopes get delivered up here on the Hill and everything shuts downs.
REP. SHERMAN: Shutting down the Congress is one thing, eliminating a city from the face of the earth is something else. We have had to endure one, let's hope we don't have to endure the other and weigh the difference between the two.
REP. HYDE: We could go on and on, but thank you for yielding.
UNDER SECRETARY BOLTON: Now, the answer to --
REP. SHERMAN: So -- so let me stipulate -- you stated that the administration believes in enforcing the law, but both you and your predecessors have never used ILSA to impose sanctions -- not on Total (sp), which is investing in Iran now, not on the Japanese, where, you wouldn't even have to impose them, you would just have to express disapproval and they would pull back. The attitude has been shovel the money to Iran and bomb Iraq.
UNDER SECRETARY BOLTON: Well, I don't agree with that, obviously. I would say that the -- that the policy on ILSA enforcement has been essentially continuous between the Clinton and Bush administrations.
Now, on the subject of Japan -- the transaction that you're referring to involves the Azadegan oil field in Iran, and the administration I think had made it clear privately to the government of Japan and it made it clear publicly that it opposed the Azadegan oil deal and had urged the government of Japan not to proceed with it. The government of Japan did decide to proceed with it, and in the context of the announcement of that decision, I said in Tokyo that although we had made our position on the deal clear, that I was confident that the Japanese position on nonproliferation was not at risk, despite that deal. And I believe that --
REP. SHERMAN: Well, wait a minute. Why would anybody in Iran care about a Japanese position on proliferation if they say, "Here's the $2.8 billion and here's a letter urging you not to develop a nuclear weapon," other than creating excessive laughter in Teheran, what would that note accomplish? The $2.8 billion is on its way, and it's on its way not because Japan overrid strong administrative opposition, because you smiled, you winked, you said you weren't concerned. And we know and you know that Japan would not go forward with this deal if you had raised a high level of opposition.
UNDER SECRETARY BOLTON: Well, we did raise a high level of opposition. And it's not --
REP. SHERMAN: And then they sent their 550 soldiers and then you lowered your level of opposition.
UNDER SECRETARY BOLTON: Absolutely not true. I think the treatment, as you yourself have said, of the Japanese agreement in principle on Azadegan is consistent with treatment of European firms that announced deals in Iran during the late 1990s.
The point that I was making and the point that I think has been borne out at the subsequent meeting of the IAEA board of governors is that Japan, along with Canada and Australia, together with the United States, took the firmest positions against the activities in the nuclear field that --
REP. SHERMAN: Oh, so we get a strongly-worded letter along with the $2.8 billion.
UNDER SECRETARY BOLTON: You know, I take it, Congressman, that the efforts that we're making multilaterally in the IAEA board of governors to refer the Iranian nuclear weapons program to the United Nations Security Council are efforts that you support.
REP. SHERMAN: I'm not sure that we've officially asked for such a referral.
UNDER SECRETARY BOLTON: Yes, we have.
REP. SHERMAN: And it is fine that you're willing to do everything possible to stop Iran from having nuclear weapons as long as it doesn't inconvenience a single corporation.
UNDER SECRETARY BOLTON: No, no. I really take issue with that. I mean, I think it's important here we talk about what we're doing in the IAEA, because the administration, as you know, is frequently accused of being unilateralist. And here's a case ---
REP. SHERMAN: Oh, no, no, no.
REP. ROS-LEHTINEN: Mr. Bolton and Mr. Sherman, we're already past two minutes, but --
UNDER SECRETARY BOLTON: -- where we are working in the IAEA --
REP. ROS-LEHTINEN: -- we'll wrap up the exchange.
UNDER SECRETARY BOLTON: We are working in the IAEA. We need the support. We need the diplomatic support of Japan and others. And I hope you would join with us in encouraging the Japanese to continue to support these multilateral efforts.
REP. SHERMAN: I would encourage --
REP. ROS-LEHTINEN: Thank you very much. Thank you, Mr. Sherman. Mr. Weller.
REP. JERRY WELLER (R-IL): Thank you, Madam Chairman.
Mr. Secretary, it's nice to have you with us today. Thank you for appearing before our committee.
I'd like to just focus my question on the subject matter, the purpose of our hearing, particularly on the president's non- proliferation agenda. And I'd like -- I came into this late, so I apologize if some of these questions have been asked before. But I'd like to hear from you a greater elaboration on the agenda that the president outlined in his February 11th speech. Are there some points that you haven't had an opportunity to make that you'd want to share with the committee this afternoon?
UNDER SECRETARY BOLTON: Well, I think one of the most far-reaching things that the president proposed is a series of measures to make sure that advanced technology, particularly uranium enrichment and plutonium reprocessing technology, are not disseminated in the world more widely than they exist already.
The difficulty that we face under the existing nonproliferation regime is that countries can be in strict compliance with their obligations under the Non-Proliferation Treaty, and yet, in a perfectly legitimate fashion, engage in nuclear fuel-cycle work that brings them extremely close to a capacity to achieve a weaponized status. And when you combine these legitimate activities, which can be conducted in the open with disclosure to the IAEA, with the prospect of clandestine weaponization work, it's clear that the framework that we're operating under is fundamentally subject to being exploited by countries like Iran as a good example of that.
