U.S. Department of State

The Need for WMD Threat Assessment in the Chemical Industry: Plant Site Level

Donald C. Clagett, Bureau of Verification, Compliance, and Implementation, Office of Chemical and Conventional Weapons
Remarks at Pugwash Conference
Zagreb, Croatia
November 14, 2008

The last quarter of the twentieth century saw an explosion of scientific and technological advances in all areas of endeavor. These advances have included the development of technology applicable to nuclear, biological and chemical weapons. Some of this technology is used in commercial industry and is, therefore, to some extent publicly available. Chemicals, along with nuclear and biological materials, have the potential to be used as Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD) in war and in terrorist scenarios. While nuclear materials are manufactured in a limited number of facilities, and biological materials are manufactured and used in relatively small quantities, chemical production, processing and consumption occur in tens of thousands of plant sites around the world each day. Further, chemicals are transferred in all manner of volumes and by various means of transportation. Some of these chemicals have the potential to be used directly as, or precursors for, chemical weapons (CW). Assessing the threat posed by chemicals is an important first step to precluding their misuse. This paper will address how the many thousands of individual plant sites might address the issue of having their chemicals potentially diverted for illicit purposes. The discussion will be limited to threat assessments of toxic chemicals produced, processed, consumed and transferred by plant sites. It will not include threats posed by chemicals with potential for fire or explosion or those threats posed by plant sites for toxic release that might be occasioned by terrorist action.

Plant level threat assessments should address a number of factors including the chemicals, their availability, quantities and likelihood of use as CW. There is no exact equation to take these factors into account, but all are relevant to threat assessment. On the surface, each of these factors seems rather simple, but in fact and as will become evident, identification of chemicals with potential for CW use is not necessarily obvious.

Chemicals

A basic listing of chemicals with a history of CW use or application is provided in the three schedules of chemicals in the Annex on Chemicals of the Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC). These include toxic chemicals that have been weaponized, usually referred to as traditional agents, and their precursors. Many of these chemicals, particularly those identified in Schedules 1and 2, do not have significant commercial use, although some do. Traditional agents and their precursors are known. Plant sites in the 184 countries that have ratified the CWC are required to declare to the Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW), through their National Authorities, activities involving these chemicals when these activities exceed specified amounts. States Parties to the CWC that have made declarations have likely declared the majority, if not all, of the activities with these chemicals worldwide.

However, adhering only to the provisions that apply to the chemicals on the CWC schedules of chemicals is not enough. The general purpose criterion, or more precisely Article I of the CWC, applies to any toxic chemicals and their precursors that are used for CW purposes. Since entry into force of this Convention, huge numbers of chemicals have been produced for test purposes using high throughput techniques including combinatorial chemistry and microreactor technology. The chemical and related pharmaceutical industry has screened hundreds of thousands of chemicals for biological activity and it is possible that non-traditional toxic chemicals and precursors exist whose threats should be considered. The CWC verification regime does not capture many of these chemicals and activities; it is therefore incumbent upon States Parties or relevant industries to address these threats through their respective mechanisms.

There are some commercial chemicals that also have potential CW applications (i.e., dual-use chemicals), particularly those toxic gases that are heavier than air. Chlorine, which is the major disinfectant in water treatment systems, actually was used in World War I as a CW agent and was reported to have been employed as a terror weapon in isolated incidents in Iraq. Other chemicals of potential concern include neuro-toxic insecticides and cyanide salts used for precious metal extraction.

Toxic and biologically active solids and low volatility chemicals and drugs, previously not considered CW agent candidates, can now be dispersed in air as a result of advances in dispersion and aerosol technology. Thus, they need to be considered as potential threats.

While the CWC’s schedules of chemicals provide a convenient list of chemicals having been used and the potential for CW use, the Article I provision of the CWC or what is usually identified as the “general purpose criterion” can apply to any toxic chemical. It requires anyone seeking to assess potential CW use to look at the chemical from a “what if” standpoint and to make a judgment call.

Availability

Chemical industry is in the business to yield profits for time and money invested. Obviously to do so it must sell its chemicals and conduct activities in a manner consistent with industry standards for legitimate business practices. In principle chemicals are available to the public. There are however constraints on some chemicals’ distribution. For example, the CWC prohibits the transfer from States Parties to non-States Parties of Schedule 1 and 2 chemicals and requires end-use certificates for transfers of Schedule 3 chemicals to these countries. In addition, many countries regulate sale and distribution of certain chemicals and implement export controls as a nonproliferation measure, either unilaterally or in concert with multilateral control regimes.

As noted before, there are chemicals beyond these traditional CW agents and precursors that might be used as CW or to produce CW. In practical terms, threats from trade in these chemicals are probably very low when sales are made to known consumers with legitimate end-uses. The threat would be greater when sales are made to businesses or individuals whose consumption track record is unknown.