So what the president is proposing and which we're working on particularly in advance of the G-8 summit at Sea Island this June is to achieve a broad international consensus, using the Nuclear Suppliers Group and other mechanisms, to try and find ways to fix the loopholes that exist in the nonproliferation regime.
If we were doing the atoms-for-peace program over again, if we had the benefit 50 years ago of the hindsight that we have now, I think we would have structured the program in a fundamentally different way so that the benefits, the civil peaceful benefits of nuclear power, could have been achieved without the attendant risks of proliferation of weapons capabilities that we face.
And I think that, just as the original atoms-for-peace concept had a strong motivation that sought to use the benefits of nuclear energy while denying the weapons aspect of it to problematic countries, we need to refine that and correct the problems in it.
And I don't expect that it's anything that will be resolved by the time of the G-8 summit or even in a few months or a year. This is going to be a long-term effort. I think it's important, even though it sounds like a very technical issue, getting into maybe not rocket science, but at least nuclear physics, it is nonetheless politically the highest priority for the United States and all of us that want to be free from the risk of continuing nuclear proliferation.
So I think it's really a proposal of great vision, far-reaching implications, and it's going to require a lot of work. And I think having bipartisan support in Congress for the initiative is going to be important in succeeding in our diplomatic efforts as well.
REP. WELLER: Mr. Secretary, one of the specific initiatives the president proposed was disqualifying someone from serving on the board of the IAEA if their country is under investigation by that very board. I was wondering, can you elaborate on how that proposal would work? What's the trigger to, you know, trigger such a disqualification? And what would the steps be necessary to make that proposal work?
UNDER SECRETARY BOLTON: Well, one of the anomalies you face in the UN system is the way countries get elected to different bodies. And many people have commented, for example, on the irony of Cuba serving on the UN Human Rights Commission or, in the case of the IAEA's board of governors last year, Iran, which was the subject of very intense debates for its flat-out violations of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty, served on the board of governors.
And the effort that we're trying to make is to create agreement that it would be a disqualification, in effect, for a country that's under scrutiny to serve as a judge in its own case. We're in discussion now with our G-8 partners and with others in the IAEA as to how to define those criteria and make it operational, perhaps by changes in the rules of procedure the board of governors of the IAEA and the like.
I think there's broad agreement with the concept that a country under investigation should not serve in a capacity such as Iran was doing. I think it's going to require some work inside the UN system to overturn the expectation that you can sit in judgment on your own programs. But I think it's an important innovation that the president has proposed and one that we're working on quite hard at the moment.
REP. ROS-LEHTINEN: Thank you, Mr. Weller.
REP. WELLER: Thank you.
REP. ROS-LEHTINEN: Mr. Delahunt.
REP. WILLIAM DELAHUNT (D-MA): Yes. Mr. Bolton, I think we're all concerned about Mr. Khan, A.Q. Khan. I think we could probably agree that when we speak of evil, this is an evil individual. I think you would agree with that.
UNDER SECRETARY BOLTON: I agree with that.
REP. DELAHUNT: And I think some of the questions that have been posed regarding our awareness of what Mr. Khan was doing haven't been really fully answered.
You indicated in earlier testimony today that there was no evidence to indicate that Mr. Khan had any involvement with top officials of the Pakistani government. Is that correct?
UNDER SECRETARY BOLTON: No, what I said was that there is no evidence that the top officials of the Pakistani government were complicit in or approved his proliferation activities.
REP. DELAHUNT: Complicit in or approved. Then what are we -- let me use the word "aware." Would you also include in that statement that they were unaware of those activities?
UNDER SECRETARY BOLTON: Well, I think it's significant that President Musharraf fired Khan as head of the Khan Research Laboratory in the year 2000. Now, I think it's also --
REP. DELAHUNT: Could you answer my question, please?
UNDER SECRETARY BOLTON: I think --
REP. DELAHUNT: Would you agree with me? I don't think we have a debate.
UNDER SECRETARY BOLTON: At some point, I think that's clear, right.
REP. DELAHUNT: Okay.
UNDER SECRETARY BOLTON: And that's why they acted.
REP. DELAHUNT: Do you think that the Pakistani government acted -- why do you think that the Pakistani government acted as they did?
UNDER SECRETARY BOLTON: I think it was a very difficult question for President Musharraf, in the face of the internal political dynamic in Pakistan, which has resulted in the past few months in two assassination attempts against him --
REP. DELAHUNT: So it was -- I don't mean to be rude, but I am going to interrupt you simply because I want to get to some other questions.
UNDER SECRETARY BOLTON: Okay, but let me just finish this one answer.
REP. ROS-LEHTINEN: If the gentleman would yield just for a second; I'm not going to take away from your time, Mr. Delahunt. But I would like to tell the members that, of course, they're free to pursue their line of questioning regarding Pakistan or any line of questioning, but I would like to point out that both the chairman and the ranking member have had classified briefings on this subject and that perhaps, if they could contact the chairman and the ranking member or we could hold another classified hearing on this topic, because I know it goes further than what Mr. Bolton is prepared to say in this open hearing. But please continue, Mr. Delahunt.
REP. DELAHUNT: I thank the chairlady for the indulgence, and I certainly don't intend to ask anything that would evoke a classified response.
UNDER SECRETARY BOLTON: Well, I wouldn't give a classified response. But I think the point is, it's difficult to discuss this in an unclassified context. But I think we can say that, given Khan's status as an icon in Pakistan -- the father of the nuclear weapons program -- and given the internal dynamic in Pakistan over the past several years, that it's not possible -- had not been possible to act with the complete freedom that the government might have wanted to act --
REP. DELAHUNT: Okay, if --
UNDER SECRETARY BOLTON: -- and that, in fact -- just one more sentence -- in fact, it was the exposure of the Iranian nuclear weapons program, the continuing exposure of the Iranian nuclear weapons program, and Qhadafi's decision to forswear all of his WMD programs that brought us to the point that it was possible for Musharraf to take the actions that he did, which we have welcomed.
REP. DELAHUNT: He had a political problem. He could have been aware, but he had a political problem.
UNDER SECRETARY BOLTON: That's correct.
REP. DELAHUNT: Okay, because there was a CIA assessment that was reported, again, in a recent New York Times story that the most active exchange of nuclear missile technology between Pakistan and North Korea occurred between 1998 and 2002. So, again -- and I think that is coterminious with President Musharraf, then-General Musharraf's role as the head of the military.
UNDER SECRETARY BOLTON: Well, you know, I'm in a difficult position because I'm not going to comment on newspaper reports about intelligence assessments, particularly when the newspaper report is wrong. It's very difficult to get into it in public session. But there is no view on our part that there was a transfer of the kind described in that article. There's no exchange of the kind described in that article.
REP. DELAHUNT: Let me ask you this. You say there's no evidence out there. What steps has the administration taken to develop whatever evidence may be available? Have we had access to Mr. Khan?
UNDER SECRETARY BOLTON: There are two broad categories, in answer to your question. The first is that there are extensive efforts underway now in a variety of places, not just Pakistan, to expand the body of information we have on the Khan network.
And second, we have been very plain with the government of Pakistan that we want full cooperation in its ongoing investigation of the Khan network. We believe we have that cooperation as of now. We believe that the government of Pakistan is complying --
REP. DELAHUNT: Let me restate the question. Have we had access to Mr. Khan?
UNDER SECRETARY BOLTON: We have not asked for access to Mr. Khan, nor do we think we should.
REP. DELAHUNT: Why wouldn't we think we should?
UNDER SECRETARY BOLTON: Because we are satisfied for now that the government of Pakistan is complying with the commitments they've made to us about the pursuit of the investigation into Khan's activities and the activities of the Khan network. We're not sovereign in Pakistan.
REP. DELAHUNT: I understand that. We're not sovereign anywhere but in the boundaries of the United States. I respect that. But also, we do have leverage with Pakistan.
UNDER SECRETARY BOLTON: And I can assure you -- I don't want there to be any misunderstanding -- precisely the concerns and the desire to have information of the kind you're articulating have been conveyed very clearly to the government.
REP. ROS-LEHTINEN: Thank you very much, Mr. Delahunt. Ms. McCollum.
REP. BETTY MCCOLLUM (D-MN): Thank you, Madam Chair.
After September 11th, President Bush clearly stated his top priority was to prevent proliferation of chemical, biological and nuclear weapons to terrorist groups, rogue nations who sponsor terrorism, such as North Korea, Iran and Libya.
The threat of WMD proliferation led to the Bush doctrine of preemptive war to justify the U.S. military invasion and overthrow of the Iraqi regime. As we know it, no weapons of mass destruction have been found.
Meanwhile, one month after September 11th, President Bush lifted nuclear related sanctions against Pakistan and President Musharraf's government because it became a vital ally of the United States on the war on terrorism. We know now that nuclear transfers to North Korea and Pakistan military cargo flights took place as late as 2002. The ship that you spoke of in your testimony in the fall of 2003 in fact was industrial equipment for nuclear weapons from Pakistan that was being sent to Libya. Yet you make the statement that no high level officials knew of this transfer or Mr. Khan's profits of over $100 million from Libya possibly alone.
The U.S. invaded Iraq to prevent the spread of mass weapons of destruction. But Pakistan is the world's worst proliferator, and has been congratulated to this administration by its efforts. I'm not comforted, and the American people should not feel comforted. In fact, February 5th, 2004, the New York Times reported General Musharraf saying, quote, "Pakistan would hand over all documents from its investigation to the international nuclear inspectors. It would not order an independent investigation into the Pakistani army's role of proliferation, calling the idea, quote, "rubbish." He said he would never allow the United Nations supervision of Pakistan's nuclear weapons. This Sunday on television General Musharraf appeared unconcerned about the consequences of Pakistan's nuclear transfer saying, quote, "If I handed over a missile or a bomb to any extremist, believe me he can do nothing about it. He could not explode it" -- end of quote.