Transport must also be considered. Short haul rail and truck deliveries within or between stable countries pose little threat. However, shipping in certain areas of the world can be subject to uncertainty. The recent acts of piracy in the waters off Africa and Southeast Asia bear testimony to this fact.

Disposition of chemical waste is also an important consideration. Some wastes contain by-products that can be processed for CW use. This could represent a potential threat which can be minimized by ascertaining that this waste is actually destroyed and not resold.

Quantities of Chemicals

The CWC specifies threshold quantities above which production, processing, consumption, import and export of specified toxic chemicals and their precursors must be declared and further thresholds of production, processing and consumption that may be verified by on-site inspection. These limits, which by industrial standards are rather low, indicate what the framers of the CWC viewed as militarily significant quantities. Again, for chemicals that do not fall under the purview of the CWC, other than through the general purpose criterion, there are no such indicative guidelines. The sale of several tons of chlorine to a municipal water treatment facility probably constitutes a low threat, but the sale of several tons of sodium cyanide to a small electroplating business that would ordinarily use kilogram quantities should raise a threat signal. Checking the end-users and end-uses for chemicals is a normal part of the export control process adopted by many countries.

Potential for Use

The likelihood of the use of chemicals for CW purposes is affected by the availability of chemicals and technical acumen of individuals or groups with nefarious intent and by the local and international political situations. Instability can raise the threat of misuse, as exemplified by a few small-scale attacks in Iraq during 2006-2007 involving chlorine cylinders, for the most part obtained locally from water disinfectant facilities. Production, processing, consumption and transfer of chemicals where there is local instability or transfer to other regions where there is instability must be considered in any threat assessment.

Additionally, there are a few countries that have not ratified the CWC and, hence, have not renounced the development, possession or use of CW. These countries may constitute a potential threat because non-participation in the CWC makes it difficult to determine whether or not these countries have CW and whether or not they may be providing chemicals for CW use to terrorists. Thus sales of chemicals deemed to have CW potential to these countries would increase the potential threat of misuse.

Threat Awareness

We have discussed the principal considerations that individual plant sites need to evaluate CW threats. We now need to address threat awareness.

Government regulation and reporting requirements contribute to plant site management awareness of the CW threat, in particular the threats in relation to traditional agents. Governments can play their part by enforcing plant site compliance with the CWC reporting requirements and meeting obligations in relation to United Nations Security Council Resolutions such as 1540. Also, some countries require export licenses for certain toxic chemicals, for example in the United States certain chemicals are controlled by the State Department and the Department of Commerce. There are chemicals on these lists beyond those on the schedules of chemicals in the CWC or those chemicals that might have CW potential. Regulation varies from country to country and sometimes from jurisdiction to jurisdiction so generalities about effectiveness of Governments in creating threat awareness can not be made. Suffice it to say that, the more Government attention, the more likely it will be that plant sites will comply with their obligations.

The ability and inclination of a plant site to achieve threat awareness is directly related to its business history. Long established companies with regulatory experience are most capable, but due to globalization these types of companies are becoming less prevalent in the chemical industry. Recently acquired or divested operations will have management upsets that will tend to decrease focus on ethical/regulatory matters including concerns about CW threat assessments. The chemical industry, previously located mainly in Western Europe, the United States and Japan, has in the last decade been moving into regions and countries that have not previously had to consider the CW potential of chemicals on their territory. Personnel in these situations will be on a learning curve for some time.

As noted before, the general purpose criterion applies the CWC prohibitions to any toxic chemical that is used for CW purposes. In a world experiencing rapid changes in technologies and business organization, the people most capable of being aware of potential CW threats and capable of making threat assessments are at the operational level. These will include personnel directly involved with the production, processing, consumption and transfer of chemicals. The first line will be the chemists and chemical engineers at the plant site. Regardless of changes in ownership it is they who have the technical knowledge to make assessments based on their knowledge of the chemistry and toxicology.

Finally industry trade organizations can also be a source of information, especially to new operations. Examples include CEFIC in Western Europe, the American Chemistry Council (ACC) in the USA and the Indian Chemical Manufacturers Association (ICMA). These organizations need to continually alert evolving plant site management of the necessity for CW threat assessment.

The need for plant sites to consider the CW threat of its products has been demonstrated in the recent past. The acquisition of unsecured chlorine cylinders in Iraq allowed terrorists to use them in attacks during 2006 and 2007, although the attacks were limited in nature. Clearly it behooves plant sites to make conscientious efforts to assess threats and to take effective follow-on actions to insure that the CW WMD threat is minimized.

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