Secretary Bolton, in light of Pakistan's expansive and dangerous network of nuclear proliferation to Iran, North Korea and Libya, should the Bush administration make billions of dollars of future U.S. assistance to the Pakistani government conditional on President Musharraf coming out of the nuclear shadow and entering the community of responsible nations by signing the Non-Proliferation Treaty? Is the Bush administration going to continue to work to protect America's security and vital interests in nuclear proliferation by holding Pakistan accountable? Or is the administration comfortable in accepting President Musharraf's assurances that Pakistan alone can end its proliferation problem, and his believe that even if terrorists were to acquire nuclear weapons they would not be sophisticated enough to use them?
And, Mr. Bolton, I have in front of me a copy from the New Republic, dated March 27th, 2004, the title of it is "Daddy's Girl." And basically this article states that Khan's daughter has information in her possession that would be very embarrassing to the Pakistani government, because it implicates very high level officials. You say you are not aware of any information that might implicate officials, but I would think Mr. Khan's daughter would be a fairly credible source. Can you comment?
UNDER SECRETARY BOLTON: I'm not going to comment on the last in public. You said in the midst of your statement that we lifted sanctions on Pakistan shortly after September 11th -- that's true. And you're aware of course that we lifted the sanctions on India at the same time.
REP. MCCOLLUM: Yes, I am, but India was not involved in selling nuclear weapons technology.
UNDER SECRETARY BOLTON: No, but the sanctions -- well, what is your evidence that the government of Pakistan was involved in selling nuclear weapons technology?
REP. ROS-LEHTINEN: Can't tell you in open session.
UNDER SECRETARY BOLTON: Okay, well, let's go into closed session.
REP. MCCOLLUM: No, every -- maybe we could get --
UNDER SECRETARY BOLTON: You know, if you -- you make allegations and that's fine -- I'm happy to discuss them.
REP. MCCOLLUM: I thought I lived in a democracy.
UNDER SECRETARY BOLTON: But we're trying -- we're trying -- we're trying to base the relationship on evidence. Let me ask another question.
REP. ROS-LEHTINEN: Will the gentle woman yield?
REP. MCCOLLUM: Madam Chair?
REP. ROS-LEHTINEN: Yes?
REP. MCCOLLUM: I asked questions. I have an election certificate. I would like some answers, and I do not wish to be grilled by Mr. Bolton.
UNDER SECRETARY BOLTON: Well, I think --
REP. MCCOLLUM: He is here to testify in front of this committee. I have every right with the oath of office I took to ask questions, and I asked him respectfully, and I would respectfully ask for answers.
REP. ROS-LEHTINEN: Thank you, Ms. McCollum.
UNDER SECRETARY BOLTON: The point that I made before was that we have no evidence that President Musharraf and the top officials of the government of Pakistan are complicit in Khan's activities.
Now, if there is evidence that you have that we don't have, I'd be delighted to receive it. We have looked for it very carefully. This is an extraordinarily serious matter. So if there's evidence that we don't have, we're pleased to receive it.
REP. ROS-LEHTINEN: Thank you. Ms. Lee?
REP. LEE: Thank you, Madam Chair. Mr. Secretary, I'm going to try to ask you questions that can be answered in open session. Basically I believe that the United States should lead by example. I know many in our country believe that. Yet I'm concerned that we continue to develop nuclear weapons, and yet we stand for non- proliferation. How do we convince other nations that they should not develop nuclear weapons or should destroy nuclear weapons when in fact we're on the direct opposite track?
I guess you haven't talked much about our own nonproliferation efforts or proliferation efforts in the context of our credibility in the world in terms of our stand for eliminating the weapons of mass destruction, because I believe that always begins at home. And I'd like for you to give us the status of that.
UNDER SECRETARY BOLTON: Well, the fundamental structure of the Non-Proliferation Treaty divides states parties to the treaty into two categories. There are five legitimate nuclear weapons states recognized by the treaty, and all other adherents to the treaty are non-nuclear weapons states by their own decision to accede to the treaty. So the fact is that from the outset all of the countries that participate in the nonproliferation regime understood that there were two separate categories of countries. With respect to --
REP. LEE: But categories of countries, those five countries, we're part of that, right, the five countries --
UNDER SECRETARY BOLTON: Yes, that's correct. We are --
REP. LEE: We can continue to develop nuclear weapons?
UNDER SECRETARY BOLTON: Right. What the Bush administration has done is negotiate and sign in May of 2002 a treaty, the Treaty of Moscow, with Russia, that puts us on a course over a 10-year period to reduce the number of our operationally deployed strategic nuclear warheads from approximately 6,000 to a range of between 1,700- to 2,200, so that over a 10-year period we will be reducing the number of operationally deployed strategic warheads by over two thirds. And I think that's both a reflection of both the circumstances we face in the world as a whole, and I think also a reflection of the commitment that the president has made on several occasions to reduce our stockpile of nuclear weapons to the lowest level possible consistent with our national security. And I think achieving a goal over a 10-year period of a two-thirds reduction gives us a very substantial credibility when we talk about proliferation with other countries.
REP. LEE: Then what do you -- tell me the status a little bit of the research that's going on now in terms of nuclear weapons development at some of our labs.
UNDER SECRETARY BOLTON: Well, I think there are two categories of issues there. The first, and I think the most important, is the work that we're doing in connection with the stockpile stewardship program, the efforts that we have undertaken and have been underway for quite some time to assure the safety and reliability of the existing nuclear deterrent. Although we are continuing the moratorium on testing, the question of the safety and the reliability of the deterrent are extremely important. And, because number one, if the safety of the deterrent were called into question, it would be of the gravest concern to all of us for the possible effect that we would have if that safety were not up to our standards. And likewise if reliability were called into question, the very efficacy of the deterrent itself would be undermined. And I think that consideration is being given to a wide variety of measures that would enhance the security and reliability of the deterrent, and I think that's appropriate.
I think there's also been testimony in support of the administration's request for appropriations for research into the design of smaller, different kinds of nuclear weapons that I think is entirely appropriate as part of a commitment to make sure that the deterrent maintains its value. That's not a question of proliferation, since as I said at the outset by definition we are a legitimate nuclear weapons state -- we're not proliferating to anybody.
REP. LEE: Well maybe I guess the concern I have is it seems like it would almost be an oxymoron, legitimate nuclear statement. I understand what you are saying. What are the other five countries -- the other legitimate nuclear states?
UNDER SECRETARY BOLTON: China, Russia, the United Kingdom and France.
REP. LEE: Okay, so outside of those countries none of the other countries have nuclear weapons or -- I mean not do not have nuclear weapons, but how do you see our nuclear nonproliferation policy then for those other countries?
UNDER SECRETARY BOLTON: Well, within the context of the nonproliferation regime there are a number of countries that have acceded to the treaty as non-nuclear weapons states that are quite obviously in violation of the treaty, Iran being a good example. There are other states that are nuclear powers that are not part of the treaty system at all. And the question I was exploring with Congresswoman McCollum a minute ago was -- didn't get very far on it -- was the issue of two states, India and Pakistan, which are quite clearly in possession of nuclear weapons, that have made it clear they don't intend to sign the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty and give up their nuclear weapons. That applies both to Pakistan and to India.
REP. LEE: So we have legitimate nuclear states, then we have non-legitimate nuclear states, and then we have non-nuclear states. I'm just trying to get an understanding of how we break it down.
UNDER SECRETARY BOLTON: Well, it seems to me within the context of those states parties to the nonproliferation regime, when countries have signed on as non-nuclear weapons states, and yet they are pursuing or have a nuclear weapons capability, they are in violation of the Non- Proliferation Treaty. There are other states that have a nuclear capability that are not part of the treaty. So in terms of their adherence or non-adherence to the NPT, they are not in violation of it because they are not parties to them.
REP. ROS-LEHTINEN: Thank you very much, Ms. Lee.
REP. LEE: Thank you, Madam Chair.
REP. ROS-LEHTINEN: Ms. Watson.
REP. WATSON: Mr. Secretary, thank you for being here today. As we discuss the Bush administration and nonproliferation, a new strategy emerges. I was quite concerned a couple of years ago when we heard the president say in a State of the Union speech that there was an axis of evil -- Iraq, Iran and North Korea. And I have heard since that time a go-it-alone attitude. So I am reading from page two of our materials that President Bush has a proposal, and there are certain phrases in his proposal that give me pause to question whether or not if these proposals became part of an agreement, and based on our prior action in Iraq would this country go it alone?
Now, let me read you the proposal language. There is one phrase that said shutting down facilities. My question is -- and you don't have to answer now -- who would shut down the facilities?
Now, he also proposed to pass a U.S.-sponsored UN Security Council resolution requiring all states to criminalize proliferation, enact strict export controls and secure all sensitive materials within their borders. Who would do this?
And there is another point. Make signature of the additional protocol a prerequisite for any nuclear import. Who would monitor and do that?
Based on past behavior, I have real question to pause that if the United States proposal is not joined do we become the overseer, the watchdog? Do we go it alone? Can you respond?
UNDER SECRETARY BOLTON: The first proposal that you mention was made by the president in connection with the expansion of the Proliferation Security Initiative to have broader inclusion of law enforcement methods and assets in the pursuit of the black market in weapons of mass destruction. The Proliferation Security Initiative from the outset, and in fact now embodied in the statement of interdiction principles agreed to by the PSI core group members last September, has said that all PSI activity will be consistent with national and international authority. So that tying in with the other suggestion that you mention, that the president made in his speech to the General Assembly last fall, for enhanced national criminalization of WMD- related activity, that would mean that we are seeking work by other nations to tighten up their criminal justice systems in ways consistent with ours and most of the other OECD countries to enhance their national law enforcement authorities in ways that would allow us to be more effective together in stopping WMD trafficking. It's not a question of trying to criminalize this on an international basis. The irony is that many states, for example, that are parties to the Chemical Weapons Convention, which prohibits the manufacture or use of chemical weapons, don't have national statutes that criminalize the activity in their own country.
REP. WATSON: Mr. Bolton, let me stop you right there.
I am reading from a speech that the president made, and I hope all of this is recorded, Madam Chair, I hope everything that says --
REP. ROS-LEHTINEN: Yes, of course. It is.
REP. WATSON: -- is said goes down on the record.
REP. ROS-Lehtinen: Thank you, Ms. Watson -- of course it does.
REP. WATSON: -- because what I am doing is reading from a proposal that the president made at the National Defense University on February 11th, 2004. President Bush announced new measures to counter the threats of weapons of mass destruction. I am reading from what the president proposed. And at the bottom of this, and this comes from our chair, it says at this point, there is still little information about the implementation of these proposals.
I am asking you, as a secretary from the State Department, what do these words mean? How, if such measures were confirmed, joined, agreed, who then would be responsible for shutting down facilities? We went into Iraq to shut down an administration. We invaded a sovereign nation. I heard you say a few minutes back "we don't have sovereignty in Pakistan." But we went in, in spite of what other nations did, we had a few with us -- the coalition of the willing. And so I question if this proposal was joined, who has the responsibility for enacting, implementing this proposal?
UNDER SECRETARY BOLTON: The states that are prepared to cooperate together to engage in the activity, that's what the Proliferation Security Initiative is all about. We envisage cooperative activity. In many response, if we had states that had taken the president's earlier suggestion to enhance the criminal authorities that they possess against the WMD-related activities, then they would be in a position to shut down laboratories, disrupt financial networks, and the other things the president had suggested. In the absence of those authorities --
REP. WATSON: Well, let me ask you a safeguard question --
UNDER SECRETARY BOLTON: -- on a national basis.
REP. WATSON: -- would we go it alone, if this proposal was joined, would we go it alone?
UNDER SECRETARY BOLTON: We have the authority within the United States right now to go it alone against manufacturers, traffickers, financiers that are engaged in the activity within our own country.
REP. ROS-LEHTINEN: Thank you, Ms. Watson. If you could just wrap it up in the next few seconds.
REP. WATSON: Okay. I am very fearful with this proposal that the United States would go it alone. And I would hope that in subsequent hearings we could get some actual feedback of what the intentions are, should this proposal be absolutely confirmed and affirmed and joined.
REP. ROS-LEHTINEN: Thank you, Ms. Watson. Mr. Schiff. So sorry. Mr. Rohrabacher -- sorry, Dana, I didn't look. Sorry.
REP. DANA ROHRABACHER (R-CA): Yes, thank you very much. I just was over at a meeting with our Italian friends in the Italian aerospace industry, as you know, it works with us very closely on many of our aerospace goals.
Mr. Bolton, could you please compare this administration's pursuit of anti-terrorism and non -- anti-proliferation in terms of these policies -- could you compare that to the Clinton administration? You know, sometimes I just think that people like to compare George Bush to something -- someone who is perfect. It's sort of like looking for the perfect spouse. And you're never going to find the perfect spouse, you've got to compare people to reality. Maybe you can just compare what you're doing as compared to all of the great accomplishments in this area of the last administration.
UNDER SECRETARY BOLTON: Well, I think one of the -- one of the things that has motivated us, particularly since September the 11th, is the obvious fact of, unfortunately, widespread non-compliance with existing treaty obligations, that many states that said that they were complying with the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty, for example, like Iran, like North Korea, had signed up for these obligations and in fact were violating them. And indeed, in some cases -- and I've elaborated in the testimony -- were actually benefitting from cooperation provided through the IAEA. We felt that where it's clear that either national law enforcement systems or the international treaty and export control regimes has been inadequate, that we needed to do more, that it was not simply enough to rely on a country signing up to agreements that they weren't prepared to comply with. That's one reason that the president has pressed so hard for the Proliferation Security Initiative. It's not intended to replace the nonproliferation treaties or the export control regimes, but it is intended to address the obvious fact that they're not completely successful.
REP. ROHRABACHER: Let me get a little more specific with you. For example, let's use an example, North Korea. It just seems to me that I was sitting in this room during the last administration -- I just seem to remember that their policy was providing basically a subsidy of hundreds of millions of dollars of taxpayer money that eventually went to North Korea, and then the North Koreans were in reality thumbing their nose at us and lying to us about it. And now I'm not sure about the dates, but wasn't it in this administration that we determined that the North Koreans were lying, and so comparing the two -- the last administration subsidized somebody -- North Korea, in their quest to build nuclear weapons, and this administration is calling them on the carpet?
UNDER SECRETARY BOLTON: We -- we concluded about a year and a half ago that the North Koreans were violating the agreed framework that was put in place in 1994, where they had committed to completely abandon the pursuit of nuclear weapons. And indeed, A.Q. Khan's recent confession I think shows fairly dramatically that even after -- after they had signed up to the agreed framework to stop the plutonium route to nuclear weapons, that the North Koreans at some point very soon thereafter began the pursuit of nuclear weapons through uranium technology.
REP. ROHRABACHER: So -- so in the last administration, the North Koreans moved forward dramatically, even with American subsidy, to develop their nuclear weapons. What about Libya during the last administration? Wasn't Libya deeply engaged in this during the last administration? And now, have they not done a reversal in this administration?
UNDER SECRETARY BOLTON: I think unclassified CIA reports going back to the year 2000 said that Libya began moving very actively in the nuclear and other field with the suspension of the UN sanctions on Pan Am 103.
REP. ROHRABACHER: All right. And what about in Pakistan? During the last administration, we now find that during the entire time of the last administration, Pakistan was deeply involved in developing its nuclear weapons, and although they administration did -- the last administration, you know, did actually take some steps, but then Pakistan then began -- became a proliferator rather than just a developer during the last administration. So, in Libya, in Korea, in Pakistan during the last administration -- and, I might add, if you look back I think you'll see the same is true for Iran -- in all of these situations, when comparing this administration to the perfect administration, it doesn't look too good, but when you compare it to the last administration, I think we get about an A-plus-plus.
UNDER SECRETARY BOLTON: Well, I think, with respect to North Korea, I think Secretary Powell put it absolutely right on target when discussing how you deal with North Korea and looking at the agreed framework he said, "We're not going to buy that horse again."
REP. ROHRABACHER: Thank you very much, Madam Chairman.
REP. ROS-LEHTINEN: Thank you, Mr. Rohrabacher. Mr. Schiff.
REP. ACKERMAN: Would -- would the gentleman yield?
REP. ROS-LEHTINEN: If -- I have been kind enough to let other members run over their time, including Mr. Rohrabacher, and if we could just this moving, Mr. Ackerman, in a minute I will recognize you. Mr. Schiff.
REP. ADAM SCHIFF (D-CA): Thank you, Madam Chair. You know, I wasn't really going to pursue this line, but as my colleague from California has raised it, I think we should follow through. First of all, to compare the last administration with the current administration, I recall in the early months of 19 -- of 2001 that the current administration was proposing to radically cut Nunn-Lugar. So, far from initiating a strong nonproliferation regime at the outset of this administration, in the months prior to 9/11, the administration's budget actually made massive cuts to Nunn-Lugar, which I think was a step -- a very significant step in the wrong direction. Subsequent to 9/11, those cuts were restored and then some, which I think has been positive. And since that point, often obstruction has come from the Congress, not the administration.
But since my colleague in particular raised the case of North Korea, I'd like to ask by what measure, by what barometer can we say that we are better off vis-a-vis North Korea today than we were three years ago? Because, it seems to me the experience of the last three years has been an increase in the rate of acceleration of North Korea's nuclear program, not a deceleration. And, while there were obvious flaws with the policy of the prior administration, whereas the North Koreans were cheating on the agreed framework, it certainly, I think, can be said that the current success of this administration's policy, if it can be argued it is no worse, it's certainly been no better in achieving its results.
So, I would like to ask at the outset by what measure are we better off vis-a-vis North Korea and its nuclear program than we were three years ago?
UNDER SECRETARY BOLTON: Well, first, perhaps I could address a -- an error in your statements about the programs in the former Soviet Union dealing with their weapons of mass destruction.
The administration began a review of those programs when it came into office, a comprehensive review of those programs that had never been undertaken before. And I think that that review was quite important. There were some modifications made that strengthened them, and I think that those modifications received broad support in Congress.
Subsequently, working together with Canada and with the other G-8 leaders, but at the initiative of President Bush, the G-8 created the Global Partnership for the Elimination of Weapons of Mass Destruction --
REP. SCHIFF: Mr. Bolton --
UNDER SECRETARY BOLTON: -- and Weapons-of-Mass-Destruction-Related Activities.
REP. SCHIFF: Mr. Bolton, if I could interject, my --
UNDER SECRETARY BOLTON: Doubled the funding for that.
REP. SCHIFF: My point, Mr. Bolton, was the administration cut its budget for Nunn-Lugar. Is that not correct? Did the administration propose a greater budget than the Clinton administration had in Nunn-Lugar in the first months of 2001?
UNDER SECRETARY BOLTON: The result of the overall review was essentially straight-line funding for all programs dealing with weapons of mass destruction in the former Soviet Union of slightly over $1 billion a year, which was the rate of funding that was being appropriated at the end of the last administration and the beginning of this one.
REP. ACKERMAN: Would the gentleman yield?
REP. SCHIFF: Mr. Ackerman, I'll be glad to yield if I have any time left, but I would like to make sure I have a chance to hear the answer to the question vis-Â -vis whether we're better off now on North Korea. And the final question I'd like to ask, in case the clock runs on me, is I agree the essential bargain of the NPT, in hindsight, is not a particularly attractive one.
One suggestion that's been made by Dr. El-Baradei is that we or other nations provide the raw nuclear material for reactors, and then we take the spent product back as a way of getting away from the bargain of atoms-for-peace that will enable you to develop the enrichment capability, et cetera, which can lead you very far along the path of developing a bomb. And I'd like your opinion, after you address North Korea, on Dr. El-Baradei's suggestion.
UNDER SECRETARY BOLTON: The situation that existed with respect to North Korea when the administration took office was that North Korea was violating the agreed framework, was actively engaged in a production scope procurement effort to acquire the capability to do uranium enrichment, to be used in nuclear weapons, and the United States and others were supplying resources to the North Korean regime that, in effect, were propping that regime up.
By exposing the North Korean deception in violation of its obligations under the agreed framework, I think that we contributed to the isolation of North Korea, contributed to a heightened awareness of the threat that North Korea's pursuit of nuclear weapons posed, and led directly to the effort that we're engaged in now through the six- party talks.
REP. SCHIFF: Mr. --
UNDER SECRETARY BOLTON: Everybody engaged in the six-party talks.
REP. SCHIFF: Mr. Bolton, do you think we're better off now that North Korea has reprocessed the spent fuel?
UNDER SECRETARY BOLTON: It's not at all clear, Congressman, when North Korea began reprocessing the plutonium. But the plutonium is only one side of the North Korean nuclear weapons effort. The uranium enrichment side, about which, unfortunately, we know not as much as we'd like, provides a completely separate route that simply continuing to keep the agreed framework in place, as many argued, would have permitted the North Koreans to continue to advance toward nuclear weapons through that route. And I think that would have been an extraordinarily dangerous situation if we were confronted with it once that had become a fact.
The other thing that we've done that's extremely significant is to take active steps to cut off the funding sources for North Korea without which its nuclear weapons program, and indeed much of the support for its elite, could not exist, through the Proliferation Security Initiative, to deny the North Koreans the hard currency that they get from the proliferation of ballistic missiles into the Middle East and elsewhere and their overall weapons program, to work with Japan and others to cut down their illegal activities in that country, and to work with a number of countries, including Australia, to cut off North Korea's illegal drug trade, to take active steps to deny the North Koreans access to financial resources that are critical to continuing their nuclear program.
REP. SCHIFF: And yet, Mr. Bolton, you would not prefer to have a North Korean nuclear program at its current stage of development over the North Korean nuclear program as its stage of development three years ago, would you?
UNDER SECRETARY BOLTON: Well, three years have gone by, three years during which, without the policies we've pursued, the North Koreans almost certainly would have been continuing their efforts in uranium enrichment. I think this is a real blind spot that some people have that, looking at the spent fuel rods at Yongbyon is not necessarily the center of the threat posed by North Korea. It was their clandestine production scope procurement efforts in the uranium enrichment field violating the agreed framework and calling into question fundamentally their willingness to agree to any resolution or initiative.
REP. ROS-LEHTINEN: You can wrap up your questions, Mr. Schiff.
REP. SCHIFF: Thank you, Madam Chair. I'll just wrap up this way.
Mr. Bolton, I don't deny that North Korea is a very tough problem. It is. And I'm not sure there's any perfect policy. But I don't think there's any question but we're at a worse stage now with North Korea than we were three years ago. And I think it indefensible to argue that we are better off now with North Korea's nuclear program where it is today than we were three years ago.
Now, it may have been that a different policy would have similarly failed. But this policy has borne very little fruit. And I think, unless we acknowledge that, we're not being candid about what's taking place in North Korea.
REP. ROS-LEHTINEN: Thank you, Mr. Schiff. And I know that all of you want to get into this discussion. I've been very generous in allowing all the members to go way over their time limit. And I will ask them to please submit their follow-up questions in writing to Mr. Bolton, who I know will be eager to respond.
And I will also pass on to the chairman and the ranking member the eager interest of our members to continue these discussions, both in an open and a closed format, and will make sure that I will tell both of them of our strong interest.
I also have a set of questions that, in the interest of time and to our next panelists, I will submit to you in writing, Mr. Bolton. And I would now like to thank you for your testimony.
REP. ACKERMAN: Madam Chair?
REP. ROS-LEHTINEN: I will recognize Mr. Ackerman to make a one- minute final statement, and we're all running over. Mr. Ackerman.
REP. ACKERMAN: Thank you. Let me thank the chair for her fairness, which she has always exhibited in the conduct of this meeting and meetings of our subcommittee in particular.
Let me just say, for the Democratic side, which has a great interest, as I know so many of our Republican colleagues do, in this issue, that some of us feel that the clock has been run on us, certainly not by the chair or the chair of the full committee, but the fact that Mr. Bolton has chosen, and possibly very appropriately so, to so fully answer all of the questions that we didn't have time to do the follow-up questions, and perhaps he didn't hear so many of the members who accepted the initial part of his answer and wanted to ask other questions. And as rarely happens, there are some members who have additional questions, as you know, who feel that their first questions were not fully answered.
REP. ROS-LEHTINEN: Correct.
REP. ACKERMAN: And we would appreciate it if we could have another session with Mr. Bolton.
REP. ROS-LEHTINEN: Right. And I will make sure that I follow up with that with our chair and our ranking member.
Thank you again, Mr. Bolton, for being here today.
UNDER SECRETARY BOLTON: Thank you, Madam Chairman.
Released on April 1, 2004